An Account of Cawdrys Triplex Diatribe, Chapter 2

An Account of Cawdrys Triplex Diatribe · Chapter 2

p. 4CHAP. II. Of M. C. his Preface.

Sect. 1. His diſcourſe of the cauſes of my miſtakes. Comparing of Superſtition and Wil-worſhip to Hereſie. Accounting Superſtition our virtue.

1TIs now more then time that we think of entring, and yet there is a Preface ſtill behind, which expects to be taken notice of, as being a very friendly recapitulation of the grounds of my great miſtakes, the unhappy cauſes of thoſe my miſcarriages, which he hath diſcovered in the inſuing Exercitations.

2But I that am not yet by all his Diatribe ſo inſtructed, or improved, as to diſcern one real miſadventure in thoſe diſcourſes, find it impoſſible for me to be edified by this his charity; I muſt be ſhewed my diſeaſe, before Hippocrates himſelf can point me out the cauſes of it, and therefore my briefeſt return to his preface, is but to beſeech him to reſerve his diſcourſe of cauſes, till the effects ſhall be ſo viſible, as to call for it; and if this be not a ſufficient reply to all of it, What is behind, will eaſily be referred to this one head, the injuſtices and miſtakes of the author of it, which I ſhall but briefely recite to him.

3Firſt, that he hath thought fit to compare Superſtition and Wil-worſhip, as they are the ſubjects of my diſcourſes, with Hereſie; whereas, 1. Superſtition, in the proper notation of the word, which firſt I ſpeak of, and vindicate our Church, whether in the ceremonies, or obſervances, from all appearance of guilt of it, is the worſhipping of Demons or deified men, and that ſure is worſe then hereſie in every Chriſtians account, and ſo inconveniently compared, ſo as to be equalled with it. And 2, whatever our p. 5Church hath admitted, is cleared to have nothing of Superſtition in it in any other ſecundary notion or acception of the word; or if it had, yet as long as it is no more but uncommanded Rites or Feſtivals, which by the Diatribiſt himſelf are thus ſtyled, thoſe ſure, in any reaſon, will not be capable of this compariſon, or accuſation of being ſo bad as hereſie; and 3. will-worſhip in the one place where it is uſed in Scripture, hath no manner of ill, but good character ſet upon it, being joyned foreign with humility, which I hope is not yet condemned to be quite ſo criminal and abominable to God, as pride and hereſie is acknowledged to be; however in this Preface, before my interpretation of Col. 2. 23. hath been endevoured to be confuted, this ſo eminent criminouſneſs thereof was not with more reaſon, then charity ſuppoſed by him.

2. That he hath affirm'd, in a parentheſis, of ſome men that 4they account theſe (and ſuperſtition is evidently one of theſe) their virtues rather then crimes; which again if applied to me, or I think to any Proteſtant living, is very unkind and unprovoked, having no ground in any part of my Diſcourſe.

3. That Wil-worſhip hath been by him elſwhere demonſtrated 5to be as criminal as Hereſie, which in what notion ſoever he hath expreſt himſelf to underſtand the word, is with no truth aſſumed by him, as far as refers to theſe Diatribae; and if it be elſwhere attempted, 1. He ſhould have referred us thither, if but to vindicate his own veracity, or elſe have recited the heads of ſuch demonſtrative arguments in this place; or in the ſecond Diatribe; and yet neither of theſe are done by him.

p. 6Sect. 2. Of being too Religious; of the intenſion or degree. The Meſſalians. Neglect of Charity, of particular callings, Eccl. 7. 16. Of multitude of Ceremonies. Too many Ceremonies no argument of too much, but of too little Religion.

1HIS fourth miſtake is, that he hath recited it as one cauſe of my miſcarriages in this buſineſs that I affirm that a man cannot be too religious, and that I atteſt this both of the intenſion or degree, and of the extenſion or number of Ceremonies taken into the worſhip of God] Whereas that which I affirm, is evidently this. 1. That in reſpect of the degree, there is no ſuch thing as nimiety or exceſs in Religion; no poſſibility of being Religious in too high a degree, Sect. 33. and this is not denyed by Mr. C. nor can be by any pious man; who knows that all his faults are omiſſions and defects, but never exceſſes of piety or religion. 2. The 2main objections imaginable againſt this, from the practice of the Meſſalians, or the neglect of the duties of charity and the particular calling, incident to the intenſe practice of holy duties, were foreſeen and prevented there; the Meſſalians fault was not their exceſſive practice, but their laying that obligation on themſelves and others; the ſame that Tertullian and the Montaniſts were guilty of, in reſpect of other auſterities, and ſo 'twas their dogmatizing, in their impoſition of heavy burthens, wherein their hereſie (not their ſuperſtition) conſiſted: And the others crime is his idleneſs, and walking foreign diſorderly, a crime cenſured by the Apoſtle, 2 Theſ. 3. 11. (yet far enough from Superſtition again) and in like manner his want of charity, and ſo not nimiety, but unſeaſonableneſs of piety, contrary to the expreſs words of Chriſt, I will have mercy and not ſacrifice.

3And if yet a third objection be offered from the words of the Preacher, Eccl. 7. 16. (which yet this Diatribiſt hath not thought fit to offer) Be not righteous overmuch, why ſhouldſt thou deſtroy thy ſelf? I ſuppoſe the anſwer is obvious, that thoſe words are the intimation of the wordlings objection, who taketh that for exceſs of duty which brings any damage or worldly deſtruction p. 7upon him, and is anſwered in the next verſe with this ſolid Aphoriſm of eternal verity, Be not thou overmuch wicked; why ſhouldeſt thou die before thy time? The fears, and from thence the prudential, but oft times very impious practices of the worldling are far the more probable path to the moſt haſty ruines.

4And ſo ſtill this branch of my doctrine, as far as aſſerted by me, was neither untruth, nor miſcarriage, nor cauſe of either in my diſcourſe.

55. As for the ſecond, that of the extenſion or number of rites and ceremonies taken into the worſhip, that there cannot be too many of them, is as far from being my aſſertion, as that which is moſt contrary. For upon that head my concluſion is, that as ſome rites or circumſtances of time and place and geſture are abſolutely neceſſary to Religion, and the ſignificativeneſs of them is no manner of prejudice to the uſe or inſtitution of them, ſo if the Diſputers will yield but this, that even when they are ſignificative, the uſe of Ceremonies may be allowed among Chriſtians, I ſhall then in ſtead of pleading for the multitude of ſuch, give my vote to the confirming the old Rule, that they be paucae & ſalubres, few and wholſom; and particularly few for five reaſons, ſet down in the following words, Sect. 39. and ſure that is contrary enough to his reporting of my opinion, that there cannot be too many of them, and ſo that which was no part of my belief, could be no cauſe of any miſcarriage of mine in that buſineſs.

66. To which if I ſhall now add, that my granting there ought to be few (and ſo that there may be too many) Ceremonies in a Church, is no way the yielding a poſſibility that a man may be too religious; but on the contrary when the too many Ceremonies either cauſe, or occaſion, or are accompanied with inward neglects, there is not too much but too little Religion, too much formality, but too little devotion, too much outward Phariſaical waſhing, but too little inward Chriſtian fervor, as there may be foreign and foreign, words too many, but too little praying (I may adde too many offers of proof, but too little reaſon) and remind the Diatribiſt that this was expreſly ſaid before in the end Mat. 6.Matt 6of Sect. 39. by the token of the inſectile animals, whoſe want of blood cauſed their multitude of legs, I ſhall then ſure have given him ground of conviction, that there were more then one calumnie p. 8in his aſſignation of the cauſes, particularly in this of the firſt cauſe of my miſcarriages.

Sect. 3. Mr. C. his diſtinctions of being too religious, multiplied unneceſſarily. Frequency of duty, if ſecured from other neglects, no exceſs, nor criminous. Prayer a branch of Natural worſhip, foreign. Exceſs in truſt, &c. as well as in Prayer. The Species of worſhip, and the circumſtances thereof. The wide difference between theſe. Times of Prayer not limited by Scripture: Set days of worſhip, Geſtures, Proſtration. Mr. C. his 3. proofs examined, Deut. 4. 2. conſidered. Apoc. 22. 19. A view of Aquinas's doctrine in this matter.

1AS for his diſtinctions, by which he is willing to clear his way, that a man may be ſaid to be too Religious, either becauſe he gives more to God then he deſerves, but ſo he cannot be too Religious; or, becauſe he gives more then God requires by the Rule of worſhip. 2. That in regard of worſhip commanded, eſpecially natural worſhip, a man cannot be too religious in reference to the intention (I ſuppoſe it ſhould be intenſion) of the devotion, is in love, fear, truſt in God (adding in a cautious parentheſis, that in inſtituted worſhip a man may be too religious, as if he pray or faſt to the waſting his health or neglect of his calling:) but in uncommanded worſhip, the leaſt addition to the Rule of worſhip is too much, and ſuch a man may be ſaid to be too religious.] I cannot imagine how he hath by either or both of theſe attain'd his end, but rather perplexed, then cleared the way for the Reader, which was perfectly ſtraight, and abundantly explicate, before he took upon him to be the harbinger..

2For 1. the two latter members of both his diſtinctions are directly the ſame, and ſo I am ſure there was too much of his diſtinctions, tautologie I ſuppoſe is ſuch a nimiety, and ſuch ſure is this [A man that gives more then God requires by the rule of worſhip is too religious] and [in uncommanded worſhip the leaſt addition p. 9to the rule of worſhip is too much, and ſuch a man may be ſaid to be too religious.]

3Secondly, for his Parentheſis, it was perfectly prevented in the tract of Superſtition § 33. and ſo was a 2d. nimiety, being added without all neceſſity or uſe, it being there acknowledged that in a frequent or intenſe practice of holy duties there might be ſome incident fault, viz. neglect of duties of charity or particular callings; and waſting of health through faſting immoderately, bears analogie with theſe.

4But then it was forewarned, that the fault herein was not the exceſs of Religion, but omiſſion of other neceſſary duties, and that demonſtrated by this, becauſe if that frequency, whether of prayer or faſting, wherein is the ſuppoſed exceſs, be either in another man, or in that man (whoſe exceſs is accuſed) at another time, ſeparated and ſecured from thoſe neglects, or omiſſions of thoſe other duties, the very ſame frequency and intention were his virtue not his crime, which therefore ſtill prejudges this from being an inſtance of the thing in hand, that a man may be too religious.

5Thirdly, his difference, in this reſpect of nimiety, betwixt natural and inſtituted worſhip, is perfectly vain and uſeleſs to his deſign, even as he himſelf hath explicated it, placing love, fear, truſt in God under the firſt head, and prayer and faſting under the other.

6For 1. I muſt remind him that prayer is as properly a branch of natural worſhip, as love, or fear, or truſt can be imagined to be, being, 1. inſeparable from truſt, 2. a neceſſary and natural means of acknowledging Gods fulneſs and our wants, 3. containing under it thankſgiving, praiſing God, which is the prime way of honouring God (He that praiſeth me honoreth me, ſaith David) and ſure that honouring of God, a moſt peculiar branch of natural worſhip, dictated by the nature of a creature, and taught by all naturaliſts that acknowledged any God, (foreign, in the Pythagorean verſes, honour the Gods, and foreign God in Phocylides) and both the petitory and the Euchariſtical comprehended under the foreign, worſhiping the Gods, in Plutarch, which Xenophon tells us foreign is the primeval law acknowledged foreign.among all men, and Hierocles, having defined Piety to be the foreign, the captain of all virtues, foreign, p. 10as having reſpect to the divine cauſe, he addes that the precept concerning that in the golden verſes, had juſtly the precedence and deference before all lawes, to give the Gods that honor which is due unto them, and all things elſe according to that order foreign. p. 10.foreign, which the creative law (that ſure is the Chriſtians law of Nature) together with their being, had afforded them. But perhaps ſuch evidences as theſe are the Philoſophy againſt which the Reader was to be forewarned in the title page, and therefore,

7Secondly, I muſt adde, to demonſtrate the uſeleſneſs of his diſtinction in this place, that it is as poſſible to exceed in truſt, in feare, nay even in love, as it is in prayer; Thus he that ſo truſts in God, as not to fear; he that truſts him with the end, ſo as to neglect the means, parallel to him that prays and neglects his calling; he that truſts and relies and hopes, but doth not purifie, (performs not the Evangelical condition) every one of theſe is, in proportion with M. C. his inſtances of prayer and faſting, an exceeder in truſt, we are wont to expreſs it by preſuming.

2. He that ſo fears, as not to love, that fears where no fear is, 8that walkes accurately foreign as a fool, he will be as properly an exceeder in fear.

3. He that ſo loves God again, either as not to fear God, or as not to love his brother alſo; he that hath a zeal to God, but not according to knowledge, he is in like manner an exceeder in love. And yet all this while none of theſe are religious too much, but too little, though they exceed the bounds of one part of duty, they are defective in another, and tis this defect, not that other exceeding, that is criminous, Theſe things ought they to have done, but not to leave the other undone; and theſe omiſſions are their crimes, and as truly ſo in the natural as in the inſtituted worſhip, though if the inſtituted worſhip in any branch be preferred before any branch of natural duty, or be more intenſely and frequently practiſed, to the neglecting thereof, this may be a greater fault then if one part of natural worſhip be intended to the detriment of another either ſuperior or equal to it, as if Sacrifice (which I acknowledge an inſtituted worſhip) be intended or preſt to the omiſſion of neceſſary charities, ceremonies to the ſlacking of the inward fervor, or the like.

p. 11So that ſtill all that this Diatribiſt's ſubdivided diſtinctions have done for us (beſide diſcovering his own miſtakes) is onelyonly this, to propoſe one ſort of things, wherein in his opinion, a man may be too religious, viz. in giving God more then he requires by the rule of worſhip, or, as again he expreſſeth it, by the leaſt addition to the rule of worſhip, which, ſaith he, is too much, and ſuch a man may be too religious. And this being the onelyonly product of his diſtinction, is, as I intimated, ſo far from clearing, that it is the perplexing and intrieating the buſineſs, which was formerly clear enough, the leading the Reader not out but into Meanders, an intanglement of the clue, a Sphinx inſtead of an Oedipus.

10For there was no ſuch foreign before, nothing ſo difficult, ſo involved, of ſo incertain and dubious ſignification as this which now he calls [giving God more then he requires by the rule of worſhip] and explains by [uncommanded worſhip, and, the leaſt addition to the rule of worſhip.]

11I ſhall evince the truth of what I now ſay, and with the ſame hand clear again what he hath clouded, by asking him but this one queſtion, Doth he mean in theſe words [more] and [Addition] any new ſpecies or ſort of worſhip, neither preſcribed by the law of Nature, nor inſtituted by any poſitive law of God? or doth he deſigne onelyonly ſome circumſtance onelyonly, or ceremony, which being not of the intrinſick nature or eſſence of worſhip, but onelyonly accidental to it, is not particularly commanded or preſcribed by the word of God, the rule of worſhip? ſuch are the time, the place, the geſtures, and ſuch outward, but ſome of them inſeparable attendants of worſhip.

12I ſhall deſire to ſecure my expreſſions from obſcurity and miſtakes, and therefore to be as explicit as may be; Prayer is a ſpecies of worſhip; praying on the Lords day, on Chriſtmas day, obſerving conſtant hours of prayer, thrice, ſeven, ten times every day, is each of them a circumſtance adherent to Prayer; ſome time is neceſſary and inſeparable from Prayer, but every of theſe times forementioned are not ſo, he that prayes but thrice doth not pray ſeven or ten times a day, So again the place of prayer may give it a different denomination, either of publick or private; the manner may render it more or leſs ſolemn, the geſtures more or leſs reverent or irreverent, the increaſe, letting down of ardor, p. 12devout or formal, and there are many ſorts, and degrees of each of theſe, but theſe do not conſtitute new or ſeveral ſorts of worſhip, but all are accidents of one and the ſame ſpecial of worſhip, viz. of Prayer.

13Here then is a wide difference, and if his meaning were of the ſpecies or ſorts of worſhip, then I never doubted to affirm with him, that all uncommanded worſhip is an exceſs, if he pleaſe, (an error, I ſhould rather ſay) a ſetting up that for worſhip of God, which is not worſhip, nay perhaps quite contrary to worſhip; and this ſure was never juſtified by me explicitely, or implicitely, in concluſions, or in grounds and principles of thus concluding, and ſo ſtill this hath not been uſefull to me to diſcover any miſtake of mine.

14The ſecond then is the onelyonly branch remaining, of which his words, as referring to me, can poſſibly be underſtood, and then 'twil prove ſo far from being any miſadventure of mine, that it will devolve all abſurdity upon the Diatribiſt.

15For I ſhall demand, Hath the rule of worſhip, i. e. the Scripture, any where preſcribed the times, the places, the geſtures, and all the circumſtances of the worſhip of God, and that both poſitively and excluſively, ſo that he that prayes oftener then the Scripture expreſly commands, or on any day not aſſigned to that purpoſe by Scripture, ſinnes in ſo doing, addes to the rule, gives more then God requires, doth too much, is too religious, is criminous and abominable to God in ſo doing? every of theſe muſt be the affirmations of this Diatribiſt, if this 2d. meaning be his, and the like he is obliged to ſay again of him that prays in any place, in any manner, in any geſture, which the word of Scripture, the rule of worſhip hath not commanded.

16And becauſe this is by all reaſon to be reſolved to be his meaning, or elſe his whole Book is perfectly caſt away, a meer foreign or beating the air, without me or any man elſe to be his adverſarie, I ſhall at the preſent ſuppoſe it ſo, and ſhew him, as deictically as he can wiſh, the abſurdities of it.

17And 1. for the times of prayer, I demand, What hath the rule of worſhip, the Scripture preſcribed? hath it preſcribed morning and evening Prayer, and that both poſitively, and excluſively to any more? If ſo, then by the ſtandard of this Diatribiſt's doctrine, Davids or Daniels praying three times a day, adding p. 13the noon day ſeaſon to the other two, muſt be criminous and abominable: or if he ſhall pitch upon any other number of times, as preſcribed by the Rule, then I ſhall add an unite more to that number and demand, whether that addition will adde abomination to his performances? If he ſaith it will, though I might preſs that affirmation with abſurdities enough, yet I ſhall ſpare it, and onelyonly demand the proof from the Scripture for this aſſertion, and when he gives it me forfeit all my pretenſions to the underſtanding that ſacred book; but if he cannot produce any ſuch Scripture, then is my Cenſor the guilty perſon, the very dogmatizer, that teacheth for Doctrines or Commandments of God, his own Dictates, which I muſt ſuppoſe to be the traditions of a man, and the doing ſo, I cannot reſiſt to be a nimiety, but not of religion, that I yet diſcern.

18In like manner for ſet days to be conſecrated to the worſhip of God, for faſting or for prayer, I demand how many every week or every yeer hath the Rule of worſhip preſcribed? Or what rule of worſhip ſhall be appealed to? the Law of Moſes, or the Goſpel of Chriſt? His anſwer to this queſtion will involve him in intricacies enough: If the Law of Moſes be the rule, then he knows all the New Moons and feaſts of the Jews, and Sabbatick years and Jubilees muſt return upon him: If the Goſpel of Chriſt, which hath certainly aboliſht all theſe, and, as he ſuppoſeth, ſet up the Lords-day, inſtead of them all, then 1. I demand in what words of the New Teſtament the weekly obſervation of this is commanded? and 2. in what words the obſerving all others but that, particularly the Feaſt of Eaſter, the annual commemorative of the Reſurrection, is interdicted, and whether the weekly remembrance of ſo great a mercy, being ſo acceptable to God, it be reaſonable to think the annual, abominable before him? And the ſame queſtion ſoon extends it ſelf to the day of Chriſts Incarnation, Paſſion, Aſcenſion, &c. and if of each of theſe he ſhall define and pronounce them unlawfull, without teſtimony and verdict from the Rule of worſhip the Scripture, then he is the Dogmatizer, that hath added to the Rule, more interdicts then are there to be met with, and ſo ſtill he is the man guilty of the nimiety.

19So again for geſtures in the worship of God, I demand, What p. 14is the geſture of prayer, preſcribed by the Rule? Is it ſtanding, ſitting, or kneeling, any, or all of theſe, or any fourth ſuperadded to theſe? If the Rule have preſcribed none, then according to his doctrine again, any of theſe muſt be criminous additions to the Rule, abominable, &c. If the rule have preſcribed ſome one, then all others, beſide that one, muſt fall under the ſame ſeverity, that that one, had done, if it had not been preſcribed: and if all three are under ſeveral precepts, and ſo the whole Rule obeyed by retaining theſe three, then ſtill I ſhall mention a fourth, that of proſtration, whether will the old penitents, in the porch, or on the pavement, every man in his cloſet and receſſe, and ſtill the queſtion returns, whether this be criminous, and by what part of the rule of worship it appears to be ſo?

20Necdum finitus the enumeration of the Diatribiſts inextricable difficulties is not yet at an end, but infinitely multipliable by every act of Religious Faſt, and of Almſgiving, the two other ſorts of Gods worship (as Aquinas (owned here by the Diatribiſt) hath defined from the ſixt of Matthew) the proportions or degrees of each of which are yet no where defined in the Scripture. But I ſuppoſe it cannot now be neceſſary, that I farther confirm what is ſo evident already.

21Elſe I might yet farther proceed from the duties of the firſt to the ſecond Table, and demand whether any thing that is done (out of the ſervice of God) for which there is no command, be a criminous exceſs? Certainly the Analogy will hold, God having given the Rule for juſtice and charity, as well as worship, and then whatſoever of any kind is not under precept, muſt by this argument be under interdict, and ſo there will be nothing left indifferent in the world: A concluſion that ſome men which have held Mr. C. his hypotheſis have rationally inlarged to, finding it neceſſary, and unavoidably deduced from thence: But I diſcern not yet, that Mr. C. hath thus improved his principle, though ſure whenſoever it is for his turn, it is thus improvable.

22But Mr. C. hath added three proofs to his affirmation, and how unreconcileable ſoever with common notions that is, yet thoſe muſt deſerve to be heeded; And his firſt proof is this, If a man or Church may adde to the Rules of Religion, then be or they may be too Religious: But Ergo.

p. 1523Here it muſt be remembred, that the thing which he had propoſed to himſelf to prove, was this, that in uncommanded worſhip the leaſt addition to the rule of worſhip is too much, and ſuch a man may be ſaid to be too religious: And this, ſaith he, I prove, 1. If a man or Church may adde to the rule of religion, &c. Of this 1. I deſire to be told, whether it be not a meer idem per idem, a proving a thing by it ſelf, and whether that be not contrary to all rules of ſyllogizing, where the medium of probation is never to enter the concluſion, as here moſt evidently it doth.

24Having ſaid this to the form, tis not needfull that I ſay any thing to the matter of this proof, it being the very thing that I have ſpoken to all this while, and by that diſtinction, of the ſorts and circumſtances of worſhip, I have competently ſhewed, that it hath no force againſt me; that indeed he that introduces any new part of divine worſhip, is a preſumptuous aſſumer, doth more then he ſhould, becauſe that which he ſhould not do, and ſo that the Major is falſe, inſtead of clear; he that thus addes, and impoſeth on God and his word, is not hereby too religious, but too bold, and was never pleaded for in the leaſt, by my treatiſe of Superſtition.

25The inconſequence of this Major will more appear, by conſidering the proof of the Aſſumption, which he annexes, The aſſumption, ſaith he, is proved by Deut. 4. 2. where all additions to the word are prohibited.

26But I pray doth he that proſtrates himſelf in prayer, adde to the word of God? then ſure he that walks in the garden, doth ſo too, much more he that makes any ſuch deductions from Scripture, as this Diatribiſt here doth, (for not onelyonly the analogie enforceth this, but it is alſo to be remembred, that the laws which had here been given by Moſes, were all ſorts of duties of common life, towards our ſelves, and our brethren, as well as of worſhip toward God, and ſo this Text muſt exclude all other uncommanded actions, as well as worſhips) The words in Deuteronomy are theſe, Ye ſhall not adde to the word that I command you, neither ſhall ye diminiſh from it, foreign ad cuſtodiendum, and in the ſame ſenſe the Targum foreign to obſerve, or that ye may obſerve that ye may keep the commandments of the Lord your God which I command you. The meaning is moſt evident that they were to perform uniform p. 16obedience to God, not to make any change in Gods commands, either to pretend more liberties, or fewer obligations, or again more obligations and fewer liberties, to be delivered them by God, then thoſe which he had then delivered by Moſes, but to ſet themſelves humbly to the performance of his precepts, and accordingly the Septuagint renders foreign to keep] foreign ye ſhall keep, the Latine, cuſtodite keep, and the Syriack, ſed obſervate, but keep the commandments, by that oppoſition ſhewing that to be the meaning of not adding or diminiſhing, viz. paying an obedience to Gods commands. And the ſame ſenſe in the like words we have again Apoc. 22. 18, 19. to ſhut up the great prophecy in the New Teſtament; And then, I pray, is he that offends againſt either of theſe two texts, too Religious? Is it not more true on the contrary, that he is a falſe Prophet, and a ſacrilegious perſon, that pretends the word of the Lord for that which God hath not ſpoken to him? But this crime I hope every man is not guilty of, that bowes or kneeles or proſtrates himſelf in prayer, by ſuch outward geſtures both ſignifying, and inflaming the inward fervor of the heart, but not inſerting any precept of doing thus, either into the book of Deuteronomy, or the Apocalyps. And this may ſuffice for his firſt proof.

27His ſecond proof is from the ſaying of the great School man, that Religion is a moral virtue (or very like it) and ſtands between two extremes, Ergo, a man may be too much religious, as well as too little.

28Firſt, I anſwer to the antecedent, that if it be remembred what the two extremes are, between which religion, in Aquinas, ſtands, the conſequent will never be inferred from it. The extremes are on one ſide Superſtition, on the other irreligion, ſuperſtition is again, ſaith he, of two ſorts, either 1. the worſhiping of a creature (of falſe Gods, or more Gods then one, as in Tertullian adv. Marc. l. 1. c. 5. ſpeaking of the worſhiping of two Gods, Vererer, ſaith he, ne abundantia officii ſuperſtitio potiùs quàm religio crederetur, I ſhould fear ſuch abundance of officiouſneſs would be rather believed ſuperſtition then religion; and S. Auguſtine, and out of him 2^• 2^•. qu. 92. art. 1.Aquinas, tangis primam chordam qua colitur unus Deus, & cecidit beſtia ſuperſtitionis, the beaſt of ſuperſtition is deſtroyed by the firſt ſtring of the Decachord, the firſt commandment of the Decalogue, p. 17preſcribing the worſhip of one God.) or 2. cum Deo illegitimus cultus tribuitur, giving undue worſhip to God, and neither of theſe notions of ſuperſtition will be at all uſefull to the Diatribiſt to prove his concluſion.

29If from the former of theſe he ſhould conclude that a man may be too religious, tis plain that this muſt be his meaning, that a man may be a Polytheiſt, a worſhipper of falſe Gods, but I hope, in this ſenſe, he that obſerves the ceremonies of the Church of England, he that commemorates the birth of Chriſt on the 25 of Deber, will not be ſaid to be too religious.

30As for the 2. that of cultus illegitimus, or indebitus, undue worſhip of the true God (which alone can poſſibly be deemed for the Diatribiſt's purpoſe) my anſwer ſhall be more particular, by viewing & weighing the words in Aquinas which are here referred to: though the place be not ſet down by the Diatribiſt, I ſuppoſe it muſt be 2^d1 2^d2 either queſt. 81. Art. 1. or elſe qu. 92. Art. 1. in concluſ. which indeed hath theſe words, Religio eſt virtus moralis, omnis autem virtus moralis in medio conſiſt it, Religion is a moral virtue, and every moral virtue conſiſts in the middle, citing it (with a ſicut ſuprà dictum eſt) from the former place qu. 81. Art. 5. Now the ſumme of that Article is this, that Reſp. ad. 3.Religion is neither a Theological nor an Intellectual, but a moral virtue, as being a branch of juſtice, in giving to God that which belongs to him, and that the due medium, wherein this, as all moral virtue conſiſts, is to be taken, not as the middle point between two paſſions, the Vid 1. 2. q. 64. Art. 2.medium rei (as ordinarily moral virtue is the moderating of paſſions, reducing them to a mediocrity, or temper, or equilibration betwixt the exceſs and defect) but according to ſome equality, in reſpect of God, Ibid.medium rationis, interpreting what he means by that, viz. equality, not abſolutely, becauſe we cannot give God ſo much as belongs to him, but ſecundum quandam conſiderationem humanae facultatis & divinae acceptationis (by conſidering what man is able to do, and what God will accept; As for ſuperfluity in ſuch things as theſe, which belong to the worſhip of God, there can be none, ſaith he, ſecundum circumſtantiam quanti, as to the circumſtance of quantity. I cannot do too much in the worſhip of God, I cannot offend that way but, as l. 2. q. 64. Art. 4 in corp.elſewhere he ſaith of this, and the like, tanto eſt melius, p. 18quanto magis acceditur ad ſummum, it is ſo much the better, by how much it comes neerer the higheſt. All the ſuperfluity poſſible is as to the other circumſtances, and he names but three, 1. cui non debet, by exhibiting divine worſhip to him to whom it ought not to be exhibited, 2. quando non debet, by giving it at a time when it ought not, (when having formerly been acceptable to God, tis now outdated) 3. in reſpect of other circumſtances, prout non debet, in a manner wherein it ought not.

31By this it appears already, how incompetent this teſtimony from Aquinas is, to prove the concluſion propoſed by the Diatribiſt, that every thing in the worſhip of God which is not commanded by God, is too much. For ſure every thing that is not commanded, is not preſently forbidden, nor conſequently offends againſt the prout debet, as it ought, the due manner, time, or other circumſtances of it. If there be any difficulty in that phraſe [prout debet, as it ought] and it be conceived to ſignifie ſo as is particularly commanded by God, and è contra, that what ever is done, being not particularly commanded by God, is prout non debet, as it ought not, this is certainly a miſtake, and very diſtant from Aquinas's ſenſe, who means by cultus debitus, due worſhip, any acts of worſhip, 2^d• 2^d• q. 81. Art. 5. in aorp.qui ad Dei reverentiam fiunt, which are done to the honour of God, with conſidering whether they be under precept or not, and conſequently with him cultus indebitus, undue worſhip, is ſuch as is done to the diſhonor, at leaſt not to the honor of God, as when of Idolatry he ſaith, that it Q. 92. art. 2. corp.exhibits divine reverence, indebitè, unduly to the creature.

32In full accord with this it is, that in that other text qu. 92. art. 1. Superſtition is by him defined to be a vice oppoſed to religion in the exceſſe, whereby a man gives worſhip to him to whom he ought not, or not in a manner that he ought, meaning as he explains himſelf, not that of quantity, but in reſpect of other circumſtances, when either it is faſtned on a wrong object, divine worſhip to that which is not God, (which ſure is againſt, not onelyonly without the command of God) or done in a wrong manner, i. e. when any thing is done in the divine worſhip, In reſp. ad tertium.quod fieri non debet, which ought not to be done, and he Art. 2. in reſp. ad tertium.inſtances, ſi quis temporibus gratiae vellet colere Deum ſecundum veteris legis ritum, If any man under Chriſtianity would worſhip God after the rites of the old law, which p. 19ſure are not onelyonly not commanded but forbidden under Chriſt, and ſo are a proper inſtance of the quando non debet the undue circumſtance of time, mentioned particularly in the former place, and convinces that which I aſſigned to be the meaning of it. I need adde no more in this place concerning the teſtimony of Aquinas. Other mentions of his opinion in this matter, will hereafter occur, and then I ſhall have occaſion to ſpeake more to them.

33His 3. proof is from the Doctors own conceſſion, who, ſaith he, grants there may be a nimiety or exceſs of religion, and addes words in ſuch a ſtyle as are abſolutely nonſenſe, even when the [not] (which I ſuppoſe the inſertion of the Printer) is blotted out, thus there may be a nimiety in adding, and ſo is an exceeder in the fear and ſervice of God.

34But to paſs by that, I anſwer, 1. that the Dr. no where uſeth that phraſe, a nimiety or exceſs of religion, the words [of religion] are inſerted by the citer and honeſtly put in different letters, to note them to be his own.

35The matter is plain, I there ſpeak of an exceſs of fear, but not of religion (ſee the beginning of §. 46. of the Tr. of ſuperſtit.) and though I after ſay, that he that thinks himſelf bound or obliges others, as from God, when God neither commands nor forbids, and ſo addes to the commands of God, and fears where there is no reaſon to fear, is an exceeder in the fear and ſervice of God, yet neither is that exceſs of religion, nor indeed exceſs of fear or of ſervice of God, but the meaning is apparently this, that in fearing God, and ſerving God he is guilty of ſome other exceſs, not an exceſs of fear of God, but fearing ſomewhat elſe, which he phanſies to come from God, when it doth not, this fear of that ſomething elſe, is an exceſsive fear more then religion ſuggeſts to him, and yet the unhappineſs of it is, this interpoſeth it ſelf in religion.

This will be more evident by an example, ſuppoſe a man to phanſie that by Gods law he ought to kill his Father, and fears Gods wrath if he doth not, this mans fear is exceſſive, but his religion is not, he is an exceeder in the ſervice of God, if he do that in Gods ſervice, which is no part of it, but quite contrary to it, but doth not mean-while ſerve God too much, but too little, doth not exceed but fall ſhort, and ſo is farre from being too religious.

p. 20There was certainly great need of Arguments, when this was thought ſit to be produced to me, who ſure knew my own meaning when I thus ſpake, and was likely enough to be able to give this account of it. As it is, I have done with his firſt diſcovery of cauſes of my miſcarriages, and ſhall now haſten to the ſecond.

Sect. 4. Exceſs of Religion. Super ſtatutum. Addition to the Rule. Doctrines. foreign, Act. 17. 22. Act. 25. 29. Six conceſſions. Superſtitioſus. Worshipping of Angels. Superſtitum cultus. Slavish fear. Religion in Epicurus. Fear of punishment in ſons; in wicked men. The neceſſity thereof. Dogmatizing. Placing more virtue in things then belongs to them.

1THe ſecond cauſe of the Doctors miſcarriages, ſaith he, is his miſpriſion, That exceſs in Religion is not well called Superſtition, or that Superſtition is not exceſs of Religion. Sect. 27 &c.

2To this I anſwer, 1. That my memorie not ſuggeſting unto me, that I was at all guilty of this miſpriſion, thus unlimitedly charged on me, I therefore read over that 27. and the two following Sections, to diſcern what it was that had given him occaſion to affirm this, and there I find no ſuch thing. The ſubject of Section 27. being the improperneſs of their expreſſions, who reſolve Superſtition, ſimply and abſtractly taken, in all Authors, to ſignifie evil; of Sect. 28. a ſecond inconſequence, that the uſe of Ceremonies not preſcribed by Chriſt, ſhould firſt be called Superſtition, then condemned for deſerving that title; of the 29. a third inconſequent, that men ſhould abſtain from ſome indifferent Ceremonies, as Superſtitious, and not expect to be counted ſuperſtitious for obliging themſelves to do the contrary. But ſure none of theſe, nor all together, do at all yield any ground for that concluſion, which he hath here miſreported from them, and that one would think, were a competent anſwer to this ſecond diſcovery of cauſes.

3But then 2. till the foreign be explained, and agreed on, what p. 21is meant by exceſs of religion, tis not poſſible for me to affirm or deny, to acknowledge or diſclaim univerſally, what I am ſaid to affirm. To deal plainly then, and without all ambiguity, If by exceſs of Religion he underſtand the doing of any thing in the worſhip of God, which Gods word doth not command (which is the onelyonly thing which is of controverſie betwixt us, as hath already been manifeſted) then I ſtick not to deny that this is Superſtition, or that ſuperſtition in any authentick notion, or in the origination of the word whether Greek or Latine, doth import or comporhend this, and if he ſhall flie to any other ſort of exceſs, and contend that to be it of which he ſpeaks, this will be then the fallacie or lying hid in ambiguities, which I took care to deprive him of in the laſt Section.

44. But he expreſſes ſufficiently what exceſs in religion he means, by the proof which he firſt offers to confirm his affirmative. For, for this he brings three proofs, and the firſt is this, becauſe it is an addition to the rule of worship, and ſo an exceſs, as ſuper ſtatutum.

55. Here though it be very hard to reduce this to any formal or legal proof of the propoſition for which it was deſigned (and beſides, it muſt be obſerved, in paſſing, that the medium here uſed, is no fitter for the proving of this then of the laſt propoſition; for it is the ſame to both, and ſo indeed it is equally proper for both, or for what elſe he pleaſe) yet thus much is clear from it, that by exceſs in Religion he means addition to the Rule, and that we formerly diſcern'd to ſignifie with him the doing any thing uncommanded in the ſervice of God, and to that we have replyed abundantly in the laſt Section.

6But he adds for the confirmation of his proof, one thing not ſaid before, that all ſuch addition to the Rule muſt be ſuperſtition forſooth, becauſe it is ſuper ſtatutum, above what is commanded, ſuppoſing, it ſeems, that that is the notation of the word ſuperſtition. And then I deſire the Diatribiſt's leave, that it may for once be my turn to make diſcoveries of cauſes, to propoſe to him, at leaſt for conſideration, whether this may not be his foreign fundamental procreative miſtake, the having inconſiderately in his youth ſwallowed this etymologie of the word ſuperſtition (I am unwilling to phanſie the Diatribiſt to be the inventer of it) as p. 22if it were ſo called from ſupra ſtatutum, above what is commanded.

7If this be not a right conjecture, I ſhall profeſs to be at an end of my ſearch of cauſes; But if it be, I deſire him to allow me the favour once to diſabuſe him, by exacting this juſtice from him to himſelf, to conſider whether any Laws of derivation, compoſition or analogie can permit him ſeriouſly to believe that [ſtatutum] is ingredient in compounding Superſtition, or that it can be by any Rules deduced from any word in the Latine tongue, but ſuperſtes, ſuperſtitis, and the rather becauſe foreign, which is reſolved to be the parallel Greek to the Latine ſuperſtition, and is viſibly ſo, if it be allowed to be deduced from ſuperſtitum cultus, hath nothing to do with ſuper ſtatutum, but is in plain words a worſhipping of Demons.

8Of this ſure I have ſaid enough in the Treatiſe of Superſtition, to ſatisfie any Scholar, that knows in the leaſt, what belongs to the uſe or the nature of words, and ſo much, it ſeems, that M^r. C. confeſſes that the original of the word was Heatheniſh, to ſignifie ſuperſtitum cultus, and only adds (foreign, in civility or fidelity to his cauſe) that though this be true, yet 'tis well applied by Divines to thoſe additions made to the Rule of worſhip. But I pray what is this but to grant the premiſes, and deny the concluſion? Tis certain and by him acknowledged, that the original of the word is another thing not ſuper ſtatutum, what then can he tolerably mean by [tis well applied by Divines]? can Divines do well to apply ſuperſtitio to ſuper ſtatutum, when that is no way the nature of the word? Or can any proof be brought from hence to conclude ſuperſtition an exceſs, or addition to the rule, becauſe it is ſuper ſtatutum, when there is no affinity between ſuper ſtatutum and ſuperſtition? what is or can be unreaſonable, if this be not?

9And ſo it appears how little truth there is in that which ſhuts up this firſt reaſon [That which the Old Teſtament calls addition to the word, the New calls doctrines, traditions of men, wilworship, ſuperſtition.] In which few words as there be many infirm parts, 1. That additions to the word are in the N. T. called Doctrines I ſuppoſe he means teaching ſomewhat elſe for doctrines, Mat. 15 9. aſſuming them to be ſuch when they are not: p. 23So again, Mar. 7. 7. where yet the word Doctrines ſignifies the Scripture or Doctrine of God, and ſo the teaching their own traditions for doctrines, is adding them to the Scripture, Doctrines there ſimply ſignifying not that addition, but that to which the addition is made) and 2. that they are called wil-worship (the contrary of which is proved in the Treatiſe of wil-worship, and here to ſuppoſe it, is a begging of the queſtion) ſo ſure this is a third, that additions to the rule of worship, are any where in the New T. called ſuperſtition, I deſire he will ſhew me one ſuch place, for my Concordance will not afford it me.

10Tis but a foreign, only twice there uſed: Firſt, Act. 17. 22. by St. Paul of the Athenians, whom he perceived to be foreign more ſuperſtitious then others: But theſe ſure never medled with, and ſo added not to the true rule of worship, any otherwiſe then as all that abandon it, adde to it, live by ſome other falſe rule, and minde not that; and if they are, for ſo doing, to be ſtyled adders to the rule of Worship, adulterers are ſo in like manner, and ſo by that meaſure or ſtandard, every ſin in the world is ſuperſtition.

11Secondly, the word is uſed, Act. 25. 29. where Feſtus ſpeaks of Pauls foreign, own ſuperſtition, but ſure meant not to accuſe him of adding to his or the Jews rule of worship, but underſtood his own Religion, and nothing elſe by that phraſe. And ſo ſtill foreign, here are as many miſadventures amaſst together, as could well be crowded into ſo few words.

12His ſecond proof now follows, thus, Becauſe as the defect in Religion is called profaneneſs, ſo the exceſs is called ſuperſtition, as ſtanding in oppoſition to it. Alas, it ſeems there is great need of proofs, for this again, as the former, was the very medium to prove the firſt propoſition, and ſo either the firſt, and this ſecond propoſition of his are all one (and then why was it cut in two, by Lucians beetle?) or elſe theſe proofs are very excellent inſtruments, fitted for all turns indifferently. However it is, I ſhall not need provide new anſwers to it, but remand it to the former Section, where it was conſidered to the utmoſt it could pretend: Only if he pleaſe, I ſhall put it in form for him, thus. The worship of the many falſe Gods or Demons is an exceſs oppoſed to Religion, or worship of the one true God of heaven and earth, in p. 24Aquinas's opinion, and ſo alſo is the worshipping the true God after an undue or unlawfull manner, ergo, the uſing any Ceremony (in the worship of the true God) which the Scripture hath not commanded, is ſuperſtition, and ſuperſtition is that: As if he ſhould ſay, ſuperſtition is that, becauſe it is ſomewhat elſe, as extremely diſtant from that, as that which is not God is from God, or as unlawfull (for ſo is ſuperſtition) is from lawfull, for ſuch is that which is not prohibited.

1313. A third proof he now adds of his affirmation, and that after the manner obſerved in his former argument from the Doctors own conceſſions, and no leſs then five, nay the fourth number being twice repeated, no leſs then ſix of them: And if I have ſo liberally granted it, I wonder how it came to be my charge, and that as the cauſe of my miſcarriages, that I denyed it.

14But 'tis ſtrange to ſee what foreign can do, phanſie firſt, and next accuſe me of denying a thing groſſo modo, and to prove me to have erred in thus denying, produce ſix ſeveral ſenſes, wherein I have granted it, whereas there is in the whole inditement but one pretended, wherein I had denyed it. In all reaſon thoſe ſix conceſſions might have reconciled the Diatribiſt to me, and perſwaded him that I was of his minde, rather then one ſingle appearance of diſſenting have thus provoked him.

15The Doctors Conceſſions, ſuch as they are, are evidently reconcileable with all that he hath propoſed, in that Tract of Superſtition, and the deſcending to a particular view of them, as they are marſhalled up by the Diatribiſt, will take away all doubt in this matter.

16Firſt, ſaith he, he grants that ſuperſtitions may denote ſuch an exceſs, Sect. 31. Here I demand what Mr. C. means by ſuch an exceſs? that indeed is thus far anſwered already, that he means an exceſs of Religion: But what exceſs in Religion? The ſuper ſtatutum, every addition to the rule of worship, i. e. every uncommanded circumſtance, or Ceremony in the worship of God? Thus he muſt mean, if he be conſtant to himſelf, and if the Doctors Conceſſions yield him any appearance of proof for his affirmative. But to ſee the luck of it, this firſt citation from the Doctor is ſo far from yielding him any ſuch teſtimony, that it is p. 25indeed the quite contrary; for that which the Doctor there obſerves Sect. 31. is this, that the word ſuperſtitioſus may indeed denote ſuch exceſs from the force of the termination oſus, but this no more then the word religioſus alſo denotes, in the opinion of Agellius out of Nigidius Figulus, and conſequently, that 1. Superſtitio and Religio were all one in that ſame Author's opinion: and 2. that it is the animadverſion of Agellius upon that Author, that all ſuch exceſſes are not culpable, or taken in ill, but good ſenſes. And then was not this a dangerous conceſſion, fit to be called out in judgement againſt me, then which nothing could be more direct to the aſſerting mine, and refuting the Diatribiſts hypotheſis?

17If this account of the word ſuperſtitioſus were not ſufficient, to ſecure my pretenſions, which in that place were only this, that ſuperſtition among all Authors ſignified not any criminous exceſs. I might farther adde, that even when the word ſuperſtitioſus; is but a bare denominative from ſuperſtitio, and yet is uſed in an ill ſenſe, as when we Chriſtians ſay a ſuperſtitious perſon, the account is clear, that ſuperſtition there ſignifies Heathen-worſhip, or ſomewhat proportionable to it Superſtitioſum eſt quicquid ab hominibus inſtitutum eſt ad facienda & colenda idola pertinens. Auguſt: de doctr. Chriſt: l. 2. c. 20.worſhipping of others beſide the one true God; and by analogie with that notion of the ſubſtantive, the adjective fitly denotes him that acts like one of thoſe falſe worſhippers, or agrees with them in ſome eminent thing, which is a branch of their falſe worſhip, as he that makes obſervations of dreams, and ominous days, or occurrences, is ſaid commonly to be ſuperſtitious herein, i. e. to imitate the Auguries of the Heathen, and many the like.

18The 2. conceſſion, that the worſhip of Angels is an exceſs or addition to the object of worſhip, and by him ſtyled that crime of ſuperſtition] a man would wonder to ſee produced by the Diatribiſt againſt me. Tis certain I make the worſhip of Angels ſuperſtition, worſhipping thoſe fellow creatures, which a Chriſtian ought not to worſhip; But is this an exceſs of religion, or not rather of impiety? worſhipping of the creature foreign beſides or over and above the creator. Tis true, this is an addition to the object of worſhip, as death is an addition to life, i. e. deſtruction to the oneneſs of that, which ought alone to be worſhipt, and admits no rival (ye cannot ſerve God and Mammon, nor worſhip p. 26the one God, if ye impart and laviſh out that incommunicable priviledge to any other) and ſo adultery is an addition to the object of marital love and fidelity: But then what is this to the prejudice of uncommanded ceremonies? the uſing of which ſuper ſtatutum, the Diatribiſt is to demonſtrate to be ſuperſtition, for about that onelyonly, he knowes, the controverſie is betwixt us.

19The 3. conceſſion is juſt parallel to this, and in part the ſame, ſuperſtitum cultus, ſaith he, the worſhip of the Worthies by heathens, or of Saints and Angels by Papiſts, is called ſuperſtition Sect. 3. moſt properly, why? but that it addes to the rule of worſhip.] I muſt not repeate what was ſo lately ſaid, though the Diatribiſt will. Tis evident I affirm all theſe to be ſuperſtition, but the uſing of an uncommanded rite is none of theſe, what heathen worthy, Saint, or Angel is worſhipped or idolized by my proſtrating my ſelf in the worſhip of the true God, by my bowing at the name of Jeſus &c. As for the reaſon why the worſhip of heathen Worthies and Saints, and Angels by analogy, is called ſuperſtition, it is ſtrange again what care of intereſt can do. The reaſon, one would think, was viſible enough to the Diatribiſt, in the very naming of ſuperſtitum cultus, theſe Worthies and Saints are ſuperſtites, ſuppoſed to live after death (ſure that is the notion of ſuperſtes) and ſo the worſhipping of ſuch is ſuperſtition, and as the Angels, ſo the ſouls of the Worthies that thus ſurvive the bodies (and in the heathens theology are removed foreign, to the fortunate Iſlands, in the Chriſtians, to heaven or paradiſe, or Abrahams boſome) are ſolemnly ſtyled foreign, and ſo the worſhipping of them is foreign, and that is ſuperſtition. Is not this reaſon enough for the juſtifying the propriety of the uſe of a word, that it perfectly accords with the origination of it both in Greek and Latine? and then what need of his capriccio, [why? but that it addes to the rule of worſhip] Certainly ſo doth ſacriledge (even when it robbes God] adde to the rule of worſhip, in this ſenſe, doing ſomething which the rule commands not, no nor permits, and yet that is not ſuperſtition.

20The 4. conceſſion produced is yet more ſtrange. A ſlaviſh fear ſaith he, of God, is granted to be ſuperſtition, becauſe fear of God being worſhip commanded in the firſt commandment, ſlaviſh fear is an exceſs of that] and he hath adventured to cite the ſections, p. 27wherein tis granted by me. §. 24. 25. of the treatiſe of ſuperſtition. Herein the Reader will eaſily ſatisfie himſelf by his own eyes; In a word, thoſe ſections ſay no ſyllable of ſlaviſh fear, or any ſuch matter (and yet the Printer hath not miſtaken his figures) all that they ſay, is this, that ſuperſtitio ſometimes ſignifies in authors any part of Divine worſhip, which in obedience to his God, or for fear of vengeance from him, any worſhipper doth perform, a thing which every ſect likes in themſelves, but diſlikes in others of a diſtant worſhip, and ſo either honours or defames with the title as of ſuperſtition, ſo of Religion alſo. Then, that it alſo ſignifies a trembling fear of Gods puniſhments due for ſinne, ſuch as the Epicureans, that denyed all providence, were willing to ſcoffe out of the world. And of this notion of ſuperſtition, and equally of religion among the Epicureans, and Cicero that took it from them, I had ſpoken there at large, from §. 14. to §. 20. to which I muſt remit the Reader, and onelyonly adde what there I omitted, that all that is there obſerved would probably receive much light, if we could retrieve one book of Plutarch, which is loſt, and inſtead of which I can now onelyonly give him the title of it, foreign of ſuperſtition to Epicurus, differing (it ſeems, both by the addition of foreign, and conſequently in the ſubject of it) from that which is now extant of Plutarchs foreign, which hath no conſiderable aſpect on Epicurus, or his followers and Philoſophy, either to defend or accuſe it. Of this ſee the learned Gaſſend in his life of Epicurus.

21But to return, what pretenſe can there be thus to change my words in an unprofitable citation (when if it had been ſlaviſh fear in his notion of it, of which I ſpake, yet that had been farre enough from the uſing of uncommanded ceremonies or inſtituting of Feſtivals) and inſtead of [that divine worſhip which any performs in obedience to his God, or for feare of puniſhment from him, and which Epicurus deſired to ſcoffe out of the world] to ſubſtitute ſlaviſh fear of God, or an exceſs of that fear of God which is preſcribed as worſhip in the firſt commandment?] Can it enter into any Chriſtians heart to think or ſay, that Epicurus was in the right in that part of his Theology, and conſequently that it was an exceſs of fear which Epicurus deſired to exterminate? This is to ſay, that all religion, belief of hell, infinite puniſhments apportioned to ſinners p. 28in another world, are exceſs of fear, and (under the title of ſlaviſh) criminous, and to be caſt out. This certainly was Epicurus's meaning, and the verſes in Lucretius demonſtrate it, where he thus argues,

—Nam ſi nullum finem eſſe putarent

Aerumnarum homines, nullâ ratione valerent

Religionibus atque minis obſiſtere vatum.

If men ſhould believe endleſs puniſhments, they could never reſiſt the religions, and threatnings of the Prieſts. And who would have expected the Diatribiſt a favourer of this ſect, as he muſt be, if this fear of God, which Epicurus called Religion or Superſtition, be by him lookt on as an exceſs of that worſhip of the firſt commandment? for that was Epicurus's very notion of it, placing his own opinion in the midſt; and as on one ſide, downright Atheiſme, denying any God at all, ſo on the other, beliefe of a providence, of rewards and puniſhments; which as the mother of fear or perturbation, and interrupter of the foreign quiet of life (his great aim) and very Quid enim intereſt utrum Deos neges an infames?injurious to the Gods, he rejected as another extreme, under the title of Superſtitio error in ſanus, amandos timet, quos colit violat. Seneca Epiſtol. 124.Superſtition. But of this ſure I have ſpoken abundantly, and did not foreſee that Mr. C. was to be admoniſht of this worſt principle in all Epicurus his philoſophie.

22Yet becauſe he is fallen into it, under color of the ordinary divinity concerning ſlaviſh fear, and becauſe mention of this ſlavish fear as of a criminous exceſs, and a branch of ſuperſtition recurres very frequently in theſe Diatribae, I ſhall not reſiſt the invitation of ſaying ſomewhat in this place, once for all, of ſlaviſh fear: By that I ſuppoſe he underſtands fear of puniſhment, as by filial fear, a reverential obedience, proceeding wholly from love, without any thing of fear in it. Concerning this diſtinction I ſhall firſt demand, whether it have any thing of propriety in it, i. e. whether ſonnes may not lawfully and reaſonably fear puniſhment from their parents, in caſe they ſhall deſerve it, even the greateſt puniſhment, exheredation, and caſting out of the family, upon their continuing diſobedient and refractary to their fathers commands, and whether this very fear be not ſo uſefull to reſtrain the exceſſes of youth, and keep them within that obedience, that no parent will ever think fit that the child ſhall know or think that his diſobedience, whatſoever the degree of it may be, p. 29ſhall not be thus puniſht, and laſtly, whether it be not duty in the childe thus to fear, and proportionably whether this be not applicable to every childe of God, eſpecially being exhorted to it, Heb. 4. 1. Let us fear leſt a promiſe being made of entring into his reſt, any of you ſhould ſeem to come ſhort of it (adding thereto Heb. 12. 28, 29.) and this diſtinction being founded in the likeneſs between a childe of God, and a childe of an humane parent: If this be ſo, then there can be no fitneſs or propriety in the diſtinction thus explicated, nor can the fear of puniſhment be diſcriminatively called ſlaviſh, nor with juſtice defined an exceſs of fear.

24Secondly, The ſlaviſh fear I ſhall ſuppoſe in the Diatribiſts notion to be ſuch as is in a wicked man, and then it muſt be either the fear of divine vengeance for ſin committed formerly, or for ſin at the time of committing it, or for ſin before he commit it; and I demand how any of theſe three fears can by a Chriſtian duly be called an exceſs, or with any propriety ſuperſtition? For ought not the wicked man to fear puniſhment for his ſins paſt, when God affirms ſolemnly there is no peace, no peace to ſuch? be not the judgements of God gone out againſt that man, and if that Lyon roar, ſhall not he fear, if vengeance be denounced from God againſt him, is it a ſeaſon for him to caſt off fear? or if he doth, is not this carnal ſecurity? and is not the contrary apprehenſion (i. e. fear) neceſſary to reduce him? in a word, are not the terrors of the Goſpel part of the Goſpel, and on purpoſe deſigned to bring ſuch a man to repentance, and can he be ſaid to believe the Goſpel, which believes not that part of it, or will they be motives of Reformation to him, if he do not apply them to himſelf, in reſpect of his preſent ſtate? and can he ſo apply them, who doth not fear the execution of them?

25So at the very point of committing any wilfull ſin, ought he not to look upon it, as that againſt which the wrath of God is denounced, and can he do ſo, and believe God, and not fear that wrath may fall on him, and that as long as he remains under the power of ſuch ſin, he remains under the wrath of God? Are all the evil abodes of an accuſing conſcience in a vitious perſon, exceſs, nay is not the contrary the higheſt pitch both of preſumption and danger, the very root bearing gall and wormwood, to bleſs himſelf p. 30in his heart, ſaying, I ſhall have peace, though I walk in the imagination of my heart, Deut. 29. 19.

26Laſtly, before the commiſſion of ſin, when he enters into temptation, is not the feare of hell an uſefull reſtraint to him, is it not both his duty and his bridle, is there, or can there be any exceſs in that? ſhould he fear, or ſhould he not fear? If he ſhould not, then what can keep him from running into all exceſs of riot? ſhall love of God, or virtue? but the wicked man, as wicked, is ſuppoſed to have none of that in his heart: But if he ſhould, if it be his duty to fear, and to fear hell, in caſe he ſhall thus go on, then ſtill how can it be an exceſs?

27The conſideration of theſe few things may perhaps give the Diatribiſt reaſon to change his minde concerning ſlaviſh fear, and no longer to think it an exceſs of Religion, nor, as ſuch, capable of the title of Superſtition.

28The truth is, what is a miſs in ſuch fear, is a defect, not exceſs, a want of love, not any unproportionable meaſure of fear, God is made up of goodneſs, as well as juſtice, and the Goſpel compounded of promiſes as well as threats and the love of Chriſt ought to conſtrein us, as well as the terrors of the Lord to perſwade, and he that hath a quick ſenſe of one, and none of the other, he is not an exceeder in fear, but deficient in love, and ſo ſtill the mention of ſlaviſh fear in this place, and frequently in the firſt exercitation, is very unapplicable to the purpoſe, for which it is brought, as an inſtance of an exceſſe of religion, or ſuperſtition.

29Some little thing more I ſhall perhaps be forced to ſay to it hereafter, but this ſhall not be repeated, and ſo muſt be remembred from hence.

30The 4^th Conceſſion of the D^rs. is obſerved to be this, that to affirme God to command, when he doth not, is granted to be ſuperſtition, under the notion of nimiety or exceſſe, becauſe that man addes to the commands of Chriſt. § 46.] To this I anſwer, that for them who are reſolved to have ſuperſtition taken in the ſenſe of nimiety, and in that ſenſe to be oppoſed to religion, as an extreme to the mediocrity, I did aſſign this of impoſing commandments on God (and ſo obligations on our ſelves, and others) which he never gave, as an exceſſe of fear, a being afraid of God, when we need not, and ſo proportionable to one notion p. 31of foreign, ariſing from the conſideration of the word foreign (which may ſignifie perhaps a trembling, and ſo cowardly fear, foreign) in that compoſition, And if hereby I have gratified the Diatribiſt, and yeelded the Dogmatizer a Superſtitious perſon, I wonder why this might not have been taken notice of in my behalf, and ſo ſaved him the pains of affixing this poſition on me, that exceſs in religion is not well called Superſtition, which 'tis viſible, and by himſelf now confeſt, that in this ſenſe, I affirme it to be; ſee that 46. §. of Superſtition.

31Mean-while the Drs. hypotheſis is ſtill ſecure, for this no way belongs to the bare uſing in the private man, or the Magiſtrates preſcribing Ceremonies in the worſhip of God, neither of them doing it upon pretenſe of Divine precept.

32The very ſame reply belongs exactly to my laſt conceſſion, vouched by him, that to place more virtue in things, then God or nature hath put in them, is granted to be an exceſs, becauſe it addes to the promiſes of Chriſt, and called Superſtition by me, §. 45.] For this is another particular, which I allow to be an exceſs, and when it is not meer folly fit to be comprehended under the ſtyle of Superſtition, for this farther reaſon beſides thoſe which I there mentioned, becauſe ſuch beliefs as theſe are moſtly borrowed from the heathen foreign, and are remainders of their practices, as S^t. Auguſtine Ep: 73. ſpeaks of the ligatures, Execranda ſuperſtitio ligaturarum, in quibus inaures, &c. non ad placendum hominibus, ſed ad ſerviendum daemonibus adhibentur, the accurſed ſuperſtition of ligatures, among which are the ear-rings &c. uſed not for the pleaſing of men, but to ſerve devills. This teſtimonie the Reader may ſubjoyn, if he pleaſe, to the Supellex already prepared for him in this kind §. 26. of ſuperſt: and diſcern how far I have been from denying, what I am accuſed here to deny, and yet as far from yeelding him any foundation of concluding, that the Ceremonies or Feſtivals of our Church are in the leaſt degree guilty of Superſtition.

34And ſo much for his ſecond diſcovery of cauſes of my (phanſied, not real) miſtakes.

p. 32Sect. 5. The innocence of Wil-worſhip. Analogie with voluntarie oblations under the law. Seeming Contradiction. The authority of Chryſoſtome and Theophylact. The 2^d. Commandment. Reducing all ſinnes to the Decalogue. Addition to the rule, Worſhip of Angels. Other ſinnes beſide that of Dogmatizing.

1THe 3^d. part of his diſcovery of cauſes belongs peculiarly to that of Will-worſhip, thus,

2The third, ſaith he, is, that foreign or Will-worſhip, is nothing but voluntarie worſhip, as innocent as the freewill offerings &c.] which propoſition of mine I muſt ſuppoſe made up of theſe two parts, 1 that Wil-worſhip is nothing elſe but voluntarie worſhip; 2 that being ſo, tis innocent, and as innocent as freewill offerings: And in which part of theſe, one or both, the miſtake lyes, I am not told, but both together indiſtinctly are propoſed, as my 3^d. fundamental miſcarriage.

3And then, as to the firſt, I cannot begin without ſome remarke, that it ſhould be poſſible to be lookt upon by this Diatribiſt, as a paradox, or miſtake, or miſcarriage in any man, and ſuch as is meet to be noted, as the moſt fruitfull mother of many more, that foreign or Will-worſhip ſhould be affirmed to be nothing elſe but voluntarie worſhip. Where I have no farther appeal to make, then either to the ears of all men of common underſtanding, or to the Gloſſaries and Interpreters of words. For is there any the niceſt difference imaginable betwixt Wil-worſhip and voluntary worſhip, ſave that in the latter [voluntary] is of a latter origination, from voluntas, voluntarius; but [will] though perhaps from the Latin originally is yet more antiently infranchiſed among us of England, I ſhall make ſhort work of this, if it be taken for any part of the miſtake, by deſiring one favour from Mr. C. viz. that he will tranſlate either the Greek foreign, or the Engliſh, Wil-worſhip, into Latine for me; will it not ſurely be voluntarius cultus, and is not that being turn'd again into Engliſh, voluntary Worſhip? What can be more evident then this?

p. 334But it may be hoped that this was not my miſtake, but what follows, viz. that this voluntary worship is as innocent as the freewill offering. But it is not poſſible, that ſhould be the miſtake neither, for freewill offerings under the Law were certainly one ſpecies of voluntary worship, and ſo known by the title of foreign, voluntary, and therefore thoſe being innocent, tis certain that all the other fellow ſpecies of voluntary worſhip, bearing proportion with theſe and having no circumſtance to defame them, which the other had not, muſt needs be innocent alſo.

5That thus it is, and this is the notion of the word in the onelyonly place where it is uſed in the New Teſtament, Col. 2. hath allready been largely vindicated in the Tract of Wil-worſhip, which the Reader is requeſted to reſort to, and the Annotation on Col. 2. where many more evidences are added to it, which make it ſuperfluous to adde yet more in this place; OnelyOnly I muſt ſecure it from the Diatribiſt's foreign or objections: And the firſt is by way of velitation, that it ſeems a contradiction in adjecto, that voluntary worship and uncommanded ſhould be innocent.

6There is no end of diſputing about appearances; That may ſeem to Mr. C. which doth not to other men, and Ammonius tells me this is very ordinarily obſervable in this very matter, foreign, many propoſitions foreign. f. 89.ſeem indeed to be contradictory, but yet are not ſuch. But I ſhall ask, Is it what it ſeems, or is it not? If it be not, why was this mentioned by one, who can diſtinguiſh betwixt true and falſe, colour and varnish, reality and appearance? If it be, I deſire to be inſtructed, what Logician hath ſo defined contradiction as wil any way accord to this expreſſion.

7The onelyonly definition or deſcription of contradiction in adjecto that ever I heard of, is, when that which is added is contradictory to that which was firſt ſet, and contradictions we know are affirmations and negations of the ſame thing in the ſame reſpect, either formally which the interpreters of Ariſtotle call foreign diagonial, foreign, fighting one with another in direct forme of contradiction, foreign, the enunciation [every man] to the negation [not every man] or interpretatively, i. e. by certain conſequence or implication, as if I ſhould ſay, Socrates is not a man, here were a contradiction in p. 34adjecto, becauſe in the ſubject of the propoſition, he that had the appellation of Socrates, was ſuppoſed to be a man, and yet in the praedicate, that is denyed of him. But certainly here is no ſuch thing, either formally, or by implication, in this propoſition, Voluntary, or uncommanded worſhip is innocent;] Of forbidden worſhip this were true, for innocence to be attributed to that, were contradiction in adjecto, but there is a wide difference betwixt forbidden and voluntary, as wide as between unlawfull and lawfull, all being lawfull, which is not forbidden, elſe there were not univerſal truth in the Apoſtles maxime, that ſin is a tranſgreſſion of the Law.

8I ſhall convince what I ſay by this plain inſtance, Theophylact ſaith of many men foreign that they exceed or tranſcend many of the commandments; I demand, Do they offend and ſin, and are nocent in ſo doing, or did that holy man think they did? Tis evident he did not; for he, after his manner, borrows from, and tranſcribes In Rom. 8.Rom 8Chryſoſtome, and in ſtead of foreign many, he reads foreign the ſpiritual; They, ſaith he, do many things with deſire and appetite, and manifeſt it foreign, in that they do even exceed the commands; It appears therefore that to theſe two holy and learned men, it ſeemed not, what to Mr. C. it ſeems, that there is contradiction in adjecto, in affirming voluntary and uncommanded worſhip to be innocent. A multitude of the like teſtimonies are put together in the Annotat. on Col. 2. which may be ſufficient to juſtifie me from ſingularity, that I diſcern not the phanſied ſeeming contradiction.

9But this affirmation again of the Diatribiſt will not want its proofs; four, that pretend to that title, are here annexed.

10For 1. ſaith he, It's expreſſely againſt the 2^d. commandment which forbids all worſhip not expreſly commanded by God. I muſt not complain of my eyes, or other faculties, becauſe they are the beſt that God hath given me; but I may wiſh for ſuch ſupplies as Mr. C. hath met with, for elſe I am ſure I ſhall never ſee the leaſt glimpſe of that which he mentions ſo expreſſely out of the 2^d. Commandment. What is expreſſely againſt the 2^d. Commandment, ſhould, me thinks, oppoſe ſome expreſſe words in it, and then it muſt follow that there are ſuch expreſſe words there, p. 35which forbid all worſhip not commanded by God, and this not onelyonly as by worſhip are meant the ſorts and ſpecies of worſhip, but the very acceſſaries and ceremonies of worſhip, and all the expreſſions and emanations of the inward fulneſs of the religious heart. But my Optick Glaſſe will not afford me any ſuch proſpect in the 2^d. Commandement: All ſorts of graven images, and ſuch like, I have there a fair view of, and an expreſs ſevere interdict of worſhiping them, but for all kinds and all circumſtances of worſhip which are not commanded, kneeling, proſtrating the body to the inviſible true God, the times and degrees of ardency of worſhip, the abſtinencies, ſelf-denyals atendant on it, ſure there is nothing ſaid expreſſely there, either to command or forbid them, and for any general comprehenſive phraſe, that can rationally contein a prohibition of all which is not commanded, I can ſay no more, but that the firſt verſe of Geneſis or any other in the Bible, hath as much of this to my eye, as the 2^d. Commandment.

11The buſineſs we are all this while upon, is, the diſcovering of cauſes of miſtakes, and therefore I muſt be excuſed again, upon the ſcore of the example before me, if I once more attempt to ſhoot my ſhaft, and by this firſt argument paſs my conjecture of the cauſe of the prefacers miſtake in this matter. It is the ſolemn practiſe of ſome Caſuiſts, to reduce all ſins in the world to ſome or other of the Commandments of the Decalogue; wherin I am not ſure that they have aim'd aright, for ſeparate gluttony and drunkenneſs (as ſure they may be ſeparated, and yet continue to be ſins) from ſome accidental conſequences of them, as waſting of health, which may aſſign either of them to the 6^t. Commandment, and the like, and you will hardly tell whither to reduce the intemperate uſe of the creature; And ſo for that ſort of lying or falſe ſpeaking which is no way hurtful, or deſigned to be hurtful to the neighbour, and many the like inſtances might be given. But on this I inſiſt not with any concernment, but leave it to prudent conſideration, what neceſſity there is, that all laws natural and poſitive divine ſhould be reduced to one or more of theſe 10. Commandments. This is not that which I meant to ſay, but farther to offer it to conſideration, whether it be not viſible, that thoſe Caſuiſts which have erred in judging the unlawfullneſs of ſome things, have not eaſily been induced to reduce them to p. 36ſome or other of the Commandments, as offences againſt the affirmative or negative part, and if not againſt the words or ſenſe, yet againſt the Analogie of it.

12According to this practice it is moſt neceſſarily conſequent, that he that hath been poſſeſt of the unlawfullneſs of ceremonies and worſhip uncommanded, and hath not ſo far conſidered, as to rectifie his judgement in that matter (by weighing this one thing, that whatſoever is not forbidden is lawful, not, whatſoever is not commanded is unlawful) muſt whenſoever he ſhall write caſes of conſcience, or comment on the Decalogue, reduce this to ſome interdict under one of the ten heads, and all the other nine renouncing it, force it in by ſome appearance of analogie, to the 2^d. Commandment; And then it falls out, that ſo many men, diſaffected to the Government and Ceremonies of the Church of England, have written on the Commandments, that it can be no more matter of wonder, that uncommanded worſhip ſhould be crowded in to the 2^d. Commandment (and there long agoe imbibed by the Diatribiſt, and never queſtioned ſince) then that Mr. Brightman ſhould find the Church of England of this age, among the ſeven Cities of Aſia in S^t Johns time, or that Mr. Parker ſhould make the uſing the croſs in Baptiſme, a breach of every one of the ten Commandments, and branch a book in folio, into the Atheiſme, as I remember, I am ſure, the Idolatrie, the &c. till at laſt, the concupiſcence of the Croſs.

13And then I ſhall but ask this Diatribiſt whether he can heartily believe that the uſe of that ceremonie was really guilty of all thoſe ſeveral tranſgreſſions of the Law of God, and if he ſhall foreign, beſeech him to examine over again his own affirmation here, 1. Whether any one man hath ſaid ſo fully what here he hath, that voluntary and uncommanded worſhip is expreſſely againſt the 2^d. Commandment (they that onelyonly reduce it thither, fall ſhort of him) 2. Whether they that have thought fit to refer it thither by reduction, have produced any cogent or ſatisfactory reaſon for ſo doing, and the next time he affirmes this from them, annex the reaſon, ſuch as may juſtifie a moſt rigid concluſion to the conſciences of all others who may be concerned in it, either in order to their own practice, or the judging of others. And I ſhall not farther exagitate this his firſt proof.

p. 3713The 2^d proof is the ſame we have had twice already, for the aſſerting the two former affirmations, voluntarie worſhip is an addition to the rule of worſhip, and eo nomine Superſtition and that is ſinfull.] But I have already ſhewed, that all additions to that rule are not Superſtition, and that all that is by any called Superſtition, is not eo nomine ſinfull, and ſo I am ſafe from that proof alſo.

15So in like manner from the 3^d, which is but another repetition, put in form of queſtion [Why is the worſhip of Angels and Saints criminal? but becauſe it was invented and added by the will of man?] This queſtion was anſwered long ſince, that the worſhip of all creatures is criminal; becauſe the command is poſitive and excluſive, that God, and none but the one God is to be worſhipped, and though the doing what is not commanded, is not a ſin, yet the doing what is forbidden muſt needs be ſinfull, and ſuch is the worſhipping of Angels &c.

16What he here addes in the cloſe of this 3^d proof, that they (I ſuppoſe, who worſhip Angels) do not urge it as a commandment of God] was ſure very unneceſſarily inſerted, For I never doubted but there are other ſins beſides dogmatizing, and can now promptly ſuggeſt to him competent ſtore of inſtances; ſure the murtherer is a ſinner, though he teach it for a doctrine from heaven, that it is lawfull to kill his brother, &c. And then why ſhould not the worshipper of Angels againſt expreſſe precept (Thou ſhalt have no other Gods before me, Thou ſhalt not bow down nor worſhip) be a tranſgreſſer of that Commandment, though he oblige not, as from God, any other man to do the like?

17His laſt proof is ab incommodo, If wilworſhip, ſaith he, be innocent, I cannot ſee how all that rabble of Superſtitious worſhip at Rome can be condemned, for they are not held out as Commandments of God, but traditions of men] The anſwer laſt given to the appendage of the 3d proof is ſufficient to this alſo. Other faults there may be in worſhip, beſide holding it out as the Commandment of God. It may for the object of worſhip take in ſomewhat beſide God, or for the ceremonies it may multiply them unprofitably, ridiculouſly, or it may be, pretend more virtue in them, then really belongs to them, and many the like. But theſe I mention, becauſe if it be true, what is here ſuggeſted, that the p. 38worſhip at Rome, is really ſuperſtitious, and that there is a rabble of that worſhip there, as is ſuppoſed in the queſtion, the anſwer is already given by the very propoſal of it, and hath without any violence to my hypotheſis, which undertook not to juſtifie all, or any other Churches in their worſhip, but onelyonly that of England, which is known to be free, where Rome, I adde, where the Greek Church in as high a degree as Rome, is guilty. And this may ſerve for the 3^d grand diſcovery of cauſes.

Sect. 6. The Lawfulneſs of inſtituting the Chriſtmaſs Feſtival. Of Church Laws.

1THe laſt ground of miſtake aſſigned by the Diatribiſt, is, that the Dr. takes for granted, That a Church or particular perſon hath power to inſtitute and obſerve worſhip not commanded by God, which remains upon him to prove before he can vindicate his Feſtival (as he and others maintain it) from the double crime of Superſtition and Wil-worſhip.

2If this differ from the third (as in reaſon it ought, elſe why ſhould it be added to it?) then the miſtake is not onelyonly, or ſo much that I affirme, as that I take for granted, when I ought to prove, that a Church or particular perſon hath power to inſtitute and obſerve worſhip not commanded by God. Now I ſhall at once prove my affirmation, and apply it to my Feſtival as he calls it, and ſhew that I have already proved it, and ſo not taken it for granted, as is here ſuggeſted.

3For the former, I offer this probation, whatſoever is in it ſelf perfectly free or lawfull by the Law of God, and that libertie no way retrenched, that a Church or particular perſon hath power to inſtitute and obſerve, But the Chriſtmaſs Feſtival or annual commemoration of Chriſt's birth, is in it ſelf perfectly free or lawful by the Law of God, and that liberty no way retrenched, Ergo.

4Of the major I ſuppoſe there can be no doubt, if there be, theſe three conſiderations will clear it. 1. Becauſe whatſoever is perfectly p. 39free and lawful, that the Church or the Chriſtian hath power to do, unleſs that libertie be ſome way retrenched to him; 2. What every particular Chriſtian may freely do, that he may ſtill do, when it is by the Church preſcribed or inſtituted, elſe that act of the Church preſcribing ſhall render that which it preſcribes unlawful, being perfectly lawful before that preſcription (and if upon the moſt Anarchical principles, that ſhould be ſuppoſed to have any reaſon it, then ſtill that liberty is ſome way retrenched, the contrary to which is ſuppoſed in the major propoſition.) 3. Becauſe the Church, meaning by that word the Ʋniverſal Church of God, whether of the Apoſtles times, including them, chief paſtors thereof, or of the purer times ſucceeding, together with the Governors of each Church ſucceeding the Apoſtles, hath the power of Stewards, noted by the Keyes intruſted to it by Chriſt, and conſequently may diſpoſe, order, inſtitute for her members, in thoſe things which ſhe ſhall judge to tend to the honor of God, and to edification, though it be not immediately commanded (ſo it be not any way prohibited) by God.

5As for the minor that the Chriſtmaſs Feſtival is thus free and lawful, doth alſo appear by the no prohibition of God's in force againſt it, by the lawfulneſs of praiſing God, and commemorating the gift of Chriſt on any day (one or more) in the year, and conſequently on the 25 of December, by the analogie of other Feſtivals among the people of God in all ages, and by the anſwer to all objections, to the contrary, and the evidence of the matter, that this libertie hath no way yet been retrencht by God, that gave it. And all this ſeverally cleared in the former diſcourſes, and the chief of them again vindicated here, by anſwer to the Diatribiſts pretended diſcovery of my miſtakes.

6On which that I do not now think my ſelf obliged farther to inſiſt, by addition of more evidences, the reaſon will be ſoon diſcerned, by taking notice of the one proof which he here ſubjoyns to this his laſt ground, in theſe words. [Which I prove by this one argument, If all additions to the word in matter of worship be criminous and ſinful, as prohibited by God, Deut. 4. 2. and elſewhere, then no man or Church can without ſin adde any worship to that commanded by God; But the firſt is true, Ergo.] Where it ſeems the whole matter is devolved to that one iſſue, p. 40whether the text Deut. 4. 2. and the 2^d Commandment (for there is not any other [elſewhere] any other text by the Diatribiſt produced to that purpoſe) be ſufficient to prejudge the uſing or inſtituting any ceremonie or Feſtival, which is not commanded by God; And I hope this ſuppletory to thoſe former diſcourſes, which hath conſidered thoſe two texts, hath ſufficiently convinced that; And ſo there is no more now needfull to be added to this matter.

7Thus have I traced this Diatribiſt through every branch of his diſcovery of cauſes, and ſhewed, I hope competently, on which ſide the miſtakes ly, and if there be no more miſcarriages in thoſe three tracts of Superſtition, Wil-worſhip, and Feſtivals, then this Preface, aſſigned to that work, hath diſcovered to me, I ſhall have no need farther to importune the reader with a Superfluous vindication, unleſs upon this ſcore onelyonly, that tis poſſible that the Diatribiſt may not have ſummed up his bill aright, that there may ſtill remain ſome particular miſtakes diſcoverable by the view of the particulars, which are here omitted in the foot of the account, and then I muſt not take advantage of falſe reckoning. And upon this ſlender account I muſt now ſtill attend his motions, and ſhall do it, in confidence, that what hath been here, in anſwer to his Preface, ſaid ſo largely, will not be exacted of me again at every turn, by way of Repetition. On which ground it is evident, that I am to make no return to the remainder, which is the recapitulating of this Preface.