Of Fundamentals, Treatise · Chapter 16
CHAP. XVI. Of the Predetermination of all things.
§. 1. AND as the abſolute predeſtination of the perſons is able to evacuate all the force of theſe fundamentals, The doctrine of God's predetermining all events.deſigned by God as motives of great energie to induce good life, ſo certainly is the opinion of God's predetermining and preordaining the means as well as the end, (i. e. all the acts of man's will, the evil as well as the good, and ſo all the moſt enormous ſins that are or ever ſhall be committed) moſt abundantly ſufficient to doe it.
§. 2. I ſay not the doctrine of God's prediſpoſing or preordering, or of his predetermining or decreeing that he will ſo diſpoſe and order all things that come to paſſe, whether good or bad, for that looks on the things as done, which are ſo diſpoſed, and conſequently includes not any influence or cauſality in the production of thē, and ſo God, that brings light out of darkneſs, can diſpoſe of the worſt things, the fouleſt ſins, the very crucifying of Chriſt, ſo as to bring health and ſalvation out of them.
§. 3.Of preordering. But betwixt this and predetermining that which is ſo diſpoſed, the difference is wide, as much as betwixt a bloody deſigners ſuborning his inſtrument to take away ſuch a man's life, and the Confeſſors repreſenting the horridneſs of the fact, and by that means bringing him to repentance; And though Ordinare in Latine, and foreign in Greek be equivocal, and capable of both theſe notions, yet ordaining and decreeing in our Engliſh uſe, is not thus liable to be miſtaken.
§. 4. Secondly, Of God's predetermining his own will.I ſay not the doctrine of God's predetermining his own will, but his predetermining the acts of our will, or our volitions; Great difference there is betwixt theſe two, as much as betwixt my willing a lawfull thing my ſelf, and my inducing another man to doe that which is unlawful.
§. 5. For God doth predetermine his own will, as oft as he decrees to doe this or that, which he might not have decreed to have done, or have decreed to have done the contrary; for when God's will is free to two things, to make or not to make a world, or ſuch a world, and the like, his decreeing to make it, and to make it ſuch, is the determining of his will, Thus when before all time God might have created man a neceſſary agent, to will and to doe every thing that he wills and doth, after the ſame manner as the fire burneth, i. e. ſo as he could not doe otherwiſe, yet 'tis evident that God choſe to create him after the image of his own liberty, a voluntary free agent that might deliberate and chooſe, and either doe, or not doe, or doe this or the contrary to it; And ſo in like manner God may determine his own will not to hinder, but permit what he ſees man inclinable to doe, when he might on the other ſide have choſen to hinder or not to permit; And thus he did when he decreed to permit the malice of the Jewes, the covetouſneſs of Judas, the popularity of Pilate to joyn all together in the crucifying of Chriſt, upon which it is ſaid, that his hand and his counſel foreign did predetermine this to be done, i. e. Chriſt to be crucified (which was done by God's predetermining to permit them to doe what they by the free act of their own wills reſolved to doe, if they were not hindred) no way intimating that God predetermined they ſhould doe it.
§. 6. And this predetermination of God's own will is ſo farre from being the determining of ours, that it is diſtinctly and viſibly the contrary, for ſuppoſing God to predetermine that I I ſhall act freely, and that he will not determine my will to this or that object, 'tis certain from thence that my will is free in reſpect of God, and not predetermined by him, And therefore that ordinary poſition, that the predetermination of God's will hinders not the liberty of ours] which by being underſtood of God's will predetermining ours, is moſt groſly falſe, and implies a contradiction, a predetermination and not a predetermination, a liberty and not a liberty to the ſame thing, is yet moſt evidently true of God's predetermining his own will, or his own will being predetermined, for that, as it reſpecteth not our will, (meddleth not with it at all) ſo it is farre from hindring or taking away the liberty of it, but on the contrary, it being one act of God's eternal will, and ſo a predetermination thereof, that man ſhall be a free agent, and another act of the ſame divine will, that this or that act of our will ſhall be permitted and not hindred by God, either or both theſe predeterminations of God's will, neceſſarily inferres the liberty of ours, which cannot but be free, when God hath predetermined it ſhall be free.
Of Gods Preſcience.§. 7. Thirdly, I ſay not the doctrine of God's preſcience, his eternal foreſight of all that is ever done in the world, For that again ſuppoſeth or looketh on the thing as done, which is thus the object of his ſight, and hath no kinde of influence or cauſality in the production of it.
§. 8. Some difficulty there is in conceiving a thing to be foreſeen or foreknown by God, and yet to continue free to be done or not to be done. And the beſt way of explicating that difficulty will be, to ſuppoſe God's ſcience to be infinitely extended in reſpect of time, as his preſence in reſpect of place, and though ſpeaking of infinitie, we muſt acknowledge our underſtandings to be very imperfect, all the meaſures we have to conceive any thing, being finite, and ſo unequal and very unable to comprehend that which is infinite, Yet if we will but conceive God's ſight or ſcience before the creation of the world to be coextended to all and every part of the world, ſeeing every thing as it is, that which is paſt as paſt, future as future, that which is by him predetermined, as neceſſary, and that which is left free, as free, that which is done, and might have been otherwiſe, as done freely and contingently, and that which is not yet done, and may or may not be done, as that which is yet free and contingent, there will remain no difficulty in affirming that his preſcience or foreſight of any action of mine (or rather his ſcience at ſight) from all eternity, layes no neceſſity on any thing to be, which is thus ſeen to come to paſſe, any more then my ſeeing the ſun move, hath to doe in the moving of it, it being certain, and neceſſary, and antecedent in order of nature, that that have a beeing, that hath a capacity of being ſeen, and only accidental and extrinſecal to it, to be ſeen, when it is, and ſo the ſeeing but an acceſſary, not a cauſe of its beeing; and it is moſt evident that God's foreſeeing doth not include or connotate predetermining, any more then I decree with my intellect, or will with my apprehenſion, which is as if I ſhould ſee with my ear, or taſt with my eye, i. e. confound the moſt diſtant faculties.
§. 9. To this may be added, that God being acknowledged to ſee or foreſee every thing as it is, it is as impoſſible that any thing ſhould be in any other manner then he foreſees it to be, as that it ſhould not come to paſſe, when he ſees it doth, or foreſees it will come to paſſe; and conſequently that God's foreſeeing thoſe things come to paſſe contingently which doe come to paſſe contingently, is a moſt certain proof that there are ſome contingents in the world; So likewiſe when God foreſees and foretels that Judas will freely and voluntarily, and againſt all engagements and obligations to the contrary, betray and ſell Chriſt, that the Jewes would not be gathered by Chriſt when he was moſt ſollicitous and ſedulous in gathering them, 'tis as certainly concluſible from the argument of God's preſcience, that they will voluntarily and freely doe this, and obſtinately reſiſt their own good, as that they will doe it at all, the manner being foreſeen by God, who cannot be deceived, as truly as the thing is foreſeen by him.
§. 10. And if there ſhould yet be any doubt (as Socinus and his followers, men very well exerciſed, and skill'd in the foreign, removing of thoſe things, which have continued immovable in the Church, have more then doubted) whether God foreſee any more then he determines, and conſequently whether it may not ſafely be affirmed, that he doth not foreſee all things, becauſe he cannot be conceived to predetermine all things, It will preſently appear, that as this is moſt irrational, ſo is it moſt falſe, irrational to grant an infiniteneſs of God's other attributes and powers, his omnipreſence, omnipotence, &c. and to queſtion the infinitie of his ſcience, and apparently falſe, if only God's predictions to the Prophets be conſidered, For there we ſee many things to be foretold, and conſequently learn them to have been foreſeen, which they that make this doubt, doe truly reſolve cannot be predetermined by God, and, rather then they will believe them predetermined by him, deny them to be foreſeen, viz: the infidelity and ſins of men, which God cannot will or decree in their opinion, and which they muſt conſequently acknowledge to have been both contingent & future, when they were foretold by him, and not to have loſt their nature by being foretold by him.
The doctrine of Predetermination noxious to Practiſe.§. 11. Having thus ſeparated this doctrine of God's predetermining all events, from theſe 3 other things, wch the haſte of Diſputers have ſometimes confounded with it, It will now be preſently diſcernible how noxious & obſtructive this doctrine is to the ſuperſtructing all good life. For 1. that which is predetermined by God is abſolutely neceſſary and unavoidable, no man hath or can reſiſt any decree of his; The bounds which are placed to the ſea by a perpetual decree, Jer. 5.22. are ſuch as it cannot paſſe, and though the waves toſſe themſelves, yet can they not prevail, though they roar, yet can they not paſſe over, and ſuch is the nature of all decrees of God; And if the actions of men were under any ſuch, (as 1. by the expoſtulation there, and 2dly, by the mention of their rebellious heart, v. 23. and 3dly, by the oppoſition which is ſet betwixt the ſea, that cannot paſſe the bounds, and the ſinner that can, it is moſt evident they are not) this would neceſſarily preclude all choiſe, and then, as Tertullian ſaith, lib. 2. contr: Marcion: Nec boni nec mali merces jure penſaretur ei, qui aut bonus aut malus neceſſitate fuiſſet inventus, non voluntate, There would be no reward of good or evil, if men were good or evil by neceſſity, and not by choiſe; and as Juſtin Martyr, Apol: 2. foreign, If mankinde had no power to avoid ill or chooſe good by free deliberation, it ſhould never be guilty of any thing that was done. And as Tatianus to the ſame purpoſe, foreign — God therefore gave liberty of choiſe to men, that the wicked might be juſtly puniſhed, being wicked by his own fault, and the righteous commended, who by the ſame liberty hath taken care not to tranſgreſſe the will of God, So certainly this doctrine muſt take away all guilt of an accuſing, and all ſolace of a quiet conſcience, and in like manner ſuperſede and ſlacken all induſtrie and endevour, which is the loweſt degree of that which hath promiſe to be accepted by Chriſt, and by faſtening all our actions as well as ends by a fatal decree at the foot of God's chair, leave nothing to us to deliberate or attempt, but only to obey our fate, to follow the duct of the ſtarres, or neceſſity of thoſe irony chains which we are born under.
§. 12. 2dly, There being little queſtion made by any, but that God both can and doth whatſoever he will both in heaven and earth, when any thing is acknowledged to be willed by God (as 'tis certain every thing is which is predetermined & preordained by him) it neceſſarily follows, that whenſoever that is done it is done by God, and conſequently if that be a ſin, God doth, i. e. committeth the ſin, and this without any ſo much as concurrence of any will of mine, but what is alſo predetermined by him; Which is evidently the defining God to be both the principal and acceſſarie in the committing every ſin; which when it is once believed, then 1. What poſſible way is there for any man to be guilty of ſin, which we know is no farther ſin, then it was voluntary in him that did it, and he free to have abſtain'd, when he did commit it, or at leaſt to have prevented that degree of force or neceſſity that is fallen upon him? And on the other ſide what poſſibility of abſtaining from ſinne, when by God's predetermination of it, 'tis acknowledged inevitable? And when theſe two are taken away, the poſſibility of guilt, and the poſſibility of innocence, what reſtraint can the belief of all the Articles of the Creed lay upon any man to flie from evil, or purſue that which is good?
§. 3. 3dly, The only way of defining of ſin, is, by the contrariety to the will of God (as of good by the accordance with that will) and if all things be preordained by God, and ſo demonſtrated to be will'd by him, it remains that there is no ſuch thing as ſin, nor any thing to be abſtain'd from, or avoided by us, nor difference betwixt good and evil, according to that meaſure of God's will, which by this doctrine is equally competible to both of them.Revealed and ſecret will. And if the diſtinction of his ſecret and revealed will be here made uſe of, and only the latter of theſe conceived to be it, in contrariety to which ſin conſiſts, that ſo there may be a way of ſinning againſt that, whilſt the ſecret will is obeyed and performed; Then, beſides the great abſurdity of affirming any thing of God's ſecret will, till by ſome means or other it be revealed, and then it ceaſeth to be (what it is pretended to be) ſecret, for if it be known it is not ſecret; and 2dly, the ridiculouſneſs of making that God's will, which is ſuppoſed contrary to his will, for certainly that which is contrary to his will, is not his will, and therefore the ſecret being ſuppoſed contrary to the revealed, if the revealed will be his will, the ſecret is not his will, and if the ſecret be his will, then that which is revealed to be his will, is not his will; and 3dly, the impiety of oppoſing God's words to his thoughts, his revealed commands to his ſecret decrees, (which is as ill as could be ſaid of any man, and will never incline any to obey God, which hath ſuch an unhandſome opinion of him) beſides theſe inconveniences, I ſay, 'tis evident that intrinſick goodneſs conſiſts in accordance, and ſin in contrariety to the ſecret will of God, as well as to his revealed, or elſe God could not be defined infinitely good, or ſo farre as his thoughts and ſecrets, but only ſuperficially good, as farre as the outſide or appearing part of him, i. e. as farre as he is pleaſed to reveal himſelf, which again is perfect blaſphemie to imagine, and that which equals God to the moſt formal and hypocritical profeſſor.
§. 14. 4thly, This doctrine is deſtructive to all that is eſtabliſhed among men, to all that is moſt pretious, 1. to humane nature, to the two faculties that denominate us men, underſtanding and will, For what uſe can we have of our underſtandings, if we cannot doe what we know to be our duty? and if we act not voluntarily, what exerciſe have we of our wills?
§. 15. 2dly, To the end of our Creation, whether ſubordinate or ultimate; The ſubordinate end of our creation is, that we ſhould live virtuouſly and glorifie God in a voluntary and generous obedience, either of which other creatures, that act naturally, are not capable of, And God's predetermining all our actions deprives us of this honour and dignity of our nature, leaves no place of virtue, which is founded in voluntary action, and as Origen ſaith cont: Celſ: l. 4. foreign, If you take from virtue the voluntarineſs, you take away the eſſence of it. And ſo this doctrine brings us down to the level of horſe and mule, whoſe mouthes are forcibly holden with bit and bridle, when yet it is one of the commands of that God, that we ſhould not be like thoſe creatures: And ſo for the ultimate end, a reward and crown in another world, which no irrational creature is capable of, this of predetermination of all our actions, which renders us neceſſary not rational agents, renders us utterly uncapable of that.
§. 16. 3dly, It is directly contrary to all God's waies, or manner of dealing with us, which is all by rational waies of perſwaſion, by propoſition of terrors and promiſes, the danger that we ſhall incurre by our diſobedience, and the infinite advantages that we ſhall reap by our obedience, and to theſe is added the authority of the Commander, vindicated from our neglect by the interpoſition of the greateſt ſignes and wonders, in the hands of his Prophets and of his Son, ſuch as we cannot but wonder when we read them (as in the caſe of the Iſraelites coming out of Aegypt, & in the wilderneſs) that they ſhould not prevail upon them, when yet they did not prevail, And what can be more contrary to rational motives, then predetermination? For as, if they had not that perſwaſive efficacie in them as to be able to move a rational man, they could not be denominated rational, ſo if they were backed with a violence, if they were propoſed to us in the name and power of an omnipotent immutable decree, they could never be ſaid motives or perſwaſives; And ſo ſtill God's gracious dealings with men being the aids and auxiliaries neceſſary to us in the purſuit of piety, and the one doctrine and perſwaſion of God's predetermination of all events, having ſuperſeded and caſſated all thoſe waies, we have no bottome left, on which to found the leaſt beginning or thought of piety, as long as we continue poſſeſſed with that perſwaſion.
§. 17. 4thly, This doctrine, if it were true, muſt neceſſarily take away all judgement to come, all reward and puniſhment, which are certainly apportioned to the voluntary actions, and choiſes of men (and therefore belong not to any but rational creatures) and can no more be awarded to thoſe actions which are predetermined by God, then to the aſcending of the flame, or deſcending of the ſtone, which by nature the providence of God are thus predetermined, and act by decree, and not by choiſe. And when all judgment to come is once vaniſhed, all reward to engage obedience, and all terror to reſtrain diſobedience is once removed, and ſo in effect the three laſt Articles of the Creed rejected alſo, what hope is there that the remaining Articles ſhould be ſufficient to doe it?
§. 18. To theſe Chriſtian & Theological conſiderations it will not be amiſſe to adde what care the Writers of Politicks have had to warn us of the noxiouſneſs of this doctrine to all civil governments, which Chriſtian religion, rightly underſtood, is ſo very farre from diſturbing, that beyond all other Aphoriſms Political, beyond the ſageſt proviſions of the Profoundeſt Lawgivers, it is (would men but live according to the rules of it) incomparably qualified to perpetuate publick weal and peace.
§. 19. But for the doctrine of thoſe, who ſo miſtake Chriſtian religion as to think it is only a chain of fatal decrees, to deny all liberty of man's choiſe toward good or evil, and to affix all events to God's predetermination, This, ſay they, is utterly irreconcileable with the nature of civil government, with the foundation thereof laid in Laws, or with the puniſhments and rewards, which are thought neceſſary to the continuance thereof, and Campanella chooſeth to inſtance in Republicâ praeſertim liberâ, in a Republick or free ſtate.
§. 20. For when the people, which think their liberty, of which they are very tender and jealous, to be retrench'd or impaired by the reſtraint of Laws, can farther anſwer their Rulers, though but in the heart (without proceeding to farther boldneſs) that they cannot obſerve their Laws, being led by irreſiſtible decrees to the tranſgreſſing of them, the conſequence is eaſie to foreſee, the deſpiſing and contemning of Laws, and hating and deteſting of thoſe who are obliged to puniſh them, when they have offended; which two are ſoon inflamed, beyond the rate of popular diſcontents, into actual ſeditions and tumults, as ſoon as opportunity ſhall favour, or opinion of their own ſtrength incourage them to it.
§. 21. That the Turkiſh Empire hath not yet found the noxious effects of this poyſon, ſo commonly received among them, will, I ſuppoſe, be objected againſt the truth of this; But 'tis viſible to what Antidotes this muſt be imputed, 1. to their ignorance and unimprovableneſs in matters of knowledge, and rational diſcourſe, being generally kept rude, and without all literature (which is the grindſtone to ſharpen the coulters, to whet their natural faculties, and to inable them to diſcourſe and deduce natural conſequences) 2dly, To the the manner obſerved in Governing them, by force, and not by obligation on conſcience, by violence, and not by laws; Which way of managerie being ſomewhat proportionable to the opinion of fatal decrees, and agreeing with it in this, that it doth really leave nothing to men's choiſes, is withall as a contrary poyſon, a hot thrown after a cold, very proper to abate the energie of it, forcing them as fatally to abſtain, as they can deem themſelves forced, or impelled to commit any ſuch enormitie.
§. 22. However 'tis manifeſt that the force they are under is a real force, and that of their fate but an imaginarie conceived one, the one but in their brains, the other on their ſhoulders, and it is not ſtrange if the irony chains are experimented to have more ſolidity, and ſo more efficacie in them, then the contemplative.
§. 23. Sed ſi Italos, ſay the Politick writers, But if this doctrine ſhould ever get among the Italians, whoſe wits are more acute (and ſure the Italians have not incloſed that excellencie from all the reſt of Europe) it would preſently put all into confuſion, they would ſoon diſcern the conſequences, and utmoſt improvements of the opinion, and never ſtick to caſt all on God, as the author of all, and having reſolved, with him in Homer, of the
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that all is chargeable on the ſuperiour cauſe, Jupiter and Fate, inferre regularly with him, (foreign) the blameleſneſs of the inferiour agent, and ſo there being no place left for ſin or law, immediately believe and follow their own wiſhes, turn Libertines, throw off all yoke of men as well as God. In intuition whereof I ſuppoſe it was that Plato would not permit in his Commonwealth any that ſhould affirm God to be the author of all the evils that were committed. And Proclus upon the Timaeus ſets them down as a third degree of Atheiſts, who attribute to God the impreſſing on men's mindes a neceſſity of doing whatſoever they doe.
§. 24. 'Tis true where there is any remainder of natural piety, he that believes the doctrine of abſolute decrees, may be thereby reſtrained from actually making the concluſions, inferring ſuch impious horrid conſequences (be they never ſo obvious and regular) of making God the author of ſin, and the like; But we know thoſe natural dictates are by unnatural ſins effaced in many, and when that one reſtraint is removed, the concluſion will be as eaſily believed as the premiſes, and where neither boldneſs nor skill are wanting to deduce it, that Concluſion will again turn Principle, and induce all vitious enormous living, which Laws were deſigned to reſtrain, but will no longer doe it, when themſelves are look'd on as impertinent invaders of liberty, deſpiſed firſt, and then hated.
§. 25. One farther conſideration hath been added to this former, that this doctrine being imbibed by Governours, is very apt to inſtill into them principles of tyrannie, if it be but by imitating and tranſcribing from God the notions which they have received of him, by doing that themſelves which they believe of him, puniſhing their ſubjects by no other rule but of their wills, decreeing their deſtruction firſt without intuition of any voluntary crime of theirs, and then counting it a part of their glory to execute ſuch decrees. Thus when Suetonius deſcribes Tiberius as a profeſſed contemner of all religion, and from thence was ſoon improved into the moſt intolerable tyrant, he renders the original of it, that he believed all things to be wrought by a fatalitie. But theſe are popular conſiderations, yet not unfit alſo to be taken in as appendent to the former.
Sin is not nothing.§. 26. Many artifices there are invented by the neceſſities of thoſe who have imbraced this doctrine, to intercept and avoid theſe conſequences of it; The two principal I ſhall name, 1. That ſin is a non-entitie, a nothing, and ſo that all things may be predetermined by God, and yet not ſin: 2. That though God be author of the act of ſin, yet he is not of the obliquitie of it, as the rider is cauſe of the horſes going, but not of his lameneſs, or halting, when he goes.
§. 27. For the former of theſe, which is a perfect phantaſie and ſchool notion, theſe things may be obſerved of it, that, beſides that it would be 1. very ſtrange ▪ that God ſhould damn a multitude of Angels and men for nothing; and 2. very ridiculous, that my ſwearing to a truth ſhould be an entitie, and my ſwearing to a falſitie, nothing; eating my own bread, enjoying my own wife, an entitie, and eating another man's bread, enjoying another man's wife, nothing; and 3dly, that which would ſoon fall back into the grand inconvenience of obſtructing Chriſtian life (for why ſhould a Chriſtian be ſuch a fool, as to be afraid of nothing, to flie and avoid nothing?) beſides theſe, I ſay, it is apparent that they that thus teach, profeſſe that ſins are predetermined, by name Adam's ſin, and Judas's ſin, and, if it be driven home, every ſin of every other man, as well as any other the moſt virtuous action. And yet farther, unleſs it could be gain'd that every virtuous action were nothing alſo, there would be little advantage in this matter, it being as contrary to judgment to come, to rewarding according to works, that one predetermined neceſſary action, which I could not but doe, ſhould be rewarded, as that another ſhould be puniſhed, and as certain a prejudice to all diligence, or purſuit of Chriſtian life, that I cannot chooſe but doe the good which I doe, as that I cannot but commit the ill that I commit, For although it be very agreeable to the goodneſs of God to abound in giving grace and inabling to doe good, to prepare, prevent, and aſſiſt, and contribute all that can be wanting to us, either to will, or doe, (as it is not competible with it ſo much as to incline any man to doe evil) and ſo there is a difference in that reſpect betwixt the good and the evil, yet to doe all this irreſiſtibly, for a fatal decree of heaven to contrive every good action of my life, ſo as it is impoſſible for me not to will and act, as God would have me, this is quite contrary to the nature of a voluntary agent, a rational creature, and conſequently to that will and decree of God, whereby he predetermined man to be ſuch, and as unreconcileable with reward or crown, as puniſhment is with that which is as much, but no more neceſſary.
§. 28. As for the diſtinction betwixt the act and the obliquitie, there is ſome truth in it,The diſtinction betwixt the act and the obliquitie. and uſe to be made of it, ſo farre as to free God, who is author of all man's power to act, from being in any degree the author of his acting obliquely or crookedly, i. e. ſinfully.
§. 29. For as it is impoſſible for us to move either to good or evil, except he that gave us our firſt beeing and powers, continue them minutely unto us, ſo he having uſed all wiſe and efficacious methods to incline and engage us to make uſe of his gifts unto his ſervice, and having contributed nothing to our evil choiſes, but his decree of permitting or not hindring them (and if he ſhould violently hinder, that would make us no whit leſſe guilty, he that would ſin, if he could, is as guilty as if he did; And without that permiſſion of evil, our good choiſes would neither be good, nor choiſes, and conſequently never be rewarded by him) it is moſt apparent that he is no author of the obliquities of our wills, but on the contrary that he doth as much to the ſtraightning of them, as without changing our natures (offering violence to our wills, which he hath decreed to remain free) he could prudently be imagined to doe.
§. 30. But this is no way appliable to this matter of freeing God from being the author of that ſin, of which he is acknowledged to predetermine the act; For 1. though a free power of acting good or evil, be perfectly diſtinct and ſeparable from doing evil, and therefore God, that is the author of one, cannot thence be inferred to be the author of the other, yet the act of ſin is not ſeparable from the obliquitie of that act, the act of blaſphemie from the obliquitie or irregularitie of blaſphemie, the leaſt evil thought or word againſt an infinite good God being as crooked as the rule is ſtreight, and conſequently he that predetermines the act, muſt needs predetermine the obliquitie.
§. 31. Nay 2dly, if there were any advantage to be made of this diſtinction in this matter, it would more truly be affirm'd on the contrary ſide, that God is the author of the obliquitie, and man of the act, For God that gives the rule, in tranſgreſſing of which all obliquitie conſiſts, doth contribute a great deal though not to the production of that act, which is freely committed againſt that rule, yet to the denominating it oblique, for if there were no law, there would be no obliquitie; God that gives the law that a Jew ſhall be circumciſed, thereby conſtitutes uncircumciſion an obliquitie, which, had he not given that law, had never been ſuch; But for the act (as that differs from the powers on one ſide, and the obliquitie on the other) it is evident that the man is the cauſe of that, 'tis man that circumciſeth, or chooſeth to be circumciſed, and ſo that refuſeth to receive that ſigne in his fleſh, and the act of killing Abel was as perfectly Cain's act, as the offering of his ſacrifice was, and ſo in all other acts, eſpecially of ſin, to which God doth not ſo much as incline, and the Devil can doe no more then perſwade any man.
§. 32. To conclude, the obliquitie of any act ariſing, by way of reſultance, from the tranſgreſſing of the rule (i. e. doing contrary to God's command) as inequality ariſeth from the adding or ſubſtracting an unity from an even number, it neceſſarily follows, that he that firſt gives the law, and then predetermines the act of tranſgreſſing (the diſobedience, the doing contrary to) that law, that firſt forbids eating of the tree of knowledge, and then predetermins Adam's will to chooſe, and eat what was forbidden, is by his decree guilty of the commiſſion of the act, and by his law the cauſe of its being an obliquitie, And indeed if the obliquitie, which renders the act a ſinful act, be it ſelf any thing, it muſt neceſſarily follow, that either God doth not predetermine all things, or that he predetermines the obliquitie; And regularity bearing the ſame proportion of relation to any act of duty, as obliquitie doth to ſin, it cannot be imagined that the author of the ſinful act, ſhould not be the author of the obliquitie, as well as the author of the pious act is by the diſputers acknowledged to be the author of the regularity of it.
§. 33. The complaint of the Gods in Homer will beſt ſhut up this,
foreign,
foreign
foreign.
O, how unjuſtly mortal men accuſe and charge the Gods, ſaying that their evils are from them, when the truth is, that they by their own wretchleſs courſes bring miſchiefs upon themſelves, above which their fate, or decree of the Gods can be deem'd to have brought upon them. And accordingly it is one of the excellent leſſons of the Pythagoreans in their golden verſes,
foreign,
This thou muſt know, that the evils that men fall under, are brought upon them by their own choiſes, On which even Chryſippus, the Stoick, and great aſſerter of fate, hath thus commented, foreign, Evils, or miſchiefs come to every man from himſelf, it being certain that by their own incitation they both ſin, and ſuffer, and that according to their own minde and purpoſe. This being ſo farre diſtant from the doctrine of fatality, it may well be wondred, how Chryſippus that aſſerted that, under the name of foreign and foreign, the chain, and the decree, (and defined it▪ ſaith †Noct: Att: l. 6. c. 2.Gellius, ſempiterna quaedam, & indeclinabilis ſeries rerum & catena, volvens ſemetipſa ſeſe, & implicans per aeternos conſequentiae ordines, ex quibus apta connexá que eſt, an eternal and unavoidable ſeries and chain of things folding and involving it ſelf within it ſelf by eternal courſes of conſequence, by which it is framed and connected, Or in his own dialect, li. foreign.that it is foreign, a natural complication of all things from all eternal, one thing following another, foreign, that complication being ſuch as cannot be changed) could believe himſelf, or reconcile this comment, or that verſe, with his great principles; And indeed †de Fato.Cicero hath paſt a right ſentence of it, Chryſippus aſtuans laboránſ que quonam pacto explicet & fato fieri omnia, & eſſe aliquid in nobis, intricatur— Chryſippus contending and labouring how to reconcile theſe two propoſitions, that all things are done by fate, and yet that ſomething is in our own power, is intangled, and cannot extricate himſelf. This Maſter of the Stoicks was preſt, ſaith Gellius, l. 6. c. 2.with theſe inconvenient conſequences of his doctrine of decrees, that then the ſins of men were not to be charged on their wills, but to be imputed to a neceſſity and preſſing, which aroſe from fate, that it muſt be unjuſt to make laws for the puniſhing of offenders, To which he had nothing to ſay but this, that though, if you look upon the firſt cauſe, all is thus fatally decreed, and chain'd, yet the diſpoſitions of each man's minde are only ſo farre ſubject to fate, as is agreeable to their own properties and qualities, as, ſaith he, when a man tumbles a cylindre or roller down an hill, 'tis certain that the man is the violent enforcer of the firſt motion of it, but when it is once a tumbling, the quality and propriety of the thing it ſelf continues, and conſummates it. In this witty reſemblance of that Stoick theſe three things muſt be conſider'd, Firſt, that the Cylindre (the inſtance that he thought fit to pitch on) is an inanimate, liveleſſe trunk, which hath nothing of choiſe, or will in it, Secondly, that neither the weight of the matter, of which 'tis made, nor the round, voluble form of it (which two meeting with a precipice, or ſteep declivity doe neceſſarily continue the motion of it) are any more imputable to that dead, choiſleſs creature, then the firſt motion of it was ſuppoſed to be, and therefore thirdly, that this cannot be a fit reſemblance to ſhew the reconcileableneſs of fate with choiſe, or the reaſonableneſs of charging on mens wills, what was inevitably produced by their fate, or of puniſhing them for thoſe acts, which they are neceſſarily driven to commit▪ To which purpoſe it may be remembred that neither is the Cylindre charged with ſin, whether by God, or men, nor any punitive law enacted by either againſt its rolling down the hill, nor indeed are ſuch charges, or ſuch laws ever brought in or enacted againſt any actions of any other creature, plant, or beaſt, till you aſcend to man, who is ſuppoſed to have a will, and not to be under ſuch inevitable, fatal laws, but to be, as that excellent man Pomponius Atticus was wont to ſay, the forger of his own fate, the framer of his fortune, which yet ſhould be as improper to be applied to, or affirm'd of a man, as of any other creature, if all his actions were as irreverſibly predetermined, as the deſcent of heavy bodies, or the aſcending of light, i. e. if Chryſippus's Cylindre and the motion thereof were a commodious inſtance, or reſemblance of this matter. But the truth is, the man was acute, and dextrous, could ſay as much for the reconciling of contradictions, as another, and though this laſt age hath conſidered this queſtion very diligently, and had the advantages of the writings of the former ages to aſſiſt them, yet he that ſhall impartially make the compariſon, will finde, that the antient Philoſophers have written more ſubtilely in this matter, and are more worth out reading, then any of our modern Schools, (he that ſhall ſurvey Hierocles on the foreign, Ammonius on Ariſtotles foreign, in ſhewing the nature of contingent, and neceſſary propoſitions, & the Chriſtian Philoſopher Boethius, lib. 2. de conſolatione philoſophiae, will, I believe, be convinced of the truth of what I ſay) and when the Maſter of them Chryſippus was ſo unable to ſpeak intelligible ſenſe, or extricate himſelf in this buſineſs, 'twill be leſſe matter of wonder to us, that they wch have eſpouſed this foreign, ſhould endevour as improſperouſly to reconcile this with other notions of piety, and to extricate themſelves out of a Labyrinth not of fewer, but more difficulties (God having moſt clearly revealed to Chriſtian, that as he rewardeth every man according to his works, ſo he requireth of him according to what he hath in his power to doe, and not according to what he hath not) as Chryſippus is by Cicero judged to have done.
§. 34. All which being duly conſidered, and the abſurdities of that diſtinction (thus applied) betwixt the act and the obliquitie, as manifeſt, as thoſe of Chryſippus's expedient, in thoſe ſo many forementioned reſpects, and the contrary ſo wide from the truth of Scripture, the attributes of God, and common notions of piety written in men's hearts, and experimented in the government of the world, and laſtly ſo noxious and poyſonous to good life, we may certainly conclude with Proſper, that great aſſerter of God's Grace, Reſp: ad 14. Object: Vincent: Ad praevaricationem legis, ad neglectum religionis, ad corruptelam diſciplinae, ad deſertionem fidei, ad perpetrationem qualiſcunque peccati, nulla omnino eſt Praedeſtinatio Dei. To the forſaking the law, to the neglecting religion, to the corrupting diſcipline, to deſerting the Faith, to the perpetration of whatſoever ſin, there is not at all any predeſtination of God. Si ergo in ſanctitate vivitur— If we live in ſanctity, grow in virtue and perſevere in good purpoſes, the gift of God is manifeſt in all this: Si autem ab his receditur,— But if we go back from theſe, if we paſſe over to vices and ſins, here God ſends no evil temptation, forſakes not the deſertor, before he be forſaken, and very frequently keeps him that would depart from departing, and cauſeth him to return, though he be departed. To which may be added that of the Arauſican Councel, which was very careful to aſſert the neceſſity of Grace, and yet pronounces an anathema againſt thoſe who affirm any to be by God predetermined to ſin.