The Court of the Gentiles Part 4, Part 4 · Book 2 · Chapter 11

The Court of the Gentiles Part 4 · Part 4 · Book 2 · Chapter 11

p. 509CHAP. XI. Of Creatural Dependence, both Natural and Supernatural.

Creatural Dependence in the general. Every Being Dependent or Independent. One prime Independent Being. Every Dependent Being by participation. The Origine of Dependence; (1) Paſſive Power: (2) The Dominion of God. Every Creature Dependent. The Dependence of a Creature not diſtinct from its Eſſence. Creatural Dependence in Subordination, Poſterioritie, and Inferiorities Creatural Dependence (1) as to Futurition. (2) As to Eſſence and Conſervation. (3) As to Operation. The human wils Dependence on God. Dependence Natural, or Moral and Supernatural: Supernatural Dependence for Habitual and Actual Grace.

§. 1.Creatural Dependence. AS appendent to Divine Efficience we may adde Creatural Dependence, which alſo appertains to Metaphyſic and prime Philoſophie. Paul being to diſcourſe among the Philoſophie Wits at Athens, and to demonſtrate the Unitie of God, and thence the ſimplicitie of his worſhip, he bottomes his Argument on the Creatures Dependence on God, Act. 17.28.Act. 17.28.Acts 17:28 For in him p. 510we live, and move, and have our being. Dependence on God for Being, Life, and Motion is eſſential to every Creature as ſuch: For al Creatures receiving whatever they have, foreign, by participation from God, it thence neceſſarily follows, that they depend on him for al. Plato alſo gives us frequent and good notices of this creatural Dependence. So Leg. 4. pag. 715. foreign, &c. God, having in himſelf the Principe, Middle, and End of althings, goes ſtraight on, expanding his force and power throughout the whole Ʋniverſe, and al its parts. Wherein we have, (1) The Dependence of althings on God, as their first Principe, Middle, and End. God is the first Principe, as he gives Being to althings; the Middle, as he conſerves the Being conferred and moves it; the End, as he gives conſummation and perfection to althings. Thence that Platonic Effate, That althings move from infinite, upon or by infinite, and to infinite: i. e. from God, as the Principe of their Beings; upon, or by God, as the Principe or Cauſe of their conſervation and motion; to God, as their last end. (2) Gods expanſion and diffuſion of his force and power throughout the Ʋniverſe and al its parts, as it were an univerſal Soul or mundane Spirit, (which Plato oft inculcates) whereby the dependence of althings on God is emphaticly illuſtrated. Whence he addes, pag. 716. That he who is puffed up by ſpiritual pride, or ſwollen with ſelf-confidence, as though he were independent, and needed not Divine conduct, foreign, is deſerted by God and left deſtitute as to al Divine Efficace and Influence; and being deſerted, diſturbes al. A lively image of a ſelf dependent Creature. We find the whole of this creatural Dependence wel expreſſed, according to Plato's mind, by Proclus thus: foreign, Althings depend on the ONE, by MIND, and SOƲL: i. e. to ſpeak plainly, althings depend on God, that ſupreme Unitie, by Christ, the Eternal foreign, or Mind, and by the Spirit, that univerſal Soul, or mundane Spirit, as before, c. 8. §. 2. But to give a more ful and convictive demonſtration and explication of the Neceſſitie and Nature of creatural Dependence, we ſhal reſolve the whole into the following Propoſitions.

1.Every Being dependent or independent. Prop. Every Being is dependent or independent. That this diſtribution of Ens into independent and dependent is adequate and commenſurate, is generally confeſſed by ſuch as diſcourſe of Metaphyſics. And for the demonſtration and explication hereof we p. 511are to conſider, That a dependent Being, and that on which it dependes do really differ in number. And the reaſons are demonſtrative: (1) Becauſe nothing as ſuch can be ſaid to depend to itſelf. (2) The dependent is in order of Nature, at leaſt, poſterior and inferior to that on which it dependes. (3) Dependence importes ſubordination to that on which the dependence is. Hence Divines ſay, that the Son of God, albeit he be, as to Origine, from the Father; yet in as much as he partakes of the ſame Eſſence with the Father, he cannot be ſaid to be dependent on him: For he being in the forme [or Eſſence] of God, thought it not robberie to be equal with God, Phil. 2.6. foreign,Phil. 2.6.Phil 2:6 here is generally rendred by al Rapine or Robberie; and we may take it properly; and ſo make foreign the ſame with foreign, he did not unjuſtly aſſume or arrogate to himſelf this title and character of being equal with God. For that is accounted Rapine or Robberie in a proper ſenſe, when any injurioſely aſſumes or takes to him, that which belonges to another: Thus the fallen Angels and Adam committed rapine or robberie againſt God, by endeavoring or affecting an equalitie with God. Thus alſo ſhould a Creature affect or arrogate an independence, either in Eſſence or Operation, it may juſtly fal under the imputation of Robberie againſt God; becauſe it thereby equaliſeth itſelf to God. But our Lord Chriſt accounted it not robberie to be equal with God, i. e. independent as God is. For one perſon in the Trinitie is not eſſentially divided from the other; but the Son is ſo generated by the Father, as that he is not foreign, another eſſence or thing, albeit he be foreign, another perſon. The Son has the ſame numeric independent Eſſence with the Father, and the Spirit. So that although one perſon be really diſtinct from the other, yet this diſtinction being involved in one moſt ſimple Divine Eſſence, it implies a contradiction to ſay one perſon dependes on the other, which was the great error of Origene, imbibed from Platonic Philoſophie, as before Ch. 6. §. 4. & P. 3. B. 2. C. 1. §. 8, 9.

§. 2.One prime independent Being. An independent Being is that which needs not any other Being eſſentially precedent to itſelf, as the cauſe of its Being and Operation. This Propoſition may be demonſtrated and explicated by its parts thus. (1) There is one prime independent Being. This is evident from the ſeries of cauſes, in which we find, that althings obey the ſuperior Power, from which they derived their origine: whence it neceſſarily follows, that to prevent a progreſſe into infinite, we p. 512ſtop in one prime, ſupreme, infinite Power, which received no this Being from any other, but is truely foreign, Self-being and Self-ſufficient, or Independent. Again, that there can be but one prime independent Being is manifeſt; becauſe where-ever there is Participation, Limitation, Potentialitie, and Contingence, there muſt needs be Dependence: But now al Beings, except the firſt Cauſe, admit Participation, Limitation, Potentialitie, and Contingence as to their Eſſence: and therefore none but the firſt Being can be independent. Hence it follows, (2) That the first independent Being admits not any precedent Being, as the cauſe of its Being. For whatever preſuppoſeth the efficience of ſome precedent cauſe, ſuppoſeth alſo Participation, Poſterioritie, and Inferioritie: which the prime independent Being excludeth. Whence alſo it follows, (3) That the prime independent Being is foreign, Self-being, or from himſelf. When we ſay the prime independent Being is from himſelf, it muſt not be underſtood poſitively, as if he did effectively produce himſelf; for that is foreign and impoſſible; but negatively, that he receives not his Being from any other. Hence we conclude, (4) That Independence is as eſſential to the firſt Being and Cauſe, as Dependence is to ſecond Beings and Cauſes. As it is eſſential to the Creature to be defective, indigent, limited, receptive and dependent; ſo it is as eſſential to the Creator to be infinite, alſufficient, and without al deficience, indigence and dependence either actual, or poſſible. Hence,

§. 3.Dependent Being by participation, &c. Whatever is dependent is Ens or Being by participation, finite, potential, contingent, and defectible. (1) Every dependent is Ens by participation. For whatever is not Being by Eſſence and independently, muſt neceſſarily be ſuch by participation: where there is not ſelf-Being, there muſt be a reception of Being from ſome other, which connotes participation. (2) Whatever is dependent is alſo finite and limited, both in Being, Virtue, and Operation. [1] Whatever is dependent is finite in Being; becauſe its Being is by participation, and according to communication of the ſuperior Cauſe. (2) Every dependent is alſo finite in virtue and efficace: For whatever is limited in its eſſence muſt neceſſarily alſo be limited in its virtue and efficace. Hence, [3] every dependent is alſo finite in its Operation: For the ſphere of Activitie cannot be larger than the ſphere of Eſſence: if the principe be limited, the operation cannot but be limited. (3) Whatever is dependent is alſo potential. To explicate and demonſtrate this Attribute of a dependent p. 513Being we muſt conſider, [1] that nothing is pure Act, but the first moſt ſimple independent Being: no Creature is pure Actualitie: where there is dependence, there is ſomewhat of Potentialitie or paſſive Power, either phyſic or metaphyſic. Al mater hath a phyſic paſſive power, or natural poſſibilitie of being corrupted: Spirits have not a phyſic paſſive power, or natural principe of corruption, yet they have a met a phyſic paſſive power of being annihilated, or caſt back into their primitive nothing. [2] Beſides the natural power, which a dependent Being has, there is an obediential power appendent to its nature. For the explication of which we are to know, that it is eſſential to a create Being to be ſubject and ſubordinate to the firſt, increate and independent Being ſo far, as to obey it in receiving al impreſſions, and acting under it whatſoever implies not a contradiction. Hence the Scholes diſtribute the power of the ſecond cauſe, or dependent Beings into natural and obediential: their natural power of receiving influences from the ſuperior cauſe, or acting is that which is appendent to their natures, and whereby they naturally receive or act, and produce effects proportionate to their natures. But the obediential power of dependent Being is, that whereby they are, according to the Law of their natures, apt to obey the firſt independent Cauſe, namely God in the receiving or acting any poſſible effect, that implies not a contradiction; albeit it may excede the natural capacitie, force, or efficace of their Beings. So that this obediential power regardes ſupernatural effects, which the ſecond cauſe cannot reach by its own Virtue and Activitie; but only as elevated by the efficacious Concurſe of God. Thus the Humanitie of Chriſt had an obediential power to the Hypoſtatic Union, unto which it was elevated by the ſupernatural efficacitie of the Spirit of God. This obediential power which is eſſential to every dependent Being, is founded in the participation and limitation of a Creature, and its ſubordination to the abſolute Dominion of God, of which more anon. Hence, (4) every dependent Being is contingent. For whatever has any paſſive or obediential power, is obnoxious to the ſoverain pleaſure and concurſe of its firſt cauſe, to which it owes abſolute obedience, even to annihilation. Hence, (5) every dependent Being is defectible. For as it is eſſential to the firſt independent Being to be indefectible; ſo alſo to al ſecond dependent Beings to be defectible. The ſupreme God being foreign, ſelf-being, and ſelf-ſufficient, a p. 514pure ſimple Act, without the leaſt mater or paſſive power, it is impoſſible that he ſhould ever fail in any thing: but every Creature being Ens, or Being by participation, and ſo compoſed of Something and Nothing, or of Act and Pfaſſive Power, it cannot be but that it ſhould be Defectible, or apt to fail, which is the root of its Dependence, as it wil appear by the next Propoſition.

§. 4.The Origine of Dependence. 1. Paſſive Power. The Root and origine of al Creatural Dependence is the creatures paſſive power, and Gods Abſolute Dominion ever it. 1. One Root and Origine of al creatural Dependence is that paſſive power, which every Creature is inveſted with. For the explication whereof we are to conſider, that all Creatures, being educed by God out of Nothing, ſtil retain a tincture or mixture of their Primitive Nothing: ſo that no Creature can be ſaid to be pure Being: for this is an attribute peculiar to the firſt Independent Being, whoſe name is, Exod. 3.14. foreign, who is, or according to Plato's Phraſeologie, foreign, Being. Every Creature has ſomething of Nothing contempered with its Being; yea more of Nothing than of Being, which makes it obnoxious to Limitation, Contingence, Mutabilitie, Defectibilitie, and Dependence. Thus Damaſcene, Orthod. Fid. L. 2. C. 3. foreign, The increate being ſolely is interminate or unlimited in nature: for every Creature is terminated or limited by God who created it. Now al limits as to Nature and Eſſence ſpeake a mixture of Nihilitie, Paſſive Power, and Dependence reſulting therefrom; whence Damaſcene addes: foreign, The Deitie only is impaſſible: namely becauſe exemt from Nihilitie, Paſſive Power, and Dependence. This Nihilitie or Nothingneſſe of the Creature is the ſame with its Paſſive Power either Phyſic or Metaphyſic; Natural or Obediential, whereby it is limited, and confined to ſuch or ſuch a degree of Entitie, Exiſtence, and Operation. For where-ever there is any mater or paſſive power of any kind, there is ever coarctation, and confinement: Nothing is or can be Infinite but the firſt pure ſimple Act, who is void of al power and compoſition; and therefore of al finitude and limitation. But every Creature being compound of Something and Nothing, i.e. of Act and Power, it's thereby rendred finite and limited to ſuch a degree of Eſſence and Activitie: and according to the Degree of its Entitie and Actualitie ſuch is the Degree of its Amplitude and Perfection. Angelic and human Spirits have of al Creatures leaſt of Nihilities or Nothing, p. 515and moſt of Entitie and Actualitie: and therefore they have leaſt of paſſive power and confinement: But yet becauſe they retain ſomething of their Primitive Nothing, and Paſſive Obediential power, therefore they have ſomething alſo of limitation and confinement. So for al other Creatures, which are by ſo much the leſſe or more limited and confined in Eſſence and Operation, by how much the more or leſſe they partake of mater or paſſive power. So that al Dependence ariſeth from the Nihilitie, Paſſive Power, and limitation of the Creature. Hence,

2. Another main root of Dependence is the Dominion of God the firſt cauſe of althings. For al Creatures having been educed,2. The Dominion of God. by the Omnipotent Power of God, out of Nothing, and inveſted only with a finite limited Being, compoſed of Something and Nothing, or Act and Paſſive Power, hence it neceſſarily follows, that al are ſubject to the Abſolute Dominion of their Creator, and impedible, according to his pleaſure. Where ever there is paſſive Power, there is impedibilitie: There is nothing foreign, unimpedible but God, who is Pure Act, and Lord of all. God has an Abſolute Dominion over his Creature, for al uſes that implie not a contradiction: This plenary and abſolute Dominion of God appertains to his Infinite Omnipotence and Supremacie, as the firſt Cauſe of althings: For no Dominion is complete and perfect, unleſſe it include a Power for al poſſible uſe. May we eſtime that a perfect Dominion, which has not an abſolute diſpoſe of al under its Dominion? And to this abſolute Dominion of God muſt there not correſpond an abſolute ſubjection in the Creature? Are not theſe two correlates? And doth not this abſolute ſubjection of the Creature to God, ſpeak its abſolute dependence on God? Is it poſſible that any Creature made by God ſhould be exemted from his Abſolute Dominion? And doth not Abſolute Dependence on God neceſſarily follow hence? Neither doth this abſolute Dependence on God regard only the Eſſence and Conſervation of the Creature, but alſo al its operations: for otherwiſe the Creature were foreign, unimpedible, which is againſt the Law of its Creation and Dependence, as §. 11, 12. Thus every Create Being is under the Abſolute Dominion of God, both as to its Eſſence, Exiſtence, Activitie and Operation: God can deprive it of each of theſe as he pleaſeth, yea reduce it to its firſt Nothing. Hence Dependence on God as to each of theſe is eſſential to every Creature, as in what follows.

p. 516§. 5. Every Creature as ſuch is Dependent on its Creator or first Cauſe. Every Creature Dependent.For the Demonſtration of this we ſhal lay down this Hypotheſis, which I conceive al wil grant, That it is impoſſible the ſame thing ſhould be, and not be. This being premiſſed we procede to demonſtrate our Propoſition thus. (1) Dependence both in Eſſence and Operation is ſo eſſential to a Creature, as that the negation of it ſuppoſeth the Creature not to be a Creature. The force and evidence of this Argument wil more fully appear in the explication of the next Propoſition, wherein we are to demonſtrate the intime connexion between Dependence and the Eſſence of a Creature. At preſent it may ſuffice, that we aſſert, that Dependence is ſo intrinſecally, eſſentially, and formally included in the very notion and eſſence of a Creature, that the negation of it implies a contradiction in the Adject, or an Oppoſite in an Appoſite. For what doth the notion of a Creature importe, but its eduction out of nothing, by the Infinite Power of its Creator? And he that educed althings out of nothing, is it not in his power alſo to reduce althings back to their primitive nothing? And doth not this ſpeak an obediential power in althings as to their Creators Soverain pleaſure? And where there is an obediential power, is there not alſo ſubordination and ſubjection? And doth not al this formally ſpeak Dependence? Thus Aquinas, contra Gent. L. 2. C. 25. demonſtrates, That God cannot make a thing, which ſhal want any eſſential principe: for upon the remotion of any eſſential principe follows the remotion of the thing it ſelf: So that if God ſhould make a thing without any one eſſential principe, he ſhould make a thing to be, and not to be. And in what follows he proves, that dependence is an eſſential principe, or mode of a Creature, as Suarez, and that not only as to Eſſence and its Conſervation, but alſo as to operation, of which, §. 10. (2) The Creatures abſolute ſubjection and ſubordination to God demonſtrates its dependence on God. That God has an abſolute Dominion over the Creature has been demonſtrated in the precedent Propoſition: and if the Dominion of God be Abſolute, then the Creatures ſubjection to and dependence on God muſt alſo be abſolute and neceſſary. It belongs to the Being of a Creature as ſuch to be ſubject to and dependent on God for the receiving and acting whatever implies not a contradiction. As it is impoſſible, that God ſhould make a Creature, whereof he has not a ful and abſolute Dominion; ſo it is as impoſſible, that a Creature ſhould p. 517be made, which may not depend on him, as Suarez, Metaphyſ. Diſput. 31. Sect. 14. p. 215. (3) The Indigences and Exigences of the Creature demonſtrate its dependence on God. Is not every Creature Multiforme, Mutable and Defectible? And muſt not every Multiforme, Mutable and Defectible Being be reduced to ſome Ʋniforme, Immutable, and Indefectible Being, as the Original principe of its dependence? is there not a natural levitie and vanitie in every Creature, which renders it fluxible, variable and inconſtant? was it not a great and moſt true ſaying of Heraclitus, That althings are in fluxe or motion? Do not althings then need ſome firſt Being and Cauſe to fixe their Beings and Motions? Again, doth not every potential Being need ſome pure Act, to actuate the ſame? And is not every Creature a potential Being, which needs God, the moſt ſimple pure Act, to actuate the ſame? Doth not every Recipient as Recipient need the active influxe of that principe from wom it receives al? And is not every Creature a mere paſſive recipient as to God, who is the firſt influential Cauſe of its exiſtence, motion, and al? Yea, is not every Creature a mere paſſive Inſtrument in regard of the Divine Influxe? Can it ſubſiſt or act without Divine concurſe? Cut off the dependence of a Creature from its Creator, and what an endleſſe Agitation, yea Annihilation would it fal into? See Aquinas, contra Gent. L. 3. C. 91. and Bradwardine, L. 2. C. 20. p. 541. (4) The Dependence of the Creature on God may be demonſtrated from its Connaturalitie. What more connatural to the Creature than dependence on its Creator? Doth not the Stream naturally depend on its Fountain for derivations? and is it not a violence to it, to be cut off from this dependence? Where doth the infirme member go for animal Spirits in order to ſenſe and motion but to the Head? And is it not moſt natural to the Ray to hang on the Sun, which gave it exiſtence? O then, how natural is it to the Creature to depend on its Creator, the prime Cauſe of its exiſtence and operation! What a violence is it to the Creature to be taken off from this dependence? Hence,

§. 6. Creatural Dependence is not really diſtinct from the Eſſence of the Creature. Dependence the ſame with the Eſſence.That the Creatures Dependence is not really diſtinct from its Eſſence is evident; becauſe every Creature being Ens by participation, it muſt neceſſarily follow, that dependence on the firſt cauſe, from whom it participates of Being, is moſt eſſential to it. As it is eſſential to the firſt cauſe to be Being by Eſſence, and ſo Independent; ſo it is alſo eſſential to the ſecond p. 518cauſe to be Being by Participation, and ſo Dependent: So that the very notion and Idea of a Creature doth inſeparably, eſſentially, and formally include Dependence on God, as that which is not really diſtinct therefrom. This is incomparably wel demonſtrated by Suarez, Metaphyſ. Tom. 2. Diſput. 31. Sect. 14. p. 214. As to the root of this Dependence, it muſt be ſaid, that it is really nothing elſe but the very eſſence of a create Being as ſuch; becauſe if we, by the force of our Intellect, remove whatever is ſuperadded to ſuch an eſſence, we ſhal find that of it ſelf it has Limitation and Imperfection; ſo that of it ſelf it is not ſufficient to act or cauſe any thing: and therefore, according to the abſolute power of God there cannot be ſuch a create Being, which ſhould not have ſuch a ſubordination to the increate Being: Therefore it is a ſigne that is founded in the very eſſential Reaſon of a create Being. Wherefore albeit we may, by the preciſion of Reaſon, and ſome inadequate conception of mind apprehend Dependence in Eſſence in regard of ſome moment of reaſon before Dependence in cauſing,—yet this later really ſuperaddes nothing to the Eſſence of a Create Being. Wherein note wel, that he makes not only dependence as to Eſſence and its Conſervation, but alſo as to Cauſation and Operation the ſame with the Eſſence of the Creature. Which Hypotheſis he demonſtrates and eſtabliſheth againſt Durandus and his Sectators, who aſſert, the Creatures dependence on God, as to Eſſence and Conſervation, but yet denie it as to cauſation and operation, ſpecially as to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin. It may not be denied, but that Suarez, in his firſt Tome of Metaphyſ. Diſput. 20. Sect. 5. p. 530. ſaith, That this Dependence of the Creature on the Creator is not altogether the ſame with the Creature, but a mode diſtinct therefrom. Yet theſe thing he grants. (1) That this Dependence of the Creature on God is ſomething really and intrinſecally exiſting in the Creature. For al confeſſe, that paſſive Creation is in the Creature: But now Dependence is nothing elſe but paſſive Emanation or Creation, if we ſpeak of the firſt Creation, from God. (2) That this Dependence is a ſubſtantial or eſſential mode affecting the ſubſtance of the Creature, albeit it conſtitute not the ſame. (3) He limits this modal diſtinction to the dependence of the Creature in its firſt Emanation or Creation, but grants, that its dependence in operation is really the ſame with the Eſſence of the Creature. (4) Suppoſe we allow a modal diſtinction p. 519between the Creatures dependence and eſſence, yet who knows not, but that the moſt awakened Philoſophers now generally grant, that Modes, ſpecially ſuch as are ſubſtantial and eſſential, do not really differ from the things modified. Thus Calovius, Metaphyſ. pag. 434. Dependence, ſaith he, is a mode of a create Being, agreeing to it by reaſon of its imperfection, which is not the very Eſſence of the Creature, nor yet a new Entitie diſtinct from the Eſſence; but ſomething affecting the create Eſſence. And he cites Suarez for this his Hypotheſis. Hence,

§. 7. Creatural Dependence, according to its formal Idea and notion, Dependence importes Subordination.importes a preſuppoſition of influence, or ſubordination, poſterioritie, and inferioritie. (1) Creatural dependence importes a preſuppoſition of influence, or ſubordination to the firſt Cauſe. This is primarily and formally included in the very notion of Dependence, neither doth it adde any real entitie or mode diſtinct from the Creature; but explicates only the intrinſec condition and habitude of the Creature relating to the omnipotent cauſalitie and influence of God. This ſubordination to God as the firſt cauſe ariſeth from the imperfection of the Creature, and the abſolute Dominion of God. And as to its latitude and extent, it regardes both natural and ſupernatural Influences and Beings. By ſupernatural Beings and Influences I mean ſuch as being above the ſphere of Nature, are not connatural to or producible by its force and power. Theſe ſupernatural Beings have cauſalities proportionable to their Entities, in which they are ſubordinate to God and dependent on him, as natural Beings in their kind. And in this reſpect the Creatures ſubordination to, and dependence on God in the whole of its cauſalitie, is commun both to natural and ſupernatural Beings. Yea, ſupernatural Beings, by virtue of their ſubordination to God, may be elevated and raiſed to act and cauſe ſomewhat beyond that cauſalitie which is connatural to them. For even in this regard they are not leſſe ſubordinate and ſubject to God, than natural Beings are in their kind, as Suarez wel urgeth, Metaph. Tom. 2. Diſput. 31. Sect. 14. pag. 215. Such is the ſubordination both as to Naturals and Supernaturals, which creatural Dependence on God as the firſt cauſe formally includes. Hence, (2) follows Poſterioritie. 2. Poſterioritie.Every dependent as ſuch is poſterior to that on which it dependes: ſo the Creature as to God. Aquinas tels us, That al ſecond cauſes act by virtue received from the firſt cauſe, as inſtruments act by the direction p. 520of Art; wherefore it is neceſſary that al other Agents, whereby God fulfils the order of his Gubernation, act by virtue from God; and thence that they are poſterior to him And this I thinke, if wel underſtood, might ſatisfie al thoſe, who with ſo much vehemence oppoſe al kind of predetermination by Divine concurſe, as to the human Wil: For if we grant, That God is the firſt cauſe of the Wils motion, I cannot ſee how we can denie him the predetermination of the Wil. Though to avoid needleſſe foreign, I generally abſtain from the terme predetermination; yet without that prejudice which ſome, I conceive, undeſervedly lode it with. For if the Concurſe of God be previous to the cauſalitie of the Wil, ſo as to determine the ſame to act, as we have demonſtrated Ch. 7. §. 4. I as yet cannot, according to my ſhallow capacitie, ſee any cogent reaſon, why the ſaid previous concurſe may not be termed predeterminant. But to returne to our Argument, Creatural Dependence implies a poſterioritie, [1] as to Nature and Cauſalitie. [2] As to Origination and Order. [3] As to Dignitie. 3. Inferioritie.Whence (3) Creatural Dependence importes alſo Inferioritie: For every dependent as ſuch as inferior to that it dependes on. Thus Alvarez, de Auxil. Grat. Diſput. 90. pag. 714. Dependence properly in cauſes efficient importes a certain ſubordination and inferioritie of him who dependes to him on whom he dependes: therefore the Divine operation of the firſt cauſe doth not depend on the cooperation of the ſecond cauſe; but on the contrary, the cooperation of the ſecond cauſe dependes on the operation of the firſt cauſe which is previous, as Ch. 7. §. 4.

§. 8. Althings create depend on God as to their Futurition. Creatural Dependence as to Futurition.For the explication and demonſtration of this Propoſition we may conſider, (1) That althings future must have ſome cauſe of their Futurition. Nothing future is of its own nature, or by its own force future, but indifferent to Futurition or Non-futurition. If things were in their own nature and of themſelves future, then they would be always future and never preſent: for that which agrees to any thing of its own nature, agrees to it inſeparably. Hence it follows, that Futurition cannot agree to things of their own nature, but by ſome cauſe, which brings them from a ſtate of indifference and poſſibilitie, to a ſtate of Futurition. And aſſuredly that which has not a certain determinate cauſe of its Futurition, cannot be certainly and determinately future, but only poſſible. p. 521(2) That which gives futurition unto althings is the Divine Wil, and Decree. It's impoſſible, that any thing ſhould paſſe from a ſtate of pure poſſibilitie to a ſtate of futurition, but by the wil of God. Things are not foreſeen and decreed by God, becauſe future, as ſome would needs perſuade us, but they are therefore future, becauſe decreed by God. Thus Wiclef held, That the Determination of God gave the higheſt firmitie in the futurition of his worke, as Walden, Tom. 1. L. 1. C. 23. pag. 37. and Bradwardine aſſerted, That every Propoſition of what is future is ſubjected to the Divine Wil, and originated thereby: So that indeed no Create Being, either ſimple or complexe, can be future antecedently to the Divine Wil. Whence it neceſſarily follows, (3) That althings future depend on God for their futurition. Every thing may as wel give Being to it ſelf, as Futurition. Of this ſee more, Ch. 5. §. 2. Of Gods Science.

§. 9. Al Creatures depend on God as to their firſt Production and Conſervation. (1) Al Creatures depend on God as to their firſt Production and Exiſtence. Plato, in his Timaeus, p. 28. ſaith,Creatural Dependence as to Eſſence and Conſervation. foreign, That every thing produced, is neceſſarily produced by ſome Cauſe. For nothing can be the cauſe of it ſelf: As Novitie of Eſſence is eſſential to the Creature, ſo alſo Dependence on God for that Eſſence. Yea, every mutation and ſtate of the Creature, with al its various modifications are from God. Yea, Suarez, Metaphyſ. Tom. 2. Diſp. 31. ſect. 14. p. 216. tels us, That a create Being as ſuch, conſidered preciſely and abſtractly, requires no other cauſe but the increate Being, in whom it hath a ſufficient cauſe both Efficient, Exemplar, and Final. For albeit ſome create Beings require other efficient cauſes beſides God, at leaſt for their more connatural production, yet the reaſon of a create Being as ſuch requires them not. And in what precedes he ſaith, that the dependence of an effect on any create ſecond cauſe is not ſo eſſential, as its dependence on the increate firſt cauſe. (2) Al Creatures depend on God for their Conſervation. This has been ſufficiently demonſtrated in what precedes, C. 8. and it ma be further argued from the impoſſibilitie of a Creatures being conſerved, but in a way of dependence on Gods conſervative influence: For if a Creature ſhould be conſerved by it ſelf, or any other cauſe, without dependence on the firſt cauſe, God ſhould not have an abſolute Dominion over it, neither were it in his power to annihilate the ſame.

p. 522§. 10. Every Creature dependes on God as to Operation. This Hypotheſis, though denied by Durandus, Creatural Dependence as to Operation.and ſome very few more, yet it is generally owned by Scholaſtic Theologues, and that on invict evident grounds. For (1) Operation is the Index of the Eſſence: what is dependent in Eſſence cannot be independent in Operation. (2) Let us conſider the ſeries of cauſes, and we ſhal find, that every Inferior is obedient and ſubordinate to its Superior in acting. (3) What is an Action but that ſpecial Dependence, which the effect has on its efficient cauſe? And is not God the prime efficient of althings? (4) No Virtue or Efficace of any ſecond Cauſe can actuate itſelf, but neceſſarily requires for its actuation the Divine Concurſe, which gives al Virtue, as alſo the conſervation and actuation of the ſaid Virtue. The Virtue of the Inferior Agent always dependes on the Virtue of the Superior, in as much as the Superior gives Virtue to the Inferior, as alſo the conſervation and actuation of the ſame Virtue. (5) Whatever is limited in its Eſſence, is alſo limited in its Activitie and Operation: and where there is limitation, there is ſubordination and dependence, as wel in operation as in eſſence. (6) If every ſecond cauſe depend not on its firſt for al its operations, then it is impoſſible, that the firſt cauſe ſhould hinder ſuch operations, for the exerting whereof the ſecond cauſe dependes not on him. Who can hinder that Action, which he cannot by any influence reach? And if this be granted, what wil become of the Providence of God? Muſt we not, with Epicurus, allow God to be only a Spectator, no way a Rector or Gubernator of the moſt conſiderable part of Human Affaires and Acts? That no Creature is foreign, unimpedible in operation, we have demonſtrated in what precedes, §. 4. of this Chapter. (7) It implies a contradiction that the ſecond cauſe ſhould act, and yet not be actuated and influenced by the firſt cauſe.

And here, whiles under the review of theſe Sentiments, I may not let paſſe, without ſome Animadverſion, the Reflexion of a Learned Author (in a new Piece about Gods Preſcience) on this Argument, namely, That it can never be proved, that it implies a contradiction, for God to make a Creature, which ſhould be capable of acting without an immediate concurſe; if I apprehend his meaning, as laid down, p. 35, 36, 37. But becauſe that Learned Author gives us only his Suppoſition, without any Demonſtration thereof, or ſolution of thoſe Arguments which the Scholes both of p. 523Thomiſtes, and Scotiſtes, as alſo the Jeſuites, Suarez and others have urged againſt the Hypotheſis of Durandus, which he ſeems to eſpouſe, I do not conceive my ſelf obliged to ſuperadde any Arguments for the re-enforcement of this Hypotheſis, which as been already copioſely demonſtrated, §. 5, 6, 7. alſo Chap. 7. §. 2, 4. and Chap. 9. I ſhal only adde thus much, that I cannot, according to the utmoſt extenſion of my narrow apprehenſion, conceive any medium between the extremes of this disjunctive Propoſition: Either the Human Wil muſt depend on the Divine Independent Wil of God for al its natural motions and operations; or God muſt depend on the Human Will in it ſelf Independent, for al his Preſcience, motives of Election, and all diſcrimination as to Grace, and gratioſe operations. I am not ignorant of the general replie, That this Hypotheſis I oppoſe only cuts off Gods concurſe as to ſinful Acts. But I would willingly be ſatisfied in theſe Queries: (1) Whether there be any Action of Man on Earth ſo good, which hath not ſome mixture of Sin in it? And if God concur to the ſubſtrate mater of it as good, muſt be not alſo neceſſarily concur to the ſubſtrate mater of it as ſinful? Is not the ſubſtrate mater of the Act both as good and ſinful the ſame? (2) Again, as there is no Action in this imperfect ſtate ſo good, but it has ſome ſin mixed with it; ſo is there any Action ſo ſinful, which has not ſome natural good as the ſubſtrate mater thereof, as we have largely proved, Chap. 9. §. 2? (3) Laſtly, if we cut off the material entitie of ſinful Acts from Dependence on Gods immediate concurſe, do we not indeed thereby cut off the moſt illuſtrious part of Divine Providence in governing this lower world? But of theſe ſufficiently in what precedes, ſpecially C. 7. § 9. Hence,

§. 11. The Wil of Man is neceſſarily ſubordinate to and dependent on the Wil of God in al its Operations. The Dependence of the Human Wil in al its Acts.The Wil of Man cannot be the ſolitary cauſe of its own Act, ſo as to exclude the efficience of the prime cauſe, as C. 7. §. 4. It's true, the Wil is a total cauſe in its own kind, yet not ſo as to exclude the total influxe of God as the firſt cauſe. Yea, God is not only the total, but alſo the immediate cauſe of al voluntary Acts; which argues the Wils total and immediate Dependence on God in al its Acts, as C. 7. §. 4. Thus Aquinas: Seing every mutable and multiforme muſt be reduced to ſome immobile principe, as unto its cauſe; and the Intellect and Wil of Man appear to be mutable and multiforme, p. 524it's neceſſary, that they be reduced to ſome ſuperior, immobile, immutable, and uniforme cauſe. Yea, he ſaith, that God is moſt intimely preſent to the Wil, and as it were acting in it, whiles he moves it to act. And Scotus, in 2. Sent. Diſt. 37. Q. 2. Queries, Whether the Create Wil be ſo far a total and immediate cauſe of its own Act, as to exclude the immediate Efficience of God? And he proves the Negative, becauſe, (1) If ſo, then it would neceſſarily follow, that God doth not certainly know the future evenements and acts of the Wil: becauſe his knowlege of things future dependes on the determination of his own Wil, as Chap. 5. §. 2. (2) If ſo, then God were not the beſt and moſt perfect Being; becauſe he ſhould not have Dominion over the Human Wil, as chap. 5. §. 3. (3) Again, if the Human Wil could produce its own Act without the immediate concurſe of God, it could alſo intend the ſame even to the higheſt degree of merit without Divine aſſiſtence. (4) The Underſtanding cannot produce its act, without Gods illumination, therefore neither can the Wil its, without Gods concurſe. See this more fully in Bradwardine, L. 2. C. 20. p. 541. Alſo Philoſoph. General. P. 1. L. 3. C. 3. S. 3. §. 4. Prop. 1. p. 524. and what precedes, in this Part 4. C. 7. & 9.

§. 12. Laſtly,Dependence Natural, Moral, and Supernatural. Creatural Dependence, as to its parts, is either Natural, or Moral and Supernatural. Natural Dependence is that whereby al Creatures as Creatures depend on God for Eſſence, conſervation and operation. Moral and Supernatural Dependence is that whereby the Rational Creature dependes on God as to Morals and Supernaturals. We find both theſe dependences conjoined in Man: for he having a double foreign or habitude to God (1) as a Creature; and (2) as a Rational Creature: he hath alſo a double dependence on God,Supernatural Dependence on Chriſt. (1) Natural, of which in what precedes. (2) Moral and Supernatural. And as in Naturals Inferior Cauſes depending on their Superiors in acting, can do nothing without, much leſſe contrary to the efficace and concurſe of their Superiors, ſo alſo in Morals and Supernaturals. Supernatural Elevation is the total, next, and formal Reaſon of acting ſupernaturally: and by how much the nearer the receptive Soul is to God, its ſupernatural influencing cauſe, by ſo much the more it partakes of his influence: as in Nature by how much the nearer the thing moved is to the mover, by ſo much the more efficaciouſly doth it partake of its Impreſſion. God doth moſt p. 525potently, and yet moſt ſweetly influence the Affect, Act, and Effect of the virtuoſe Soul, Phil. 2.13. Al effuſions of virtuoſe Acts are proportionate to the Souls dependence on the efficacious infuſions of God. Yea the natural Wil, by virtue of its Supernatural Dependence, is elevated to act above Nature.

This Supernatural Dependence of the New Creature on Chriſt, as Mediator and Spring of al Grace, is lively illuſtrated in Sacred Philoſophie. Thus Pſal. 87.7. As wel the ſingers,Pſal. 87.7.Ps 87:7 as players on inſtruments ſhal be there: Al my ſprings are in thee. Glaſſius renders the words thus: And they ſhal ſing as thoſe that lead the Dances: Al my ſprings are in thee. The Pſalmiſt having given us, in the foregoing Verſes, a Prophetic Deſcription of the glorioſe Reigne of the Meſſias on Mount Zion, or in Evangelic Churches, and the great number of Converts who ſhould ſing forth his praiſes there, he concludes with this as the burden of their Song: Al my ſprings are in thee: i. e. Al the Springs of my Divine Life are in thee, O great Mediator: Thou alone art the prime cauſe and object of my dependence. The New Creatures dependence on Chriſt for ſupernatural Grace, is Ʋniverſal, Total, Abſolute, and Immediate; and that both for Habitual and Actual Grace. For Habitual Grace.1. Chriſtians have an Univerſal and Abſolute Dependence on Chriſt for Habitual Grace. So John 1.16. And of his fulneſſe have we al received, Joh. 1.16.John 1:16and Grace for Grace. foreign here ſignifies, either the ſame with foreign upon; and then the ſenſe is: Grace upon Grace, i. e. abundant Grace, and that freely: or it may note the Analogie which is between the Grace received from Chriſt, and Nature received from Adam; and then the meaning is this: Grace for Grace, i. e. as the Child receives from his Parents Member for member; or as al the Sons of Adam receive from him Luſt for luſt; for there was no luſt in his heart, but what was communicated to his Poſteritie; ſo the Children of Chriſt, the ſecond Adam, receive from him Grace for Grace, i. e. al manner of habitual Graces, anſwerable to thoſe in his Human Nature. This Supernatural Dependence on Chriſt for Habitual Grace is alſo wel expreſſed by the Diſciples, Luk. 17.5.Luk. 17.5.Luke 17:5 And the Apoſtles ſaid unto the Lord, Encreaſe our Faith: foreign, Adde Faith to us, i. e. ſome additional degrees of Faith. The Apoſtles had been oft rebuked by their Lord for their Infidelitie, and therefore now, having by their frequent relapſes gained ſome ſenſe of their own inſufficience, they depend wholly on him for ſupplies: their own impotence engageth them to depend p. 526on his Omnipotence. Grace is a Celeſtial Plant fed by an inviſible Root in Heaven, and by Juices derived from a Principe above it ſelf. As the ſtrength of Adam's Habitual Grace could not preſerve him when he truſted thereto, and did not depend on his Creator; ſo the impotence of the New Creature cannot hurt it, ſo long as it dependes on Chriſt.

2. The New Creature has an Univerſal,For Actual Grace. Pſal. 141.8.Ps 141:8 Abſolute, Total, and immediate Dependence on Chriſt for Actual Grace. Thus, Pſal. 141.8. But mine eyes are unto thee, O God the Lord: in thee is my truſt; leave not my ſoul deſtitute. Hebr. make not my ſoul naked, or emty. foreign ſignifies to evacuate or make naked. So the Targum foreign. It notes his total dependence on god. We find the Churches abſolute and immediate dependence on Chriſt for Actual Grace lively deſcribed,Cant. 8.5.Song 8:5 Who is this that cometh up from the Wilderneſſe, leaning upon her Beloved? Who is this? i. e. this Woman, or Church, that cometh up out of the Wilderneſſe. This ſhews her abandoning her own forces and ſtrength. Leaning, or Cleaving to. The Original word is no where elſe found in the Old Teſtament. The LXX. render it by a word that ſignifies, confirming her ſelf: which denotes her dee ſenſe of her own inſufficience, with abſolute and total Dependence on Chriſt for Actual Grace. Chriſtians ought to live immediately and totally on that Grace which is in Chriſt, and not on habitual Grace received from him. Members and Branches live on life, but the life of their Head and Root: So Chriſtians ought to live not in the ſtrength of their own Graces, but in the ſtrength of that Grace which is in Chriſt, as Paul, Gal. 2.20. When men are more ready to act in the force of Grace received, than in dependence on Chriſt, they ſoon fal into ſin. This Dependence on Chriſt for Actual Grace is wel illuſtrated,Phil. 2.12, 13.Phil 2:12Phil 2:13 Phil. 2.12. Work out your own ſalvation with fear and trembling. This fear and trembling doth not implie douting, as the Papiſts would needs perſuade us; but a modeſt, humble, ſelf-abaſing ſenſe of our own inſufficience, with an abſolute dependence on Gos Al-ſufficient Grace. Thence it follows, v. 13. For it's God that worketh in you to wil and to do, of his good pleaſure. This is a ſtrong inducement to worke the Soul to an holy ſelf-deſpair and humble trembling Dependence on Divine Grace, becauſe God workes both to wil and to do of his good pleaſure.Heb. 12.1, 2.Heb 12:1Heb 12:2 So Hebr. 12.1, 2. Let us run with patience the race ſet before us, looking to Jeſus the author and finiſher of our faith. This p. 527looking implies abſolute conſtant dependence, as Eſa. 45.22. Look unto me, and be ye ſaved, &c. This Evangelic Supernatural Dependence on Chriſt for Actual Grace is very comprehenſive, taking in the whole of the life of faith as to Sanctification. (1) It includes dependence on Chriſt for Actual Grace in order to Divine Conduct in al our ways. So Cant. 1.4. Draw me, Cant. 1.4.Song 1:4we wil run after thee. This drawing notes impotence in them that are drawen, but Omnipotence in Chriſt that draws. So Hoſ. 11.3, 4. I taught Ephraim alſo to go, &c. This Divine Conduct is alſo lively expreſſed, Pſal. 119.133. Order my ſteps in thy Word. foreign confirme, diſpoſe, &c. (2) It includes dependence on Chriſt for Actual Grace, in order to the fortifying and corroborating the Spirit under al Infirmities, and againſt al Tentations. Pſal. 61.2.Pſal. 61.2.Ps 61:2 When mine heart is overwhelmed: lead me to the Rock that is higher than I. This repreſentes one tending to ſome place of ſafetie, whoſe own forces fail him to bring him thither. Whence he addes, to the Rock that is higher than I: i. e. too high for me to mount up unto, by mine own ſtrength., So Pſal. 27.13. I had fainted, unleſſe I had believed: Pſal. 27.13, 14.Ps 27:13Ps 27:14i. e. being ſurrounded with ſo many difficulties, I had been quite overwhelmed, had I not depended on, and encouraged mine heart in my God. Thence he addes, v. 14. Wait on the Lord, be of good courage, and he ſhal ſtrengthen thine heart. Be of good courage, foreign confirme thine heart by dependence on God. LXX. foreign play the man: and then it follows: foreign, and he ſhal make thine heart ſtrong. The like Pſal. 73.26.Pſal. 73.26.Ps 73:26 My fleſh and mine heart faileth, but God is the ſtrength of mine heart. foreign, the Rock of mine heart; or the firme Adheſion and Dependence of mine heart is on God. We find al this exemplified in Paul, 2 Cor. 12.9.2 Cor. 12.9, 10.2 Cor 12:92 Cor 12:10 Moſt gladly therefore wil I glorie in mine infirmities, that the Power of Chriſt may reſt upon me: foreign, that the Power of Chriſt may tabernacle or dwel on me, and frequently manifeſt it ſelf. And he gives the reaſon of it v. 10. For when I am weak then am I ſtrong: i. e. Chriſt is never ſo ſtrong in me, as when, being moſt weak in my ſelf, I depend moſt on his ſtrength. How oft are the ſtrongeſt Chriſtians foiled by the leaſt Tentations, when they endeavor to overcome them in their own ſtrength? And on the contrary, how oft do the weakeſt Chriſtians overcome the greateſt tentations, when they depend on Divine Grace? (3) It includes alſo dependence on Chriſt for Quickening Grace, in order to the performance of al Duties and Services. Pſal. 119.25. Quicken thou me according to thy word. p. 528foreign put life into me. The like v. 37, 40, 88, 107. Look as wormes that are dead in the Winter, live again at Spring, when under a warme Sun; ſo the dead heart, when dependent on the warme beames of Actual Grace, as Mal. 4.2. Dependence on Actual Grace brings ſweet Inſpirations of Grace into the heart, whence flow Divine Reſpirations of the heart towards God. (4) It includes alſo Dependence on Chriſt for Actual Grace in order to Divine Fructification. Pſal. 52.8.Ps 52:8So Pſal. 52.8. But I am like a green Olive-tree in the Houſe of God. the Olive-tree being ful of an unctuoſe juice, is always green and flouriſhing with fruits; ſo was David's heart, by Dependence on Divine Grace. So it follows: I truſt in the Mercy of God for ever. To conclude this Subject, it is wel obſerved by Suarez, That the Dependence of a Supernatural Being on God agrees with the Dependence of a Natural Being, the due proportion being obſerved: i. e. as Natural Dependence is Abſolute, Immediate, and Total; ſo Supernatural. See more hereof in what precedes, Chap. 10. §. 1. alſo B. 1. C. 3. §. 3.

FINIS.

End of the text · Theophilus Gale, The Court of the Gentiles Part 4 (1677)