The Schools Guarded, Extract
Examen Examinis. An Examination of Mr WEBSTERS Illogicall Logick, and Reasoning even against Reason.
THis Mr Webster (as I suppose) is that Poet, whose Glory was once to be the Author of *As the D…vils Law-Case.Stage-plaies, but now the Tutor of Universities. But because his Stage-Players have been discountenanced by one of the late Parliaments; does he… therefore addresse himselfe to the Army▪ for the like force, and as little favour in behalfe of all Humane Learning? for advancement whereof,Reperto quod est optimum, qui aliud quaerit, pejus vult. Quintil. the best way being already found, he that seeks for another, desires worse (and so none at all) though he pretend to a Reformation. For my own part, I could wish that his Poetry still had flourished upon Mr Iohnson's account, in his Epistle before one of his Playes (the Fox) to the two most equal Sisters; the Unniversities (a far better address, then this here) but it is odious to be like the Fox in the Fable, who having lost his owne Orna…ent, envied his fellows theirs, by pretending burthen or inconvenience. I have neither leisure nor lust, to examine all his Examen; but yet to know Hercules by his foot, I cannot but observe▪ how in his Chapter of Logick, he Reasons against Reason: and as Diogenes accused Plato, with a worse pride of his owne; so he prosecutes Aristotle, under the name of Arch-Sophister, indeed with his owne sophisms; which what may we call but envy and pride, those two Mothers (saith Aquinas) of discord: whil'st one through envy, recedes from the way and will of another, through pride, to prefer his owne As Quintilian (if that Dialogue de Oratoribus be his) condemnes the Oratory of his time, as abused to incense the people in Principes viros, ut est natura invidiae: not sparing (not onelyonly Sy… la and Pompey, but) even Scipio himselfe; or as Livy: Et ante alios in Caemillum.
But what if Oratory be thus abused to calumniating, should there be therefore no Oratory at all? or if Logick to cavilling, no right reason at all? as indeed there is none such without the orderly use of it, for rationis est ordinare (saith Aquinas) and that is best done, not by the Web which is here woven, to unravell all Humane Sciences, but by the Art of Logick. Such a Master whereof, was Aristotle ▪ that of him we may say for knowledge, as for vertue, Valerius Maximus of the said Scipio, Quem Deus immortalis nasci voluit, ut asset in quo se virtus per omnes numeros hominibus efficaciter ostenderet.
But let us see, what against so gloria light, and to falsifie the sight or sense of all ages hitherto, is here produced by him, who hoc tantùm rectum quod sap…t ipse pu…at.
Chap. 4. §. 1. What here he saith, is no more then may be objected against any Science or Art (though never so much by himselfe approved) e. g. his owne late Poetry, and now beloved Astrology (yea the Gospell of Peace it selfe may bee abused for war and discord:) but whatsoever *Finis operantisthe aim of the Logitian is, the *Finis operis.end of the Art is truth.
As to that of Aristotle, for which so vehemently he inveighs against, or rather proudly insults over him; the more strongly the opponent maintaines his part (for which purpose in his Topicks, he supplies him with store of Arguments) the respondent his, the more effectuall is their disputation, for the end thereof, viz. the di…covery of truth: as Scaliger saith, ut ex silice & ferro elicitur ignis, it… conflictu ingeniorum veritas. And besides, in his Politicks also, he observes the rules to be kept for upholding Tyranny: but will Mr Webster therefore conclude, that he allows of that way of Government?
Sect. 2. Or is truth his owne end, in accusing whole Universities of most rationall men, and even Logick it selfe, as proceeding very preposterously, whereas, Logick is indeed the Mistriss of all due method to all Sciences, and to himselfe if methodicall. As if the Prince in whom as supream consists the Order of the whole community, should be accused himselfe for breaking it, which as such, whether good or evil, he keeps, though if evill, not so well as he might; and by keeping his subjects in it, preserves them by it: for all things consist in order, which confounded, they come to naught. Logick, as such, proceeds orderly, directing the minde in the knowledge of truth, as first in the apprehension of simple Termes, and then in the composition and division of the same, and last of all in Discourse, without confusion, falshood, or fallacy. In which last, it proceeds as well à posteriori, by induction, to find out the truth, or to know that such an affection is the true property of such a subject: as à priori, by demonstration, to perfect the knowledge of it: for then is the knowledge distinct and perfect, when the thing is known as it is, as the effect by the cause, as it is by its cause, which is the order of Nature: and not the cause by its effect, which is our Method, through the imperfection of our Intellect, deriving its notions from sense, and so beginning à posteriori, but à parte rei, indeed preposterous. First, then doth Logick proceed preposterously, because to advance our Reason as neer as may bee, to the Angelicall manner of understanding, by knowing things (as they are distinctly and perfectly) it teacheth us to proceed in the order of Nature, or to begin à priori? 2. As to say that induction hath altogether been layed aside, is most false, and against sense: So Reason requires that syllogismes (wherein we prove and demonstrate the effect by the cause) be preferred before it. So that whilest he extols (and for a new method of his own, against all establisht and approved order) so highly cries up induction before syllogismes, his owne is the errour which he condemnes, and therein hee proceeds preposterously.
Sect. 3. Here also the defect pretended, is his owne; in not acknowledging, both how fit are the denominations of Genus, Sp…cies, &c. to the Notions thereby exprest, and these Notions adequate to the things we conceive by them. For gathering of which Notions, the certaine Rules which he seems to desire, but indeed rejects them, are these two. Comparison of things, as to that wherein all agree, for the community, and abstraction thereof, from differences, whether essentiall or accidentall, for the unity of the simple essence, which hath thus the generall denomination of an universall, and is either of one kind comprehending infinite singulars, accidentally onelyonly different, as Homo, and so is fitly exprest by the word species: or generally comprehensive of divers kinds, both constituted in themselves, and distinct one from another, by their proper essentiall differences, as Animal, Animatum, Compositum, Corpus, Substantia, and so as fitly is called Genus; which is either summum, and so is not at all; as a species it selfe subordinate, as substantia, or subalternum, which in re…pect of a superiour, Genus it selfe is a Species, and to alterno respectu both, as Corpus, compositum, Animatum, Animal.
The Genus then is divided into severall species, which are either subalternae, as having under them other Species, in respect whereof they are also Genera: or infimae, as superiour to no species at all, but onelyonly to its owne singulars; in which the division rests, as in so many Individuals.
Now, have we not here, both notions adequate to the things, and words as fit to expresse these Notions? or in all this excellent order, can Mr Webster invent confusion?
But he would shew, that hee hath read, and seems to understand the Lord Bacon, in his Novum Organon, though his testimony be nothing for him, *Sin…tiones ipsae confusae sin…, &c.as Hypotheticall, and so not *Propositio hypothetica nibil ponit in esse.Positiv…ly true, till the condition be first proved: but without any proofe thereof Mr Websters Thesis is absolute, and so false.
Sect. 4. The said Notions, and determinations, concerning which, there, are given a few, plaine, ca…e, necessary and usefu…l Precepts, are some of the hardest passages wherein are exercised the unski…full and tender wits of young men: and so far are the Questions and Disputes, which are agitated by riper judgements, from derogating from their Art, that rather they add to it, &c.
Ans. Whereas here he objects that they do not see that they act as foolishly (even those of the best judgements) while they dispute of the very Art of Disputing, as he that endeavours to see the proper vision of his owne eye: his owne is indeed the blindnesse, in not seeing the difference of Understanding and sense.
Turpe est doctori, cum culpa redarguit ipsum.
For the eye, or the outward sense, apprehends not its own Act, being neither colour, nor light, nor the difference of its owne, from the proper objects of other senses. e. g. that which pronounceth White to differ from sweet, is neither the sight nor tast, whereof each apprehend but one of them, and so cannot judge of both 3. but the inward or common sense, as judge of the Acts and Objects of all the outward: whereas the Understanding, whose object is universall, or all things knowable, is re… flexive to know it selfe, its owne Acts and Objects▪ and then▪ as the soule of man is both the Object, Subject, and Author of its owne disputes, while by reflexion, it knows it selfe. So the Logician reflecting upon his owne faculty, may dispute of what sort it is, whether Science or Art, which, as directing the mind by its denominations, propositions, syllogismes, where the end is to act accordingly, is an Art; and yet as reflecting upon it selfe, its owne Acts and Objects, where the end is knowledge, may be called a Science too.
Sect. 5. How can hee blame the Stagirite, for not defining or disputing, what Logick is, what a Category is, what substance or quantity is; if herein hee should act as foolishly, as he that endeavours to see the proper vision of his owne eye. But ad rem. Neither is he indeed, nor his Interpreters, guilty of such defects, as here he fancies, and fastens on him, whose end is contention, to make the contention endlesse. But for the proposition and distribution, two of his subjects.
Magnus Aristoteles trutinando cacumina rerum ▪
In duo divisit quicquid in orbe fuit.
The members of which two heads, he handles in their order: Nor is therefore his Organon, so organized, a confused headlesse piece.
But such is his owne objection against his booke de Interpretatione, where the Moods of Propositions, are made neither more nor fewer then four, viz. necessary, impossible, possible, and contingent. For what is so plaine, as that the matter of all discourse, is either necessary, or impossible, or possible, or contingent; and so may well be reduced to these foure. Manners or Moods, so called, because they specifie, how the predicate belongs, or not, to the subject of the proposition; For all that we can conceive or expresse, is either necessary, if it cannot but bee, or impossible if it cannot bee, or possible, if it may be, though it be not yet, nor ever shall bee; or contingent, if it be or shall be, though it might not have been, or may never be.
But see here, how Mr Webster, so subtle and quick-sighted in seeing the Defects of Aristotle, is blind in his owne. See it in his owne instances. Having pr…mised the definition of a Mood, that it doth modificate the proposition (i) indicate how the predicate is in the subject, he infers, and insults, may not all Adjectives by the like right be Moods? No, because they are all reduced to those foure before mentioned: but hee saith, if this be a Modall proposition, it is a necessary thing, that man is a living Creature, these also are Modall; it is an honest thing, that a man should be studious of virtue; it's a just thing, a sonne should obey his Father; it's a gallant thing to dye for ones Country. Where, if his propositions be these, man is studious of virtue, the sonne obedient to his Father, one dyes for his Country, their matter is all contingent. Or if these; man to be studious of virtue, is an honest thing, a sonne to obey his Father, a just thing, one to dye for his Country, a gallant thing; so his Adjectives are no Moods at all (to shew how the Predicate is in the subject) but themselves the Predicates, and in all his propositions, the matter is onelyonly necessary.
So that his errour is, as if Aristotle had designed to assigne the Modall, as a distinct species of proposition, and not onelyonly to give one generall Rule, for all the species before enumerated, as that their matter is either necessary, or impossible, or possible, or contingent.
Sect. 6. Nor is he more Orthodox or busie, to better purpose, in the matter of definition, where the office of Logick is, onelyonly to give the Precept or Rule, how it ought to be made, which to explaine by example, it takes the instance from other Sciences: Nor is Logick to define what Homo or Animal is, this being the part of Naturall Philosophy, as to treat of it's proper subject. Now the precept which Logick gives for the definition of things in actu signato, as that it ought to consist of the next Genus, and a constitutive difference, is …ost true, exact, and infallible: and therefore i… in actu exercito, animal rationale, be not indeed the true definition of man, the errour is the Philosophers, who must find out for his owne subject, the next Genus, and constitutive difference (as religiosum, or the like, i… not rational… ) according to the Rules and Precepts, which in Logick he hath for both; to make (by the Rules for that too) the definition exact and perfect: So that the same which Mr Webster before objected against Logicians, as that they seem to make Logick a part of Physicks, hee is guilty of here himselfe.
But because as an open enemy to our Physicks, as well as our Logick, he would equally glory in the defects and errours of both; the truth is that the errour is all his owne: for that bruit beasts are irrationall creatures, and so rationall the proper difference of man, it appeares. 1. By comparing, as man with Angels, so the said bruits with man: For Angels are intuitive, meere or simple intelligences, as seeing both in the sight of the subject, what is attributed or denyed to it without composition or division: and in the sight of the Principle, what flowes from it without discourse… and so we men also are intelligent creatures, but not as Angels, the operation of whose Intellect, is onelyonly the apprehension of simple termes, and not lyable to falshood; for besides that we have two other, to compound or divide, and to discourse, and so are rationall too; which being thus our essentiall difference, little lower then the Angels, is yet common to us with bruit beasts.
2. That Rationale is not a graduall onelyonly, but our essentiall difference, it is evident at least by this, that whereas Gradus …on variat speciem, in us specifically distinct, is the principle of reason, from any in bruit beasts, as appeares As Mr Webster saith, that wee know nothing in nature, but à posteriore, and from the affections and properties of things must seek for their causes.à posteriori, by the properties of it, as aptitude to speak, &c. which we have as rationall.
And whereas further he saith, that irrationall is negative, and so can positively prove nothing. This his sequell were true, if it were negative secundum rem and not onelyonly se…undum …ocem. e.g. immortall is also negative, and yet if St Pauls Argument from the word mortall, be of force, when he saith, … not sinne raign… in your mortall bodi…s; how much more is that of St Peter▪ abstaine from fleshly lusts, which warre against your [immortall] soules.
Now as immortall (applyed to God, Angels, and the reasonable souls of men) implyes more then a meere negation of dying, for otherwise, all things but living creatures, should be imortall. So irrationall, speaks the positive and specificall nature of a bruit beast, as rationall, that of man, though in so great a scarcity and inequality of words to things we bee destitute of a better way to expresse the same: for why doe wee say, that the Ox… is irrationall, and not as well that the stone is so, since the negative of reason in both is alike, and the habit undue to both; but that irrationall▪ implyes▪ that positive Nature, whereof the one is partaker, and not the other.
2. I should wonder that one who is so contentious, seeking all occasions to cavill, should omit division; were it not hereby evident, that hee hath nothing to say against it.
But why doth hee make such hast in his wrath against Reason, to come to Argumentation? or what can be made more absolute (without addition or alteration by some curious wits, in so many ages of men) or so exact as our Art of syllogizing. But Novelists moved with the spirit of pride and envy, are out of love as with all that others have invented, and not themselves, so even most with the best, for the greater glory of reformation. Yea whereas other inventions are concerning such outward things▪ as we use more seldome, wee have continuall use of our owne Reason▪ and yet still is our Art of syllogizing, so imperfect a thing, that now one should presume to abrogate it? He mislikes, that so many sorts of our syllogismes conclude negatively, since it is sufficiently known, that de negativis non da…r scientia▪ but doth he not know as well, that por negativa datur? yea, himselfe saith, and alledgeth his Author for it, that humane Science doth consist in a certaine negation of falsity, rather then in the affirmation of verity.
It is undenyably true (saith he) that the knowledge of the premises is more certaine, then the knowledge of the conclusion, and therefore undoubtedly certaine, that the knowledge of the conformity, betwixt the premises and the conclusion, doth praeexist in us; where both the consequent may bee true, and the antecedent; but how doe they hang together? Grammatically indeed in the Copulative words, and therefore: but hee defies all Logicall wayes of Arguing. Or how is it that the said knowledge before, and without the syllogisme, may bee said to be, or praeexist in us? not in Act, but onelyonly in aptitude (as Alex. Alens… Metaphys.one saith, that aptitudo ad rem est aliquid ipsius rei;) which aptitude is reduced to Act (without which it should bee in vaine) or the knowledge (saith Mr Webster himselfe) excited by syllogizing; and yet is syllogizing also in vaine? or in procuring that act, uselesse? else why doth he say, and therefore why dost thou torment and macerate thy selfe in that question, which is more subtile to despise then to dissolve? which (since nothing can bee inferred from a thing wherein it is not contained) is another therefore without inference▪ subtilty beyond sense, and a sleighting or despising (not of some vaine question, but) of so useful a thing, as the best of Logick it selfe, against reason.
Ob. And so is that which here hee objects, saying, that sometimes from false premises, there doth follow a true conclusion, as in this syllogisme,
Nullum adorabile est Creator,
Omne simulacrum est adcrabile, Ergo,
Nullum simulacrum est Creator.
Nor can it therefore be judged, that the conclusion of syllogismes, doth of necessity compell Assent, or that the conclusion doth necessarily depend upon the premises, as the truth is not contained in a lye, nor the knowledge of it.
Ans. 1. We say not that that in syllogisms, which of necessity compels, assent is the conclusion it selfe, but the premises, when out of them it is rightly proved (i) when the premises both are true and well ordered in Mood and figure, Assent to the conclusion is made necessary; for ex veris nil nisi verum, and that by vertue of the right order and disposition in Mood and Figure, for otherwise out of true premises, there may follow a false conclusion: as
Omnis asinus est animal,
Omnis homo est animal, Ergo,
Omnis homo est asinus.
So then we are taught in the first and second part of our Logick, to make the premises true, and in the third, so to dispose and order them, as to necessitate Assent to that, which we make our conclusion from; and yet is all this so despicable, that Mr Webster extolling his owne subtlety, and the force of his Understanding, should not onelyonly, not seek, but reject it's true helpes?
2. The conclusion indeed doth necessarily depend upon the premises, in respect of the forme at least, as the conclusion of a true syllogisme, and so doth that of his syllogisme before mentioned: or in respect of the matter too, as a true conclusion▪ and so not.
3. Whereas it is objected, that as the truth is not contained in a lye, so no more is that true conclusion in the false premises.
The premises both are true (i) they are true propositions for the substance, categoricall, for the quantity universall, for the quality, vocis; the one Negative, the other Affirmative; and re…, both false; yea even because false, they are therefore true propositions. For in simple termes, and in speeches not enuntiative, there is neither …alshood nor Truth; but if you make Homo, or homo albus, either true or false, you make a true proposition of it; and if to one such, you add another in Mood, and Figure, there is true disposition too, for a true syllogisme. So that even the true conclusion of false premises is contained in and deduced out of them, in respect of the forme, for so are they also true▪ though not in respect of the matter, since that is false.
Lastly, To all that in the residue of the Chapter, he objects or cavils against Logick, may that serve, which before was answered? as that by direction thereof wee doe defend the truth, as the true definitions of things, and infer out of true premises, rightly ordered, undeniable conclusions, whereby wee have not onelyonly bare Opinations, Putations, or probable Conjectures; but infallible Science, and Apodicticall to informe and satisfie the Intellect, by evidentiall demonstration.
Whereas Mr Webster cavilling against all reason, contradicts and confounds his owne. As first, when he saith [Numb. 4.] a Chymist when he shews me the preparation of the Sulphur of Acrimony, the Salt of Tartar, the Spirit of Vitrioll and the uses of them, he teacheth me that knowledge, which I was ignorant of before, the like of which no Logick ever performed: having said immediately before, that demonstration, and the knowledge of it, is in the Teacher, in whom it serves to demonstrate and to shew it others, who learn it of him. Againe [Num. 5.] he condemnes all Logick, as conducing to no other knowledge, then such as is duely probable and conjecturall; as if that were not more then such, which is acquired by demonstration.
Besides, he most highly extols Astrology, and the now Professors thereof, his friends, as common enemies with him, as well even to Divinity it selfe, as to Logick and humane learning; who presume by their Art, to foretell *As the fall of Law and Divinity.such future contingencies, as depending on mans free will, are not known to Angels themselves, unlesse by *Durand and others.conjecture onelyonly, or revelation. And have any the best Astrologers, so cleare a Light, as to see by the Heavens more, then these Heavenly lights themselves, or as Mr Webster, then all wise men? Yea how grossely have they failed in things even meerly naturall, conjecturing at *As Mr Sanders, one of the most learned of them.raine and showers, during all the late winter drought; but not at all of the later rain, as if God had provided both to discover their grand Imposturage and presumption, if not impiety, in taking men off from himselfe the first, to ascribe all or too much to Nature, and second causes.
All which is to me, a sufficient evidence, that this great Examiner, notwithstanding his faire pretences of Reformation and truth, might, if thoroughly examined himself, be found not steering his course indeed by right zeale to these,In his Epistle Dedie. but by that which he also seems to disclaime, even selfe-interest.
However, certaine it is, that truth or reformation, cannot be truly sought in a way against Nature as is here Mr Websters in preferring himselfe, before all the wisest and best in all Ages, to inform and Reforme his Mothers, the Universities; forQuicquid exprimitur in natura, imprimitur ab intelligentia, scil▪ explicante, mediante natur…. Alex. Alcus… &c: Opus naturae est opus intelligentiae.
Nunquam aliud Natura, aliud sapientia dicit.
Nature Gods owne true wisedome is, and then,
Is never tharted by the truth of men.
Truth and truth can never jarr…. foreign.
Aristot.
FINIS.