Authority of Magistrates About Religion, Section 13
SECT. 13.
After this, I begin to think what does hinder, but that this worthy Knight my friend and I ſhould reconcile? As for the main buſineſs, we hold together againſt any that ſhall oppoſe us, That in all matters of Religion, the Magiſtrate may not uſe his Sword to force any againſt their Conſciences; and ſo long as we agree in the main, we may have leave to abound each in his own ſenſe otherwiſe. The difference then we have under this agreement does I ſuppoſe lie in two things. The one is, That in things Religious this Gentleman ſeems to deny the Magiſtrate the uſe of his Sword altogether, and I deny it him not, but meerly when ſuch things are againſt mens Conſciences. And herein methinks he ſhould come over to me, for ſeeing Liberty of Conſcience is the thing mainly he is engaged for, in the denial of the Magiſtrate the uſe of his Sword in theſe things, there is no need he ſhould deny it at all when Conſcience is not concern'd in them. The other is that in Civil things he grants the Magiſtrate the uſe of his Sword, as over liberally as he takes it away in Religious; whereas I ſuppoſe that as long as there is ſtill the ſame reaſon, that is, ſo long as the thing is againſt a man's conſcience the Magiſtrate may not force any one to it, whether it be Civil or Religious. And herein indeed ſhould I be as ready to come over to him, who knows how prudent it muſt ſeem in ſtanding for Liberty, to confine it to things of Supernatural Revelation, leſt the Magiſtrate be offended if we touch on Civils: but that if I did ſo, I muſt really forſake the Patronage of Conſcience, which I am not willing my ſelf, nor that this Gentleman ſhould do. For if we grant once that Conſcience may be forc'd in any one thing, there may be the ſame or the like reaſon urged to force it in another, and ſo in all, and then here liberty is gone. If we will not ſtand by her in all diſtreſſes, we cannot defend her in any. The ground of alls is, Conſcience is a thing which can be ruled by none but the Almighty. And for as much as all Authority or power reſolved into its original, is, the will of God that ſuch a one ſhould command, it ſeems not a thing conſonant to reaſon to ſuppoſe it the will of God that a Superiour ſhould require that of a perſon, which it is his will that perſon ſhould not do.
Things then which are Civil may be ſo in themſelves, and yet come under ſome conſideration which is religious, or may have Religion incidental to them. If this worthy Gentleman be content to hold that in things Civil under every conſideration that is but civil, the Magiſtrate may uſe his Sword without ſcruple, I yeild to him: but if a thing ſecular does come under a conſideration which is religious, and in that conſideration is againſt a mans Conſcience, I cannot conceive, but that the caſe is the ſame here as if the matter were it ſelf Religious. For whatſoever the thing be, in that reſpect, as he makes a Conſcience of it, I have ſaid before, it is a point of Religion to him.
The Fifth-Monarchy-man thinks in his Conſcience, he may not pay Taxes. A ſtrange opinion! Againſt Scripture, Senſe, and Righteouſneſs: Yet if you ask the man his reaſon, he will bring you a Text perhaps out of Daniel or the Revelations, and the ſum of all will come to this, that if he does, he thinks verily he ſhall receive the mark of the Beaſt, and be caſt into the lake of fire and brimſtone, and rather than venture that, he will choſe to ſuffer, though it were death. I count this man now as one in a Feaver, that is, touched in his head, and who can help ſuch a conceit? his opinion is grounded on the Revelation, and we agree, that in matters of ſupernatural Revelation, the Magiſtrate may not force any againſt their Conſciences. What then ſhall he do? I anſwer, In this caſe, and the like as this is, it is the management only of the Laws with prudence, will decide ſuch difficulties. It is againſt the mans Conſcience, voluntarily to pay his Tax, it will wound his Soul if he does: but it is not againſt his Conſcience, nor will it wound him, that he is aſſeſſed, and that the Officer comes, and diſtrains, and pays himſelf. So long as he bears his teſtimony by a non-payment, he is willing to have the money taken by force. And thus does the Officer do right, for the Law is, he ſhall pay, or be diſtrained: and the man keeps his Conſcience, and no hurt is done. But if a Magiſtrate would not be content here, unleſs the man payes his money in ſpecie, and by way of acknowledging his Authority from God, or elſe he will hang him, or burn him, I have not a heart ſo hard to juſtifie any ſuch rigor, which appears more than needs. Unto this inſtance, no doubt but we may ſuppoſe many more, wherein there may be required of perſons ſome things which are apparently their duty (as this rendring to Caeſar the things which are Caeſars, is,) by the Law of God, as well as man, and yet in regard of ſome principles ſome have received, or ſome circumſtances they are in, they are againſt their Conſciences: You may ask therefore in general, Does not the Magiſtrate well to uſe his Sword, and execute the Law upon offenders in ſuch caſes? I anſwer, no doubt but he does; becauſe he acts upon ſuppoſition, that ſuch things are according to their Conſciences, and he is not to ſuppoſe otherwiſe: Nevertheleſs, if it come within his cognizance, that the thing indeed is a matter of Conſcience to him, I do humbly apprehend, and ſay, that the great duty of Charity which he owes to his brothers Soul, and is above any Law of man, ought to prevail with him for ſome ſuch middle courſe in the execution of the Law, that neither may the man be hurt in his Religion, nor the publick ſuffer by his ill example: but that both his Conſcience be regarded, and righteouſneſs alſo take place.
You may ſay perhaps, You would indeed have the magiſtrate have a care, and not force a man to any thing againſt his Conſcience: but you think notwithſtanding, he may very comfortably puniſh him, if he do not what was enjoyned. I will ask then, For what could you comfortably puniſh him, for being true only to his Conſcience, which is to be faithful to God? I do not find, if I were a Magiſtrate, that I could have any great comfort in that. Indeed if a man were doing, or does a thing which is evil or deſtructive to the Government and common good, though it be according to his own Conſcience or judgment but what he ought to do, I think the Magiſtrate may puniſh him with comfort, and may reſtrain him more comfortably from what he would do: but I do not think he may puniſh him with any ſuch content for not doing that which yet were good, ſo long as it is againſt his Conſcience. My reaſon I give is this, Becauſe in the one, the man does what God would not have him: in the other, he does what God would have. God would not have him do evil becauſe of his erroneous Conſcience, but that he ſhould lay down his error and do good: but God will have every man ſo regard his Conſcience, though erroneous, that he muſt not do any thing againſt it, for any fear or advantage in the world. Again, as for what cauſe, I will ask, For what end could you puniſh him? Is it for the moſt ordinary end of puniſhment, the parties amendment, that is, the making the man do what he now leaves undone? I anſwer, Then your diſtinction here becomes void, when you ſay, you would not force him to any thing againſt his Conſcience, but you can puniſh him; for the Magiſtrates forcing a man to any thing againſt his Conſcience, is to puniſh him for not doing the thing to make him do it. Or is it only for example ſake to others? If ſo, Then muſt theſe others be either ſuch as the thing is alſo againſt their Conſciences, and then I ſay, you are no more to puniſh one man, to enforce others thereby to do againſt their Conſciences, than to force himſelf to act againſt it: Or theſe others muſt be ſuch as it is not againſt their Conſciences, though againſt his, and in ſuch a caſe, if their be indeed a puniſhment can be inflicted, ſo as will not be inductive, either to the man himſelf, or others, to do the thing which is againſt their Conſciences, but will only induce others, who can do it according to theirs, to the doing, I am not careful though it be executed upon any; yet cannot ſay ſteadily, that you may execute it, becauſe the very nature of puniſhment is ſuch, as unleſs it be for a fault, and that wich deſerves it, there is no other end without this, can juſtifie the infliction of it. You ſee at laſt ſtill unto what all will be reduced. Things are, or things are not againſt mens Conſciences. And there is a forcing poſitively, or negatively. Underſtand theſe terms as I have unfolded my ſelf, and ſo judg of the weight or inſufficiency of my Undertaking.