The Magical-Astrological-Diviner Posed and Puzzled, Treatise · Chapter 18
CHAP. XVIII.
18. From the fatuity of Fate.
1. WHether the very word, tearm, or name of Fate and Fortune, be not of Paganiſh origination; and withall, of ſuperſtitious derivation and acception? As Fate or fatation, from praefation or fore ſpeaking. And (I pray) whoſe ſpeaking? not Gods, but the ſtarres; nay, not the ſtarres, but the conſtellated Oracles: For theſe were the firſt Faticanes, and their hills, or cells, the firſt Vaticanes that ere were heard of. Although I rejoyce not much in etimologizing, neither do account an argument from the Notation to be very ſtrong, eſpecially in names of humane impoſition: Yet ſomething may (not amiſſe) be affirmed or denyed, from the notation of the name (though it be not ſo exquiſite, but alluſive only) keeping the principall letters, and comming neer to the nature of the thing. Let them therefore give me leave a little to play upon the word: and if they will undertake to doe otherwiſe; let others judge if they be not more ridiculous. Fatum à fando; vates, quaſi fates, à fando, vel à foreign, Fatuus à fando. Fate, and Fatories, and Fatiloquiſts, and Fooles, all taken from talking they know not what; foreign, and foreign, why any of foreign; and not all rather of foreign? in as much as fatidicall men, and Fooles, both fore-ſpeak many things, but fore-ſee nothing, foreign, vel foreign, vel foreign, vel foreign; of making furious and phantaſticall both connexions and Predictions; vel quaſi foreign, ſuppoſing the hand or power of the Moon, or coeleſtiall bodyes, to be therein; vel foreign, ſive foreign, doubting whether the coeleſtialls doe ſignifie or preſage any ſuch thing, yea or no; vel foreign; whether moneths, or dayes, or years, doe indeed diſtribute ſuch things as they prognoſticate; vel foreign, whether there be any ſuch part or lot indeed; vel foreign, whether there be any ſuch thing asFate in deſtiny remaining; vel quaſi foreign thing not coherent, congruous, convenient, neceſſary. But why not of foreign, rather than of all the reſt? ſave that there is nothing in this their fatall Deſtinie, to be loved or deſired. Sic foreign, quare non à foreign, aeque ac à foreign? Take them one as well as another, and then they note all together, that Fate may as eaſily be occurred, and prevented, as that it muſt neceſſarily have its fact or finiſhing. And that it may as well be paſſed by, as paſſe upon. Sic foreign, à foreign, happening any way; vel a foreign, becauſe of every ones own fabricating or making; vel quaſi foreign; as a thing (at beſt) but in a mans vowes, wiſhes, or deſires, rather than in any reality. Sic Fortuna quaſi vortuna, à vertendo, of turning every way. Vel quaſi forte una; peradventure ſomething, peradventure ſomething, peradventure nothing. But to ceaſe from deſcanting upon names, the very nature of both theſe hath alwaies cauſed the learnd to call them the foreign; the moſt vain and fooliſh things of themſelves, that a man could either fear or confide in.
2. Whether Fate or Fortune ought once to be named among Chriſtians? And how many eminent Saints of Gods Church have retracted, and repented that ever they have ſo done? And how mamany of them have, and do daily warn men to be wary, how they rake the heatheniſh termes out of their aſhes, and tranſlate them into the Church of Chriſt? Not that they are litigious about termes, or ſcrupulour of titles: But becauſe the word of God hath not a word, nor a ſyllable, nor a ſound, nor a ſignification of either of them; if it be rightly tranſlated or underſtood. And becauſe neither of them can be of any edification to the Church of God: but the uſe of them is a prophanation both of his Word and Church.
3. Whether there be any ſuch thing as Fate in nature, or in the world? And whether they that determine for it, doe aptly diſtinguiſh it: or in the determination abſtract and exempt it from the very hetheniſh originall and acceptation? And whether all their diſtinctions of Fate be able to diſcern it, for a ſolide and ſober truth, in any part or reſpect? The Theologicall fate is abuſive; for that's not paganiſh fate, but divine providence. The Naturall fate is ſuperfluous; for that need be called no more but natures common order. The Stoicall fate is ſuperſtitious, for that binds all things, perſons, actors, (in heaven or earth) to an ineluctible neceſſitie. The Chaldaicall, Mathematicall, or Genathliacall fate is worſe than all the reſt, as adding to them all a ſydereall or conſtellationall fancy. But what kind of Fate call they that which they make to ſit in the middle, and as it were hover in the balance, betwixt the deſultory levity of an indifferent caſualty; and the preſultory temerity of an urging, and inevitable neceſſity?
4. Whether Fate or Fortune doe not mutually take away one another? For neceſſity and contingency have alwayes been held as contraries and inconſiſtents. Elſe to what end were all thoſe diſputes betwixt the Stoicks and the Epicures? But why then doe ſo many Authors ſpeak of both theſe ſo promiſcuouſly? And why doe our Fataries, and Fortunaries ſo confound them: eſpecially in their prognoſtications, or predictions?
5. Whether the Philoſophers have been more ſerious than the Poets, about the ſeries of Fate? As for the Poets, what child ſmiles not to read the pretty fictious of the three Fates, or fatall Siſters; Clotho, Lacheſis, and Atropos; yea, or of Nova, Decima, and Morta; and of their names, derivations, progenie, order, and offices? As for the Philoſophers (Stoicks and Epicures,) It were long to tell, how featly they have toſt both Fate and Fortune, too and fro in their ſundry argumentations, aſſertions, definitions, deſcriptions, opinions, &c. But (better than all their earneſt) it is excellent ſport which they make (in their Mythologies, Apologies, Hieroglyphicks, &c.) with Fortunes wheel and horn on the one hand: and Fates Diſtaffe and Spindle on the other.
6. Whether argue the more ſtrongly; the Stoicks againſt Fortune, or the Epicures againſt Fate? Me thinks the Stoicks (for all their gravity) doe but rayle, when they call her the Goddeſs of fools, an empty name, a verſatile wind, a ſhort Sunſhine, a ſudden tempeſt, a muddy torrent, a fools paradiſe, a labyrinth, &c. Reproaching her for blind, deaf, mad, brutiſh, inſtable, treacherous, envious, cruell &c. Querulouſly accuſing her for playing with her own gifts; and ſporting her ſelf with humane mortality and miſery; turning all things upſide down, corrupting her own nature, or ruſhing upon her very ſelf, repenting of her good, rejoycing at her evill, taking the ſtronger part; regarding not vertue, but power; anſwering thoſe more, that dare, than that implore her; carrying on things againſt reaſon, prudence, counſell, vertue; moſt deceiving, where ſhe is moſt truſted; fooling all ſhe foſters; ſmiling and killing at once; tampering her hony with poyſon; immoderate both in good and evill; ſtrangling at laſt her own nurſelings; exalting and depreſſing; giviving and taking; dealing indiſcriminatly; ſatiſfying the greedy, more than the needy; giving unto many too much, to none enough; now a mother, now a ſtepdame; when moſt flouriſhing or flattering, moſt feeble; and making but the more unhappy, for having been acquainted with her happineſs. But (in my mind) the Epicures (for all their levity,) reaſon better. For though they might return the many invectives againſt Fortune upon Fate, yet they ſoberly argue thus; If there be neceſſitating and enforcing fatation upon things, muſt not ſuch a thing be done by a man, whether he be inſtructed or exhorted to it or no? nay, ſhall he not doe it whether he will himſelf or no? Is not the deſtinating decree enough to bring all things about, although there were neither command, nor care to goe about it? Does it not robb all rationall creatures of mind, will, counſell, deliberation, to tye them up to inevitable neceſſitie? How then are their proper motions reſerved, not only to rationalls, but to every moving creature? What naturall ſeries of cauſes can there be betwixt intellectualls, rationalls, ſpiritualls, animals, inanimates, and artificialls? Is it not ridiculous, to make an indiſſoluble ſeries, or conjunction of cauſes, where (beſides a deity) reaſon, and accident are ever and anon making an interruption? Who will ſay, that all things are concludedby, and included under Fate? Is there not much arbitrarineſs, whether one man will beget another, or no? and much more, whether one man will kill another, or no? How can there be ſo much as a naturall fate or neceſſity over men, when we ſee they are not all carryed one way: as things of one nature or kind (beaſts, birds, fiſhes, flyes) are? but men (although of one nature) are carryed diverſly, as their wits and affections lead them. Were people have ſundry Lawes, and they duly executed; how are they led along by their convenient edicts, rather than by the fatall decree of the Starres? Are the lawes of men and fate repugnant? and are theſe more prevalent than they? If all things be neceſſarily bound under Fate; what can be ſubject to reaſon, will, nature, occaſion, time, manners, prudence, counſell, ſociety, contingency, caſualty? Muſt not mens ſins and vices be neceſſary alſo, and inforced? Why ſhould he be puniſhed for offending, that is not able to reſiſt an impelling force? Is he to be blamed, that is not of his own power? we may commend vertue, but what praiſe of the vertuous, not ſo by labour and induſtry, but by fate and neceſſity? Doe not the Authors of Fate goe, and come; ſpeak, and keep ſilence; offer, and forbear; conſult, and deliberate; procure, and prevent; exhort, and dehort, praiſe, and diſpraiſe; reward, and puniſh? and why ſhould they doe all this, if they did believe their own doctrine of Deſtiny? Why ſhould men ſtudy or labour, if their fate be ſufficient to make them both wiſe and rich? How many things are not as the Fates will but as we will our ſelves? Have the Fates determined that a man ſhall have children, that will not marry, nor once touch a woman? that he ſhall be wiſe, that will not learn? that he ſhall be liberall, that will not give? that he ſhall be drowned, that will not come neer the warer? that he ſhall dye in a ſtrange Country that will not travell? If Fate have appointed a wound, or a diſeaſe to the body, is there not a medicine and meat to cure it? but if it could intend any evill upon the ſoul or mind, yet is there not education, and diſcipline to prevent it? Many things may be effected beſides nature: may they not much more then beſides Fate? If every man may fabricate his own Fortune, why not alſo contrive his own Fate? If Fate had never had name, or nature, or power, would things have fallen out otherwiſe than they doe fall out? why then ſhould Fate be inculcated, ſince (without Fate) there is Nature and Fortune, to which all things (neceſſary or caſuall) may be aptly referred? In this old Philoſophicall diſpute, what eaſie Moderator would not give this cenſure? That either ſide hath ſaid ſufficient, to overthrow his Adverſaries opinion; but neither of them enough to eſtabliſh his own.
7. Hath not the conſtellatory Fatation introduced ſo many ſtarry Gods into the world? Yea, made ſo many providentiall, and tutelary Gods and Goddeſſes (ſome Select, others Aſcriptitious) to have a hand in the whole adminiſtration of the Univerſe? But particularly ſo many Geniall or Genitall Gods and Goddeſſes, and their ſundry ordinations and offices at every mans geniture. As of Janus, Jupiter, Saturn, Genius, Mercury, Apollo, Mars, Vulcan, Neptune, Sol, Orcus, Liber Pater, Tellus, Ceres, Juno, Lucina, Fluona, Luna, Diana, Minerva, Venus, Veſta. Moreover, Vitumnus, Sentinus, Mens, Mena, Iterduca, Domiduca, Abaona, Adeona, and Dea Fatua too, not of the leaſt ordination and operation, either in the birth, or life, or death? And no marvell that they make ſo many Conſent-Gods goe to the fate of a Man: when they will have ſo many to be buſie about the fate of an herb. As Seia fatally preſident of the ſowing; Segetia or Segeſta, at the comming up of the Corn; Nodotus or Nodinus, at the knitting or knotting; Volutina, at the involving of the leaves; Batellina or Datellea, at the opening of the blade; Proſerpina at the budding; Hoſtilina, at the equall ſhaping of the eare; Flora, at the flouriſhing; Laſturtia, at the nouriſhing; Tutilina, in the keeping; Matuta, or Matura, at the ripening; Meſſia, at the mowing; and Runcina, not only at the weeding, but at the plucking up by the roots.
8. Whether Fate be one or many? If it be one ſimply, then what needs any reduction? if it many, why is it not reduced to one? And then in vain is that done by many, which may be done by one: and it is prophane, l to aſcribe that to many, which ought to be a ſcribed to one. If it be one truly, then is it undivided in it ſelf, and divided from all others: which how can that which is a ſeries, or connexion of ſo many things be? eſpecially having its inherence in movables or mutables. If it be but one accident, why ſhould it imply all under a neceſſity? If it be but one by aggregation, collection, connexion, ſo are things fortuitous as well as fatall. Beſides, ſuch an unity is in the meaneſt degree of entity. Wherefore then ſhould it order, and ſubordinate things of a more perfect degree then it ſelf? If it be many, or a multiplicity; then is it unequall, indeterminate, uncertain, and next to a nullity. If it be one, why then ſo they make it do diverſe, according to divers conjuctions and conſtellations? If it be many, how can they make any certain and particular pronouncing upon it?
9. Whether that they call Fate, be in the firſt, or among the ſecond Cauſes? If in the firſt, that is as much as to make it equall unto God: If among the ſecond, then is it inferiour unto man. For among ſecond cauſes, and eſpecially in involuntary actions, and all ſuch as fall under humane counſell and deliberation; the intellectuall mind, and rationall will, hath no ſuperiour. And what more contrary to the order of nature and creatures, than that the leſſe noble ſhould be diſpoſing, and governing thoſe more noble than themſelves?
10. Whether there be a fatall neceſſity upon all acts or events? If upon all acts, where's Liberty? if upon all events, where's contingency? And whether upon theſe, both good and evill? and that whether naturall, civill, or ſpirituall? If upon naturall acts and events, good, or evill; then what uſe of means either to preſerve, or to prevent? If upon acts civill, and good; what merit? what praiſe? if upon acts civill, and evill; what laws, what puniſhments? If upon events civill, and good; what thanks? if upon events civill, and evill; what hopes? If upon acts ſpirituall, and good; what free grace? if upon acts ſpirituall, and evill; what free will? If upon events ſpirituall, and good; what free bounty? If upon events ſpirituall, and evill; what free mercy?
11. How can there, or why ſhould there be ſuch a thing as Fate, impoſing a neceſſity upon actions, and events? when as divine providence it ſelf doth it not: ſo as to exclude liberty, contingency, or caſualty from things. But works with ſecond cauſes according to their own motion, and manner. Permitting ſometimes their exuberancy, ſometimes their deficiency: preſerving to them their ſundry orders, offices, and degrees of efficiency. Suffering the remoter cauſes, or agents, to be impedited by the more proximate; that all effects might not be taken for naturall, and neceſſary; but that his own free diſpoſing might appear. Although nature, and every naturall agent, be of it ſelf, and ordinarily, determinated to one effect; and to the producing of it after the ſame way: yet he ſuffers it to be impedited by one debility, and indiſpoſition, or another (either to come to paſs otherwiſe, or elſe to be altogether prevented) that ſo he might preſerve a contingency in all naturall cauſes: to the intent nothing might be thought abſolutely neceſſitating, but his own will and pleaſure above. Much more doth he confirm a freedom to the rationall will; not only that good may the more chearfully be done, and accepted; but the evill alſo that is done, or ſuffered; may not unjuſtly be imputed to providence, becauſe of a neceſſity impoſed.
12. If fate be (as they define it) the Series, order, nexure, ligation, complication, conſtitution, diſpoſition of ſecond cauſes, &c. what feeble things are all thoſe ſeconds put together without the firſt? what can their own motion work to, without his ſpeciall concurrence? what if he work not with them? what if without them? what if againſt them? Leave them to themſelves, and what knot in a rope of Sand? Can there be a perpetuall ſeries, or indiſſoluble connexion betwixt cauſes ſo diſparate, yea ſo adverſe, as naturall, internall, neceſſary, and arbitrary, adventitious, accidentall? yet after this order is fate oftentimes finiſhed. A languiſhing man not only conſumes away within himſelf; but the ayr, meats, drinks, poyſon, act the fatall conſummation. To an ordinated deſtiny of an unfortunate end; comes in inordinately fire, water, a fall, a gun, a ſword, an unlucky hand, &c. and hath not this neceſſitating fate now the complement by accident? and is there not a caſuall intervention (of more force to the fatall effect) than all the cauſall connexion? How many accidents fall out fatally, that can have no ſecond cauſe ordinatly aſſigned to them; much leſs proſpected in them (but muſt be referred meerly to divine will and pleaſure) unleſs you will have accidentall inſtruments (that interven inordinately) to be ſuch?
13. The Phyſicall fate they will have to be a ſeries of pure naturall cauſes, &c. (viz. betwixt the ſtars, the elements, the temperament, the inclination, the manners, the action, and the iſſue or event) now where are all theſe cauſes knit together? in the efficient, the form, the matter, or the end? How are they worthy to be called cauſes, or ſo proved? How are they pure, naturall, and neceſſary cauſes; when ſome of them are voluntary, and contingent? what connexion of them is that, which carrys on prime, and ſecond cauſes; naturall, and voluntary; neceſſary, and contingent, with one fatall force, or inevitable agitation? what ſeries is that which (as hath been ſaid) is ſo often interrupted? what copulation betwixt the firſt, and the laſt; when as (by their own confeſſion) the ſtars are not the cauſes of all events; neither doe all thoſe effects fall out neceſſarily, whereof they are the cauſe; How are they fatall then; or their complement of fate?
14. Whether in the ſeries both of fate, and of fortune (although two contraries) Aſtrologers have not delivered the ſame order, and connexion of cauſes (as the ſtars, tempers, manners, actions, events) or elſe what difference doe they make between them? Nay wherefore doe the ſame Authors ſpeak of fate, and fortune ſo promiſcuouſly, and indiſcriminately? (eſpecially in their prognoſticating, or predicting way) Is it not becauſe they are not able to diſtinguiſh them? Or is it not becauſe they are conſcious of a fortuitouſneſs of event, even in their ſtricteſt fatality?
15. Whether (in the ſeries of fatall cauſes) the effect doth follow the univerſall, indefinite, equivocall, and remote: or elſe the univocall, proximate ſpecificall and particular cauſe? And which of theſe is that which doth determine, and diſtinguiſh the effect? Does not a man generate a man; and a Beaſt, a Beaſt; what ever the poſition of the ſtars be? Thoſe that have been borne in the ſame region, at the ſame moment, under the ſame poſition; have they all been the ſame? nay, how divers have they been (for all that) in their ingenies, their fortunes, and fates? And why ſo? but becauſe they have taken their ſeverall affections, and inclinations from their particular cauſes?
16. As for ſecond cauſes, means, agents, inſtruments; ſeeing God Almighty makes uſe of them, to bring his own purpoſes to paſs (not out of any defect, or neceſſity; but to make his own efficiency the more perceptible.) Yee ſeeing he oft-times renders the moſt noble, and convenient means ineffectuall; and uſes the meaneſt, and unapteſt of them, to the producing of very eminent effects; Why then ſhould we be bound to lurke at that order, which God himſelf obſerves not? why ſhould our faith be taught to reſpect, or reſt upon the middle things; in a prejudice to that providence, which is the abſolute beginning, and end of all?
17. Whether the ſecond cauſes be not ordained as the remedies, rather than as the means of fate, or fortune? providence it ſelf that has determined ſuch an accident, or event, has it not alſo ordained ſecond means, to help, and relieve, in ſuch a caſe? wherfore are the creatures, and their offices created to ſuch ends: if they be not to be uſed to ſuch ends, for which they were created? what ever the fate, or fortune be; is there not a naturall Law (impreſt in every creature) to labour for the conſervation of it ſelf, both in its being, and well being? To what end hath God given men a mind, will, reaſon, affections, counſell, deliberation, ſcience, art, obſervation, experiment, means, inſtruments, &c. but as well prudently, and diligently to diſcern, procure, fortify, prevent, remedy; as thankfully to accept, or humbly to ſubmit? Hath not the Spirit of God ſecretly, and ſweetly ſuggeſted to his deareſt children (in their ſudden, and extraordinary perils, and perplexities) even preſent advices, and ſuccours; beſides the inward conſolations, and confirmations of his grace? yea, is not this one cauſe why men are kept ſo ignorant of future accidents (and of their utmoſt iſſues, after that they are already happened) that men might not only prepare for them; but make uſe of ſuch means, as God himſelf hath prepared againſt them? Otherwiſe, ſhould they not tempt God, in a neglect of them?
18. Whether there be not in the whole courſe of nature, in the univerſall world, and eſpecially throughout the whole Church of Chriſt, farre more effectuall cauſes, means, orders, connexions, rules, guides, guards, helpes of life, of health, peace, libertie, ſociety, &c. for counſell, actions, paſſions, accidents, events, than the coeleſtiall bodies can poſſibly be? ought theſe then to be reſpected more than all they? or yet in compariſon to them?
19. Who is able to bring into one ſeries, or can reconcile to truth the old Philoſophicall opinions, about the exerciſe, or execution of Fate, by ſecond cauſes? As whether by Angels, Spirits, Geniuſſes, Demons, Devills, by the Soul of the world, by the Souls of men, by the totall ſubſervience of Nature, by the motions and influences of the Starres, and caeleſtiall bodies, by ſenſible agents, by artificiall inſtruments, yea, and by very accidents and caſualties? Chriſtians know, and acknowledge all theſe creatures to be the miniſters, or inſtruments of providence. The Angells doing his will, are the more eminent miniſters both of his mercies and judgements: adminiſtring not only in temporalls, and in ſpiritualls, but likewiſe to eternalls. And if it be ſo as Philoſophie ſayes, that they are the Intelligencies, that move the caeleſtiall orbes; then have they an ordination over the adminiſtration of the Starres. The Devills are not only permitted, but wiſely and juſtly uſed in the execution of temptations, tryalls, judgements. (But how comes in Fate and Fortune? who can tell? unleſſe they intrude among the Devills, and be indeed of their foyſting in.) As for the heavenly bodyes, they are to be confeſt, as of Gods ordination and employment in their order, light, motions, and prodigious appearances. But he makes ſpeciall uſe of mens reaſon, underſtanding, wills, affections, memories, counſells, deliberations, policies, vocations, ſocieties, arts, artifices, Lawes, Cuſtomes, actions, and experiments, in the government of the world: and yet more eſpecially their gifts, graces, duties, offices, ſervices, in the governing of his Church. Laſt of all come in the whole hoſte of creatures to act here as he hath ordained. Now what fatation, or fatall neceſſitation to man, among all theſe? Angels or Devills can but inject into the mind: they cannot compell, no nor yet incline the will. That's only for the infinite power of God himſelf to doe, men (as to naturall, civill, and morall acts) are ſtill actors in their own liberty. As for bodyes (Coeleſtiall or terreſtriall) they work directly but upon bodyes only: and the terreſtriall are held, and found to be the more proximately, particularly, and ſenſibly diſpoſing. Beſides the friendſhip and hatred, the complyance and adverſneſs of men; is not the ſervice, or diſſervice of the brute creature; the vertue or venome of an herb or minerall; yea, the defence or offence of a ſword, a knife, a ſpear, a gun, a club, &c. are not all theſe more ſenſibly apprehended, to be more neerly advantagious or prejudiciall to health or ſickneſſe, riches or poverty, honour or diſgrace, proſperity and adverſity, life or death; than are all the joynt benevolences, or malevolencies of the fatall Starres? If therefore a fatidicall prognoſtication may be made from the Caeleſtiall: why not rather from the terreſtriall motions?
20. Whether Fate be above the Starres, as their governour; or elſe under them as their miniſter? If above them, why make they the ſtarres to be the cauſes of fate? For ſo they muſt needs be ſuperiour to it. If under them, how then are the ſtarres themſelves ſubject to fate? for ſo they muſt needs be inferiour. How then ſhould the ſtarres diſpoſe of others fate▪ that are not able to diſpoſe of their own? Is it for creatures (terreſtriall or caeleſtiall) to perform that to others, which they are not able to preſerve to themſelves? Ought not therefore ſuch a diſpoſition to be referred ſolely to him, that hath the ordination, and gubernation of all things (both in heaven and earth) ſimply, freely, eternally and immutably in himſelf?
21. How can the fatall ſeries of cauſes be from the ſtarres? when as the ſtarres themſelves are not cauſes, as in humane and arbitrary actions. Not cauſes, where they may be ſignes; as of things already done, and paſt. Yea, God himſelf may ſignifie many things, whereof he is not the cauſe: as in evill, and ſinfull actions. Nay, have not the fatidicall Vaticinators themſelves made many fatall ſignes, which could never be cauſes, nor yet once come into any ſeries, or neceſſary connexion? As in their aruſpicies, and anguries; from the entrailes of beaſts, flight, and noiſe of birds, &c. as alſo from lots, dreams, prodigies, caſualties, yea and phyſiognomies, &c.
22. How can the ſtarres be the firſt in the fatall ſeries of ſecond cauſes? When as (of all creatures) the ſpirituall, intellectuall, or rationall are the ſupreme: and the corporeall, animate, or inanimate their inferiours. Now the ſtarres are both corporeall, and inanimate; Spirits, and ſouls; as they have more ſimilitude to, ſo they participate more vertue of divine providence than all other creatures: For they are both the cognoſcitive, and the operative inſtruments of providence, which the other are not. For theſe being but the executive only: may either be directed, or diverted by the iutellectuall, and ordinative. As acting of themſelves with liberty, deliberation, diſcretion obſervation of right rules, application of fit means, and intention to a due end. And therefore are the more eminent miniſters of providence, than all things elſe, in heaven or earth.
23. Whether any ſuch cut as fatation, may be properly ſayd to be in, or from the ſtarres? For fatation imports a primordiall law or decree; not an influence only, or effect: what ſacrilege is it then to aſcribe that to the inſtrument, which is only peculiar to the principall agent? Since it is for inſtruments (eſpecially the inanimate) not to ordain, but execute only, (Yea, it is a queſtion, whether there be any fatation even in fate it ſelf?) it being accepted, and diſcerned, not for a ſeminall diſpoſition, but for an ultimate execution: and that inherent in the moveable or mutable ſubject. Wherefore, ſeeing fatation is neither in the ſtarres, nor in fate it ſelf: whether can any thing be ſayd to be fatall with reſpect to the ſtarres? For the ſtarres are but ſecond cauſes. And with reſpect to all ſuch, ſome things may be ſayd to be naturall, ſome things arbitrary, ſome things indifferent, ſome things contingent, ſome things uncertain, ſome things caſuall: but few or none fatall.
24 Whether it be in the power and validity of the celeſtiall bodyes to impoſe a fatall neceſſity, either upon humane actions, or yet upon naturall things? For if the ſtarres be any ſuch cauſes; then muſt they cauſe principally of themſel…es, intentionally, directly, immutably. Now how can they be principall cauſes; when providence is above them? how of themſelves: when they work not upon humane actions but by accident? how intentionally; ſince they want a mind, or ſoul? how directly; when they operate upon humane actions but indirectly? how immutably, when their ordination or diſpoſition may be impedited? Again, were they thus acting; then ſhould there be no contingents, or accidents, no libertie, or free actions, nor prevention of any events or iſſues; no particular cauſes ſhould be defective; nor diſtance of place, nor indiſpoſition of the mean; no neglect of the means, no endeavour to the contrary, or oppoſition ſhould be available: nay, not only the underſtanding▪ but the will ſhould be tyed to corporall organs and matter; yea, and the ſtarres ſhould not only be of ſufficient, but of infinite power.
25. How doe the celeſtiall bodyes work ſo fatally upon theſe inferiours: when as they here operate not upon a neceſſity, as to the producing of the effect. For albeit their impreſſions be naturall; yet are they not received, but according to the manner of the receivers, which are fluxible, and not having themſelves ſtill after the ſame way. Becauſe of the matter, that is in a potentiality to many, yea, and to contrary formes. The matter alſo is movable, and corruptable, and may eaſily defect of it ſelf, may be intrinſecally indiſpoſed, and extrinſecally impedited. And the ſtarres themſelves are but indefinite, and remote cauſes; to which the effect can never follow determinatly, and neceſſarily, unleſs the middle cauſes be neceſſary; and then they follow them, and not the other. But in the foreſaid ſeries the middle cauſes are moſt of them contingent: and from many contingent cauſes can come no effect of neceſſity, becauſe any one of them, and all of them together, may be defective, and not attain unto their end.
26. Seeing the heavenly bodyes act not upon theſe inferiours, but by their light and motion; and ſo communicate nothing to the matter they work upon, but light, motion and heat: Now why may not all theſe flow from all the ſtarres in generall? And why then ſhould ſuch, and ſuch fatall inclinations be attributed to ſuch, or ſuch poſitions or conjunctions? And if there be any particular vertues of the light and motion of ſome ſtars, contrary to the vertues of the light and motion of other ſtarres; how is that demonſtrated? And how comes it to paſſe that they ſhould be operative and effectuall one way, in their ſimple natures or qualities: and yet another way in their relative aſpects and poſitions? Is an imaginary relation, or reſpect of more validity, than a reall ſubſtance or propriety?
27. They ſeem to define fate more acurately, that make it to be the …eries, or connext order of naturall cauſes. Now till they can directly and ſucceſſively deduce thoſe naturall cauſes, down from the ſtarres, to thoſe fatall events: what reaſon is there to credit their propoſition, much leſſe their prognoſtication? They likewiſe will have fate (in the beſt ſenſe they can take it) to digeſt and diſtribute all things, according to certain motions, ſucceſſions, orders, forms, places, times. Now if their fate cannot be well underſtood, or diſcerned, without theſe ſame aſtrictions: why are they ſo confounded at the inexplicableneſs of the circumſtances? Otherwiſe, why doe they not predict uſually the very times and places, together with the fates themſelves? Moreover, the firſt definers of fate, held it to be, not in the ſuperiors, but in the inferiors themſelves. Namely, a diſpoſition inherent in the moveable thing: and that urging to an immoveable event. If indeed it be ſuch; ought not every mans fate to be collected from himſelf, rather than from his Stars?
28. How ſhould the things of fate, and fortune be foretold; when it is not yet (with one conſent) told what things they are themſelves? Some have gone ſo high, as to ſay that they are Deities or Gods: others are fallen ſo low, as to make them vanities, and nothing. Some confound theſe two together: ſome ſet them ſo oppoſite, as that they make them confound one another. Some admit many things of both (as they ſay) at the fore-gate: and exclude all again at the back door. Some place them in the beginning in the middle, in the end of a buſineſs. Some make us to be in their power: Some them in our power. Some would have us believe both but inquire neither. But if they would no inquiry after their nature, and properties: why make they ſuch inquiry into their operations, and effects?
29. Whether fate be mutable, or immutable? If mutable; how is it fate? Is there not then a contingency of fate: as well as a fate of contingencies? If immutable; what hope? what colour? what means? what remedy? Nay, if immoveable; how moves it (as they ſay) according to the nature, and order of all moveable things? That is to ſay, with naturall things, naturally; with neceſſary, neceſſarily; with voluntary, voluntarily; with contingent, contingently; with violent, violently; with remiſs, remiſſely. And all this not as a prime, and free; but as a ſecond and neceſſary cauſe. Why may we not as well ſay, with rationall things … tionally; with brute, brutiſhly; with ſenſuall, ſenſually; with … tuous, vertuouſly; with vitious, vitiouſly; with proſperous, p…o… perouſly; with adverſe, adverſely; with uncertain uncertainly, …. And then, what irrefragable law of fate is that, which is fain to conform to, and comply with every ones manners, and manner of working?
30. Whether fate be abſolute in decree, or conditionate? If abſolute; then can it not be otherwiſe, and what remedy? Nay then is it infinite omnipotent, eternall, and with ſuperiority? If conditionate (and that not from a liberall diſpenſation of its own, but a naturall ordination from another) what fatation is that then, that comes upon condition? that depends upon others actions, not its own determination? If it be abſolute; then is it cruell, and unjuſt in many things: if it be conditionate; then is it variable and certain in nothing. Set aſide the firſt act, which is the eternall decree; and the laſt act, which is death: theſe indeed may be ſaid to be both abſolute, and conditionate; but Chriſtians are not taught to call theſe fate. But take it (as they doe) for the middle act, then can they make it to be neither abſolute, nor conditionate.
31. Whether fate, and fatall events follow the body; or the mind? If the body; what difference betwixt the fate of a man, and of a beaſt? In events (good or evill) who is worthy? who is guilty? And how follow they the mind; ſeeing the ſtars (neceſſarily and directly) make no impreſſion there? Becauſe it is ſuperiour, according to the order of nature: and not ſubject to matter, time, or place: but united to an intellectuall, and ſpirituall ſubſtance; and therefore cannot ſuffer from corporeall things, although celeſtiall. Nor can they ſo exceed their own ſphear, and ſpecies; as to act directly upon it. And if not upon the intellective faculty, which acts neceſſarily: much leſs upon the elective power, which is free; and never acts but freely; nor is ſubject to fatality, or fatall neceſſity. For then ſhould the election of the will be no more, but a meer naturall inſtinct; ſhould be determined to one thing; ſhould act but one way; ſhould have the like motions in all upon the like repreſentations; ſhould not have any thing in its own power to diſcern, deliberate, chooſe, refuſe, &c. but muſt be carryed on, either naturally, or violently, as the Stars doe incline or enforce?
32. Whether fate or fortune, be either in good, or evill actions? If fate be i… good actions; are they not neceſſitated, and inforced? if fortune … there; are they not fortuitous, and accidentall? And ſo, what …e of them? what reward? The like may be affirmed of evill actions; and if likewiſe thus inferred; what ſhame? what puniſhment? In vitious actions, either fate offers violence to a mans will, or leaves to its own liberty. If the firſt, is not a mans will to be excuſed in evill? and if the laſt, is not every mans will the cauſe of his own fate? yea and of the hardeſt and heavieſt fates? For they are ſuch which follow ſin, and wickedneſs.
33. Wherefore ſhould man (or his actions) be made the ſubject, yea the ſlave of fate; when as indeed man, as man, is ſuperiour thereto? For fate being but a ſydereall ſervice of ſecond cauſes, muſt be reduced to the providence of the firſt cauſe: and in that reduction, man himſelf hath place, or preferment, before all the ſtars of heaven. Becauſe the divine providence receives to it ſelf, or extends it ſelf in a more ſpeciall way, to intellectuall, or rationall: than it doth to all other creatures elſe. In as much as they excell all others, both in the perfection of nature, and in the dignity of end. In the perfection of nature; Becauſe the rationall creature hath the dominion over his own actions, and operates voluntarily: whereas the other act not ſo much, as are acted. In the dignity of the end; becauſe the intellectuall creature only, by his operation, reaches to the ultimate end of the univerſe, ſc. to know, and love God. But the other creatures touch not that end, by an inſpired intention, but only according to ſome participated ſimilitude. Furthermore, God provides for the intellectuall nature principally, and as it were for ſelfs ſake: and but for all other crtatures ſecondarily and in order to it. The rationall creature is Gods agent: the other are but his inſtrumens. Now God cares more for his agents than he doth for his inſtruments. Yea they are the inſtruments of this very agent: and he makes uſe of them either in his practice, or contemplation. God hath more regard to the free, and liberall: than to the neceſſitated, and ſervile acts of his creatures. The rationall creatures are the more noble in themſelves, and of more neer acceſſion to the divine ſimilitude; and therefore tendred by God before and above all others. They are the more principall parts of the whole univerſe: to which the leſs principall are but ſubſerving; as intended for their ſakes, and working for their ends. Intellectuall natures have more aſfinity with the whole; as apprehending all things elſe beſides themſelves: whereas every other creature is but a part, and capable of no more but a bare participation of its own particular entity. Now it is not for the inapprehending part, to have an ordaining power over the apprehenſive whole. By the courſe of nature the rationall creature uſes all other things for it ſelf, as either for the perfection of its intellect, the explication of its ſcience, the exerciſe of its vertue, or elſe the ſuſtentation of its body, to which the intellectuall nature is united. And therefore it is not for them, to diſpoſe, rule, govern, impell neceſſitate him him: but for him to obſerve, rule, govern, diſpence moderate, and make uſe of them.
34. Whether any thing can be ſayd to be fatall (with reſpect to us) till it have taken effect? For a fatality before it be, is but a contingency to us: and to us a concingency, after it is, is a fatality. Why then ſhould we be bound to believe the prognoſticated things of Fate or Fortune before hand? yea, though they may have ſome naturall cauſe, remotely neceſſary, or of ſome indefinite probability: yet is not all this ſufficient for our faith in particular; becauſe, as concerning many ſuch naturall cauſes, there is in us nevertheleſs (beſides the ſupreme) a liberty, and power to prevent.
35. Suppoſe the Fates have deſtinated one man to be hangd, or kill'd by another; why ſhould not that be prognoſticated from another mans nativity, as well as his own: ſeeing he alſo comes neceſſarily into the ſeries of ſecond cauſes? Indeed ſome of the old genethliacks have boaſted to foreſee, or foretell a mans fate, or fortune, from the nativity of his parents, Brethren, children, &c. But have not others of them held it for a fooliſh fancy, that the fate or fortune of one man ſhould lye involved, not only in his own; but in the conſtellations of ſo many mens nativities?
36. Whether they that ſuffer the ſame fate, have the ſame ſtarres coupling, or compacting thereunto? Et è contra. Suppoſe them ſuffring (and ſuffring to death, the laſt line of Fate) for Chriſt, the Goſpe…l religion, and conſcience. Is this fatall deſtiny alſo from the ſtarry order, and connexion? who ever heard that the ſtarres made Martyrs, or neceſſitated unto martyrdome? How then hath it come to paſſe, that young, old, men, women, of ſeverall ages, ſexes, nations (and therefore not of the ſame conſtellations) have all agreed to undergoe the ſame event?
37. Whether that be true Fate, which they would mingle together with providence? and how can divine providence, and Pagan Fate agree? For Providence is the beginning, and continuation of all things: Fate is the end or utter confuſion of them. Providence is in the ordering of caſuals, as well as fatals: Fate is oppoſing all things fortuitous; and therefore not diſpoſing them. Providence is an act in God: their Fate is no more but an event upon the creature. Providence is a diſpoſition impendent, or out of the thing: Fate is a diſpoſition inherent, or in the thing. Providence comprehends all things (paſt, preſent, and to come) ſo does not Fate in her connexion of Cauſes. Providence is in and over all things, from the greateſt to the leaſt (good, evill, celeſtialls, terreſtrialls, ſpiritualls, corporealls, univerſalls, ſingulars, naturalls, rationalls, voluntaries, neceſſaries, contingents) ſo is not Fate. Providence is more ſpeciall to one, than to another: but Fate is a neceſſity to all alike. Providence can work immediately, without, and againſt means: Fate can operate nothing but according to her ſeries, or connexion. Providence can act with every creature, reſerving to it its own motion (as with free agents freely; with contingents contingently, &c.) whereas Fate hath no way to work but fatally, that is neceſſarily, forcibly, inexorably, immutably, inevitably. The rules, order, ſucceſſe of divine providence, are either written in his own book or in his own breaſt: and not in the Starres and Planets, as Fate is. The wiſedome, juſtice, power, goodneſſe of his providence; all this is written in his own book: the particular ſucceſſes, iſſues, events thereof all theſe are written in his own breaſt Even wiſe Providence it ſelf is not herein to be diſcerned or determined before-hand: what ſatuous thing is Fate then, that is ſo obvious and triviall, as for the Faticanes to foretell? Is not this difference enough between them, and never to be reconciled; Providence is a prudent counſellor, and will have the particular iſſues kept ſecret: Fate is a ſilly babbler, and will have them commonly foretold?
38. Whether (had it not been for the fictions of Fate and Fortune) there had ever been hatcht opinions and hereſies, ſo prejudiciall to divine providence? and that even amongſt Pagans themſelves, that had experience ſufficient to convince them of the truth, and power of it: and of the juſtice, yea and goodneſſe of it in great part. Had the divine providence ever been denyed: if Fate and fortune had not been held for Gods? Had God himſelf been implanted under Fate, or made ſubject to the decrees of it, or ſlandered for a ſloathfull & careleſs ſpectator of humane things, and terrene: if they had not confined and limited God to content himſelf with the reiglement of the heavens; as if it had veen beneath his dignitie and majeſtie, to vouchſafe to look down to ſmall things, or once to take notice of of what was done here below: but to commit the care and rule of all ſublunary and inferiour things, to the ſtarres and celeſtiall bodyes; as his ſubſtitutes and their ſuperiours? Had prophane and wicked men ever accuſed providence, and excuſed their impieties: had they not heard of fatall ſtarres neceſſitating and inforcing both their wills and actions?
39. Was not the conſtitution of Fate and Fortune, firſt invented in a derogation to God, and his divine providence: and that through a paganiſh and infidelious ſcandall at good things happening to bad men here; and evill things to good men, which had never been excogitated, or had ſoon vaniſhed had they been thus Chriſtianly inſtructed, viz. That the all provident Creator diſpenſes theſe middle things with an indifferent hand, as unto creatures. That the beſt men upon earth, are not worthy of the leaſt of goods things: & may deſerve to be involved in the utmoſt of evill things, that can here befall them. That the wiſe Diſpoſer knows how to turn theſe outward good things to the evill, of evill men: and theſe outward evill things to the good of good men. That this preſent world is no time of full puniſhing, or rewarding: but theſe two preciſely pertain to the world that is to come.
40. Admit that either Fate or fortune was ſo indeed as they preſage; or much more than they can imagine: yet how is the beſt of them both ſufficient to moderate all fond hopes and fears? Or what is able to doe that; but a lively faith (voyd of theſe heatheniſh ſuperſtitions) and aſſuredly believing, That there is an all-provident God, that only foreſees all things neceſſarie: and to whom nothing is contingent or caſuall. That can, will, and doth work (for the beſt of his) both with ſecond cauſes, and exteriour means; as alſo without them, yea and againſt them. That binds not the world, much leſſe tyes his Church unto them. That hath written his childrens names in the book of life: and much more then (they may be aſſured) hath numbred the hairs of their heads, as concerning all earthly accidents. That ſhines, and moves in the Sun and Moon, and ſtarres: and makes their generall influxes more, or leſſe effectuall, as he is pleaſed to adde, or abſtract his ſpeciall motion; or oppoſe his immediate adminiſtration, or interpoſe the office of his more excellent Miniſters, Angells, and reaſonable Souls.