An Account of Cawdrys Triplex Diatribe, Chapter 6 · Section 8
Sect. 8. My anſwer to a firſt head of objections vindicated. Prudence loſt by mans own ſin recoverable by grace. The puniſhments of Adams ſin are not our faults. Perfection of innocence capable of degrees. So perfection of the Judaical law, and of the Chriſtian. So mercifulneſs to ability. foreign 2 Cor. 8. 3. Merciful as God is merciful belongs not to the degree. Gods righteouſneſſe puniſhes not where there is no law. Intuition of reward in Chriſtian performances, no Popery. Proofs of this from Scripture, from the nature of Hope, Faith, Gratitude. Not alwayes prudent to undertake the higheſt. Martyrdome no conceited Popiſh perfection, yet under no precept to all. S. Hieroms words examined. Two notions of the word Perfection. Some perfection poſſible in this life, and yet capable of growth. The law, as it ſignifies the condition of the firſt Covenant, is not now in force with believers. Of Chriſts perfecting the law. Every man is not bound to do what is beſt. 1 Cor. 7. 3. 8. foreign of moral good. The ſaying of Gregory explicated.
WHat remains now in that Tract of Will-worſhip, was by me added for the preventing of miſtakes; To which end three heads of objections I propoſed, the firſt ariſing from the obligation that prudence ſeems to lay upon us to do alwaies that which is fitteſt and beſt, the ſecond from the general precept of loving the Lord with all the heart, &c. the third from the ſeeming favourableneſs of our doctrine to the Romaniſts works of ſupererogation, & to each of theſe I gave particular anſwers, which muſt be viewed in that Tract from §. 40. to the end. And to theſe anſwers, what he now oppoſes, I ſhall now examine foreign.
And firſt, ſaith he, Every man is bound to be prudent to that degree of prudence which he loſt by ſin. To this I anſwer, that if he ſpeak of the mans own actual ſins, whereby he hath any way infatuated himſelf, there is then truth in his affirmation; but tis not appliable to the matter in hand, viz. to ſuch an high degree of prudence as now I ſpeak of, for of that he may come ſhort, without any degree of actual ſin as ſhall thus infatuate and deprive him of prudence; and beſides, ſpeaking, as I do, of a pious, merciful, and ſo of a regenerate man, I may ſuppoſe him by the inlightning wiſe Spirit of God returned to that ſtate of prudence from which his own actual ſins may have degraded him, & in caſe he be ſo, then, as he is as prudent as by this rule of the Diatribiſts thus underſtood he is bound to be, ſo certainly he is yet capable of growing in that, as in other graces, and ſo of being yet more prudent, and if he do ſo, and thereby obey that exhortation of S. Peters, Grow in grace and in the knowledge—he is ſtill free from ſin in this reſpect, though he have not yet arrived to the higheſt degree of prudence that humane, but lapſt nature is capable of.
But if by ſin he means not actual but original ſin, and ſo thinks that every man is bound to be prudent to that degree of prudence that Adam loſt by his fall, this ſure will be found to be a miſtake; For this loſſe of Adams was a puniſhment of Adams ſin, and when it is inflicted by God on his poſterity, muſt be lookt on as a puniſhment, and he that is puniſht cannot be obliged not to be puniſht, No man is now obliged to be as prudent as Adam was in his integrity any more then to be as healthy, i. e. in effect to be immortal, Nay ſuppoſing Adam to have ſinned and ſo to have tranſgreſt the Law in that, it cannot be imagined, that it is over and above that, a new or farther act of ſin in him to be leſſe knowing, prudent, or healthy, then he was; all theſe, without any new act of his will, nay contrary thereto, falling upon him by Gods decree or punitive juſtice; and if it were not ſin in Adam himſelf, then ſure it cannot be ſuch in his poſterity, and ſo a man now, one of his poſterity, cannot be bound to that degree of prudence which Adam once had, any more then to be born in the ſtate of innocence and perfection, when yet he is neceſſarily ſuppoſed to be born after the image of the lapſt imperfect Adam, which he could not be, if he were born in this perfection.
And when in the ſame place he adds, that every man is bound to be pious in the higheſt degree, proving it by this, that the law requires perfection of holineſs, and the Goſpel (ſaith the Doctor) yet greater perfection, and every man is bound to be merciful to his ability, as our heavenly Father is merciful (which ſure is the higheſt degree) this is but an heap of paralogiſmes, no one of the proofs belonging to the higheſt degree of piety or mercy, which was the one thing which was to be inferred from them.
For 1. the perfection of holyneſs which the law required, was but either ſincere and upright, or at the moſt but unſinning obedience, and neither of thoſe includes the higheſt degree of piety, which is poſſible.
If by the law be meant the Covenant made with Adam in innocence, then indeed tis true that the perfection which that required was unſinning obedience, and if Adam had performed that, tis yet evident that he had been capable of higher degrees of piety then that law required, there being in unſinning obedience, a latitude, and ſo many degrees, of which the loweſt denominates it unſinning, and ſo perfect in that ſenſe, and all the ſuperior degrees are additions, and to each of thoſe higheſt the Law cannot be thought to binde when it is ſatisfied with the loweſt.
This will be plain by the inſtances formerly given of frequency in prayer &c. wherein it is viſible that Adam in innocence might have exceeded any proportion which Gods law will be ſuppoſed to have required of him; And in a word, if Adam had never ſinned, yet might his ſtate have been a ſtate of proficiency, by which it is evident that the perfection required of him was not the higheſt degree of piety, for then he had ſinned by any lower, and ſo innocence and growth in him had been incompetible; Beſide, there is no reaſon to doubt but that Adam and his poſterity ſhould have been rewarded according to their works, and ſo have been capable of different degrees of rewards; in caſe they had continued in innocence, which yet had been impoſſible if every man had been bound to be pious in the higheſt degree, and had ſinned as oft as he did not arrive to it.
But this is but ſpeculation; & by the law I rather ſuppoſe he meant the law of the Jews, & then the perfection of holineſs wch that required muſt, I ſuppoſe, ſignify truth & ſincerity of holyneſs, ſuch as was in Zac. Lu. 1. 6. & in reſpect of which he was ſaid to be juſt & blameleſs in all the Commandments of the Lord—Now tis as certain that this perfection is as capable of degrees alſo, and that all that are thus perfect, are not yet ſo in the higheſt, or in the ſame degree, Tis certain Zachary and Elizabeth were both thus perfect, but no way probable that they were arrived juſt to the ſame degree of it, one might very reaſonably be deemed to excell the other.
This may appear of the Judaical Law by that which we have oft cited out of the Law, that there was one degree of mercy which was called foreign their righteouſneſs, that to which they were obliged by the Law; another ſtyled foreign abundance or excellence of goodneſs, foreign, wch the Law didnot command, ſub periculo animae, require or exact from them: This is ſo plain I need ſay no more of it.
Secondly, That greater perfection, which Chriſt required, is yet but a higher degree of the ſame perfection, but not the higheſt that is poſſible; Suppoſe there be eight degrees as of heat in nature, ſo of zeal or piety, or perfection, and ſuppoſe a Jew required to have ſo many of them as would denominate him perfect, i. e. at leaſt five of them, and a Chriſtian to have more then a Jew, ſuppoſe ſix, yet 'tis viſible that he that hath all that is required of a Chriſtian, is yet capable of having more, then is ſo required, viz. ſeven, & yet not to arrive to the higheſt that is poſſible, i. e. to the 8. degree
But beſide this, there is in every ſuch degree a latitude alſo, and in it as it were fractions, of each degree (and all this ſubdiviſion little enough to bear proportion with the great difference of the works of pious men here, or with the difference of the degrees of their glory hereafter) and he that hath the loweſt fraction of the ſixt degree, hath the ſixt degree, but not in ſo high a meaſure, as he that attaineth to an higher, viz. to the ſeventh degree, or to another fraction of the ſixt, and ſo 'tis evident in the hypotheſis or application, that every Chriſtian may be obliged to exceed a Iew in piety, mercy &c. and yet nothing hinder but that one Chriſtian may exceed another in every of theſe.
Thirdly, Though every man be bound to be mercifull to his ability, yet 1. That mercifulneſs which is according to ability is not placed in any indiviſible point; Two men that have the ſame abilities, and the ſame opportunity and occaſion requiring mercy from them, may very lawfully give or be merciful one more then another; For ſuppoſing any ſumme that in all thoſe circumſtances both are bound to give, yet certainly one may lawfully exceed that ſumme give more then he was thus obliged, and yet not do beyond his ability; and 2. In caſe he do yet give more, even beyond his ability, i. e. deny himſelf lawfull injoyments on purpoſe to inable himſelf for this higher liberality, yet ſure this will not be ſinfull in him, but on the contrary more acceptable and commendable, as it was in the Macedonians; of whom St Paul teſtifies that they were foreign thus liberall of their own accord beyond their power, and as ſuch are propoſed for an example to the Corinthians, 2 Cor. 8. 3.
Laſtly, The precept of being mercifull as our heavenly Father is mercifull, is not (the Diatribiſt well knows) applicable to the degree of mercy which is in God, for finite creatures cannot attain to that but onelyonly to the kind of it, mercy to enemies as well as friends, and ſo could not with any colour be brought for a proof of his objection. And indeed after all this the Diatribiſt hath let fall a few words in the cloſe of this 4th §. which ſhew he had no belief in the force of it, For having ſet the caſe ſo as is the moſt for his advantage that he could wiſh, all circumcumſtances ſo concurring that a man ſhould be bound to give ſo much as will ſupply anothers wants, and to give leſs were neither prudent nor pious, yet he dares not pronounce if an offence againſt either of thoſe virtues, to go beyond this, but breaks off abruptly with theſe words [whatever it were to give more] From which in confidence of his I ſhall not doubt to infer, that in that very caſe, ſo clothed with all thoſe circumſtances, he cannot deny, but that as I am bound to ſupply his preſent wants, ſo I may make proviſion alſo againſt his future neceſſities, and be far from ſinning, do that which is more acceptable to God in ſo doing.
His next return to a 2d degree of my anſwer, is taken from his old Topick, of virtues conſiſting in a middle point between two extremes, from which if it ſwerve to either extreme it is a fault though not obſerved, perhaps obſervable by men, yet juſtly puniſhable by a righteous God. But to this though much might be ſaid afreſh, from the conſideration of that righteouſneſs of God, which doth not uſe to puniſh thoſe facts which have no Law obſervable by man to forbid them, but firſt ſhews men his will, and what is good, and then requires obedience to it, yet becauſe ſo much hath already been ſaid both to that of all virtues being placed in the middle, and to the latitude and not indiviſible point of that middle, I ſhall not now give farther reply to that; Any more then to the next branch of it, of prudence in our created nature, requiring to do what was fitteſt, for to that I have ſpoken already in this §.
Under this head of prudence, one farther degree of objection, I foreſaw, viz. that Prudence knowing the greateſt perfection to be moſt gloriouſly rewarded, would bind a man to aſpire to perfection, and not to content himſelf with any thing but the beſt. Upon the firſt ſight of theſe words the Diatribiſt is ſtartled, and diſclaimes making any ſuch objection. But to this I anſwer, that he well knows I had no intelligence with him, and conſequently could not divine his pleaſure, but as well as I could propoſed all objections I foreſaw poſſible from him, or any man elſe, of the moſt different perſwaſions.
But then till he ſhall pleaſe to propoſe other which have more force in them (as all this while he hath not propoſed any, but ſuch as thoſe from the 2d Commandment) I might expect that this my ſervice ſhould not be ſo very ill interpreted and faſtidiouſly caſt off, with a [we ſhould not have framed ſuch an objection.]
The crime which was thus to be averted, was it ſeems, a leaven of Popery, in thoſe words wherein I had propoſed the objection; And 1. If it were ſo indeed, I wonder, what error I had commmitted, or why Papiſts may not be permitted to make objections, or how the Diatribiſt came to have the monopoly of making them. But then 2. What was the ſuſpicious phraſe which I had uſed? Why forſooth, that I mentioned glorious rewarding, This, ſaith he, ſeems at firſt ſight to touch upon the mercenary and meritorious way of Romaniſts.
This is not to the buſineſs in hand, yet I cannot but make ſome ſtay, and behold this rarity. For 1. Is the mercenary way all one with the Romaniſts doctrine of merits? If it be, it is to be feared, that David was a Romaniſt, for certainly he affirmes it of God, that he rewardeth every man according to his works, even when he deprecates the mercy and free grace of God, and makes this the prime evidence of it that he thus rewards men. Nay what is Chriſt when he minds them of their great reward in heaven that ſuffer for him, Mat. 5. 12. That give, and pray in ſecret, Mat. 6. 2. 5. of a prophets reward and a righteous mans reward, Mat. 10. 41. and of St. Paul of ſuch works peculiarly as were not under precept, 1 Cor. 9. 18. and a multitude of the like nature every where in the Scripture? Is not this reward, merces, and is not all that obedience which is performed in intuition of the glory which ſhall be revealed, this very mercenary way? and being ſo, is it preſently the meritorious way of the Romaniſts; Is there not merces ex pacto, reward by the tenure of Chriſts promiſe, as well as merit either of congruity or condignity; and is it as unlawfull to look at and expect the performance of Gods promiſe, as to challenge heaven as the merit of our works?
Again, hath not Chriſt propoſed his rewards on purpoſe to allure us to come unto him? and is it not lawfull for us to come that very way which God hath called us? Is not hope a Goſpell grace, and ſuch as ſets us a purifying, 1 Joh. 3. 3. and is not the future reward the object of that hope, and ſo that which regularly ſets a Chriſtian about his work? Nay is not that Faith which juſtifies, in this Diatribiſt's opinion, the belief of the promiſes? and may not a Chriſtian then look at thoſe promiſes, which yet he muſt believe?
But, ſaith he, he muſt firſt look on the commands of God, and beauty of holineſs, and ſeek that firſt for it ſelf, and by and by, it is but carnal prudence, adviſing onelyonly or firſt to look at the perfection of glory. But to this I anſwer, 1. That the forme of my objection was not ſuch as ſuppoſed prudence to look either onelyonly or firſt on glory, but on the greateſt perfection (of virtue here) as the way to the moſt glorious reward (hereafter) And therefore to inſert the word [onelyonly] was that to which he had no kind of temptation.
Nay for the priority of order, looking firſt on the reward, it is viſible that I had not given the leaſt intimation of it, but contrariwiſe I had ſaid diſtinctly, that prudence would adviſe to aſpire to perfection, and to the beſt, meaning evidently the perfection of virtue (not of glory) to which the moſt glorious reward was proportioned. And yet after all this, ſuppoſe I had ſpoken of ſome man (in my objection) who looks firſt at the perfection of glory, and in order to that laſt end, purſues virtue as the one way to it, could he juſtly ſay this were carnal prudence in him and ſinfull?
The beauty of holyneſs is a thing ſeldom diſcerned but by the experience and practice of it, and in that caſe ſure there is need of promiſes to excite and attract to that practice (yea and of terrors to drive) and the Goſpel makes uſe of both theſe, and ſo doth Faith, which is the Spiritual, not carnal prudence. And indeed, if the beauty of holyneſs may firſt be lookt on, and that is one promiſe, but that a leſſe perfect one and to be injoyed in this life, then why may not the foreign or eternal reward, which is alſo the beauty of holyneſs, and that a perfect beauty, a purity from ſin, as well as immunity from burthens and miſeries, a wiping away ſpots, as well as tears, be firſt lookt on alſo.
Briefly I ſhall demand of the Diatribiſt, whether gratitude in a regenerate man who hath received from Chriſt the great benefits of election and redemption and juſtification, may not be allowed to incite and ſtir up duty? If it may, I demand again, whether the reward decreed to him in his election be not lookt on by him, and whether that do not excite this gratitude? If it do, whether this be a carnal gratitude, and the mercenary way of the Romaniſts?
But I muſt not allow my ſelf farther to expatiate on ſuch digreſſions: The Diatribiſts divinity in this point is but ſuitable to what formerly he gave us a taſte of, in the paſſage of ſlaviſh fear, and both together are exemplified to us by the woman that went about the city with a firebrand in one hand, and a baſon of water in the other, ſaying, that one was to burn up heaven, and the other to quench the fire of hell, that neither hope nor fear, promiſes, nor terrors might have the leaſt influence on her, but pure ethereal love do the whole work. And all that I ſhall need adde, is only this, that ſtill there is an heaven and hell in Scripture (and all duty is not quite rarified and converted into this love) and many good Chriſtians there are, which make uſe of both theſe, and offend againſt no precept of Chriſt in doing ſo.
But I have at large handled this point of looking at the promiſes in our obedience, not only in a Sermon on 1 Cor. 7. 1. but more punctually in an addition to the Pract. Catech. now in the Preſs, p. 416. &c. and ſo ſhall not here any farther inlarge upon it.
My anſwers there to the forementioned objection are fitter for the Diatribiſt to combat with. I proceed therefore to conſider what replies he makes to them.
To my firſt anſwer, which was this, That though prudence doth adviſe to this of aſpiring to perfection, yet doth it not lay any command, ſo as not to obey it will be preſently ſinful] (a thing which had oft been proved formerly, by the example of S. Pauls adviſes when he had no commands, for ſure Prudence may well imitate S. Paul herein, and do ſo too) To this I ſay, he replies by bare affirming but not proving or offering the leaſt proof for the contrary, only when he mentions the perfection of virtue, he addes [required by the commands of God] as if the higheſt degree of virtue were under command, which he knowes is the thing which through this whole debate is denied by me, and the proofs and reaſons of my denying it given at large, and then what a begging of the queſtion is it to affirm it here, without any tender or overture of probation?
To my ſecond anſwer then, which was by conſidering the want of ſtrength in ſome men, which makes it not prudent in them to undertake the ſteep way of the greateſt perfection, founded in the words of Chriſt, He that can receive it, let him receive it,] He replies by asking what perfection I mean which will be dangerous to undertake as a ſteep way? that which is required in the commandments of the Law and Goſpel?] I anſwer, twere a contradiction and madneſs in me, when I ſpeak of perfection, which is not under command, to mean that which is required in the commandments, It is certain I mean uncommanded degrees of virtue, the undertaking thoſe courſes be it of virginity, auſterities, abundant labourings, Martyrdome it ſelf, when either I am not competently furniſhed with ſtrength from God for the going through with them, or have not any reaſon to perſwade my ſelf that I ſhall be ſo furniſhed. For then, if indeed I have not ſtrength, the very undertaking ſuch heights may prove treacherous and precipitious to me. And that this is my meaning, he at laſt takes notice, and fills his margent with proofs of it, both from this, and from another Tract, and when he hath taken all that pains to finde out my meaning (which I profeſſe to be it, and thought it had been obvious to any man before) he fairly takes his leave of it again, hath nothing to ſay to it, but returns to that perfection of holyneſs which, ſaith he, is the duty of all, and all that I need return to him, is this, that if it be ſo, it is not that perfection I ſpeak of viz. virginity, &c. for that, I hope is not every mans duty, but at at the utmoſt his, who can receive it.
This he is reſolved not to take notice of, and accordingly proceeds, and when I ſay, that even the precept of God may ſometimes interpoſe and make it unlawful for us to aſpire to the moſt perfect ſtate (meaning evidently virginity, martyrdome, &c.) he ſaith this is as ſtrange (and again in the rear, by way of exclamation, What ſtrange divinity is this!) demanding whether Gods precepts croſs one another—when he cannot but ſee that my whole diſcourſe and proceſs is founded in the ſuppoſition of that evident truth, that theſe ſtates of perfection are not under any precept of Gods, and ſo that the precept which ſhall croſs the undertaking of them, is far from croſſing any precept of God.
After this repeated exclamation and wonderment, he is content at length, as he ſaith, to hear me ſpeak and explain my ſelf. And my explanation being by ſuppoſition of a duty of our calling awaiting us on the one ſide, and an opportunity of martyrdome on the other, and that exemplified by S. Cyprian's caſe, that then obedience is better then the richeſt ſacrifice] here he findes place for triumph and ovation. By this tis evident, ſaith he, he means not perfection of holineſs according to the commandments of God, but a conceited perfection of martyrdome, as Papiſts do.
That I who ſpeak through that whole Tract of uncommanded acts, ſhould not mean that perfection which is according to (as that ſignifies required by) the Commandments of God, is too evident to be any ſpecial foreign or diſcovery at this time now toward the concluſion of his view of that Diſcourſe. Of that therefore he hath my free confeſſion; But if by perfection according to the Commandments he will allow me to mean (as the words literally import) that ſort and degree of perfection which the Commandments of the Goſpel allow of very well, though they require it not of every man, or lay it under precept, then I ſhall not doubt to approve the perfection which I inſtance in, viz. that of martyrdome, to be ſuch, (unleſs when ſome diſcharge of known duty or yet greater good calls us another way) and if this be the doctrine of Papiſts, I hope yet that all Proteſtants are not therefore bound to diſclaim it, I never heard that our old Engliſh reformation, which I thought had been ſealed by the blood of many martyrs, had lookt on martyrdome as a conceited Popiſh perfection, And if this be the privilege of the preſent deformation to exclude martyrdome out of the catalogue of virtues, as the Martyrs and Saints out of our Calendars, if this Diatribiſt be now one of that Triumphant Church, which hath thrown all croſs from their ſhoulders, and diſclaimed all pretenſions to this conceited perfection, and reſolved all to be Papiſts which ſhall thus communicate with the ſufferings of Chriſt, and obſerve this conformity with the image of Gods ſon, Rom. 8. I ſhall only tell him that I ſhall be very well pleaſed to be guilty of this piece of Popery, and to ſuffer from this ſword of the tongue till God pleaſe to call me to any higher tryals: Mean while when the Apoſtle and the Church which hath tranſcribed his ſtyle, have uſed the phraſe foreign being perfected by ſufferings, and called martyrdome foreign perfection, I cannot retract that ſtyle, what envy ſoever fall on me for the uſing it.
What now followes in purſuit of this matter, Does God call all men at all times to martyrdome? Is there any command for all men to be martyred &c.] is directly the evincing my aſſertion againſt himſelf, for upon that very foundation it is that I ſuperſtruct, therefore Martyrdome which is the higheſt degree of perfection, is not under any command, Quod erat demonſtrandum.
In my third anſwer, which was, that perfection here had degrees in it, and conſequently ſuppoſing men bound to be perfect, Mat. 5. 48. yet it followes not that they are bound to the higheſt degree of perfection) his anſwer is, he will grant this, and yet deny my voluntary oblations ſtill,] But how can that be, when that higher degree of perfection is ſuppoſed to be under no precept, and ſo to be free, and ſo when arrived to, a voluntary oblation? But his grant, it ſeems was only conditional, for it followes in his words [For we ſay there are degrees of, or rather to perfection here, upon condition that he will grant that every degree, even the higheſt, is required by the law of God, and what is ſhort of that higheſt is ſo far culpable] This condition I confeſſe I cannot perform, and ſo muſt loſe the advantage of his grant, And truly to require it of me is to grant my premiſes, and require me to renounce my concluſion, For from that conceſſion, that there are degrees in perfection, and there may be perfection, where yet there is not the higheſt degree of perfection, it infallibly follows, that the higheſt degree of perfection is not under obligation of that precept which requires no more then that we be perfect, as when the precept binds to no more then to be mercifull in ſome degree, it is evident that it binds not to be mercifull in the higheſt degree, and conſequently that the higheſt degree of mercy ſhall be ſtill free, under no obligation of precept.
In this matter he deſires to ſpeak his own ſenſe in St Hieromes words, Charitas quae non poteſt augeri &c. citing Ep. 62 for it. But this citation is ſure miſtaken, there is no ſuch thing in that Epiſtle. The place ſure is in St Hieromes Epiſtle to St Auguſtine, where he deſires his ſenſe of thoſe words, Jam. 2. 10. He that Tom. 9. p. 159.keeps the whole Law, and offends in one point, is guilty of all. On which occaſion he diſcourſeth a great while, how one virtue may be found in them which yet are guilty of other ſins, and ſo from one thing to another, not by way of defining, but by raiſing of difficulties to provoke St Auguſtines ſolution of them.
And on theſe termes he purpoſes his notion of virtue, that it is the loving of that which is to be loved, and is in ſome greater, in ſome leſs, in ſome none at all, and then addes, Pleniſſima verò, quae jam non poſſit augeri, quamdiu homo hîc vivit, eſt in nemine; quamdiu autem augeri poteſt, profectò illud quod minus eſt quàm àebet, ex vitio eſt. Ex quo vitio non eſt juſtus in terrâ qui faciat bonum, & non peccet, &c. But the moſt full virtue, ſuch as cannot be increaſed, is in no man as long as he lives here, But as long as it may be increaſed, that which is leſs then it ought to be, is faulty, whereby it is that the Scripture ſaith that there is not a juſt man on earth, which doth good and ſinneth not; and, in thy ſight ſhall no man living be juſtified; and, if we ſay we have no ſin, we deceive our ſelves &c.
By this view of the place it is evident that the virtue, which, on occaſion of the place in St James, he ſpeaks of, being an univerſall, impartial obſervation of the whole Law, and conſequently every failing in that a vice (for to that all the proofs belong, that there is no man but ſinneth ſometimes) there is no reaſon to extend his ſpeech any farther then to this, and then it will in no wiſe be appliable to our buſineſs, which is onelyonly of the degrees of this or that particular virtue, which it is certain that man may have, who yet is guilty of ſome ſin in other particulars.
This therefore I willingly acknowledge, that he that failes of any part of his duty, is therein faulty, or this is ex vitio in him, and if of that onelyonly S Hieromes words [quamdiu augeri poteſt] be underſtood (as it is moſt reaſonable they ſhould, whether wee judge by the occaſion, or the proofes of his ſpeech, or by the expreſs words, quod minus eſt quàm debet ex vitio eſt, that which is leſs then it ought, i. e. leſs then he is bound to do, is faulty) then as I fully conſent to the truth of them, ſo when that is granted, no man can hence infer, therefore every regular act of obedience which comes ſhort of the higheſt degree of perfection, is a ſin; for beſide many other inconveniences formerly noted, this freſh one will be obſervable from St Hieromes own words, that then every act of virtue in this life is a ſin, for as for that fulleſt perfection which cannot be increaſed, the beginning of this teſtimony acknowlegeth, that it is not to be found in any man in this life.
In a word, the word Perfection is capable of two notions, either it may ſignifie the perfect obedience of never ſinning, and of this onelyonly St Hierome ſpeaks, both when he ſaith it is not attained in this life, and when he addes, that whatſoever is leſs then this is ſinfull. Or elſe it may ſignifie any higher degree of exerciſe of any particular virtue, chaſtity, mercy, fortitude, &c. And of this onelyonly it is that I ſpeak (and St Hierome in the words cited from him appears not ever to have thought of it) and to this onelyonly my affirmation belongs, that there are degrees in that perfection, and that he that hath attained to any of thoſe degrees, ſins not againſt Chriſts precept of perfection, though he was not arrived to the higheſt degree.
But, ſaith he, the Doctor goes on, If there be any perfection attainable in this life, twill be capable of degrees and growth alſo] and then he addes, whether he be of their mind who hold perfection poſſible in this life, I cannot ſay, but this I can ſay, he ſpeaks contradictions, for perfection admits of no degrees or growth.
Here I ſee the Reader may be abuſed, if I do not give him a true narration of my words in that place, §. 46. Having mentioned one interpretation of the perfection which Chriſt commands us to aſpire to, Mat. 5. 48. viz. that it ſignifies mercifulneſs, Lu. 6. 36. I adde, if that ſenſe will not be admitted, yet if it be any perfection acquirable in this life, twill be capable of degrees and growth alſo. Now by a ſlight change of [if it be] into [if there be] this ſenſe is quite altered and made lyable to ſuſpicion, that I teach perfection (I ſuppoſe he muſt mean the unſinning perfection ſpoken of by St Hierome) poſſible in this life, and to the charge of ſpeaking evident contradictions, that I can talk of growth in ſuch perfection.
Truely there was little of juſtice in this, I hope he will be ſenſible of it. The perfection which I there ſpeak of, be it love and mercy to enemies, or be it any other Chriſtian duty ſet under precept by Chriſt, is certainly in ſome degree attainable in this life by them which have ſinned, and do ſtill ſinne through infirmity, in other things, and perhaps in ſome circumſtances of this, and then I hope there can be no hereſie in this, to ſay that by the grace of Chriſt one may obey ſuch a precept of Chriſts, love his enemies &c. when St Paul profeſſeth unlimitedly he can do all things through Chriſt that ſtrengthened him.
And then what contradiction can there be in affirming that in this virtue of loving enemies, of mercy &c. there are degrees and conſequently poſſibility of growth? Of mercy it hath oft been exemplified that it is ſo, and whatever particular virtue it be that can be phanſied to be meant by Chriſt by foreign perfection, I doubt not but it will be as viſible, when that virtue is named. But the Diatribiſt attempts nothing that way, onelyonly miſtakes perfection for ſome other thing, either for a ſinleſs perfection, or for ſuch a ſtate as cannot be increaſed, knowing well enough that that is not attainable in this life, and certainly is not the matter of Chriſt's precept, Mat. 5. and as certainly is not the perfection that there I ſpeak of.
Once more, what I ſaid in this matter [that if the perfection (ſpoken of in the objection) be not acquirable in this life, 'tis certainly not under Evangelical precept now, citing that of Mat. 11. of Chriſts light and ſupportable burthen, and his commands not grievous, i. e. poſſible to be performed by us] falls under his very ſharp diſcipline, This, ſaith he, is ſtrong and ſtrange confidence.
His language I ſhall not onelyonly willingly bear with, but thank him for it; I ſhall onelyonly examine the reaſons which he offers for thus accuſing me. They are three, Firſt, becauſe the Law requires perfect obedience of Chriſtians, as the rule of eternal righteouſneſs, adding that all orthodox Divines have maintained this againſt the Church of Rome, OnelyOnly the Doctor is of the Church of Romes mind, and charges the Law with imperfection, citing it from Pract: Cat: p. 94.
Here are many miſadventures, I ſhall but name them, 1. That the Law requires perfect obedience of Chriſtians, meaning by that the Moſaical Law, for that onelyonly, be knowes, it is, which the Doctor chargeth with imperfection. The Law indeed ſometimes ſignifies the Covenant of exact unſinning obedience, and of that Law or that Covenant it is moſt true that it required perfect, as that ſignifies unſinning obedience. But then 1. This was the firſt Covenant, and is not now in force with faithfull penitent Chriſtians, who are not under this Law but under grace, i. e. under a 2d Covenant which requires not innocence but repentance, ſincere, not perfect obedience: And therefore 2dly. It cannot truely be ſaid that this Law requires this perfect obedience of Chriſtians, nor conſequently that it is the rule of Evangelicall righteouſneſs, i. e. of that righteouſneſs by which believers are now ſaid to be juſtified: I ſhall not inſiſt on the proving of this here, becauſe it is but a digreſſion in this place, and is abundantly explicated elſewhere, in the Pract: Cat. concerning the two Covenants.
2dly. That he makes this doctrine of the Law's requiring perfect obedience of Chriſtians, to be one of the Doctrines maintained by the orthodox againſt the Church of Rome, when it is indeed but a contention of words, that the Diatribiſt (it ſeems) and ſome others have eſpouſed againſt I know not what adverſary.
3dly. That the Doctors charging the Law with imperfection is a thing wherein he complies with the Church of Rome, when tis evident in that place of the Catech: that 1. The words of Chriſt that he came, foreign to fill up the vacuities of the Moſaical Law, and 2. The many expreſs examples of his doing ſo, in that 5t. of Mat. his additions to the Law in ſo many particulars introduced with [It was ſaid of old—But I ſay unto you] and laſtly, the uniforme ſuffrage of all antiquity joyning in this interpretation of Chriſts words, was the ground whereon I built my affirmation, and if in this the Church of Rome were of my mind (as I do not find it is, making ſome of thoſe additions, Mat. 5. counſels, not all of them precepts) I ſhould never diſclaime the doctrin upon that account, any more then the articles of the Creed, which the Church of Rome is acknowledged to believe with us.
His 2d proof is, that the Goſpel cals for the perfection of the law, Be ye perfect as he is perfect, Mat. 5. and be ye holy as he is holy, 1 Pet. 1. 15, 16. I anſwer, 1. this proves not his propoſition, viz. that it was ſtrong and ſtrange confidence in me, to ſay, that if the perfection be not acquirable in this life, tis not now under Evangelical precept, Acquirable perfection may be (and ſome degree of it is) under precept, but unacquirable perfection is not. Chriſts eaſie yoke is not now made up to us of impoſſible precepts. 2dly. That perfection in one of the places mentioned by him, appears to be mercifulneſs, and the holineſs in the other, that of S. Peter being oppoſed foreign, to the former luſts, when they were in ignorance, reſpects either that ſort of purity particularly, or however that more univerſal purity, which is now more ſeverely required of all Chriſtians, in an higher degree, then it had been under the Jewiſh oeconomy; and of either of theſe I never doubted, but they are now under Evangelical precept. But then ſtill that is nothing to the higher degrees of thoſe, or other Chriſtian virtues, which all this while we ſpeak of. No more is that which follows from the Doctor himſelf, ſaying that Chriſt came to perfect the Law. So he might do, and yet leave ſome degrees of mercy &c. free and not under precept, as hath oft been ſaid.
I ſhall not now take leaſure to examine, with what truth he addes, that that perfection which Chriſt came to adde is ſtill the perfection of the Law, It is true, it was the requiring of what the law had not required, and ſo the adding more to it, and perfecting it as a law, requiring all that ever ſhall be required of men by law, or precept. But this concludes nothing againſt higher degrees of this very perfection, being ſtill left free, and not under law, the onelyonly thing which now he contends againſt.
His 3d proof is taken from the account I give in the Pract. Cat. p. 95. of the lightneſſe and ſupportableneſs of Chriſts burthen, 1. in taking off the burthen of unprofitable ceremonies, 2. in taking away the damning power of every leaſt ſin, &c. 3. in giving greater ſtrength. From whence he concludes, It was not then, that he required not perfect holineſſe under the Goſpel. I anſwer 1. foreign, that this concluſion can with no Logick be thus deduced being à teſtimonio negativè. It is very poſſible there might be other reaſons, beſide thoſe I there named, My mention of three being ſufficient for the matter then in hand, did no way prejudge or exclude more. But then 2. I grant that this now mentioned, neither was, nor well could have been any part of my account of the eaſineſs and ſupportableneſs of Chriſts Evangelical burthen, above that legal of Moſes, becauſe it was common both to the law of Moſes and of Chriſt, that there were ſome degrees of perfection, which were by neither of them under precept, Moſes's law had place for free-will offerings, as well as Chriſts, nay Chriſts hath put ſome things under precept, as I conceive, which were not under precept by Moſes's law, in this one reſpect there lies more weight on a Chriſtian then did formerly on a Iew, but that is abundantly recompenſed by other reſpects, which this is not a ſeaſon to inlarge upon.
Having thus anſwered all his objections in this matter, it will I hope be conſequent, that he hath not yet demonſtrated the truth of that aſſertion, which from what he hath ſaid he aſſumes to be apparently and viſibly true, viz. that every man is bound to do that which is beſt, becauſe the law and the Goſpel alſo require perfection of obedience in every commandment; For to this I have oft replied, that both of them require perfect obedience to all, that either of them requires, which notwithſtanding there are ſtill foreign under both, which no precept either of law or Goſpel requires, or puts under neceſſity of obligation to any.
The falſeneſs of that propoſition, that every man is bound to do that which is beſt, I had formerly evidenced by two means, 1. the words of the Apoſtle, 1 Cor. 7. 38. he that marries doth well, but he that marrieth not doth better, 2. by this, that the beſt being a ſuperlative, ſuppoſes the poſitive, which is lower then that, to be yet good, &c.
To theſe he will now apply anſwer; To the firſt, that well and better there, do not refer to moral goodneſs but worldly good, for the preventing of troubles in thoſe afflicted and perſecuting times. But this anſwer will be ſoon ſhaken aſunder, 1. by conſidering that as the well and better do certainly belong to the ſame kind of good, ſo it is viſible that the well cannot belong to the worldly but moral good, and then conſequently the better muſt do ſo too. That the foreign, doth well, belongs to moral goodneſs, is evident by v. 28. where adviſing them that are looſed from mariage, not to mary, he addes foreign, but and if, or, though thou do mary, thou ſinneſt not, and if the virgin mary, ſhe ſinneth not, What can be more clear then that the doing well is not ſinning, and ſure that is a moral, not only a worldly good.
Nay 2. the Apoſtle is as expreſſe that the marying is quite contrary to the worldly good, for having ſaid, that they that mary ſin not, he addes immediately v. 28. foreign, but ſuch ſhall have trouble to the fleſh, and what can be more contrary to worldly good? But yet farther 3. the Apoſtle ſets down the advantages of not marrying v. 32. the unmarried careth for the things of the Lord how he may pleaſe the Lord and the unmaried woman in like manner that ſhe may be holy both in body and ſpirit v. 34. whereas the maried man cares for the things of the world how he may pleaſe his wife, and the woman in like manner how ſhe may pleaſe her husband; And then are not theſe ſpiritual (not barely worldly) advantages, and is not the holyneſs of both body and ſpirit, and the caring for the things of the Lord, a greater moral or rather ſpiritual good, then the bare caring for the things of the world, to pleaſe a yoke-fellow? I hope I need ſay no more on this; nor ſure on that which he next addes, that if the perſon have not the gift of continence, it is then not only good but neceſſary for him to mary, for he knowes that as S. Paul ſpake of him that had that gift, when he ſaith he doth better, ſo I that only cited S. Pauls words, muſt be reſolved to ſpeak alſo. But as long as of him that hath that gift, i. e. hath power of his own will, it is true, that if he mary, he doth well, i. e. ſinneth not, but yet doth better if he do not mary, it is evident that I have all that I pretend to, and certainly this is given me by S. Pauls words.
To my 2d argument that the beſt being ſuperlative, ſuppoſes the poſitive to be good, he replies [I hope the Doctor will not deny but works done by Faith are good, and yet that they are not perfect in this life, i. e. come ſhort of what we are bound to by the Goſpel, will he now ſay they are evil?] I anſwer, I will not ſay they are evil, but they are good though not perfect from all poſſible mixture of ſin. And what now he can gain from this his queſtion thus anſwered by me, as he expects I ſhould anſwer it, it will not be eaſie for any man to imagine, For ſure this is the confirming not the diſproving of my argument, For by his own ſetting it, it is manifeſt, that thoſe things are not evil, which yet are capable of a greater perfection, and then the perfection being the ſuperlative the poſitive is ſuppoſed to be good, and not evil, and yet evil it muſt have been, if every thing which is inferiour to the moſt perfect, were ſin, or if the higheſt perfection were under Precept.
What he addes out of Gregory, that all humane juſtice is convinced to be injuſtice, if it be ſtrictly judged] is 1. contrary to his former queſtion to me [will he now ſay they are evil?] whatſoever the Doctor think, the Diatribiſt it ſeems will ſay they are convinced to be injuſtice, and that, I muſt ſuppoſe, is evil, (and is not this great inconſtancy in him?) 2. It is of no force againſt my pretenſions, for when I ſaid, ſuch a thing is good, and another beſt, I never meant that either of them is not convincible by Gods ſtrict judgement to have ſome mixture of evil, but that the evil which is or may be adherent to it in ſome other reſpect (as of all humane actions is acknowledged) being pardoned by God in Chriſt, the lower degree being good, i. e. an act of obedience to Chriſts command, that which is higher and ſo better then that, may yet be ſomewhat which he hath not commanded, and ſo ſtill a foreign in a Chriſtian. And thus much on occaſion of the ſeveral degrees, and paſſages of my anſwer to the firſt objection, which I foreſaw, that which was taken from the conſideration of what Prudence might adviſe and ſeem to require of us, which hath proved a buſineſs of ſome length.