A Case of Conscience of a Non-Conformist, Text 3
The Diſſertation.
THe Diſcourſe of Eccleſiaſtical Polity came to my hand within two or three days after it came abroad; I kept it by me about juſt a week, and then carried the preceding Animadverſions to the Preſs, to come out with the firſt ſheet: But how many weeks it may be ere they be printed, I know not: In the mean while, I think good to prepare two or three more, in regard of one ſubject, which is ſo neceſſary to be adjoyned, that it lies at the bottom of all our buſineſs. That is, Concerning the Power of the Civil Magiſtrate, in Religious Affairs. I muſt confeſs I have ſome Papers by me, beſides thoſe againſt the Friendly Debate, which are not controverſal and contentious; but healing, and tending to peace: The Original Deſign whereof, was, for Moderation on both ſides; to wit, For Condeſcention on the part of Authority towards Tender Conſciences, and for ſubmiſſion on the part of the Subject, (ſo far as every one can) to what is eſtabliſhed. I ſhall leave thoſe Papers perhaps but the more entire in their proper matter, and yet ſupply my ſelf here out of ſome former years thoughts for this preſent occaſion.
Indeed the power of the Supreme Magiſtrate in things Religious, is a buſineſs of great Concern, and aſſured Difficulty. That the Church is to be govern'd by thoſe Officers whom God hath ſet in it, appears reaſonable. That ſuch are Apoſtles, Paſtors and Teachers, unto whom the Keys are committed and not the Sword, cannot be denied. That when there is no formal power then at all in the Magiſtrate over the Church of Chriſt, there is ſome Superintendent inſpection nevertheleſs belonging to him, as Epiſcopus foreign in Eccleſiaſtical Affairs, the Example of the good Kings in the Old Teſtament, and Conſtantine under the times of the New, and the Confeſſions of all Churches, will allow. That in the exerciſe of this external objective power, which he hath in the Church, he is not to be a blind Executor onelyonly of the Biſhops will, in putting a Sanction on their Canons, and enforcing the obſervance, without having the Book of the Law delivered to him, and conſequently a Judgement of Diſcretion, whether they be agreeable to the Rule of Gods Word, and condition of his People, the conſonant Judgement of Proteſtants will aſſert on all hands. Now then when the Magiſtrate hath ſomething to do, and not all to do in theſe Affairs, how, or how far this Authority of his, is to be maintained or ſtated, that it intrench not on the Liberty of Conſcience, which is due to his Chriſtian Subjects, (as peculiar and ſacred to God) is the Attempt, I perceive, of ſome late Papers bearing that Title; The Arguments whereof (eſpecially as to the Nations Intereſt) I have already praiſed: The ſtate of the Queſtion I judge alſo, to be tendered with much Ingenuity and Reaſon; but when they come to the very point where I expect their notion fixt, that I might ſet my foot upon it, and ſtand faſt, I find the ground methinks ſinking away from its Foundation.
Let us conſult Common Places on that head De Magistrata, and we ſhall find theſe are made two Queſtions by Divines: Whether the Magistrate is to TAKE CARE of Religion? Whether he is to COMPEL HIS SƲBJECTS to it? And when the former is granted generally from that Text, Deut. 17, 18. and that Tenet, That he is Custos utrinſque Tabutae; the latter is denied, yet with Caution. Diſtinguiſh (ſay they) between Cogere ad fidem, and i…terdicere exercitio in heterodoxia. Poſterius ad evitandum corruptionem & ſcandala competit Magiſtratui. Diſtinguiſh again of a Commonwealth or Kingdom, free or not free from divers Religions. Ibi cavendae, hic tolerandae, ſed cum conditione ne publica Religionis exercitia heterodoxis facile concedantur: By this little, we ſee a door open for Chriſtian Prudence to be let in to the deciſion of theſe matters, which being guided by the Light of Univerſal Nature, and the General Rules of Scripture, muſt needs make very much way for variety of Judgement and Practiſe in the Caſe.
To ſtate theſe matters then a little, which our purpoſe requires.
The Civil Magiſtrate (ſays the Apoſtle) is the Miniſter of God for our good: The Souls good is the beſt good. Ea eſt optima Reſpublica, with Ariſtotle; Ex cujus inſtituto quiſ que optimè & beatiſſime vivat. As Religion makes Folks be… Subjects, and beſt men, it makes them moſt happy, having the Promiſes of this Life, with a better. The inſtitution of the Magiſtrate upon this Account appears to be for this End, That the People may lead peaceable Lives under him, in all Godlineſs as well as Honesty. It is not conſequently for us here to imagine, that the Magiſtrates Authority does extend onelyonly to Civil Things, but to take a care of Sacred alſo, and to ſee the Will of God to be executed in both. Im…atores ſacra & ſaecularia ex aequo curant; ſin ad ſingula veniatur, fatendum eſt anguſtius eſſe jus imperii circa ſacra quam circa profana, bac una ratione, quod Lex divina de ſacris plura conſtituat, & libertati eximat, quam de caeteris rebus. To this purpoſe we muſt know that Actions or Things, quae ſubjacont humano imperio, are either ſuch as are determined and neceſſary, being commanded or forbidden of God; or ſuch as are indifferent, being left undetermined by him. In Things or Actions which God hath forbidden or commanded, that is, which he hath determined, to wit, either by the Law of Nature, or Divine poſitive Inſtitution, the Duty of the Magiſtrate does lie in removing Obſtacles, adminiſtring Helps, and withdrawing Occaſions of the ſin; but his Power preciſely does lie in ſuper-adding a new Obligation to that of Gods, and by the ſanction and infliction of puniſhments, to inforce unto the Duty. And ſo is he a Keeper onelyonly of the two Tables, having no Right of changing a Tittle of Gods Will. In things left indifferent, and not determined by God, that is, in things which are neither written in the mind of Man, nor Gods Word, Haec ſive ſacra, ſivè profana ſint, determinare in alteram partem Jus eſt ſummae poteſtatis; The Magiſtrate hath Power here, and Liberty; Liberty to determine, and Power thereby to change ſuch things into lawful and unlawful, according as he requires or prohibits them for the ſpiritual or temporal good of his people; and the effects of that Command or Prohibition, are Obligation and Coercion.
This premiſed, the ingenuous Papers before mentioned, after they have endeavoured to ſhew the extremity of three Opinions about the Magiſtrates power in Religions Things; In ſome that make him the ſole Judge of all Matters Spiritual and Temporal; In others, that affirm the like power, but to be exerciſed in Spirituals, in a perfect ſubſerviency to the Church; In a third, that make him have nothing to do but in Civil Matters onelyonly, (wherein, if that Truth rather, which lies contained in thoſe extream Opinions, as omne falſum in nititur vero, ſhould be diſcovered, (inſtead of their bare rejection) and laid well together, the moſt mature account of the Magiſtrate, in reference to this point, were I think to be given) they bring the whole to this iſſue, That the Magistrate is the great Office… … Minister (as the Apoſtle calls him) of God upon Earth, to ſee his Will (which in Religion they count (if I miſapprehend them not) is what alone he hath revealed) to be put in execution. And then for the reſcuing that liberty they would aſſert and keep for the Conſcience, they put in, That under the Goſpel the Magiſtrate muſt do this in the manner alſo that Chriſt hath appointed, and ſo not by the temporal Sword. This is to profeſs a great matter and momentous Truth, but in the fulneſs of the Authors own pious and weighty Conceptions, he hath left his Reader at a perfect loſs of the true account, when we are brought as it were too, almoſt within ken of it. I muſt humbly crave pardon therefore, if I bring a few of my dryer thoughts here, to miniſter to his abundance.
The Office it ſelf of the Magiſtrate is to bear the Sword, and by that to act, or effect what it his to do. Where a Perſon hath no power of Coercion, he acts not as a Magiſtrate, but as another man, as an eminent Member only of the Society; and he that ſayes, He may not uſe the temporal Sword in the concerns of the Goſpel, does upon the matter ſay, That quâ Magiſtrate, he hath nothing to do at all in Religion, which is an acknowledged Errour. What the Will of God then is, we are orderly to enquire here, which the Magiſtrate is to ſee done. It is the Will of God that People ſhould be Converted, that they ſhould Believe, Repent, and be ſaved: And it is his Will that the Goſpel be preached, and his Ordinances attended to that end. It is not to be thought, I ſuppoſe, the Office of the Magiſtrate concerns both theſe alike without diſtinction. If men are not converted, and believe not, he cannot make them do that. But if the Miniſter neglects his duty of Preaching, Catechiſing, Adminiſtring the Sacraments, or Cenſures which Chriſt commands in order thereunto, the Magiſtrate may puniſh him, becauſe herein he hath power, when he cannot adminiſter the Ordinances and Excommunicate any himſelf, wherein he hath none committed to him, Aliud enins eſt imperium circa ſacra, aliud ſacra functio. If the People likewiſe be looſe and prophane, and upon that account come not to Church but neglect God, he may puniſh them for their not coming, which, I hope, is in the concerns of the Goſpel, although if they abſtain only upon doubt, ſcruple, or reaſon of Conſcience, there is difference in the matter. There are therefore the inward or the outward acts of men. When the Magiſtrate is ſaid to be the Miniſter of God, and conſequently to ſee his Will performed, it muſt be underſtood, not ſimply and indefinitely, but reſtrictè, & ſecundum quid, in reference to mens outward acts, and the inward as they are concern'd only in the outward. Neither muſt we confound the diſtinctions of ſacred and civil actions with inward and outward in this place. The power of the Magiſtrate may extend to both in the one, but does not in the other. The inward acts of men are not within his Cognizance, and ſo not under his Juriſdiction. The Government of the Church accordingly is internal, and external. The internal government of it belongs to Chriſt; It is he alone can rule mens hearts. The Magiſtrate can but look to the outward acts; and his kingdom is, when Chriſt's is not, of this world. This external rule again of the Church, or Church-affairs, muſt be diſtinguiſhed into two ſorts; It is one ſort belongs to the Paſtor and Church-guides; and another to the Magiſtrate. For inſtance, the Magiſtrate cannot be ſaid properly to make Cinons (ſayes Bramhal of Schiſm) being preſcribed under pain of Excommunication, and yet can they have no obligation (Grotius ſhews) on the Subjects, but by Empire only. The one is then▪ Eccleſia regimen externum formale; the other, Externum objectivum. The one is, directive, ſwaſory, declarative; The other, Juris conſtitutivum, imperatory, coercive. This I take to be certain, that into whatſoever the Rule of the Magiſtrate extends, his Sword muſt. What he may command, he may compel; that is, he may puniſh if the command be not fulfilled; and where he cannot compel, he cannot command. I ſpeak as to the ſtanding Power, not the Exerciſe, wherein prudence is to direct. It is true, the pious Magiſtrate is to deſire and endeavour the ſalvation of his People; He is to ſeek their good, and the ſpiritual good is beyond their temporal. But he is to do this (I hope) in his ſphere, according to his place, as far only as he can, that is, as far as his Sword will go. His Sword will not reach the inward man: If it would, he might, he ſhould uſe it no doubt to do them good. But ſeeing it will not, he is to ſee then that the ſpiritual Sword be applied, the Word preached, and the Miniſters office executed; and how is he to ſee to that, to cauſe, on enforce that, and the People to attend thereunto, but by the authority of his Sword? To ſay or think then becauſe the Salvation of mens Souls is wrought by God's grace, not by outward force; that is, becauſe the Goſpel is the power of God to that end, and the Weapons are ſpiritual, not carnal, that is able to do this; Therefore the Magiſtrate is not to uſe his Sword in Religious affairs, is (though in ſome ſenſe true, and what in that truth may be ſpoken) in the groſs obnoxious to miſtake through the want of conſideriug what the matter (materia circa quam) of humane Empire is, which is the outward acts of men only (thoſe Religious acts I ſay, as well as Secular, that are outward) and the not diſtinguiſhing in the government of the Church aright, between that which Chriſt hath committed to the Magiſtrate, and what he keeps in his own hands, and executes by his own officers. That which is therefore rather to be ſaid, to build Uniformly on the ſame bottom, I ſuppoſe is this; The Magiſtrate in that Author's notion is God's chief Officer to ſee his revealed Will in the world, and as a Chriſtian Magiſtrate let me ſay, to ſee his will in the Church to be performed. This I take it (underſtanding it as to mens outward acts, and without an excluſive meaning of his determining power in indifferent things) is very well. Now it is the will of God, that every man alwayes in what he acts (though he is not alwayes to act) whether in things Religious or Civil ſhould do according to his Conſcience, ſo far for certain, as never to do againſt it; which he requires of him under thoſe terms, that he ſhall ſin certainly if he does. This is God's will by the light of Nature, by the rule of Scripture, and univerſal Conſent. The Conſcience either is in the Right, and then it is as God to us, it muſt be obeyed, we muſt do according to it, we ought not to be diſturbed by man: Or it is in an Error, and then we muſt not go againſt it, even when we are bound to be informed otherwiſe, and lay down that Error. It is the duty conſequently of the Magiſtrate to ſee that his Subjects be not put upon any thing that is againſt their Conſciences, and that they ſerve God (when it is fit) according to them. If a man goes againſt his Conſcience, I ſay he ſins againſt God, which it is his will he ſhould not do; and how does that man ſee the will of God to be executed, who compels men to that, the contrary whereof is his Will?
There is no need here, to put any difference between thoſe things that do not differ in this point. Let the Magiſtrate under the Goſpel have the ſame power with thoſe (allowing a variety only in their Judicials) under the Law. And whether things are Religious, or Secular, if God hath left them free, and neither preſcribed nor forbidden them, let ſuch be equally at the Magiſtrates determination, with this difference alone, that God hath determined more things certainly (if not all things but Circumſtances only) in Religion, (and ſo exempted them from humane arbitriment) then he hath done in Civil matters. Let the Magiſtrate know farther, That in whatſoever he may Command, his Power is coercive, and his Sword may be uſed (I ſpeak as to the Quod licet, not quid convenit) to cauſe his own, and much more God's Will, to be done. There is nothing of all this does hurt that Liberty I ſtate, and eſtabliſh for the Conſcience, whoſe ſafeguard I place not in any diſtinction in reference to the Magiſtrates power, between things Sacred and Civil, or between what might or ought to be done under the Law, and may not under the Goſpel: but in the moſt holy Anchor of God's ſupream Authority and determination, which overrules the Magiſtrate, who derives from, and muſt not go againſt his Will; nor can command or compel to that which he hath made to be ſin, as the doing any thing againſt Conſcience is. Duo ſunt genera actnum imperil qui ar jus imperantis non pertinent, Deo vetita jubers, Deo juſſa vetare. And unto this is there nothing moreover (that I know of) to be added or replied, but only to decide well (as is intimated from Divines at the firſt) between Reſtraint and Conſtraint, if I may ſo ſpeak; it being one thing I mean how far the Magiſtrate may proceed in reſtraining men of wild Principles that they act nor according to their Conſcience (miſ-inflamed) and another in conſtraining them to do things which are againſt their Conſcience. That the Magiſtrate may proceed in the one, that is to reſtraint upon good reaſon, it appears from hence; becauſe that although God does require every man to act in whatſoever he does according to his Conſcience, yet he requires not that in every thing, which is according to his Conſcience, he ſhould act. His Conſcience may be erroneous, or the thing not expedient, if lawful to be done. Again, the Magiſtrates Conſcience and his are two; He may think he is bound in Conſcience to act (ſuppoſe in preaching Seditious or ſeducing Doctrine) yet if upon reſtraint he acts not, his Conſcience cannot accuſe him of ſin, becauſe he cannot help it, and the Magiſtrates reſtraining him is (according as he believes) good, and thereupon he does it. Now here is nothing contrary to his office, the execution of God's Will (whoſe Miniſter he is) for the man, I ſay, does not break his Will (though his Will be, if he act, he ſhould act according to his Conſcience) becauſe that beſides the thing perhaps is not to be done, he is under reſtraint; and ſo excuſed even to himſelf by the neceſſity: and the Magiſtrate does perform his Will (as he judges) in reſtraining him, becauſe of the evil that would follow if he ſhould ſuffer him. But now in the caſe of Conſtraint, I mean in the conſtraining any to do that which is againſt their Conſcience, that is, manifeſtly againſt the office or work of the Magiſtrate, who being to ſee God's Will performed, does hereby directly endeavour that his Will be not performed. His Will is, that the man ſhould never act againſt his Conſcience whatſoever comes of it, and he is forcing him hereunto.
Here then are there two Queſtions, in thoſe Papers mentioned, propoſed to the life, as the ſum of what could be deſired, if they had but been directly anſwered when propoſed. The one is, How far men must be ſuffered to do thoſe things which they ſay they are in Conſcience obliged to do? The other is, How far they may be commanded and enforced to do ſuch things which they indeed believe, and ſay, they are in Conſcience abliged not to do? The ſubſtance of theſe Queſtions, I perceive that excelling Gentleman takes to be one, and ſo they are paſſed off into his main entendment. But as the putting a difference (I accounted before) as to ſome things which (in relation to what is aſſerted) admits none: So muſt the confounding that here, wherein the difference being put is ſo much to purpoſe, needs lead unto darkneſs. To theſe two Queſtions therefore I anſwer in the ſtead of thoſe Papers. As to the former, I doubt not but men may and ought to be reſtrained oftentimes in many things unto which they think themſelves to be obliged; and my ground for it is given. As to the latter, I humbly do apprehend that in that point alone, the Liberty which theſe ſaid Papers have ſo ingeniouſly contended for, is to be placed: and ſo far an that comes to, the Arguments they have tendred are prevailing. It is not becauſe a man's acts barely are Religious, that I plead an exemption from the Magiſtrate as is ſtill ſaid, but becauſe of his Conſcience: Whether the acts be Religious, Moral, or Civil, the man makes a Conſcience of them, and the Sword cannot reach to the inward-man, or to the Conſcience. It does not me dole we know with mens inward acts at all, and it cannot reach I ſay to compel outward acts againſt the Conſcience, becauſe that were to uſe the Sword againſt God, and the Magiſtrate is the Miniſter of God. But it may reach to hinder or reſtrain outward acts which ſome men are about doing, or think they ought to do according to their Conſciences, becauſe their Conſcience or judgment may deceive them; And either the thing ought a or to be done, or it may not be fit to be done; If it be fit for themſelves, it may not in regard of others, or the publick utility; unto which they are to give place.
Let me yet uſe a few more words (I crave pardon I have uſed ſo many) for while words are onelyonly to make the mind known, I may expreſs my ſelf ill; but no words are enough, though multiplied, till that be done. Where the Conſcience is erroneous, I ſay, Gods will lies in both theſe things, That a man ſhould not do againſt his Conſcience, becauſe it is his Conſcience; and that he ſhould not do according to his Conſcience, becauſe it is erroneous; but that he ſhould lay down his Error, and ſo act. And this is the meaning of that which Divines do ſay, That ſuch a Conſcience does ligare, non obligare. The Magiſtrate accordingly may not compel him to that which is poſitive, to act againſt his Conſcience; but to that which is negative, to wit, not to act according to it. Put a caſe in this point as high as you can any: Suppoſe a man, who is otherwiſe a very conſciencious man, hath imbibed ſuch ill-ſhapen Fifth-Monarchy-Principles, that he cannot own the preſent Powers that are over him, and ſo dare not do any thing, in the doing whereof he ſhall own them; what ſhall the moſt tender Magiſtrate do with ſuch men, unleſs as we do with Wolves and wild Creatures, that is, lock them up that they may do no hurt? I anſwer, The Magiſtrate, I think, cannot compel this Fifth-Monarchy-man to any ſuch actual owning of his Authority, or to any ſuch act whereby he owns him, that does go againſt his Conſcience, (he cannot compel a man to own the true God or Chriſt, contrary to his Light;) but if he act according to his Conſcience, in diſowning the Powers, ſpeaking againſt them, reſiſting or rebelling, he may be puniſhed too, juſtly, upon the ſame reaſon; becauſe though it be Gods will a man ſhould never act againſt his Conſcience, yet it is Gods will too, that he ſhould not act according to it, when it is erroneous and wicked, and for ſo doing, he is puniſhed. The ſum is, The Magiſtrate may not many times uſe his Sword in the Poſitives, when he may in the Negatives of his Commands or Laws, which he exerts and enforces as Gods Miniſter for the putting the Divine Will in execution. And after this, I am very glad methinks, to find the Teſtimony of two ſuch perſons as I do to this Determination. Suſpenſo pede hic incedendum, ut illi lpſi qui Divinae humanae que ordinationi reſiſtunt, non tam cogantur benefacere, quam malefacere prohibeantur; Quae duo in hot ipſo argumento, Magustinus olim (Con. Petil. l. 2. c. 83.) provide diſtinxi…. Grotius de Imp. Cir. ſac. c. 6. ſ. 10.
To draw then to an end. In things agreeable to common Light; and the natural Good of Mankind, this coercive power of the Magiſtrate lies open. In things Religious, whether indifferent or neceſſary, the uſe of the ſame Power appears juſtifiable, upon the ſuppoſition that they are not againſt the Conſciences of thoſe on whom they are impoſed (as the ſervice of the true God we are to ſuppoſe was not againſt any of the Jews Conſciences (or at leaſt in their account was not) when the good Kings in the time of the Law compelled them to it) but if the Magiſtrate be inform'd that any thing either is in its nature, or becomes grievous to the Conſciences of his People, the caſe is alter'd. He may apply other Remedies, as a Chriſtian; but as a Magiſtrate he may not, upon the account declared, compel any body to that, the doing whereof is ſin to him, and ſo againſt Gods will that he ſhould do it. I will adde, Power in the Root (which in my Papers that lie by, is made out) is nothing elſe but Gods will that ſuch a man ſhould command: But in theſe things which God hath prohibited, it is not his will that any ſhould command, and much leſs uſe coercion alſo. Conſequently; if the Magiſtrate command a thing againſt my Conſcience, that Command (at leaſt to me) is void, and without power. Gods Vicegerent within me, my Conſcience, makes his external Voice to ceaſe. So far as his power goes then, we may grant it to be coercive; but in things againſt the Conſcience, he indeed hath not any; who muſt ſay hereof, what Paul ſaid of the Truth, I can do nothing againſt it, but for it, and according to it.
I remember in the Life of Joſephus, when ſome of the Trachonites came in for reſcue to the Jews, where himſelf was Governour, and the Jews would thereupon conſtrain them to be circumcized, or elſe let them not abide with them; he would not permit that injurious Zeal, alledging, That every man ought according to his own Mind, and not by mans compulſion, to ſerve God. In our Engliſh Story (to ſuit this) when Ethelbert the firſt Prince that received Chriſtianity of the Saxon Heptarchy, was converted by Austin, ſent hither by Gregory, and many thereupon came into the Church, it is ſaid, He ſpecially embraced thoſe that came in, but compelled none; for he had learned that the Faith and Service of Chriſt ought to be voluntary and not of conſtraint. It helpeth much to eſtabliſh the publick Tranquility (ſays the Imperial Edict of Constantine and Licinius) for every man to have liberty to uſe and chuſe what kind of worſhipping himſelf pleaſes: And for that intent is this done of us, to have no man inforced to one Religion more than another. A Prince who would draw his ſubjects, divided into ſects and factions, to his Religion, ſhould not in my Opinion uſe Force, ſays Bodin. Which he enhaunces more particularly from the Example of Theodoſius toward the Arrians. John Barclay (not William that wrot Adverſus Monarchomachos) hath a diſcourſe on purpoſe to this effect, about the Calviniſts, (as it is thought) under the Name of the Hyperephanians, in one Chapter of his Argenis. It was obſerved by the Popes Councel (ſays Guiccardine) that the Proſecution of Luther, ſince it was not accompanied with their own Reformation, did increaſe his Reputation: and that it had been a leſs evil to diſſemble the knowledge of ſuch a matter, which would perhaps have diſſolved of its ſelf, than by blowing at the Brand, to make the Fire burn the more. There are ſome Notes may be conferred with this out of Davilah, upon the Deliberations of the politick Katharine Regent of France, about the Pacification in her Son Henry the Ill's time; I will reſt in one, after Hexry the IV. ſucceeded: That great Prince thought good to declare himſelf Catholick, but gets that ſame Edict for Liberty to the Hugonots, to be renewed and paſſed the Parliament of Paris; by which means endeavouring to remove ſuſpition from their minds, and confirming them by good uſage, together with ſome Gifts and Promiſes to the chief Heads, he inſenſibly took away (ſays that Hiſtorian) the pulſe and ſtrength of that Party; ſo that thoſe that are verſed in the Kingdom, believe that a few years of ſuch ſweet poyſon (if he had not been diſabled in this courſe through want of money) would have extinguiſhed that Faction, which ſo many years of deſperate War, had not, with the effuſion of ſo much blood, been able to weaken. Violent Courſes, ſays my Lord Cook, are like hot Waters, that may do good in an extremity; but the uſe of them doth ſpoyl the Stomach, and it will require them ſtronger and ſtronger, and by little and little they will leſſen the operation. They that love this Commonwealth, ſays Judge Jenkins, will uſe means, together with the Reſtitution of the King, to procure an Act of Oblivion, and Tender Conſciences a juſt and reaſonable ſatisfaction, elſe we must all periſh, firſt or laſt. I ſet down theſe paſſages which my ſelf occaſionally have noted: I might add many more out of others. But let the mouth of all mortal Suffrage be ſtopt from henceforward, ſince we have a determination from the Metropolitan Chair; and the Oracle, in that Book which is the Subject of the precedent Animadverſions, hath thus ſpoken, The Voice of the publick Laws cannot but drown the uncertain Whiſpers of a tender Conſcience; all its ſcruples are huſht and ſilenc'd by the Commands of Authority; it dares not whimper, when that forbids; and the nod of a Prince awes it into ſilence and ſubmiſſion. But if they dare murmur, they muſt be chaſtized out of their peeviſhneſs, and laſh'd into obedience. Unto which I muſt ſubjoyn this for ſurpluſage; And theſe things (ſays he) cannot but appear with an undeniable evidence to any man that is not invincibly either ignorant or wilful, or both; and therefore 'tis time they ſhould, at leaſt for ſhame, if they will not for Conſcience, ceaſe to diſturb the Church with Clamours and Exceptions ſo miſerably impertinent, that I bluſh for having th… far purſued them with a ſerious Confutation. So let us leave that Here to his Victory, in the Sella Curulis of his own Imagination.
Sound Drums and Trumpets. Exit the brave Author:
One carrying off the Slain. Vos Epiſcopi plaudite.
FINIS.
ERRATA.
Page 4. line 10. read, the Inſtance of the Cottage, with a Parentheſis. p. 8. l. 17. f. bound to the King, r. bound to the thing.
End of the text · John Humfrey, A Case of Conscience of a Non-Conformist (1669)