The Third Step of a Non-Conformist, Essay
THE THIRD STEP OF A Nonconformiſt, For Recovery of the Uſe of his Miniſtry. WITH Some Occaſional Notice taken of the Judgment and Decree of the Univerſity of Oxford, paſt in their Convocation, July 21. 1683.
By one of the Followers of Peace, and Lovers of Impartiality.
Probitas laudatur & alget.
Ju.
LONDON, Printed for Tho. Parkhurſt at the Bible and Three Crowns, the lower end of Cheapſide. 1684.
The Third Step.
THE Year Eighty Two preſenting ſome riſe to the Nonconformiſt for new thoughts about their returning into the Vineyard, upon the Expiration of one Clauſe in the Subſcription required by the Act for Uniformity, which was of deepeſt Reſentment to many, and the greateſt cauſe of their Ejection, it ſeemed reaſonable to me to apply my ſelf to the Biſhop of the Dioceſs upon that Errand. It was not for any Preferment that I ſeek, (for I am not like to Conform ſo far) but it was for a Liberty only of Preaching without Moleſtation, as without Emolument, which is in effect for the licenſe only of exerciſing a piece of Self-denial, in coming out of a ſtate of quiet and caſe, into a ſtate of work, of care, of cenſure, that if it ſo pleaſe God, I might yet be ſome way ſerviceable to my Generation, and my Old Age not altogether unprofitable. Unto this end I Printed lately four or five Sheets, entituling them, Two Steps in order hereunto, appointing my Bookſeller, as ſoon as they were done, to ſend them to the Biſhop and Archbiſhop, with a Letter from me to both, the Contents whereof were, humbly to crave their pardon for my ſending thoſe Sheets, and their leave to wait on them after due time of readding, to know their pleaſure, ſignifying my unwillingneſs to ſurpriſe them, but that they might conſider beforehand, and if it were good for them, to deny or grant my requeſt at firſt hearing, it would be good to do the ſame after deliberation.
I ſtay'd ten days or thereabout, and then went my ſelf to both in perſon; I found no pride, and no offence, but all the civility, that becomes the gravity, candour, and dignity of ſuch perſons: but I found they had not read my Sheets, ſo as either to have underſtood what I ſought, or conſidered whether it could be granted. Upon this I ſpared not to write again to both, for the informing them in ſhort, and yet in full, what it was I deſired, and I went again alſo to one of them, thinking to have ſpoke with him, but he ſent me back word, I muſt come another time, he was then buſie. Whether this Meſſage by his Servant did ſignifie his unwillingneſs to be preſſed any further, or that I ſhould indeed take a better opportunity when he had more leiſure, I am in doubt: but for the prevention of the fruſtrating an endeavour of this kind (if it may be conſcionably effected) I do upon this further pauſe judge it expedient, (if not neceſſary) to add a Third Step to my Two former, before I go to any Biſhop more in this matter. For having by my ſelf and friends made ſome tryal of the Inclinations of more than theſe two of them, I am induced to a recollection upon the whole Deſign, and to ſet my ſelf, if it be poſſible, to come yet to a cloſer point with them than I have already about the ſame.
It is not (I know) for any Chriſtian to judge of anothers Conſcience, which is know only to a man's own ſelf and God; and much leſs is he to make his Judgment the ſtandard or meaſure to another mans. Conſcience in this caſe is nothing elſe but the inward Judgment of a mans Soul, whether ſuch a thing be lawful for him to do in the ſight of God, or agreeable to God's will, or not. Every conſiderate man knows here his own Latitude, and after many a day and years laying the thing to heart, I will, if I can, tell you Mine in this Caſe.
The Rule I lay down in ſubmitting to, or refuſing any Impoſition of men, is this. We muſt ſit down and conſider what we believe to be the meaning of the Law-givers, and if we can ſubmit to it in that ſenſe or meaning which we believe theirs, we muſt do it: but if we believe their ſenſe to be ſuch as we cannot take it in that ſenſe, we muſt forbear it, and ſuffer. See the Book entituled, A Peaceable Reſolution of Conſcience touching our preſent Impoſitions, and the Margin of the Sheriffs Caſe, where that Book is cited. The bottom is this; The Law is the Will of the Law-giver, and it is the Law-givers Meaning is his Will, which you will alſo find in them both.
By the way here I cannot but take notice of the Seventeenth Propoſition, which is condemned in the late Decree of the Univerſity of Oxford, July 21. 1683. An Oath obligeth not in the ſenſe of the Impoſer, but the Takers, for which they quote and condemn the Sheriffs Caſe, when the Poſition or Rule, that all Impoſitions of our Superiours muſt be taken in the ſenſe and meaning of thoſe that Impoſe them, is the foundation of that whole Determinations. Theſe expreſs words are laid down in the beginning of it, and that they may be obſerv'd, there is this Note in the Margin: To this Rule there is a double extream; The one is of thoſe who think a man muſt take every Impoſition in the ſtrict literal Conſtruction, and can ſubmit to it no otherwiſe: The other is of ſuch who ſuppoſe that if a man can frame any Interpretation of his own that is but reaſonable, he may take the words in that ſenſe, and be ſatisfied. The firſt of theſe is ſo rigid, that there is nothing to be Impoſed, but we ſhall ſtrain at it; and the laſt ſo looſe, that nothing can be Impoſed but we ſhall ſwallow it. Then is the true Medium offered there, which you have here recited before. If you ask now farther who this one and the other yet be, I will tell you. In the firſt Extream are moſt of the Nonconformiſts: in the laſt are thoſe of the Conformists, which we uſed to call Latitudinarians. The name roſe up about the Uniformity Act, and this is the reaſon of it. A Latitudinarian is one that is, or was, againſt the Impoſition of indifferent things that ſtumble people, as well as the Nonconformiſt, but he is for the Submiſsion. And this I ſay is the reaſon becauſe of his Latitude in the Interpretation. There was an excellent perſon, eminent in Learning, and of an incomparable Temper, now with God, the Reverend Dr. Whiſcot, (the Father of this ſort of men) who was ſeveral times diſcourſing with me, and maintaining the latter Opinion, being liberally ready to affirm, that a man might defend in Living with a Rational Construction of an Impoſition by his Wit, as he might is Purſe by his Sword; but I was alwaies for holding him to the Meaning of the Law-giver. I have been ſorry methinks very much, that this ſuperlative worthy man is not yet alive, that I might talk with him about this Decree at Oxford, that hath here given Judgment for me againſt him in the buſineſs, whom I would have had convinced really in Conſcience, becauſe that Opinion of his was not to be held, and I thought he did hurt others in holding it; and I do therefore heartily thank the Univerſity that they have pickt up this Seventeenth Propoſition into their Decree, and condemned it, being a Tenent of ill conſequence, when Declarations and Oaths ſhall hereby be rendred but as ſo many Cobwebs, which may intangle a weak Judgment; but thoſe that have Wit ſhall break through them, and the Magiſtrate ſhall have no hold-faſt on any. Nevertheleſs, I thank not the Univerſity for gathering this Propoſition from the Sheriffs caſe, which profeſſeth the clean contrary as they do. And if any ſuch Tenent therefore could be deduced from any occaſional paſſage thereof by conſequence (or Logick,) ſo long as the Deſign and whole ſcope of it does bend de induſtria to the oppoſite thereunto, ſuch a Decree as affixes to a Book that Propoſition, against which it expreſly declared, and then to burn the Book for it (if I may uſe the words of no leſs than a Biſhop who had read both the Decree and Caſe) must be very iniquitous. I put it in theſe very words, becauſe they are anothers, and he ſpake them not (I will ſuppoſe) in diſhonour to the Univerſity, but the rather becauſe he was told, it is ſome other Book they meant under the Title of the Sheriffs caſe, and not this which I ſpeak of, and own, as propoſing the ſame Doctrine which they do, and condemning the ſame Propoſition.
To return, if upon mature conſideration, according to this Rule, I am perſuaded that the meaning of the Parliament who impoſed the Declaration which is to be ſubſcribed by me, if I go on, was no more than I have tendred in the Explication of my former Sheets, then do I not need to be beholding to any Biſhop, who can give my ſelf the favour of ſubſcribing, and ſo require his Certificate of courſe: But if indeed (do what I can) I find my mind ſtill in ſome doubt, I muſt on neceſſity think father.
It was ſome years before I could tell how to ſubſcribe that Declaration at all (eſpecially as it was clogg'd till Eighty two) with any Explication. When I came to think on an Explication, it was a good while longer before I could be ſatisfied how to do it, unleſs I might put my Explication to the words of the Declaration, and ſo ſet my hand to both together. I endeavoured therefore, and made tryal, whether I might have leave to do ſo, but could not obtain it. I acknowledge the candid ingenuity, and courteous good will of the Dioceſan, but he made higher inquiſition. I bethought my ſelf hereupon of a leſs Requeſt, that if I might by the Biſhops conſent be but permitted to write theſe words [According to a Paper given into the Biſhop Iſubſcribe] in the Regiſters Book (as in the former Sheets,) it appeared to me in effect all one as to ſet my name to the words of the Declaration with my Explication, ſo long as ſuch a Paper was given in to him. I have not been wanting therefore to try again with more than one Biſhop, whether ſo little a favour as this might be obtained, and I have intimated my ſucceſs, ſo that the Condeſcenſion that a man may reaſonably expect (without a Parliament) from any Biſhop, to truſt to it, is like to come to this, to grant what the Law allows, if ſome of them will yet do that.
Here are Two Steps then I have made, and the Third I am to get up. I cannot ſubſcribe without an Explication, but I can ſubſcribe with one. That was the Firſt Step. If I ſubſcribe with an Explication, it is neceſſary that I declare my Explication, but it is not neceſſary that my Explication and the words I ſubſcribe be put together in one Paper, or in the Regiſters Book. If it be ſignified that I do it with an Explication, it is as well, and in effect the ſame thing. This was the Second Step. If I may not ſignifie this in the Regiſters Book, I come now to conſider if I publiſh it in Print, and ſo notifie it both to Biſhop, Regiſter, and all the World, whether this really be not as well alſo, as if I were ſuffered to do ſo, and that for the ſubſtance, which will go to the heart of all my ſcruples. And if in the upſhot this will ſerve, there is none can hinder me this Laſt Step, for I land methinks here upon my right (or upon Law) when my ſtanding was but precarious before.
Well! I do conſider in the Sheriffs Caſe, to what Reſolution (or Latitude) the Author of that Paper came about the Oxford Oath. Let us ſuppoſe a man convinced that the Interpretation offered in regard to the Oath, and in regard to this Declaration is probably the very meaning of the Law-giver, but he is not perſuaded beyond all doubt, and he would have ſomething for his relief in regard to that doubt. For an alleviation to this man, there is this paſſage in that Caſe. If a man is perſuaded in his Conſcience, the meaning of the Law-giver was no more than thus, he may ſubmit, and make no ſtand; but if he believes their meaning was otherwiſe (or doubts that it was more than thus) he cannot ſwear or ſubſcribe but with limitations, and he muſt declare thoſe limitations, or forbear. But if he ſhall ſwear of ſubſcribe (ſuppoſing him one that doubts) with making a declaration that he does it in this meaning ſuppoſing it the ſenſe of the Law-giver, and with theſe Explanatory Limitations to their meaning if in any thing indeed it be otherwiſe, if the Juſtices admit him to the Oath after this Declaration (for whether they admit the ſenſe or not, it is no matter, becauſe they have no power in it) we are perſuaded (ſays that Paper) that his Conſcience may receive ſatisfaction thereby, in his compliance with the Law in theſe Impoſitions.
By the way again, from this place it is very likely the Oxford Convocation might gather the Propoſition before cited out of this ſaid Book; but if ſo, I muſt anſwer, Unleſs they are of the Opinion, that though a man refuſe an Oath without admittance to take it with Limitation, and then does declare his Limitations, and ſo is admitted to it, he is yet obliged to perform it being taken, in the full ſenſe of the Impoſer, notwithſtanding thoſe Limitations, there is no difference between them and the Sheriffs Caſe in this matter. But if that indeed be their Opinion, let them ſpeak it out, and make this the condemned Propoſition. An Oath taken with a declared Limitation to the ſenſe of the Impoſer, does oblige no farther than he hath declared beforehand, that he will be bound when he took it. This Propoſition I own in the behalf of the Sheriffs Caſe; if they condemn it, I crave from them ſome illumination. That an Oath in general muſt be taken in the ſenſe of the Impoſer, we agree, and that a man that takes it, and ſays nothing, is obliged to the full ſenſe thereof ſo taken: But if a man declares his Limitations, I ſuppoſe that Inſtance alone of the Oath between Rahab and the Spies, does make the matter good on my ſide beyond diſputation. But ſure the Univerſity of Oxford can never differ with me in this, and conſequently there is ſome miſtake here about this Book. The Sheriffs caſe I ſpeak of was firſt Printed 1680. and Reprinted 1681. in one Sheet, and then again Printed the third time with the Addition of the two Papers more making four Sheets and a half in all for the year 1682. and entituled, The Caſe of the Sheriffs, or third years Paper in regard to the Act for Corporations, being the Caſe alſo of the Diſſenting Miniſters in regard to the Act at Oxford. Whether this Paper (or Book) be the Sheriffs Caſe condemned and burnt by the Convocation, I muſt take liberty to queſtion. I do acknowledge my ſelf to be a Son of that Univerſity, and I ought not to think unmannerly of my Mother. I ought not to think ſo many not only of Perſons, but Ranks of judicious perſons could be ſo overly (nay ſo directly out) in any cenſure. And why ſhould they condemn a Book that was never like to hurt any of them? Why ſhould they really burn a Book that could never have been writ for the nonce by any one of themſelves ſo much to ſerve them? Why ſhould they Martyr an Innocent Book (let me ſay yet, ſeeing ſo many think it this) which hath certainly offered more toward Juſtifying the Conformiſt (I pray God it may not hinder any one man from a due ſenſe of his ſin, who either went againſt his Conſcience, or knew not what he did when he Conformed), and helping the Diſſenters to Conform, than all the Books that were writ on their own ſide (which generally have waved theſe Political Points, where lay our chief ſcruples) ſince the Act of Uniformity? I ought not above all, to think them of ſuch a manner of ſpirit at Univerſity, as if they did hate us for coming in, and yet hate us for being Nonconformiſts.
If any perſiſt that this indeed is the Book which they meant and condemn'd, I muſt not then leave that matter yet without ſome farther diſcuſſion. The Univerſity have charged the Sheriffs Caſe for aſſerting that an Oath obliges not in the ſenſe of the Impoſer, but the Takers: The Sheriffs Caſe ſays expreſly, An Oath muſt be taken in the ſenſe of the Impoſer, and builds upon it. There are two queſtions therefore to be made of this. One, In what ſenſe muſt an Oath be taken? The other, In what ſenſe does it oblige being taken? If theſe be not made two, the Univerſity will he guilty of Slander, and belying the Sheriffs Caſe, which is a thing not to be imagined: But theſe being diſtinguiſhed, it appears ſtraight that the Univerſity and Sheriffs Caſe agree thus far, (as was ſaid even now) that an Oath muſt be taken in the ſenſe of thoſe that Impoſe it, and when it is ſo taken, it obliges accordingly. The difficulty ariſes only when the Impoſers ſenſe and Takers do differ, and there are two Caſes herein to be propoſed, for there are no General Rules ordinarily without their Exceptions. One is the Caſe of Miſtake, when a man does honeſtly take an Oath in that ſenſe which he believes in his Conſcience to be the very ſenſe of the Impoſer, but he comes after his taking it to underſtand the ſenſe to be ſuch as he could not, and would not have taken it, if he had underſtood the ſame before: The queſtion then is, Whether his Oath now obliges him to the performance in that ſenſe which really is the Impoſers, or that which he underſtood to be theirs when he took it, and elſe had not taken it. If the Univerſity does hold that an Oath binds in the ſenſe of the Impoſer univerſally even in this caſe of Miſtake, and all others without diſcrimination, I deſire the Judicious to ponder well of it, whether that be a mature Determination. The other Caſe is, when a man is not miſtaken, but diſtinguiſhes the ſenſe of an Oath beforehand, and declares the ſenſe in which he takes it, excepting againſt that ſenſe wherein he cannot take it: The queſtion then ſtill ariſes, Whether the Univerſity do hold the man is obliged to the Impoſers ſenſe, notwithſtanding his Predeclaration; and if they do, I muſt leave it again to the better adviſed to conſider, whether this be a mature, or raſh Determination. If they determine the Point otherwiſe, how could they condemn the Propoſition they have condemned, without explanation or exception? In ſhort, unleſs it be another Book they mean, they have collected their Propoſition out of the Sheriffs Caſe very untowardly, and they have as overly condemned it when they have ſo done.
To paſs on; It is propoſed farther in that Sheriffs Caſe, that a man ſhould moreover write down his ſenſe or limitations, and give in his Writing (or that Caſe it ſelf, ſuppoſing it ſpeaks his full mind for him) to the Juſtices, together with his declaring thoſe Limitations, which if he does in abundantiorem cautelam, he is like to be ſtill the better ſatisfied: Yet if he does not, ſo long as in words, or writing, a man does but declare as openly as he ſwears (that it may be as much known,) that he takes the Oath but in ſuch or ſuch a lawful ſenſe (Sèe the Quotation in the Margin of the Caſe), this is the main there intended.
There are two ways then for my ſelf here to take, to eſtabliſh me in my Reſolution. One is, if I can convince my Soul beyond doubt that the meaning of the Law-giver was no more than I propoſe in my Explanations: And the other is, if any doubt yet remains, to heal it with the prepared Remedy.
For the two firſt Clauſes of the Subſcription, they are all one (it is plain) with the two firſt Clauſes in the Oath, and it is really ſomething eaſier, in my mind, to ſubſcribe to the ſame things in a Declaration, than to ſwear to them in an Oath. The Contents of both Clauſes comes but to this, That it is unlawful to take Arms againſt the King, or againſt his Authority, when both are certainly to be held inviolable. To take Arms in the firſt Clauſe muſt be conſtrued Raiſing War or Forces, becauſe it is meant ſo on neceſſity in the second Clauſe. Nothing leſs can be underſtood by it againſt the Commiſsionated. The Commiſsionated are ſuch as have the Kings Authority. The Authority of the King in this Realm is Royal, not Lordly, that is, a Right to Govern according to Law. Theſe perſons conſequently who have not, or purſue not their Commiſsions according to Law, are not Commiſsionated, that is, have not, or exerciſe not his Authority. When this little Interpretation only is made, there are no Objections to be invented, but they may hereby receive a Solution. See the Margin of the firſt Sheet of that Caſe. And that this is the true ſenſe of the Law-giver, let the Second and Third Sheets of the ſame be conſulted.
I am not indeed ignorant of the many and hard Caſes which are, and may be raiſed here by way of Objection, and which do require therefore that I ſhould ſpeak a little fuller, though I am elſe unwilling, and this alone is as much as can be well born. The Learned and Acute Biſhop of Winton, who like another Caleb in Divinity, does write after Fourſcore as if he were but Forty, (whether his Pen be for Fight or Government, for Polemicks or Politicks) in his late Book againſt Mr. Baxter ſticks not to aſſert, that the Legiſlative Power in this Realm does lie ſolely in the King, and yet doth make no doubt to tell us for all that, with others, that the Government is not Deſpotical but Political, that is, as I call it, Regal; which is thus explained by Bracton, Non eſt Rex, ubi Voluntas imperat, non Lex. As the Apostle therefore ſpeaks of his own Authority which was Spiritual, that he had none for Deſtruction, but for Edification, and that he could ſay nothing againſt the Truth, but for the Truth: So may we ſay of the Power of the King, which is Temporal, it is a Power according to Law, and for the Law, not againſt the Law. The King, and the Kings Officers can do nothing againſt the Law, but for it.
Put the Caſe then that a Prince ſhould go about to Deſtroy his whole People, which is a Caſe put by Grotius from Barclay, as inconſiſtent with Ruling them, and the Biſhop forementioned anſwers, this is not to be ſuppoſed of any man but a Mad-man. But ſuppoſe it replied, what if a Price were a Madman, or ſo mad, or ſavage as the Spaniard, who, when they had Conquered Mexico, Hiſpaniola, and thoſe places, butcher'd ſo many thouſands of them, worrying them like Beaſts with Dogs? What if a Prince were of the Spirit of the Duke of Alva, of Charles the Fifth, of the Iriſh, unto whom a hundred thouſand Hereticks were but a Breakfaſt, and he could then Dine preſently with another hundred thouſand of the ſame? Suppoſe a Prince that would alienate his Kingdom, as King John, That would bring in the Turks upon them, or ſell them for Slaves to a Forein Tyrant? What if a Prince would raiſe an Army out of one of his Dominions that were Papiſts, and bring it into another of them that are Protestants, and ſwear that unleſs they will turn their Religion (that is, yield to be damn'd), he will burn them all, or exterminate them, according to the Lateran Council; yea, though the ſaid Religion were by Law Eſtabliſh'd? Theſe are Caſes may be ſuppoſed; Not that I imagine any ſuch in good earneſt ever like to be. God forbid! I am not a man of that complexion: but to the end I may make the moſt of the Objection (for I had as good elſe even quite ſay nothing), I do anatomize the Scruples of my Brethren, laying them naked before all men of equal Judgment, who may conſider whether they are with, or without Reaſon, and ſearching the wound to the quick; I am willing ſo to apply the Remedy, as at once to procure both the Adverſaries Compaſsion, and our own Satisfaction.
Suppoſe then it be demanded whether a Kingdom or whole Nation have a right by the law of Nature to defend themſelves in theſe Caſes, though Particular Perſons have not? I muſt anſwer, that ſuch Caſes as theſe are ſo odious in the naming, as we are not to conceive they came once into the mind of the Law-giver (that is, the King and the Two Houſes, as one Corporation) who impoſed this Declaration: and conſequently that they are not to be put, for the ſtumbling ſuch as are to ſubſcribe it: but if they be ſuppoſed and put, that it was the mind of the Impoſers they ſhould be excepted, or excluded by ſuch an Interpretation of the Commiſsionated, as is already given.
For, for inſtance but in one Caſe more that is caſie and obvious: Suppoſe a Prince of our Land ſhould ſend perſons for the Levying Money on the Subject without a Parliament, or Parliament-Tax: I doubt not but the Conſtables, Juſtices, or Sheriffs, might keep the Peace in the name of the King againſt theſe men: and that yet we may maintain it unlawful to take Arms againſt thoſe that are Commiſſionated by him, becauſe ſuch as theſe (I have ſaid) are not Commiſsionated, or ſuch Commiſſions have no Authority, and are no Commiſſions. The Conſtitution of our Kingdom is ſuch, as the King can Commiſſion no ſuch thing. And when I have ſaid ſo in regard to this one Caſe which is the lower, the ſame Anſwer may be given to thoſe Caſes, which are higher, I account beyond diſputation.
The Learned Arniſaeus writes a Book (I remember) on this Subject, Non licere ſubditis ulla ex cauſa contra legitimum Principem arma ſumere. He holds the Poſition indefinitely in the affirmative, yet makes no ſcruple upon ſuppoſition of any ſuch a Caſe, to put in his Limitations: And why may we not conceive that when a Parliament impos'd upon us ſuch a Declaration as this, they did intend we ſhould ſubſcribe it no otherwiſe but in ſuch a Determination as the Learned who have moſt Loyally written for Monarchy, and againſt Rebellion, do maintain ſuch a Poſition; that is, prout prudens definierit? The Commiſsionated (I ſay) are ſuch as have the Kings Authority. The Kings Authority is Political, and he can give no other, but what he hath himſelf, to any. If his Authority then be for the Law, and he has none againſt it; and if it be againſt the King only, and thoſe Commiſsionated by him, that is, againſt his Perſon, and his Authority only, that we declare it unlawful to take Arms, I ſee not any thing left in the Objection (let what Caſe ſoever be put) but that this Declaration in the Two firſt Clauſes of it may be ſubſcribed.
For the laſt Clauſe, [And I will Conform to the Lyturgy of the Church of England as it is now by Law Eſtabliſhed] let us compare it with the laſt Clauſe of the Oath, [And I will not at any time endeavour any Alteration of Government in Church or State] and ſurely methinks a mans heart will begin to beat much rather at his approach to the taking the latter, than ſubſcribing the former. But there is one thing inſtead of all to ſatisfie. This Subſcription is not impoſed only on Miniſters; but on ſuch as Teach School, and Tutors at Univerſity; and it cannot be conceived the meaning of the Law-giver, that ſuch perſons in ſubſcribing this Declaration, ſhould be engaged to read Common-Prayer, but to hear it, or go to Church, or Chappel: Now, while I am a Miniſter without any Place which requires my reading Common-Prayer, I am to be underſtood to engage no farther in my Conforming to the Lyturgy, that ſuch who are bound to ſubſcribe, and are no Miniſters (For if I took a Living, I muſt ſubſcribe this Declaration again, which I ſhould not ſcruple to do in my former Sheets Explication, but in my ſtate, that have no place to officiate in, and ſeek none, I ſuppoſe that in the mind of the Law-giver I am not yet bound ſo far): and as for going to Church, it is what I am wont to do, without Subſcription.
Neither is there any word in this Subſcription that confines the Subſcriber ſo to go to Church, as that he may never go to other Meetings upon any occaſion. It were exceſſively rigorous to ſtretch the words ſo far, and there is not one of a hundred that would rationally gather that this was the Parliaments meaning by this Subſcription. If it were, I declare my Exception.
I muſt moreover ſignifie, that in Subſcribing, I will Conform to the Lyturgy, I do not oblige my ſelf to every thing whatſoever that is enjoyned in that Book, as I do in general to go to Divine Service in the Pariſh Congregation. More particularly, in the Preface before the Prayers it is required of all Miniſters, that they ſay daily the Morning and Evening Prayer either privately or openly, not being let by ſickneſs, or ſome urgent Cauſe, and I do not apprehend that by Conforming to the Lyturgy, it was the Law-givers meaning I ſhould be engaged to this, who do not, and will not engage my ſelf to that which I ſhall never perform, for I ſhall uſe my own Prayers at home. Indeed I think that what Miniſter ſoever does make the Declaration of aſſent and conſent to all and every thing contained in, and preſcribed by that Book, he muſt be according to the Law-givers meaning engaged hereunto, for he does conſent to all in regard to the Uſe: And I ſhall not lightly therefore ever (I think) make that Declaration, in thoſe words and no other.
In fine, if the ſenſe of this Clauſe comes to no more in my ſtate than going to Church, and of the other two to no more than I have delivered, then may I very ſafely yield to this ſubſcription, and if I am to do what I can, both in regard to the fifth Commandment, and in regard to the uniting and ſtrengthning the Proteſtant intereſt, and in regard to the uſe of my Miniſtry (I charge my brethren by the way to lay theſe three things with me well to heart, for really I ſtick greatly for want of their company) or at leaſt the freer uſe of it, to preach in publick, then is it not only lawful, but what it ſeems I am bound to do. Nevertheleſs becauſe I am not certain, or at leaſt not ſo certainly perſwaded of the mind of the Law-giver, as to be in regard to all particulars beyond doubt, and becauſe I ſhall be apt to be raiſing ſcruples after, I muſt for the preventing my trouble, and ſecuring my peace, fly to that refuge in regard to this Declaration, which is ſet open in regard to the Oath in the Sheriffs Caſe: And I do therefore make this preſent & publick declaration (I crave pardon for the neceſſary repetition) that in this meaning, which I have all along delivered, ſuppoſing it the meaning of the Law-giver, and with theſe explanatory limitations to the meaning, if in any thing indeed it be otherwiſe, I do ſubſcribe the Declaration required to be ſubſcribed in the Act for Uniformity, whenſoever I ſet my hand to the Biſhops Regiſters book; whom I deſire by theſe preſents with all other any way concerned, to take cognizance of it. And alſo when I give my aſſent to the 39 Articles (if I give it) I do aſſent with my Firſt ſheets foreprized explication.
I know there is no body of a deliberate underſtanding, but he does and muſt make ſome Interpretation of the Articles (to ſpeak alſo a little of theſe) in which he conceives them true, or elſe he cannot aſſent to them according to his Conſcience, let it be as large as it will, if he hath any at all: But I muſt profeſs this is not ſatisfactory to mine without a declaration alſo of the ſenſe of ſuch of them (which you may ſee in my former ſheets) as I do ſcruple. I will as honeſtly give my reaſon, and it is, becauſe if I aſſent to the Articles and ſay nothing, my Conſcience tells me I muſt Interpretatively be thought to aſſent to them in the ſenſe of the Impoſers, that is (as I have been uſed to think) of the Majority of the Convocation that framed and decreed them, and I do verily believe their ſenſe to be ſuch in ſome of them, as I do certainly in my Judgment diſſent from it. I might inſtance in the 18th and the 11th Article, but I refer to my Two firſt Steps.
It may be ſaid, it is true it was the Convocation decreed the Articles, but it is the King that ratifies them, and when the ratification is from his authority alone, it is he, is the ſole Impoſer. I anſwer, this is a notion but newly riſen up in my mind, and if it prove right after due canvaſſing, then muſt we look into the Declaration of the King (whether James or Charles, or both) which is ſet before the Articles, to find out what that ſenſe is which is there ratified, and we have theſe words. We will that no man put his own comment to be the meaning of the Article, but ſhall take it in the literal and grammatical ſenſe.
I muſt ask here in the firſt place, what was the intent of the King when he ſaies he will have no man put his own comment on the Article? Can any man indeed ſubſcribe the Article and not make his own Interpretation? This were not to ſubſcribe with Truth or Judgment; on only he muſt not make his ſenſe to be the meaning, that is, his private ſenſe to go for the ſole publick Interpretation. There is a latitude manifeſtly underſtood and allowed by the King in this literal and grammatical ſenſe, becauſe it is ſuppoſed by him that all the Clergy though of different Judgments do ſubſcribe them, and every one pleads them in favour of his own opinion. I muſt ask them next, whether this literal and grammatical ſenſe be to be underſtood with reference to the mind of the Convocation that decreed theſe Articles, or without any regard to it? All words (we know) are nothing but the ſignification of the mind, that mind muſt be ſome bodies, and an Article having no mind, but they that paſſed them, I ſhould judge that the literal and grammatical ſenſe of an Article is the meaning or mind of thoſe that decreed it, Interpreted or Underſtood by a Literal and Grammatical conſtruction of the words wherein they have expreſſed that mind or meaning: But if the Literal and Grammatical ſenſe which is authorized by the King's Declaration, be underſtood without any ſuch reference, ſo that a man may frame for himſelf any ſenſe he can, ſo long as he makes it hold true in a Literal, Grammatical ſenſe, then muſt I confeſs here a great freedom, eaſe, and kind of deliverance appearing to me for my Aſſenting to ſome of the Articles which have moſt ſtumbled me, becauſe in the ſenſe of thoſe that decreed them I could not do it (I will name particularly the 18th and 36th Article): Nevertheleſs, in regard that there is, or may be, ſome other of theſe Articles as hard to be ſubſcribed in the Literal and Grammatical ſenſe, as thoſe two to me foreintimated in the ſenſe of the Convocation, I do find my ſelf ſtill conſtrained to keep to my foregoing Declaration. That is, if I take the liberty (I ſay) of an Explication, and Declare the ſame, the Biſhop and all the World do ſee how I aſſent to them, which is, in a Doctrinal Interpretation, and with which I am then methinks well ſatisfied: But if I make no Explication, or if I uſe no words about it, I muſt be conſtrued to aſſent to them in the Authentick Interpretation; and whether that be the ſtrict Literal and Grammatical ſenſe, authenticated by the King, or the ſenſe in which they were at firſt decreed or paſſed, it will come all to one, I have no way without the courſe I take, to eſcape prevarication. This is my Conſcience, and I go by it.
To return to the Subſcription, it may be queſtioned, in the end whether it be lawful to Subſcribe a Declaration or Swear an Oath with an Explication, if it be ſuch as includes any reſtriction or limitation to the ſenſe of the Impoſer. For Anſwer therefore to this,
I do premiſe that if any man Subſcribe or Swear to an Impoſition, without making any Declaration about it, he muſt frame no Interpretation in his mind but that which he believes to be the very meaning of the Law-giver, or elſe he prevaricates, or equivocates (his mind and words being not equal), which is to ſin againſt Truth: But if he does declare himſelf before he Swears or Subſcribes, I take that to be nothing but fair dealing, and another matter. Only I muſt yet make a difference between a mans declaring himſelf upon Conviction that the ſenſe of the Impoſer is ill, and ſuch as he cannot Subſcribe but by vertue of that Declaration: And his declaring upon doubt only, that is, being perſuaded as to the main, that the ſenſe of the Impoſer is no other but what is good, or what he can Subſcribe, and yet there remains ſome doubt retarding him. In the one caſe I think there is more reaſon for a man to put the queſtion, which yet I ſhall ſpeak to by and by: When in the other I think the declaring a mans ſelf is a Salve ſo proper to the Malady, and ſo innocent, as I ſhould be ſorry if any queſtion at all be made of the Lawfulneſs of it. For the Truth is, I do account the determination of this Caſe in regard to the frequency of it, ſo needful, that if there were nothing elſe in the Sheriffs Caſe beſides that, it were fit to be Printed for its ſake. This being premiſed, I anſwer directly.
I. If there be any evil in this, it muſt be either in regard to the Fifth Commandment, or the Ninth. Either becauſe it is againſt our duty of Obedience to the Higher Powers, or againſt our Duty of Sincerity or Truth. Here is no ſin againſt Truth and Sincerity, for therefore do I make my Explication, that I may not forſake Truth, but keep my Sincerity in what I do: And here is no ſin of Diſobedience, becauſe the Law of God ſuperſedes that of Man; and when I do what I can in regard to the one, I muſt do no more (and I think declare it) by virtue of the other.
2. If a Poſition be capable (note I ſay capable, not if uncapable) of a good ſenſe, and a bad, and the bad ſenſe were the ſenſe of the Impoſer, and yet I ſubſcribe it in the good ſenſe with profeſſing my Exceptions againſt the bad, and that be as well known, as that I have ſubſcribed, I do not ſin thereby againſt Truth, becauſe I ſubſcribe not indeed in this caſe to the Poſition of the Impoſer, but to another which I can ſubſcribe. You may ſay, Here is a Cheat then put upon the Law. I anſwer, no Cheat, which ſignifies ſomething diſhoneſt, but an honeſt Avoidance of it, or lawful ſhift (without equivocation, mental reſervation, or Jeſuitical Trick), which all that do not ſubmit to it, do uſe in ſome other way as they can, without ſin. Indeed, if he that is to take my Subſcription, or my Oath, will, after I have made my Declaration, refuſe me upon that account ſaying, This is not the Oath Impoſed, and I cannot accept it), he may prevent my paſſing, but if he does not, (and will let me go off with another, which ſerves as well, or better), I ſee no evil in it by him or me, ſuppoſing ſtill no detriment to the Publick in the buſineſs. If you ask then how ſhall a Certificate be given me that I have ſubſcribed, I muſt confeſs, unleſs I may write According to a Paper delivered in to the Biſhop I ſubſcribe, and ſo it be certified likewiſe, According to a Paper delivered in he hath ſubſcribed, I ſee not how a Certificate ſhould be other in this caſe.
But 3. I thank God this is not the caſe here in good earneſt, for the Explication which I do give of this Subſcription, and in which (as reſpecting me): it may be clearly ſubſcribed, is the very, ſenſe it ſelf (I ſuppoſe) of the Low-giver, inſomuch as I think therefore I ſhould my ſelf ſcruple no farther, and that another in my ſtead would not, and need not: Only being conſcious of ſome former wound on my mind, I am forced to provide againſt my own infirmity. And the truth is, it is in this caſe alone I dare inſiſt ſo much on what I do, referring the other caſe before to the Judgment of the more aſſured, and to my own farther conſideration: When if an Impoſition (I ſay) be indeed ſuch as that the ſenſe thereof is really doubtful, or I indeed doubt of the Law-givers meaning therein (eſpecially if in my belief I en cline more to think the good ſenſe theirs rather than the evil) I cannot apprehend any means more honeſt, or ſo proper, as ſuch a Declaration of ones ſelf mentioned for the keeping a good Conſcience (or rather for ſatisfying the ſame) in what a man does. And now if the Biſhop then herein, and all good men will, or do, bear with me, I do them no hurt, and they relieve me. Bear ye one anothers burdens (ſays the Apoſtle), and ſo fulfil the Law of Chriſt.
It remains only, that I go to ſome Bishop after I have Printed my Paper, and give it him. If when he hath read it, he thinks my Explanations (or ſenſe) agreeable to the meaning of the Law-giver, he can have nothing to ſay againſt me: if he think otherwiſe, let him chuſe whether he will admit me. I am not to be ſollicitous about his thoughts, ſo long as I have diſcharged my ſelf. He cannot refuſe me in Law, and I in my Conſcience have my ſatisfaction. Let him but read my Papers, or let me (or his Chaplain) ſignifie the Contents to him, and all is brought to this Period.
Before my going off, that I may underſtand my ſelf, and be underſtood, there are Two things I am to make my Application for, to the Biſhop, or Biſhops; For a Certificate; For a Licence.
For the Certificate, That is to be granted of courſe upon my ſubſcribing the Declaration required in the Uniformity Act. In order to ſubſcribe it, I made in my former Sheets Two Steps. The Firſt was, I deſired liberty to explain the Declaration, and then to ſet my hand to it in the ſame Paper with my Explication. This being not granted, and the way of Subſcribing (as I am informed) being by the Regiſters inſerting that Declaration in his Book, and the Miniſters putting their Names only to it, my Second Step or Requeſt hath been that I may do ſo with the liberty of writing theſe words, According to a Paper delivered in to the Biſhop, I ſubſcribe. What hurt it could be to any Biſhop, for me to ſubſcribe thus, that is, with theſe words in his Regiſters Book, I-am ignorant, either from the Law, or from the Canons: But becauſe I am apprehenſive how apt the Biſhops themſelves are to ſuſpect it as dangerous, or though ſafe, not to allow it, becauſe ſingular, I am put upon a procedure to a Third Step in theſe ſecond preſent Sheets, which is, the capacitating my ſelf againſt the need of more Condeſcenſion than the Law allows, if no other can be had; and this hath not been altogether unprepared before in my thoughts. It is no ſin for a Biſhop to read my Sheets, if I preſent them to him, no breach of the Law, or of the Cannons. If he do read them, or hath read them, and I know that, I am free then to ſeek to be admitted. If he will not read my Paper, or hear the Contents, then will not I neither ſubſcribe; If he will, or hath, and would not after admit me upon that account, I ſhall acquieſce in his pleaſure; but ſo long as I offer to ſubſcribe as other do, he cannot refuſe me an Admiſſion, nor a Certificate, becauſe the Act of Parliament does require it.
For a Licence then to Preach, the matter I confeſs is not altogether the ſame. Here is a May, there was a Muſt. In the Biſhops granting Licences, they go ordinarily upon the Canons, and the 36th Canon requires Three Points or Articles to be ſubſcribed, with an Ego libenter & ex animo ſubſcriboſ: Upon thoſe terms I ſeek not a Licence, (I cannot, I never ſhall believe) but upon the Act for Uniformity, where we may find theſe words. And be it further Enacted, That no Perſon ſhall be allowed to Preach, &c. unleſs he be Licenſed by the Archbiſhop, or Biſhop, and ſhall in the preſence of the ſame Archbiſhop, or Biſhop, read the 39 Articles of Religion, with a Declaration of his unfeigned Aſſent to the ſame. By which words it appear that though the Canons require Two Points more than Aſſenting to the 39 Articles, a Biſhop (at leaſt the Archbiſhop) may juſtifie himſelf by this Act, if he require but that one, that is, if he give me a Licence only upon my Reading in his preſence, and declaring my Aſſent to the 39 Articles of Religion. And why am I to Read the Articles in his preſence, but that it is to be ſuppoſed the mind of the Law-giver, that he may examine me thereupon, if he will, whether I underſtand them, or how? And if ſo, I muſt on neceſſity explain my ſelf, and conſequently it is ſo far from being againſt Law to accept of my Aſſent with an Explication, that it ſeems rather the intent of the Law-giver that it ſhould not be taken without.
Note moreover, To come for a Licence upon a man's being Beneficed in a Dioceſs is one thing, and to ſeek a Licence for Occaſional Sermons is another. The Canon does impoſe its Subſcription upon all that have any Living, Lecture, or Preferment in the Church, but for a liberty to Preach meerly on occaſion, without any Publick Emolument, I think no more needs be required than what is made neceſſary by the Act of Uniformity.
Let the Canons be conſulted, the Biſhops will find this true, that if the ſhall give a Licenſe for Preaching to any that have Benefice, Living or Lecture in their Dioceſs, without requiring of him the Canonical Subſcription, they are obnoxious to a penalty; but what is it? why ſuch a Biſhop ſhall be ſuſpended for a year from doing ſo any more, That is in effect all, and how rarely was that penalty it ſelf ever executed upon any? But if he give a Licence only for Occaſional Preaching, where a man hath no Dignity, Living, or Lecture in the Dioceſs, let the Order of the Canons be inſpected, they will find no penalty inflictable for that. And if there be no penalty to be found in ſuch a caſe, quod impunè fieri poteſt, I muſt urge, id lieet; and the Licet then appearing, there can be no queſtion remain but upon the Libet only.
And now whether the Biſhop or Biſhops will deal with me, as he may, according only to the Act, or will ſtand with me upon the Canons, which he may chuſe, the Lord knows. I have reaſon to doubt. If my Requeſt be grated, it is well; I will ſay of it as Lot ſaid of Zoar, It is a little one, and my Miniſtry ſhall live; let them but read my Papers, and admit me▪ I ask no more. But if they will not grant it, I have done; for when I have gone ſo far as I can, I will not be got to make a Step farther to what I cannot for any thing, or any body (through Gods grace) in the world.
I muſt confeſs moreover, that I am my ſelf exceeding timerous, and backward to the doing any thing in order to Miniſterial Conformity, although I am for coming to Church as a Pariſhioner, even more forwards than other; for it hath ſtill been my practice, and I have been engag'd in my Opinion and Books againſt Separation. My fears about doing this are ſecret and dark, and whether it be Superſtition only; or aliquid foreign, ſome Impreſs from God, it is for ought I ſee unevitable; ſo that I am not ſure if the Biſhops at laſt would let me, whether that will. I do not uſe here any Colour (God is my witneſs), but I ſpeak with a feeling care as I would of my Life: & I muſt therefore conclude thus. As on the part of the Biſhops, If they will; So on my part alſo, if it be right, if it be meet, if I be clear in my Soul if I can do it.
JOHN HUMFREY.
FINIS.
End of the text · John Humfrey, The Third Step of a Non-Conformist (1684)