A Reply to the Catholic Gentlemans Answer, Chapter 2

A Reply to the Catholic Gentlemans Answer · Chapter 2

p. 7CHAP. II. Concerning Hereſie, Excommunication, Infallibility.

Sect. I.

Of paſſing ſlightly over the difference betwixt Hereſie and Schiſme.

Nū. 1 THe exceptions to the ſecond Chapter are three; the firſt concerning Hereſie, the ſecond concerning Excommunication, the third concerning Maſter Knots conceſſion, which uſhers in a Diſcourſe of Infallibility.

Num. 2 The former in theſe words, He ſlightly paſſeth over the diſtinction of Hereſie and Schiſm, as if he would not have it underſtood, that all Hereſie is Schiſme, though ſome Schiſme be no Hereſie.

Num. 3 What is here called the ſlight paſſing over the diſtinction of Hereſie and Schiſme, is one piece of injuſtice in him, and the cauſe to which it is affixt, my unwillingneſſe that it ſhould be underſtood that all Hereſie is Schiſme, will ſoon appear to be another.

Num. 4 For the firſt, It is evident that in that Sect. 3. of Chap. 2. I do not at all conſider the diſtinction of Hereſie, and Schiſme, nor could, without abſolute interruption and diſturbance of the diſcourſe in hand, & direct tranſgreſſion of all rules of method, ſay any thing to that ſubject, in that place. The thing that I there manifeſt is the difference betwixt Excommunication and Schiſme (and ſure that is not Hereſie and Schiſme, unleſſe Excommunication be Hereſie, and ſo the puniſhment of the Sin be the Sin it ſelfe) between the paſſive and the active, or reciprocal diviſion or ſeparation, and all that I ſay in p. 8that Section, which can relate to Hereſie, is, that where the offence, for which a man is excommunicated, is Hereſie and not Schiſme, there it is evident, that his Excommunication, which ſtill is his puniſhment and not his ſinne (the cauſe of it alſo being not Schiſme, but ſomewhat elſe, Hereſie, or the like) cannot be the guilt of Schiſme in him that is ſo puniſhed.

Num. 5 Now it is evident, that I cannot be ſaid to paſſe over that ſlightly, which I doe not ſpeak to at all, and to which I had no occaſion to ſpeake, and conſequently that I was no way lyable to this exception.

Num. 6 And that being ſaid, the ſecond part of the ſame exception, that of the ground on which I doe this, muſt needs be as cauſleſſe as the former. For 1. 'tis certaine, that my thoughts, or wiſhes, or deſignes, are not things which can duely fall under this objecters cognizance (he cannot upon any ſure grounds, divine or affirme, what I aimed at in ſuch or ſuch a ſlight paſſage) and 2. 'tis yet more certaine, that no collection can juſtly be made from my doing that ſlightly, which I did not meddle with at all. But then 3. to remove all ſcruple or poſſible occaſion of jealouſie in this matter, 'tis the deſigne of Chapter 8. (the method then leading to it) under a ſecond ſort of Schiſme, to conſider the departure from the Vnity of the Faith, which being but a periphraſis of Hereſie, is conſequently the defining all Hereſie is Schiſme, and ſo the profeſt avowing of that, which he ſuſpected me unwilling to have underſtood. And ſo ſtill there is not the leaſt appearance of juſtice in this ſuggeſtion.

Sect. II.

Excommunication how it differs from Schiſme. Wilfull continuance under cenſures is Schiſme. The Biſhop of Rome is not our Lawfull Governour. The ſevere conditions of their Communion.

Num. 1 HIs ſecond exception is perfectly of the ſame making with the former, thus,

p. 9Num. 2 Againe, ſaith he, treating of Excommunication, he eaſily ſlideth over this part, that wilfull continuance in a juſt Excommunication maketh Schiſme.

Num. 3 Here againe 'tis evident, that I treat not of Excommunication, nor have any occaſion fitly to treat of it, farther than to ſhew, that Schiſme, being a voluntary ſeparation, the word in no propriety pertaines to that act of the Governour of the Church, whereby he ſeparates or cuts off any by way of Cenſures. Certainly he that is put to death by Sentence of Law, cannot be judged a Felo de ſe, one that hath voluntarily put himſelfe out of the number of the living, or be liable to thoſe forfeitures which by the Law belong to ſuch. He that is baniſhed out of the Kingdome cannot be guilty of the breach of that Statute, which forbids all Subjects going out of it, nor be puniſht juſtly for that which is his ſuffering, not his deed; his puniſhment, not his delinquency.

Num. 4 As for his wilfull continuance under juſt Cenſures, the wilfulneſſe of that, certainly makes him culpable, and the continuance in Excommunication, being alſo continuance in ſeparation from the Church, which is Schiſme, whenſoever it is voluntary, I make no doubt of the conſequence, that ſuch wilfull continuance in Excommunication, be it juſt or unjuſt, is actuall Schiſm, ſuppoſing (as the word wilfull muſt ſuppoſe) that this continuance is wholly imputable to the will of the Excommunicate, i. e. that if he will ſubmit to that which is lawfull for him to ſubmit to, he may be abſolved and freed from it.

Num. 5 If this were it, that he would have had more explicitely affirmed, then I anſwer, that as there I had no occaſion to ſpeak to it, ſo now upon his ſlighteſt demand I make no ſcruple to give him my full ſenſe of it, that he, which being caſt into priſon for juſt cauſe, may upon his Petition, and promiſe of Reformation be releaſed, or if the cauſe were unjuſt, may yet without doing any thing any way unlawfull, regaine his Liberty, from thenceforth becomes not the Magiſtrates, but his owne Priſoner, and is guilty of all the damage, be it diſeaſe, famiſhing, death it ſelfe, which is conſequent to his impriſonment. And the analogie holds directly in Excommunication; p. 13He that continues under the Cenſures of his Eccleſiaſtical Ruler, when he might fairely obtaine abſolution from them, is by himſelfe ſentenced to the continuance of this puniſhment, as by the Governor of the Church, to the beginning of it. But then all this while this is not the condition of our Church, in reſpect of the Church of Rome, they being not our Lawful Superiors, indued with jurisdiction over us, and for other communion, ſuch as alone can be maintained or broken among fellow-brethren, or Chriſtians, it is carefully maintained by us, as farre as it is lawfully maintainable.

Num. 6 And both theſe being there evidenced in that, and the inſuing Chapters, I did not warily or purpoſely abſtaine from (becauſe I had nothing that ſuggeſted to me any opportunity of) ſaying any thing more to this purpoſe. The ſevere conditions which are by the Romaniſts required of us to render us capable of their communion, ſubſcription of error, or profeſſion againſt Conſcience, make it impertinent to propoſe or diſcuſſe either of theſe two queſtions, 1. Whether we lye under a juſt excommunication, 2. Whether, if we did, we would wilfully continue under it, or conſequently, whether we be now guilty of Schiſme in this notion?

Sect. III.

Mr. Knots conceſſion and concluſion. The power of a fallible Church to require beliefe. Of Antiquity, Poſſeſſion, Perſwaſion of Infallibility, Motives for Vnion. Vncertainty of the Proteſtants reaſons. The grand Hereſie and Schiſme of not believing Rome infallible. Beliefe ſufficient without infallibility. Fictions of Caſes.

Num. 1 THe third exception inlargeth to ſome length, in theſe words,

Num. 2 What he calls Maſter Knots conceſſion, I take to be the publike profeſſion of the Roman or Catholike Church, and that nature it ſelfe teacheth all rationall men, that any Congregation that can lye, and knoweth not whether it doth lye or no, in any p. 11propoſition, cannot have power to binde any particular to believe what ſhee ſaith, neither can any man of underſtanding have an obligation to believe what ſhee teacheth, farther than agrees with the rules of his own reaſon: Out of which it followeth, that the Roman Churches binding of men to a profeſſion of Faith (which the Proteſtants and other haereticall multitudes have likewiſe uſurped) if ſhee be infallible, is evidently gentle, charitable, right, and neceſſary, as contrariwiſe in any other Church or Congregation, which pretends not to infallibility, the ſame is unjuſt, tyrannical and a ſelfe-condemnation to the binders: ſo that the ſtate of the queſtion will be this, whether the Catholick or Roman Church be infallible or no, for ſhee pretendeth not to binde any man to tenets or beliefs upon any other ground or title▪ By this you may perceive much of his diſcourſe—to be not onelyonly ſuperfluous and unneceſſary, but alſo contrary to himſelfe, for he laboureth to perſwade that the Proteſtant may be certaine of ſome truth, againſt which the Roman Catholick Church bindeth to profeſſion of error, which is as much as to ſay, as he who pretendeth to have no infallible rule by which to governe his Doctrine, ſhall be ſuppoſed to be infallible, and he that pretendeth to have an infallible rule, ſhall be ſuppoſed to be fallible; at moſt becauſe fallible objections are brought againſt him: now then conſider what a meek and humble Son of the Church ought to doe, when of the one ſide is the Authority of Antiquity and Poſſeſſion (ſuch Antiquity and Poſſeſſion without diſpute or contradictions from the adverſary, as no King can ſhew for his Crowne, and much leſſe any other perſon or perſons for any other thing) the perſwaſion of infallibility, all the pledges that Chriſt hath left to his Church for Motives of Vnion: on the other ſide, uncertaine reaſons of a few men pretending to learning, every day contradicted by incomparable numbers of men Wiſe and Learned, and thoſe few men confeſſing thoſe reaſon and themſelves uncertaine, fallible, and ſubject to error, certainly without a bias of intereſt or prejudice, it is impoſſible for him to leave the Church if he be in it, or not returne if he be out of it: for if infallibility be the ground of the Churches power to command beliefe, as ſhee pretends no other, no time, no ſeparation within memory of Hiſtory, can juſtifie a continuance out of the p. 12Church: You may pleaſe to conſider then how ſolid this Doctors diſcourſe is, who telleth us, for his great evidence, that we, (ſaith he) who doe not acknowledge the Church of Rome to be infallible, may be allowed to make certaine ſuppoſitions (that follow there) The queſtion is, whether a Proteſtant be a Schiſmatick becauſe a Proteſtant? and he will prove he is not a Schiſmatick, becauſe he goeth conſequently to Proteſtant, that is Schiſmatical grounds: I pray you reflect, that not to acknowledge the Church to be infallible is that for which we charge the Doctor with Schiſme and Hereſie in Capite, and more than for all the reſt he holds diſtinct from us, for this principle taketh away all beliefe, and all ground of beliefe, and turneth it into uncertainty and weather-cock opinion, putteth us into the condition to be circumferri omni vento Doctrinae, ſubmitteth us to Atheiſme and all ſort of miſcreancy, let him not then over-leap the queſtion, but either prove this is not ſufficient to make him a Schiſmatick and an Heretick too, or let him acknowledge he is both.

Num. 3 This diſcourſe thus inlarged to the conſideration of fallibility and infallibility in a Church, is certainly a digreſſion in this place, and taking the occaſion from ſome words of mine, Sect. 6. of a conceſſion of Maſter Knots, it is a little neceſſary to recount, what conceſſion that was, and the uſe that I there made of it, that ſo it may appeare, whether there were any thing blameable in my procedure.

Num. 4 The ſubject I was upon, Sect. 5. was the undoubted lawfulneſſe of being and continuing excluded from any ſuch Church, the conditions of whoſe communion containe Sin in them. To this head of diſcourſe I mentioned a conceſſion of Maſter Knots, that it is perfectly unlawful to diſſemble, aequivocate, or lye in matters of Faith, and this as a confirmation of my then preſent aſſertion, that when I am not permitted by the Romaniſts to have external communion with them, unleſſe I doe thus diſſemble, equivocate and lye, affirme my ſelfe to believe what I doe not believe, I may lawfully continue thus excluded from their communion. But then I could not juſtly conceale what Maſter Knot there added as his concluſion from hence (together with the acknowledged unlawfulneſſe of forſaking the externall communion of Gods viſible Church) that p. 13therefore the Church of Rome is infallible, becauſe otherwiſe men might forſake her communion.

Num. 5 Here indeed I thought it very ſtrange, that this concluſion ſhould be thus deduced from ſuch praemiſſes, that it ſhould be deemed lawful to ſeparate from a Church for every error, or for no more but being ſubject to error, being fallible, though it were actually guilty of no errour, which I conceived to be the ſame in effect, as to affirme it lawfull, to forſake the communion of all but Saints, and Angels, and God in Heaven, becauſe all others were peccable and fallible. But yet I thought not fit to goe farther out of my way to preſſe the unreaſonableneſſe of it, but contented my ſelfe with that, which was for my preſent turne, his confeſſion that it was lawful to ſeparate or continue in ſeparation from the Church of Chriſt, in caſe we could not without lying, &c. be permitted to communicate with it.

Num. 6 This being the whole buſineſſe, as it lyes viſible to any in that 5. and 6. Sect. Let us now ſee what a confuſion is made to gaine ſome ſmall advantage from hence, or excuſe for a long digreſſion.

Num. 7 Firſt it is the concluſion, viz. [that any Congregation that can lye, &c. cannot have power to binde any to believe what ſhee ſaith] which he ſaith is called by me Maſter Knots conceſſion. But this is a great miſtake, I never lookt on this as his conceſſion, never called it by that title, but as a concluſion that he made a ſtrange ſhift to deduce from another conceſſion.

Num. 8 A conceſſion, this Gentleman ſhould in reaſon have underſtood to be ſomewhat which the Adverſary yeilds, and which the diſputer gaines advantage by his yeilding it, ſuch was his aſſertion, that all lying and diſſembling was unlawful, and that rather than that ſhould be admitted, it were lawful to forſake the external communion of the Church of Chriſt. And that, and nothing but that, was by me cited as his conceſſion.

Num. 9 Secondly, That concluſion it ſelf, that the Congregation that is fallible cannot have power to binde to believe,—is not ſo much as conſidered by me in that place or elſe where; I ſaid not one p. 14word againſt it, which might provoke this objector to take it up, and confirme it, neither was it in the leaſt needfull, or pertinent to the matter then in hand, to enter into the conſideration of it. All that was by me taken notice of (and that but in paſſing) was the conſequence or coherence betwixt the praemiſſes and that concluſion, which naturally inferred a third thing, that it was in Mr. Knots opinion, lawful to forſake the Communion of any fallible Church, which I thought by the way, would be ſure to excuſe us (though we ſhould be granted to have forſaken and continued wilfully in Separation from the Roman Church) if it might but appeare, that either that were guilty of any one error, or lyable to fal into any one. And this being intirely all that was there ſaid by me, there is no reaſon I ſhould ſo far attend this Gentleman in his digreſſion, as to conſider what here he proceeds to ſay, upon his new-ſprung ſubject of diſcourſe, very diſtant from that of Schiſme, to which I indeavoured to adhere, having elſewhere purſued at large, the Romaniſts other hypotheſis concerning their Churches Infallibility.

Num. 10 Were it not thus remote from our matter in hand, and perfectly unneceſſary to the defence of our Church from Schiſme, I might diſcover farther many infirme parts in this procedure. I ſhall but briefly touch on ſome of them.

Num. 11 1. For the truth of that propoſition [that a Congregation that can lye, i. e. a Church that is fallible, and knoweth not (i. e. hath no infallible certainty) whether it lye or no in any propoſition, cannot have power to binde any to believe what ſheſaith] I may certainly affirme, 1. That this is no infallible truth, being no where affirmed by any infallible ſpeaker, or deduced from any infallible principle. For as to the Scripture, it is not pretended to be affirmed by that, and for Natural Reaſon, that cannot be an infallible Judge in this matter of defining what power may be, or is by God given to a Church, without defining it infallible. A Prince may no doubt be impowered by God to give Lawes, and thoſe Lawes oblige Subjects to obedience, and yet that Prince never be imagined infallible in making Lawes. And natural reaſon cannot conclude it impoſſible, p. 15that a Church ſhould have a proportionable power given it by God to binde belief, &c.

Num. 12 As for the Catholick or Roman Church, 1. that is a mispriſion, the Catholick is not the ſingle Roman Church, nor the Roman the Catholick. 2. There no where appears any ſuch definition, either of the Catholick, i. e. Vniverſall Church of God, or particularly of the Roman Church, no act of Councell repreſentative of that Church, no known affirmation of that diffuſed body under the Biſhop of Rome's Paſtorage, that all authority to oblige belief is founded in Infallibility. 3. If any ſuch definition did appear, it could no way be foundation of belief to us, who doe not believe that Church, or any definition thereof, as ſuch, to be infallible.

Num. 13 2. If we ſhall but diſtinguiſh and limit the termes, 1. what is meant by [can lie] 2. By knowing or not knowing whether it lie or no, 3. By power to binde, 4 By belief (as every of theſe have a latitude of ſignification, and may be eaſily miſtaken, till they are duly limited) It will then ſoon appear that there is no unlimited truth in that which he ſaith is the whole Churches affirmation, nor prejudice to our pretenſions from that limited truth, which ſhall be found in it.

Num. 14 1. The phraſe [can lie] may denote no more than ſuch a poſſibility of erring, as yet is joyned neither with actuall error, nor with any principle, whether of deficiency on one ſide, nor of malignity on the other, which ſhall be ſure to betray it into error. Thus that particular Church, that is at the preſent in the right, in all matters of faith, and hath before it the Scripture to guide it in all its deciſions, together with the traditions and doctrines of the antient and Primitive Church, and having skill in all thoſe knowledges, which are uſefull to fetch out the true meaning of Scripture, and ability to inquire into the antient path, and to compare her ſelf with all other conſiderable parts of the Vniverſall Church, and then is diligent and faithfull to make uſe of all theſe ſuccours, and in uprightneſs of heart ſeeks the truth, and applies it ſelf to God in humble, and ardent, and continuall prayer for his guidance to lead into all truth, This Church, I ſay, is yet fallible, may affirm and teach falſe, i. e. this is naturally poſſible that it may, but p. 16it is not ſtrongly probable that it will, as long as it is thus aſſiſted, and dispoſed to make uſe of theſe aſſiſtances, and means of true defining.

Num. 15 2. That Churches knowledge, whether it define truly or no in any propoſition, may ſignifie no more than a full perſwaſion or belief (cui non ſubeſt dubium, wherein they neither doubt nor apprehend reaſon of doubting) that what they define is the very truth, though for knowledge properly ſo called, or aſſurance, cui non poteſt ſubeſſe falſum, which is unerrable or infallible in ſtrictneſs of ſpeech, it may not have attained, or pretend to have attained to it.

Num. 16 3. By power to binde may be meant no more than authority derived to them from the Apoſtles of Chriſt to make deciſions, when difficulties ariſe, to preſcribe rules for ceremonies or government, ſuch as ſhall oblige inferiors to due obſervance and obedience, by force of the Apoſtles foreign, his precept to obey the rulers ſet over us in the Church, which we may doe without thinking them ſimply, or by any promiſe of God, inerrable or infallible, as the obedience which is due to civil Magiſtrates, which ſuppoſes in them a power of binding ſubjects to obey, doth yet no way ſuppoſe or imply them uncapable of erring and ſinning, and giving unreaſonable commands, and ſuch as wherein it is unlawfull to yeild obedience to them.

Num. 17 Beſide this, there may farther be meant by it a generall obligation that lies on all men, to believe what is with due grounds of conviction propoſed to them, ſuch as the disbelieving or doubting of it ſhall be in them inſeparable from obſtinacy; and this obligation is again the greater, when that which is thus convincingly propoſed, is propoſed by our ſuperiors, from whoſe mouth it is regular to ſeek and receive Gods will.

Num. 18 Laſtly, Believing may ſignifie not an implicite, irrational, blinde, but a well-grounded, rationall, explicite belief of that which, as the truth of God, is duely propoſed to us; or again, where there is not that degree of manifeſtation, yet a conſent to that which is propoſed as moſt probable, on the grounds afforded to judge by, or when the perſon is not competent to p. 17ſearch grounds, a bare yeilding to the judgment of ſuperiours, and deeming it better to adhere to them, than to attribute any thing to their own judgment, a believing ſo farre as not to disbelieve. And this again may rationally be yeilded to a Church, or the Rulers and Governors of it, without deeming them inerrable or infallible.

Num. 19 Nay, where the propoſition defined is ſuch, that every member of that Church cannot without violence to his underſtanding yeild any ſuch degree of belief unto it, yet he that believes it not, may behave himſelf peaceably and reverently, either duely repreſenting his grounds, why he cannot conſent to it, or if his ſubſcription or conſent be neither formally nor interpretatively required of him, quietly enjoy his contrary opinion. And this may tend as much to the peace and unity of a Church, as the perſwaſion of the inerrability thereof can be ſuppoſed to doe.

Num. 20 By this view of the latitude of theſe terms, and the limitations they are capable of, it is now not ſo difficult to diſcern, in what ſenſe the propoſition under conſideration is falſe, and in what ſenſe it is true, and by us acknowledged to be ſo.

Num. 21 A congregation that is fallible, and hath no knowledge or aſſurance (cui non poteſt ſubeſſe falſum) that it is not deceived in any particular propoſition, may yet have authority to make deciſions, &c. and to require inferiors ſo farre to acquieſce to their determinations, as not to diſquiet the peace of that Church with their contrary opinions.

Num. 22 But for any abſolute infallible belief or conſent, that no Church, which is not it ſelf abſolutely infallible, and which doth not infallibly know that it is infallible, hath power to require of any.

Num. 23 By this it appears in the next place, in what ſenſe it is true, which in the following words is ſuggeſted of Proteſtants, that they binde men to a Profeſſion of Faith, and how injuſtly it is added, that, ſuppoſing them not to be infallibe, it is unjuſt, tyrannical, and ſelf-condemnation to the binders. The contrary whereto is moſt evident, underſtanding the obligation with that temper, and the infallibity in that notion, wherein it is evident we underſtand it. For what injuſtice or tyranny &c. p. 18can it be in any lawful ſuperior, having defined what verily he believes to be the truth of God, and no way doubts of his having deduced it rightly from the Scripture, but yet knows that he, as a man, is fallible, and that it is poſſible he may have ſome way failed in this, as in any other his moſt circumſpect action, what injuſtice, I ſay, can it be, authoritatively to direct this definition to thoſe, who are committed to his charge, and expect their due ſubmiſſion to it? meaning by ſubmiſſion, what I have here expreſt to mean by it.

Num. 24 So again it appears of the Roman Church, how far it is from gentle or charitable in them to bind men to profeſs, as matter of faith, whatſoever is by that Church defined, upon this one account, that the Church is infallible & can't erre; when this very thing, that it is infallible, is not at all made probable, much leſſe infallibly deduced from any reaſon or teſtimony that is infallible.

Num. 25 Next then, when he ſaith, that the ſtate of the queſtion will be this, whether the Roman Church be infallible or no, I am not ſure I know what queſtion he means, whether the main Queſtion on which the Tract of Schiſme was written, i. e. whether the Church of England be ſchiſmaticall or no, or whether the particular queſtion, which this Gentlemans haſte hath framed to himſelf in this place, Whether a fallible Church may have power to binde any to believe what ſhe ſaith? But I ſuppoſe by ſome indications, that the latter is it, and then, as from hence I learn what he means by infallible, a Church that cannot poſſibly erre, all whoſe definitions are ſuch, quibus nequit ſubeſſe falſum, ſo untill this be proved of that Church, I muſt be allowed to ſpeak like one who think not my ſelf obliged to the belief of it, and being ſure of this, that a Proteſtant is or may be verily perſwaded of ſome truth, againſt which the Roman Church bindeth to profeſſion of error (meaning by verily perſwaded, ſuch a certainty only, cui non ſubeſt dubium, he hath no doubt nor reaſon to induce doubting of it) I cannot imagine how that part of my diſcourſe, wherein I have ſuppoſed or aſſerted this, can be either ſuperfluous, unneceſſary, or (whatever other weakneſs it be guilty of) contrary to my ſelf. For certainly I that think I am fallible, may yet verily believe, without all doubt, the truth of many propoſitions, which p. 19if I ſhould affirm my ſelf not to believe, I muſt doubtleſſe lie, and then ſin, by Mr. Knot's former conceſſion. And 'tis as certain on the other ſide, that he that pretendeth to have an infallible rule, may yet foully miſtake, both in that generall, originall, and in many other particular, derivative pretenſions; His ſuppoſed infallibility, if it be not rightly ſuppoſed (and till it be proved, it will not be ſo) will be ſo farre from an amulet to keep him ſafe from all error, that it is the likelieſt way to deliver him up to it, as the premature perſwaſion of his particular election may be the ingulſing any, through ſecurity and preſumption, in the moſt certain ruine.

Num. 26 In the proceſſe of this diſcourſe he is pleaſed to mention four advantages of the Roman Church above any other, Antiquity, poſſeſsion, perſwaſion of Infallibility, the pledges that Chriſt hath left to his Church for motives of union, and nothing but uncertain reaſons on the other ſide, which ſaith he, muſt make it impoſsible for any without intereſt or prejudice to leave the Church, if he be in it, or not return, if he be out of it.

Num. 27 To this imaginary ſetting of the ſcales between them and us, and particularly to the fourth advantage pretended to, the pledges that Chriſt left for motives of union, it is ſufficient to reply in generall, that for us, which have not voluntarily ſeparated, but are by them violently removed from communion with them, and cannot be admitted to reunion, but upon conditions, which without diſſembling and lying we cannot undergoe, it is in vain to ſpeak of motives or obligations to return to their communion. We that are bound, as much as in us lies, to have peace with all men, muſt not admit any known or wilfull ſin in order to that moſt deſirable end. And this one thing as alone it is pertinent to the matter in hand, that of ſchiſme, ſo it is neceſſarily the concluding of this controverſie, We that are not permitted to return, and ſo we are, if the conditions of our return be ſo incumbred, as to include ſin, cannot with any juſtice or equity be charged for not returning.

Num. 28 Againſt this here is nothing ſaid, any farther than the bare mention of the three other advantages on their ſide. And none of theſe are of any force to perſwade our return, upon ſuch conditions as theſe, much leſſe to exact it as duty from us.

p. 20Num. 29 By Antiquity and Poſſeſſion, as here they are ſpoken of, I am apt to ſuppoſe he means not antiquity of the Roman Church, or the preſent doctrines (and therefore I ſhall not ſpeak of them) but the antiquity of our communion with them (if he mean a Poſſeſsion in the belief of the Popes Vniverſall Paſtorſhip, I ſhall have occaſion to ſpeak of that**Ch 7. Sect. 1. hereafter.) And if this be granted, as for fraternall communion, and ſuch as is due from one ſiſter Church to another, it is willingly granted, then this will divolve the blame on thoſe who are guilty of this breach, who have caſt us out, and permit us no way of returning with a good conſcience, And ſo this is little for the Romaniſts advantage.

Num. 30 But if in ſtead of fraternall communion, it be ſubjection to the Roman See, that is by his words claimed, and pretended to by poſſeſsion, then as we willingly grant to that See all that the antient Canons allowed to it, and ſo cannot in that reſpect offend againſt Antiquity, ſo what, contrary to thoſe Canons, they have at any time aſſumed, and unlawfully poſſeſt themſelves of, can no way be pretended to be their right, or they to be bonae fidei poſſeſſores, true or fair poſſeſſors of it, which qualification and condition is yet abſolutely neceſſary to found their plea from poſſeſsion, and which alone can bear any proportion with that, which Kings can ſhew for their crowns, or proprietaries for their inheritances.

Num. 31 Of this head of poſſeſsion, or preſcription, it were eaſie to adde much more, by conſidering that claim and title, by the known rules whether of the Canon, or Civil Law. The Civil Law, which is generally more favourable to Preſcription, doth yet acknowledge many waies of interrupting it, as by calling it into queſtion, and that is ſufficiently done in ſome caſes, per ſolam conventionem, by citing, or ſummoning the poſſeſſor, and when conteſtatio litis, the entring a ſuit is actually required, yet ſtill he that appears to have cauſed the impediment, and kept it from coming to this conteſtation, is not to gain any advantage by his guilt, but adverſus eum lis habetur pro conteſtato, he ſhall be lookt on, as if the ſuit had been actually conteſted againſt him. See Bartolus in l. ſi eum §. qui injuriarum in fi: ff. ſi quis caut:

p. 21Num. 32 But as to the Canon Law, which in all reaſon the Catholick is to own in this queſtion, it is known that it admitteth not any the longeſt preſcription, without the bonae fidei poſſeſſio, (he that came by any thing diſhoneſtly, is for ever obliged to reſtitution) and for the judging of that, allows of many waies of probation, from the nature of the thing (the courſe we have taken in this preſent debate) and from other probable indications, and where the appearances are equal on both ſides, the Law, though it be wont to judge moſt favourably, doth yet incline to queſtion the honeſty of coming to the poſſeſſion, and to preſume the diſhoneſty, upon this account, becauſe mala fides, diſhoneſty is preſumed induſtriouſly to contrive its own ſecrecie, and to lie hid in thoſe receſſes, from which at a diſtance of time it is not eaſily fetcht out. So Felinus in C. ult: de praeſcript: per leg: ult: C. unde vi. And in a word, it is the affirmation of the Doctors, preſumi malam fidem ex antiquiore adverſarii poſſeſſione, the preſumption is ſtrong that the poſſeſſion was not honeſtly come by, when it appears to have been antiently in the other hands, and the way of conveyance from one to the other is not diſcernible. See Panormit: and Felinus in c. ſi diligenti X de preſcript: Menochius arbit: quaeſt: Caſu 225. n. 4. and others referred to by the learned Groti… in Conſil: Jurid: ſuper iis quae Naſſavii—p. 36. &c. But I have no need of theſe nicer diſquiſitions.

Num. 33 As for the perſwaſion of infallibility, meaning, as they muſt, their own perſwaſion of it, that can have no influence upon us, who are ſure that we are not ſo perſwaded, unleſs the grounds, on which their perſwaſion is founded, be ſo convincingly repreſented to us, that it muſt be our prejudice, or other vitious defect, or affection in us, that we are not in the like manner perſwaded of it. But on this we are known to inſiſt, and never yet have had any ſuch grounds offered to us: As may in ſome meaſure appear by the view of that Controverſie as it lies viſible in the Book, intituled, The view of Infallibility.

Num. 34 As for the uncertainty of the reaſons on the Proteſtants ſide, by uncertainty, meaning fallibility, and the poteſt ſubeſſe falſum, whileſt yet we are, without doubting, verily perſwaded that our reaſons have force in them; that cannot make it p. 22poſſible for us to believe what we doe not believe, or lawfull upon any the faireſt intuition to profeſſe contrary to our belief. I believe that Henry VIII. was King of this Nation, and the reaſons on which I believe it, are, the teſtimonies of meer men, and ſo fallible; yet the bare fallibility of thoſe teſtimonies cannot infuſe into me any doubt of the truth of them, hath no force to ſhake that but humane belief, and while I thus believe, I am ſure it were wilfull ſin in me, though for the greateſt and moſt pretious acquiſitions in my view, to profeſſe I doe not believe it. The like muſt be ſaid of any other perſwaſion of mine, denied by the Romaniſts, and the denying whereof is part of the condition required of me to make me capable of communion with them.

Num. 35 But it is not now time to inſiſt on this, both becauſe here is nothing produced againſt it, and becauſe here follows a much higher undertaking, which ſwallows up all theſe inferior differences between us, viz: that not to acknowledge the Church (that muſt be the Roman Church) to be infallible, is the great crime of ſchime and hereſie in capite, and more than all that I hold diſtinct from the Romaniſts.

Num. 36 This I acknowledge was not foreſeen in the Tract of Schiſme, and may ſerve for the una litura, the one anſwer to remove all that is there ſaid. For if our grand Fundamental ſchiſme and hereſie be all ſummed up in this one comprehenſive guilt, our not acknowledging the Church of Rome to be infallible, then it was and ſtill is impertinent to diſcourſe on any other ſubject but that one of Infallibility, for if that be gained by them to belong to their Church, I am ſure we are concluded Schiſmaticks, and till it be gained, I am ſure there is no reaſon to ſuppoſe it.

Num. 37 But then as this is a compendious way of anſwering the Tract of Schiſm, and I wonder, after he had ſaid this, he could think it ſeaſonable to proceed to make exceptions to any other particulars, this one great miſtake of the Queſtion being diſcovered, made all other more minute conſiderations unneceſſary (as he that hath ſprung a mine to blow up the whole Fort, need not ſet wiſpes of ſtraw to ſeverall corners to burn it) ſo it falls out a little unluckily, that this doth not ſuperſede, but p. 23onelyonly remove this Gentleman's labour, it being now as neceſſary that he ſhould defend his hypotheſis of the Church of Romes Infallibility, againſt all that is formerly ſaid by me on that ſubject, as now it was to make this Anſwer to the Book of Schiſm, and till that be done, or attempted to be done, there is nothing left for me to reply to in this matter.

Num. 38 For as to his bare affirmations, that the not acknowledging their Infallibility takes away all belief and ground of belief, turns all into uncertainty, &c. nay, ſubmitteth to Atheiſme and all ſorts of miſcreancy.] It is ſure but a miſtake or miſunderſtanding as of ſome other things, ſo particularly of the nature of belief; For beſide that I may have other grounds of belief than the affirmations of the Roman Church, the authority of Scripture for the ſeveralls contained in it, and the Teſtimony of the univerſal Primitive (that ſure is more than of the preſent Roman) Church, to aſſure me that what we take for Scripture is Scripture, and to derive Apoſtolical traditions to me, and ſo I may believe enough without ever knowing that the Roman Church defines any thing de fide, but much more without acknowledging the truth of all ſhe defines, and yet much more without acknowledging her inerrable and infallible: Beſide this, I ſay, it is evident that belief is no more than conſent to the truth of any thing, and the grounds of belief, ſuch arguments as are ſufficient to exclude doubting, to induce conviction and perſwaſion, and where that is actually induced, there is belief, though there be no pretenſe of infallibility in the argument, nor opinion of it in him that is perſwaded by it.

Num. 39 That all that God hath ſaid is true, I believe by a belief or perſwaſion, cui non poteſt ſubeſſe falſum, wherein I cannot be deceived, and there I acknowledge infallibility upon this ground, whether of nature or of grace, of common dictate, or of religion, that it is impoſſible for God to lie, to deceive, or to be deceived; But that the whole Canon of Scripture, as it is delivered to us by the Laodicean Councel, is the Word of God, though I fully believe this alſo, and have not the leaſt doubt to any part of it, yet I account not my ſelf infallible in this belief, nor can any Church that affirms the ſame, unleſſe they p. 24are otherwiſe priviledged by God, be infallible in affirming it, nor any that believes that Church be infallible in their belief; And as that priviledge is not yet proved by any donation of Gods to belong to any Church, particularly to the Roman, ſo till it be proved, and proved infallibly, it can be no competent medium to induce any new act of Infallible belief, the want of which may denominate us either hereticks or ſchiſmaticks.

Num. 40 In the mean time, this is certain, that I that doe not pretend to believe any thing infallibly in this matter, not ſo much as that the Church is not infallible, muſt yet be acknowledged to believe her fallible, or elſe I could not by this Gentleman be adjudged a ſciſmatick for ſo believing: And then this ſuppoſeth that I may believe what in his opinion I believe untruly, that ſure is, that I may believe what I doe not believe infallibly. The matter is viſible, I cannot think fit to inlarge on it.

Num. 41 One thing onelyonly I muſt farther take notice of, the ground which he here had, on which he founds his exception againſt the ſolidity of my diſcourſe, calling it my great evidence, that we that doe not acknowledge the Church of Rome to be infallible, may be allowed to make certain ſuppoſitions that follow there.

Num. 42 The matter in that place Chap. II. Sect. 12. lies thus. In examining the nature of ſchiſme, I have occaſion to mention one (not reall, but) fiction of caſe; Suppoſe firſt that our Anceſtors had criminouſly ſeparated from the Church of Rome, and ſuppoſe ſecondly, that we their poſterity repented, and deſired to reform their ſin, and to be reunited to them; yet ſuppoſing thirdly, that they ſhould require to our reunion any condition which were unlawfull for us to perform, in this conjuncture, I ſay, we could not juſtly be charged for continuing that ſeparation.

Num. 43 This fiction of caſe I could not think had any weak part in it, for as it ſuppoſed that on one ſide, which I knew a Romaniſt would not grant, viz: that they ſhould require any condition unlawfull for us to perform, ſo it ſuppoſed on the other ſide, that which we can no way grant, viz: that our Anceſtors criminouſly ſeparated; But this I knew was ordinary to be done in fictions of caſes; Suppoſitio non ponit, is the acknowledged p. 25rule, my ſuppoſing either of theſe was not the taking them for granted, And yet after all this, I foreſaw that objection, that the Romaniſt, who acknowledges not any ſuch hard condition required to our reconciliation, will conceive this an impoſſible caſe; And to this I anſwered, that we, that acknowledge not their Church to be infallible may be allowed to make a ſuppoſition (meaning as before a fiction of caſe) which is founded in the poſſibility of her inſerting ſome error in her confeſſions, and making the acknowledgment of it the indispenſable condition of her communion. What I have offended herein, I cannot imagine, for 1. I onelyonly ſet a fiction of caſe, doe not take their infallibility for a thing confeſtly falſe, nor in that place ſo much as dispute againſt it, Only I ſay that which was ſufficiently known before I ſaid it, that their Infallibity is not acknowledged by us, and ſo that her inſerting ſome error in her Confeſſions, is to us, i. e. in our opinion a thing poſſible, and ſo for disputation ſake ſuppoſable, in the ſame manner as I ſuppoſe that which I am known not to believe, and if this Gentleman be thus ſevere, I ſhall deſpair to approve my diſcourſes to him.

Num. 44 Secondly, that I make it my great evidence, is not with any appearance of reaſon ſuggeſted by him, It comes in meerly as an incidentall, laſt branch, the leaſt neceſſary, moſt unconſiderable of any, and that which might have been ſpared then, or left out now, without any weakning of, or diſturbing the diſcourſe.

Num. 45 Thirdly, Whereas he adds, that I proceed to make certain ſuppoſitions that follow there, this is ſtill of the ſame ſtrein, I make but one ſuppoſition, viz: in caſe ſhe make any unlawfull act the indiſpenſable condition of her Communion, And that one certainly is not in the plurall, more, or indefinitely, certain ſuppoſitions.

Num. 46 That I put this one caſe as poſſible, and then proceeded to conſider, what were by the principles acknowledged by all, particularly by Mr. Knot, to be done in that one caſe, was agreeable to the ſtricteſt laws of diſcourſe which I have met with. And if in compliance with this Gentleman, I muſt deny my ſelf ſuch liberties, and yet yeild him ſo much greater, on p. 26the other ſide, If I muſt at the beginning of a defenſe of the Church of England, be required to grant the Church of Rome infallible, i. e. to yeild not onelyonly that ſhe ſpeaks all truth, but alſo that it is impoſſible ſhe ſhould ſpeak any thing but truth, whom yet, by entring on this theme, I undertake to contradict, and to prove injurious in cenſuring us for Schiſmaticks, this were, as I have ſaid, an hard task indeed, The very ſame as if I were required to begin a duell by preſenting and delivering up all weapons into the enemies hand, to plead a cauſe, and introduce my defenſe by confeſſing my ſelf guilty of all that the plaintiffe doth, or can have the confidence to charge upon me.

Num. 47 And if theſe be the conditions of a diſpute, theſe will queſtionleſſe be hard, whatſoever the conditions of our reunion be conceived to be, and moreover this Gentleman will be as infallible as his Church, and then 'tis pity he ſhould laviſh out medicines, that is ſo ſecured by charms, that he ſhould defend his cauſe by reaſons, which hath this one ſo much cheaper expedient, to anſwer a whole book in one period.

Num. 48 And ſo much for his Animadverſions on this ſecond Chapter, which are no excellent preſage of that which we are to expect in the inſuing.