A Pacific Discourse of Gods Grace, Part 3

A Pacific Discourse of Gods Grace · Part 3

p. 98The Extracts of three LETTERS Concerning Gods Praeſcience reconciled with Liberty and Contingency, referred to, and promiſed in the firſt Letter to D. Sanderſon, §. 8.

THE FIRST LETTER.

§. 1. AS to the diſtinction betwixt inevitably and infallibly, (of which you deſire my ſence) it is certain you muſt underſtand no more by the infallibility, then is vulgarly meant by Neceſſitas Neceſsitas ex hypotheſi.ex hypotheſi, which is no more then that whatſoever is, cannot not be, or, omne quod est, eo ipſo quod eſt, neceſſariò eſt. For ſo whatſoever is ſeen, or (which is all one in an infinite Deity) foreſeen by God, is thereby ſuppoſed to have, in that ſcience of his, an objective being; If it were not, or did not come to paſs, it ſhould have no ſuch objective being, if it Objective being.have, it is thereby evidenced to be ſeen by him, who was, is, and is to come, and ſo (being infinite) is equally preſent to all, and equally ſees, and knows all from all eternity. What therefore you conclude (as it is moſt agreeable to this, ſo it) is moſt true, that God knows all things as they are, ſuch as come to paſs contingently, he knows to come contingently, and from thence I undeniably conclude, therefore they are contingent; As for Socinus's reſolution Socinus's doctrine.that he foreſees onelyonly what are foreſeeable, and that contingents are not ſuch, but onelyonly thoſe that come to paſs by his decree, I conceive it as dangerous p. 99as M. Calvins, that he predetermines all things, Calvins.and it is viſibly as falſe. For it is evident by the prophecies of Judas &c. that God long (before) foreſees ſins, which are as certainly contingent, and not decreed or decreeable by God. If therefore any Gods foreſight of ſins.that writes againſt the Remonſtrants go about to retort their arguments, and conclude from their acknowledgements of Gods praeſcience, what is charged on their adverſaries doctrine of praedetermination, I conceive it is but a boaſt, that hath no leaſt force in it, praedetermination having a viſible influence and cauſality on the object, but eternal viſion, Difference betwixt Praedetermination and Praeviſion.or praeviſion being ſo far from impoſing neceſſity on the thing to be, that it ſuppoſes it to be already, from the free choice of the Agent, and that being of it is, in order of nature, before its being ſeen. Gods ſeeing, or foreſeeing hath no more operation or cauſality of any kind on the object, then my ſeeing your letter hath cauſed your letter. You wrote freely, and now I ſee it, and that being ſuppoſed, it is infallibly certain that you have written, and that you cannot not have written. And juſt ſo it is in reſpect of God. OnelyOnly I am finite, and ſo is my ſight, I ſee few things, and thoſe onelyonly which are preſent, but God being infinite ſees all ab infinito, that are never ſo long hence future.—At Cambridge they have lately printed Origen contra Celſum, and Philocalia Gr. & Lat. (which were rarely had and dear) the latter of which hath good Chapters on this ſubject.

§. 2. This Letter met with ſome prepoſſeſſions, ſo far advanced, as to cauſe a Reply of ſome length, and that neceſſitated my larger endeavours to remove them, which I ſhall here add alſo; His Reply, p. 100to which this referres, is none of my goodes, and therefore I may not take that liberty in diſpoſing of that, but you will diſcerne the force of it, in my returnes, which were as followes.

The Second LETTER.

SIR.

§. 3. I received your Letter, and in it your ſence of that difficult point, which I cannot approve of, but on the contrary aſſure my ſelf, that as Omnipotence is not onelyonly the power of doing all Omniſcience proportionable to Omnipotence.things that any or all creatures can do, but more then ſo, the doing all things that imply not a contradiction, (as the ſame thing at once to be and not to be, the doing of thoſe being as impoſſible to God, as it is to lye,) ſo the Omniſcience of God is the knowing all things which any creature can know, and not onelyonly ſo, but the knowing all things which implye not a contradiction to be known, and then that will be extenſible to all things that are paſt, preſent, or to come, of what ſort ſoever they are; what is paſt, or preſent, or being future is decreed by him, or comes to paſſe by ſome neceſſary cauſe in nature, which he decrees not to hinder, Gods knowledge of theſe will not, I ſuppoſe, be doubted of. All the queſtion will be of future contingents, which before they are done, Future contingents with in Gods reach.are poſſible to be, or not to be, but whenſoever p. 101they come to paſſe, are as determinately in being; as is any thing elſe, (the moſt neceſſary,) that is allready done. Unleſſe then, what by being future is out of my reach, is alſo by being future, out of Gods reach, there can be no pretenſe that any ſuch future contingent ſhould not be objicible to Gods all ſeeing knowledge.

§. 4. And that nothing that ever ſhall be, or will come to paſſe, is thus out of Gods reach, muſt ſure be yeilded to Gods immenſity, which relating Proved by Gods immenſity.to time, as well as place, it will be equally derogatory to it to limit it to the preſent time, in oppoſition to the future, and to the preſent, (be it whatſoever finite,) place. This therefore I take to be the one thing fit to be conſidered in this matter, whether Gods immenſity comprehend not a commenſuration to all time, and ſomewhat beyond that, as much as infinite is beyond finite.

§. 5. This I ſuppoſe cannot be denyed to the Notion which is due to a Deity, and if ſo, then God was immenſe from all eternity, and cannot be imagined to advance or arrive to this by any foreign, proficiency, or improvement, by continuing or enduring from the beginning to this time, or to the end of the world, but in every imaginable point of time, even before time was, he was thus immenſe, and if ſo, his knowledge being as immenſe as himſelf, all that he was from eternity preſent to, (i. e. all things that ever were or ſhall be,) muſt needs be objected to his knowledge.

§. 6. Againſt this, your prime argument is, that it is no more derogatory to his omniſcience not to know that which is in nature unintelligible, then to his Omnipotence, not to do things impoſſible.] This p. 102is expreſly Socinus's grand argument, and to it I Socinus's argument anſwered.anſwer. 1. That the phraſe, (in nature unintelligible,) may be ſet to ſignifie no more then what no naturall, i. e. created power can know, and then there is no truth in the propoſition, unleſſe proportionably [impoſſible] ſignify what no finite naturall created power can do: and if both thoſe phraſes be meant ſo, there is nothing gain'd by it, becauſe a Deity may both do and know more, then any creature can. But then ſecondly, the phraſe [in nature unintelligible] may alſo ſignifie that which in the nature of things, whether finite or infinite, created or uncreated, is not poſſible to be underſtood; And thus I ſuppoſe you meane it, and then the interpretation of the phraſe muſt be, that for ſuch a thing to be objicible to any, though infinite, underſtanding, implyes a contradiction, (for nothing elſe is ſimply impoſſible:) And Of the contradiction.this being your meaning, I abſolutely deny, that for God to be by his immenſity preſent to all time, (and all that he is preſent to, he may ſee,) implyes a contradiction, or hath any appearance, (to him that conſiders what infinite is,) of ſo implying. And if you will make tryall and attempt to prove it doth, it muſt be by proceeding on the known definition of contradictoryes, a repugnance in terminis, as idem eodem reſpectu eſſe & non eſſe, and then you will ſoon diſcerne the unqueſtionable truth of my deniall. For Gods ſeeing all future contingents, will neither imply God to be, and not to be, to ſee, and not to ſee, to ſee certainly, and not to ſee certainly, nor the future contingent to be, and not to be, or to be neceſſarily and not to be neceſſarily, or to be future, and not to be future. For the thing being future, and contingent now, p. 103and ſo continuing till it comes to paſſe, and when it comes to paſſe, coming to paſſe contingently, and ſo as it might not come to paſſe alſo, but when it actually is done, it implying a contradiction, (and ſo being impoſſible,) not to be done, and ſo being neceſſary neceſſitate hypotheticâ, i. e. ſuppoſing that it is, all this God ſees and knowes by the ſeverall acts of his intellect, anſwerable to the ſeverall notions of the thing.

§. 7. From all eternity, and ſo in every point of time, before it comes to paſſe, God ſees it both as future, and as contingent, and ſo, as that, which till it is, may be or may not be; and when it comes to paſſe, in ipſo fieri, he ſees the man that does it, act freely, having power to the contrary, and the thing never neceſſary, but as being done, and that onelyonly by that neceſſity, whereof that propoſition in logick is to be underſtood, Omne quod eſt, eo quod eſt, neceſſariò eſt. All which is very obvious to be conceived, and there is not the leaſt contradiction, or ſhew thereof in it.

§. 8. This one would thinke you readily granted, when you ſay, God infallibly knowes all that is paſt, preſent, or poſſible to be, (for no man demands any more,) yet you deny it again in theſe words, [meer contingents which with equall poſſibility may be, or may not be, have no being in act, and therefore can caſt no reflection, or objective being into the mind of God.] To which I reply, Firſt, that you ought to advert. 1. That what may be, or may not be, may be. 2. What may be, is poſſible, and 3. You your ſelf confeſſe that God knowes all that is poſſible. Secondly that the having no being in act, (which ſeemes to be your ſtumbling block,) is a phraſe proportioned to the thing, and to our p. 104finite underſtandings, to which the thing is future onelyonly, and ſo hath no being yet: but when God is conſidered as infinite, then whatſoever ſhall ever be in act, that actuall being of it, is the object of Gods ſight, and hath been ſo from all eternity, and is no more removed from him, then that is removed from me, which is preſent with me; And if you ſay, God ſees before, what in after time ſhall hang in the ballance of humane indetermination, i e. what he may do, deliberates, and is free to do, or not to do, but hath not yet done, I demand, why may he not alſo foreſee which end of the ballance doth at length overpoiſe? (Is not one of theſe as truly future, as the other, when the man is not yet borne?) And ſo again, which end doth not overpoiſe, and never will, although he ſee it might, if the man ſhould chooſe ſo, and that the man may ſo chooſe, but ſtill that he doth not. This is it, wherein you ſay the contradiction is, and now it is viſible there is none, nor the leaſt approach towards any.

§. 9. Here you add, (which is your ſecond main objection,) that it is a miſtake to call that A ſecond objection.poſſible, which God foreſees ſhall never be, for if God foreſees the contrary, (i. e. that it ſhall never be,) it is indeed impoſſible. But, 1. I pray, is nothing poſſible to come to paſſe, but what actually comes to paſſe? If ſo, nothing that is, is contingent. But if ſome things be poſſible to come to paſſe, which yet do not come to paſſe, why may not God ſee they will not come to paſſe? And if he can, then that is no miſtake, which you ſay is. 2. Do but change the word foreſight into (which is the ſame,) ſeeing from all eternity, and then it is plain, that God from all eternity may ſee that thing will never p. 105actually be, which yet is free for the agent to do, or not to do, (and God ſees that too,) and ſo is poſſible every way, ſave onelyonly ex hypotheſi, on ſuppoſition that it will never be; And as the bare hypotheticall neceſſity is no abſolute neceſſity, ſo the bare hypotheticall impoſſibility is no abſolute impoſſibility. 3. God ſees every thing as it is, and it's being or not being ſuch, is in order of nature antecedent to Gods ſeeing it; Therefore it infallibly followes, that if it be poſſible to be, though it ſhall never be, God ſees it is poſſible to be, and if God ſees it poſſible, it unavoidably followes that it is poſſible.

§. 10. And it is not fit here to interpoſe, that though it ſeem to us poſſible, in reſpect of ſecond cauſes, yet if God foreſee the contrary, it is indeed impoſſible;] For what I am by God left free to do, or not to do, that, not onelyonly ſeemes, but is indeed poſſible, and ſo it is, though in event I never do it, and being ſo in it ſelf, God's ſeeing it will never be, hath no leaſt influence upon it, ſo as to make the leaſt change in it, (for that is the work of his will, not of his knowledge,) and ſo it cannot from poſſible convert it into impoſſible.

§. 11. When therefore you ſay, no cauſe can effect that which God ſees ſhall never be, this is onelyonly true in ſenſu compoſito, that, in caſe it ſhall never be, and ſo God ſees it ſhall never be, no cauſe ſhall effect it, but in ſenſu diviſo it is moſt falſe, for I am truly able to write more lines to you then I ſhall ever write, or conſequently then God foreſees I ſhall write, and even this, that I am thus able, God equally foreſees.

§, 12. By this you ſee how far I am from being convinced, or by any reaſon forced to grant, that p. 106future determinations of free agents are not foreſeeable, and what the inconvenience is of affirming they are not, even no leſs then derogating from Gods Immenſity, and Infinity, and judging the perceptions of an infinite Creator by our finite, created meaſures, his more then unfathom'd Ocean by my ſpan, and feigning contradictions, where there are none.

§. 13. Now to the Inconveniences which you enumerate, Inconveniences enumerated and anſwered. The firſt.I ſhall reply alſo, as oft as I perceive I have not prevented, or anſwered them already. The firſt is, that the ſight can be no more certain then the things are which are ſeen, and therefore there cannot be a certain knowledge of thoſe things, which in their cauſes are uncertain,] I anſwer that all the certainty of the knowledge of any thing depends upon its being firſt, and then of its being known to be, and not onelyonly upon the certainty of its cauſes; I do now as certainly know that I have written nine pages to you, as I know that the fire burns, therefore that may be known certainly, which is not certain in its cauſes. And as that which is preſent to me is certainly known by me, ſo are all things to come from all eternity, preſent to an immenſe Creator, be they contingent, or not. And in this caſe there is not more in the effect then in the cauſe, for what is contingently come to paſs, being done, is certain, and cannot be undone, and God ſees it, as it is, therefore he ſees it as done, and ſo certain, yet as done contingently, and ſo as that which might not have been, the being, certain, the manner of its coming to act, uncertain. The being then being the cauſe of the ſeeing, or in nature antecedent to it, and the ſeeing the effect or conſequent of the being, the certainty of the effect is p. 107but proportionable to, and exceedeth not the cauſe.

§. 14. The ſecond Inconvenience is, that of ſaying The ſecond.that every thing that happens was certain to be, before it happens] But I ſay not ſo, unleſs by certain you mean ex hypotheſi, certain to be, in caſe it be; for in caſe it ſhould not be, God ſhould ſee it would not be, and then it ſhould be as certainly otherwiſe.

§. 15. The ſhort is, All Exhortations, Induſtry, Preaching, &c. are founded in the liberty of our actions, and if they be free till they be actually determined, and then are paſt freedome, and become neceſſary, ſo conſequently muſt Exhortations, &c. be all uſefull, till the thing be done, (and then indeed, as to the doing, or not doing that, they are not uſefull, but their ſecond ſeaſon of uſefulneſs comes in, in caſe it were a ſin, Exhortation to Repentance, &c.) and that is as much, as can be or need be pretended to, and this is fully competible with Gods ſeeing certainly from all eternity, whatſoever ſhall come to paſs in time; His ſeeing it ſuppoſing it done, though for the manner of its being done, that were contingent, and if ſo, then is it not certain to be, before it happens, but it is certain to be, when it is, and it firſt is, in order of nature, before it is ſeen, and its being already ſeen, before it be done, depends onelyonly on the immenſity of Gods preſence, and ſight, which reacheth out to all that ever ſhall be; ſo that that which is future to us, he is preſent to it, and in that ſence, though he ſees it as future, tis yet preſent to him.

§. 16. Your third inconvenience is, that, by this, the damnation of ſuch or ſuch men is as fixed and unalterable, The third.as though they were reprobated from all p. 108eternity, and it is as ill in respect of me, if I muſt inevitably be damned by my own free will, as if I had been ſentenced to Hell by Gods decree, and in respect of God worſe, for he muſt be deprived of the free exerciſe of his omnipotence, (becauſe he cannot make that not to be which he foreſees will be) and brought under a Stoicall Fatality, and ſo be an helpleſs ſpectatour of what anothers will is pleaſed to effect.] I anſwer if by [ſuch and ſuch men] you mean ſuch or ſuch individuall entities, without reſpect to their qualifications or demeanures, then all your conſequence, as it is inconvenient, ſo it is falſe, for from Gods ſeeing ab aeterno, that Judas will be reprobated, it follows not, that he ſees he will be reprobated, but for his willfull Treaſon. But if you mean by ſuch or ſuch men] men ſo or ſo qualified, i. e. finally impenitent, then 'tis true, but not inconvenient, that finall impenitents, ſhould from all eternity be reprobated. And ſpeaking of theſe in this ſence, 'tis true, which you add, that it is as ill in reſpect of the perſon, i. e. finall impenitents, meaning by [as ill] as ſad and penal, nay 'tis more ſad, and penal to be reprobated for final impenitence, which I am guilty of by my own freewill, then it would be to be onelyonly by Gods decree involved in it, my willful culpable guilt being ſome addition to my miſery, and (as long as God is juſt) it being expectable that thoſe puniſhments will be ſharper, which I bring on my ſelf, by the exerciſe of my free will, then what comes on me by a decree grounded no way in my actions. And ſo ſtill this is no Inconvenience. But if you mean by [as ill] that which hath as little mixture of Gods goodneſs towards me, then your conſequence is falſe, for to Gods ſeeing Judas reprobated, p. 109and his ſeeing it ab aeterno, it is no way conſequent, that he gives him no power to eſcape Damnation, viz. Grace to be able to ſtand and not fall, or Grace to recover if he will make uſe of it, but the contrary rather follows; For how can God ſee him damned for the betraying Chriſt, and not repenting and returning, unleſs this were done wilfully by him (ſins of weakneſs and ignorance finding mercy, as in the caſe of Saul, perſecuting the Church) and unleſs he were firſt a Diſciple of Chriſt, and ſo were illuminated, and aſſiſted by Chriſt, and if he were ſo, then he had this power and Grace, or might have had it, if he were not wanting to himſelf, and if ſo, then this was not ſo ill to him (in this ſenſe, of which now I ſpeak) as to have been irreſpectively reprobated, and never vouchſafed this Grace.

§. 17. So when you ſay It is worſe in respect of God, and prove that becauſe he muſt be deprived of the free exerciſe of his omnipotence] there is no truth in that conſequence, or the reaſon of it. For Gods omnipotence conſiſts not in being able to make both parts of a contradiction true, that were in the very attempt a departing from veracity, a falſeneſs, a ſin, and ſo the greateſt impotence, and ſo moſt contrary to omnipotence. And ſuch is that, which alone your conſequence, and the reaſon of that ſuppoſes, making that not to be, which he foreſees will be, for by the latter part of that expreſſion you mean that w^ch from eternity he ſees to be done, and then to be done and not to be done, is in terminis contradictory. And this impotence or not being able to cauſe the ſame thing at once to be and not to be, is far from all notions of Stoical fatality, that I ever heard of (els ſure all rationall creatures muſt be Stoicks, for p. 110they all reſolve that what is, cannot not be) and as far from making God an idle helpleſs ſpectator of what anothers will is pleaſed to effect: for his providence, and aſſiſtence, and efficacy belong to other things, not to the making that not to be, when it is, but to the preventing it before it came, giving Grace ſufficient, preventing, reſtraining, exciting, &c. ordering it and diſpoſing of it to his own wiſe ends, when it is done, and puniſhing the doer juſtly, if he repent not, to which he is alſo ready to give Grace, if he humbly ask, and ſeek and knock for it: All this is ſuppoſed to be done by God, and ſo God is no helpleſs ſpectator, and all this is reconcileable with the effects being wrought by our free will, as long as Gods grace works not irreſiſtibly.

§. 18. Here I remember that of S. Auguſtin. de Civ. l. 5. c. 10. Nullo modo cogimur, aut retenta praeſcientia Dei, tollere voluntat is arbitrium, aut retento voluntatis arbitrio, Deum, quod nefas eſt, negare praeſcium futurorum, (this is expreſly contrary both to the Calviniſts pretenſion on one ſide, and the Socinians on the other.)

§. 19. Your fourth inconvenience is, that then God never purpoſed to ſave all mankind.] If by purpoſing The fourth.you mean decreeing, and by ſaving, actually beſtowing heaven upon them, then that conſequence is true, but not in the leaſt wiſe inconvenient, for God never decreed to ſave final impenitents, and ſuch are many of mankind, after the giving of Chriſt, but on the contrary, hath ſworn ſuch ſhall not enter into his reſt. The ſaving of mankind which God decreed is the redeeming them, and giving them Chriſt, and Grace, and making them ſalvable, and being deficient in nothing toward p. 111that end to thoſe, that will make uſe of it. As for the other notion of Salvation, it is no where ſaid that God purpoſed that in the notion of decreeing, but onelyonly that he ſo will'd as to deſire it, and to give ſufficient means of effecting it, but thoſe means proportioned to rational agents, and ſo not violent or irreſiſtible, or ſuch as ſhould, by being contrary to freedome, exclude rewardableneſs. So when you ſay, Chriſt could not have an intention to dye for them, who he foreſees would be nothing advantaged by it] if by dying for them] you mean ſo dying, that they ſhould actually be ſaved, ſo 'tis true, he intended not to dye for thoſe that are finally impenitent, and ſo are not advantaged by it, for ſure it is no part of his Covenant or intention in dying, to ſave ſuch: but if by dying for them you mean purchaſing pardon, upon ſuppoſition of repentance, then that he intended thus to dye for them, that make not this advantage of it, (and ſo he ſees make it not) appears evidently by many texts, which tell us of his redeeming thoſe that deny him, that periſh, &c. and is intimated by the very ſtyle you uſe of their being nothing advantaged by it, for if he did not purchaſe thoſe advantages for them, why is that phraſe uſed?

§. 20. Your fifth Inconvenience is, that on this The fifth.ſuppoſition, God could not ſeriouſly call upon ſuch, whom his preſcience points out for Damnation, to repent, more then I could bid him take heed that he fall not, whom by tumbling down I ſaw mortally bruiſed already.] I anſwer, 1. that if you mean any more by that phraſe [his praeſcience points out to Damnation] then [he ſees ab aeterno, that they will not repent, but dye in their ſins,] I reject the phraſe, as not belonging to the queſtion, my hypotheſis p. 112being far from yielding, that praeſcience doth any other way, but this, or in any other ſenſe, point out any to damnation. And therefore changing that obſcurer for this other more perſpicuous phraſe, I ſay that Gods praeſcience of mens not making uſe of his call, is very reconcileable with the ſeriouſneſs of his call, which I inferr from Gods own words, and oath, as I live, ſaith the Lord, I deſire not the death of him that dyes, turn you, turn you, for why will you dye? what can be more ſerious then this ſpeech, directed to thoſe that dye, and he ſees, obſtinately will dye. But this differs widely from my warning him to take heed of falling, whom I ſee actually fall'n, becauſe whenſoever God thus calls not to fall, the man is not fall'n: when he calls him to ariſe again, being fall'n, he is not irreverſibly fall'n, and therefore accordingly he calls him (not, not to fall, but) to riſe again. And what God thus doth in time, God ab aeterno decreed to do, and his foreſeeing it would not produce the deſired effect, was in order of nature after the decree of doing it, and therefore is in no reaſon to have any influence on (ſo as to change) the decree, and if not ſo, then the decree ſtanding ſtill in force, it is moſt neceſſary that it ſhould be performed, and ſo that God ſhould in time call thus ſeriouſly to repentance.

§. 21. And indeed, for God to foreſee (as he doth, or els would not puniſh for it,) that his moſt ſerious call will be rejected, and yet not to ſuppoſe his call is moſt serious, is an abſolute contradiction, and ſo cannot poſſibly be ſuppoſed or imagined.

§. 22. To my argument of Judas's ſin being foreſeen, and foretold by God, from whence I conclude p. 113The foreſeeing of Judas's ſin.that that is foreſeen which is not cauſed by God, or to which the man is not determined by any act of Gods will) which you ſay is very preſſing, you anſwer by referring to my judgement 1. whether the Prophecies could not have been fullfilled, had Judas never been born: 2. whether by liſtning to his Maſter he could not have repented, &c.] The argument from thence defended.To the firſt I anſwer, that the prophecy, as it was terminated in him, could not poſſibly have been fullfilled, had he never been born, and that the foreign, or utmoſt completion of the prophecy Pſal. 41. 9. was terminated in him, the holy Ghoſt by S. Peter tells us, Act. 1. To the ſecond, that I doubt not but by liſtning to Chriſt, he might have repented, and then God foreſaw that he might, yet foreſaw he would not do what he might, and ſo foretold this; whereas if he would have done otherwiſe, it is as undoubted, that God ſhould have foreſeen that, and might, if he had pleaſed, have foretold it alſo, as Chriſt did not onelyonly his treaſon, but alſo S. Peters denyall, and repentance alſo. As for that which you ſuggeſt, that the prophecy of him might be like that of Jonah, conditional] 1, there is little probability for it, when the event hath ſo much otherwiſe interpreted it, which if it had not done, I ſhould not have reſiſted your ſuggeſtion, as far as concerned his periſhing. But then 2. you know my Argument was founded in Gods foreſeeing his ſin (and no his periſhing) and to that his conditional foreſight, exemplified in Jonas to Nineveh, is not applyable,

§. 23. That which you cite from Chryſoſtome, who gives for a reaſon why Chriſt admitted Judas Hom. 83. … Mat.to the Sacrament, that nothing might be omitted that might conduce to his amendment] belongs not to p. 114your firſt, but ſecond queſtion, and ſo I allowed of it, as you ſee, and am not prejudiced by it. For to your concluding queſtion I anſwer expreſly, Chriſt look'd on Judas's not ſinning, or repenting, as poſſible, till by his repudiating all the means of Grace, and his meaſure of iniquity fill'd up, he withdrew his Grace from him, which whether he did before, or not till his death, I have no means of deſining. OnelyOnly this I reſolve, that Chriſts foreſeeing what he would do, had no leaſt influence on the effect, any more then the effect hath on the cauſe, or the ſenſe on the object, Gods foreſight being in nature conſequent to, and cauſed by his doing it, not the cauſe of it. And when you ſay, that if it were poſſible, then the contrary was not certain, I grant it was not certain, till it was done, and when you inferr, then it could not be foreſeen, I deny the conſequence, for thoſe things which are not certain, till they are done, may by an immenſe Deity be ab aeterno ſeen to come to paſſe in time, and ſo that ſight or foreſight be as certain, as a foreſight of what is moſt neceſſary in its cauſes: and the reaſon is clear, becauſe of that which is done, it is as certain that it is done, as of that which is in cauſis, it is certain, that it is in cauſis, and being ſo, it may caſt a reflexion on the underſtanding of him that is preſent to it, and ſo is God to futures, as well as to the preſent.

§ 24, And when you ſay in your Poſtſcript, that it is a contradiction to ſay that things paſt or future are preſent, and therefore all things are not, nay cannot be preſent to God;] I anſwer, 1. that you uſe not the right definition of a Contradiction, in ſaying thus, for future doth not contradict preſent, but preſent and not preſent is a contradiction, and ſo p. 115future and not future; 2. although it be granted of any finite thing, that it cannot be both preſent and future, yet God being immenſe, may and muſt be preſent to that which is future, or els he is bounded and limited. Yet this doth not inferr God to ſee what is future as preſent (which you ſay is to be deceived) but to ſee what is future as future, which though indeed it be future, yet he by his immenſity may be preſent to it. And none of the inconveniences, which you add, follow on this; onelyonly let me tell you (on ſtrength of that Propoſition, Quicquid eſt neceſſario eſt id quod eſt) that as God cannot change what is paſt, ſo he cannot change that which is preſent, ſo as to make it, when it is preſent, not preſent, and then no more can he change that which is future, ſo as to make it not future. All that can be done is, either 1. to make that which is contingent (and ſo may be or may not be) to become neceſſary, by decreeing it; or 2. to come to paſs really, though but contingently, or els 3. not to come to paſs, or finally to leave it ſtill free, yet to foreſee what will freely be done, as much as what will neceſſarily be done.

§. 25. So that you ſee the maxime which you miſlike, is not ſo much, that all things are preſent to God, i. e. repreſented to him ſub ratione praeſentis, as this, that God by his immenſity is preſent to all things, and his ſight being as infinite as his being, this is as eaſie to be underſtood, as the other, or as any infinite is comprehenſible by our finite underſtandings, which you call duller apprehenſions, for ſo ſure are all ours, when we imploy them upon infinites. You ſee into what a length I am run, indeed much above mine own intentions, but ſhall not repent of it, if it contribute to the diſabuſing p. 116you, and ſhewing you the way out of this intricacy.

§. 26. This ſecond Letter having ſome enforcements of the old, and addition of new ſcruples, returned to it, by the ſame hand, which I accounted it my duty to anſwer at Large, by a third letter, (which I ſuppoſe will conclude this controverſy,) I ſhall here alſo ſubjoin it. It was as followeth.

The Third LETTER.

SIR.

§. 27. THough yours of—made haſt to me, yet I found no leaſure to afford it any ſerious reflections, till this—and therefore being already guilty of two long delayes, I ſhall not now encreaſe them by prooeme, but fall immediately to the view of your reply. And in it, what you firſt lay down, partly by way of conceſſion, partly by way of apology for your own Notion, partly by way of oppoſition to mine, I muſt confeſſe I ſee not what propriety of application it hath to that The ground of our aſſertion Gods immenſity, and the no implicancy of a contradiction. Gods immenſity extends to the knowledge of all things poſsible.which was the ground-work of my Paper, viz: that whatſoever hath a being, or ever ſhall have a being, (which though by being future 'tis out of my reach, yet by being future, is not removed out of Gods reach,) is objicible to Gods all-ſeeing eye of knowledge, and this upon the grounds of his infinite unlimited immenſity, by you and by all Chriſtians acknowledged, p. 117and the no contradiction, (which alone renders it impoſſible to God,) which it implyes, for God thus to reach out immenſly, and ſee all ab aeterno, which (and in the manner as it) in time comes to paſſe.

§. 28. In ſtead of ſhewing this implicancy of a contradiction, (which alone was to have been done,) you have tendred a reaſon to prove, [that An objection againſt that anſwered.God's knowledge is not properly ſaid to be immenſe, in regard he knowes all things poſſible,] viz: becauſe they conjunctim are not abſolutely infinite. But ſure this hath no force againſt my poſition, which doth not prove Gods immenſity of knowledge, Gods immenſity ſuppoſed not proved.by this argument of his knowing all things poſſible, or by any other, but takes that for granted, and needing no proofe, and from thence inferres and concludes the other, viz: his knowing all things paſt, preſent or future, and againſt this concluding 'tis viſible your reaſon is of no kind of force, [for that theſe conjunctim are not infinite,] for an immenſe knowledge may and muſt ſee all finites, though it ſelf be infinite.

§. 29. So again, when you ſay his immenſity cannot relate to time, and place, which are both finite, A ſecond objection.and you cannot ſee how any quantitative extenſion ſhould be ſubjected in a purely ſpirituall eſſence, and preſs this with abſurdityes, and ſtrange conſequences, (as if it were maintained by them, againſt whom your debates lye,) if you conſider again, you will ſee, there was no cauſe for it, I am ſure in my papers there was none, which when they propoſed to your conſideration, whether Gods immenſity comprehend not a commenſitration to all time, immediately added, and ſomewhat beyond that, as much as infinite is beyond finite. By comprehending p. 118a commenſuration to all time, if when What is meant by commenſuration to all time.it had that immediate addition to explaine it, it can be miſunderſtood, I muſt then farther expreſſe my ſelf, that I meant, no quantitative extenſion, or indeed any more then this, that God is, was, and ſhall be, from, and to all eternity, and as his eſſence, ſo is his Immenſity, Omnipreſence, Omniſcience; he ſees and knowes all things, not onelyonly that are or have been, but that ever ſhall, or will be, i. e. ſhall ever have an actuall being, objicible to knowledge, and even for poſſibles, that yet never come to paſſe, he ſees and knowes both parts. 1. That they are poſſible to be. 2. That they will never be.

§. 30. This I have added in relation to thoſe words of yours, on which you ſeem to lay weight, [The time to come is now no time, as the things A third objection.which meerly be poſſible, are now no things, and therefore to apprehend that God is in ſuch time, or that ſuch things are preſent with him, is to conceive that that is not.]

§. 31. Here, Firſt, let me tell you, your compariſon, Anſwered.or proportion holds not, being laid betwixt the time to come, which is really future, and the things meerly poſſible, which ſhall never be; But paſſing that, 'tis certain Secondly, that though the time to come, according to our finite meaſures, is now to us no time, i. e. is not the preſent time, (which holds equally of the time paſt, which being paſt is now to us not preſent,) yet in reſpect of Gods immenſity this cannot be ſaid, for What is future is objicible to God.that were to encumber him with our ſinite rules, and meaſure infinity by our ſpan of time, which with me you profeſſe to avert, and abhor.

p. 119§. 32. So though the things meerly poſſible are So what is meerly poſsible.now no things, (I ſhall add, nor ever ſhall be,) yet even theſe are objicible to him as they are, i. e. as things meerly poſſible; which yet never ſhall actually be, for he may and doth ſee that they are poſſible, and alſo that they ſhall not come to paſſe.

§. 33. And when againſt this you argue, that A fourth objection anſwered.this is to conceive that which is not,] If you mean by it, that which is not actually, I grant it, but find no inconvenience in affirming, that God ſees or conceives that to be poſſible, which he ſees is not, nay ſhall never be; But if you meane, that if ſo, then God conceives contrary to truth, there is then no ſhew of truth in that conſequence, for his conceiving that to be meerly poſſible, which is meerly poſſible, is to ſee according, (and that is not contrary,) to truth. Nazianzen's ſpeech that God foreign, alwayes is, but neither properly foreign Orat. 4….was, nor foreign, ſhall be, and that eternity is neither foreign time, nor foreign, part of time, is ſo far from having any unkind aſpect on my notions, that it is the very thing that I contend, that we No proportion between our finite and Gods infinite.muſt not go about to fathom eternity by our finite lines of time, but lay all that is done in time, or ever ſhall be, foreign, naked and bare before him, and ſtill acknowledge that beyond this, there is an infinite abyſſe, which we cannot fathom.

§. 34. On this what you build, and apply equally to that which is paſt, and future, [that which Aſiſt objection anſwered.is paſt vaniſhing, ſay you, into nothing, and before it was, being nothing,] might (me thinks) by being reflected on, extricate you out of your labyrinth. For can you doubt that God knowes what p. 120is now paſt? I preſume you do not, can not; God may know that which actually is not.And then why may he not as well know what is future? When the onelyonly objection to that, being [becauſe it is not, and he muſt then know that, that is not,] you have equally reſolved, that that which is paſt, is not, as that that is future; and ſo that your objection, either holds againſt both, or neither, I pray conſider this.

§. 35. Next when you inſiſt, that the acts of his infinite underſtanding, in relation to the creature, A ſixt objection anſwered.muſt needs be finite, as the creatures are finite.] I cannot apprehend, how you can reap any the leaſt advantage by it, meaning, as the words import, that God ſees things as they are, for this you know and acknowledge is my ground alſo, and to this it is conſequent, (and ſo not ſtrange,) that whatſoever he ſees ab aeterno, he muſt ſee, as it is, Gods ſeeing every thing as it is.i. e. as it is done in time, whether neceſſarily, or contingently, but no way conſequent, that he can ſee nothing ab aeterno, becauſe it is in time that it comes to paſſe, for that which comes to paſſe in time, he that is eternall, and immenſe, and omniſcient, may (ſeeing it implyes no contradiction,) ſee ab aeterno, though I who am finite, and whoſe ſight is limited, and finite, cannot.

§. 36. When therefore you argue, that it is no more derogatory to his eternal wiſdome, to ſay that A ſeventh objection anſwered.he ſees or knowes this or that in time, and not ab aeterno, then it is to his infinite power, to ſay that it workes in a finite manner,] Me thinks the fallacy ſhould be to groſs to impoſe on you, upon a ſecond view: The former member of your compariſon expreſſly denying his ſeeing or knowing ab aeterno, which is the greateſt derogation to immenſity, and omniſcience and eternity, when the p. 121latter hath no ſuch negation of his power of working, but affirmes onelyonly that he workes in a finite manner, (which he may do ſometimes, when there is no need of interpoſing his infinite power,) but not that he workes not ab aeterno, which the proportion, if it were obſerved, would exact, and then that would be as derogatory to his power alſo.

§. 37. The obſerving of this will I hope cleare to you that which you ſay is ſo ſtrange, it being but the ſame fallacy again in another dreſſe, (which therefore I ſhall no farther purſue,) or if the reaſon which An eigth objection anſwered.you add, from the temporarineſs of the creature, which ab aeterno had no being, ſave onelyonly in mere poſſibility,] have ſtill any force with you, I hope it will ceaſe to have ſo, when 1. you conſider that an objective being is ſufficient to cauſe knowledge, and that it's being in time is no hindrance to an immenſe Deity to ſee it ab aeterno, for if he may ſee it a day before it comes to paſſe, why may he not equally ab aeterno? 2. That futures, though contingent, differ from meer poſſibilityes, that which is meerly poſſible never coming to an actuall being, and ſo being not future, and of ſuch I ſhould erre indeed ſtrangely, if I thought God did foreſee them Difference between poſsible and future.as future, or ſee them as having an actuall being. It ſuffices that he ſees them as they are, i. e. as meerly poſſible, and why that which is poſſible, though it never be, God may not ſee ab aeterno to be poſſible, I neither ſee, nor am offered by you any ſhew of reaſon. How you come to conceive it ſaid by your adverſaryes that the acts of Gods underſtanding are all neceſſarily eternall, (you meane I ſuppoſe by your whole diſcourſe ab aeterno,) All Gods acts are not ab aeterno.I gueſs not, when he that ſaith God ſees ab p. 122aeterno, what now I do, muſt alſo grant that he now, i. e. in time ſees me do it, or elſe could not believe him Omniſcient. 'Tis the part of immenſity to do both, and of Omniſcience to know all things both future, and preſent, and the affirming one of theſe is very far from denying the other.

§. 38. You ſay this is no convincing argument, Gods underſtanding was infinite ab aeterno, therefore A ninth objection anſwered.whatever he knowes, he knew ab aeterno, more then this, Gods power, &c. was infinite ab aeterno, ergo: what he does now, he does ab aeterno.] But 1. Who urged that former argument in that forme? Not I ſurely. 2. If I now ſhall, your parallel bears no proportion with it, unleſs the antecedent and conſequent be better ſuited then they are; For in your antecedent you ſpeak of power, in the conſequent of doing, which belongs to Gods will, not to his power, (for ſure God does onelyonly what he wills, not whatſoever he hath Gods knowledge ſuitable to his power,power to do, or to will.) But ſet both to the ſame, viz. to his power, and then it will follow inevitably thus, Gods power and ability of doing whatſoever he pleaſed was infinite ab aeterno, ergo. Whatſoever he now does he had power to do ab aeterno; And this is the argument which alone is ſuitable to the former, Gods underſtanding was infinite ab aeterno, ergo. Whatſoever he knowes, (or now ſees,) he knew or ſaw ab aeterno, i. e. Whatſoever now is, or ever ſhall be done. Both theſe are apparently true, though one of thoſe which you had ſuited amiſs, were falſe, the other remaining true.

p. 123§. 39. Having removed theſe rubs, which you ſay thus hinder your conſent, I ſhall hope you will yeild to as much as I pretend, which is not, you ſee, that God coexiſts to things that neither are, nor Gods coexiſtence to all that ever is, not to what never ſhall be.ever will be, i. e. to things onelyonly poſſible, but not future, but that Gods immenſity is ſuch, as that he reacheth out and is preſent, ab aeterno, to all that is done in time, and ſo that all that ever ſhall be, is ab aeterno objected to his knowledge; Againſt this nothing that you have ſaid in your five firſt pages hath any ſemblance of force, and therefore I hope this now will be granted by you, and then I have it under your hand at the bottom of your fift page, that moſt of your objections will be eaſily anſwered, which therefore I might leave your ſelf to do; but having a little more leaſure then ordinary, I will a while accompany you in the view of every of them; and begin with your defence of your firſt objection.

§. 40. And there Firſt, when to prove it to The enforcements of the former objections anſwered.imply a contradiction that a thing that is not, (as, ſay you, all mere poſſibles are,) ſhould be intelligible, you thus argue, it's being intelligible implyes that it is, ſo it is, and it is not, (which is a contradiction,) the fallacy is two fold, 1. You confound futures that are, (by being ſuch,) ſuppoſed The firſt enforcement of the firſt.to have an objective being, though not as yet an actuall, with meer poſſibles, which never ſhall be, and ſo are not future, but onelyonly poſſible to be, and agreeably are ſeen and known onelyonly to be poſſible, but not to be future, and 2. You confound an objective being which alone is implyed in being intelligible, with preſent, or actuall being; and now take it out of theſe ambiguities, and ſet it as it is, that God ab aeterno did, or now doth ſee that p. 124which to day is not, but to morrow ſhall be, and then what is become of that, [is and is not,] i. e. of the contradiction? or conſequently of your whole cauſe? Nothing being impoſſible to God, but what implyes a contradiction; which therefore again I preſſe; ſhew the contradiction, or yeild the cauſe.

§. 41. Secondly, when to your ſaying that all The ſecond.things paſt, preſent, or poſſible, are known to the divine wiſdom, I returned a parentheſis, [No man demands any more,] and you now reply, that I did not fully apprehend your meaning, which was that God knew all things poſſible, not as future, my rejoynder is, that I well diſcerned the difference betwixt poſſible and future, all things being not future, which are poſſible; Yet becauſe all futures are poſſible, (though all poſſibles are not future,) I could not miſapprehend your words, which ſpake of all things poſſible,] in concluding that all futures were comprehended under that ſtyle of all things poſſible, for ſure futures are in that number, and then if all futures were intelligible to God, and by you granted to be infallibly known by him, this as I ſaid, was all I demanded. There is difference I conceive, betwixt poſſible and Poſsible and meerly poſsible differ.meerly poſſible, all futures are poſſible, but what is meerly poſſible excludes futurity. Sometimes you ſpeake of meer poſſibilityes, and then I never apprehend you to meane futures, as, when you ſpeake of all that is poſſible, I am obliged to do.

§. 42. Now then if you ſpake, or ſpeake of meer poſſibilityes, and ſay that God knew all things meerly poſſible, as meerly poſſible, and not as future, you ſay moſt truly, but then your example p. 125of A. B's future marriage is nothing to your purpoſe, for if it be conſidered as future, then though it be yet poſſible to be, or not to be, yet it is not meerly poſſible, for by being ſuppoſed future, it is conſequent that it ſhall be, whereas what is meerly poſſible, ſhall never be. When therefore you ſay, both are known by God as poſſible, (viz: that he ſhall marry, and that he ſhall not,) neither as future, you deceive your ſelf, for though he ſees both as poſſible, yet he ſees one as future, viz: as contingently future, future when it might be otherwiſe, and the other as meerly poſſible, i. e. not future, ſees it, I ſay, as future, not by conſequences, Scientia media.or per ſcientiam mediam onelyonly, in the ordinary notion of that, viz, if this be, that will follow, (for which ſcience there is place ſometimes in things meerly poſſible, and not future, as in the example of the Oracle concerning the men of Keilah, that if David truſted them, they would deliver him up, when yet he not truſting himſelf to them, they did not, could not deliver him,) but by reaching out ſo far as to ſee it done, in that other notion of Scientia media, whereby God ſees what man will freely do, and not onelyonly conditionally what he might or would do.

§. 43. Your following objections againſt this, that what is known as future, is certainly known will be, but A. B's marriage is altogether uncertaine,] is of no more force then the anſwer of the double neceſſity, ſimplex, and ex hypotheſi evacuates, for what is certainly known will be, may be alſo in reſpect of the agent uncertain, as being free for him to do, or not to do, which notwithſtanding when he hath done, it is then certainly p. 126what it is, and as ſo, it is ſeen by God from all eternity.

§. 44. Thirdly, when I ſaid that the having no being in act, is a phraſe proportioned to the thing, and to our finite underſtandings, 'tis viſible. 1. That I ſpake of the phraſe, and nothing elſe. 2. That my meaning is, that to our finite underſtandings that is not preſent, or in act, which is ſtill future, but yet God by his immenſity may reach out, and be preſent to it, or ſee it, as wee do that which is before our eyes.

§. 45. And when againſt my words you argue thus, [if it be proportionable to the thing, then it is The thirdalſo to Gods underſtanding which depends thereon,] 'tis plain again, that you miſapprehend mee, for I oppoſe Gods infinite, to our finite underſtandings, and not Gods underſtanding the thing, to the reality of it; God underſtands it, as it is, and ſo ſees that future, and contingent, which is truly ſo, (as Cicero ſaith, Ʋt praeterita ea vera dicimus quorum ſuperiori tempore vera fuerunt inſtantia, de Fato.ſic futura, quorum conſequenti tempore vera erunt inſtantia, ea vera dicemus,) but till it actually be, God ſees it by his infinite ſcience, which by our finite we cannot reach.

§. 46. Let it then be granted that Gods underſtanding depends on the thing, what followes thence? No more but this, that future contingents having yet no being in act, and therefore being not viſible to our finite faculties, have yet a being objective, as being really, though contingently future, and Gods knowledge being proportioned to the things, and depending on them as ſuch, i. e. as future contingents, and not as actually being, theſe he knowes by his infinite knowledge.

p. 127§. 47. But ſay you, his underſtanding can be no more actuall then the thing is from whence he derives that underſtanding,] what truth is there in this? I know what is paſt, my knowledge is actuall, but the thing past is not ſo; I know if the courſe of nature be not altered, (or, which as to this matter, is equivalent, I believe,) the Sun will riſe to morrow, here my knowledge or belief, is actuall, but the object is future, not yet actuall, ſave onelyonly that it is now actually true, that the Sun will riſe then. And then why may not Gods knowledge be actuall either of what is paſt, or future, (and ſo now actually is not,) and yet he ſee it as it is, i. e. what is paſt as paſt, what future, as future?

§. 48. Fourthly, when to my queſtion, [Why, if God ſees before, that which in after time hangs in the balance of humane indetermination, he may not alſo foreſee which end of the balance will at length overpoiſe?] You anſwer, that the foreſight of the former is the foreſight of poſſibles, but the foreſight of the other is the foreſight of a contingent future, and that the one is not as truly future, as the other,] you cannot but ſee, you do not render any anſwer to the queſtion, i. e. any reaſon why he may not ſee what is really, though contingently future, as well as that which is meerly poſſible? It is true, one is not as truly future, as the other, but what ſhew is there of reaſon, that what is leſſe future, or not future at all, ſhall be ſeen, and that which is future, and ſhall really be, ſhall yet not be ſeen by him that is Omniſcient? can it's no kind of being, not ſo much as in futurition, ſet the advantage on that ſide, and make that moſt intelligible, which hath no being, and that leaſt, which hath? p. 128If it do, yet ſure it ſhall be no ground of reſolving that the really future is not at all, even to God foreſeeable, or that there is any contradiction in this, which if you remember was incumbent on you to prove, by that of hanging in the balance, &c. but is not now attempted by you.

§. 49. I proceed to your defenſe of your ſecond The firſt nforcement of the ſecond.objection. And firſt when you grant that many things are poſſible, which will never be brought to act,] how could you ſay before, that it was a miſtake to call that poſſible which God foreſees ſhall never be? Is that a miſtake which is perfectly true? Or is not Gods foreſight agreeable to what is?

§. 50. But ſay you now, God that ſees all things as they are, ſees them as poſſible, not the one ſide of a contradictory propoſition as determinately true, and the other as aſſuredly falſe, for ſo he ſhould ſee them as they will be hereafter, but not as they are now,] I anſwer, 1. God that ſees them as they are, ſees them not onelyonly as poſſible, but as future, for they are not onelyonly poſſible, but future, 2. Of contradictory propoſitions, as, that I ſhall kill my ſelf to morrow, and I ſhall not kill my ſelf tomorrow,] one is determinately true, I mean not by determinately true, that God hath decreed it ſhall be, but it is true on the one ſide, and not on the other; for if I kill my ſelf tomorrow, then it is true to day, that I will kill my ſelf tomorrow, and if ſo, then it is falſe, that I ſhall not kill my ſelf tomorrow. What then is determinately true, God ſees as determinately true, and ſo ſees it as it is. 3. If he ſees them as they will be hereafter, ſure this is ſufficient, who would deſire any more? Nay this is to ſee them as they now are, for now they are future, p. 129i. e. things that now are not, but ſhall hereafter be.

§. 51. In your reply to my ſecond anſwer, it is no way pertinent which you ſay of a bare ſuppoſition proving nothing, yet being granted proving any The ſecond.thing that is neceſſarily deducible from it. For 1. when I ſpeak of a bare hypotheticall neceſſity, you ſpeak of a bare hypotheſis or ſuppoſition, which is quite another thing, your bare ſuppoſition is a ſuppoſing, (though no more then ſuppoſing) that to be, which is not, but our bare hypotheticall neceſſity is a conditional, as that is oppoſed to an abſolute neceſſity. How wide are theſe one from the other? 2. Then if you review that my ſecond anſwer, to which you make this reply, you ſhall ſee how little propriety it hath to it. It was this, Change the foreſight into ſeeing from all eternity, and then it is plaine, that God from all eternity may ſee that will never actually be, which yet is free for the agent to do or not to do, (and God ſees that to,) and ſo is poſſible every way, ſave onelyonly ex hypotheſi that it will never be, and as the bare hypotheticall neceſſity is no abſolute neceſſity, ſo this bare hypothetical impoſſibility is no abſolute impoſſibility. To this your reply is, that though a bare ſuppoſition prove nothing, yet it being granted, it infallibly proves any thing neceſſarily concluſible from it.] You ſee now how little this is ad Iphicli boves, and yet, 3. If it were pertinent, it would not be for your advantage, for ſuppoſing, (as I alſo do,) that God ſees the thing as contingently future, free for the agent to do or not to do, it muſt by your rule neceſſarily follow, that the thing is contingent, and ſo not abſolutely neceſſary, or any other wayes, then that when it is, it cannot not be, which was all p. 130I had to make good in that anſwer.

§. 52. In my third anſwer you grant all I aske, onelyonly you interpoſe, that to our purpoſe it is all one whether Gods preſcience render the object certain, The third.or preſuppoſe and find it certain; and, as if this were, upon the meer ſaying it, preſently granted, as a Maxime cleare by it's own light, you add no word of proof to it. Which how far from reaſonable it is, you will now diſcover. And 1. to render, and to find, are as far from all one, as to cauſe Great difference betwixt rendring and finding certain.and not to cauſe, for ſure what I render certain, I cauſe to be ſo, what I find certain is cauſed by another and not by me. And being thus diſtant in themſelves, it is ſtrange they ſhould to our purpoſe be all one. Is it all one to our purpoſe, whether I commit ſin freely, when I had grace to abſtain from it, or God cauſe or work it in me? What two things can be leſſe all one then theſe? and this the one purpoſe, for which the men, with whom you diſpute, do inſiſt on this ſubject, and diſtinguiſh betwixt Gods foreſight and his decree. And therefore as you are very ſollicitous that your opinion ſhould be freed from the imputation of derogating from the Divine immenſity, and Omniſcience, ſo at this time it concernes you to be as carefull, leſt you offend againſt Gods purity, and other attributes, when you make it all one for his preſcience to find and to render the object certain; i. e. to ſee all the ſins that wee commit, and to cauſe them. I pray conſider this, and it will force you either to acknowledge that God foreſees certainly what we do freely and contingently, or to The great conſequence of this difference.deny our ſins, (i. e. voluntary actions,) to be free, or to deny that Chriſt foreſaw that Peter would deny, or Judas betray him, both which he foretold to his Diſciples.

p. 131§. 53. I proceed to your defenſe of the objected inconveniences againſt my anſwers to them. And firſt, it breakes no ſquare, whether [in themſelves,] The defence of the objected inconveniences, anſwered.be inſerted, or omitted, 1. becauſe what is in it's cauſes utterly uncertain, is ſo in it ſelf. 2. becauſe you yeild to all I ſaid on this head as The firſt.rationall and convincing, and onelyonly queſtion the truth of my principle, which you know I was not again to prove in that place, when I was anſwering the objections, or inconveniences.

§. 54. Your ſecond inconvenience I underſtood The ſecond.before in the very ſence that your inſtance now ſets it, and accordingly I rendered anſwer to it, and ſhewed wherein it was that Exhortations, &c. were founded, viz. in the liberty of our actions, ſo long as till they be actually committed, and no longer. And to this you give no anſwer at all, nor to ought I ſay on that head, but onelyonly ſay over in another Scheme the ſame thing to which I anſwered.

§. 55. In this your new Scheme you ſay, that had it been known aforehand, that A. B. would obſtinately have continued in his wickedneſs, it had been vain to have uſed exhortations, and ſo for God (ſuppoſing his preſcience,) it were vain to enjoyne them.] Here the word [vain] in the obvious notion imports unprofitable, or uſeleſſe, and then, 1. I pray conſider, whether it be fit to ſpeak thus Preſcience makes not exhortations vain.of God. It is certain Chriſt ſaw Peter would fall, Judas would betray him, yet he told them both of it before, and that telling them was a timely admonition, and equivalent to an exhortation, adding of Judas a terrible threat, or denunciation, that it was better for him, that he had never been borne. Would you think it tolerable for any Chriſtian to ſay hereupon, it was vain, for Chriſt to do p. 132all this? I trow you would not, and therefore will your ſelf think fit to avoid it.

§. 50. Should you have any ſcruple in this, the ſtory of Pharaoh, and the paſſages, Rom. IX. referring The example of Pharoah.to it, would, à multò majori & fortiori, ſuperſede or anſwer it. God had there foretold Moſes, that he would harden Pharaoh's heart, which I hope is much more toward inferring a neceſſity, then Chriſt's foretelling Peter, or Iudas of the fall of the one, and treaſon of the other. And yet God exhorts Pharaoh after that, and he that objects againſt his doing ſo, Rom. IX. that ſaith foreign; Why doth he yet, (after that ſixt judgement, when God himſelf hath ſent his plagues on his heart, why doth he ſtill, or yet) find fault, is anſwered, Nay but, O man, who art thou, that diſputeſt againſt God?

§. 57. In the former part of that ſtory, when it was not come to that height, yet it is moſt evident that from the beginning of Moſes's miſſion to Pharaoh, God had foretold that Pharaoh, would harden his own heart, and that (alone) is perfectly parallel to our caſe, which is of preſcience of future contingent acts of mans will, yet are all Gods meſſages and ſignes by Moſes purpoſely ſent to melt, and perſwade him to let the people go. Doth any man now want a perſpective to diſcerne that Acts of Gods wiſdome not ſubmitted to our cenſure.theſe meſſages of heaven were not vaine? Or that ſuch acts of Divine wiſdom, (his wayes, that are not like ours,) are not to be ſubmitted to our tribunall, but adored and reverenced, and no otherwiſe approached by us? But then,

§. 58. Secondly, if by vain you meane no more, then that which doth not finally obtain the effect principally deſigned, ſo there will be no difficulty in affirming with S. Paul, that Gods grace and p. 133ſo his exhortations, &c. may be received in vain, for ſo God knowes it is too frequent for us to do, mean while what thorow our default becomes fruitleſs to us, doth not returne ſo to God, but ſerves Gods ſubſequent, (though it reſiſts his,) Gods antecedent and conſequent will.antecedent will, which is alſo Gods will, viz: to puniſh the obdurate, as well as his antecedent is to ſave the humble and tractable, and the more frequent the exhortations are, ſuppoſing grace annext to enable to make uſe of them, (as you know we ſuppoſe,) the more culpable is the obſtinacy againſt ſuch meanes, and the more culpable, the more juſtly puniſhed, and ſo Gods juſtice vindicated from all aſperſion, and mans freedome aſſerted: And the exhortations, that have contributed to all this, will not be deemed vain, though they attain not the fruit primarily intended, the ſalvifick effect or deſigne of them.

§. 59. And whereas you compare this to a Phyſician The uneffectuallneſs of Gods acts not chargeable on him;preſcribing a medicine, which he foreſees will do him no good.] I muſt ask by what meanes it comes to paſſe that that medicine will do him no good? By it's own inſufficiency or impropriety to the diſeaſe, or by the obſtinacy of the patient, that he will not take it? If by the former, I then acknowledge with you that Phyſician were vain; but that is no way applyable to God, whoſe medicaments are ſufficient, being the power of God to ſalvation to all that believe. But if it be by the ſecond onelyonly, then the Phyſician is far from vain, as doing all that the wit of man can do, or wiſh toward the recovering of his patient. For he that will not uſe his recipe's, ſeemes bent on his own death, and as guilty of it, as he that cuts his own throat, and 'tis no diſparagement to the Phyſician, p. 134that when he is preſcribing remedies for his feaver or conſumption, he doth not cure his obſtinacy, or that he preſcribes to him, as to a wiſe man he would preſcribe, (though indeed the event be much other, then it would be in a wiſe man, but that is not the Phyſicians fault,) and as little can the vanity be imputed to Gods operations, when by our defaults onelyonly they prove uneffectuall; God himſelf, Iſa. V. appealing to us in the like caſe, what could he have done more to his vineyard which he had not done, when yet pro uvis labruſcas, inſtead of grapes it brought forth nothing but wild grapes.

§. 60. In that place no doubt it was poſſible for God to have done ſomewhat which he did not, Force not competible to a rational vineyard.viz. to have forced the ground to bring forth good grapes, but to a vineyard interpreted there to be the houſe of Iſrael, to a rational vineyard, and to that which was to be left in a ſtate of rewardableneſſe, of doing and not doing, of freedome, the dowry of the will of men and Angels, with which they were created, this was not competible and therefore 'tis truly ſaid, God could do no more, then he did, or doth, (whatſoever the event be and be foreſeen by him,) and that is as contrary as is poſſible to the objection of vainneſſe.

§. 61. For the enforcing the third inconvenience, you ſay it ſeemes hard that finall impenitents ſhould The third.from all eternity be reprobated, unleſſe conditionally,] never conſidering, what was moſt conſpicuous in my anſwer, that final impenitence it ſelf is that onelyonly condition. When therefore you ſay, It were, as if a perſon ſhould be ſentenced to death for a fact before it be committed, you fall back into the two miſtakes, which my anſwer, if adverted to, had prevented. 1. You ſpeak of a perſon ſimply, and p. 135abſtracted from guilt, when I ſpeak of a final impenitent, i. e. a perſon ſo very ill qualified, and fouly guilty. 2. I ſuppoſe his ſentence to be founded in his guilt, and his guilt, in order, before his ſentence, but both of them in the mind of God, (who ſeeing his guilt, awards that puniſhment, adapts his revenge to that fact,) ſeen as paſt, before ever that ſentence goes out againſt him.

§. 62. Here you ſay A. B's, Salvation was ab aeterno poſſible, (which I grant,) and thence infer, that God did not ab aeterno ſee his damnation as certain, but onelyonly as poſſible. But I deny the conſequence, for he may ſee both his ſalvation and damnation as poſſible, and yet ſee one of them as onelyonly poſſible, the other being alſo future, which is ſomewhat more, then onelyonly or barely poſſible. Meane while nothing hinders, but what is, (and God ſees,) thus future, he might by his omnipotent power have prevented, (which yet, you ſay, by my reaſon he could not,) onelyonly then, he had not ſeen it as future, but as that which would have been, if he had not prevented it.

§. 63. Again you ſay, that if God had infallibly foreſeen that A. B. living longer would unavoidably have fallen into ſin, and therein have perſevered till death, you verily believe, in regard of his goodneſs and love to mankind, not onelyonly in generall, 1 Tim. II. 4. 2 Peter III. 9. But to A. B. himſelf, Ez. XVIII. 32. that God would take him away in his infancy, aſſoon as baptized, when he was in the ſtate of grace and ſalvation.] In this proceſſe of yours, I wonder whence the word unavoidably came. For Wilfull falls are not unavoidable.I that according to your ſuppoſition, look on A. B. as one baptized, and in the ſtate of grace, and ſalvation, p. 136can never grant that he unavoidably falls and finally perſeveres in ſuch ſin, as brings damnation; I grant he may fall, and that finally, but ſure not unavoidably, for by that grace he was enabled to ſtand, and if he fall, he falls willfully, but that is not unavoidably.

§. 64. And what if Godſees from all eternity that he will thus fall, doth that render his fall unavoidable? Nor made ſo by Gods preſcience.No, but Gods foreſeeing that he would fall willfully, when he had grace to ſtand, (which circumſtance he foreſaw, as well as the fall it ſelf,) muſt infer the quite contrary, that when he falls he might have ſtood, and ſo fell not unavoidably.

§. 65. But then leaving out that unſeaſonable word, [unavoidably,] which in all reaſon you might have done, when in relation to the certitude of Gods preſcience you had ſaid, [infallibly foreſees,] there will then be no ground of truth in that propoſition, no ſhew of proof of it from the goodneſs and foreign of God to all, or to any particular, as thoſe texts or any other expreſs it, for from none of thoſe it is rendred probable in Gods love to mankind engages him not to prevent them by death, whoſe fall be foreſees.any degree, that they which are baptized, and have ſufficient grace given them, and promiſe of abundance, if they make uſe of it, ſhall have violent reſtraints, or be taken out of the world, rather then they ſhall fall into wilfull ſin. Conſult the places again and you will ſoon find there is no propriety in them for the proofe of this.

§. 66. And yet if even this alſo were true, it would no way incommodate our pretenſions, for If it did, it is nothing to the caſe of preſcience here.in that caſe of Gods taking away ſuch a man, in his infancy, it would follow by our doctrine, that God foreſaw that from all eternity, and ſo that he p. 137foreſaw not A. B. a finall impenitent, which is the deſtroying and voiding your whole ſuppoſition.

§. 67. How then this ſeeming advantage could reaſonably incline you, to profeſs it your thought, that the doctrine of preſcience is very much inconſiſtent with the omnipotence and goodneſs of God, &c. and that 'tis ſwallowed without examination, I now leave you candidly to conſider, by your reflexions on the ſtrength of that reed you laid this weight on. Judge I pray, might not God, if he would, have created a world of men, taken them up into heaven, and crowned them, (if crowning it could be called,) with everlaſting bliſſe, and ſo left none of them in the hazards of this world? Yet did not, (it is evident by the fact,) his love of mankind oblige him to this, but men are left to vaſt dangers, and multitudes fall under them. Muſt all this now be imputed to Gods ignorance how all things would frame in the world in this other Adams ſin foreſeen by God, yet not prevented.courſe, which yet it appeares he hath choſen? The conſequences are too horrid to inſiſt on. Let us inſtance once for all in Adam, 'tis certain he fell, and in him all his poſterity, did not God foreſee or know this, till the effect told it him? Then how was Chriſt given in decreto divino, before the creation of the world? I hope you will not ſay he was not ſo given, when the Scripture is in many places ſo expreſſe for it, eſpecially, Epheſ. I. 4. and when Gods decrees are ab aeterno, and ſo eſpecially this, the foundation of all the reſt, of thoſe that concern our ſalvation, Yet can I as little imagine what elſe you can ſay, unleſſe you will forſake your hypotheſis.

p. 138§. 68. For if he decreed Chriſt before the creation, then he foreſaw there would be need of him, Evidence that it was foreſeen,if ſo, then he foreſaw Adams fall, and then why may he not have foreſeen all other mens ſins, all contingent future events, of which he is no more the author, and of which there is no more neceſſity The ſame of all other ſinnes.that the free agents ſhould act them, then there was that Adam ſhould ſin before he was created. I pray conſider this, and it will do your whole buſineſſe.

§. 69. But let us examine your reaſons, by which you will approve your affirmation, that That preſcience derogates not from omnipotence.preſcience ab aeterno derogates from omnipotence. You inſtance in King Charls's death, and you might have done the like in the death of Chriſt, whereof the ſacred writ teſtifies, that it was by the determinate counſell and foreknowledge of God. Now preſcience being admitted, ſay you, it was as certain that King Charles ſhould die, Jan. 30. as now it is that he did die that day, and to that it is conſequent, that it could not have been prevented by omnipotence it ſelf.] Your conſequence I deny, ſub hâc formâ, becauſe he that ſaw it would be that day, equally ſaw, both that he might, and that he would not prevent it. By his omnipotence it is certain, he might, by his will and wiſdom, (now revealed,) that he would not prevent it, by his Omniſcience, that from all eternity he knew he would not, by his very mercy to him, and for other moſt wiſe ends, that he would actually deliver him up to the wills of the malicious, able to deſtroy the body, but no more, which again is founded in his foreſight of their malice, and muſt ſuppoſe it. All which makes it as infallible, that God might have prevented it, as that he would not, did not, therefore this is far p. 139from derogating from his omnipotence, in this of his not being able to prevent it, the contrary to which is by this our Scheme expreſsly eſtabliſhed.

§. 70. This foreign; for my poſitive anſwer, you cannot but know already, all the neceſſity conſequent to preſcience is the neceſſity ex hypotheſi, it is neceſſary to be while it is, and becauſe it will be, therefore God foreſees it will be, and if men would have done otherwiſe, God would have foreſeen otherwiſe.

§. 71. When you take it for mine acknowledgment then, that God cannot change that which is future, ſo as to make it not future, I anſwer, that ſenſu diviſo it is moſt falſe, for whatſoever is future, God can change, and make it not future, and then foreſee it not future. But if you meant Conjunctim, that remaining future, he could not make it not future, 1. That is a great impropriety of ſpeech, and moſt unreaſonable, that he that ſpeakes of changing, ſhould mean keeping it ſtill as it is, unchanged, and 2. You ſee the fallacy, that moſt palpable one, of a benè diviſis ad male Conjuncta, which I hope will no longer impoſe upon you. The ill conſequences you feare and exaggerate, ſhould God be thought not to have been able to have prevented it, I ſhall not need inſiſt on, deteſting the thought, as much as is poſſible, and having ſo far ſecured our Scheme from it, that if God foreſees not that he could prevent any future whatſoever, I ſhall not think he foreſees any thing.

§. 72. So likewiſe for his goodneſs, you cannot Gods preſcience derogates not from his goodneſs.doubt but I acknowledge that as fully as you, in relation to our ſalvation: Let us ſee then how I am obliged to deny this again by admitting his p. 140Preſcience. Why, ſay you, if God willingly ſuffer ſo many to be damned, whom he might have ſaved where is his foreign? &c. I anſwer, juſt where you your ſelf will, and muſt place it, unleſſe you believe many ſhall not be damned finally. For 'tis moſt certain, God by his abſolute power might have ſaved all them, that yet are now damned, and the ſhew of inconvenience is exactly the ſame, whether God be believed to foreſee all things ab aeterno, or no. For ſuppoſe we, that God foreſaw not, but ſaw in time as we do every thing that happens in our preſence, and ſuppoſe we a wicked man filling up the meaſure of his iniquityes, or ready to die in his ſins, I demand might not God, if he would, reſcue him out of that ſtate, convert him into a Saint, and aſſume him, as he did Elias in the ſanctified ſtate? Queſtionleſſe he might, yet without all controverſy he doth not thus to every wicked man, for if he did, none ſhould be damned; Do you now reconcile this with Gods foreign, his words and many vehement aſſeverations, (as I doubt not but you are well able to do,) and then review your own queſtion, [If God willingly ſuffer ſo many to be damned whom he might have ſaved, where is his foreign?] 'Tis not poſſible you ſhould need more words to diſintangle this ſnarle, and in my former papers I ſhewd you in this place to what Gods foreign belongs, giving ſufficient grace, &c.: to which you reply nothing, and therefore I ſuppoſe conſent to the truth of it, though 'tis ſure both that God by his abſolute power might do more then he doth, (and therefore I like not your expreſſion, that he does what omnipotence could performe, citing, Iſa. v. 4. In place of it, I ſhould have ſaid, what his covenant, p. 141promiſe, mercy, juſtice, equity, wiſdom, obliged him to do, or what was reconcileable with all theſe, without intereſting his abſolute power, or omnipotence in it,) and that obſtinate ſinners do actually reſiſt, and fruſtrate all the methods that are uſed by him.

§. 73. Of the manner of S. Auſtin's aſſerting preſcience I need not farther inſiſt, then that by S. Auguſtine and Lud. Vives their ſenſe of preſcience.the expreſſe words of that period I produced, he will have it reconciled with the free will of man, which if all would do, there were little more to be required of them. Yet becauſe you have endeavoured to take off the force of S. Auſtin's words, and from Ludov. Vives's words on Chapter, IX. (Quod ſi indignum, &c. Dicamus à providentia voluntate que Dei cognitionem ejus proſiciſci, voluntatem statuere quod futurum ſit, ſcientiam quod volunt as ſtatuerit, noſſe,) to draw him to Calvins ſence, I ſhall read over that IX. Chapter, both Text, and Comment, and give you ſome paſſages out of it; In the Text, 1. That they are much more tolerable that bring in Syderea Fata, a fatality depending on the ſtarrs, then they which take away praeſcientiam futurorum, foreknowledg of futures: and that it is a moſt open madneſs, confiteri Deum & negare praeſcium futurorum, to confeſs God, and to deny his preſcience. 2. Nos ut confitemur ſummum & verum Deum, it a voluntatem ſummamque poteſtatem & praeſcientiam ejus conſitemur, nec timemus ne ideò voluntate non faciamus quod voluntate facimus, quia id nos facturos eſſe praeſcivit cujus praeſcientia falli non poteſt, as we confeſs the ſupreme and true God, ſo we confeſs his will, and ſupreme power and preſcience, neither do we ſcare leaſt we ſhould not do voluntarily, what we do p. 142voluntarily, becauſe he foreſaw it, whoſe preſcience cannot be deceived, making it the heathen feare of Cicero, which now is yours, leſt the infallibility of the preſcience ſhould impoſe neceſſity, and fruſtrate Lawes, exhortations, &c. 3. Nos adverſus ſacrilegos auſus & Deum dicimus omnia ſcire, antequam fiant (marke omnia) & voluntate nos facere, &c. Contrary to the darings of ſacrilegious men, we both affirm that God knowes all things before they are done, and that we do them voluntarily. 4. Novit incommutabiliter omnia quae futura ſunt, & quae ipſe facturus est, he knowes unchangeably all things which are to come, and which he will do, not onelyonly the latter, but the former, and all of one as well as the other. 5. He that foreknew all the cauſes of things, among them could not be ignorant of our wills, quas noſtrorum operum cauſas eſſe praeſcivit. Which he foreſaw to be the cauſes of our workes. 6. Qui non eſt praeſcius omnium futurorum non eſt utique Deus, he that foreſees not things to come, is not God. 7. Of our liberty, Voluntates noſtrae tantum valent, quantum Deus eas valere voluit, & praeſcivit, & ideò quicquid valent, certiſsime valent, & quod facturae ſunt ipſae, omnino facturae ſunt, quia valituras atque facturas eſſe praeſcivit cujus praeſcientia falli non poteſt, our wills can do as much as God will'd and foreknew they were able, and therefore whatſoever they can do, they moſt certainly can do, and what they will do, they altogether will do, becauſe he foreſaw they could and would do it, whoſe preſcience cannot be deceived. Next in Vives's comments you have, Non res futurae ex ſcientia Dei manant, ſed ſcientia potius Dei ex illis, quae tamen futurae non ſunt Deo, ut eſt error multorum, ſed praeſentes. Quocirca non recte dicitur p. 143praeſcire, niſi relatione ad actiones noſtras, dicendus eſt ſcire, videre, cernere. Quod ſi indignum videtur, &c. Things future do not flow from Gods ſcience, but rather Gods ſcience from them, which yet are not future to God as the error of many is, but preſent, wherefore he is not rightly ſaid to foreſee unleſſe it be in relation to our actions, he muſt be ſaid to know, to ſee, to perceive, which if it appeare unworthy, &c. There come in the words by you recited, of Gods ſcience coming from his will, which you ſay is Calviniſm, but is not ſet by Vives to interpret S. Auguſtin's ſence that way, no nor to aſſert it as his own, but to recite another opinion, that hath leſſe impiety in it, then the denying of preſcience would have. Thus you ſee what that Chapter in the Father, or his Commentator gaines you. Mean while I take you at your word that you grant with S. Auguſtin the preſcience of God, and if you grant it with him, you muſt grant it not onelyonly in things which come to paſſe neceſſarily, (as all that God decrees do,) but ſimply in all things, and particularly in thoſe, wherein voluntatis arbitrium retentum, freedom of will retained is concerned, for to thoſe you ſee he thorow out the IX. and X. Chapters applyes it, and if you grant preſcience in them, you grant as much as I deſire, if not, you deny it, (which yet you again ſay you do not,) more then S. Auguſtin.

§. 74. What you here add as your concluſion from S. Auguſtine in his confeſsions, lib. II. c. 18. videri non poſſunt ſed praedici poſſunt ex praeſentibus quae jam ſunt & videntur, they cannot be ſeen but they may be foretold from thoſe things that are preſent, and are now ſeen, and from Origen foreign Philocal. c. 23.foreign, viz: That Gods knowledge of p. 144future contingents is meerly hypotheticall, this being ſuppoſed, that will follow, &c.] I ſhall now proceed to examine, 1. By a view of your two Teſtimonies, then of your concluſion from them. And firſt for S. Auguſtin's words, they are not ſpoken of Gods preſcience or predictions, but of ours, and that of things coming from natural cauſes, Intucor auroram, ſaith he, oriturum ſolem pronuncio, &c. I behold the morning, I pronounce the Sun will riſe. Look and you will ſee it manifeſtly, ſo then it is nothing to Gods preſcience of future contingents, and you can conclude nothing from it.

§. 75. And for the Chapter in Origen's Philocalia, it cannot be, but you muſt have noted in it, c. 11.the weight that he layes on the prediction of Judas's Origens teſtimony.treaſon, the general reſolution, that foreign, every thing that is future, God ſees it will come to paſſe, (and yet foreign, the foreknower is not cauſe of all that are foreknown,) citing from Suſanna, 42, 43. That God is foreign, the knower of ſecrets, that knowes all things before they are, then he propoſes the queſtion, foreign. foreign, how God from all eternity foreknowing thoſe things that are thought to be done by every man, our free will may be retained. Which he treats againſt the heathen that ſay Gods foreknowledge takes away all praiſe and diſpraiſe, &c. and maintain it juſt as you do, as you will ſee, if you compare your, and their arguing. Now to p. 72.theſe his anſwer is, that God from the beginning of the creation of the world, nothing being without a cauſe, foreign, p. 145by the progreſſe of his mind thorow all things that are future, ſees them, that if this be, that will follow, &c. and ſo foreign, proceeding to the end of things, he knowes what ſhall be. Which he doth expreſſe, to ſhew that he ſees the dependence of all things, not from his own will, who by knowing them, as it followes, cauſes them not, but in a concatenation of humane acts and choiſes, as p. 73.when by temerity one walkes inconſiderately, and meeting with a ſlippery place falls, which he that ſees, is no way the cauſe of his fall, ſaith he, adding that Ibid.God foreſeeing foreign, how qualified every one will be, ſees alſo the cauſes that he will be ſo, mean while his foreſeeing is not the cauſe of their being what they are, but though ſtrange, ſaith he, yet 'tis true, foreign, the thing future is the cauſe that Ibid.ſuch a foreknowledge is had of it, for it doth not becauſe it was known come to paſſe, but becauſe, (foreign,) it was to come to paſſe, it was known. Then he comes to a diſtinction in what Ibid.ſence it is true, that what is foreſeen foreign ſhall altogether be, and ſtates it juſt as we do all along. From all which, (that I may now follow, you to your inferences,) you can with no reaſon conclude, that it was his and the reſt of the Fathers doctrine, that Gods foreknowledge of future contingents is meerly hypotheticall. You ſee moſt evidently from their ſayings, every where ſcattered, (competently by thoſe which I have now ſet down,) that this was not their doctrine. And this one paſſage, if it were favourable to your conceit, (as it is not,) yet could in no reaſon evacuate all others.

§. 76. In your concluſion that which I miſlike is not the word, [hypothetical] but [meerly] for p. 146that ſignifies God to have no other foreknowledge but that. I doubt not but of all things that are, God foreſees, as Origen's words were, that if this be, that will follow, and ſo I deny not hypothetical foreknowledge. But I cannot confine Gods foreknowledge Hypothetical. foreknowledg.to this one head, for why may he not alſo ſee, (and as eaſily,) that this, and that will both be? The principall uſe of hypothetical foreknowledge, is in things meerly poſſible, which come not to paſſe, (as before I applyed the example of Keilah, which you now mention.) But what can that have to do with thoſe things, which do actually come to paſſe, and that meerly by the free will of man, and by no neceſſity of conſequences? Though, (as I ſaid,) even in thoſe, God that ſees them as they are, both in their cauſes, and moſt caſuall, or voluntary mutations, and progreſſion, and all circumſtances concomitant, ſees one thing following, (though but freely, not neceſſarily,) out of another, firſt this, and then that, and becauſe this, or upon this motive, therefore that; Which as it is far from aſſerting any neceſſary chain of cauſes, contrary to the freedome of mans will, which in that very place Origen largely eſtabliſhes, ſo it is far from a knowledge meerly hypothetical, for that is not the knowledge of what is, but what will be, if ſomewhat elſe make way for it, which being uncertain, whether it will be or not, there can be no determinate knowledge, that the other will be, which is quite contrary to his inſtances of Judas's betraying Chriſt, &c. Which were as really and determinately foreſeen and foretold, as they were really acted. And therefore I muſt deſire you not to think this favourable to the Socinian's opinion of Gods foreknowledge of future contingents being onelyonly or meerly hypothetical, (though p. 147God foreſee hypothetically, yet not onelyonly ſo,) or that this key will fit all places of Scripture, which foretell things to come, becauſe it fits the caſe of Keilah, and Jer. 38, 17. and ſome few others.

§. 77. I have the more largely inſiſted on this, becauſe it ſeemed ſo likely to miſlead you, there being ſome examples of foreknowledge meerly hypothetical, from whence yet to infer that Gods foreknowledge indefinitely, is meerly ſuch, i. e. that he hath no other, is the ſame errour as from particular premiſſes, or from one or two examples to make an univerſal concluſion.

§. 78. On view of your fourth objected inconvenience, you grant all I ſaid in anſwer to it, onelyonly, The fourth'sſay you, the former difficulty ſeemes to recurre, how A. B. may be truly ſalvable, when if abſolute preſcience be granted, his damnation was as certain before he was borne, as it will be when he is in Hell.] I anſwer. 1. That in anſwer to objected inconveniences all that can be required of any man is, to ſhew that that inconvenience doth not follow, not to eſtabliſh the principal doctrine again, (which before had been done by the no implicancy of contradiction, which left it poſſible for God to foreſee future contingents, and then by conſideration of his omniſcience, which qualifies him to know every thing which is ſcibile, or the knowing of which implyes no contradiction, and then by the teſtimonies of the Prophets, who from Gods preſcience foretold ſuch futures,) having therefore done all that was incumbent on me, I had hoped the difficulty would not ſtill have remained, when all I ſaid was granted. But ſeeing it doth, I anſwer, 2. That ſuppoſing Gods eternal preſcience, it cannot but as clearly appeare, that A. B. not onelyonly may be, but is truly ſalvable, p. 148whilſt he is in Viâ, as that he is damned, or no longer ſalvable, when he is in Hell. For ſuppoſing A. B. in viâ, to be one, for whom in Gods decree Chriſt dyed, and ſuppoſing Gods eternall preſcience of all that is, (unqueſtionably of all that he himſelf will do, as he ſure will all that is under his decree.) It muſt thence neceſſarily follow, that God foreſees him ſalvable, and ſuppoſing that at length he is damned, it doth but follow, that God foreſees him damned; Theſe two things then by force of praeſcience are equally cleer, that he is one while ſalvable, another while damned, and ſo they are equally certain, and if his having been ſalvable do not hinder his being damned, then neither will his being damned hinder his having been ſalvable. He is truly ſalvable Salvability of Judas as concluſible from Preſcience, as damnation.who God foreſees will not be ſaved. How ſo? becauſe God truly beſtows upon him all means neceſſary to ſalvation, and that being all that is required to make him ſalvable, this is as truly done, when the effect followes not, as when the meanes are moſt ſucceſsfull. And Gods preſcience of the ſucceſsleſsneſs, makes no change, hath no influence either on the meanes, or the man, any more then my ſeeing a thing done hath cauſality in the doing it. Now if he be ſalvable, (though in event he never be ſaved, but damned,) and Gods praeſcience that he is ſalvable, be as efficacious to conclude him ſalvable, as his preſcience that he is damned, to infer him damned, what a palpable partiality is it to infer from preſcience, that his damnation is certain before he is borne, and yet not to infer from the ſame principle, that his ſalvability was certain before he was borne? Nothing can more irrefragably prove the weakneſs of your inference, then that it is ſo obvious to retort it.

p. 149§. 79. The ſhort is, that which is future onelyonly contingently, it is certain that it is foreſeen by God, yet till it is, it may be otherwiſe, and if it be otherwiſe, God ſees it to be otherwiſe, and what may be otherwiſe, is not certain to be ſo, and therefore his damnation is not certain before he is born, which is the direct contradictory to your inference, and that method which will equally infer contradictories, of what force it is to eſtabliſh truth, I leave you to judge who propounded the difficulty.

§. 80. Here then is the errour, becauſe God cannot erre in his foreſight, therefore you conclude from ſuppoſition of his preſcience, that the thing, which you ſpeake of, is certain, when yet it no way appeares to you or me, that God ever foreſaw it, but by our ſuppoſing that it comes to paſs. Hence then comes all the ſuppoſed certainty, from ſuppoſing it to come to paſs, which is the certitudo ex hypotheſi, a certainty that it is, as long as it is ſuppoſed to be, and then Gods preſcience hath nothing to do with it, but it would be as certain without ſuppoſing Gods preſcience, as now it is by ſuppoſing it. And now would you have me ſhew you how A. B. is truly ſalvable whilſt you retain your ſuppoſition that he is damned? This, if you marke, is your difficulty, for you have no other ground to ſuppoſe that God foreſees him damned, but becauſe you ſuppoſe him damned, and ſeeing it is, you ſee what a taske you have ſet me, even to make two members of a contradiction true together. This I confeſſe I cannot do, and I grant God cannot, yet thus much I will do for you, I will mind you, that even when A. B. is in Hell, the propoſition is ſtill true, that A. B. when he was on earth was ſalvable, and if it be true when he is in Hell, I appeale to you whether it be p. 150not true, when God foreſees he will be in Hell, doth Gods foreſeeing him in hell impede more then his actuall being in it? If not, then notwithſtanding Gods preſcience, A. B. is ſalvable, and ſo now I hope you ſee both that, and how he is ſo.

§. 81. In your fifth inconvenience, you ſtill adhere that you think it ſcarcely reconcileable with that The fifth.determinate preſcience which I hold, for God ſeriouſly to call thoſe whom he foreſees ab aeterno that they will not repent. But you take no heed to the place of Gods ſerious call to thoſe who he ſees will die.Scripture, which I demonſtrated it by, turne you, turne you, why will you dye? and, as I live, I delight not in the death of him that dyes, where it is evident, God ſeriouſly, (if an oath be a note of ſeriouſneſſe,) calls thoſe who dye and will dye. Why do you not lay this to heart, when it is ſo cleare, and (you yet give me your leave to ſay,) unanſwerable?

§. 82. I ſaid, when God calls to a man not to fall, he is not fallen, and, you ſay true, but he is fallen in Gods preſcience.] I now ask you, how you know he is? Your onelyonly poſſible anſwer is, that if he be fallen, then by the doctrine of preſcience, God muſt foreſee him fallen, and you now by way of ſuppoſition, (which 'tis lawfull for diſputations ſake to make,) take it for granted, i. e. ſuppoſe he is fallen. And then, (as even now I ſaid,) to your voluntary ſuppoſition all is due, and with that I cannot reconcile the contradictory, and ſo ſtill what is this to preſcience?

§. 83. Again you conclude, that God ſees, A. B. will never riſe again, how do you know, or imagine God ſees it, but becauſe you ſuppoſe it true, that he will never riſe again? and if it be true, then it is alſo infallibly true, whether God ſee it or no. And ſo ſtill what have you gained, your ſuppoſing it true is it to which adheres the ſuppoſition of Gods foreſeeing, p. 151and infallibility conſequent to that, but that addes no weight to that which was before ſuppoſed infallible.

§. 84. Again you aske, can God ſeriouſly call him, who [he ſees] will never repent, ſeriouſly do that he ſees uſeleſs, and abſolutely ineffectuall?] I have oft told you, and proved to you, that he may, 'tis certain he called Pharaoh, when he had predicted he would not hearken, and he moſt ſeriouſly doth things to ſalvifick ends, which do not eventually attain thoſe ends, and he foreſees they do not.

§. 85. I ſaid that what God doth thus in time, he ab aeterno decreed to do, this (as it is apparent by the antecedent, to which the relative [thus] belongs,) I ſpake of Gods calling men, ſome not to fall, others to riſe again, and you reply, that it ſeemes to you utterly improbable that God ſhould do whatſoever he doth, by an antecedent decree.] I have no temptation to leave our preſent taske, which is ſufficient for the day, to diſpute that queſtion with you in the latitude, as your, (whatſoever he doth,) importeth. It will ſuffice, if God doth any thing by an antecedent decree, or decree any thing before he do it, for if any thing, then ſure his calls and warnings, which are parts of his covenant of grace, and that is ſub decreto, decreed by him. And then what I ſaid before, is ſtill of full force, Gods foreſeeing mens diſobediences to his calls, was in order of nature poſteriour and ſubſequent to his decree of calling and giving them grace, and being ſo, cannot move him to change what went before, or preſently to diſannull it, and till it be diſannulled, 'tis certain, and exacted by veracity, that he act according to it, i. e. that he call thoſe ſeriouſly, who yet he foreſees reſiſt him. Why you ſhould here farther inlarge, of the greater improbability, p. 152that God ſhould without conſideration decree what afterward he perceives would be uſeleſſe, I gueſs not, being ſure no words of mine gave you temptation to think that I affixt inconſiderate decrees to our God of all wiſdome, or counted thoſe calls uſeleſſe, which through our obſtinacy, (onelyonly) faile of their deſigned good effect.

§. 86. No more did I give you cauſe for that harſh-ſounding phraſe of Gods neceſſarily purſuing it, becauſe it was decreed.] I ſhould rather have ſuggeſted to you theſe words, inſtead of them, that God is faithfull, and juſt, and veracious, and ſo performes his part of the covenant of grace with men, howſoever they are, (and he foreſees them,) wanting to their own part.

§. 87. What you ſay you underſtand not in my laſt papers, I thus explaine; thoſe calls of God which Gods foreſight of mans rejecting his calls and the criminouſneſs thereof a proof of the ſeriouſnes of them.the obdurate reject, are moſt ſeriouſly meant by God to their reformation, elſe he would not puniſh them for rejecting them, as he doth by withdrawing them, &c. This God decrees to do ab aeterno, which he could not, unleſſe he ſoreſaw their rejection of them, and yet neither could he foreſee their ſo criminal rejecting them, unleſſe he foreſaw the ſeriouſneſſe of them, and if he foreſaw that, then it is as certain as any thing, that God foreſees that they are ſerious, and although God do not actually inflict puniſhment upon bare foreſight of ſin, yet ſure he may decree to puniſh thoſe whom he foreſees to deſerve it, and that is all that is neceſſary to my arguing. Elſe I might tell you that God that accepts not a temporary faith, will never accept ſuch a man as is anſwerable to the ſtony, or thorny ground, (who in time of tryall would fall away,) though he ſhould be taken away before temptations approach.

p. 153§. 88. In that of Judas, you grant that the prophecy, The predictions of Judas could not be fulfilled in another,as terminated in him, could not have been fulfilled, had he never been born, but then your quere remaines, ſay you, whether it might not have been fullfilled in another?] I anſwer, 1. it could not have been fullfilled in another, without ſome other diſciples doing what he did, and 'tis certain no other did ſo, and therefore what was foretold muſt have been fulfilled in him, or elſe, (which may not be believed of a divine Oracle,) had not been fulfilled. But then, 2. Chriſts words to John pointing out Judas for the Traitour, he that dippeth, &c. was a prediction of God perfectly terminated in Judas's perſon, and could not be fulfilled in any other, and ſo your new quere is anſwered alſo. And that gives you a farther reaſon, (if what was ſaid before to your ſecond quere were not ſufficient,) that our Saviours prediction was not conditional, but categorically Not conditionall.enunciative, verily I ſay unto you that one of you ſhall or will betray me, and he that dippeth, at that time when Chriſt ſpake it, deictically, i. e. Judas, is that perſon.

§. 89. In your view of what I ſaid to your ſecond queſtion, you firſt inſiſt on my anſwer, that the event proved the denunciation againſt Iudas was not like that againſt Niniveh conditional, but I foreſaw the ſmall force of that, which I uſed onelyonly foreign, and therefore added a ſecond, that the prediction of Iudas was of his ſin, as well as puniſhment, and the prediction of his ſin, could not be conditional, nor the prediction of the Ninivites puniſhment any way be applicable to it, leaving therefore the weaker, I adhered onelyonly to this, which when you labour alſo to evacuate, by interpreting, [one of you will betray me,] by [unleſſe he repent, &c. he will betray p. 154me.] You conſider not, 1. that Chriſts death, as it was from all eternity decreed by God, ſo it was oft predicted by Chriſt, and his reſurrection, and many other things depending on it, and among theſe ſtill the treachery of one of his diſciples is one, and that is not reconcileable with this interpretation. 2. That foreſeeing that he would be ſo diſpoſed, as unleſſe he repented he would betray him, is the foretelling of a future contingent. 3. That one particular prediction, wherein Iudas was deictically ſignified, was private to S. Iohn, that lay in Ieſus his boſome, as appeares, Ioh. XIII. 24, 25, 26. And though the words to Iudas himſelf, Mat. XXVI. 15. may better beare that ſence you aſſigne, yet the words to Iohn, which Iudas heard not, could be no ſuch admonition to Iudas, and therefore were without queſtion abſolute, and ſo thoſe other to Peter verily I ſay to thee, before the Cockcrow twice, thou ſhalt deny me thrice, when he had profeſſed he would So that of Peters denyall.rather die, then deny him, are not eaſily healed with this foreign, [unleſſe thou repent thou wilt deny me,] for aſſuredly Peter meant not now to deny Chriſt, but reſolved the contrary, and therefore had nothing to repent of in this behalfe. And when you ſeeme to demonſtrate it could not be abſolute, becauſe Judas might confeſſedly have repented, and if he had, then it muſt have been interpreted conditionally, I anſwer according to my hypotheſis, that if Iudas had repented, Chriſt had never foreſeen, or declared of him, as he doth, i. e. that he ſhould betray him.

§. 90. But, ſay you, you ſee not why a conditional prediction may not be applyable as wel to the prevention of ſin, as of puniſhment,] I ſhall ſhew you why it may not, becauſe the puniſhment is Gods work, and for the averting of that there is force in the p. 155Ninivites repentance, which is the condition required Prediction of ſin cannot be conditionall.on their part, on the performance of which God hath generally promiſed to ſuſpend his puniſhments, and therefore the threats are conditional, which in equity will not be inflicted, if the condition be performed. But the ſin is man's work and to the commiſſion of that no other party contributes but himſelf, and ſo neither is the prediction of it a threat, but a down-right enunciation, neither is there any condition imaginable to be performed on the other party, anſwerable to the other caſe, unleſſe God ſhould forcibly interpoſe to avert it, (and that cannot be imagined to be the meaning, [except I reſtrain Judas he will betray me,] or if it were, it were ſtill an act of Gods abſolute foreknowledge, that he will do ſo, if not violently reſtrained) all probable meanes to his amendment, and particularly the admitting him to the Sacrament being, ſaith S. Chryſoſtom, already uſed to him, and yet, ſaith Chriſt, he will betray me.

91. Now for defence of your Poſtſcript, and the contradiction which that charged on our hypotheſis, I pray marke the Iſſue of it. If you can prove that it implyes a contradiction for God to foreſee future The iſſue of the whole queſtion whether preſcience of contingents imply a contradiction.contingents, then you certainly prevaile, as on the other ſide if you ſucceed not in this attempt, you muſt reſolve your opinion erroneous, becauſe nothing being impoſſible to God but to lie, and ſo to make good both parts of a contradiction, if preſcience bring not this conſequence, it muſt be poſſible to God, how inexplicable or unintelligible ſoever it be to me, who for want of facultatem analogam, cannot judge of the actions of an eternal God, and if it be yeilded poſſible, then the predictions of Scripture will be proofes beyond queſtion of the truth of p. 156it. To this one teſt then let us come. The contradiction you aſſigned was, our ſaying, that things future are or may be preſent to God. I ſhewed you the definition of contradictoryes was not competible to theſe, of which eſt and non eſt is the known example, The lawes of contradictions.and preſent and future are neither preſent and not preſent nor future and not future. And again in contradictions both parts muſt be conſidered in the ſame reſpects, whereas future being enunciated in reſpect of us, and our finite ſight, preſent is expreſt to be in reſpect of God, whoſe ſcience is immenſe, and infinite.

§. 92. Now to this you reply, 1. That preſent and future, though they are not formal contradictions, yet really and in ſence they are, for future is that that is not preſent, but to come, and preſent and not preſent are formally contradictory. 2. That my conceſſion that no finite thing can both be preſent and future is enough for you, for God cannot be preſent to that which is not preſent to him.] I now anſwer to your firſt, that there is nothing ſo falſe, that I cannot make good by this your arguing. In particular, by this the doctrine of the Trinity and Ʋnity were equally confuted, The argument, holds equally againſt the Trinity, and unity.for Trinitas in the wonted notion is not one, but three, and one, and not one, are formally contradictory. This is the direct image and tranſcript of your arguing, mutatis mutandis, yet I know you deny not the Tri-unus Deus, how then can you on no better proofe deny preſcience? The Socinian's conformably deny both, but you are partial, and deny but one of them. It is never ſafe to deſpiſe the ordinary rules of art, but ſeldome more dangerous then in this, whereas if Logick were duely revered in it's dictates, and nothing thought contradictory in ſence, but what is an affirmation, and negation p. 157of the ſame thing, this intricacy would be unfolded, and that which is future to me, be preſent to God, without the encumbrance or dread of a contradiction.

§. 93. To the ſecond I anſwer, that it cannot ſuffice to your pretenſions, that no finite thing is both preſent and future, meaning, (as it is plaine I did,) in the ſame reſpect, preſent and future to me: When yet what is future to me, may be preſent to one that lives a year hence, and ſo much more to God who liveth for ever. When therefore in your proof you ſeeme to ſuppoſe me to hold, that what is future to me, is not preſent to God, you did miſtake me, for as I ſaid, that God being immenſe may and muſt be preſent to that which is future, or elſe he is bounded and limited, and ſo not immenſe, infinite, ſo I deemed that, which God is thus preſent to, to be objectively preſent to him, and ſo it was from all eternity, though to us it be not yet preſent, but future. So that the other part of the definition of contradictoryes, if it had been adverted to, had ſuperſeded this part of your anſwer alſo, viz. that it is the affirmation and negation of the ſame thing in the ſame reſpects, as here you ſee it was not, and ſo was not uſefull to you.

§. 94. But ſay you, if all future contingents are and ab aeterno were all preſent to God, then they are all eternall.] I deny that conſequence, what is finite, and in it ſelf yet future, by it's objective preſence to God, is not changed into eternall, nay even What is preſent to God, is not eternall.that which really is, and ſo is really, (and not onelyonly objectively,) preſent to him, is yet as far from eternall, as Chriſt's body, by being united to his infinite divinity is from becoming infinite. This then was but a Sophiſme that you will ſoon ſee thorow.

p. 158§. 95. And ſo your other part of the ſame paſſage of S. Auguſtin Confeſs. L. II. c. 18, that again you reſort to, was in effect formerly anſwered, by ſhewing that it belonged onelyonly to what is future, and preſent to us, and ſo to our ſight, not to Gods. I have now gone thorow your papers and wearied you, and almoſt my ſelf, yet if what is written prove uſefull to you, to the depoſiting that which I cannot but deem an Errour, although I lay no Epithets upon it, it will be far from burthenous to

Your very affectionate friend and ſervant H. HAMMOND.

p. 159POSTSCRIPT.

§. 96. TO extricate you finally out of this difficulty, I ſhall deſire you by way of recapitulation, to conſider apart theſe two propoſitions, the firſt that Gods ſcience being as immenſe Two propoſitions.and infinite, as himſelf, is not limited to things paſt or preſent, or futures, by him decreed, but extends The firſt of God immenſe ſcience.to all that ever ſhall be, or may be; to what may be, ſo as to ſee it may be, though it be not, to what ſhall be, ſo as to ſee it come to paſſe, as in time it doth come to paſſe, contingent things, contingently, &c. Of which propoſition if there can be any doubt to any man, who ſtedfaſtly believes Gods immenſity, let the predictions recorded in the Scripture The proof of it.be conſidered, thoſe eſpecially which are of ſinnes, which it is as impoſſible for God to decree or predetermine, as to cauſe, and yet he foreſees and foretells them, witneſſe Chriſts foretelling Peter, that he ſhould deny him thrice, when Peter himſelf was ſo far from foreſeeing, or purpoſing it, that he reſolved the contrary. The ſecond propoſition, The ſecond of contingency and liberty.that there are future contingents, that all the ſinnes (at leaſt) of men are not decreed, and predetermined by God, or cauſed by any neceſſity. Of which no man can doubt, which believes the Scripture, and therein the procedure of the judgement to come, the difference in reſpect of guilt and puniſhment betwixt voluntary and involuntary actions, The proof of it.(the motions of men and of ſtones,) and again the exhortations and menaces of God in Scripture, and the great ſeriouſneſſe, expreſt, and proteſtations prefixt to them.

p. 160§. 97. If taking theſe propoſitions apart, any Chriſtian can doubt of the truth of either of them, The concluſion.he ſees the ſhelves he ſplits upon, and the ſhipwrack of a great part of the Faith, whither on this, or that ſide. But if he cannot but aſſent to theſe truths ſeverally, and onelyonly wants the skill of reconciling the ſeeming difficulties which they beget, when he attempts to put them together, (of which ſort are all the inconveniences, or objections, produced in this matter,) let him on that occaſion conſider, how (more then) credible it is, that he doth not underſtand all things, that are, having but finite facultyes, and finite meaſures, which are not proportioned to infinite powers, or objects; Which makes it moſt ſeaſonable to ſuperſede all farther enquiries, and to acquieſce in an aſſurance, that God can reconcile his own contradictions, ſuch I meane, as though by the known rules of Logick they appeare to be really no contradictions, yet by us are conceived to approach nere to ſuch, through prejudice, or thinking (not too little, but rather) too much upon them. In which caſe to reſtrain our farther ſearches is the ſame neceſſary mortification, which it is to reſtrain inordinate appetites, and is a principall peice of duty owing to the Apoſtles precept of foreign, being wiſe to ſobriety: God give the world of Chriſtian profeſſors more of it, then is yet diſcernible among them.

FINIS.