View of Some Exceptions Made by a Romanist, Part 2 · Subpart 39 – Subpart 41
C. 18. Anſw. to C. 18.
Section 1 In your report of his Lordſhip's argument, Section 30. you leave out thoſe words [therefore there is one] and ſo make nonſence of that period, which in his Lordſhip's ſetting of it is excellent reaſon. But I can believe that this was but a ſlip, As for your anſwer to the parrallel caſes, wherein, ſaith his Lordſhip, Gods goodneſſe is equally concerned; doe you thinke you can ever ſatisfie any reaſonable man in ſaying, [that the firſt thing he ſpeaks of is onelyonly contrary to Gods goodneſſe in his Lordſhips underſtanding, not abſolutely; but of the ſecond, he ſpeaks, not as it is in his underſtanding, but as it is ſimply in it ſelfe] from whence you conclude, that he changes the tearmes] Certainly, Sir, in deſpight of your exception, argument is good, Thus;
Section 2 If it be ſufficient to conclude an infallible guide becauſe it agrees not with Gods goodneſſe to let men want one, then any man that conceives that Church to teach any thing which he conceives againſt Gods goodneſſe, by the ſame reaſon is not to receive her doctrine; The caſe is cleare, becauſe nothing concludes to any man any farther, then it is conceived by him; and that is not a proofe to me, which I doe not conceive to be ſo; which makes his Lordſhips arguing to be farre from fallacious; For the matter of this paragraph is not whether it be really true, that it agrees not with Gods goodneſſe to let men want an infallible guide, but (ſuppoſing it to be ſo) whether it will follow the Church is infallible, or whether he whoſe underſtanding is convinced and perſwaded of that truth, [that it is not agreeable to Gods goodneſſe to let us want ſuch a guide] be enforced to confeſſe it infallible.
Section 3 This alſo his Lordſhip diſputes not againſt (but will willingly acknowledge the conſequence, ſuppoſing that the Antecedent were true) onelyonly by the ſame argument proves another thing, that he that conceives the Church to teach any doctrine contrary to Gods goodneſſe, or that, which is ſuch to his underſtanding, or he that ſuppoſes the Church to teach ſo, muſt not believe that Churches doctrine. So that if you marke, the ſuppoſition is equall on both ſides, not taken for true one ſide, and onelyonly pretended on tother, but one taken to be true by you, (that, not to provide an Infallible guide is contrary to Gods goodneſſe) and tother taken to be true by his Lordſhip (that Gods damning thoſe that erre without either negligence or prejudication, is contrary to his goodneſſe alſo) and if the Argument be of force on one ſide, it muſt be ſo alſo on tother, and for you to ſay that what you ſuppoſe, is true, but what his Lordſhip ſuppoſes, is not ſo, is a terrible petitio principii againe, and no ground of a confutation againſt his Lordſhip; The ridiculous arguments that you put in his Lordſhips paper, without his privity, will be matter of reproach to you, (who if you underſtood (as I ſuppoſe you did) were willing to deprave his diſcourſes) and not unto his Lordſhip.
Section 4 As for your way of ſatisfying his Lordſhips underſtanding, that what the Church teaches is not contrary to the goodneſſe of God, [becauſe the Church knowes what is ſo, better than he] 'twill ſure prevaile little with any, that is a diſputing whether the Church is infallible or no, (as you ſee his Lordſhip now is) for if ſhe be fallible, ſhe may miſtake in that judgment, and that ſhe doth not miſtake, there will be no aſſurance from her ſaying it, as long as the controverſy depends about her Infallibility, which to affirme not to depend, or to be no controverſy, is petitio principii againe.
Section 5 As for your Concluſion of this diſpute, wherein you ſet the compariſon betwixt two Arguments, and ſay yours is much the better; I ſhall not need debate that with you, becauſe they are not the two Arguments betwixt which his Lordſhip makes the compariſon. The firſt I confeſſe you have rightly ſet downe, [This Guide to my underſtanding teaches things contrary to Gods goodneſſe, therefore it is not the Guide] and this will be as good an argument, as this other, ['Tis to my underſtanding contrary to the goodneſſe of God, that the Roman Church ſhould not be an infallible Guide, or that there ſhould be no infallible Guide, where there is none but the Roman Church, therefore the Roman Church is ſo] In this compariſon the conſequences are equally true, and built upon the ſame ground, that that which is againſt Gods goodneſſe cannot be; and the Antecedents equally affirmed according to ſeverall underſtandings, and then whether the other Argument which you bring, be comparable to either, it matters not.
Section 6 But when at laſt you give us a note, that the argument from God's goodneſſe doth not conclude that your Church is infallible, but onelyonly that it may be ſo; I confeſſe you make me repent of all this unprofitable attendance I have paid you, in following your argument thus farre, when your ſelfe have given me directions to a ſhorter cut of anſwering, viz: by granting that it may be infallible, that is, that nothing in nature reſiſts, but that, if God's pleaſure were ſo, it might be infallible, but ſay we, we have no evidence from God that it is his pleaſure it ſhould, and therefore we conclude it may be deceived, or may be fallible; betwixt which two, though there may be ſome difference, (as there is betwixt falli and fallibilem eſſe) yet unleſſe ſome evidence can be brought againſt one, which cannot againſt the other, they will be both equally true, as farre as reſpects our knowledge or debate of them.
Section 7 And when you adde, that 'tis from other reaſons that you conclude ſhe is infallible, and not from this of Gods goodneſſe, I anſwer, that 'tis cleare that his Lordſhip was now diſputing onelyonly againſt that reaſon taken from Gods goodneſſe, which it ſeemes you confeſſe was no reaſon; and for your other reaſons, they are either confuted in other paragraphs of his Lordſhips Treatiſe, or when you produce them, ſhall be.
To the 31. Sect. Chap. 19.
This Section is ſpent in the enquiring whether a man ſhall be damned for making a diligent and impartiall enquiry after the true religion, of which he finds the infallibility of the Church to be a part, ſuppoſing that his reaſon, when all is done, will not aſſent. This is his Quaere, and the ſame may be made concerning any other verity, or point of doctrine; as namely, of the holy Scripture, whether or no it be the word of God; and what ſhall become of that man whoſe reaſon, after an impartiall ſearch made, will not aſſent; or againe, about the truth of Chriſtian Religion, unto which, after ſuch a ſearch made, his reaſon will not condeſcend.
I anſwer first, that it is a mockery to aske whether or no any Man ſhall be damned for making a good enquiry without ſucceſſe; and in effect it is the ſame as to enquire whether a Man ſhall be damned for doing a deed that's commendable and good. For this Queſtion ſuppoſes that either the Enquirer, or we were very ſimple Creatures, and did not underſtand our ſelves, or elſe that the Gentleman-demander was not in earneſt, but propounded it only for his recreation, though at a time ill choſen and unſeaſonable, and alſo in a matter about which there ought to be no jeaſting.
I anſwer ſecondly, that in a place where inſtruction and information may be had, the caſe he puts is morally impoſſible to happen out; for we deny that where the ſearch is diligent, impartiall, and without prejudice, and where againe information ſufficient is to be had, that there the reaſon ſhall not be able to aſſent, and that whereſoever it cannot, that ſame happens, either through weakneſſe, or inhability of judgment and capacity, or elſe by reaſon of ſome diſordinate paſſion of the will, by which the underſtanding is miſled and darkened, as in thoſe, who are refractary, it for the moſt part falls out. Which paſſion and prejudices ariſe, ſometimes from cuſtome and education, ſometimes from vitious inclinations, ſometimes from a crookedneſſe and perverſity of nature, which doth refuſe inſtruction. Wherefore as it is no ſufficient excuſe for an Infidel to ſay, I have ſearched diligently whether or no Christ be the true Meſſias, or whether the Scripture be the word of God or no, and after all endeavours uſed, my reaſon will not aſſent; ſo in like manner it is as little ſufficient to alleage, that after enquiry made about the true Church and her Infallibility, your reaſon would not aſſent, for in theſe caſes, we cannot grant any ignorance invincible; or free that errour which poſſeſſes them from guilt. Now what ſhall become of others who want inſtruction ſufficient, and have no crookedneſſe or backwardneſſe in their will, and die in ignorance, is another point, and different from this of ours, and is to be reſolved in the Queſtion about the efficacy of Implicite faith, to which I referre my Reader.
Chap. 19. Anſw. to Ch. 19.
Section 1 In this Paragraph his Lordſhip askes a Queſtion, Whether, ſuppoſing [that he that never heard of the Church of Rome, ſhall not be damned for not believing it infallible] it can be thought, that he that hath made diligent ſearch, and uſed honeſtly all meanes afforded him, and yet doth not believe the Church infallible, ſhall be damned for that not-believing (this is the Queſtion, and to weigh it downe on one ſide [that that latter ſhall not be damning when tother is not] this reaſon is put in that in this matter all that that Man hath done in the ſecond caſe more than in the former, is onelyonly the having diligently enquired, which is preſumed to be no damning ſinne.
Section 2 In ſtead of the Queſtion thus put, you ſet another ſomewhat diſtant, but I will ſuppoſe tending to the ſame effect, whether a Man ſhall be damned for making a good enquiry without ſucceſſe; which you ſay is a mockery, and ſo, as I conceive, ridiculous to affirme it; and ſo, Sir, after all your deſcanting on his Lordſhip for asking this queſtion, it is apparent by our explication of it, that upon the denying of that which you ſay, 'tis ridiculous not to deny, it inevitably followes, that that Man ſhal not be damned for denying the infallibility of your Church.
Section 3 And though you take paines to perſwade that this caſe is morally impoſſible, yet you muſt give us leave from your ſtating of the caſe, wherein you ſay it is ſo, (viz: when information ſufficient is to be had) to conclude your proofe a petitio principii againe; for when wee deny your Church to be infallible, and moreover affirme, that if it be, it cannot be infallibly knowne to be ſo, how can you thinke that we ſhall ever yeild (without any offer of proofe) that there is ſufficient instruction to be had for any man in this point? beſides, for you to ſay that every Mans not acknowledging this, proceeds either from Weakneſſe or Paſſion, what is that but uncharitableneſſe firſt, and then ſhortneſſe of diſcourſe, (when the caſe was on ſuppoſition that there was no fault of which his ſearch was guilty) and Petitio principii againe?