A Plea for the Non-Conformists, Account

A Plea for the Non-Conformists · Account

p. 1AN Account of the Non-Conformiſts Meetings for Divine Worſhip, by, Mr. H. according to his Middle-Way, againſt Dean F's charge of Schiſme; and of the freedome of Conſcience, from unuſefull Laws, and the power of conſtraint againſt his Exceptions.

HAving written four Papers which being bound together I call Mediocria, and finding in the end of one of them an Advertiſement about a Book Entituled Two Points of great Moment, (which was the Obligation of humane Laws, and the Authority of the Magiſtrate in the matters of Religion,) by me diſcuſſed: I think it but civill to take an opportunity (while it is in my mind) of returning my acknowledgments to the Reverend and worthy Dr. & Dean, the Author of Tolleration not to be abuſed for his reſpectful Animadverſions, in referrence (I count) to both theſe Points, in his Advice to Conformiſts p. 2and Non-Conformiſts. I confeſs my ſelf obliged to him for it, and to requite the obligation, I will preſent him with two things: my anſwer to what he hath put in againſt me, and an Apology, according to my Middle Temper, for the Non-Conformiſt in the matter above named.

I will begin with the Laſt firſt, both becauſe it is of moſt preſent import and it is alſo fit I ſhould preferr that of the Publick, before my Private Vindication. There are diverſe ſorts of the Non-Conformiſts, and they have their Meetings we know, not all on the ſame Reaſons. There are ſome who have been and are for our Parochial Churches, who are ſatisfied with their Conſtitution, and, if they might have freedome, would ſtill chooſe them: And there are others that are in their inclinations for the Congregationall way only. For my part I profeſs my Self of the former Sort, and do here declare in the behalf of my Self and many others of my Brethren, that we do not go from our Pariſh Church or Miniſter, in oppoſition to them, as if ſuch Congregations were not Churches; No, we are ſenſible when our Lord hath commanded that the Tares ſhould not be pluckt up for fear of endangering even but Some of the Wheat, what a grievous diſpleaſure it may like to be to him, if we ſhould go to Root up all the Wheat for fear of the p. 3Tares, which to Unchurch whole Pariſhes were to do: Nor is it out of Pride, Vanity, Oſtentation, Faction, or Self-advantage that we do it: We could not anſwer a leſſer Man▪s, then a Dean's charge againſt us, if we did ſo. Two things therefore I will acknowledg, That our Pariſh-Churches are true Churches: And that it is our Duty conſequently to deſire and endeavour their Union and Proſperity. And what would any Conformiſt have of me more, unleſs it be alſo to joyn with them there in the Participation of the Ordinances, which I refuſe not neither upon convenient occaſion? Well! Upon what ground then ſhall I offer my Apology for the Cauſe I have here undertaken? Why I will give it very impartially. As I grant theſe two things to be our duty, ſo muſt I aſſume that which will not, and cannot be denied me, that it is the duty likewiſe of thoſe who are ſet apart to the office of the Miniſtry (ſuppoſing them in every reſpect fit for the Work, to have a call to it, and prudent Sincerity does not at preſent otherwiſe direct) to preach the Goſpel, by way of diſcharge of that office. We have the Apoſtles expreſs authority and example for this, who when they where Threatned and Commanded by the Magiſtrates to Speak no more in Chriſt's name, they have left us their p. 4anſwer on record, Whether it be meet to obe… Go… or You, judg… …e. Now I muſt lay down this rule, that when two duties come together ſo that we cannot perform the one, but we muſt omit the other, the greater duty muſt take Place of the leſs. The rule appears in it's own light, and alſo from Scripture. I will have Mercy (ſayes God) and not Sacrifice. What is the meaning but that when act of Righteouſneſs and Mercy fall in, ſuch duties as that of Sacrifice which are leſs muſt give way. Here then is our caſe plainly, which of theſe is the greater duty? We are to ſeek Unity, and to Preach the Goſpel. If we keep our Pariſh Churches, we muſt not Preach the Goſpel: If we Preach the Goſpel, we muſt go to theſe Private Meetings. Which of theſe is indeed of greateſt concernment to the glory of God, and the Peoples Salvation? In General which is the greateſt Matter that the Goſpel of Chriſt Jeſus be Preached: Or the Union of our Pariſh-Churches be promoted? In Particular, whether ſhall I, or any other Non-Conformiſt who have a call upon occaſion to Preach at ſuch a time, place, or Company, do more Service unto God by going & doing it: or by refuſing and going to my Pariſh-Church, for the ſake of Unity, for which I have ſtill other Seaſons? And which is the p. 5greater Evil to have a people of a Pariſh divided into ſeveral places to hear the Miniſters of both Perſwaſions Preach to them (when this too ſhall not hinder them being parts ſtill, or Members of the ſame Church): Or that all the Preachers or Miniſters in the Nation but thoſe only who Conform ſhould have their Mouths ſtopped or their Talents buried? How! when there is ſo many of them! So many of them truly ſerious and painful Labourers! So many of them that actually do ſo much good, and the ever-laſting welfare of thouſands of men's Souls depend upon it? What is Parochial Ʋnion in compariſon! I will appeal to the Conſcience of every upright equal man, whether Conformiſt or Non-Conformiſt, that fears God, to give Judgment. For the charge then of this Dean which he ſeems to have managed ſo ſtrenuouſly, I anſwer. Schiſme is a Cauſleſs Breach of the Churches Ʋnion, or a cauſleſs ſeparation from her Communion, the Communion of a Church whereof we are Members, or ſhould be. Let this learned man, or any other that hath read any thing about Schiſme tell me, if I do not define it right by a Separation that is Cauſleſs, for if there be a cauſe, the Separation will be juſtified, as it is between us and the p. 6Church of Rome. Now when the caſe between the Conformiſt and us is ſo open and in the face of the Sun, that unleſs we Countenance or allow of thoſe Meetings which are Locally Diſtinct from our Pariſh-Congregations, the whole generation of the Non-Conformiſt Miniſters muſt be laid by, from the exerciſe of their office for ought I ſee as long as theſe men do hold, whatſoever becomes in the mean time of the Souls of ſo many multitudes: what apology, defence, or Account do we need more but this only? Is there not a cauſe? They are the words of David to his ſurly Elder Brethren, that are offended only for his being about the buſineſs he was ſent. And David ſaid, what have I done? Is there not a Cauſe?

I am very ſenſible that there is much more may be ſaid, or that there are other Pleas which may be made by the Non-Conformiſt for their Meetings then this I offer. I have (I know) propoſed my ſelf a little in another Paper, towards ſome Catholick Healing of us, even under our ſtated Separations, if they cannot be helpt. If they can, or if this be enough, it is this Plea I chooſe, as the moſt indifferent between the Conformiſt and us, the moſt fair and conducive to our Uniting again, if God give that Grace to the Nation. And this (under pardon) I p. 7will be ſo bold, as to name my Plea, Mr. H's, Plea, Of Greater Duty.

The Church is a number of ſuch as own, or believe in the Lord Jeſus, and joyn in Society for the glorifying his Name in ſubmiſſion to his Ordinances. Theſe Societies are either Particular, or that which conſiſts of them all, the Church Ʋniverſal. Of the Church as Ʋniverſal Chriſt is the Head, from whom we have theſe Ordinances: &, when the Congregations which are Parochial, & others that meet ſeparately from them, do both conſent or unite in his Ordinances, that is, in the ſame Doctrine (ſo far as is neceſſary to Salvation,) and in the ſame Worſhip, required in the Word, who can deny them to be both Parts of the Univerſal Church Viſible, and ſo true Churches? As for going to diverſe places, if there be no breach of the great Commandement which is Charity, in other reſpects, it is a matter of indifferency, & can be no ground to charge Schiſme upon one more then the other. There muſt be ſome other conſideration than of the Church found out if they will accuſe us of Schiſme: And that is not as it is Ʋniverſal or Particular, but as it is National and Parochial. As it is Ʋniverſal and Particular it is ex praecepto, of Divine: as it is National and Parochial it is ex providentia, of Humane and prudential inſtitution. There are ſome things p. 8required to the Church ad eſſe, and ſome things ad bene eſſe. That which is required ad eſſe, is named (a due adminiſtration of the Word, Sacrament and Prayer), and we divide not in it. That which is required ad bene eſſe is either neceſſary to that bene (or melius) eſſe, being of Divine Authority, and that is ſome Diſcipline in general, though for the Sort, I will not ſay which is ſuch, or that which is accidental and accumulative from man, as to have the Supreme Magiſtrat Chriſtian, and a Nurſing Father to it, with his People generally of that Religion. The one of theſe (I ſay) is of God's Praeceptive (we ſpeak it not ſimpliciter, but in regard to the Conſtitution of the Church of Chriſt): the other of his Providential will only. In this accidental regard as the Church is National do we acknowledg that the King is head of it, and hath his Ordinances in reſpect thereunto to be obeyed, as Chriſt hath in regard to the Ʋniverſal. That the Magiſtrate hath Authority to Protect the Church of Chriſt, by ſeeing that Chriſt's Ordinances be obſerved in every Congregation according to their way, and in looking to the whole that they do nothing but what ſhall make to the Peace of the Nation, is out of queſtion. The King here governs by his Laws, and the Laws of this Land have appointed the conſtitution p. 9of particular Churches to be of Pariſhes as moſt convenient to that purpoſe. If we conſent not to theſe Laws we break the Ʋnion which is of Humane inſtitution, though we preſerve that which is Divine. Diſobedience to the wholeſome commands of our Superiours is ſin, and when that ſeparation therefore, which is a thing indifferent otherwiſe does become ſinful through that diſodedience, unleſs we have ſomthing to juſtify the diſobedience, ſuch ſeparation, by Analogy, is Schiſme. And here do I verily think muſt the bottom of all that can be charged upon us about Schiſme be placed. If the Parliament ſhould Legitimate theſe ſeparate Meetings by an Act, they would immediately become parts of the National Church no leſs then our Pariſhes, and that would put an end to the Schiſme; the Evil chargeable upon us any otherwiſe, being like to be found the Fault of the Perſons, not of our meetings, or of the Thing: But ſo long as they are againſt Law, it is the Obligation of humane Laws I perceive, and the Authority of the Magiſtrate about Religion are the points muſt come into Plea. Theſe have been treated and put together in a Book entituled, Two points of great Moment Diſcuſſed. The ſubſtance whereof as to my preſent purpoſe will reſolve into this Diſtinction.

Laws which are Wholeſome Laws, that p. 10is, for the Common Good in Civil's, and for Edification in Spiritualls, do bind us under Pain of Sin. Such is the law I count for Parochial Union, but there are two Caſes wherein we are exempted from ſuch Laws, and which juſtify the Non-Obedience. One is, when that which is commanded is againſt a man's Conſcience. The other is, when that which is commanded cannot be done, but ſome other Duty which is of greater Concern muſt be thruſt out, and in this Caſe (I ſay) the omitting that which is the leſſer Duty, is no ſin. In this Point, ye ſee before, I have placed our Apology. I muſt add, that foraſmuch as it is no Sin to omit a leſſer Duty for doing a greater, when both cannot be done, but to omit the greater Duty conſequently muſt be ſin: it follows, that ſuppoſing it to be Schiſme to refuſe Communion, when we may come to Church without ſin, it muſt be no Schiſme to wave it, or not to come, when if we come we ſhould ſin, as we muſt, when we ſhall omit a greater Duty by coming. Schiſme is a Voluntary Departure without cauſe given from that Chriſtian Church, whereof he was a Member; or a Breach of that Communion wherein a man might have continued without Sin, ſayes that late Author of a Serious and Compaſſionate Enquiry, into the cauſes of men's contempt of the Church and the remedies. p. 11A Book two fine I count to bear a Diſpute, or uphold ſo large a deſign he undertakes. I would fain know (ſayes another) by what Authority this ſeparating practiſe can be juſtified from the guilt of the moſt Horrible Schiſme that ever was heard of in the Chriſtian World. A ſober Anſwer to the new Separatiſts. Pa. 156. again (Pa. 157.) Diſtinguiſhing of a Voluntary deſertion of ones Miniſtry, and chooſing ſilence in caſe of Non-Conformity. The ſecond (ſays he) is the Illuſtration of four Cardinal Vertues, Humility, Meekneſs, Selfe-denial, Obedience. I cannot but quote theſe Paſſages as pleaſant to my Humor, nor can I forbear Laughter at the Reading of them. Not becauſe that worthy honeſt Citizen hath not read Ethicks, in calling theſe Cardinal Vritues, whereof we know indeed there are Four, but neither of theſe is One of them: But for the Spirit, or preſent Aſſurance where-with he Writes, I could never be ſo Confident when I wrote againſt Separation. Nor can I look on this Separation only from the Churches of the Nation, not from Chriſt's Church or Churches, that is a Schiſme of mans Denomination (our Pariſhes being of Humane Contrivance out of Queſtion,) to be ſuch a Horrible Creature as he makes it. The great Bear hath been led ſo long about p. 12the ſtreets that the very Children are no longer afraid of it. Neither can I think it any ſuch Vertue for a man to give over Preaching. I am mightily Flattered methinks in this Paſſage, who, if this good man be in the right, ſhould be one of the moſt Vertuous Non-Conformiſts among all our Brethren. I pray God to for-give me that Vertue with my Manifold Aberations. I declare my Self with the Old Non-Conformiſt a Conformiſt Pariſhioner, though a Non-Conforming Miniſter, and refuſe not to joyn in the Ordinances of Doctrine, Breaking Bread; and Prayers, in our Parochial Congregations.

Laws which are not Wholeſome Laws, that is, not for the Spiritual or Temporal good of the Community (ſuch as our Ceremonies & the like things I count be) may, I Preſume, entangle the Mind and Oblige the outward Man to ſuffering, or to doing rather then Suffer, if they be not Sinful to us, as well as Ʋnprofitable, but they do not (I have maintained, and muſt deſend ſtill what I have determined as of neceſſary import to tender Chriſtians) oblige the Conſcience of the Subject. And ſo I deſcend to my Proper Concernment.

J. H. ſ…ith, that unleſs th… matter of the Princes Command be antecedently neceſſary in p. 13Judgment of the Subject, it obliges not the Conſcience. Sir! This is a miſtake, I ſay not ſo. I ſay indeed, that unleſs a Law be for the common Good, it binds not in point of Conſcience, and I give theſe two reaſons for it. The one, becauſe the Magiſtrate hath no Authority from God but for our Weale, nor the Biſhop but for our Edification. The other becauſe we are to ſuppoſe the Superiours will, or intention, is meaſured by his Authority: And when the thing commanded is not for our Good or Edification, as it is deſtitute of God's Authority, it muſt be ſuppoſed void alſo of his Miniſters intention. See my Obligation of humane Laws, Pa. 139. with pa. 25. But that I ſhould be made upon this to hold therefore (and that for a Principle) that the Conſcience is only Obliged from the Matter of the thing Commanded, and not from the Command of the Magiſtrate, is ſuch an abuſe and weakneſs, as the modeſty of thoſe Words [You ſeem to Say] will not excuſe. There are a Thouſand things good for the Publick, which, being not commanded, are not neceſſary, nor Oblige any Body. The controverſie between Conformiſt and Non-Conformiſt is ſuppoſed to be about things indifferent, in which the Conſcience is Free, and not Bound, till our Superiours Command comes. It is by the Authority p. 14then of our Superiour (I ſay) derived from God, that the Conſcience is obliged: Inſomuch as that before the Command there is no Obligation: and when he commands, the matter of the command muſt be ſuch as he hath Power to Command in, or it is void. It is Authoritas imperantis agnita (I have noted it ſome-where) is the Objectum formale obedientiae, and anſwereth the queſtion, Qûare obedis? But I am not aware (ſaith the kind Dean) That obedience to man in things indifferent is commanded of God in Scripture. Yes! I am aware that Things indifferent (by which we mean whatſoever is neither commanded nor for-bidden in the Word,) are either for the Common good, and ſo the ſubject matter of the Superiours Authority, and Obedience to men in ſuch things is commanded by God in Scripture: Or they are not for the common Good, but againſt it, and in ſuch matters, neither hath the Superiour Authority (I ſay) from God to command them, nor can ſuch commands for that reaſon be obligatory to the Conſcience. But Obedience to them is alſo required in the Law of Nature for the common Good. How? Is Obedience required by the law of Nature for the common Good, to things which I ſuppoſe not for the common Good? Why, It is for the ſecurity of the Publick p. 15peace, and God's own Vicegerency on Earth. I anſwer, The Honour of the Magiſtrate, and ſecurity of the Government is preſerved (and the common good thereby concern'd) in our obedience, when the Laws are wholeſome Laws; in our ſuffering, when they are ſinful Laws; in our avoiding contempt and ſcandal, when they are unprofitable Laws; in our ſubjection to the Authority reſiding in the Perſon under all Laws ſo that when he will, he can enforce them. Upon this account, there is a difference ordinarily between the Command of a Maſter or Parent, and the Laws of a Nation. A Command to a Child or Servant, does ſuppoſe, a do it, or I'le make you. If the Magiſtrate ſets himſelf to have a Law obeyed by a particular perſon, the caſe is the ſame; and ſeeing the honour of the Governour and the Government it ſelf is ſtill (I count) concern'd in this, that he ſhould be able to make his Subjects obey, if he put his power out, and the thing be no Sin, Obedience being for the common good, in ſuch a caſe, a man is obliged to it in Conſcience: but if he do not, a Law ſuppoſes only the common good mainly to be entended, prudence to be uſed, no contempt offered, and the will of the Magiſtrate is done. When our Obedience then (I ſay) p. 16does indeed ſerve thoſe ends he mentions (and greater be not ſerved, or the ſame otherwiſe better ſerved) we are obliged: But what if it ſerves them not? What if my impertinent Obedience ſhall but diſturb the Peace (or the peaceable) and reflect diſhonour on the Law-giver? what if it ſhould do more hurt than good, taking one thing with another? when it is not for the common good, I ſay, and then only, that we are not obliged in Conſcience.

There are a few more words here needful, becauſe we are at the bottom. How far the Laws of man do bind the Conſcience, was the queſtion, That the Conſcience is not bound at all by humane Conſtitutions, hath been the opinion of no few Doctors, nor mean perſons: for in the Act for the VVedneſday faſt, it ſeems to have been the received judgment at that time of the whole Nation. I ſay theſe faſts (or the like appointments) are to be obſerved, yet ſhall not the breaking them, make a man to do deadly ſin, except in his mind be ſome other malicious affection therewith annexed, as raſhneſs of mind, deſpite, or ſuch like; for ſo much as no poſitive Law of man made without foundation of Scripture, may bind any perſon, ſo that in breaking ſuch he ſhall therefore ſin deadly. John Lambert the p. 17Martyr. So Luther, and the Proteſtants I ſuppoſe ordinarily after Gerſon. See Downam, ſee Field. They do impiouſly Ʋſurp and aſſume to themſelves, that which is proper to God; who will have their Lawes bind the Conſcience, and threaten Damnation to the Offendors, ſayes that learned Dr for our Currant Doctrine; who does therefore quote alſo two Papiſts. Human Lawes binds the Conſcience not, Ex voluntate Legiſlatoris, ſed ex ipſa legum utilitate & ratione. Stapleton Cont. 5. De pot. Ec circa leges Mor. Quaeſt. 7. Art. 2. Quamvis peccet quis tranſgrediendo leges humanas, non tamen ligant conſcientiam: patet per ſimile de praeceptis medicorum, quae deſpicere quis non poteſt ſine peccato, & tamen non ligant conſcientiam. Gerſon De vita ſpir. anim. Lect. 4. If you think this too large, that the Lawes of Man, however, ſhould not be made to oblige the Conſcience in equality with the Lawes of God, is but moſt reaſonable; That they do oblige therefore only ſo far, as to the avoiding contempt and ſcandal, hath been our moſt conſtant determination (I think) againſt the Papiſts. Now I would willingly know here, upon what bottom ſuch a Determination is laid; and that which offers it ſelf, is this. That whereas all Lawes do oblige only, but according p. 18to the will of the Law-giver, it is ſuppoſed that he entends we ſhould be obliged ſo far only. But I pray why do we ſet theſe limits to his will? why may we not ſuppoſe as well, that he entends his obligation with other limits, to wit, that his Lawes ſhall bind us ſo far, as ſtands with our convenience; or ſo far as the hurt or damage to us, does not exceed the good we ſhall do the Community by our Obedience? If our Superiour entends not to bind us ſo far, as God does by his Lawes, but ſo far as, the ſupream Law of Charity requires (See Davinants Determinations, Quaeſt. 20. p. 100.) why may we not ſuppoſe other limits (I ſay) as well as theſe mentioned? The truth is, there is no bottom in the buſineſs, till we come to that I have laid, which is this, that foraſmuch as God hath entruſted no Authority with any to give Lawes, but for the Peoples welfare, and this is the end therefore of all Lawes, there are no Men in capacity of Law-givers (eſpecially a Parliament that repreſent the Community) but are to be ſuppoſed to entend this altogether: and conſequently if a Law prove otherwiſe, or is againſt the common good, it muſt be ſuppoſed alſo, that ſuch a Law is devoid of their intention, or is not according to their will, and ſo p. 19does not bind the Conſcience, even upon this double ground; both becauſe it is deſtitute of the Authority it ſhould have from God, and its Authority from the will of Man alſo, upon the account declared. That the will of the Law-giver ſhould be meaſured by his Authority, is but meet (I hope) to be ſuppoſed: and this laſt ground, therefore having been but once touched in my Book before quoted, I do imprint it now more ſenſibly in this Paper.

I muſt confeſs I have heard it ſaid to me, by One or Two, ſometimes thus, When a thing is indeed deſtructive to the publick good, we will grant you what you ſay; but not ſo, when a thing is only againſt it, or not for it. I reply, Sirs! I pray let us come to a bottome, This is not to go to the bottome. Why ſhall not a command deſtructive to the common good bind the Conſcience? If it be ſin to diſobey, we muſt not ſin to avoid miſchief, we muſt ſay therefore it is not ſin. And why is it not ſin, but becauſe ſuch a Command hath none of God's Authority? I muſt aſſume, ſo hath no Command that is not for the common good; for the Authority that any Man hath from God, is only for our Good, for our Edification. Here is the bottome, if it be firm, it muſt hold throughout; if not, it muſt not hold at all. p. 20He is the Miniſter of God for our good. According to the power given to us of God for Edification.

To the Dean's Texts, I have anſwered, Subjection is to be owned alwayes out of Conſcience. Obedience is ſuppoſed to be required in Scripture, in matters wherein the Superiour hath Authority, that is, a right from God to Command. Such matters being only what is for the publick good, thoſe Lawes or Commands which are beſides that end, are no Lawes or Commands God bids us obey, that is, are in ſenſu univoco no Lawes: and when … obey in all others, but in thoſe which are Lawes only ſecundum nomen, I do obey him (I count) in all things; becauſe thoſe I diſobey, are none ſecundum nominis rationem.

It may be perhaps thought upon this, that I ſhould have made a quicker diſpatch of my Work then I do, to ſay that all Lawes do indeed bind the Conſcience (it is properer to ſay do bind in Conſcience), but ſuch Lawes as are not for the common good are no Lawes. To which purpoſe may Cicero and Suarez be conſulted. Omnium commune axioma eſt de ratione & ſubſtantia legis eſſe, ut pro communi bono feratur. Suarez, De legibus l. 1. c. 7. You may find Authorities enough there quoted to read at p. 21your leaſure. I will tranſcribe thus much out of Cicero my ſelf. Principem legem mentem eſſe dicebant omnia ratione aut cogentis aut vetantis dei: ex qua illa lex quam dij humano generi dederunt, recte eſt laudata. Eſt enim ratio menſque ſapientis ad inbendum & ad deterrendum idonea.—Conſtat profecto ad ſalutem civium civitatumque incolumitatem vitamque omnium quietam & beatam conditas eſſe leges: eoſque qui primum ejuſmodi ſcita ſanxerunt, populis oſtendiſſe ea ſe ſcripturos atque laturos, quibus illi ad ſcriptis ſuſceptiſque honeſte beateque viverent: quaeque ita compoſita ſanctaque eſſent, eas leges videlicet nominarunt. Ex quo intelligi par eſt, eos qui pernicioſa & injuſta populis juſſa deſcripſerint, cum contra fecerint quam polliciti profeſſique ſint, quidvis potius tuliſſe quam leges. The ſum of both comes to this. The chief Law is the Divine reaſon; The Lawes of Men muſt be agreeable to that; God's Commands are to make Men happy, by living vertuouſly; Mens Lawes accordingly, that are not for the Peoples welfare, are nothing leſs than what they are called. To theſe I will joyn Auguſtine, Iſtas leges, injuſtas vel potius nullas dicemus? Nam mihi lex eſſe non videtur quae juſta non fuerit. Auguſt. de lib. arb. l. 1. c. 5. If you ask me then, why I did not go this way, I will tell you, that beſides p. 22it looks not ſafe, fit, or civil to ſay, that any thing which is once paſſed into an Act of Parliament is no Law, there is a neceſſity you may perceive here, that we muſt come to ſome diſtinction at laſt: and I did chooſe to diſtinguiſh of the Obligation, and to ſhew in what ſenſe we are not obliged, rather then of the Law, and to ſay in what ſenſe, it is no Law. Let Law be defined outright according to theſe, and, Law is the Declaration of the will of the Law-giver, what the Subject is to do for the publick good. If a Law now be not for the publick utility, it is no Law according to this definition; it hath not that in it which is de ratione legis, as the Schools ſpeak. It is a Law therefore in ſenſu aequivoco which agrees in the name, but not in ſenſu univoco, which participates of the nature or the definition. To avoid the uſing theſe terms therefore, and in regard ſuch an Act is Law ſtill in ſome ſenſe, in the common ſenſe and Vote of the Nation, and in ſome reſpect more than aequivocally ſo, becauſe proceeding from a rightful Authority, it does in part agree in the definition, as well as in the name, and conſequently in part muſt be Obligatory, it does appear how the diſtinction does as it were naturally devolve upon the Obligation: and ſo ſpares this upon the Law; ſeeing if we will truly p. 23explicate what we mean, when we deny ſuch a Law to be law, this we muſt ſay in good earneſt, and nothing elſe is our meaning, that it is a Law ſo far as to be obeyed for fear of the penalty (for never to reſiſt I count in my Book is ſtill pre-required), but not ſo far, as that every omiſſion of it is ſin, or that we are obliged to it in Conſcience. And thus by going the farther way about, we are but brought the nearer home to the true deciſion we entend. Only one thing I find wanting yet in the explanation of the terms of this diſtinction I uſe between the Outward Man and the Conſcience. I have been at a good deal of pains to make thoſe received terms currant (Compare my Obligation of human Lawes p. 24. with my Authority of the Magiſtrat p. 50.) and all I ſee will not ſerve till I diſtinguiſh alſo of Conſcience it ſelf, which is taken Phyſically or Theologically. Conſcience Naturally taken is any knowledge of my ſelf or my concernments: Conſcience taken Theologically is the knowledge of what I have to do with Reference to the will and judgement of God, Judicium de ſemet ipſo prout ſubjicitur judicio dei. When Divines in this point therefore do diſtinguiſh the Outward Man and the Conſcience, by the Conſcience we muſt underſtand Conſcience in the Theological p. 24ſenſe only. That is, we Separate not …he Reaſon, Will, Underſtanding, or Na…ural Conſcience it Self from the Outward Man, but Conſcience only Theologically taken. And the Meaning is plainly, that though a Man in Reaſon underſtands, and is Conſcious in regard to his own concernement, that ſuch a Law is to be Obſerved, if he will avoid this or that Penalty or Inconvenience: Yet ſo long as he Believes God does not Command him to do it, and that he ſhall incurr no Diſpleaſure from him though he omits it, this is to be Obliged in the Outward Man only, and not in Conſcience; or …n the Conſcience taken Naturally, not Theologically in Conſcience.

After I had wrote this and all the reſt, (only ſomthing I hereupon inſerted before), I had Dr. Field on the Church accidentaly brought me. It was many years ſince I read him, and I had forgot every thing in him on this Subject but only his Diſtinction between Subjection and Obedience which I like, and ever retained. I am well pleaſed to find my genius agreeing ſo much as it does with one of ſo great Note and Learning; eſpecially ſeeing that Tenet which Dean F. oppoſes as mine is that alone in effect wherein our Sentiments meet not. You ſay (ſayes Dean F.) when a thing is p. 25Commanded of God, or we think it tends to the Publick good, then only Conſcience is Obliged: But this Obligation is only from the neceſſity of the thing Commanded, & becauſe you approve it to be a Duty before, and conſequently in Obedience to your own Reaſon, and not at all out of Conſcience of the Command, or in Obedience to the King. Well! Let us then hear Dr. Field, a greater Dean, deliver his judgment: Which I will ſet down in his words at large for the Readers Edification.

The queſtion ſhould not be propoſed, whether Humane Laws bind the Conſcience (This he takes up in the Negative as not to be queſtioned): but whether binding the outward Man to the performance of outward things by force and fear of outward Puniſhment to be inflicted by men, the not performance of ſuch things, (or the not p…rformance of them with ſuch affections as were fit) be not a Sin againſt God of which the Conſcience will accuſe us, he having Commanded us to Obey the Magiſtrates and Rulers he hath ſet over us! For anſwer hereunto, there are three ſorts of things (ſayes he) Commanded by Magiſtrates. Firſt, Evil and againſt God. Secondly Injurious in reſpect of them to whom they are Preſcribed, or at leaſt Ʋnprofitable to the Common-Wealth in which they are Preſcribed. Thirdly, ſuch p. 26as are Profitable and Beneficial to the Society of Men to whom they are Preſcribed. Touching the Firſt Sort of things, We muſt not Obey. Touching the ſecond Sort of things, all that God requireth of us is that we ſhew no contempt of Sacred Authority though not rightly uſed, that we Scandalize not others, and that we he Subject to ſuch Penaltyes, as they that Command ſuch things do lay upon us. In the Third Sort of things, it is only that God requires our Willing and ready Obedience. The Breach and Violation of this kind of Laws is Sin, not for that humane Laws have Power to Bind the Conſcience, or that it is ſimply and abſolutely ſinful to break them, but becauſe the things they Command are of that Nature that not to perform them, is contrary to Juſtice, Charity, and the deſire we ſhould have to procure the Common-Good of them with whom we Live. We are bound then ſomtimes to the Performance of things preſcribed by Humane Laws in ſuch Sort that the not Performance of them is Sin; not ex ſola Legiſlatoris voluntate, ſed ex ipſa legum utilitate, as Stapleton Rightly obſerved. But ſome Man will ſay, what do the Laws then effect ſeeing it is the Law of Juſtice, and Charity that doth bind us, and not the Particularity of Laws newly Made! To this we anſwer that many things are God and Profitable, if they be generally Obſerved, which without ſuch p. 27general Obſervation will do no Good. The Law procureth a general Obſervation. Bellarmine objects, Be ſubject for Conſcience Sake. To this we anſwer. Firſt. That it is a matter of Conſcience to be Subject in all things, for Subjection is required Generally and Abſolutely where Obedience is Not. Secondly. We ſay that it is a matter of Conſcience to Seek and Procure the Good of the Common-Wealth, and that therefore it is a matter of Conſcience to obey Good and Profitable Laws, ſo farr as we are perſwaded our Obedience is profitable. Moreover, General and Long continued Diſuſe is, and Juſtly may be thought an Aboliſhing, and Abrogating of Humane Laws. For ſeeing Lex inſtitutitur cum promulgatur, vigorem habet cum moribus utentium approbatur. On the Church Pag. 4. l. 34.

I muſt remember my Antogoniſt to take Notice that What he goes to oppoſe in me as ſome ſingular Opinion of mine, which yet is not mine, but he miſtakes me in it, is Preſented by this Great Dr. of the Church as the received Doctrine of Proteſtants: As alſo, that the Doctrine which in deed is mine, & this Dr agrees ſo much with me, does require his better Conſideration.

J. H's. Second Principle is that Human Powers may not lawfully Command or Inforce any p. 28thing againſt the Conſcience, even in Civil Concernes. He ſhould have ſaid in things that are materially Civil, yet under ſome Conſideration unto ſome Religious. What the Magiſtrate cannot Command (I ſay indeed) he cannot Inforce. The Magiſtrate cannot Command what God forbids. God forbids every Man to do any thing againſt his Conſcience. And what hath any Mortal to oppoſe againſt this? Why, he has one Argument only, which he takes from my Conceſſion, in the ſtating my Matter. I Diſtinguiſh between a Man's doing according to his Conſcience, and his doing againſt It; and of Reſtraint and Conſtraint accordingly in the Magiſtrate. I grant that the Magiſtrate may Reſtraine a man from doing according to his Conſcience when he is doing hurt to Church or State through his errour, and may Puniſh him for the Evil he does: He argues from hence that he may Conſtraine him to doe that which is Good for the Church or State, though it be againſt his Conſcience, upon the ſame account. But I ſay, not. There is a Difference. I give my Reaſon. Becauſe in the one, the Man does what God would not have him: In the other, he does what God would have. God would not have him to do Evil, becauſe of his erroneous Conſcience, but that he ſhould lay p. 29down his Errour and do Good: But God will have every Man ſo to regard his Conſcience though Eerroneous, that he muſt not do any thing againſt it, for any Fear, or Advantage in … Eaerth. Author. of the Mag. Pag. 12…. And what anſwer makes he to this Reaſon! Why not a word. So overly a… men ordinarily to ſpeak at the firſt ſight againſt that, which others have thought long upon. The ſubſtance of the Diſtinction, and ſo of my Detemination, I cited out of Auguſtine, and confirmed it with Grotius his Approbation. I might add to them the Learned Rutherford, who are Judicious mighty Men all three, but this Gentle Dean hath not Pondred the Matter. For thus he proceeds. The Law of God is the Rule of Concience. This Law is Negative as well as Affirmative, and binds the Conſcience equally in both reſpects. So far we are Agreed. Hold Sir! A miſtake again. He forgets the known Rule in the Schools, that Affirmations bind Semper, not ad Semper, not to all times, or in all Caſes: but Negatives do bind Semper and ad Semper, alwayes, and againſt all Exceptions. He remembers not himſelf therefore, when he ſaies they Bind equally, and ſo thinks not how the Deciſion of the Point muſt reſolve into this Iſſue. In the affirmative Caſe I ſay it is true, that God requires p. 30the Man to lay down his Errour, and not to do the thing, and therefore the Magiſtrate may Restrain, or Puniſh him: In the Negative caſe he urges likewiſe, God commands him the Same as to laying down his Errour, and to do the thing, and therefore he may Conſtraine or make him. But I reply no ſtill, the difference remains. Though in the Negative caſe (that is, when the Conſcience which is Erroneous ſayes they muſt not do ſuch a thing) God requires this Joyntly, to lay down his Erroneous Conſcience (or be other-wiſe informed), and to do the thing, yet does not he require this Separately, that while he is ſo informed, he ſhould do it: When in the affirmative Caſe (that is when the Conſcience which is erroneous, ſaies thou muſt do ſuch or ſuch a thing) God requires he ſhould lay down his Errour & not do the thing both Joyntly and Separately; ſo that even while he is Perſwaded in his Conſcience that it is his Duty, God's Negative Command is Obligatory againſt that Perſwaſion. The reaſon is from what is Said, becauſe Affirmatives do not bind ad Semper, or in all Caſes, but Negatives do. This is one of thoſe Caſes. Thou ſhalt not do againſt thy Conſcience, is a Negative Indiſpenſable: Thou ſhalt do according to it, holds not in this Caſe, when the p. 31Conſcience is in an Errour.

I will conclude with the Hiſtory of this little I have written. There is a Book call'd the Friendly Debate, which when it came out was received every where with diverſity of acceptation, and cenſure. There are many things in it I am perſwaded in my heart fit to be ſpoken: yet do I not know, nor the Authour himſelf perhaps know from what manner of Spirit they are ſpoken. It is in appearance a Spirit elated, contemptuous, engaged (if not imbitterd) againſt a party, and ſo far un-Catholick, which does through the ſides of that party oftentimes make Religion her ſelf feel, entrenching upon it almoſt all the way, in regard to thoſe weakneſſes and follies which Human reaſon is ever ready to impute to it. But God hath choſen the fooliſh things of the World to confound the Wiſe: and the things that are deſpiſed hath he choſen. Among other matters againſt the Non-Conformiſts, that Authour brings this, that they obſerve not the Lawes, the Oxford Act, and others, and that therefore they cannot be good Subjects, nor good Chriſtians, nor Miniſters of Chriſt. A heavy charge, and a neceſſary caſe of Conſcience! Upon this occaſion I preſented to the publick a ſheet called the Caſe under this Title. Whether a Non-Conformiſt p. 32who hath not taken the Oxford Oath, might come to live at London,, or any Corporate Town, or within Five miles of it, and yet be a good Chriſtian? To this Sheet the Authour was pleaſed to give me an Anſwer. That Anſwer drew me forth to write my Book by way of reply, of the Obligation of human Lawes. To this reply the learned Debater anſwered no more. After the Debate, another peice comes forth of Eccleſiaſtical Polity, exceeding the former both in Pomp and Deſign, in Luſtre and the Attempt; that was for aſſerting an Authority in the Magiſtrate over the Conſcience to end all Diſputes, which being a thing not to be endured, though but in the matter of Conformity, as the Authour I think only meant, I wrote alſo my other Book, of the Authority of the Magiſtrate about Religion. Unto this Book I had no anſwer from that Authour neither: Only having cauſed thoſe few Copies which were left of the Obligation in Quires to be Bound up with this, and Printing ſo many on purpoſe of the Sheet called The Caſe over again, to fit and joyn to both, and then Entituled it, Two points of great moment Diſcuſſed, I do obſerve that it hath pleaſed this Reverend Dean to ſtep in with theſe Two exceptions of his, which I have anſwered: and one p. 33thing more in the cloſe muſt not paſs unregarded, which he brings in under the head of the former of the Two.

This Obligation (of I. H.) is only from neceſſity of the thing commanded. But in all other caſes you need not obey only for wraths ſake, that is, no farther then you are forced; and therefore when you are got above fears you will not, or need not, regard Authority. This principle will hardly prove the Non-Conformiſts the only Loyaliſts. Beſides the miſtake before noted. It is nothing but want of the preſent knowledge, in this Dr as it was in the Debater, of the diſtinction I offered them out of Dr Field, between Subjection and Obedience, or the ſenſe of it, that made them fall into ſo ſlender ſort of reaſoning, as this is. Though there be many caſes, wherein we are not bound in Conſcience to Obey: yet are we alwayes bound in Conſcience to be Subject, or never to Reſiſt, and upon that ground is our Loyalty maintained. This I have ſaid, I know moſt effectually in my firſt Book of the Two Points, unto which, therefore, when that which is brought to its Aſſiſtance in the Second, and this little in theſe Two Sheets now more is added (which I would by no means have thoſe, who have the p. 34other be without), there is nothing beſides, as I can find in my mind (unleſs to tell the Reader, leaſt he be at a loſs, that there are a few of theſe Two Poynts ſo bound up, yet to be had, at the Golden Lyon in Paul's-Church-yard) that is lacking to my full ſatisfaction on thoſe Subjects,

Vale Lector & fruere Deo gloria. I. H.

End of the text · John Humfrey, A Plea for the Non-Conformists (1674)