Judgment Worthy of God, Treatise
Of Faith and Works.
HE that ſaith with St Paul, a man is juſtified by faith and not by works, and to reconcile St James with St Paul, affirms, that good works are the effect of true faith, means either that true faith, where e're it is, is able to produce good works, though it do not alwaies actually produce them; or elſe, that it actually and neceſſarily produceth them. If the former be his meaning, then I conceive it true in ſome degree, but not pertinent to his purpoſe of reconciling St. James with St. Paul, becauſe faith may be able to produce them, and yet never actually produceth them; and ſo the man that is ſuppoſed to be juſtiffied by faith, never be able to ſhew his works, which St. James requires of him, and conſequently his faith be a dead faith, i. e. not able to juſtify. But if the latter be his meaning; that true faith, whereſoever it is, actually and neceſſarily produceth good workes, I conceive it falſe; yet can I not diſpute againſt him in thoſe termes, by inſtancing in any particular to the contrary. Becauſe he hath a guard or hold for himſelf to fortify him againſt any aſſault, by affirming to any ſuch inſtance of mine, where good workes were not produced, that that faith was not true faith; which yet if he ſhould be put to prove, he would have no other reaſon to confirm it, but only becauſe it produceth not good works; being ready, if it did produce good works, to acknowledg it true faith; which how guilty it is of thoſe two faults in diſputing, circulus and petitio principii, I think is manifeſt to any. Yet being by this Sophiſm of his interdicted this way or proceed…ng, I have but one way of arguing left me; firſt, to demand his definition of true faith, and whatſoever definition he gives, to prove that faith, in that notion of his, is the cauſe of good works, at the moſt, but as a man is the cauſe of a child, a true perfect, univocal cauſe of the effect, when the effect is produced; but yet ſuch a one, as might have ſuſpended that action, by which it was produced, and ſo might have been as truly a man without the actual producing of that effect, as he is now, he hath produced it: that is, that faith is a rational or moral, not natural agent, working freely, not neceſſarily.
To bring this operation to practiſe, I will ſuppoſe this definition of faith to be given me (which by them that affirm good works to be an effect of faith is ordinarily given) that it is a fiducial aſſent to the promiſes of Chriſt. Where that I may not miſtake him, I muſt firſt demand, whether he conceives theſe promiſes, which are the object of his faith, to be abſolute, or conditional. If he affirm them abſolute, made to mens perſons, or individual Entityes, without reſpect to their qualifications or demeanors, then ſurely that faith, which ſuppoſeth all kind of qualifications of the ſubject ſo unneceſſary, will never ſo much as move me to produce good works, becauſe I may as well be ſaved without them, the promiſes being ſuppoſed without condition; and therefore he that affirms good works to avail nothing in the buſineſs of attaining to ſalvation, cannot, without contradicting himſelf, ſay, that his faith muſt neceſsarily produce good works, if it be a ſaving faith: for ſure all that neceſſity proceeds from a believing, that without good works there is no ſalvation to be had; which if it be not believed, that neceſſity ceaſeth. But if he affirm the promiſes, which are the object of his faith, to be conditional, then I muſt ask, what he takes this condition to be, either faith alone, or good works alone, or faith and good works together: if faith alone, then (beſide the ridiculouſneſs of that, in making the believing that I ſhall be ſaved, the only ground of my believing I ſhall be ſaved) the former inconvenience recurrs again, that that faith which ſuppoſeth faith only to be a condition of the promiſes, will find good works as unneceſsary, as that faith which ſuppoſ'd the promiſes to be abſolute, and ſo will never incline me to them neither. If he affirm the condition of the promiſes to be good works alone (I mean by good works all other graces beſides faith, contrition, amendment of life, charity▪ holyneſſe &c.) then he acknowledgeth, that theſe good works are of themſelves ſimply requir'd of a man that is, or will be a believer; and ſo that they are no neceſſary effect of faith, for if they were, it would be enough to require faith alone, and they would undoubtedly follow without requiring. For I conceive it ridiculous to make the condition of an Indenture ſomething that is neceſſarily annext to the poſſeſſion of the demiſe. If he affirm faith and good works neither ſingle, but both together to be the total adaequate condition of the promiſes, which St. Paul calls faith conſummate by charity, St. James, faith made perfect by works, St. Paul again foreign (which certainly is the truth) then firſt I muſt admoniſh him, that his fiducial aſsent, by which he defines faith, muſt not ſignify a believing with reliance, that he is one of them that ſhall be partakers of what is promiſed, which they are wont to call ſpecial faith, or particular application; for that muſt either ſuppoſe them to have performed the condition, and ſo good works in them (yea and faith) muſt be before faith; or elſe it is the believing confidently of a lye, it being abſolutely falſe, that the thing promiſed belongs to any that hath not performed the condition.
But his fiducial aſſent, if it be a tolerable definition of faith, muſt be (anſwerable to the promiſes) only this, a believing and relying conditional; that he ſhall be partaker of what is promiſed, that is, a believing (and depending on it) that God will not fail him, if he fail not God; that God will give him heaven, if he perform ſincere obedience, and rely upon the gift of Chriſt, not on any merit of his obedience for the attaining of it. Now to ſay the truth, this fiducial aſſent thus expreſs'd (and none but this) may truly be affirm'd to be a moſt powerful motive to me to produce good works; but then it is as true, that it is as powerful a motive to me to rely on the gift of Chriſt, and ſo in that reſpect faith may be ſaid to produce good works, faith may alſo be ſaid to produce that which they call faith, i. e. the believing, that if I obey and rely, I ſhall be ſaved, is a motive thus to produce actual relying; and in this ſence I will acknowledg both (if he, with whom I diſpute, will thank me for it.) But then, ſecondly, it follows not that that which is a powerful motive, is a cauſe neceſſarily producing, becauſe that motive is but a moral motive, perſwading not enforcing, and man by corruption, or by ſome prevailing temptation may reſiſt that motive, and I think 'twould be no Paradox to ſay, that ſome men have made no doubt of the truth of God's conditional promiſes, i. e. have verily perſwaded themſelves, that if they ſerved God ſincerely, they ſhall be ſaved, and yet quite neglected God's ſervice: and if it be objected, that they want the fiduciall, though they have the aſsent, and that if they had the affiance, they would aſſuredly produce good works; I anſwer, that by that affiance they mean either abſolute aſſurance that they ſhall be ſaved, (and that, if it be not an error, ſuppoſeth good works, if it be, produceth them not) or elſe a conditional affiance; and then again I affirm of that, that it is no more then what I expreſt by making no manner of doubt, but if they ſerve God ſincerely, they ſhall be ſaved; which though I believe to be a moſt powerful motive to obedience, yet I conceive not a neceſsary irreſiſtible cauſe, (becauſe 'tis only a moral motive) nay nor that that alwaies produceth the effect. Firſt, becauſe the fooliſh virgins had as much of this as the wiſe, for ought we ſee; and after the door is ſhut come as confidently, Lord Lord open to us, & yet it ſeems did not watch and make ready their Lamps, which was the act of obedience requir'd of them; and the want of it forfeited their hopes. 2. Becauſe the unprofitable ſervant that profeſſeth he knew that God reaped where he ſowed not, yet hid the Talent in a Napkin, put it not out to the exchangers. 3. Becauſe the exhortations of Chriſt and the Apoſtles are generally to good works, as well as to faith, nay much more frequently, which argues to me that faith doth not neceſſarily produce good works, and they that are ſuppoſed to have faith are exhorted to adde to their faith virtue, 2. Pet. 1.5. which (if Faith were a neceſſary cauſe of Works) were all one as to exhort the Fire to burne, the Water to moyſten &c. 4. Becauſe there is a difference obſerved in Scripture between a working and a non working Faith, and the priviledges are beſtowed only on the firſt, by which it is plain, that it is poſſible for it not to worke. 5. Becauſe faith is ſaid to be made perfect by works Jam. 2.22. which ſure an agent cannot be ſaid to be by producing an effect, which it cannot but produce; as the act of Humectation adds no degree of perfection to the water. Nay 'tis a general rule, that the producing of what effect ſoever adds no perfection to the cauſe, ſave only relative; as the begetting of a Sonne adds only the relation of a Father, but nothing elſe more then he was before; it rather ſuppoſeth him perfect before, which is the importance of the Logick axiom, effectus eſt extra naturam cauſae. All that can truly and in propriety of ſpeech be ſaid of Faith in this matter, is this; that Faith is ſo ſtrong a motive to obedience, that if it be drawn as a Weapon to the purpoſe, and uſed as it ſhould, it would in reaſon out-ballance all the contrary temptations to diſobedience: & if the will, which hath the caſting voice, give its ſuffrage, as in reaſon it ought, it ſhall then infallibly produce obedience ▪ but yet not irreſiſtibly, becauſe that will being ſtill a free faculty at leaſt to evill, may after all the propoſal of motives either ſuſpend its Action, or elſe do that which it ſhould not. For ſure it is an error of Socinus to affirme cognitionem rerum pulchrarum aut turpium, quales praeter alias ſunt res honestae & vitioſae; harum odium, illarum amorem neceſsariò gignere; and that Socrate's ſpeech (praeſente ſcientia fieri non poſse ut quis incontinens ſit) was true, with this Caution, ut quis ſciat res honeſtas, eas facienti magnum commodum allaturas def. diſp. de loco c. 7. ad Rom. & in 1 Joh. 4.8. If by amor and odium he mean proſecutio and averſatio, as 'tis plaine he doth by that which followes. For ſure Medea was not deceived in her ſelf when ſhe ſaid, video meliora probo que , deteriora ſequor. And ſo many, who make no doubt of an Heaven to belong to all penitent reformed Servants of Chriſts, and that that Heaven conteines joyes above all that the World can afford, do yet chooſe the pleaſures of ſin for the preſent ſeaſon; like Ephraim that is likened to an heifer that loved to tread out the Corn, betook her ſelf to that courſe which for the preſent yielded ſome profit (as the Heifer being by the Law then unmuſſelled, might eat as ſhe troad it out) that had its reward at that minute, that ſhe did the Work. Whence is all this? but from hence, that the carnal pleaſures of ſin for the preſent obtaine the conſent of the will againſt all the future pleaſures and joyes of Heaven, joyn'd with the ſowerneſſe of preſent obedience; which could never be, if believing the promiſes allwaies either neceſſarily, or infallibly produced good works.
FINIS.
End of the text · Henry Hammond, Judgment Worthy of God (1665)