Inquiry Concerning the Possibility of a Trinity in the Godhead, Postscript
Postscript,
HAving the Copies of some Letters by me, which I wrote to Dr. Wallis between two and three Years ago, upon this Subject; I think, Sir, it is not improper, and perhaps it may be some way usefull, to let them accompany this to your self.
And here I shall freely tell you my principal inducement, (taking notice in some of the Doctor's printed Letters; of others to him, contained in them) to send him (incognito) one also; but with that reason against printing it, which you find towards the end of the first Letter.
It was really the apprehension, which had long remained with me, that the simplicity, which (if the Notion of it were stretch'd too far) not the Scriptures, but the Schools have taught us to ascribe to the Being of God, was that alone which hath given us difficulty, in conceiving a Trinity in the onelyonly One God.
It is not the Unity, or Oneliness of the Godhead; but the Simplicity of it, as the School-men have stated it, that hath created the matter of dispute. Unity, you know, denies more of the same; simplicity denies more in it. Concerning the former that there could be no more Gods than One, we are at a point; the reason of the thing it self, and the Holy Scriptures so expresly asserting it, leave it out of dispute.
All the doubt is about the latter. Not whether such a thing belong to the Nature of God; but concerning the just explication of it: As it is a real excellency, not a blemish; and not meerly a moxal, but a natural excellency, there can be no doubt of its belonging to the Divine Nature; but if you understand it as exclusive of all Varietie therein, you find not any express mention of such an Attribute of God in the Scriptures. They are silent in the matter. It hath no authority, but of the Schools. That and the Reason that can be brought for it must give it its whole and only support. It is the only thing that must open, and give way, to admit the Doctrine of the Trinity; and it is the only thing that needs to do so. For we none of us assert a Trinity of Gods; but a Trinity in the Godhead. It is the only thing that can to the Adversaries of the Trinity with any colourable pretence seem opposite to it. And which therefore I thought the only thing that remained to be sifted and examined, if they will state it in an opposition thereto. What so mighty and invincible strength of reason it had, whence alone either to shock the Authority; or pervert the plain meaning of the Holy Scriptures, discompose the whole frame of Christian Religion, disturb the Peace of the Church, perplex very thinking minds, subvertt the Faith of some, and turn it into ridicule with too many.
I reckon'd the Dr. (as I still do, notwithstanding the Contempt this Author hath of him) a Person of a very clear, unmuddied Understanding. I found him, by what he express'd in his first Letter of the Trinity, not apt to be awed by the Authority of the Schools, nor any Bigot to them, as having declined their Notion of a Person, and fixing upon another, (less answering, as I apprehended, the Scheme and Design of Christianity) I thought it easie, and reputable enough to him to add, what might be requisite in this matter, without contradicting (directly, or discernibly) any thing he had said. I gave him the opportunity of doing it, as from himself, without seeming to have the least thing to that purpose suggested to him by any other. I had my self, I think, seen and considered the main strength of the School-mens reasonings concerning that simplicity, which they will have to be divine; and, for ought I do yet know, have competently occurr'd to it in this foregoing Letter, and partly in what you will now find I wrote to him. But what there is of real infirmity, or impertinencie to this case (as it is, and ought to be represented) in their arguings, I reckon'd he would both see and evince more clearly than I.
Therefore I greatly desired to have engaged him upon this Point; but I could not prevail. And am therefore willing that what I writ then with design of the greatest privacy, should now become publick. Not that I think it hath so great value in it self; but that perhaps it may furrher serve to excite some others more able and more at leasure to search and enquire into this matter; and either to improve, or disprove what I have essayed. And which of the two it is, 'tis all one to me. For I have no Interest or Design, but that of Truth, and the service of the Christian Cause.
I was so little apprehensive of any such future use to be made of these Letters, that I kept no account of the dates, except that one of the two latter (which both only refer to the first) I find by the Copy I have in my hands, to have been sent Decemb. 19th. 1691. I remember it was a long time, and guess it might be 6 or 8 weeks, e're I heard any thing of the first, after I had sent it. Probably it might have been sent in October, or the begining of November before. I at length heard of it very casually, being in an house in London, whither the Doctor's Eighth Letter was nevvly arrived (then no secret) in order to impression. I then found this my first Letter was lightly toucht, but mistaken; vvhichwhich occasioned (it being a Post-night) my second. That was followed by the third, the next Post after, when I had a little more time wherein to express my mind, tho' I still concealed my Name, as it is yet fittest to do, my main Business in my Letter to you lying with a Person, who (blamelesly enough) conceals his.
These two latter of my Letters to the Dr. produced some alteration in that Paragraph of his 8th. Letter, which relates to my first.
But yet no way answering the Design for which I writ it. You have them now together exactly according to the Copies I have by me, excepting one or two circumstantial things fitly enough left out, or somewhat altered.
And they had all slept long enough, if this occasion had not brought them to light.
But before I give them you, let me suggest some things further to you concerning the foregoing Letter to yourself.
You may apprehend that some will think it strange (if not an inconsistency) that I should suppose it possible an absolute onmimodous simplicity may not belong to the Divine Being, when yet I absolutely deny all composition in it.
And I apprehend too some may think so, at least a while; but such as have considered well, will not think so, and such as shall, I presume will not long. For,
1. If I had deny'd the simplicity of the Divine Nature, had the inference been just, that therefore I must grant a composition? How many instances might be given of one opposite not agreeing to this or that thing, when also the other doth as little agree! And most of all doth the transcendent excellency of the Divine Nature exempt it from the limiting by-partitions to which Creatures are subject.
Take Reason in the proper sense for arriving gradually by argumentation from the knowledge of more evident, to the knowledge of obscurer things, and so we cannot say the Divine Nature is rational. But is it therefore to be called irrational? Faith and Hope agree not to it. Are we therefore to think Infidelity or Despair do not disagree?
It is indeed more generally apprehended, we can scarce have the notion of any thing that strictly, or otherwise than by some very defective analogy, agrees to him, and to us. Some Pagans, and some Christians from them (not in derogation, but) in great reverence to the high excellency of the Deity, not excepting the most common notion of all other, even that of being it self; but making his Being and Substance to be superessential, and supersubstantial. 'Tis out of doubt that whatsoever perfection is in us, is not the same thing in him formally, but in an unconceivable transcendent eminency only. Do therefore their Contraries agree to him?
2. I am far from denying the simplicity of the blessed Nature of God, which I ascribe to him in the highest Perfection which it is capable of signifying. I most peremptorily affirm not only all the Simplicity, which he expresly affirms of himself; but all that can by just consequence be inferr'd from any affirmation of his; or that can by plain reason be evinced any other way. Whatsoever is any real Perfection, &c. Sect. 11.
'Tis true while I affirm such a simplicity as excludes all composition, in the sense already given, I affirm not such as excludes all variety. Not such as excludes a Trinity, which he so plainly affirms, and with such distinction, as his affirmations concerning it imply, and make requisite.
I further judge that tho the Scriptures do not expresly ascribe simplicity to the being of God, as a natural excellency, they say that which implies it, as such, to belong to him; as when they bring him in saying of himself I am what I am. This must imply his nature to exclude every thing that is alien from it self. I take it, as it signifies (besides a moral) a meer natural excellency, to import a most perfect purity of essence. And I understand that to be purum, which is plenum sui, and quod nihil habet alieni. I do therefore take the natural simplicity of the divine Being to exclude the ingrediency of any thing that can infer in it, conflict, decay, change, disturbance or infelicity in the least degree; and to include whatsoever infers the contraries of all these; serenity, tranquillity, harmony, stability, delight, and joy, in highest Perfection; as necessity of existence also doth; and that for all this, it by no means needs to exclude a Trinity, but to include it rather.
But I judge humane (and even all created) Minds very incompetent Judges of the divine simplicity. We know not what the divine nature may include consistently with its own perfection, nor what it must, as necessary thereto. Our eye is no judge of corporeal simplicity. In darkness it discerns nothing but simplicity, without distinction of things. In more dusky light the whole Horison appears most simple, and every where like it self. In brighter light, we perceive great varieties, and much greater if a Microscope assist our Eye. But of all the aerial people that replenish the Region (except rare appearances to very few) we see none. Here want not Objects, but a finer Eye.
'Tis much at this rate with our Minds in beholding the spiritual Sphaere of Beings, most of all the uncreated, which is remotest, and furthest above, out of our sight.
We behold Simplicity! and what do we make of that? vast undistinguisht Vacuity! sad, immense Solitude! only this at first view. If we draw nearer, and fix our Eye, we think we apprehend somewhat, but dubiously hallucinate, as the half-cur'd Blind man did, when he thought he saw Men like Trees.
But if a voice which we acknowledge Divine speak to us out of the profound abyss, and tell us of gratefull varieties and distinctions in it; Good God! shall we not believe it? Or shall we say we clearly see that is not, which only we do not see? This seems like somewhat worse than blindness!
Now follow the Letters.
LETTERS TO Dr. WALLIS, Sent in 1691.
LETTER I.
SIR,
I Could much please my self in revolving in my own mind the very respectful Thoughts and Veneration I have long had for you, and in Conversing with the grateful and entertaining Idéa which I have not abitrarily, but by your irresistible imposition received; and retained of you many Years, on the account of your former most useful and acceptable Performances, and which is both renewed and heightened greatly by your late, clear, prudent, and piously modest Discourses (both Letters and Sermons) of that awful Mystery [the Trinity in the Godhead.] But as I can neither satisfie my self of the fitness of making an Encomium of you the matter of a Letter to your self; so nor can I hope to please you by doing a thing in it self so inept, and so insignificant to you. I shall better do both, if I shall offer any thing to you concerning this mentioned Subject, your further consideration whereof may prove a further benefit to the World.
In what you have already said concerning it, you have used that great Caution, and so well guarded your self, as not so far as I can apprehend, to give an adversary in this single point, the least advantage. That which I would in the general, humbly offer, is, whether you have said so much as with safety might be said, and as the Case may require, for the gaining of a just advantage to the common Christian Cause.
We design, in fight, not only to keep our selves safe, but to overcome, and not in praelio only, but in bello. In Wars, indeed of this sort, both our own safety and victory, are less to be valued than truth. Which, being of a piece, can be injured in no part, without some dammage to the whole frame of congenerous Truth. And as it is very possible, while an Enemy is withstood attacking some one Fort, a greater loss may not be provided against elsewhere; it may so fall out in Affairs of this kind too, that the Care of defending some one Truth may be accompany'd with a present not attending to the jeopardy of divers others.
The nearer we approach an Adversary (within just limits) in these rational decertations, the less he can have to say against us. But being well resolved our selves about the main point of disagreement, we then take Care not to come so near, as to fall in with him, pass into his Tents, and give away our main Cause.
I am (worthiest Sir) far from assuming so much to my self, or detracting so much from you, as to give a judgment that this really is done in your Discourses about the Trinity. I only submit it to your own most penetrating judgment, what may be further requisite and possible in this matter, to take away any appearances hereof, and prevent ill consequences that may too easily ensue.
I have, for my own part, long impos'd it upon my self to abstain from any positive Conceptions concerning the Godhead, beyond what I find expresly contain'd in the divine revelation, or what the reason of things, either antecedently thereto, or consequentially thereupon, doth most evidently perswade and require; and do greatly approve the same caution, which I cannot but observe with you. But desire it may be weigh'd whether such measures may not, and must not lead us further.
As for the word person, you prudently profess not to be fond of it, the thing being agreed, thô you also truly judge it a good word, and sufficiently warranted.
For the Notion signify'd by it, you all along seem to decline that of the Schools, or the Metaphysical one, which, you know, makes it to be a rational (or intelligent) suppositum; and to take up with (what I think I may, wanting a fitter, i. e. a more comprehensive word, call) the Civil Notion of it; which will allow the same man to be capable of sustaining three or more persons, supposing his circumstances or qualifications to be such or such, as to that purpose you speak both in your Letters and Sermons.
Now whereas you have also told us, Letter 1. that by personality you mean that distinction (whatever it be) by which the three persons are distinguished each from other; that which, with great submission, and most profound respect to you, I propose to your further Consideration, will be capable of being resolved into these two Enquiries.
1. Whether only such a distinction of the Divine Persons, as this amounts to, will be sufficient to found the several attributions which the Holy Scriptures give distinctly and severally to them, and to preserve the Scheme of Christian Religion entire, which is wont to be deduced from these Sacred Writings.
2. Whether some further distinction may not be admitted as possible, consistently with the salved unity of the Godhead.
As to the former, 1. Whereas you think the word Person to be a good word, and sufficiently warranted by Scripture, Heb. 1. 3. where the Son is called the express Image of his Father's Person; alledging that so we render the word Hypostasis which is there used, and do mean by it what you think to be there meant; I desire you would please to consider whether the word Hypostasis, according to the common use of it will admit to be so taken, as you explain your self to mean by the word Person. For thô the Latine word persona, as you say, according to the true and ancient sense, may well enough admit to be so taken, as that the same Man might sustain three persons, I offer it to your re-consideration, whether ever you have observ'd the word Hypostasis, in any sort of Authors, when it signifies any Person at all (for I know that it frequently signifies somewhat else than a Person) to be taken in that sense. And whether one Hypostasis so taken as it uses to be when it signifies a Person, may not be capable of sustaining three of those Persons which you here describe. And whether, according to this sense you mean not God to be only one such Hypostasis.
2. Be pleas'd further hereupon to consider how well it agrees with this supposition of God's Being but one Hypostasis, or intelligent suppositum, so frequently to speak, as the Holy Scriptures do of the Father, Son or Word, the Spirit or Holy Ghost, as three distinct I's or He's. The Lord possessed me (as the Divine Word or Wisdom is brought in speaking) in the beginning of his way.—I was set up from everlasting, Prov. 8. 22, 23. When he prepared the Heavens I was there, vers. 27.—Then was I by him, vers. 30, &c. The Word—was with God, Joh. 1. 1. He was in the World, vers. 10. We beheld his glory, vers. 14. And of the Spirit, He dwelleth with you, Joh. 14. 17. The Holy Ghost whom the Father will send in my name, He shall teach you all things, vers. 26. And whom I will send you from the Father, he shall testifie of me, Chap. 15. 26. And when he is come, he will reprove the World—Ch. 16. 8. And the observation seems to me as weighty, as it is usual, that, in some of the mentioned Chapters, the somewhat hard Synthesis of construing foreign with foreign (even where foreign is not the nearer Suppositum, but, in one place, a very remote one, (and one would think too remote to be referr'd to ch. vers. 13, 14.) is rather chosen to be used than that the Spirit should not be spoken of as a distinct he, or rather than he should be called it, (which could not so fitly notifie a Person.) If the same man were a King, a General, and a Father, I doubt whether that would give sufficient ground to his being called He, and He, and He.
2. But the distinct Predicates spoken of the three Sacred Persons in the Godhead seem much more to challenge a greater distinction of the Persons than your Notion of a Person doth seem to admit. That of sending, and being sent, spoken so often of, the first in reference to the second, and of the first and second in reference to the third, as not to need the quoting of places. If the same man were a King, a General, and a Judge, methinks it would not well square with the usual forms of speaking among Men (and God speaks to Men as Men) to say, that, as the first, he sends the two latter, that is himself.
And one would think our being required to be Baptized in the distinct Names of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost should signifie some greater distinction.
As also that three are said to bear witness in Heaven. I doubt that in a Cause wherein our Law requires two or more Witnesses, the same Man that should be a Father, a Brother, and a Son, would scarce thereupon be admitted for three Witnesses.
And how the Incarnation of the Son can be understood according to your Notion of Person, without the Fathers and Holy Ghosts Incarnation also, I confess I cannot apprehend. Your Notion of a Person contradistinct to the Scholastick Notion, as was said before, seems to leave the Godhead to be but one hypostasis, or Person in the latter sense. How then are we to conceive of the hypostatical union? The assumed Nature will be as much hypostatically united with the Father, or the Spirit, as with the Son.
3. And doth not this civil, or meerly respective Notion of a Person, the other being left, fall in with the Antitrinitarian? Will it not make us Unitarians only, as they affect to call themselves? Would any of them who (as you are pleas'd to take notice Letter 6. p. 1, 2.) say, none but a Mad-man would deny there may be three Persons in God, have been so mad (not yet professing themselves Converts) as to say so, if they had not suppos'd their Cause not hurt by this Notion of a Person? For, (as you well say, Letter 1.) we need not be fond of words, so the thing be agreed, so have they equal reason to say, we need not be afraid of words, if in the sense you agree with us. And with one sort of them I only desire you to consider how great an appearance the asserting only of three Persons, in the one sense, quitting the other, will carry off an agreement?
And have they not all the advantage left them which they seek in arguing against the satisfaction made by our Saviour from the necessity of an alterity, that in the business of making satisfaction there must be alter atque alter, One who satisfies, and another who is satisfy'd. I do very well know, what Instances are brought of humane Rulers making satisfaction for Delinquents, but there is no parity in the Cases. They being themselves Debtors to the governed Community, as God is not, who hath with most undoubted righteousness made all things for himself.
4. And consider whether by your Notion of a Person you forsake not the generality of them, who have gone, as to this point, under the repute of Orthodox? Who no doubt have understood by three Persons, three intelligent Hypostases; tho' they have differ'd in thinking, some of them, that only a foreign was the genitum or spiratum as to the two latter; (a notion that is either too fine, or too little solid, for some Minds to grasp, or take any hold of.) Others that the divine Nature might it self be some way said to be communicated to them. But I pass to the
IId Enquiry: Whether some further distinction may not be admitted as possible?
The only thing that straitens us here, is the most unquestionable unity or unicity (as we may call it) of the Godhead. Which, if it cannot be otherwise defended, I must yet for my part, notwithstanding these hardships (and I know no man with whom I could do it with more inclination) fall in with you. But I must crave it of you so far to fall in with you know not who, as to apply your clearer mind, as, I do my more cloudy one, to consider whether it can or no?
You will here say further than what? and what would I have further?
To the former of these, I only say, further than the asserting, in very deed, but one Hypostasis in the Godhead, distinguished no otherwise into three, than by certain relative capacities, like those which may among men be sustain'd by one and the same man; and which distinction, as you after add, is analogous to what, in created beings, is called distinctio modalis.
To the latter, I desire you to observe what I generally propose, not that we may positively assert any further determinate distinction as certain and known; but only whether we may not admit some further distinction to be possible, in consistency with the Unity of the Godhead. I do equally detest and dread to speak with rash and peremptory confidence about things both so Mysterious and so Sacred. But may we not modestly say, that if to that Oeconomy which God hath represented himself in his Word, to bear, and keep afoot, towards his Creatures, any further distinction than hath been assigned is necessary, it is also possible, and may be, for ought we know (if indeed we know nothing to the contrary.) What is impossible we are sure cannot be necessary. But God himself best, and only knows his own nature, and what his own meaning is in the representation he hath made to us. If we sincerely aim to understand his meaning, that we may bear our selves towards him accordingly, he will vvith mercifull indulgence consider our shortor mis-apprehensions. But vve need not say there is not this or that distinction, if really vve do not knovv there is not. While vve knovv so little of natures inferiour to our ovvn, and even of our ovvn nature, and hovv things are distinguished that belong to our selves, vve have little reason to be shy of confessing ignorance about the Nature of God.
Therefore I most intirely agree to the tvvo Conclusions of the Ingenious W. J. vvherevvith he concludes his Letter. But in the mean time (and pursuantly enough thereto) cannot but doubt the concludingness of his very acute reasonings against, at least, some of the expressions of that learned Person (Dr. Sherl.) vvhichwhich he animadverts upon, as, I perceive you also do p. 16. of your 7th Letter. And even W. J. himself: for vvith a pious modesty he tells us—concerning infinite Natures he presumes not to determine. Letter, p. 8.
What he objects against that Authors having said the divine Persons are three beings really distinct (vvherein I instance, not intending to run thorough that elaborate Letter) that then there must be three distinct Essences—seems to me a foreign. I doubt not the Author vvill easily admit it. But what will be the consequence? That therefore there are three Deities? That cannot be his meaning, nor be consequent from it, if he only mean that the Deity comprehends in it three such essences. If indeed he think those three beings are as distinct as Peter, James, and John; what is said by W. J. against him, I think irrefragable, that then they are no otherwise one, than Peter, James and John; and by him against himself; for Peter, James and John are not mutually self-conscious, as they are asserted to be, which mutual self-consciousness, since it is supposed to make the three divine Persons one, cannot be supposed to leave them so distinct, as they are with whom it is not found.
As to what is observed of the defective expression of this unitive Principle by the word consciousness, that bare Consciousness, without consent, is no more than bare Omnisciency. Sure it is not so much. For Consciousness doth not signifie Omnisciency. We are conscious to our selves, yet are not omniscient. But I reckon, (as I find he also doth) that even consent added to consciousness, would yet leave the expression defective, and still want the unifying power which is sought after. For it would infer no more than a sort of moral union, which in the kind of it, may be found among men, between whom there is so little of natural union (speaking of the numerical nature) that they are actually separate.
But now may we not suppose (as that which is possible, and actually is, (for ought we know) what may be fundamental to both Consciousness and Consent, a natural union even of the numerical natures? Such an union would not infer an Unity, or Identity of these Natures, Essences, Substances, or Beings themselves. For as W. J. hath well argued, Letter, p. 5, 6. Substances upon Union are not confounded or identify'd, or brought to unity of Substance, but continuing numerically distinct Substances acquire some mutual community or communication of operations, &c. And deferring the consideration a while what this would signifie towards the unity, notwithstanding, of the Godhead, shall take notice how accommodately to our present purpose W. J. speaks in what follows, where instancing in the chief unions that are known to us, he says, Our Soul and Body are two substances really distinct, and in close union with one another. But notwithstanding this, they continue distinct substances under that union. In like manner the humane soul of Christ is in union with the Logos, or second Person of the Trinity, which we call an hypostatical Union. But neither doth this union make an unity of substance. For the two substances of the divine and humane natures continue distinct under that union. 'Tis true, he addes, which must not be allowed in the Unity of the Godhead, where there can be no plurality or multiplicity of substhaces. Nor do I say that it must, I only say Do we know, or are we sure there is no sort of Plurality?
But if we are sure that there are temporal unions (i. e. begun in time) as in our selves for instance, of two substances that make but one man, and in our Saviour an humane nature and divine that make but one Emmanuel. How do we know but that there may be three in the Godhead that make but one God? And the rather, because this being supposed, it must also be supposed that they are necessarily and eternally united, and with a conjunct natural impossibility of ever being, or having been otherwise, whereof the absolute immutability of God must upon that supposition most certainly assure us. And such a supposed union will be most remote from making the Deity an aggregate. And for any thing of composition, I reckon we are most strictly bound to believe every thing of the most perfect simplicity of the Divine Being which his Word informs us of, and to assent to every thing that is with plain evidence demonstrable of it. But not every thing which the Schools would impose upon us, without such testimony or evidence. For as none can know the things of a Man, but the Spirit of Man which is in him, so nor can any know the things of God, but the Spirit of God. Nor can I think the Argument concluding from the imperfection of a Being, in which distinct things concur that were seperate, or are de novo united, to the impersection of a being, in which things some way distinct are necessarily and eternally self-united. Nor can therefore agree with W. J. that we are to look (universally) upon real distinction as a mark of separability; or that clear and distinct conception is to us the rule of partibility. For tho' I will not affirm that to be the state of all created Spirits; yet I cannot deny it to be possible that God might have created such a being, as should have in it distinct (assignable) parts, all of them essential to it, and not separable from it without the cessation of the whole. But now, as the accession of the humane Nature to the divine in the hypostatical union infers no imperfection to the divine, so much less would what things we may suppose naturally, necessarily, and eternally united in the Godhead infer any imperfection therein.
I easily admit what is said by W. J. Letter pag. 8. That we have no better definition of God, than that he is [a Spirit infinitely perfect] But then, being so far taught by himself my conception of him, I must include in it, this trinal distinction, or a triple somewhat which he affirms of himself, and without which, or any one whereof, he were not infinitely perfect, and consequently not God, and that all together do make one God. As you most aptly say of your resemblance of him, a Cube, there are in it three dimensions truly distinct from each other, yet all these are but one Cube, and if any one of the three were wanting, it were not a Cube.
Set this down then for the Notion of God, that he is a Spirit infinitely perfect, comprehending in that omnimodous Perfection a trinal distinction, or three persons truly distinct, each whereof is God. What will be the consequence? that therefore there are three Gods? Not at all, but that each of these partaking Divine Nature give us an inadequate, and all together a most perfectly adequate and entire Notion of God.
Nor would the Language of this Hypothesis being prest to speak out (as he says in his Letter) be this—these are not fit to be called three Gods; but not possible (with any truth) to be so called.
And whereas he after tells us these three being united by similitude of Nature, mutual consciousness, consent, cooperation under the greatest union possible; and in that state of union do constitute the foreign, the entire all-comprehensive Godhead, and adds, this looks somewhat like a conceivable thing. To this I Note two things: 1. That he makes it not look like so conceivable a thing, as it really may do. For he leaves out the most important thing that was as supposable as any of the rest, and prior to a meer similitude, viz. a natural union of these (supposed) distinct essences, without which they are not under the greatest union possible; and which, being supposed necessary, and eternal, cannot admit these should be more than one God.
2. I note that what he opposes to it (so defectively represented) is as defective, that the Christian Trinity doth not use to be represented thus, &c. What hurt is there in it, if it can be more intelligibly represented than hath been used?
But his gentle treatment of this hypothesis, which he thought, as he represents it, not altogether unintelligible, and which with some help may be more intelligible, became one enquiring what might most safely, and with least torture to our own minds, be said, or thought in so awful a Mystery. It however seems not proper to call this an hypostatical union—much less to say it amounts to no more. It amounts not to so much. For an hypostatical or personal union would make the terms united (the unita, the things or somewhats under this union) become by it one hypostasis or person; whereas this union must leave them distinct persons or hypostases, but makes them one God. In the use of the Phrase hypostatical or personal union the denomination is not taken from the subject of the union, as if the design were to signifie that to be divers hypostases, or persons, but from the effect or result of the mentioned union, to signifie that which results to be one person or hypostasis. As the matter is plain in the instance wherein it is of most noted use, the case of the two Natures united in the one Person of the Son of God; where the things united are not supposed to be two Persons, but two Natures so conjoyn'd, as yet to make but one person, which therefore is the Negative result or effect of the union, viz. that the person is not multiply'd by the accession of another Nature, but remains still only one. But this were an union quite of another kind, viz. of the three hypostases, still remaining distinct, and concurring in one Godhead. And may not this be supposed without prejudice to its Perfection.
For the Schools themselves suppose themselves not to admit a composition prejudicial to the Perfection of the Godhead, when they admit three modes of subsistence, which are distinct from one another, and from the Godhead, which they must admit. For if each of them were the very Godhead, each of them (as is urged against us by you know who) must have three Persons belonging to it, as the Godhead hath. And your self acknowledge three somewhats in the Godhead distinct, or else they could not be three: I will not here urge that if they be three somewhats, they must be three things, not three nothings; for however uneasie it is to assign a Medium between something and nothing, I shall wave that Metaphysical contest. But yet collect, that simplicity in the very strictest sense that can be conceiv'd, is not, in your account, to be ascribed to God, either according to his own word, or the reason of things.
It may here be urged, how can we conceive this Natural Union (as I have adventur'd to Phrase it) of the three Persons, supposing them distinct things, substances, or Spirits? Is such an Union conceivable, as shall make them be but one God, and not be such, as shall make them cease to be three distinct things, substances, or Spirits? We find indeed the mentioned unions of Soul and Body in our selves, and of the two Natures in Christ consistent enough with manifest distinction; but then the things united are in themselves of most different Natures. But if things of so congenerous a Nature be united, will not their distinction be lost in their union?
I answer, 1. That a Spirit and a Spirit are numerically as distinct, as a Body and a Spirit. And, 2. That we may certainly conceive it as possible to God to have united two or three created Spirits, and by as strict union as is between our Souls and Bodies, without confounding them; and I reckon the union between our Souls and Bodies much more wonderful than that would have been. Why then is an unmade, uncreated union of three Spirits less conceivable as that which is to be presupposed to their mutual consciousness?
I shall not move, or meddle with, any Controversie about the Infinity of these three supposed Substances or Spirits, it being acknowledged on all hands that Contemplations of that kind cannot but be above our measure. And well knowing how much easier it is to puzzle oneself upon that Question, An possit dari infinitum infinito infinitius, than to speak satisfyingly, and unexceptionably about it to another.
And tho' I will not use the expressions, as signifying my formed judgment, that there are three things, substances, or Spirits in the Godhead (as you that there are three somewhats) yet, as I have many Years thought, I do still think that what the learned W. J. doth but more lightly touch of the Son, and the Holy Ghost being produced (which term I use, but reciting it, as he doth) not by a voluntary external, but by an internal, necessary, and emanative Act, hath great weight in it.
In short my sense hath long lain thus, and I submit it to your searching and candid Judgment, viz. That tho' we need not have determinate thoughts, how far the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are distinguished; yet we must conceive them in the general to be so far distinguished, as is really necessary to the founding the distinct attributions which the Scriptures do distinctly give them. And that whatever distinction is truly necessary to that purpose, will yet not hinder the two latters participation with the first in the Godhead, which can be but one, because that tho' we are led by plain Scripture, and the very import of that word, to conceive of the Father as the Fountain, yet the Son being from him, and the Holy Ghost from them both, not contingently, or dependently on will and pleasure; but by eternal, natural, necessary promanation, these two latter are infinitely distinguisht from the whole Creation. Inasmuch as all Creatures are contingent beings, or dependent upon will and pleasure, as the Character is given us of created things, Rev. 4. 11. Thou hast made all things, and for thy pleasure they are and were created. But that whatever is what it is necessarily is God. For I have no doubt but the Dreams of some, more anciently, and of late, concerning necessary matter, and the Sophisms of Spinosa and some others, tending to prove the necessity and identity of all substance are (with what they aim to evince) demonstrably false.
The Summe of all will be this,
1. That we can be more certain of nothing than that there is but one God.
2. We are most sure the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are sufficiently distinguished to give a just ground to the distinct attributions, which are in Scripture severally given to them.
3. We are not sure what that sufficient distinction is (wherein I find you saying with me over and over) But whereas you rightly make the word person applicable to God, but in a sense analogous to that which obtains of it with men; why may it not be said it may be fitly applicable, for ought we know, in a sense analogous to that notion of it among men, which makes a person signify an intelligent hypostasis; and so three distinct persons, three distinct intelligent hypostases.
4. But if that sufficient distinction can be no less, than that there be in the Godhead, three distinct intelligent hypostases, each having its own distinct singular intelligent nature, with its proper personality belonging to it, we know nothing to the contrary, but that the necessary eternal nature of the Godhead may admit thereof. If any can from plain Scripture testimony, or cogent reason evince the contrary, let the evidence be produced. In the mean time we need not impose upon our selves any formal denial of it.
5. If the contrary can be evidenced, and that hereupon it be designed to conclude that there can be but one intelligent hypostasis in the Godhead, and therefore that the Son, and the Holy Ghost are but creatures, the last refuge must be to deny the former consequence, and to alledge that thô the same finite singular nature cannot well be understood to remain entirely to one, and be communicated entirely to another, and another, the case will not be the same speaking of an infinite Nature.
SIR,
If what is here said shall occasion to you any new thoughts that you shall judge may be of common use, I conceive there will be no need of Publishing my Letter, but only that you be pleased to comunicate your own Sentiments, as from your self, which will have so much the more of Authority and Usefulness with them. The most considerable thing that I have hinted, is the necessary Promanation of the Son, and Holy Ghost, that must distinguish them from contingent Beings, and so from Creatures; which if you think improveable to any good purpose, as it hath been with me a Thought many years old, so I suppose it not new to you, and being now resumed by you, upon this occasion, you will easily cultivate it to better advantage than any words of mine can give it.
But if you think it adviseable that any part of my Letter be Published, if you please to signifie your mind to that purpose in one Line to marked——it will come Sealed to my view, and will give Opportunity of offering my Thoughts to you, what parts I would have supprest, which will be such only, as shall leave the rest the fuller Testimony of my being,
Poirets method of proving a Trinity in the Godhead, tho' it call it self Mathematical or Geometrical, is with me much less convictive, than the plain Scriptural way.
SIR, Your most sincere Honourer and most respectful Humble Servant, Anonym.
LETTER II.
SIR,
YOur Eighth Letter happening to come to my View before it was printed off, I have the Opportunity of taking Notice to you that it quite misrepresents the intent of the Letter to you subscribed Anonymous, which it makes to be the defending or excusing some Expressions of Dr. Sherlock's; which indeed was the least considerable thing, if it were any thing at all in the design of that Letter, and not altogether accidental to it. The true design of it was, that there might be a clearer Foundation asserted (as possible at least) to the Doctrine of the Incarnation and Satisfaction of the Son of God. Nor can the fortè quod sic, here be solved by the fortè quod non, the Exigency of the Case being such, as that if more be possible, it will be highly requisite; and that it cannot well be avoided to assert more, unless it can be clearly evinced that more is impossible. Nor yet is it necessary to determine how much more is necessary. But not only the commonly receiv'd frame of Christian Doctrine, doth sem to require somewhat beyond what the meer civil or respective Notion of the word Person imports; but also the plain Letter of Scripture, which says Heb. 1. 3. that the Son is the express Image of the Fathers hypostasis, which seems to signifie there are two Hyyostases, and other Scriptures seem to say enough, whence we may with parity of Reason collect a third. Now that Letter intimates, I think, sufficient matter of doubt, whether hypostasis doth not signifie much more than Person, in your sense.
The principal thing that Letter humbly offer'd to consideration [i. e. whether, supposing a greater distinction than you have assign'd be necessary, it may not be defended, by the just supposal that the promanation of the second or third Persons (or hypostases rather) howsoever divers they are, is by natural eternal necessity, not contingent, or depending upon will and pleasure, as all created Being is and doth] is altogether waved. That Letter was written with design of giving you the occasion of considering what might be further requisite and possible to be asserted for the serving of the Truth, and with that sincerity and plenitude of respect to you that it might be wholly in your own Power to do it in such a way, as wherein not at all to disserve your self. Which Temper of Mind is still the same with
Reverend SIR, Your most unfeigned Honourer, and Humble Servant, Anonym. Decemb. 91.
LETTER III.
Worthy SIR,
I Am very loath troublesomely to importune you. But the very little time I had for the view of your 8th. Letter, before I wrote mine by the last Post not allowing me fully to write my sense as to that part which concern'd my former Letter; I take leave now to add, that my design in it (as well as the profest design of the Letter it self) was to offer you the occasion of employing that clear understanding, wherewith God hath blest you, above most, in considering whether a greater latitude cannot be allow'd us in conceiving the distinction of the three in the Godhead consistently with the Unity thereof, than your notion of a person will extend to. And if it can, whether it ought not to be represented (at least as possible) to give a less exceptionable ground to the Doctrines of the incarnation and satisfaction of the second Person, in order whereto it seems to me highly requisite. This was that I really intended, and not the vindicating the Sentiments of that Author, which you might observe that letter animadverts upon. The Scripture seems to allow a greater latitude, by the ground it gives us to apprehend three hypostases; which so much differ from the notion you give of persons, that one hypostasis may sustain three such persons as you describe. The only thing that seems to straiten us in this matter, is the usual Doctrine of the Schools about the divine simplicity. I confess I greatly coveted to have had your thoughts engag'd in sifting and examining that Doctrine; so far as to consider whether there be really any thing in it, cogent and demonstrable that will be repugnant to what is overtur'd in that Letter. And I the rather desir'd more room might be gained in this matter, apprehending the Unitarians (as they more lately affect to call themselves) might, upon the whole, think you more theirs, than ours; and while they agree with you concerning the possibility of such a Trinity as you assert, may judge their advantage against the other mentioned Doctrines, no less than it was.
My desiring that letter of mine might not be printed, was most agreeable to what I intended in writing it; that was, only to suggest to you somewhat (very loosly) that I reckon'd you more capable than any man I knew, to cultivate, and improve, to the great service of the common Christian Cause. And that you might seem to say, what you might, upon your own search, find safe and fit to be said, as meerly from your self, without taking notice that occasion was given you by any such Letter at all. Had I design'd it for publick view, it should have been writ with more Care, and with more (expressed) Respect to you. But if upon the whole, you judge there is nothing in it considerable to the purposes it mentions, my further request is, you will please rather to suppress that part of your Letter which concerns it (for which I suppose there is yet opportunity) and take no notice any such letter came to your hands. I am,
Reverend SIR, Your most Respectful, Humble Servant, Anonym. Decemb. 19. 91.