The True Idea of Jansenism Both Historic and Dogmatic, Part 2

The True Idea of Jansenism Both Historic and Dogmatic · Part 2

p. 101PART II.

The Dogmatick Idea of Jansenisme.

The Principles of Jansenisme as laid down by Jansenius. 1. Efficacious Grace the first Principle of Jansenisme: of habitual and actual adjutorie. 2. The traduction of Original sin. 3. How far Invincible ignorance is sin. 4. Of sinfull Concupiscence, 1 Joh. 2. 16. 5. Of the nature of Fruition, and that God is its alone object. 6. Why love to the creature for it self is irregular. 7. The pestiferous effects of creature-love and fruition. 8. No free-will to good. 9. Indifference not essential to Liberty, neither does voluntary Necessitie exclude it. 10. The state of pure Nature, since the p. 102fall, is but a philosophick figment 11. Love to God in the state of Innocence both natural and supernatural▪ How love to God is a debt to huma… Nature, and yet of Grace. 12. Ther… is no natural Grace or Happines, b… what is supernatural. 13. How G… cannot but punish sin: Sin the greate… punishment of sin. 14. No Obligatio… on God to give Grace to such as improve Naturals. 15. The impotence … the Law as to salvation, and the irr…tation of sin thereby. 16. Of Medic…nal efficacious Grace, and its necessiti… 17. The nature of efficacious Grace i… Divine suavity. 18. There is no sufficient Grace but what is efficaciou… 19. How many wayes Gods Precept are usefull and possible, without sufficient Grace. 20. The Distributions … Efficacious Grace into preventing an… subsequent. 21. All Grace in love … God. 22. Of servile fear, its causes▪ &c. 23. Of Free-will, its nature, &c. 24. The mode of reconciling Free-wi… with Efficacious Grace. 25. Of Pre… destination, its act, object, motives, &c▪ 26. Of Reprobation, and against Vn… versal p. 103Grace. 27. Against Scholastick Theologie. 28. The Jansenists D…gmes of faith, touching the perfection of Scriptures, efficacious Grace, justification by faith, &c. 29. Their practical Theologie. 30. Their Principles as to Church Discipline: 1. That there is no humane infallible judge in matters of faith. 2. That Church…power is declarative only. 3. For liberty of Conscience, &c.

HAving given some Historick account of Jansenisme, §. 1. The Principles of Jansenisme.its Authors, Rise, and Progresse, together with sundry particularities, as to matter of fact: we now proceed to its Principles both Dogmatick and Practick; wherein we may be more affirmative and peremptory, than in former matters of fact. The Principles of Jansenisme (as of all Religi…n) have a threefold foreign or regard. 1. To Faith or Doctrine. 1. The Notional Principles of Jansenisme as laid down by Jansenius.2. To Discipline and Worship. 3. To Morals, or Conversation. We shall begin with the first, namely the Principles of Jansenisme relating unto Faith; which though in themselves more speculative and national, yet have they a very soverein influence on practice. p. 104These national principles of Jansenisme may be considered, as laid down by Jansenius, the Founder of this Sect, or as taken up by his Adhaerents. We shall first consider them, as they are to be found in Jansenius his Augustinus, which is made the source and measure of Jansenisme. And here we may not engage so deeply, as to extract a perfect Idea of all Jansenius's Doctrine; but shall content our selves to cull forth and collect such particular notions of his, as carrie in them some note of peculiaritie and remarque, whence the denomination of Jansenisme received its Original. And in this undertaking we shall follow Jansenius, foreign, in his own words (translated) and method, as well as sense, so near as we may.

1. As foreign,…. Efficacious Grace the first Principle of Jansenisme. the first lie or Idol of Molinisme consists in the asserting of Free-will; so, foreign, the first Truth of Jansenisme regards Efficacious Grace. This is the first great fundamental notion, which I have remarqued in Jansenius and his Adhaerents, who indeed are great Advancers of Efficacious Grace, but as great Abasers of p. 105Corrupt Nature; friends of Free Grace, but professed enemies of Free-will. So Jansenius (in his August. Tom. 2. fol. 60.) distinguisheth of a twofold Adjutorie, or Divine Assistance: Of a twofold Adjutorie habitual and actual.the one he calls an Adjutorie sine quo non, without which we cannot act: the other he calls an Adjutorie quo, by which we act. The first he makes to be only habitual, preparatory and potential, whereby the Powers of the Soul are prepared, corroborated, and capacitated to act: the second he makes to be an actual, energetick or influential Adjutorie, whence followeth the application and determination of the power to act.Habitual Grace. The former potential habitual Adjutories he supposeth to be in the same rank, with the Power or Facultie, for whose corroboration and assistance they are given: for out of them and the power which they informe, there is constituted one intire complete operative facultie; whence the power cloathed with, or informed by these habitual Adjutories, receives the denomination of an actus primus, a first act, which gives not foreign, Phil. 2. 13. the will, Phil. 2. 13.Phil 2:13and the doe, but only a complete power p. 106of willing and doing. Amongst thes… dispositive potential Adjutories or Assistances he reckons all Habits or Powers▪ as Intelligible species or Ideas, and the light of Intelligence, commonly stile… intellectual Habits; as all moral Habits Dispositions, and Preparatory Graces, seated in the will.Of Actual Grace, and its necessitie. As for the adjutoriu… quo, the Adjutorie by which we act, o… actual Assistance, he proves, by invincible arguments, that both the Will, and the freeness of the will, as to whatever is morally good, depends immediately and wholly on the actual Adjutorie or concourse of Efficacious Grace. This he proves at large, in his Tom. 3. lib. 1. c. 2, 3. but especially, cap. 4. fol. 6. where he gives this Demonstrative reason from the cause, why no M…tion or Act of the Will can be Morally good, without the Adjutorie of Efficacious Grace: The true root (sayes he) why no work morally good, can be done without Grace freeing or uncaptivating the will, is this: That which by the bondage of Concupiscence is taken from good works, is not some supernaturalitie of the work, or the Reason of merit, but it is the p. 107very formal Reason, by which a good work is constituted such; so that upon the defect thereof sin ipso facto followeth. For the Pondus or weight of Concupiscence, with which the soul is possessed, wrests it from the love of justice and rectitude, which is necessarily and essentially required in every good work, and fastens it to some Creature. But of this more hereafter.

2. Another great Principle, §. 2. 2. The traduction of Original sin.on which Jansenius does largely discourse in order to the subversion of Molinisme, is touching the Traduction or propagation of Original sin, &c. So Jansen. August. Tom. 2. lib. 1. cap. 6. fol. 86. I find it, sayes he, to be the undubitable opinion of Austin, That Original sin is no otherwise propagated, from the first man to Posteritie, but by the lust or Concupiscence of the flesh; that by the magnitude of that sin all humane nature should be vitiated. For by this it comes to pass, that this Concupiscential Law, or evil of Nature, being propagated, also Original sin should be propagated. This he does more fully explicate in what follows, p. 108cap. 19. of this lib. 1. Where he proves out of Austin, that good or evil Qualities are propagated, not by Emigration, but Afficiencie (i. e. by affecting what is produced) by reason whereof there is some like Qualitie propagated, as lights are propagated by Afficiencie, without emigration. Jansenius asserts here a Prolifick force in the seed; also a great efficacie in the fancie of the Parent, for the propagation of original sin; concluding, that the depraved Imagination and Lust of the Parents have a mighty force and influence on the Morals of their children. And whereas it may be demanded, how the soul can receive Impuritie from the bodie? he replies, that the soul, by the defilement of the flesh, becomes fleshly: for the societie of sinful flesh hinders it from savoring any thing that is spiritual: as liquors receive a tang from the vessel,§. 3. The depravation of the understanding: and how far invincible ignorance is sin. &c.

Jansenius proceeds, from his Discourse of Original Sin in general, to the particular branches thereof; and begins with the Depravation of the Vnderstanding. So in his Tom. 2. lib. 2. cap. 5, 6. fol. 128. p. 109Where that which deserves special remarque is, that he proves, against the common persuasion of the Scholes, that invincible ignorance of what is our duty is both sinful and punishable. His words are these, Invincible ignorance, which flows from necessitie, not from the will, is not without sin. By invincible ignorance he means such as cannot be overcome by any human diligence. And first he takes it for granted,Jansen. Aug. to. 2. lib. 2. c. 2, 3, 4, 5. that invincible penal ignorance, wherein we are borne, wants not sin. Then he comes to a distribution of Ignorance, into Ignorance of Law, and of Fact: as for Ignorance of Law, 'tis either of the Divine Pos…tive Law, or of the natural Law; and thence he concludes, That the question is not of invincible Ignorance, as to matter of Fact, or as to the Divine Positive Law, both which excuse from sin; but of invincible Ignorance as to the Law of Nature, or any branch thereof. Now that this invincible Ignorance of Natures Law, excuseth not from sin, he proves, 1. Because the knowledge of the said natural Law is c…nnatural to human Nature, 2. If invincible Ignorance of the Law p. 110of Nature should excuse sin, there is n… reason why judicial ex…cation or blindnes should not also excuse sin: for both are a sort of ignorance; and both are invincible to corrupt nature only, but vincible by Divine Grace and Power. Thus Jans. Aug. Tom. 2. l. 2. c. 6. fo. 127, &c.

Hence Jansenius passeth on to the corruption of the Will and Affections;§. 4. Of concupiscence, and its natural propention unto the creature. which he discourseth of under the notion of Concupiscence. So Tom. 2. lib. 2. cap. 7. fol. 130. Concupiscence (saies he) which Tullie calls Lust, and the Platonists Pleasure, or delectation, is nothing else than an habitual pondus or weight, by which the soul is inclined and bent to the fruition of the creatures. For whether this concupiscence be the very sensitive Appetite and Will, as destitute of Grace, and, by their own gravitie and weight, prone to the appetition of things created, as many will have it; or whether it be somewhat superadded to these powers, as Austin rather inclines; (whether one or t'other) its still like an inveterate custome, pertinaciously propelling to the fruition of Pleasures: p. 111Whence Austin more than once calls it, a natural, and, as to all human power, invincible custome. The …ject of this concupiscence he makes to …, what ever is not God; and particu…rly all pleasures, not only of the bodie, …ut also of the mind. Whence he does, …ith Austin, reckon not only the Epicu…ans, but also the Stoicks, and other …hilosophers, who placed the chiefest good … Wisdom or Virtue, as sensual voluptuous …ersons, who lived according to the flesh, … Rom. 8. 4, 5.Rom. 8. 4, 5.Rom 8:4Rom 8:5 The End of this Concu…iscence he makes to be, the fruition of the creature. For all love either terminates on God, and so 'tis charity, or on the creature, and so 'tis concupiscence; which according to Austin, is, quandouti…ur fruendis, ac fruimur utendis, an use of things to be injoyed, and an injoyment of things to be used. Thence, in what follows, cap. 8. fol. 132, &c. he gives us the distribution of Concupiscence, according to that 1 John 2. 16.1 John 2. 16.1 John 2:16 into 1. The Concupiscence of the sensitive part, or the lusts of the flesh; which comprehends all the Pravitie of the external senses, &c. 2. The Concupiscence of knowing, or curiositie, p. 112termed the lust of the eye. 3. T… Concupiscence of excelling, called th… pride of life. These three Parts of Co…cupiscence he makes the roots of … sin.

Jansenius having discoursed at large … the Adherence of the Will to the creature which he calls Concupiscence, §. 5. Of the Nature of fruition; and that God is the alone object thereof.he come… to treat of the Wills Adhesion to God, under the Notion of Fruition. So Tom. 2▪ lib. 2. cap. 16. fol. 150▪ &c. Man… (saies he) love those things they know not they love; but this their love is discovered by fruition: for love without fruition cannot be understood; as neither fruition without love: seeing love is the …eginning of fruition; & fruition the end of love; for none injoys any thing but what he loves; and none loves any thing but what he would fain injoy. Whence it comes to passe, that as there is no Fruition, but what is seasoned with love, so there is no love, but what tends to frution. Therefore love, saies Austin, is nothing else, but the will desiring or tending to the fruition of somewhat—For love, as a hidden fountain, precedeth p. 113fruition; and fruition as an open stream or lake wherein love is drowned, is more manifest than Love: Wherefore there is the greatest vicinitie betwixt fruition and love; so that Austin, explicating the reason of fruition, saies, that to injoy any thing, is by love to adhere unto it, for it self. For if we do not adhere unto the thing for it self, we do not properly love it, but that other thing, for which we adhere to it. Fruition properly is not love, but the fruit, effect, and end thereof. For love when its object is absent, breaks forth into desire; and when present and possessed, into fruition and joy; which is the center that terminates its motion. These things being thus explicated; it evidently follows, (adds he) according to Austin, that a rational creature may injoy nothing but God only. For we injoy only that which we love for it self; wherein our objective happiness consists—From this immobile principle it follows. 1. That all use of the creature, which is not referred unto God, is sin. 2. That all fruition of the creature, no lesse than the love thereof, is sin. 3. That to p. 114use God for the obtaining the creature▪ is sin: which perversitie is found in all sin; whilest we would injoy things t… be used, and use things to be injoyed. Whence sprang that rule of Austin, that all human perversion is, when men would enjoy things to be used, and use thing… to be enjoyed: And again, all ordination and virtue, is to injoy things to be injoyed, and to use things to be used. For this is commanded, not only by Christian Discipline, but also by that natural order which the eternal Law has constituted: Which order is apparently disturbed when any injoy the means as the end, or stick in the way, as in the terme or end. Hence cap. 21. fol. 164. he adds, This the Spirit of God most savingly indicates unto us, that there is no true… self-love than that, whereby we love God with all the heart: and because the most refined and noble love of God, consists in a mans being abstracted from the reflexion, and consideration of himself, it thence followeth, that by how much the more a man forgets himself, by so much the more noble and exact regard he has unto himself. Thus, by p. 115…n admirable kind of contention, the more … man denies himself, the more he seeks himself; the more he is emptied of self, …he more he is filled with God. To relin…uish God is to embrace nothing.

Hence Jansenius (Tom. 2. lib. 2. c. 19. …l. §. 6. Why love to the creature for it self i… irregular.156.) gives us a demonstration from because, why it is unlawful, for a creature … terminate on himself or on the crea…ure, as the ultimate object of his love. Be…ause this is the natural condition of a rati…nal creature, to be placed under God, but …bove all corporeous Beings. Now this order … preserved by regular Loves and Weights. …or a weight, according to Austin, is the …mpetus or Bent of every thing towards its …roper place. And the weight of a rati…nal creature is his love, which is the …dea, and measure of corporeous weights. This Pondus or weight of love, is infused into a rational creature, for the preservation of natural order; that so he may be subject to God, but Lord of all inferior things. For such is the nature of love, that it subjugates the person loving to the thing beloved. What we love we serve, and are inferior unto: whence it follows p. 116that the Lover is affected with … the perturbations of the thing be love… Seeing therefore God, the first Truth a… chiefest Good, is alone superior to the r…tional creature, to him alone we oug… to su…ject our selves, by the weight … love: which when we do, we act ra… onally and virtuously: for virtue, whi… implies the best state of a rational cre…ture, is nothing else but the order of lo… whereby, as by a weight, the soul kee… it self below that which is most supre… and above that which is below it, in … middle state, according to the obligati… and appointment of the eternal La… Hence the root of all sin is an inordin… adherence to the creature, &c.

Thence Jansenius proceeds to demonstrate the pestiferous effects of inordin… love,§. 7. Seven Pestiferous effects of creature love and fruition. which terminates on the creature So Tom. 2. lib. 2. cap. 20. fol. 159. Th… first effect (saies he) which the love … the creature produceth in the soul, … amission of libertie. Whence also follows incapacitie of judgement. 2. Another effect of this inordinate love to th… creature, is, that it transformes us into th… p. 117…enesse of those things we love. For all …ve tends to unitie, so far as 'tis possi…e; and albeit it comes short thereof, … it leaves a likenesse. For all likenesse … but a defective Vnity: So that by the …rce of love, a man that loves the flesh, is …ereby made fl…sh…y. 3. Hence follows ano…er effect of creature love; the alligation or …inding the heart to the things beloved. This at first is insensible, but yet by fre…uent acts, this inordinate love increas…th; so that at last, from delight there …riseth custome; and from custome necessi…ie. 4. Whence also follows a difficultie of rending the heart from, and grief in parting with beloveds. 5. Hence likewise results instabilitie and inquietude of soul. 6. Whence also proceeds defilement of soul: for love is a kind of touch, yea, 'tis an intimate ingr…sse, or entering into the thing beloved; which, if it be more ignoble than the lover, does blemish and contaminate its dignity. This Impuritie clouds and darkens the mind, obstructing its s…renitie of judgement. 7. Lastly, From this hebetude of mind, and alligation to creatures, proceeds a perverse use of things; which is another pestiferous effect p. 118of creature love. For we can ne… use things well, till we have spirits … obliged from them: a mind chained the creature by inordinate love, … but abuse it. Whence he conclud… fol. 162. That all things must be refer… unto God, not only in the habitual co…tution of the soul, but also in actual, or least virtual intention thereof.

These things being premised touchi… inordinate and ordinate love or fruiti… Jansenius proceeds to prove that … Will cannot be the Parent of any w… spiritualy or morally good. §. 8. No Free Will to good.So Tom. 2. … 3. cap. 14. We judge, saith he, … opinion of Austin, and his Disciples … indubitable. 1. That no good wo… no not morally such, can be perfor… by Free Will, unlesse it be freed by …wird… and that not of every kind, but of fai… 2. That the Libertie of abstaining fr… sin is lost, and a necessitie of sinni… even in every act, introduced: beca… whatever is not of …aith, is sin. T… he farther demonstrates, Cap. 17. fol. 2… Because, according to the principle … Austin, there can be no Work … p. 119good, but what is referred unto God, for himself. Whence lib. 4. cap. 11. he proves, That the virtues of the Romane and Greek Philosophers were vain and sinful, because swollen with pride. And cap. 12. he particularizeth in the pride of the Stoicks, who held, That the Offices of virtue were desireable because consentaneous to reason; wherein they made reason their God. He farther demonstrates the Pride of the Stoicks and Peripateticks, in making virtue to be the chiefest Good, which, saies he, is in Austins sense, to live according to the flesh, Rom. 8. 5. Hence also he proceeds to demonstrate, Tom. 2. lib. 4. cap. 16. That there are no seeds of virtue naturally in men. He grants, that if we consider the Office of virtue materially and nakedly, without regard to its forme or end, there may be said to be some seminal dispositions naturally implanted in human nature: whence sprang those heroick acts of the Romans, &c. But addes he, this Office of virtue is but as the matter or corps; 'tis the End that is the Forme, or soul of virtue. Then he concludes, that this opinion of the see…s of virtue inherent in human nature, was traduced, p. 120by the Semipelagians, from the Gentile Philosophers, viz. the Peripateticks, Stoicks, &c. whose opinion Tullie lib. 5. de …inib. thus relates: Nature induced the elements of virtue,—but she only begins virtue, and no more. These Philosophick opinions of the seeds of virtue, addes he, the Pelagians, Semipelagians and Scholemen have brought into the Christian Scholes: whence also the Scholemen distinguish virtue into Natural and supernatural: which is a distinction not known to former Ages.

Jansenius having demonstrated the Impossibilitie of Free Will to good,§. 9. Necessitie of sin excludes not human libertie: neither is Indifference essential thereto. with the necessitie of sinning in lapsed nature, he goes on to remove that common Pelagian objection, viz. that this necessitie of sin destroyes human Libertie. For the full solution hereof, he gives us an exact Idea of the Libertie of the Will, and its combination with some necessitie. Thus Tom. 2. lib. 4. cap. 24. Where he proves at large, That Libertie includes not, in its formal reason or nature, Indifference to good and evil. He shewes, that this false Idea of Libertie was taken up by the Pelagians, p. 121from the institution of Gentile Philosophers, who fancying nothing more as requisite to good, but the meer office, or naked matter, asserted an Indifference to good and evil in all; wherein they placed Libertie, as the Pelagians and Scholemen after them. But that Indifference to good and evil is not essential or necessary to Libertie, Jansenius proves, 1. From the Devils, who are determined to evil, yet freely. 2. From the good Angels, who are determined to good, yet freely. 3. From the cognation 'twixt Libertie and Voluntarinesse: For as an act of the Will may be voluntary so also free, though immobile and necessarily determined; and that according to the confession of the Scholes, which grant that a desultori us mobilitie, or mutabilitie of will, is not of the ess…nce of Libertie, but its imperfection. He farther proves, that Libertie is the same with voluntarines; yea, the same with the will it self, which ceaseth not to be most free, when 'tis most fixed and necessary. Yea, this firmitie and necessitie, which ariseth from the wills own natural vehemence, or voluntary tendence is so far from prejudicing its Libertie, p. 122as that it does greatly corroborate… and confirme the same. He tells us also, that these false …dea's of human libertie were derived from Aristotle, who measured every thing by his own reason▪ Whereas others of the Ancients had mor… Orthodoxe notions of human libertie making it the same with rational spontaneitie, or voluntarines, &c. of these things Jansenius discourseth at large, in what follows, chap. 25. also in his Tom. 3… lib. 6. cap. 3. 5. 10, 25, 35, 37, &c.

The Molinists to maintain their foreign,§. 10. Against a state of pure Nature. or great Diana of free will, invented a middle state which they call … state of pure Nature, without sin or Grace. This Jansenius greatly opposeth, as tha… which was greatly derog…tory to the Wisdome and Grace of God. So in his Tom. 2. … spends two or three whole Books in disproving this state of pure Nature. 1. H… tells us, that such a state of pure Nature was altogether unknown to Austin▪ and the Primitive Church: it having been obtruded upon us by the Gentile Philosophers, and Christian Hereticks the Pelagians, &c. so fol. 278. Then he passeth p. 123(l. 1. c. 1. fol. 279.) to what the latter Scholemen mean by this their state of pure nature, viz. a Negative Puritie, wherein they suppose a man to be created without Sin, or, Grace: I presume the same with Aristotles rasa tabula, which he likened the soul unto. Now that there cannot be such a state of pure nature, Jansenius proves, 1. From the order or regard a rational creature has unto God, as his first princ…ple and last end or good: For saies he, 'tis impossible that a rational creature should be produced by God in a connatural manner, without some regard to his last and most connatural end. So cap. 3. fol. 282. For, the reason of Divine Providence, and the connatural order of things require, that as things proceed from a first principle, so they tend to some last end. Yea, this flows from the very Institution of Human Nature, and is founded in its very Essence, that it adhere to God, as its supreme principle and last end. Which not to do is sin. 2. Seeing a rational creature cannot be made without a will regularly inclined to God as Creator, hence followeth a necessitie of Grace, p. 124to inspire this will, whereby the possibilitie of a state of pure nature is overturned, &c. 3. All love terminates either on the creature, and so 'tis concupiscence, or on God, and so 'tis Divine Charitie, or love, &c. Whence it follows, there can be no middle state 'twixt sin and Grace, because the will alwayes adheres to God or the creature.

Hence Jansenius proceeds to demonstrate,§. 11. Love to God in the state of Innocence, both natural and supernatural. That Love to God was in the state of Innocence a gift naturally due to humane Nature, and yet of Grace given to it. So Tom. 2. de Pur. Nat. l. 1. c. 15. If (saies he) a rational creature cannot be created without love to God, then hence occurs a weighty difficultie, whether this love may be stiled natural, or supernatural: a debt or Grace. To which he replies thus: It seems to me that both may be affirmed without a contradiction. That this love is supernatural, is beyond controversie amongst all Catholicks; for, as eternal blisse, so the Love of God, which is the way thereto, is in like manner supernatural: p. 125for though one and t'other be the action of a creature, yet neither flows from the principles of nature, or natural faculties and force. This love to God may be called also natural, not only as consentaneous unto Nature; but 1. On the part o… reason: as the natural light of reason dictates, that God is to be beloved above all, and that by the most natural, strict and universal obligation, than which nothing is more moral, essential, and eternally obliging to human Nature, &c. 2. This love of God may be said to be natural, in regard of the will, as God is the most natural end of its choice, according to that of Scotus, God is the natural end of man, although not to be obtained naturally. Whence he starts another difficultie, cap. Whether this love to God be a debt to human Nature.17. fol. 312. Whether this love to God, be a debt due to human Nature? to which he replies, 1. That God is to be loved by his creature in every state. 2. That this love, although it be consentaneous to human nature, yet it is the effect of supernatural Grace. 3. Hence (saies he) it is most safe to affirme, p. 126that a rational creature considered without any fore-going sin, cannot be created without love to God; at least without a sufficient facultie, by which he may be inabled to cleave unto God, as his Creator: for otherwise the will should be void of …s natural rectitude, and so sinful, &c. Which to impute to God, is a note of blasphemie, whereby he is made the Author of sin.How of Grace. Thence Jansenius proceeds cap. 20. fol. 320. to shew how this love to God, though a debt due to human Nature, proceeds notwithstanding from Grace. 1. There are, saies he, certain debts or decent connaturalities, congruencies, and equities, which spring not from the right of the creature, but from the Grace of God. For God is oft said to be a debtor to himself, his own attributes, not only to his Justice, but also to his Wisdom and Goodnesse, &c. 2. Again, the very nature of a Rational creature, is the gratuitous and free gift of God; so in like manner the rectitude of the same nature, which though inseparable, yet it ariseth not from any merit of the p. 127creature, but from such arguments or reasons as concerne the attributes of God, his Wisdom and Goodnes.

From the foresaid hypothesis, §. 12. There is no natural virtue or happines, but what is supernatural.that there is no such thing as a state of pure Nature, Jansenius rationally concludes against, and rejects that usual distinction amongst the Scholemen of virtue and beatitude, into natural and supernatural, &c. So Tom. 2. de Nat. Pura lib. 2. cap. 2. fol. 326. Where he tells us, That he has oft wondred how it came to pass, that the ancient Philosophers, Socrates, Plato, &c. discoursed more accurately, and truly of the lapsed state of man, than the late Scholemen? Neither addes he, can I find any other reason hereof than this, that the late Scholemen have all followed the pur-blind reasonings of Aristotle; who being ignorant of his own imbecillitie, and not sensible of any supernatural adjutorie, taught men to expect all good from their own virtue, &c. Hence the Pelagians sucked all their poison: which the Scholemen endeavoring to moderate and allay, have framed two men in one, a Philosopher, p. 128and a Christian: Whence, what ever they find in the Philosopher, touching free will or natural virtue they apply to their Philosopher; and whatever they find in Scripture, touching Grace, they refer to their Christian. Thus they frame a double virtue and happinesse, one natural, another supernatural. So again, Jansen. Tom. 2. lib. 4. de Grat. Christi, cap. 16. fol. 255. The Scholemen, saies he, finding the Pelagian Infusions touching seeds of virtue, repugnant to the Catholick Doctrine, they frame a double man in a single, and so double charitie, double virtues, double works; the one natural, the other supernatural; whereof there is not the least foot-steps in Austin, who termes the Philosophers and Scholemens natural virtues but splendid sins. So Tom. 2. de pur. Nat. lib. 2. c. 5. fol. 332. The Scholemen, saies Jansenius, confes, that man cannot be in a connatural mode created, but for some last end: hence they are forced to coin a twofold beatitude, one natural, t'other supernatural, &c. Then he concludes cap. 8. That as this state of pure Nature derived p. 129its original from the error of Gentile Philosophie; so likewise this imagination of natural happines, &c. In brief, he demonstrates clearly, that these common notions, so frequent in the Scholes, touching natural and moral virtues and happines, as distinct from spiritual or supernatural, are but a meer chimera, or figment, hatcht first in the Gentile Scholes, and thence derived by the Pelagians and Scholemen into the Christian Scholes, with no small prejudice to the Christian Faith. That there cannot indeed be any action or work naturally or morally good, but what is such supernaturally and spiritually is very evident, because the rule of all good, whether natural, moral, or spiritual is one and the same, namely, the Will of God revealed in the Moral Law, which gives the esse morale, the moral Being, moralitie or formal constitution to all moral good or virtue, whether natural or supernatural. Besides all good that is truly such, requires an integritie or fulnes of causes, a good principle and end, as well as matter or duty, according to that Theologick M…xime, Good consists of p. 130all its causes, but evil of any defect.

Hence Jansenius proceeds to prove,§. 13. That God cannot but punish sin. that there is a kind of necessitie on God, for the punishing of sin. So Tom. 2. de Pura Nat. lib. 3. cap. 2. That God, saies he, can permit sin, whereby his order is disturbed, to go unpunished, Austin every where rejects, as a Paradoxe irreconcileable with Divine Justice. And this necessitie of punishing sin results not hence, that God has thus by his peculiar will constituted, but from the very sanction of the Eternal Law, against which God cannot act, any more than against himself, seeing it is nothing else, but Gods eternal Reason and Will. The punishment of sin is sin.Then he proceeds cap. 3, 4. to shew, what those punishments are, which are so inseparably and indispensably fastened to sin,1. Horror of Conscience. viz. 1. Horror of Conscience, which is oft more intolerable than death it self. And if there be at any time securitie on sinners, yet this ariseth not from any health of conscience, but from its s…upor. Now by how much the more stupid conscience is, by so p. 131much the more uncurable 'tis: as in the bodie, so in conscience, stupidnes is a disease worse than the most torturing dolors or pains.2. Inquietude. 2. Another inseparable punishment of sin, is a perpetual inquietude. 3. Losse of God.3. But another more weightie and intimate punishment of sin, is the losse of the chiefest good. For although no one sins but with his will, yet no one parts with his chiefest good, but against his will.4. Adherence to the creature. 4. This is followed with another punishment, which is adherence to the creature, and by how much the more pleasingly and securely the sinner enjoyes the creature, by so much the more 'tis fastned to it, and therefore by so much the more miserable.5. Sin is the worst punishment of it self. 5. Sin is an unseparable punishment of it self. For though sin precisely as voluntarie, is not a punishment but offence, yet as it is the offence of a rational creature, so it is an evil, which none would voluntarily partake of: For none chooseth pure sin. The greatest punishment of sin, saies Seneca is in it self: it is no sooner committed but punished by its very act. Whence Jansenius, cap. 11, &c. fol. 382. p. 132proceeds largely to prove that no evil can be inflicted by God on an innocent person; which overturnes the Molinists state of pure nature.

Jansenius, §. 14. No obligation on God to give Grace to such as improve Naturals.the more effectually to undermine the Jesuits great Idol of Free Will, proves Tom. 3. de Grat. Christi, lib. 1. c. 5. fol. 7. That God is not bound by any stable Law, to give Grace to him that does what he can by the force of nature to improve the abilities he has. For (saies he) there is no Law or Ordination of God: by which Grace is conferred on sinners that do nothing of good: but this is dispensed, not only altogether freely, but also according to the most profound Laws of Divine Gubernation; whereby Grace is sometimes imparted to the most hainous sinners, and denied to others more righteous. Whence the question is resolved into this, Whether Grace be infallibly given to those who are less sinful. That Grace is not thus dispensed, is evident, in children, who without peradventure are lesse sinful than persons adult, and yet frequently excluded from having p. 133any share in Divine Grace. The like as to persons adult. And indeed this Law obliging God to dispense forth Grace, according to mens improvement of Naturals, is but a vain Comment found out by such, who being not able to bear the inscrutable profunditie and liber…ie of imparting Grace, were willing to frame certain chains, whereby Nature and Grace should be knit together, that so condemned Nature might as it were by certain scales or degrees passe from one to the other. Thus Jansenius.

Hence Jansenius undertakes to prove the Impotence of the Law as to salvation,§. 15. The impotence of the Law as to salvation with the irritation of sin thereby. and its prevalence as to the irritation of sin. So Tom. 3. de Grat. lib. 1. cap. 8. The knowledge of the Law, (saies he) although it removes the ignorance of our dutie, yet it leaves concupiscence more difficult to be overcome, more flourishing and strong than before. And whoever imagineth, that the Law was given to the Jews immediately for this end, that so they might by institution thereof be brought to a more facilitie p. 134of righteousnes is greatly deceived. For lust being repressed, is increased; and being like to be deprived of its lusted good, it burnes more strongly for the injoyment of it. Yea, the Law is so far from lessening sin, as that it aggravates the same, and shuts up the sinner under a more severe condemnation. 1. In that he now sins against more light, &c. 2. In that, if the sinner be brought to any partial or imperfect conformitie to the precepts of the Law, he presently is puffed up with pride, carnal confidence, and self-sufficience which is the worst of sins. Then cap. 16. 18. he proves, That the Grace of the Law, affects the mind only, not the will: it shews the disease, but does not cure it, &c. of which more hereafter.

Jansenius having demonstrated the Impotence of the Law, §. 16. Of medicinal efficacious Grace its …ecessitie.in combination with Free will, to confer Grace, he thence proceeds to prove the Necessitie and efficacie of Christs medicinal Grace, &c. So Tom. 3. de Grat. lib. 2. cap. 22. The genuine nature (saies he) of medicinal p. 135Grace consists herein, that it give not only an habitual or potential capacitie, but also an actual Adjutorie, or Assistance, whereby the will may be determined (hic & nunc) immediately unto good. Then cap. 24. he proves more largely, That this medicinal Grace is Vorticordious or most potent. 1. In that it does, by an ineffable suavitie, mixed with power, effectually overcome the heart. 2. In that God is the alone supreme Agent in this work. 3. In that this Medicinal Grace is such, as that its effect depends not on the will, but the will is by it determined: whence Austin saies, the will cannot resist this Grace, but that she is more in the power of Gods triumphant victorious Grace, than in her own, &c. Whence he proceeds to prove, that the Molinists Conditional Grace destroies Christs Medicinal Grace, and the difference 'twixt the Grace of a sick, and that of a sound will, &c. cap. 25.

p. 136Hence,§. 17. The nature of efficacious Grace in Divine suavitie. lib. 4. de Grat. c. 1, &c. Jansenius proceeds to discourse more fully of the nature of this Medicinal Efficacious Grace, which he stiles a spiritual suavitie, or coelestial delectation, whereby the will is prevented, and bent to will and do whatever God has appointed it should will and do. This he afterwards calls the Inspiration of Charitie, with other Affections naturally flowing thence. That this medicinal Grace is, as to its substance, a spiritual suavitie or delectation infused from Heaven, he demonstrates out of Austin, 1. By an induction of every kind of good, which owes its original to this Inspiration of Divine suavitie infused by God. 2. He proves the same from the contrary, namely sin, which springs from a terrene suavitie. 3. From the conflict 'twixt these opposite suavities. 4. From the nature of the will, which by reason of its infirmitie embraceth nothing, but what delighteth: and by how much the more it delighteth in any act, by so much the more strongly it acteth or worketh. Then cap. 11. he tells us, that this heavenly p. 137delectation, is a vital indeliberate act, dropt into the soul by God; which implies both love and desire of, as also complacence and satisfaction in its proper objects. He makes Love to be the principal cause of this Delectation, which tends to its center God, by the motion of desires, and terminates or rests therein by satisfaction and delight. For who ever loves God, does so far possesse him, and thence injoies him with delight, and and also delights in him with injoyment, &c.

Jansenius having made some entrance on the explication and demonstration of Efficacious Grace, §. 18. No sufficient Grace but what is efficacious.he asserts and proves, Tom. 3. de Grat. lib. 3. cap. 1, 2, 3. That men in their lapsed state are afforded no sufficient Grace, but what is also efficacious. For, saies he, this Adjutorie purely sufficient belongs to the Grace of Nature, and is altogether unuseful for the reparation of persons lapsed, although it should be augmented to six hundred degrees of sufficience: Yea, it cannot be asserted, since the fall, unless with a greater delusion than that p. 138of the Pelagians, taking away origina… sin, we will allow unto Nature unwounded force. Yea, what can be produced more monstrous, than such a kind of Adjutorie, distinct from all the rest, which was never from the beginning of the fall, nor shall be to the day of judgement, conferred on the human will. So cap. 5.—11. he proves, That the Law was given to the Jews, and to many Christians, without any such sufficient or adjuvant Grace. And unbelievers want this sufficient Grace as well the next as more remote, and all the principles thereof, &c.

Hence Jansenius passeth on to shew, how many waies the precepts of God may be said to be possible, §. 19. How many waies the Precepts of God may be said to be possible and useful without sufficient Grace.without asserting such a sufficient Grace: So Tom. 3. de Grat. lib. 3. cap. 15, &c. That the Possibilitie of Gods commands, on which the Libertie of Will, and the Reason of sin depends, may be more fully explicated, it must be observed, how many wayes a man may be said to be able, &c. 1. Most remotely, by the flexibilitie of human libertie. 2. Somewhat p. 139more nearly, by faith and love. 3. But most compleatly by the Assistance of actual Grace. This complete power, which actual Grace gives, is alwaies joined, and that inseparably, with an actual will. Thus therefore the precepts of God are possible, 1. To the just by faith and love. 2. To unbelievers, by virtue of the flexibilitie of natural libertie, neither does the suspension of actual Grace at all excuse their moral impotence, of observing the Precepts; because this impotence is not antecedent but consequent and voluntary, arising from the perverse disposition of the will, which, by how much the more fixed 'tis; by so much the more inexcusable 'tis, so far is it from excusing sin. Then cap. 17. Jansenius proves, that these Divine Precepts are very useful, (though impossible to be kept) by unbelievers, without the vain figment of sufficient Grace, and that 1. To discover mens dutie. 2. To discover their infirmitie. 3. To render them inexcusable. 4. As a medium of judicial hardnes. 5. But especially as to the Elect, these Precepts and Exhortations p. 140are useful: 1. To teach them … infirmitie, their blindnes and hardnes … heart, &c. 2. To make them of … misse and humble spirits, willing to … saved in Gods way, and on termes … free Grace. God commands a du… beyond our strength, thereby to dri… us out of our selves to Christ. 3. To…gether with the Word of Precept, … gives out a word of Power, &c.

Jansenius having discoursed of … Nature and Necessitie of Efficacious Gra… he proceeds to treat of the several kin… thereof.§. 20. The distribution of Grace into Praeventing, subsequent, operant, cooperant, excitant, adjuvant. Thus Tom. 3. lib. 4. de Gr… cap. 12. to the 19th, where having give… the sentiments of Suarez, and Vasque… and their defects herein, he laies do… a division of his own conformable … the mind of Austin, and so distribut… Grace, 1. Into Praevenient and subseque… Which names (saies he) are respe…ctive; whose terme is not Grace, (… though one Grace did precede th… other) but the acts of the Will. Fo… Grace is said to be praevenient, becaus… it prevents every good motion of th… will; and subsequent, as it follows th… p. 141foregoing good motion. This division had its rise not from the Metaphysick Speculation of the latter Scholemen, but from that famous Pelagian Controversie, Whether the Will begins the first good mo…ion, so as that Grace follows the good …otion of the will? or whether on the …trary, Grace praecedes, &c. Hence Grace operant, is the same with praeve…ient, and Grace co-operant the same with …bsequent. Hence also Grace excitant is …iled, that which begins the first good …otion in the will, and Grace adjuvant is …hat which assists any good already be…un in the will, &c.

Jansenius having finisht his Discourse … Medicinal Efficacious Grace, §. 21. An Virtue consists in love to Go….he pro…eeds to the effect thereof, namely to …irtue, which he makes to consist, radi…ally and principally in Love to God. So …om. 3. de Grat. lib. 5. cap. 3, &c. Austin (saies he) teacheth us, that the virtue of a Rational creature, is no other than love to God. Which Doctrine indeed seems very exotick to the Sectators of Aristotles Morals; but yet, if it be duely weighed, it will be found to p. 142be most true. For mans chiefest goo… and virtue consists in adhering to God▪ which is done by love. Virtue is nothing else but a rectified will. Henc… he proves, that all the Cardinal Virtue… Prudence, Temper…ce, Justice, Fortitude; yea, those which they terme supernatural, as Faith and Hope, have … their original from Love to God. Hen… also he proves, cap. 9. 10. That love … concupiscence which refers all to self, … respect of God, is vitious: yet 'tis not repugnant to love to God, to have an e… on the reward: for love to God for himself is the only reward of our love to God, i. e. consummate love to God, is the only reward of our present inchoate love to God.

Hence Jansenius passeth on to treat of the fear of Hell, §. 22. Of … fear o… Hell, its causes, effects, &c.its causes, properties, and effects. So Tom. 3. de Grat, lib. 5. cap. 21. &c. where he shews, that the fear of Hell, considered in its self, is lawfull and profitable; because it is an avoiding of evil, yea, it may be subordinate to our last end: And whereas some stick or acquiesce in this fear, as p. 143… the term or center; this is the fault … him that fears, not of the fear. He …en distinguisheth 'twixt ordinate and …ordinate fear of Hell: Ordinate is that whereby the fault is more feared than the punishment; inordinate, when the punishment is feared more than the fault; which some call servile fear. Thence he leads us to the Spring-head of this fear of Hell, shewing, how it springs not from a spirit of Adoption, which inspires coelestial suavities into the heart; but from the spirit of bondage, or a certain general Grace of of God. Yet addes he, this fear of Hell is attributed to the Grace of God, because 1. It proceeds from a Legal faith of Gods Eternal Judgement, which is a gift of God. 2. God followes this apprehension of future Judgement with comminations, threats, and commotions of Conscience, &c. 3. God works this fear by softening the heart; and that either by the immission of temporal tribulations, or by the ablation of carnal delights, which harden Conscience. Thence he shews, cap. 25. that this fear of Hell is not from the special grace of p. 144Christ, 1. Because it produceth a Legal Righteousness. 2. It does not sever the heart from sin; because the sinner flies not from sin, but from punishment; he abhors sin, not as sin, but as dolorifick or painfull: there remains still in such, a depraved will, which is chained by fear of Hell, but not mortified or extinguisht. Hence cap. 35. he proceeds to Explicate the good effects of this legal fear in order to a thorough conversion: and so he concludes, that this servile fear of hell, as 'tis fear, so 'tis good, but as servile, so 'tis evil.

Jansenius having discoursed at large of medicinal Grace, §. 23. Of Free-will, its nature, &c.its nature, and effects, he returns again to the main hindge or head of the Controversie, to discourse more fully of Free-will, its nature, &c. Thus Tom. 3. de Grat. lib. 6. cap. 1. &c. fol. 255. where he begins with this sad Lamentation: There is deserved and great matter of grief, that some are so given to human, and for the most part fallacious r…tiocinations, as that they suppose it more meet to draw the intelligence of free-will from Aristotle, p. 145and the Gentile Philosophie, than from the bosom of the ancient Church: namely, because this matter exceeds not the bounds of natural reason, therefore (as they conceit) it must be measured by reason. Neither indeed is the Pelagian haeresie concerning Grace and Free-will any other than pure Aristotelick Philosophie. Hence he goes on to prove, that Free-will according to Austin, signifies nothing more than the power or act of the will, which is alone properly and immediately free, whereas the Reason is free, only by participation from the will. Then he proceeds to shew, (cap. 3. &c.) That free is opposed to servile or captive, and implies somewhat positive, which is nothing else but to be sui juris, under its own power, and so to act freely, is to have our act in our own power, i. e. in the power of our own will: So amongst the Greeks, that is stiled free, which is foreign, in our power, which they also called foreign; which Basil opposeth foreign, whence it follows that all the internal and external faculties and acts are so far free, as they are in the power of, or p. 146subject to the will. For whatever we wil… is in our power. The will is alwayes, yea essentially free in every act, though necessarily determined thereto. He farther proves (from cap. 9. to cap. 38.) the essential combination of a voluntary necessitie with the wills freedom; and that by arguments both artificial and autoritative: shewing, how this necessity of the will flows from its self, its self-moving power, as in God, Christ, glorified Saints, &c.

Hence Jansenius Tom. §. 24. The manner of conciliating efficacious Grace with the Libertie of the Will.3. de Grat. lib. 8. cap. 6. unto 21. is engaged in that intricate difficultie of reconciling efficacious Grace with human Libertie, The mode (sayes he, cap. 6.) of conciliating Divine Grace with free-will is so difficult to be discerned, according to Austin, that when the libertie of the will is defended, the Grace of God seems to be denied; and when the Grace of God is asserted, the libertie of the will may be thought to be taken away. Hence Austin, to manifest, that the libertie of the will continues safe under Grace, and that both might very p. 147well conspire together in one, he never attempted any thing against the Pelagians, which excluded the will from an instrumental concurrence with the Grace of God, &c. Then he adds, cap. 15. This very thing John Scotus does professedly teach, whilest he clearly delivers, That a necessitie of willing, is consistent with the libertie of willing; because saies he, the will, by reason of the firmitie of its Libertie, does impose a necessitie on it self, both in exerting its act, as also in persevering or fixing it …elf in act. Hence he farther declareth, that the will alwaies keeps its mode of acting freely, and it is impossible that this mode of acting freely, should be by any power whatsoever, taken from her. …hus Jansenius who cap. 18. addes farther thus, The Catholicks say, that by the Grace of God working in us every good work is done, yet that we are not compelled against our will to believe or that Grace is violent; because if the will be compelled or forced it does not will. And they adde the reason, because God by Grace does not destroy reason and will, but enables p. 148men to will aright. The like cap. 19. It cannot be (saies Jansenius) but that the will must be free, therefore if Grace enables and makes us to will, it enables and makes us also to will freely, so that there can be no repugnance 'twixt Grace and the libertie of the will—Therefore no necessitie, no …fficacie on the acts of the will, is to be feared but only force, coaction, and violent necessitie. Thence cap. 21. he answers the objection of those who pretended, That this his concord of the wills libertie with efficacious Grace differed not from the opinion of Calvin, &c. To which he replies, That if Calvin agrees with Austin in any point, we must not have indignation against Austin for Calvins sake, but rather thank Calvin for Austins sake, &c. In brief Jansenius (following Austin) gives a singular method for the conciliating Divine Grace and human Libertie; namely, by virtue of that secret, yet powerful sweetnes (which the Scholes terme connaturalitie) which attends the operation o… medicinal efficacious Grace, whereby 'tis rendred no lesse compleasant and sweet, p. 149…an powerful. This happy concordance … efficacious Grace with human libertie is …xcellently illustrated by Gibieuf, in his …rned Treatise of the Libertie of the …ill, wherein he discovers himself to be Jansenist thoroughout, which has …rought him under the odium of the Molinists, especially of Annatus, who …as answered him.

Jansenius having discoursed most …argely of the Doctrine of Efficacious Grace, §. 25. Of Divine Predestination.he at last determines or centers …n the root, head or spring of all, viz. in Predestination. So in his Tom. 3. lib. 9. de Grat. cap. 1, &c. Where he begins in …his Preface thus. The dispute of Predestination is so intimately conjoined to that of Grace, that the nature of the one cannot be exactly known, without the knowledge of the other. Whence it comes to passe, that look into how many parts the neoterick Scholes are diltracted, about the operation of Grace, so many dissensions in opinion have they also about Predestination: every partie contending in their manner, according as the Grace they p. 150defend requires. But the principal difficulties in this matter have had their rise from the too great contention of Philosophick ratiocinations, &c. Jansenius after his Preface proceeds (cap. 1. fol. 364.) to the explication of Predestination, both name and thing. As to its names, he tells us, That to predestinate properly signifies to praedecree, praedefine, praedetermine somewhat. Thus the Greek foreign signifies, as Rom. 8. 29. Ephes. 1. 5, 11. And because every Praedefinition of God must necessarily, eternally precede its temporal effects, hence instead of foreign sometimes the simple foreign is used, as Rom. 1. 4. Luke 22. 22. Acts 2. 23. Acts 17. 26, 31. Acts 10. 42. In all which places foreign signifies the same with foreign; whence foreign is sometimes rendred simply to decree; because to decree with God is the same with to praedecree. Hence (cap. 2. fol. 366 he concludes, That from this principle 'tis no way difficult to resolve many Scholastick Questions. For hence 'tis manifest, 1. That the object of Predestination is not things eternal, p. 151but temporal. 2. That Gods Predestination regards his own affairs: things to be done by him, not meerly by others. For we decree things we are to do, either by working, commanding or persuading, &c. 3. That Gods Decrees regard both end and means: for they include all God does. 4. Hence also it comes to passe, that children may be predestinated to glory without previous faith, as well as persons adult by ordinate merits: for there is no difference in the Decree. 5. That Predestination regards not only Good, but also Evil, &c. Hence Jansenius (cap. 5.) proceeds to the more full explication of Predestination; which, saies he, is expressed in Scripture by many aequipollent names: for sometimes 'tis called Dilection; because God by it wills nothing but good to his creature. Sometimes 'tis termed Election; because he chooseth one and refuseth another: sometimes 'tis stiled Purpose; because it is not a sterile dilection, but an efficacious decree of conferring some benefit. Lastly, 'Tis called a preparation; because the Decrees of God are as it were pregnant, or p. 152bigge with child, till they break forth into operation. Election not founded on a Praevision of Faith or Merits.Jansenius haveing given a general explication of Predestination, he passeth on (cap. 15. to 25.) to the head of the Controversie to prove that Efficacious Election, is not founded on any praevision of merits: 1. He proves the absolutenes of Divine Election from the Efficacie of Gods will which reacheth both end and means, cap. 17. 2. From Gods efficacious Intention and Will, as to the salvation of Infants, who cannot be supposed to have any merits, &c. cap. 19. 3. From Gods admirable Gubernation or Disposition of all things, so as that every thing tends for good to the Elect; which argues a most efficacious Intention and absolute will of Providence. 4. From Gods contrary Providence towards the reprobate, cap. 20. 5. He takes another Argument from Gods Efficacious Vocation, according to his own purpose, which extends it self to all the effects of Election, even in infants, which argues an absolute purpose, cap. 21. 6. Then he concludes (cap. 25.) that the very nature and profunditie of free Grace p. 153requireth that the reason of the effusion or of the substraction thereof, be fetcht from the very good pleasure of the Giver, not from any thing in the persons to whom 'tis given.

Hence Jansenius proceeds to discourse of Reprobation, §. 26. Of Reprobation.which he makes to be (according to Austin) Gods leaving men under their original damnation, &c. So Tom. 3. de Grat. lib. 10. cap. 2. &c. Where explicating the distinction given by Moderne Divines of Reprobation into Negative and Positive, he concludes the nullitie of this distinction, by shewing how negative Reprobation includes also positive. The like he farther inculcates, cap. 3. But according to Austin (addes he) there is no negative Reprobation to be allowed, because in every signe or moment of Divine account, it ever has adjoined to it (by reason of the object or person on which both falls) positive Reprobation. Then having discoursed at large of the Acts and Effects p. 154of this positive absolute Reprobation (cap. 5. 9. 13. &c.) he concludes, with an Apologie for God his sovereintie, and just procedure herein, (cap. 17.) It may not (saies he) seem a wonder to any, that God should create, conserve, and governe such a number of Reprobates without any purpose of saving them. For they serve for that purpose to which they are meet, and very necessary in this state of matters: namely, that in them the severitie and justice of Divine Vengeance against sin,Against Universal Grace. as also the magnitude of merciemercy towards the Elect might be shown forth. For they who have coined that exotick kind of Predestination, wherein God is exposed and brought in, as ready to pour out his Graces indifferently unto all, that he who will may free himself; whilest they seem to lay open the bowels of Election towards all, they do wholly evacuate the whole of Gods love towards the Elect, which is so greatly applauded in the Scriptures, and S. Austin, &c. p. 155Lastly, Jansenius (fol. 446.) draws a lively and large parallel 'twixt the Semipelagians and these New Scholemen or Molinists in all points of moment referring to Grace, &c.

Hence Jansenius (as also his Comrade St. Cyran)§. 27. Against Scholastick Theologie. entertained a deep displeasure against that abstruse, cloudy, and wrangling kind of Theologie brought in by the Scholemen, in imitation of Aristotle, &c. So Jansen. Tom. 2. de Nat. pur. lib. 2. c. 2. fol. 326. Where he shewes, how the Scholemen suckt in from Aristotle, their notions of a state of pure Nature, Free will, &c. Thus they joined Aristotle with Christ, and his Philosophie with the Scripture, as Dagon with the Ark. So again Tom. 2. lib. proaem. cap. 28. he saies, that the Scholemen being drunken with the love of too much Philosophie, would fain digge forth, penetrate, forme, and judge of the hidden Mysteries of Grace, according to the rules of reason. Hence that ardor of questioning p. 156and disputing every thing. Hence their Theologie became stuffed with an heap of innumerable opinions, by which all things, though never so contrary, are made probable: whence a general foreign, or Scepticisme: for nothing is more natural, than of Peripateticks men should become Academicks, &c. Thus much of Jansenisme as I find it delivered by Jansenius.

We now proceed to discourse a little of Jansenisme, §. 28. …he Jan…nists …ogmes …f Faith.as taken up and maintained by the Sectators of Jansenius, who in the general touching their sense of Jansenius, refer us to the first and third Disquisition of Paul Ireneus, as also to the first and fourth part of Denis Raymond, Wherein (say they) the Jansenists have declared exactly what they understand by the sense of Jansenius: Moreover how far they symbolize with, and are willing to conforme unto, the expressions of the Thomists has been before in the historick narrative sufficiently mentioned. But to give p. 157some particular Dogmes of the Jansenists as to faith.

1. They generally (following Jansenius and St. Cyran herein) begin to have a good esteem of the Sacred Scriptures: and to vindicate much their perfection as the only rule of faith: I met with this expression in one of their Papers,La simple Verite a Paris. 1664. viz. That it is an heresie to judge of heresies without the Word of God. This farther appears by their late Translation of the Scriptures.

2. As for Jansenius's Doctrine touching efficacious Grace, they reduce it to this Proposition maintained by all the Thomists, viz. That all the Grace of Christ is efficaciously productive of some effect to which it is nextly ordained, and which God by an absolute will, intends. So Refutation du P. Ferrier c. 4.

3. Hence they allow not any Grace to be sufficient, but what is also efficacious. So Refutat. du P. Ferrier, c. 11. pag. 64. Because (say they) this word Grace sufficient is not to be found, either in the Scripture, or in the Councils, or in the Fathers, &c. p. 158therefore no Jesuit has right to oblige us to make use of it farther than we please. And to shew their dislike of this sufficient Grace, which the M…linists do so much Idolize, the Jansenists a while since, in a Shew at Paris, framed a Chariot wherein sat two Virgins; the one with fair and beautiful fruit in her hands without use, which they called sufficient Grace; the other with fruit useful and nourishing, which they stiled Grace Efficacious. See their sentiments of Sufficient Grace, Part 1.

4. The Jansenists (as Jansenius and St. Cyran their heads)Of Justifi…ation by …aith …one. seem good friends to Justification by Free Grace, and Faith in the blood of Christ, without any regard to human merits as abused in the Popish sense. 'Tis true they make use of the name merit, but in no other sense than it was used by Austin, without any approbation of the thing, as the ground of Justification. This is manifest not only from their Books, but also by their Practice. It was the usual method of Jansenius, p. 159for the comforting of afflicted consciences, to send them to the blood of Christ alone: and Mr. St Cyran seems mighty warme and pressing on this point. The like instances I have had touching others of this persuasion in France, who being to deal with dying persons, insisted much upon pressing them to have recourse to the blood of Christ.

Neither indeed are the Jansenists verst only in speculative and notional, §. 29. Their practical Theologie.but also in practick and active Theologie; especially the chief of them Jansenius and St. Cyran seem to have had a very deep, broad, spiritual light and insight into the Mysteries of the Gospel, and true Godlines; and I am apt to persuade my self, they had some feeling apprehensions and inward acquaintance with those choice Gospel truths, they commend to others. They talk much of studying the Scriptures, and acquainting our selves with the mind and Spirit of God therein; they p. 160presse, with some affectionate importunitie, to the renouncing our own righteousnesse, strength, wisdom, wills, &c. They greatly commend to us spiritual povertie, soul-humilitie, heart-mortification, self-emptinesse, and abjection, &c. These things they insist upon, not according to the Monkish mode of external mortification, but in a Gospel strain, with so much meeknesse of wisdom, and yet with so much spiritual passion and warmth, as if their words were but sparks, or ideas of that Divine fire which burned in their hearts. This I have particularly observed in Mr. St. Cyrans Epistles, in reading whereof, and comparing his expressions with the Character and Idea I have of his Spirit, and life, I must confesse I have been much recreated. But thus much of their Doctrine.

p. 161The Jansenists begin also to have very moderate and favorable persuasions about Church Discipline; Their principles of Church Discipline.as it appears by these particulars.

1. They are come now generally to disavow, 1. That there is no human infallible Judge in matters of Faith.not only the Popes, but all human Infallibilitie. This is one of the last refuges they have made use of against their adversaries, as it appears by a Paper of theirs lately publisht, titled, Abregé d'un Traicté intitulé l'Illusion Theologique. The summe whereof they comprise in this Syllogisme: One ought not to hold for Hereticks any, but such as resist an Infallible Authoritie in matters of faith. Now its certain, the Pope has not such an Autoritie. Therefore, &c. The second Proposition, adde they, is clear; (as well as the first;) for an Infallible Autoritie i… Soverein in its kind, and acknowledgeth no superior, &c.

p. 1622. Hence they also hold,2. That the definition of Dogmes belongs to the Word, and the definition of facts to the Church; to which we owe only a submission of respect, not of Faith. that the Definition of Dogmes and submission of faith thereto, belongs only to the Word of God; which they make to be the measure of faith, and seat of all Church-Power. So the Bishop of Comenge in his Letter to the King, an. 1664. touching the Jansenists, speaks thus of them; It is true, Sire, that they place not in the same rank the submission which they render to the Definition of Dogmes, and that which they render to the Definition of particular facts; because the one is a submission of faith, and the other a submission of respect, and of Discipline. The truth, Sire, of things revealed by God, may not enter into comparison with those not revealed; th… Dogmes are revealed, and not particular facts—We ought therefore to separate the Dogmes and fact decided in the Constitutions receive… by the whole Church; to the en… that we submit to the one with … submission of faith, and to the other p. 163with a submission of pure respect. Thus also the Jansenists themselves, in their La simple verité, à Paris 1664. The common light of reason (say they) shews, even to the most grosse, that two things that are essentially separate, as a particular fact, and a Doctrine of faith, may be also separate in the creance of believers, &c. Hence also the Jansenists assert,

3. That the Church has only a Declarative power, and that as to matters of fact and Discipline; i. e. Ministerial only, and subordinate unto that of Christ. This is evident by their La simple Verité pag. 60. In the state of this life the Church demands of her children nothing but love and accord: and the obedience she requires of them, touching the facts which she decides, is nothing but modestie and peace; not a creance or belief. She commands them to believe nothing, but what she has learnt of Jesus Christ. She declares to them his Word, not her own; leaving to them, as other things, so also that p. 164libertie, which he has given unto them; provided, that they loose not that respect, which they owe to their Mother, and trouble not the union of her children. Thus the Jansenists of the Churches Power and Discipline.

4. Hence also,4. Libertie of Conscience. as it naturally follows, the Jansenists allow, yea contend for a Libertie of Conscience, as to matters of fact, and Ecclesiastick determinations about things indifferent, or things not clearly revealed. This evidently appears by, and flows from what was lastly mentioned of them: where all that they require to the Churches definitions, is only a submission of respect; and in case of difference in persuasions, a respectuous silence, so far as the Churches Peace and Vnity require… it, &c.

p. 1655. Hence also we see what Vniformitie, 5. What Uniformitie is requisite.and Obedience they require, as to Church determinations about matters of fact, (which is the alone object of her power:) namely a submission of respect, or in case of differences a respectuous silence only, not a submission of faith.

6. Hence as to Church Censures they hold,6. Of Censures. (La simple Verité pag. 58.) that Excommunication implies a penal death of the soul: and seeing this death is the last of punishments, which the Church can impose, she ought not to ordain it, but conformably to the Scripture, and holy Decrees, which are those of the Spirit of God; for undubitable crimes, and worthy of death, against those who are convicted.

7. Touching Schisme,7. Of Schisme. they hold, that be is the Schismatick, who treats others more Catholick than himself, as guilty of Schisme.

p. 166As for Heresie, they say, 8. Of Her…sie.1. 'Tis an Heresie to judge of Heresies without the Word of God. 2. That 'tis an Heresie to believe, that all those, who have a spice of Heresie, are Hereticks. They make Heresie to consist mostly in the affection; as in their La simple Verité, pag. 50.

FINIS.

ERRATA.

PAge 9. line 24. for works, read Augustinus: p. 15. l. 11. for au r. at: p. 16. l. 22. r. Gautruche: p. 20. …. 22. r. Jansenius's Augustinus: l. 25. for against r. from: p. 23. l. 27. after besides, adde that: p. 53. l. 26. r. drew: p. 66. l. 19. for nos r. nobis: p. 78. l. 10. for was r. has: p. 81. l. 2. for it r. there: p. 87. l. 24. r. Heretical: p. 93. l. 23. r. rest: p. 139. l. 22. for by r. to: p. 148. l. ult. for compleasant r. pleasant.

End of the text · Theophilus Gale, The True Idea of Jansenism Both Historic and Dogmatic (1669)