Works of Hooker, Book 8 · Part 2
In what Measure.
IN power of Dominion, all Kings have not an equal latitude: Kings by conquest make their own Charter; so, that how large their power, either Civil or Spiritual is, we cannot with any certainty define further, then onelyonly to set them in the line of the Law of God and Nature for bounds. Kings by Gods own special appointment, have also that largeness of power which he doth assign or permit with approbation touching Kings which were first instituted by agreement and composition made with them over whom they raign, how far their power may extend; the Articles of Compact between them is to shew not only the Articles of Compact at the first beginning, which for the most part are either clean worm out of knowledg, or else known to very few; but whatsoever hath been after in free and voluhtary manner condiscended unto, whether by express consent, (whereof positive laws are witnesses,) or else by silent allowance,Arist. Fol. lib. …. Cap. …. famously notified through custome, reaching beyond the memory of man. By which means of after. Agreement, it cometh many times to pass in Kingdoms, that they whose ancient predecessors were by violence and force made subject, do by little and little grow into that sweet form of Kingly Government, which Philosophers define, Regency willingly sustained, and indued with Chiefly of power in the greatest things. Many of the ancients in their writings do speak of Kings with such high and ample terms, as if universality of Power, even in regard of things and not of persons, did appertain to the very being of a King: The reason is, because their speech concerning Kings, they frame according to the state of those Monarchs, to whom unlimited authority was given; which some not observing, imagine, that all Kings, even in that they are Kings, ought to have whatsoever power they judge any Soveraign Ruler lawfully to have enjoyed. But the most judicious Philosopher,Pythag…rae …. pad Eccless. de Reg…o. whose eye scarce any things did escape which was to be found in the bosome of nature, he considering how far the power of one Soveraign Rule… may be different from another Regal Authority, noteth in Spartan Kings, That of all others they were most tied to Law, and so the most restrained power. A King which hath not supream power in the greatest things, is rather intituled a King, then invested with reall Soveraignty. We cannot properly term him a King, of whom it may not be said, at the least wise, as touching certain the chiefest affairs of the State, foreign, his right in them is to have rule, not subject to any other predominancy. I am not of opinion that simply in Kings the most, but the best limited power is best, both for them and the people: the most limited is that which may deal in fewest things, the …e…t, that which in dealing is tyed unto the soundest, perfectest, and most indifferent Rule, which Rule is the Law: I mean not only the Law of Nature, and of God; but the National Law consonant thereunto. Happier that people whose Law is their King in the greatest things, then that whose King is himself their Law: where the King doth guide the State, and the Law the King, that Common-wealth is like an Harp or Melodious Instrument, the strings whereof are turned and handled all by one hand, following as Laws, the Rules and Canons of Musical Science. Most divinely therefore Archytas maketh unto publike felicity these four steps and degrees, every of which doth spring from the former, as from another cause, foreign The King ruling by Law, the Magistrate following, the Subject free, and the whole Society happy. Adding on the contrary side, that where this order is not, it cometh by transgression thereof to pass that a King groweth a Tyrant; he that ruleth under him abhorreth to be guided by him or commanded; the people subject unto both, have freedome under neither, and the whole Community is wretched. In which respect, I cannot chuse but commend highly their wisdom, by whom the Foundations of the Common-wealth hath been laid; wherein though no manner of Person, or cause be unsubject unto the Kings Power, yet so is the Power of the King over all, and in all limited, that unto all his proceedings the Law it self is a rule. The Axioms of our Regal Government are these, Lex facit regem: The Kings Grant of any favour made contrary to the Law is void; Rex nibil potest nisi quod jure potest: Our Kings therefore, when they are to take possession of the Crown they are called unto, have it pointed our before their eyes, even by the very Solemnities and Rites of their Inauguration, to what affairs by the same Law their Supream Power and Authority reacheth; crowned we see they are, enthronized and annointed; the Crown a Sign of a Military Dominion: the Throne of Sedentary or Judicial; the Oyl of Religious and Sacred Power. It is not on any side denied, that Kings may have Authority in Secular affairs. The Question then is,Stipl. de … Princip. I…s. …. 6, 17. What power they may lawfully have, and exercise in causes of God. A Prince, or Magistrate, or a Community (saith Doctor Stapleton) may have power to lay corporal punishment on them which are teachers of perverse things; power to make Laws for the Peace of the Church; Power to proclaim, to defend, and even by revenge to preserve dogmata the very Articles of Religion themselves from violation. Others, in affection no less devoted unto the Papacy, do likewise yield, that the Civil Magistrate may by his Edicts and Laws keep all Ecclesiastical Persons within the bounds of their duties, and constrain them to observe the Canons of the Church, to follow the rule of ancient Discipline. That, if Ioash was commended for his care and provision, concerning so small a part of Religion, as the Church-treasure; it must needs be both unto Christian Kings themselves greater honour, and to Christianity a larger benefit, when the custody of Religion, and the worship of God in general is their charge. It therefore all these things mentioned be most properly the affairs of Gods Ecclesiastical causes; if the actions specified be works of power; and if that power be such as Kings may use of themselves, without the fear of any other power superior in the same thing; it followeth necessarily, that Kings may have supream power, not only in Civil, but also in Ecclesiastical affairs, and consequently, that they may withstand what Bishop or Pope soever shall, under the pretended claim of higher Spiritual Authority, oppose themselves against their proceedings. But they which have made us the former grant, will never hereunto condescend; what they yield that Princes may do, it is with secret exception always understood, If the Bishop of Rome give leave, if he enterpose no prohibition; wherefore, somewhat it is in shew, in truth nothing which they grant. Our own Reformes do the very like, when they make their discourse in general, concerning the Authority which Magistrates may have, a man would think them to be far from withdrawing any jot of that, which with reason may be thought due. The Prince and Civil Magistrate (saith one of them)T. C. l. 1. p. 192. hath to see the Laws of God, touching his Worship, and touching all Matters, and all Orders of the Church to be executed, and duly observed; and to see every Ecclesiastical Person do that office, whereunto he is appointed; and to punish those which fail in their office accordingly. Another acknowledgeth,Farmen… …ef…of the Godly Magistrate. That the Magistrate may lawfully uphold all truth by his Sword, punish all persons, enforce all to their duties towards God and men; maintain by his Laws every point of Gods Word, punish all vice in all men; see into all causes, visit the Ecclesiastical Estate, and correct the abuses thereof: Finally to look to his Subjects, that under him they may lead their lives in all godliness and honesty… A third more frankly prosesseth, That in case their Church Discipline were established, so little it shortneth the Arms of Soveraign Dominion in causes Ecclesiastical, that Her Gracious Majesty, for any thing they teach or hold to the contrary, may no less then now remain still over all persons, in all things Supream Governess even with that full and Royal Authority, Superiority, and Preheminence, Supremacy, and Prerogative, which the Laws already established do give her; and her Majesties Injunctions, and the Articles of the Convocation house, and other writings Apologetical of her Royal Authority, and Supream Dignity, do declare and explain. Possidonius was wont to say of the Epicure,Cicero lib. 1. de ma… Decr. That he thought there were no Gods, but that those things which he spake concerning the Gods, were only given out for fear of growing adious amongst men: and therefore that in words he left gods remaining, but in very deed overthrew them, in so much as he gave them no kind of Action. After the very self same manner, when we come unto those particular effects, Prerogatives of Dominion which the Laws of this Land do grant unto the Kings thereof, it will appear how these men, notwithstanding their large and liberal Speeches abate such parcels out of the afore alleadged grant and flourishing shew, that a man comparing the one with the other, may half stand in doubt, lest their Opinion in very truth be against that Authority, which by their Speeches they seem mightily to uphold, partly for the avoiding of publike obloquie, envie, and hatred, partly to the intent they may both in the cad by the establishment of their Discipline, extinguish the force of Supream Power, which Princes have, and yet, in the mean while, by giving forth these smooth Discourses, obtain that their savourers may have somewhat to alleadge for them by way of Apologie, and that such words only sound towards all kind of fulness of Power. But for my self, I had rather construe such their contradictions in the better part, and impute their general acknowledgment of the lawfullness of Kingly Power, unto the force of truth, presenting it self before them sometimes above their particular contrarieties, oppositions, denyals, unto that errour which having so fully possest their minds, casteth things inconvenient upon them; of which things in their due place. Touching that which is now in hand, weare on all sides fully agreed, First, that there is not any restraint or limitation of matter for regal Authority and Power to be conversant in, but of Religion onelyonly; and of whatsoever cause thereunto appertaineth Kings may lawfully have change, they lawfully may therein exercise Dominion, and use the temporal Sword. Secondly,Kinds. that some kind of actions conversant about such affairs are denyed unto Kings: As namely, Actions of Power and Order, and of Spiritual Jurisdiction, which hath with it inseparably joyned Power to Administer the Word and Sacraments, power to Ordain, to Judge as an Ordinary, to bind and loose, to Excommunicate, and such like. Thirdly,By what…e…. that even in those very actions, which are proper unto Dominion, there must be some certain rule whereunto Kings in all their proceedings ought to be strictly tyed; which rule for proceeding in Ecclesiasticall affairs and causes by Regal Power, hath not hitherto been agreed upon with such uniform consent, and certainty, as might be wished. The different sentences of men herein I will now go about to examine, but it shall be enough to propose what Rule doth seem in this case most reasonable.
The case of deriving Supream Power from a whole intire multitude into some special part thereof; as partly the necessity of expedition in publick affairs, partly the inconvenience of confusion and trouble, where a multitude of Equals dealeth; and partly the dissipation which must needs ensue, in companies where every man wholly seeketh his own particular (as we all would do, even with other mens hurts) and haply the very overthrow of themselves, in the end also; if for the procurement of the common good of all men, by keeping every several man is order, some were not invested with Authority over all, and encouraged with Prerogative-Honour to sustain the weighty burthen of that charge. The good which is proper unto each man belongeth to the common good of all, as part to the whole perfection; but these two are things different; for men by that which is proper, are severed; united they are by that which is common. Wherefore, besides that which moveth each man in particular to seek his own private good, there must be of necessity in all publick Societies also a general mover, directing unto common good, and framing every mans particular unto it. The end whereunto all Government was instituted, was Bonum publicum, the Universal or Common good. Ob … publica per … consu… L.C. 11. … de origine. i… ris Civilis.Our question is of Dominion, for that end and purpose derived into one; such as all in one publick State have agreed, that the Supream charge of all things should be committed unto one: They, I say, considering what inconveniency may grow, where States are subject unto sundry Supream Authorities, have for fear of these inconveniencies withdrawn from liking to establish many; foreign, the multitude of Supream Commanders is troublesome, No Nan (saith our Saviour) can serve two Masters; surely two supream Masters would make any ones service somewhat uneasie in such cases as might fall out, Suppose that to morrow the Power which hath Dominion in Justice, require thee at the Court; that which in War, at the Field; that which in Religion, at the Temple; all have equal Authority over thee, and impossible it is, that then in such case thou shouldst be obedient unto all: By chusing any one whom thou wilt obey, certain thou art for thy disobedience to incur the displeasure of the other two.
But there is nothing for which some comparable reason or other may not be found;According to what example. are we able to shew any commendable State of Government, which by experience and practice hath felt the benefit of being in all causes subject unto the Supream Authority of one? Against the policy of the Israelites, I hope there will no man except, where Moses deriving so great a part of his burthen in Government unto others, did notwithstanding retain to himself Universal Supremacy; Iehosaphat appointing one to be chosen in the affairs of God, and another in the Kings affair's, did this as having Dominion over them in both. If therefore from approbation of Heaven, the Kings of Gods own chosen people had in the affairs of Jewish Religion Supream Power, why not Christian Kings the like also in Christian Religion? First, unless men will answer, as some have done,Stapl. de prin. Doct. pag. 19. Stapl. 10. That the Jews Religion was of far less perfection and dignity then ours, our being that truth whereof theirs was but a shadowish prefigurative resemblance. Secondly, That all parts of their Religion, their Laws, their Sacrifices, and their Rights and Ceremonies, being fully set down to their hands, and needing no more, but only to be put in execution; the Kings might well have highest Authority to see that done; whereas with us there are a number of Mysteries even in Belief, which were not so generally for them, as for us necessary to be with sound express acknowledgement understood: A number of things belonging to external Government, and our manner of serving God, not set down by particular Ordinances, and delivered to us in writing, for which cause the State of the Church doth now require, that the Spiritual Authority of Ecclesiastical persons be large, absolute, and not subordinate to Regal power. Thirdly,Idem ib. That whereas God armeth Religion Iewish as Christian with the Temporal sword. But of Spiritual punishment, the one with power to imprison, to scourge, to put to death: The other with bare authority to Censure and excommunicate: There is no reason that the Church which hath no visible sword, should in Regiment be subject unto any other power, then only unto theirs which have authority to bind and loose. Fourthly, That albeit whilst the Church was restrained unto one people, it seemed not incommodious to grant their King the general Chiefty of Power; yet now the Church having spread it self over all Nations, great inconveniences must therby grow, if every Christian King in his several Territory shall have the like power. Of all these differences, there is not one which doth prove it a thing repugnant to the Law, either of God, or of Nature, that all Supremacy of external Power be in Christian Kingdoms granted unto Kings thereof, for preservation of quietness, unity, order, and peace, in such manner as hath been shewed.