The Middle Way in Election and Redemption, Part 1

The Middle Way in Election and Redemption · Part 1

THE Middle-Way In One Paper of ELECTION & REDEMPTION.

With Indifferency between the ARMINIAN & CALVINIST.

By J H

Doing nothing by Partiality.

1 Tim. 5.21.

LONDON, Printed for T. Parkhurſt, at the Three Bibles in Cheap-ſide. 1673.

p. 1OF Election, or Predeſtination.

THe deſigne of theſe Papers is to offer to ſuch as will conſider, and can tend to receive, or cultivate what is offered, ſome Notices of truth which lye upon my mind about ſeverall matters, that, by the Communication of the little light I have, I may fetch in more to my own underſtanding from others: and alſo by the Partiality that appeares ſo often in the doctrine of the Orthodox, I may promote ſome generall kind of condeſcenſion in all perſons to a more favourable opinion of one another: the proper conſciouſneſs of our own moſt miſerable palpable blindneſs in moſt things, and ſeveral points of Religion, (wherein many times we are indeed but the more blind, becauſe wee think we ſee), being enough methinks to make every mortall, even with ſhame and confuſion, to be ready either to have a little higher eſtimation of his Brother that differ from him, or a little leſs indignation at any ſuch difference, or diſtance in his way and judgment.

I will begin with theſe heads. Of Election, and of Redemption.

It is the generall opinion of Divines, that God from all eternity fore knows all things, and, That, there are a certain number p. 2of perſons determined by Him that ſhall be infallibly brought to glory. For declaring this Decree, they do go ſeverall wayes. In the generall, they may be reduced to two: the way of Abſolute; and the way of Conditionall Election. Of either way there are two ſorts. In the Conditional way; The firſt ſort do conceive, that God foreſees who they be that will live godlily and keep his commandements, and them he chooſes to ſalvation; while thoſe he foreſees will be wicked, he decrees to damnation. Ʋnde Apoſtolus (ſay they). Quos praeſcivit, hos & praedeſtinavit. From whence the Apoſtle Whom he did foreknow, them he alſo did praedeſtinate. The ſecond ſort, perceiving this to be contrary to Scripture, with makes Election to be of grace & not of works, do ſay thus: That God foreſees who they be will beleeve, and ſo chooſing them as being in Chriſt through faith, decrees to give them grace, which will lead them to ſalvation: and thoſe that he foreſees will not believe, he decrees to leave them, as out of Chriſt, to Condemnation. Non elegit Deus opera cujuſque in praeſcientia quoe ipſe daturus eſt; ſed fidem elegit in praeſcientia, ut, quem ſibi crediturum praeſcivit, Ipſum elegerit ut Spiritum ſanctum daret, ut bona operando etiam vitam aeternam conſequerentur. God did not chooſe the works of any in his foreſight which himſelf was to give, but he choſe faith in his foreſight, that, whom he foreknew would beleeve, he might chooſe them, to give the holy Spirit unto; that by doing good works they might obtain eternall ſalvation. Auguſtine, in libro expoſitionis quarundum propoſitionum ex epiſtola ad Romanos. Again, Quos Deus ſuos fidei opere futuros eſſe praenovit, hos praedeſtin̄avit ad gloriam. Thoſe who God foreknew would become his through their beleeving, he elected unto glory. De praedeſtinatione Dei. c. 5. The former opinion, is the way of the Pelagian; the latter, of the Arminian. Which yet I ſet not down after the more ſubtle times of Arminius himſelf, but thoſe of Auguſtine according to theſe cited paſſages; the one of which he afterwards expreſly retracted; and the book it ſelf out of which I fetch the other, I beleeve either to be ſpurious, or to have got abroad from him unawares, before he had reveiwed it. The Orthodox therefore, ſuch as we account the Synod of Dort, do declare for the Abſolute way, in oppoſition to both theſe. To wit, that God without conſideration either of mans faith, or good works, but p. 3meerly according to the counſell of his own will, not rendring his reaſon to us, hath determined to give that grace to ſome perſons whereby they ſhall effectually be ſaved: and to leave others to the freedome of their own wills, that they may be judged at the laſt Day according to their deſerts. In this way, there are likewiſe two ſorts of Doctors. The one teach, that God looks on men without any conſideration of ſin at all, in their ſtate before the Fall, in this decree of his grace to ſome, and not to others: The other teach, that God looks indeed on men all alike without conſideration of deſert, but not without conſideration of ſin, to wit in their faln eſtate; and ſo decrees his mercy to ſome, and juſtice to others. Note here, that our Divines of the former ſort do not ſay, that, God decrees damnation to any without conſideration of ſin (nor ſalvation indeed without conſideration of faith and repentance): but, Decree's the giving or not giving ſaving grace to keep them from ſin and damnation, to whom he pleaſes, without any conſideration in man whatſoever. For, Predeſtination, ſay they, being an immanent and eternall act of the Divine underſtanding & will, cannot be conceived as dependent upon any foreſeen temporall acts of mans free-will. Note alſo, that St. Auguſtine who was the firſt ſet up for the Abſolute way, and yet not till his latter writings, doth declare for the ſecond ſort of this way. Caeteri autem ubi niſi in maſſa perditionis juſto divino judicio relinquantur? The reſt that are not elect, are left according to Gods juſt judgment, in the maſſe of thoſe that are faln, unto perdition. De bono perſeverantiae. c. 14. The one of theſe opinions is called the Supralapſarian doctrine: the other, the Sublapſarian. Which are names indeed may make a rumbling to many that know not what they ſignify, but ſo long as they come into one and the ſame Conſequent, which alone is to be regarded, the difference is not of moment to diſturb any.

And what is the Conſequent then of theſe Doctrines, which is fit to be enquired? The Conſequent of the firſt doctrine, that Election is ex praeviſis operibus, of works foreſeen, muſt be this, that the good life or good works of men therefore do ariſe from their own free wills, and that the grace of God is given according to their merits. This was the main opinion doubtleſs which the Church condemned in Pelagius. From whence indeed thoſe two p. 4other followed, that, Man may therefore chooſe whether he will ever commit any ſin; and, That he muſt be free from original corruption. Tria ſunt quae maxime adverſus eos catholica defendit eccleſia, Ʋnum eſt, Gratiam Dei non ſecundum merita dari, quoniam Dei dona ſunt. Alterum eſt, in quantacunque juſtitia ſine qualibuſcun que peccatis neminem vivere. Tertium eſt, naſci homines peccato primi homnis obnoxios. There are three things eſpecially which the Catholick Church defends againſt the Pelagians: One is, that the Grace of God is not given according to mans merit: Another is, that there is no man, how great ſoever his righteouſneſs be, that lives without ſome ſins. The third is, that men are born liable to the guilt of Adams firſt tranſgreſſion. De bon. perſev. c. 2. The conſequent of the ſecond opinion, that Election is ex praeviſa fide of fore-ſeen faith, is, That although our good works are indeed the fruit onelyonly o… Gods Spirit, and to be aſcribed to Gods grace; yet muſt our frith, upon which the Spirit or this grace is given, or by which it is impetrated, as that Father ſpeaks, be both in our own power and from our own will; as being that, and that alone in man, that makes the difference between one and another; or the reaſon why God ſhould chooſe ſuch a one to give him his grace, and paſs by the other. And this doctrine, with the Conſequent of it, muſt be acknowledged to be St. Auguſtine's in his firſt writings, which he choſe no doubt as the moſt moderate then in the Church, which (as we may judg by Proſper, and Hilary's Epiſtles to him) was never uſed to define election otherwiſe than ſecundum praeſcientiam, according to foreknowledg, till his dayes. And this was the reaſon that thoſe of Marſilia (ad quorum authoritatem non ſumus pares, ſayes one of thoſe Epiſtles, quia multum nos et vitae meritis antecellunt & ſacerdotis honore) were ſo offended at that Father for his change. And from hence does Arminius profeſſe ſome-where, Non ſtamus Auguſtino, We ſtand not with Auguſtine: for which this alſo, as I remember, is his reaſon. Quia ſibi ipſe non ſtetit, becauſe he ſtood not to himſelf. The Conſequent of the other two doctrines which belong to Abſolute election, and come in this repect, I have ſaid, bat to the ſame, is, on the contrary hand, That neither our good works, nor our faith it ſelf, nor indeed any good that is in man, is of our ſelves but of the operation of God, or of his Spirit, who does at firſt excite our wills to Faith and a holy p. 5life, & by his continual aſſiſtance carry us on in perſeverance unto the end, that we may be ſaved; ſo that, the whole buſineſs: of our ſalvation firſt and laſt muſt be aſcribed to Him alone. And if any ask the reaſon then why he gives not the ſame grace to others as to his Elect, he ſhall find theſe words ſtill in St. Auguſtine's mouth. And who art thou that replieſt aga…nſt God? May he not do what he will with his owne? Hath not the Potter power over his clay. O the depth of the knowledge and wiſdome of God, how unſearchable are his judgments, and his wayes paſt finding out! It were but jniury to quote a ſentence or two out of the Father for this, which is the deſigned contents of ſeverall of his laſt books. See de Praedeſtinatione & gratia. De correptione & gratia. De praedeſtinatione ſanctoram. De bono perſeverantiae, to name no more.

The great difficulty now in this Conſequent of Election which appears, does undoubtedly lye here: If neither the faith nor good works of man do ſpring from his own free will, but from the grace of God and Election, then may the unbeliever and wicked excuſe themſelves, and ſay, It is not long of themſelves that they believe not, nor obey, but the cauſe is in God who gives them not faith and obedience, and they cannot help their own reprobation. They will not ſay that, Reprobation is any other than a negative decree, which infuſes no malice in them, but it denyes them that grace which Election gives others: and, if it be not in their power to beleeve and repent without that grace, How can they be condemned for their not beleeving and repenting? This difficulty I am aſſured did ſtick ſo faſt upon this Father in his firſt writings, that I do hardly think him quite out of the gravell in any of his laſt. Let us turn to his book De ſpiritu & littera. In his one and thirtieth Chapter, he offers the queſtion, Whether faith be in mans power, and determines that it is, and muſt be ſo? Upon this in his thirty third chapter he comes to another queſtion which is put to the quick, Whether the will whereby he believes, be therefore of himſelf, or of God? If it be not of our ſelves (ſayes he) but of Gods gift, then may man ſay (according to the objection propoſed) that he beleeved not, becauſe God gave him not the will. If it be of our ſelves, How can that text of the Apoſtle, what haſt thou, O man, thou didſt not receive, be true; ſeeing this will to beleeve he hath of himſelf? p. 6For the extricating us out of this diſtreſſe, he yields to the firſt, and ſeems convinced, that faith muſt be both in our own power, and of our ſelves, for that reaſon. Dicit Apoſtolus, Idem Deus qui operatur omnia in omnibus: nuſquam autem dictum eſt, Deus credit omnia in omnibus. Quod ergo credimus, noſtrum eſt: quod autem bonum operamur, illius eſt qui credentibus dat Spiritum ſanctum. In his Expoſition upon the Romans. The Apoſtle ſayes that God works all in all, but never that he beleeves all in all. That We beleeve therefore, it is of our ſelves: but that we do good works it is of him who gives his holy Spirit to them that beleeve. To the laſt therefore he chooſes to anſwer: Liberum arbitrium naturaliter attributum a Creatore animae rationali, illa media vis eſt, quae vel intendi ad fidem, vel inclinari ad infidelitatem poteſt. Et idco, nec iſtam voluntatem qua credit Deo, dici poteſt homo habere quam non acceperit, quandoquidem vocante Deo ſurgit de libero arbitrio quod naturaliter cum vocaretur accepit: Vult autem omnes homines ſalvos fore & in agnitionem veritatis venire, non ſic tamen ut eis adimat liberum arbitrium, quo vel bene vel male utentes juſtiſſime judicentur. The ſubſtance is, that, The will whereby we beleeve may be ſaid to be received of God, although it proceed from our ſelves, becauſe the faculty from whence it ariſes, is received from him; that is, Becauſe the nature we have, is of our Creator, the will which is of nature, is of Him.

This does not ſatisfy me, for theſe reaſons.

1. That which the Father ſayes as to the voluntas qua credimus, The will whereby we beleeve, I take to be the ſame which Pelagius ſaid as to the voluntas qua bene operamur, The will whereby we doe good works. But if this text, and ſuch as this, be good againſt Pelagius, they muſt be good againſt Auguſtine here, that neither is our faith of our ſelves, upon the ſame account. The truth is, The judgment of this Father while he wrot this book, is this. The Spirit is given to a man upon his beleeving. This Spirit infuſes grace, charity, or juſtification. This charity is that which diſpoſes to good works. Good works therefore (he counts) muſt be of grace and Gods ſpirit, and to follow juſtification which is with him this infuſed grace: But as for beleeving which is the firſt thing upon which the Spirit it ſelf is given to infuſe this grace, from whence our good works doe ſpring; this muſt ariſe, he accounts, from mans free will, or p. 7elſe the fault will not be in himſelf (which is the argument convinces him), but it muſt lye on the will of God onelyonly, that he hath not the ſpirit, and ſo no grace, and ſo does not well, and is not ſaved. Whether this argument be irrefragable or no, we ſhall ſee by what will follow.

2. There are two queſtions raiſed together by the Apoſtle, Who maketh thee to differ from another? and, What haſt thou, O man, that thou didſt not receive? The chief difficulty lyes in anſwering the former queſtion; for, by that is the ſecond to be regulated. Now if that we have from God is onelyonly this middle faculty, which we may uſe to beleeve, or not, Who is it makes the difference in one mans uſing it to faith, and another's to infidelity! That which is the leſs, the Poſſe velle, The power to will ſhall be of God (that is, of Nature, and ſo of God): but the Ipſum velle, The will or willing it ſelf, which is the greater, and which indeed ſaves us, ſhall be of our ſelves.

3. The Scripture is expreſs concerning faith. — and that not of our ſelves, it is the gift of God. If the word foreign, there, referrs to the whole ſentence, we have other texts. No man cometh to me, that is, beleeveth in me unleſs the Father draw him. To you it is given not only to believe, but to ſufther for his name. This is the work of God that you beleeve. Who hath firſt given to him? Of him and to him are all things. I obtained mercy That I ſhould be faithfull, not Becauſe I was faithfull. But ye beleeve not, becauſe ye are not of my ſheep. Again, As many as were ordained to ſalvation, beleeved. It ſeems here that the cauſe why ſome beleeve and ſome beleeve not, is their being, or not being of the number of thoſe who are ordained to be of his flock. The like text in reference to works, as theſe to faith, is that to the Epheſians, He hath choſen us in him before the foundation of the world that we ſhould be holy. It is not therefore mans faith or holineſs is the cauſe of Gods Election, but it is Gods election is the cauſe of mans holineſs and faith. A prime and eternal cauſe (ſay our Divines) cannot depend upon the ſelf ſame temporal effects which are thereby cauſed. If therefore the Ordination of God be the cauſe from whence mans faith and holineſs are derived; his foreſeen-faith, or foreſeen-works are not to be imagined antecedent cauſes, merits, conditions, or motives unto the Divine Predeſtination.

4. We have St. Auguſtine acknowledging himſelf to have bin herein in an errour: So that theſe arguments muſt be p. 8no longer againſt Auguſtine, but againſt thoſe who have taken up that opinion he forſook. In nullo gloriandum eſt, dixit Cyprianus, quoniam, noſtrum nihil ſit. Quod ut oſtenderet adhibuit Apoſtolum, Quid autem habes, quod non accepiſti? Quo praecipue teſtimonio convict us ſum cum errarem, putans fidem qua in Deum exedimus, non eſſe donum Dei, ſed a nobis eſſe in nobis: & per illam nos impetrare Dei dona, quibus temperanter, & juſte, & pie vivamus in hoc ſeculo. Quem errorem nonnulla opuſcula mea ſatis indicant. It was the ſaying of bleſſed Cyprian, that we may glory in nothing, becauſe that which is ours is nothing. This he proved by the words of the Apoſtle. By which teſtimony I was firſt convinced when I erred, thinking that faith was of our ſelves, and then good works obtained by it. Which errour ſeveral of my former pieces do ſufficiently ſhew. De praedeſtinatione ſanctor. c. 3. I wiſh he had mentioned the book here which I am citing, as he does one or two other, that I might have known his ſolution to the difficulty which himſelf hath urged, but left unanſwered upon our hands.

To return then to the Father's queſtion, Whether the Voluntas qua credimus, The will whereby we beleeve, be of our ſelves, or God's gift? I muſt not chooſe the firſt with him in that book, but the laſt according to other of his works. Nevertheleſs, we muſt carefully diſtinguiſh the two things whereof he hath made two queſtions, Ʋtrum fides in noſtra conſtituta ſit poteſtate, Whether faith be in our power, in one chapter: and, Ʋtrum voluntas qua credimus donum ſit Dei, an ex libertate arbitrii, Whether the will whereby we do beleeve, be the gift of God, or the effect of our own liberty, in another. I do apprehend here, that both theſe two things are to be held, That faith is in our power, and That the will whereby we beleeve is not of our ſelves, but of Gods grace or gift. The holding both theſe is that which cuts the thread of all difficulties in this matter. For the one, That faith is in mans power, we are beholding verily to that Father. A thing is in a mans power, which he may do if he will. Hane dicimus poteſtatem, ubi voluntati adiacet facultas faciendi. When he accounts Faith then to be in mans power, he underſtands this, That he may beleeve if he will. And this is a truth of great neceſſity, yet hath difficulty: But when he proceeds hereupon ſo farre, as to make the will therefore whereby p. 9we beleeve to be of our ſelves, it was a ſtep which himſelf ſaw need, to draw back. There are many things that are poſſible, which yet never ſhall be, as this Father himſelf gives inſtances of, upon another occaſion, in the firſt chapter of this book. There are likewiſe many things which a man can do, that yet he never will, or is like to do without ſome ſpeciall cauſe moving him to it. Such is the buſineſs of mans Converſion. There is no man (we are to hold with him) but he may beleeve, I will adde, repent, and be ſaved, if he will: yet is this to be known and held alſo, That there is no man for certain ever will, unleſs it be from that one ſpecial cauſe which is Gods grace, or the Spirit's motion that works his heart thereunto. Now then, Shall a man remain an unbeleever, and impenitent and periſh, the fault ſhall lye upon himſelf, and God ſhall be juſt, becauſe we place faith in his own power. He may believe, and repent, and be ſaved, if he will. If God would and he will not, he may thank himſelf. Again, if he do believe, and repent, and is ſaved, he ſhall have no cauſe to boaſt or glory in himſelf, becauſe that though he might believe and repent if he would, yet would he never have repented while the world laſted, he would have bin damn'd firſt, if it had not bin for the grace of God that wrought him over, after he had ſtood ſo long out. And this is a ſad truth I grant, which needs not the proof of one or two ſingle texts, when the ſcope of the whole Scripture which attributes our deſtructon to our ſelves, and our life and help unto God, does ſeal to it. Who is it hath made thee to differ? Of him we have the will and the deed. By grace, ye are ſaved.

You may ſay, If the will then be of God, why does he not give the will, as well as the power to all, ſeeing he would have all men to be ſaved? I anſwer in the firſt place what Auguſtine hath before, that God will have all men to be ſaved and come to the knowledge of the truth; but yet ſo as the free will of man be not deſtroyed. My meaning though, is not as I take the Father's to be there, as if the will in believeing could not be of God (of unwilling making man willing) but this freedome were loſt; when I doubt not but the caſe is the ſame in believeing as in well-doing, where mans free will, and Gods grace would ſtand together alwayes in his account. I ſay farther, God will have all to be ſaved in vouchſafing the means to all, to be ſaved if they will. This appeares p. 10in theſe three particulars.

1. That he hath given his Son to dye for all the world.

2. The Lord Jeſus hath by his death procured the New Covenant, or ſuch termes upon which Salvation may be had, as are poſſible to all the World. This is a point to be known, that there is this difference between the Covenant of Works, under which we are by Nature, and the Covenant of Grace, unto which we are Redeemed; that, The condition of the one, as to our falne Eſtate is Impoſſible, and the condition of the other is Poſſible. If it be not poſſible, or in Mans Power to perform if he will, then hath Chriſt done nothing for the World, but died onelyonly for his Elect. For, To procure a Benefit on a Condition that is impoſſible, is all one, as to procure no Benefit at all.

3. There is ſufficient light by the Goſpel, or by other means from within and without, to inſtruct all men, ſo that if they be not wanting to that Light, they may be ſaved: And thus are we to make good this Truth, God will have all to be ſaved, if they will of themſelves; which yet doth not hinder, but he may will the Salvation of ſome more than ſo, that is, not only if they Will of themſelves; but if they Will by his Grace, which he gives, or refuſes to whom he pleaſes.

Cur autem illum adjuvet Deus, illum non adjuvet: Illum tantum, illum non tantum; iſtum illo, illum iſto modo, penes ipſum eſt, & aequitatis tam ſecreta ratio, & excellentia poteſtatis. But why He helps this man, and not that? this man ſo much, and that man not ſo much; this man one way, that man another; we muſt leave it to Him, whoſe Power and Wiſdom is above our reach. De peccatorum meritis & remiſſione, l. 2. c. 5.

I know indeed, The Scripture ſpeaks ordinarily of a Cannot; but there is a Cannot which denotes an Impoſſibility, and a Cannot which denotes an Indiſpoſition onelyonly. In the Parables, the Steward ſays be cannot digg; and the Man in Bed, he cannot riſe. In the ſame ſenſe the Scripture ſays, We cannot come to Chriſt, unleſs we be Drawen: and we cannot learn to do well, that are accuſtomed to do evil. When a man is ſo diſpoſed againſt any thing, as that he certainly never will do it under that diſpoſition, it is common for us to ſay he cannot; as of the Idle perſon, we ſay, he cannot work; of the Abſtemious, he cannot drink. The Scripture accommodates it ſelf to our Language: He that is born of God, cannot ſin, ſayes the Apoſtle: That is, he is under that diſpoſition p. 11through the New Nature, that he can no more find in his heart to live in any deliberate courſe of ſin, than the Wicked can endure to come up to an Univerſal unreſerved Reſignation of himſelf unto God. Thus are we to underſtand ſuch Texts. St. Auguſtine, I remember, in the book laſt quoted, which he perſues, De ſpiritu & litera, is very wary of denying a Poſſibility to a man, even of living without ſin, when he is induſtriouſly proving that none in Earth but do ſin; and there are ſome learned Divines ſtand much on this, that we have our faculties, and the object ſufficily propoſed; and therefore a Natural Power to every thing which is our duty. But the Father is more cautious, who diſtinguiſhes between what we can do by Nature, and what by Grace: Without me, ſayes Chriſt, ye can do nothing; and through Him, ſayes the Apoſtle, I am able to do all things. By Grace he thinks it ſafeſt to hold that Poſſible, which by Nature, or to our bare natural ſtrength and faculties, he doubts-not to count Impoſſible. There is a medium therefore between both. They that dare ſay, If it be the duty of a man that is without Grace, to live perfectly, it is poſſible; or, That it is in the power of man, in the ſtate of Nature, without Grace, to keep all Gods Commandements, and live without ſin, becauſe it is his Duty, are too boyſterous on the one hand; for, Auguſtine does manifeſtly account this to be the extreameſt Pelagianiſm; and the Father, I count, in framing this diſtinction for this purpoſe, is too tender on the other. It is true, a man hath his Natural Faculties, and the Object may be revealed, but theſe faculties are corrupt and unſutable to the object. There is Nature then, and corrupt Nature. The Scripture ſpeaks of Man as he is; and that is impoſſible to Falne Nature, which to Original Nature was poſſible. The Law it ſelf nevertheleſs, being founded in Gods Nature, and Man as Created after his Image; is unchangable, and cannot ceaſe to require of all men, what it did at firſt of Adam, when given in Innocency. It is the duty conſequently of every body, whether he hath Grace, or hath not, To keep this perfect Law of our Maker entire; but we are not to affirm it to be Poſſible, or within the power of any whatſoever. No certainly, ſeeing the Scripture tells us ſo often, and ſo flatly, that, By the deeds of the Law, no fleſh living ſhall be juſtified: Seeing there is no man but is born in original ſin, which he cannot p. 12help; and the Apoſtle calls Concupiſcence, ſin; and ſeeing the Grace of God, or the Spirit, is not given to any for their fulfilling the Law ef Works, but the Law of Grace (which is a point not conſidered on by Auguſtine, I take it, and moſt others), we muſt chooſe rather to ſay that the whole duty indeed of man, according to the Law of Works, (take it together) is Impoſſible; for, ſo does the Apoſtle, I account, intend in that expreſſion, foreign. That is as much as to ſay, The Law in that, through the weakneſs of the fleſh, none is able to perform it, cannot poſſibly juſtifie any. The impoſſibility lying on us in regard to the performance, not in it. True, it were poſſible through ſuch an extraordinary meaſure of the Spirit as the Man-Chriſt had (not to leave Auguſtine quite), but that meaſure being not to be given to any body elſe, it is beſt ſaid, to be Impoſſible, even by the ſtrength of Nature, & by Grace (according to its ordinary meaſure on Earth) Impoſſible; when yet, as for the terms of the Law of Faith, I hold it fit ſtill, to ſay, they are Poſſible to all; though there is none do perform them, but by Grace.

Upon this, there is one thing needs muſt yet be ſpoken to, for it hath ſtuck ſome time upon my ſelf. It is this; when Auguſtine is telling us that Faith is in our power, he offers us this Reaſon, Becauſe a man may believe, or not believe, he accounts what he will. Hoc quiſque in poteſtate habere dicitur, quod, ſi vult, facit; ſi non vult, non facit. Vide nunc utrum quiſquam credat ſi noluerit, aut non credat ſi voluerit. That every man is ſaid to have in his power, which, if he will, he does; and, if he will not, he does not. Conſider now, whether there be any that believe if they will not, or do not believe if they will. The contrary to this I judg is certain, that there are ſome things I cannot believe though I would, and ſome things that I cannot but believe, though I would not never ſo fain. From whence I ſhould oppoſe therefore that Faith then, whatſoever elſe is, cannot be in mans Power, no more than it is of his own Will. For ſatisfaction to which, I acknowledg that there are Doctrines or Propoſitions which are true, that many a man cannot believe if he will; nay perhaps ſome Articles that the Ancients have impoſed as neceſſary to Salvation. I ſay, I acknowledg that a man cannot make himſelf to believe what he will, nor otherwiſe than he does believe; nevertheleſs, I do apprehend that that-Faith, p. 13which is the condition of the covenant of grace is indeed in mans power. I apprehend that whereas the conditions of the Covenant of grace are, and muſt be, ſuch as are poſſible, there is no man who believes as much as he can; but his will ſhall be accepted for whatſoever is required more, which he cannot, and which is not given. Or elſe we had a good have bin left ſtill to the covenant of works. The condition then of the Covenant of grace, or thoſe …erms which remain of neceſſity of ſalvation, does not lye in an aſſent to every doctrine and article which is true in the Chriſtian religion, but to ſo much as ſerves to bring a man unto Chriſt, or unto God, Without faith it is impoſſible to pleaſe God, for he that comes unto him muſt beleeve that he is, and that he is a rewarder of them that diligently ſeek him. And ſuch a faith as this, will the light of Nature inſtruct every man to. Though where the Goſpel is preached, the beliefe of Chriſt alſo, in his perſon, offices, word, and works, will and muſt neceſſarily follow, ſeeing, To whom much is given, of him ſhall much be required. Ye beleeve in God, beleeve alſo in mee. Ʋnleſs ye beleeve I am he, ye ſhall dye in your ſins. Now, let us bring that faith a man has to the teſt. If my beleeving of God, or Chriſt, that he will be good to me if I repent, does produce this repentance, then is my faith ſaving and effectual: if it do not, then is the fault in my will. When it lyes on my will then, it is in my power: yet if I will I muſt hold it to be ſtill of the grace of God. Huc valere debet tota Dei notitia (ſayes Calvin), ut omne bonum ab illo petere, & illi acceptum ferre diſcamus. To this purpoſe does the whole knowledge of God which is taught us in Scripture conduce, that we ſhould learne to ſeek all our good at his hands, and live in the return of our thank-fulneſs to him.

When God made man, he muſt know the end of his work He muſt foreſee what man will do, what his poſterity will do, all that they will do, the end of all. When God foreſees the actions of man, it muſt be conceived in the order of nature that they will be, before he foreſees them: and, if they will be, they muſt have ſome cauſe, and that cauſe muſt depend on the firſt Cauſe, and ſo all be reſolved into God's will. It is true, that he foreſees alſo what is poſſible as well as future: but a thing is poſſible only, becauſe he will it not; & future becauſe he wills it. I ſay not, that this inferrs a Phyſical determinate influx into every act of man, which, proceeding from his p. 14free will is ſometimes good and ſometimes evill: it is ſufficient that there is ſuch a complexion of circumſtances provided, as that a vaga moralis infallibilitas, a morall indetermined certainty as to the event, ſhall ariſe out of the whole together, according to his eternal counſel. As for ſin or evill; it is a defect of Entity or good, a privative no poſitive thing, and ſo is of our ſelves, and not of Him, as Auguſtine againſt the Manichees, and the Schools after him have it. What followes now upon this, but that there is not an act of a mans whole life, or will, ſo farre as either ſub genere Entis, or ſub genere Morum it is good, but it muſt be of God.

And what then is there to mate that Father's doctrine of Election, as it is laid on this fonndation? Let us give the mind its greateſt liberty. One may think. As there are ſome things which are not poſſible, & it is no derogation to Gods power to ſay he cannot do them: ſo may there be ſome things non ſcibilia, not knowable, & it ſhall not derogate from his Omniſciency to ſay he foreknows not them. Such things as are left altogether to the will of a free agent, may be thought ſuch. There are ſome things depend on mans will, which God determines; and here hee foreknows mens wills, becauſe he knowes as well as does, whatſoever he will: and there are ſome things depend on mans will which we are to conceive that he determines not, but will have contingent; and here to make God ſuch a one as that he muſt foreſee every thing whether he will or no, and that a contingent to him ſhall be impoſſible though he would have a contingent, does ſeem to be an affront to his Majeſtie, rather than a perfection. To this purpoſe we read that when God ſaw that the thoughts of mans heart were evill continually, it is ſaid it repented him that he made man. And we have many expreſſions of the like import. O that my people had bin thus and thus, or would be thus and thus! Thou art a gracious God, and mercifull, ſlow to anger, and of great kindneſs, and repenteſt thee of the evill. And why may we not frame our notion of God from ſuch texts of Scripture as theſe, as well as from others, and rather than from the definition of the Schools? Eſpecially if we can make God more lovely to our ſelves & more adorable, than by their conceptions. There is nothing that God does will now, but what he did decree always. And why ſo? Becauſe, the Schools ſay, there will elſe be compoſition in God, the compoſition of an eſſence and accident, p. 15and God is a pure act, & ens ſimpliciſſimum. But what if the Conceptions of thoſe holy men, who would have God like to man in regard of the Scripture expreſſions (wherein they were ſo zealous, as we have a famous Eccleſiaſtical ſtory about it), ſhould not be ſo injurious on one hand to the Almighty, as ſuch Conceptions as theſe on the other, which do quite puzzle our Intellectuals, and leave us without any quick ſenſe at all of him? It is certain that God is Good, Righteous, Ʋnchangeable: but we muſt have a Conception of goodneſs, righteouſneſs and unchangeableneſs, and that which is agreeable to that herein, which we eſteem perfections in our ſelves, before we attribute them to him. When we make God then to be always gracious to thoſe that do well, and diſpleaſed with evil, and ſo brings, or determines to bring a Judgment on one, and beſtows a Bleſſing on another, according as he ſees at the preſent the Provocation of the one, and Obedience of the other, without any other determination before, beſides that of his Law; why is not this an Ʋnchangeableneſs, more worthy the Divine Excellence, than that, by which he being conceived a pure act, muſt be made never to will any thing elſe, than what he wills at once from all Eternity?

Upon the like Hypotheſis as this, one may alſo propoſe a ſutable notion of Praedeſtination. To wit, that the Scripture being skanned to the bottom, Election perhaps may be found indeed nothing elſe but Gods determination to ſave Men and Women by the Covenant of Grace, and not by the Covenant of our Greation, or by the Righteouſneſs of God declared in the Goſpel, and not by the Righteouſneſs of Works. This definition ſhould be founded on ſuch Texts, where the purpoſe of God, according to Election, is ſaid to be not of Works, but of him that calleth. And He hath called us not according to our works, but according to his purpoſe and Grace. It ſhould be founded alſo on the inſtances of Iſaack and Jacob, in whom the Children of the Promiſe are Elected, in oppoſition to the Children of the fleſh; that is, thoſe that look for Juſtification by the deeds of the Law. And thus have we the example of the Jews rejection upon that account. And thus when a Phariſee hath lived ſo Righteouſly, that as to the whole Law he is blameleſs, and ſo truſts to his Righteouſneſs, ſhall ſay, And why am I rejected for all this, and ſuch a Publican onelyonly for his repenting and truſting on the mercy of God, through Chriſt is accepted? p. 16it may be anſwered, the reaſon is plain, becauſe it is God that makes the difference, by decreeing and appointing what terms he pleaſes, upon which one ſhall be ſaved, and not another. Hath not the Potter power over his Clay, of what ſort he will, to make Veſſels of honour and diſhonour? ſo that it is not of him that Willeth, or Runneth; it is not upon ſuch terms as a man himſelf ſets, or would ſet, of works; but it is of Grace, of him that ſheweth mercy. Well! But what would be the Conſequent of ſuch Doctrine as this? Why the Conſequent, no doubt, muſt be the ſame in effect with the Pelagian, which is Ʋniverſal Grace, and Free will to purpoſe. But I confeſs my ſelf to have imbibed the Doctrine of St Auguſtine from my younger years, that I am convinced by it, believing that nothing can be ſet up againſt it with any ſtrength, which is ſhort of Vorſtius; while Pelagius and Vorſtius both, are names we know that do ſo male audire, Are of ſuch ill report in the Church, as the Arminians themſelves will not bear. For our apprehenſions then of God, according to the Schools, it muſt be acknowledged, that he is ſaid in holy Scripture, to dwell in the Clouds and thick darkneſs; and into ſuch darkneſs, or thoſe Clouds, will I account indeed that he is put, while he is made to be actus purus, and wrapt in their notions, which if they ſerved no other, they do yet ſerve this end; even moſt reverendly and exceedingly to hide him from us, and render him thereby, but as he is, very truly incomprehenſible to us.

To reflect then back on the difficulty before, as to the Conſequent of Election our way, if any ſay they are not ſatisfied with what I have ſaid, becauſe a power never produced into act, is as good as none. I anſwer, if I propoſe that which they would have, and it be all can be had, there is a meaſure in things, which when we have ſet in any point ſo, as the Determination cannot be paſſed, but we ſhall run into the extreams on one ſide, or the other, which we ſeek to avoid, we ought to be ſatisfied. Eſpecially when ſuch a power alone as this, which in the effect, without Grace, is none, will do our work. If we allow not a power to man, how ſhall God be juſt, how ſhall God condemn any (which is that lyes at bottome ſtill of of what is ſaid) for not doing that which was not in his power, or which was not poſſible? If when a man hath Power, he does alſo exert that power, and wills of himſelf; how ſhall ſuch Scriptures p. 17be true which have been urged? It is God that makes us to differ. Of him we have the Will and the Deed: Nay, ſuch Texts more eſpecially, as ſpeak expreſly of a Cannot, when the true intent and meaning of them is this, that we do not, and never will (as I have had it before) till God prevents us by his effectual Grace. Without Chriſt we can do nothing. All our ſufficiency is of God: No man can come to him unleſs he be drawen. Si non eſt liberum arbitrium quomodo Deus judicabit mundum? Si eſt liberum arbitrium, quomodo ſalvabit mundum? If man have not Free-will, how ſhall God judg him? If he have, how ſhall he ſave him? This is the difficulty of the Father. If then there be ſuch a liberum arbitrium to be found out, which quodam modo is ſine libero arbitrio, ſuch a power, as in the effect is no power; that is, ſuch as without Grace (which alſo is efficacious) comes to nothing, then can we decide this buſineſs for him. Suppoſe a Magiſtrate for ſome fault ſhall cut off a Malefactors hands, and then command him to write, and promiſe him great things if he will, and threaten him if he do not write, can we think this Magiſtrate ſerious? Is this becoming a righteous and good man? If you grant not man to have power, why do you Preach? why do you Exhort? If you will give him more than this (I muſt perſiſt), why do you Pray? why do you ask Grace of God? what is it to ask his Grace, but that God would incline the will? Alunt quorſum vocare hominem ad praeſtandam conditionem quam implere nequeat? It is objected, why are men called to that condition they cannot perform? Reſpondeo, poſſe, & non poſſe eam implere. Non poſſunt niſi datur poſſe poſſunt tamen quia quod non poſſunt, pravitati eorum debetur. I anſwer (ſayes Conyer), They cannot, if it were not given (that which is onelyonly of Nature is given), but they can, becauſe it is to be attributed to their wickedneſs alone, that they cannot. They can, and they cannot, Thus others ſay: They can, and they wont I ſay. OnelyOnly in regard this wont is never changed in any, but by ſpecial Grace; the Scripture (I have ſaid) calls it a can't. That is, it is a can in it ſelf, but a can't in the effect; it being in effect all one when you never will, as if you could not. What? when the Scripture ſayes, they can't, do I then ſay, they can? yes, becauſe my can, and never will (I affirm) is the Scriptures can't. But there are ſome of you believe not. Therefore I p. 18ſaid unto you, that no man can come unto me, except it be given him. Some of you, notwithſtanding all my Preaching and Miracles, believe not; therefore I ſaid unto you, you can't. And this interpretation (I muſt adde) accords with the Ancients. Non potuerunt, hoc eſt noluerunt. It a nonnunquam poteſtate pro voluntate utitur. Chryſoſtome on Jo. 12.39. So Auguſtine. Non poterant quia nolebant, quippe eorum voluntatem praevidit Deus. Hoc autem quod dicit, non potuerunt credere, ſignificat, noluerunt. Nam malus & improbus homo non poteſt credere quam diu talis fuerit, mala ſcilicet eligent & volens Thophylact. Mundus odiſſe vos non poteſt, & Quomodo poteſtis bona loqui cum ſitis mali? Quo pacto quidquam horum impoſſibile eſt, niſi quod voluntas repugnat? Nazienzen. Impoſſibile dicitur quod, rariſſime contingit, according to one, quod difficilime per ficitur according to another. See Ruiz on that head, Impoſſibilitatem bene operandi Patres abhorrent, etiam quamdiu illam ſonat expreſſe cortex Scripturae. Ad queſt 23, & 24. Ex parte prima S. Thomae. Diſp. 39. Sec. 8.

And here I cannot but inſert the mention of a late Diſcourſe about Natural and Moral Impotency, or Natural and Ethical power, which terms do expreſs this can and cannot with ſo much dexterity, though my ſelf uſe them not, becauſe my Papers were on the Anvil before that book came out. And there is ſomthing therefore, I find, I have already, and after, puts me in mind of two things I want in that ſingular pretty Tract. One is, a little more tenderneſs in that inculcated aſſertion. The more moral Impotency, the more inexcuſable. I believe the Author was himſelf of a healthfull mind, and not ſenſible of thoſe imbred inclinations, and ſicklineſs which ſome ſoul are born with, & no ſtrivings againſt it will utterly ſubdue, till death. There are beſides certain impreſſions and wounds ſometimes on the imagination that are incurable. I do not doubt now, but God, who is moſt wiſe and good, who knoweth our frame (as the Pſalmiſt ſpeaks), and remembreth we are but Duſt, will conſider the ſeveral Conditions, Complexions, and Temptations that every man is obnoxious to in this life; and that there will be grains of allowance for ſome moral Impotency at the laſt day. Non ſine magna noſtra utilitate relinquitur nobis materia certaminum ut humilietur ſanctitas dum pulſatur inſirmitas. It is not without our great benefit, that God does leave in his Children, matter p. 19for their ſpiritual Combat, that they may be humbled in their Piety, while they are aſſaulted with their infirmity. Ambroſe. De vocatione gentium. The other thing I want, is, a diſtinction in regard to that principle of his, and indeed foundation, which he inſiſts ſo much upon throughout the book. That which is our duty muſt be poſſible. It is certain that perfection is ſtill our duty; and it is enough for us onelyonly to make whatſoever is neceſſary to our Salvation to be in our power. Diſtinguiſh we muſt therefore between the Law of Works, and the Covenant of Grace. We are indeed to maintain the condition of the one to be poſſible for good reaſon; but as for what is required in the other, though it be ſtill our duty, and muſt remain ſo eternally (for Good and Evil according to Nature, can never be changed), we are not to deny in our falne ſtate, to be impoſſible. Which hath been before Noted.

To return, There is a point near a kinn to the matter in hand, of great difficulty, what part the will of man does bear in our good acts. That the beginning of all that is good, comes from God, who by his preventing Graee, works in us at firſt (as the Schools ſpeak) without us; and, That when the will is excited, he does work alſo with us, by his operating, or co-operating Grace, as the principal cauſe ſtill, and conſequently, That the whole good which is done, upon that account, is to be attributed to him, we ſhall find yeilded by the School men, as well as tendred by St. Auguſtine, Proſper, Fulgentius, and the like Fathers. Totum bonum eſt Deo tribuendum, quia totum Dens operatur. See Ruiz. De Deo operante; & libero arbitrio, Sec. 1. On the other hand, That being acted, we act, and ſo concur with Gods Grace; That it is we Believe, Repent, and not God: We that work out our Salvation, though he gives the will and the deed: We who walk in his Statutes, though he puts his fear in our hearts to do it: and ſo We accordingly, who are bid to make our ſelves new hearts, which is his work out of queſtion; this is alſo undeniable in Scripture. Deus eſt qui operatur—cum procul dubio, ſi homo ratione utatur, non poſſit credere, ſperare, diligere, niſi velit: nec pervenire ad palmam, niſi voluntate cucurrerit. It is God works in us, when beyond doubt, there is no man uſes his Reaſon, but it is himſelf alſo that wills. Aug. Enchir. c. 32. Ʋt velimus, & ſuum eſſe voluit & noſtrum, ſuum vocando, noſtrum ſequendo, in another book. It p. 20is God then according to the determination of the ſchools, that is the principal cauſe, and the will of man the leſs principal, partiall, ſecundary cauſe, of our good actions. His part indeed is ſuch to which all the glory is due, and yet ours ſuch as the good works are reckoned ours, and we ſhall be rewarded for them at the laſt day. When Calvin therefore ſeems here to oppoſe, I find him thus treated. Supponebat haereticus hominis arbitrium itae divina praedeſtinatione regi, ut quamvis operetur ſpontanee, nihil tamen agat ciun poteſtate non agendi, ſed agatur Dei operatione, That heritick Calvin (ſaies the now named learned Jeſuit out of Stapleton) ſuppoſed the free will of man to be ſo governed by praedeſtination, that though it does act ſpontaneouſty, yet it acts not with a power of not acting, but it is acted by the operation of God. Well! what is the difference between them? Does Calvin indeed go to evacuate that free-will man hath by nature? no ſuch matter. Does he make the will to act ſo by Gods operation, as to have no operation of its own? I think not ſo. But I will tell you where the water ſticks. It ſticks between the Schools and Calvin, where it does between the Arminians and Calviniſts, and that is upon the point altogether of reſiſtibility or irreſiſtibility. The work of grace is underſtood by Calvin and the Calviniſts to be ſuch, as leaves not any power in the will to reſiſt, or of not acting. They doe ſtand ſo much on the bare term of Gods drawing us, as it leads them to ſpeak with exceſs. The truth therefore is to be thus decided. We are to hold with the Schools and Arminians, that the will hath ſtill power to reſiſt, or not to act, for mans nature is deſtroyed elſe: but we are to hold with the Calviniſt, that though it hath power, it never will, or does reſiſt, but will moſt certainly act, when it is acted by Gods electing grace. As in the caſe before of the Reprobate (I have ſaid), a man hath Power to beleeve, and repent, ſo that it is his fault, and he is juſtly condemned, if he do not, when yet he never will, for want of this grace: So in the caſe of the Elect, a man hath power to reſiſt, and not to act, but he will beleeve and repent infallibly, and never reſiſt, when he is wrought upon by it. The reaſon is, becauſe God by his praedeſtination of ſuch a perſon to life, does prepare a Vocation ſo Fit, and ſuited to his temper, condition, and the circumſtances he is in, as it ſhall inevitably carry the will (which by the way does reconcile p. 21the Certainty of the one, with the Liberty of the other, according to St. Auguſtine's intention), when the ſame means ſhall be uſed to a perſon not elect, but being not ſuited to his ſtate, they have no ſuch event: Even as the ſame phyſick given to two bodys diverſly diſpoſed, hath an operation upon one, and does the other no good. In ſhort, the grace of God is reſiſtible with the Arminians, in regard of power: it is irreſiſtible with the Calviniſts, in regard of the effect. The will does ever retain its Phyſical power to act, or not act; when yet it is made Ethically impotent (to uſe once the Authour before) to reſiſt. Quisquis andet dicere, habeo ex me ipſo fidem, non ergo accepi, profecto contradicit apertiſſimae veritati: non quia credere vel non credere non eſt in arbitrio voluntatis, ſed in electis praeparatur voluntas a domino. If any dare ſay I have faith of my ſelf, and therefore did not receive it, he does for certain contradict the truth. Not becauſe that to believe or not beleeve is not in the power of the will, but in the Elect the will is prepared of God. Aug. De Praedeſ. Sanc. c. 5. We may add St. Ambroſs (or Proſper rather). Qui ad obediendum ſibi ipſum velle ſic donat, ut etiam a perſeveraturis illam mutabilitatem, quae poteſt nolle, non auferat. In one of his two books, De vocatione gentium.

The ſumm is, where a man beleeves, repents, and is converted, the difference is made between him and the reprobate. This is acttuall, or created praedeſtination. Man concurrs in this work: nevertheleſs, in regard that it is not through his own ſtrength, or through that grace which is univerſal, or common to the Reprobate with the Elect, but through that grace which is peculiar and prepared by increated predeſtination for him, it is not of himſelf, but of God, that he is made to differ. And if it be granted, that it is in his power to hinder the difference, while grace is making of it, ſeeing it is in his power ſtill not to act: but yet be aſſerted alſo, that the decree working infallibly, carrys the will, that it never is, or ſhall be hindered when that works: I do not ſee but this controverſie about Gods operation, and mans free will, may be agreed. How is it ſaid (ſayes Auguſtine), it is not of him that willeth or runneth, but of God that ſheweth mercy? If it were to be underſtood onelyonly becauſe it is of both, then might we ſay it is not of God likewiſe that ſheweth mercy, but of him that willeth and runs. But when no Chriſtian dare ſay ſo, it remains (ſayes he) to be ſo p. 22underſtood, Ʋt totum Deo detar, qui homini voluntatem bonam & praeparat adjuvandam, & adjuvat praeparatam; That the whole be given to God, who both fits the will for his help, & then helps it, being made fit. Enchiridion ad Laurentium, c. 32.

As for the way of the Papiſts, that is, which the Trent Councel does tread, it ſeems to me verily an invented, forced way. They would avoid the cenſure of Auguſtine, and former Councels which condemned Pelagius, yet in effect do entend but the ſame thing. They ſay, therefore, that God does vouchſafe his grace to all; with this grace ſome co operate, and ſome do not. Thoſe that will co-operate with it God fore-ſees, and praedeſtinates them: thoſe that co-operate not, he rejects and condemns. By this means they will avoid making their own works to be the cauſe of their Election, ſeeing they can attribute all to this ſufficient aſſiſtance; when yet the conſequent of their opinion comes to one, that it muſt lye in the will of man which co operates, or co-operates not with this aſſiſtance, to make the difference, why one is choſen and ſaved, and not the other. That which is ſaid by the Pelagian, placing Grace only in Doctrine, or the Goſpel, is more ſingle I take it than this. It is true, there are ſome others beſides the Papiſts, are willing to hold Election to be of Works, or of Faith foreſeen, who will yet deny the Conſequent, that our Faith, and and good Works therefore muſt ariſe from our own free wills, and be meritorious; becauſe they will ſuppoſe them ſo foreſeen, (which the Papiſt I ſuppoſe ſay too) as to be wrought in us, or performed by Gods grace. But let me ask then, what they mean by this Grace? If they mean ſuch as in effectual, and determins the will, and ſo is peculiar to the Elect, Lo here the Doctrine of abſolute Election: If, they mean ſuch only as leaves the will in aequilibrio, to be determined ſtill of it ſelf, then the matter returns to the former iſſue. I will therefore cloſe up this point of Election with the obſervation of that very judicious perſon that wrote the Councel of Trent. who having ſet down the debate of the Doctors about it, and divided them into two opinions, which comes in effect (without reciting the whole) to the tenents of abſolute and conditional Election, he gives us his judgment. The firſt Opinion (ſayes he) which is Auguſtines, as it is myſtical and hidden, keeping the mind humble, and relying on God without any confidence p. 23in it ſelf; knowing the deformity of Sin, and excellency of Divine Grace: So was the ſecond plauſible, and popular, cheriſhing Humane Preſumption, and making a great ſhew; and it pleaſed more the Preaching Fryers, than the Ʋnderſtanding Divines. The Defenders of this, uſing Humane reaſons, prevailed againſt the others: But coming to the Teſtimonies of Scripture, they were manifeſtly evercom. I deſcend not to the more minute Diſputations, De praedeterminatione phyſica, between the Dominicans, and Franciſcans; or De ſcentia media, among the Jeſuits, which are of lower date (I count) in the World, and ought not to make us trouble. I leave alſo the Janſeniſt and Moliniſt to that Bone; Haec praedeſtinatio Sanctorum nihil aliud eſt quam praeſcientia ſcilicet, & praeparatio beneficiorum Dei, quibus certiſſime liberantur quicunque liberantur. This Predeſtination of the Saints, is nothing elſe but the Fore-knowledge, and Preparation of thoſe Benefits of God, whereby they are moſt certainly ſaved, that are ſaved. Aug. De bono, perſ. c. 14.

There are two Opinions yet I ſhall mention, which are ſingular; I do not think them true, yet am I pleaſed with any intent for compoſing the Scripture. The one is that, aſcribed to Catarinus at Trent, to Occam, and others; That there are indeed ſome few Perſons, who are Elected Abſolutely; of theſe God takes a ſpecial care that they never fail; as we read of Peter: But that the reſt of Mankind are left to univerſal Grace, and the liberty of their wills, under a Conditional Election, and Reprobation. The other is an Opinion of a Learned Doctor of another Profeſſion, very Studious of the Holy Writings; who is often telling me when I ſee him, That, Election is only to a Church-State, and peculiar Priviledges: But that we read of a Common Salvation.