Of the Reasonableness of Christian Religion, Chapter 2
CHAP. II.
A Digreſsion concerning the uſe of Reaſon in deciding Controverſies in Religion.
Sect. 1 HAving proceeded thus far for the convincing of the gainſayer; it may not be amiſs to conſider the beleiver awhile, and give him the bounds or limits, within which Reaſon is obliged to contain it ſelf, in matters of Faith, and this even by the verdict of Reaſon it ſelf. And I ſhall do it by a brief ſtating of this Queſtion.
Sect. 2 Whether Right Reaſon be appointed the Judge of Controverſies? Whether all doubts of all ſorts be to be determined by the dictates of Nature, in the Hears of every Man which hath the uſe of Reaſon?
To this I ſhall ground my anſwer in theſe two Rules, or Poſtulations. 1. That
Sect. 3 The meaſure of mans natural power of knowing or judging of things, is his participating of thoſe things (in ſome degree) with God, in whom they are as in the Fountain. So that the man may finde, and behold them in himſelf as truly, though not as eminently, or in the ſame degree, as they are in God.
For certainly, if a man denudate of all experimental, acquired, revealed knowledge, of all forain helps, left onelyonly to himſelf as a man endued with Reaſon, ſhould be queſtioned in any thing, and ſuppoſed able to expreſs his conceptions, he would be fain to fetch out every word that he ſaid, from within him, ſay onelyonly what his own heart could diſcern within himſelf, otherwiſe he ſhould be ſuppoſed to anſwer more, then he had means to come to the knowledge of; The work done would be above the proportion of the means to it; the concluſion would have more in it then the premiſes.
From hence follows this ſecond Rule, That
Sect. 4 Men are naturally able to judge onelyonly of thoſe things, which by ſome ſure connexion depend on thoſe attributes of God, which are communicated to (and particularly by) men, and are the like (as far as the adumbration or tranſcript, is to the exemplar or pattern) for kinde, though not degree, in man as in God.
Sect. 4 Now all Controverſies, (i. e. all things ſubject to judgement) are reducible to two heads, Goodneſs or Truth; ſo that the Queſtion now is, Whether Right Reaſon can infallibly judg, what is good, or bad, true or falſe?
And then to this I anſwer, Firſt, Concerning the firſt Head.
Sect. 5 For a thing to be good morally (for Metaphyſical goodneſs is all one with truth) depends, by ſure connexion, from that eternal justice which is primarily in God, That being the rule, as it is the Fountain, of all moral goodneſs in men, or things: Every thing being good, more or leſs, as it more or leſs partakes of that juſtice, which is in God.
Sect. 6 Now this being one of the attributes of God, which are called Communicable, it is truly affirmed, That that justice, which is in God, is the very ſame in ſubſtance, communicated to men, though in a lower degree. And therefore it follows by the ſecond rule, that man by the light of nature, and general impreſſions, i. e. by a power of ſeeing, whatſoever is within his ſphear, is enabled by God to judge what is just, what not, what morally good, what bad. And no man judges amiſs in theſe things, but he that hath his judgement corrupted by ſome prepoſſeſſion, or habituall vice, or preſent prevailing temptation; and therefore of moral Controverſies, i. e. whether a thing naturally, or in it ſelf, be good or bad, juſt, or not, Right Reaſon is a Judg.
Sect. 7 Yet this with this Caution, or limitation, that it be not extended to thoſe things, wherein the Law of Nature hath been elevated higher by any poſitive Law of Chriſt. For as Right Reaſon: cannot judge what is lawful in any particular Kingdom, becauſe what Nature hath made lawful, the Municipal Laws of that place may have forbidden, and made unlawful, (and that Right Reaſon cannot take notice of, unleſs it be told ſo) ſo in Christs Kingdom, the Church, when he hath forbidden what Nature had left free and unforbidden, Reaſon (untaught by Chriſt) cannot ſay, that that is unlawful, yet generally will be found to bear that Teſtimony to Chriſt, that what Chriſt hath ſuper-added to the Law of Nature Right Reaſon will of its own accord commend, as beſt, or moſt laudable, and excellent in them that do it, though not knowing any precept for it, it will not affirm that it is neceſſary, ſo as it cannot be omitted without ſin.
Then concerning the ſecond Head, I anſwer,
Sect. 8 That for a thing to be true, i. e. to have a Being either potential or actual, depends partly on Gods Power, partly on his Will. In reſpect of its potential Being, it depends on his Power, in reſpect of its Actual, on his Will.
Sect. 9 Now Gods Power, though it may in ſome ſenſe be ſaid communicable to the Creature, becauſe all ability in the Creature is a gleam of infinite ability in God, yet is not this ſo communicated, as his Juſtice or Goodneſſe was ſaid to be. For Goodneſſe in the creature is a kinde of image truly reſembling the goodneſſe in God, and that a kinde of natural image, as is the face in the Glaſſe, not a voluntary one, which hath its Being from the variable Will of the Artificer. But power, or ability in the Creature, is not thus a natural image of Gods power, but as a reflection of a thing, which voluntarily, and variouſly caſts its beams. Voluntarily, I ſay, becauſe the diſpenſing of his Power, either in manner, or meaſure, is a free act of his Will; and variouſly, becauſe he doth it, firſt, unequally; and ſecondly, not ſo to any, but that he can (and ſometimes doth) withdraw or ſuſpend it, when it is beſtowed; ſo that I cannot ſay, that as that which is juſt in God to be done, is juſt to be done by the Creature, ſo what is poſſible to be done by God, is poſſible to be done by the Creature.
Sect. 10 The reaſon of the not communicating of Gods Power to the Creature, as well as his Juſtice, may be this, becauſe it conduced not to the end of the Creatures Creation, as the other did: For though God intended to make a Creature truly good, and just, yet he did not truly powerful. Power indeed being in it ſelf not a vertue, as juſtice is, nor in it ſelf morally good, or evil, and therefore not ſo agreeable to the condition of a Creature, but rather indeed peculiar to the Majeſty of a Creator.
Sect. 11 From all this it follows by the ſaid ſecond rule, that man is not able to fathom Potentiall truths, becauſe Power is not the ſame in ſubſtance in God, and in the Creature, and therefore by what is in the Creature, he is no way enabled to conceive what is in God, and ſo conſequently to define of any Potentiall truth, becauſe though it may not be wrought by any thing that is in the Creature, or within his ſphere of knowledge, yet it may be by God.
Sect. 12 All the natural impreſſion, or light, that in this behalf a rational Creature hath, is that two contradictories cannot be true at once, and therefore I think, all Principles that are not thought fit to be proved in any naturall ſcience, (if they be truly ſo) may eaſily be reſolved into this one, A thing cannot at once be, and not be. And this natural impreſſion riſes not from any obſervation of the power communicated to the creature, (for then ſtill it would hold, that though man cannot do contradictories at once, yet God may) but from a ſight, that this would be an effect of extreme impotency, more then is conceiveable in any Creature, and therefore cannot be imputed to God, who is conceived Omnipotent, nor conſequently to man, unleſſe God ſhould take away all degrees of power quite from him, and then he ſhould be annihilated.
Sect. 13 Now for actual truths already in Being, which are works either mediately, or immediately of Gods Will, our Reaſon is no farther judg of them, then as Gods Will is communicated to us by ſome Images, or Pictures of it, either ſubſtantiall and reall, as when a thing done, is preſented to the faculty, to which it is objicible, there a real image of Gods Wil is impreſt in me, (& by that I may judg diſtinctly) or when it is revealed to me either from God, or from any other witneſſe, of which in this matter I am convinced, that he partakes of Gods veracity, i. e. would not lie to me, and this may be called an intentionall Image of Gods Will impreſt in me.
Sect. 14 Thus may Right Reaſon judg of things in Being, either becauſe it is ſo really repreſented to the ſenſes, and that is evidence; or becauſe is either revealed, or elſe atteſted by God, which Reaſon knows can neither erre, nor deceive, and this is adherence; or becauſe ſuch a concurrence of teſtimonies agrees to tell me ſo, as I have no Motive or Reaſon to disbeleive, and this is humane Faith, (which may reaſonably take place, untill I either ſee ſomewhat, or receive ſomewhat by an higher teſtimony revealed to the contrary) which alſo is weaker, or ſtronger, according to the importance of the matter, authority of the teſtifiers, my particular danger, if I be deceived in it, &c.
Hence the Concluſion is, That
Sect. 15 Right Reaſon is able to judge of all meerly Moral objects, whether any thing be good or bad morally; of Naturall objects in matter of fact, whether ſuch a thing be done or no, by the help of the means ſpecified, and by diſcourſe, and analogy from things that we ſee are done, to judg that ſuch another thing is poſſible: But of ſupernatural truths, ſuch things as it never diſcerned in Nature, either in the kinde, or the like, it cannot judg any farther then thus. Either firſt, that though we cannot do it, yet for ought we know it is poſſible, (nay it hath a Being) with God; or ſecondly, that God hath affirmed it ſo, therefore I am ſure it is; or thirdly, that comes to me from authority, that I have no reaſon to ſuſpect, but on the contrary concurrence of all Reaſons to be perſwaded by it; nay, there are ſome inward Characters in the thing it ſelf, that makes me caſt off all jealouſie or doubt of ſuch affirmations, and therefore I believe it is ſo. But generally, and in theſi, it is no way Judge of theſe laſt kind of Controverſies.
Sect. 16 And therefore though God, in moral actions, even in himſelf, ſubmits and appeals to mans reaſon, Iſa. 5. 3. Ezek. 18. 25. yet in theſe latter he derides all thoſe, that goe about to judge of them by reaſon, 1 Cor. 1. 20. And agreeably Saint Paul in his Preaching the Goſpel, for the proving the truth of Chriſtianity, was fain, ſaith aforeign Cont. Celſ. p. 4.Origen, to uſe a peculiar way of demonſtration. Firſt, by comparing of Prophecies in the Old Teſtament, concerning Chriſt: Secondly, by Miracles; but in practical matters he appeals to that which was written in every ones heart, Rom. 2. 15.
Sect. 17 To this purpoſe hath Eulogius an Oration againſt thoſe, who think to be able to comprehend the true Theology of Christians (i. e. Chriſtians diſcourſes concerning the Perſons of the Deity) bforeign, p. 862.by the Wit, or Reaſon of Man; and Photius hath approved of that diſcourſe of his, that he doth cforeign.talk of God Piouſly, and devoutly, and ſet Chriſtian divinity a pitch beyond humane wiſdom, dforeign.ſuperior to all other eVid. Juſt. Mart. p. 5. & 6. A & 8. C. 9. A. So Juſt. Mart. p. 375. A. & for the foreign, p. 379, So for the foreign of the union of Chriſts natures, 382. B. foreign, 386. B. 387. D. 388. A.artificial method, or rules of Art.
Sect. 18 In ſum, it is obſervable in the writing of the Scripture, that generally in defining theſe laſt ſorts of Truths, Gods authority is ſet down, as the onelyonly proof of what is ſaid, without uſing any other way of arguing, or ſecular demonſtration: All that is indulged to mens Reaſon, being onelyonly this; Firſt, to conſider, whether it be not very equal, and reaſonable to believe God, without any other motive, or topick of proof, even in thoſe things, which are above, or beſide Right Reaſon, nay, againſt the propoſals of corrupt; and ſecondly, to ſearch (by what helps ſoever a reaſonable mans prudence and diligence can ſuggeſt, or furniſh him with) which is that Word of God, which contains theſe revelations, which Reaſon tells them, they muſt believe without farther reaſoning.
Sect. 19 But not to ſuffer my ſelf to believe any thing (though revealed by the Scriptures) but what Reaſon otherwiſe would lead me to, is the ſame that Celſus perſwaded the Heathens (of his ſide) to, againſt Chriſt, to fforeign. Orig. cont. Celſ. p. 8.follow Reaſon, and the rational guide in all the doctrines, we receive, all error and deceit being, ſaith he, brought into the world by Faith; and that they that believed any thing without Reaſon for it, are like them that delight in Juglers, &c. and therefore he laughs at all thoſe who requiring not Reaſon for what they believe, uſe this phraſe, gforeign.Doe not examine but beleive, thy Faith ſhall ſave thee, as men that are diſpleaſed with wiſdom, and in love with folly. To all which Origen, as acute a Reaſoner as any, oppoſes nothing, but the Evidence of Prophecies, and the Word of God for this rule of Faith. Which if it be not ſimply beleived without any Philoſophical rational enquiry, concerning the things affirmed in it, many will of neceſſity ſtill wallow in infidelity after all that God hath done for the reſcuing them out of it, and only a few find that by rational ſearch, which before they beleived by ſimple Faith.