The Court of the Gentiles Part 4, Introduction

The Court of the Gentiles Part 4 · Introduction

p. 1A PROEMIAL SCHEME OF REFORMED PHILOSOPHIE.

§. 1. WHereas I ſometimes intended to have caſt the whole of Reformed Philoſophie into one Syſteme, I am herein in part diſappointed, in that I have communicated the principal part of what I intended in my Philoſophia Generalis. But what I could not wel digeſt therein, I have now made public in this Part IV. Of Moral and Metaphyſic Philoſophie. So that, to ſpeak the truth, I have now put my laſt period to Philoſophie, without the leaſt Intention of making any farther progreſſe therein: only to give the Reader a Breviarie of the Forme and Method I would aſſume, were I to caſt Philoſophie into one entire Syſteme or Idea; as alſo to give him an Index where to find al the parts of Reformed Philoſophie more profeſſedly diſcuſſed by me, I judge the following Scheme of Philoſophie moſt neceſſary. Philoſophie is either General, or Particular: Particular Philoſophie is either Notional, or Real: Real Philoſophie is either Natural, Moral, or Supernatural. This General Diſtribution of Philoſophie, taken from its object, ſeems to me of al moſt genuine and natural; and that which reduceth it to one uniforme Syntagme or Syſteme, as it may appear by the following particulars.

Philoſophie in its General Idea comprehendes the following particulars. (1) The General Hiſtorie of Philoſophie,General Philoſophie. and Philoſophers; with their ſeveral Sects, Dogmes, Modes of Life, Diſcipline, and Characters: Of which we have treated copioſely, Court of the Gentiles, P. 2. and Philoſ. General. P. 1, & 2. l. 1. (2) The Generic Idea of Philoſophie, Cognition: which takes in al p. 2the Intellectual Habits. As [1] Opinion; which is a kind of Medium between Ignorance and Science, ariſing either from Senſe, or Affection, or Conſidence, or Conjectures. Its object is things Phyſic, Senſible, Singular, &c. Its Attributes, Infirmitie and Incertitude, Obſcurite, Inſtabilitie and Inquietude: Of which ſee Philoſ. Gen. P 2. l. 2. c. 1. [2] Experience; its Diguitie, Object, Subject, Extenſion, Qualities and Effects: Of which ſee Philoſ. Gen. P. 2. l. 2. c. 1. ſ. 3. [3] Imitation; wherein are conſiderable its Nature, Origine, Subject, Object, Effects; namely Images and Signes, regular Uſe and Abuſe; of which, Philoſ. Gen. P. 2. l. 2 c. 2. [4] Faith; its Generic Nature, Object both Material and Formal, Act, Subject, Proprieties, Differences, and Species; of which ſee Philoſ. Gen. P. 2. l. 2. c. 3. [5] Sapience; its prime Cauſe, Object, Act, Proprieties, Effects, Conveniences with and Differences from other Sciences, and Corollaries; of which, Philoſ. Gen. P. 2. l. 2. c. 4. [6] Intelligence; which is ſaid to be an Habit of or Aſſent to firſt Principes, not Practic but Speculative, which give al evidence to, but receive no evidence from concluſions; as Philoſ. Gen. P. 2. l. 2. c. 5. ſ. 1. [7] Science; which is a certain aſſent to neceſſary concluſions, by ſome certain Medium; as Philoſ. General. P. 2. l. 2. c. 5. ſ. 2. [8] Art; which is an Imitamen of Nature, or habitual Idea and Exemplar inherent in the Mind of the Artificer, whereby he is directed unto a regular Operation; as Philoſ. Gen. P. 2. l. 2. c. 5. ſ. 3. [9] Prudence; wherein we have conſidered its Subject, the Practic Judgement or Conſcience, conſiſting of two parts, Syntereſis, and Syneideſis: its Object, both End and Means: its End and Offices, foreign and foreign: Its Species, foreign, Good Counſel, foreign, Sagacitie, foreign, Experience, foreign, Senſate and reflexe Cognition, foreign, Providence: its Material parts, Ethic, Oeconomic, Politic: its Cauſes both Diſpoſitive and Proxime: its Oppoſites and Differences, ſpecially from Carnal Policie or Craft in 20 Particulars: its Effects, Characters, and Corollaries. Al which we have copiofely conſidered, Philoſ. General. P. 2. l. 2. c. 6. Alſo Court Gent. P. 4. B. 1. c. 1. (3) The General part of Philoſophie includes alſo the Examen of its Object, Subject, Ends, Adjuncts, Difference from Philoſophie and Theologie, Excellence, Effects, Corruption, Right uſe, Parts, as alſo the Characters and Offices of Philoſophers: which we have largely diſcuſſed, Philoſ. Gen. P. 2. l. 3.

p. 3§. 2. Philoſophie conſidered in its Particular Ideas, Notional Philoſophie or Logicis either Notional, or Real. Notional Philoſophie, termed by the Platoniſtes Dialectic or Rational, becauſe the ancient mode of Reaſoning was by Dialogues, is now communly ſtiled Logic; which properly treats of Notions, either Simple or Complexe. Simple Notions are foreign, Imitamens or Ideas of things impreſſed on the mind, without either Affirmation or Negation: as the Notion or Idea we have of a Man, Horſe, or the like. Complexe Notions are either Propoſitions, which, being compoſed of ſimple Notions, give ſome judgement of things; or Syllogiſmes and Diſcourſes, which are compoſed of Propoſitions; or Method, which is compoſed of ſimple Notions, Propoſitions, and Diſcourſes. Theſe are the four parts of Logic; which are taken from its proper End, and anſwer to the four great Operations of the Mind. For what is the End of al Logic,The End of Logic. but to direct and conduct the Mind into the Cognition of things? Hence Logic is termed by Plato foreign, The Art of Introduction, i. e. whereby Men are conducted into the knowlege of things: alſo foreign, the Way and Method for the Acquirement of Sciences, and al uſeful knowlege. Yea Ariſtotle, as wel as Plato, defines Logic, foreign, a Method for the right diſpoſing of every Probleme propoſed. Whence alſo Ariſtotle ſtiles Logic, foreign, the Organ or Key of al Sciences; whereby we are introduced into the Cognition of althings. Ariſtotle made Logic the Organ of Philoſophie, yet no part thereof; but Plato made it both an Organ and Part. So Ammonius, as Court Gent. Part. 2. B. 3. c. 8. §. 3. Of what great uſe Logic is, not only for the Acquirement of Sciences, but alſo for the Reſtauration of the mind to its native Claritie and Acumen, in order to a right Apprehenſion, Judgement, Diſcourſe, and Method, in the Cognition or Diſquiſition of things, is moſt evident to any that underſtandes the Nature and Uſe thereof. Yea, according to the Idea I frame of Logic, the Clarifying and Rectifying of the Mind is its principal End, and that of the Acquiſition of Sciences much inferior thereto. For of what uſe are al natural Sciences, but to Clarifie and Elevate the Mind, for the contemplation of more Sublime and Noble Objects? So that to make uſe of Logic only as an Inſtrument or Key to Sciences is to deprive ourſelves of the principal uſe thereof; which is to Purifie and Refine the Intellect, in order to the more diſtinct, real and perfect knowlege of things, ſpecially p. 4ſuch as are moſt Sublime and Divine. I no way dout, but that a judicious perſon, by the aide of Logic, may be greatly Aſſiſted and Capacitated for the more expedite exercice of Mechanic or Politic Employments: but O! of what incomparable advantage might Logic be in Theologic Contemplations and Controverſies, were it but wel Reformed and ſeated in a ſolid, judicious, humble, ſerious, rectified Mind? So much for the End of Logic.

The Ʋtilite of Logic may further appear if we conſider the Parts thereof;The firſt part of Logic, about Simple Ideas or Notions. which are four, anſwerable to the four Operations of the mind. 1. The prime or firſt Operation of the Mind conſiſtes in its ſimple Apprehenſion of things, without Affirmation or Negation, Judgement or Diſcourſe. This ſimple Apprehenſion of things is by Ideas, or Notions impreſſed on the Mind: Theſe Ideas or Notions ariſe either immediately from the things themſelves, conſidered in their real Natures and Attributes, or elſe from the Minds Comparation and Abſtraction: the former they cal firſt Notions; the later ſecond Notions. Again theſe Ideas and Notions may be conſidered, either in regard of their Qualitie, namely their Clarite and Obſcuritie: or in regard of their Quantitie, i. e. their Extenſion or Reſtriction; their Ʋniverſalitie, Particularitie, and Singularitie. Now the mind of Man having been by the Fal much wounded and diſabled, as to the regular exerting this firſt Simple Apprehenſion of things, in order to the Acquirement of right Ideas and Notions, hence the firſt part of Logic is to ſuccur and direct the mind in this its firſt Operation of ſimple Apprehenſion, for the procurement of Clear, Diſtinct, and real Ideas or Notions, both firſt, and ſecond, Univerſal, Particular,Objective Ideas or Categories. and Singular.

And becauſe al Subjective Ideas or Notions of things ariſe from, and are indeed but Imitamens or Images of the things themſelves, hence Logic, (1) begins with the conſideration of the things themſelves, as they lie in their Objective Ideas, and are the Original Exemplars of al Subjective Ideas or Notions impacted on the Mind. Logic handles theſe Objective Ideas, not as any part of its formal Object, but only as the Subſtrate Mater, or prime Elements, from which ſubjective Ideas and Notions ariſe. Theſe Objective Ideas or real Beings conſidered in Logic are reduced by the Ariſtoteleans, (from I know not what Pythagorean Superſtition) to Ten Categories or Predicaments; unto which they conceit p. 5al Beings are to be reduced, as to their proper Claſſes. But this Diſtribution being now generally exploded by al awakened ſpirits, yea diſapproved by ſome of the more candid Ariſtoteleans, we ſhal content our ſelves with this curt, yet apparently more native and diſtinct diſtribution of Beings. Ens, or Being is either Infinite, or Finite. Infinite Being is but one, namely God, who having no termes of Eſſence, cannot admit termes of Definition; but doth every way tranſcend al Predicamental Confinement, as the ſober Ariſtoteleans acknowledge. Finite Ens or Being may be diſtributed into Subſtance, or Mode. 1. Subſtance.[1] Subſtance is either Incorporcous or Corporeous: Incorporeous Subſtance is divided into Angels, or Human Souls. Corporeous Subſtance is either Inanimate or Animate: Inanimate Bodies are either Simple, as the Three Heavens, with the four Elements, Fire, Air, Water, Faith: or Mixed; which are again divided into imperfectly mixed, as Meteors: or Perfectly mixed, as Minerals, Metals and Plants. Animate Corporeous Subſtance is divided into Brutes, or Human Bodies. Of al theſe we have copioſely Philoſophiſed, Philiſ. Gen. P. 1. B. 3. c. 2. and Court Gent. P. 2. B. 3. c. 9. [2] Mode is not a Complete Ens or Being, 2. Mode.neither is it a mere Non-entitie or Nothing; but of a middle nature between a complete perfect Being and nothing; or, as ſome properly terme it, Appendicula Rei, an Appendicule, or Little Appendix of a thing. A Mode is either Subſtantial and Eſſential, or Accidental. A Subſtantial and Eſſential Mode is that which Eſſentially adheres to the thing, and cannot, no not ſo much as by Mental Abſtraction, be ſeparated from the thing: ſo that to denie it of the thing Modified thereby, implies a ſlat contradiction, either Virtual or Formal. Thus Quantitie is a Mode Eſſentially appendent to and inſeparable from Corporeous Subſtance: in like manner al Proprieties are Eſſential Modes of the Subject they are proper to. Accidental Modes are ſuch as appertain not to the Eſſences of things, and therefore may be ſeparated, at leaſt Mentally, if not Really. Again Modes may be diſtributed into interne and externe: Union and Corporeous Formes are interne Modes; but Actions and Relations externe. Thus much for Single Objective Ideas loged in things.

(2) As for Simple Subjective Ideas, and Notions, Firſt Notions.they are uſually ranged under theſe two Heads, of Firſt and Second Notions. Firſt Notions, are ſuch as ariſe immediately from the thing it ſelf, or from the Comparation and Comprehenſion of ſeveral Individual p. 6things under one commun Notion. Hence they may be diſtributed into Singular, and Ʋniverſal. A ſingular firſt Notion or Idea is the ſimple Imitamen or Repreſentamen of ſome one indvidual thing in the mind: as the Idea of Alexander, Plato, or the like. An Ʋniverſal firſt Notion, is that which comprehendes and repreſentes many different Species, or Individuals: As Animal, Man, Brute. Theſe Univerſal Ideas or Notions are either Generic, as Animal;Second Notions. or Specific, as Man. Second Notions are only Termes of Art abſtracted and aſſumed by the buſy Mind, the more diſtinctly to apprehend and expreſſe things. Al Diſciplines, ſpecially Organic, have certain termes of Art, whereunto they reduce things comprehended under thoſe Diſciplines. Such are the parts of ſpeech in Grammar, Noun, Pronoun, Verb, &c. Thus in Logic there are certain Second Notions or Ideas, framed out of firſt Notions collated or compared together. As by comparing al Animals together, we find there is one commun Nature, in which they al agree, albeit they may have in other regards their Specific Differences. Thus it appears, that al Animals agree as to Senſe, &c. Thence we conclude that Animal is Genus: which is a ſecond Notion or Terme of Art, under which al Animals are involved. So that indeed theſe ſecond Notions are not Real, but only Mental or Rational Beings, framed out of Real Beings, and unto which al Real Beings are reduced, as to ſo many Artificial Claſſes. Theſe ſecond Notions are by ſome diſtributed into Separate or Simple, and Conjunct. Separate ſecond Notions are ſuch as agree to things apart: as Genus, Species, Difference; the Whole and the Part; the Cauſe and the thing Cauſed; the Subject and the Adjunct, or the Accident. Conjunct Second Notions are ſuch as agree to things Conjunctly: as Convenience, Diverſitic, Oppoſition, and Order. Which are copioſely diſcuſſed by Logicians, ſpecially the Ramiſtes; who in Imitation of Cicero, terme this firſt Part of Logic, which treats of Simple Ideas and Notions, INVENTION; becauſe it furniſheth our Invention with Topics and Arguments, in order to a Judgement and Diſcourſe of Things.

2.Propoſitions and Judgements. The ſecond Part of Logic regardes Propoſitions or Judgements, as it anſwers to the Second Operation of the Mind, which conſiſtes in a judgement of things by Affirming or denying the ſame. For albeit the Mind may have a ſimple Idea or Notion of a thing by ſimple Apprehenſion; yet it cannot make a Judgement p. 7thereof, without Affirmation or Negation. So that the proper object of this ſecond part of Logic, is, to uſe Ariſtotles ſtile, foreign, Complexe orations, Notions, or Ideas; ſuch as carrie with them an Affirmation, or Negation. Propoſitions, in regard of their Species and Affections, admit of various diſtributions. (1) In regard of their Species, or Kinds, Propoſitions, are diſtributed, [1] into Simple and Compoſite. A Simple Propoſition is that which cannot be reſolved into other Propoſitions. The Simplicitie of a Propoſition is taken from the Unitie of its Subject, Predicate, and Verbal Copule. As, A man is Rational. A Compoſite Propoſition is that which is compoſed of other Propoſitions conjoined. The Principal of Compoſite Propoſitions are Hypothetic, and Disjunctive. The parts of an Hypothetic Propoſition are copulated by the conditional particle, If: as, If he be a man, he is rational. The firſt part is called the Antecedent, the later the Conſequent. The Veritie of an Hypothetic Propoſition conſiſtes not in the truth of the Parts, but in their Connexion. If the condition be impoſſible, an affirmative Hypothetic is equipollent to a ſimple Categoric Negative. A Disjunctive Propoſition is that which hath parts conjoined by a Disjunctive particle: as, Every Animal is either a Man, or a Brute. [2] Propoſition, as to its kind, is divided into Pure and Modal. (2) The Affections of Propoſitions are either Abſolute, or Relate: Abſolute Affections are Quantitie and Qualitie. [1] A Propoſition in regard of its Quantitie, is either Ʋniverſal, Particular, or Singular. The notes of Quantitie regard the ſubject of Propoſitions, which is either Ʋniverſal or Singular. If the ſubject be Univerſal and taken Univerſally, i. e. in its utmoſt Latitude and Extenſion, expreſſed by the note Al, or No, then the Propoſition is Ʋniverſal: as Al men are rational. If the ſubject be Univerſal, but limited and confined by ſome note of Particularitie, then the Propoſition is Particular: as, Some men are learned. If the ſubject be Singular, then the Propoſition is ſuch: as, Plato was a Philoſopher. The Ariſtoteleans adde, though without reaſon, a fourth ſort of Propoſitions, which they cal Indefinite, conſiſting of an Univerſal Subject, without any note of Quantitie. As, Man is learned: Virtue is beautiful. But their miſtake herein is obvious: for if an Univerſal ſubject be found without reſtriction and limitation, it muſt be taken Univerſally. Whence the firſt Propoſition, Man is learned, is falſe; becauſe al men are not ſo: but the p. 8ſecond, Virtue is beautiful, is true, yet not indefinite, but Univerſal; becauſe al Virtue is ſo. [2] In regard of Qualitie, a Propoſition is Affirmative or Negative, True or Falſe. A Propoſition is true, when it conjoins things to be conjoined, or divides things to be divided. A Propoſition is falſe, when it conjoins things to be divided, or divides things to be conjoined. The Relate Affections of a Propoſition are Converſion, Equipollence, Subalternation, and Oppoſition.

3.Syllogiſme and Diſcourſe. The third part of Logic is of Syllogiſmes, anſwerable to the third operation of the Mind, which is Ratiocination or Diſcourſe. That which induceth a Neceſſitie of Ratiocination and Argumentation is the Compoſition and Limitation of the human Intellect, which cannot judge of the Veritie or Falſitie of a Propoſition, by the ſole conſideration of its Termes, without aſſuming a middle Terme or Argument, for the demonſtration thereof. A Syllogiſme may be conſidered either in regard of its Compoſition and Conſtitution; or in regard of its Diviſion and Species. In the Compoſition and Corſtitution of a Syllogiſme, we may conſider both its Mater and Forme. 1. The Mater of a Syllogiſme is either remote or proxime. The Mater of a Syllogiſme.(1) The Remote mater of a Syllogiſme is its three Terme; two whereof are Extreme, the other Middle. The Predicate of the Queſtion is always the Major Extreme; becauſe it is ever more Univerſal and Extenſive than, or equal to the Subject. Hence the Subject of the Queſtion is ever the Minor Extreme, becauſe leſſe, or not more extenſive than the Predicate. The Middle Terme is aſſumed as an Argument to prove the Queſtion, and is collated and compared both with the ſubject or minor extreme, as alſo with the predicate and major extreme; either ſeparately, as in ſimple Syllogiſmes, or conjunctly, as in compoſite. This middle Terme is ſo termed not in regard of its Site, but Office: yet in the firſt Figure it is middle as wel in regard of Site as Office. (2) The Proxime mater of a Syllogiſme is its Propoſitions; which in a ſimple perfect Syllogiſme are three; Major, Minor, and Concluſion. The two firſt are uſually termed the Premiſſes; the laſt, the Concluſion; which is the ſame with the Queſtion, or Theſis to be demonſtrated.

2.The Forme of a Syllogiſme. The Forme of a Syllogiſme conſiſtes in the apt diſpoſition of the Premiſſes, ſo as the Concluſion may thence neceſſarily follow. And becauſe al kinds of Concluſions cannot be deduced from al kinds of Premiſſes, hence Logicians preſcribe certain p. 9general Rules, for the regular deduction of Concluſions from their Premiſſes: Theſe Rules they bottome on certain Axiomes,General Axiomes and Rules. ſuch as theſe: (1) Particular Propoſitions are contained in the general of the ſame kind. (2) A Propoſition becomes Particular or Ʋniverſal from the Particularitie or Ʋniverſalitie of its Subject. (3) The Predicate of an Affirmative Propoſition having not greater Extenſion than its Subject, is alwaies conſidered as taken Particularly; becauſe it is by accident that it is ſometimes taken Ʋniverſally. (4) The Predicate of a negative Propoſition is alwaies taken Ʋniverſally. From theſe Principes the following general Rules, for the right conſtitution of ſimple Syllogiſmes, as to their forme, are deduced. [1] From two particular Propoſitions nothing regularly can be concluded. [2] From two Negatives nothing duely follows. For two negative Propoſitions ſeparate both Predicate and Subject from the middle terme. [3] The middle terme muſt once at leaſt either in the Major or Minor, be taken Ʋniverſally. For if it may be taken twice Particularly, it may be taken for diverſe parts of the ſame whole: whence the termes of the Concluſion can neither be rightly conjoined, nor ſeparated. As, Some Animal is a Man: Some Animal is a Beſte: Therefore ſome Beſte is a Man. [4] The Concluſion ever follows the weaker Part. i. e. If any one Propoſition be Particular or Negative, the Concluſion alſo is Particular or Negative. The reaſon is; becauſe the Premiſſes are the cauſe of the Concluſion: now we al know, that what infirmitie is in the cauſe, follows alſo in the effect. [5] The termes of a Concluſion may not be taken more Ʋniverſally in the Concluſion, than in the Premiſſes: and the reaſon is manifeſt; becauſe we may not argue from a Particular to an Univerſal. [6] The Minor terme or extreme is the ſame in the Concluſion, as it is in the Premiſſes: i. e. if it be Particular in the Premiſſes, it is ſo in the Concluſion: and if it be Univerſal in the Premiſſes, it muſt be ſuch in the Concluſion. [7] When the Minor Propoſition is an Ʋniverſal Negative, the Concluſion alſo muſt be Ʋniverſal. [8] When the Concluſion is Negative, the Major Propoſition cannot be a Particular Affirmative. [9] When the Concluſion is Negative, the Major terme muſt be taken Ʋniverſally in the Major. The reaſon is; becauſe it is taken Univerſally in the Concluſion. [10] A Negative Concluſion cannot be proved by two Affirmative Propoſitions. The Reaſons of theſe Rules ſee more fully, L'Art de Penſer, or the Janſeniſtes Logic, Part. 3. C. 3.

p. 10Theſe general Rules for the right formation of a ſimple Syllogiſme being premiſſed,Figures and Modes. we procede to Figures and Modes, wherein the formal Conſtitution of a Syllogiſme is placed. A Figure is the regular Diſpoſition of the middle terme or Argument with the two extremes, or the parts of the Queſtion. A Mode is the regular diſpoſition of the three Propoſitions, according to their differences as to Quantitie or Qualitie: which Logicians expreſſe by theſe four vowels, A, E, I, O. A denoting an Univerſal Affirmative; E, an Univerſal Negative; I, a particular Affirmative; O, a particular Negative. There are three Figures. (1) In the firſt Figure the middle terme or Argument is the Subject in the major and the Predicate in the minor Propoſition: hence it becomes middle not only as to Office but Site. This firſt Figure has four Modes, expreſſed by certain termes of Art, whoſe vowels expreſſe the Quantitie and Qualitie of the Propoſition annexed thereto. As [1] Barbara: which notes each Propoſition in the firſt mode to be Ʋniverſal and Affirmative. [2] Celarent: which notes the firſt Propoſition to be Univerſal and Negative; the ſecond, Univerſal and Affirmative; the third, Univerſal and Negative. [3] Darij: which notes the firſt Propoſition to be an Univerſal Affirmative; the ſecond and third particular Affirmatives. [4] Ferio: which notes the firſt Propoſition to be an Univerſal Negative; the ſecond a particular Arffimative; the third a particular Negative. Of theſe Modes two are Affirmative, two Negative: the Affirmative are grounded on this principe: Whatever agrees to an Idea or Notion taken Ʋniverſally, agrees alſo to al that which is comprehended within the extenſion of that Idea or Notion. Or thus: Whatever is affirmed Ʋniverſally of an Ʋniverſal Idea or Notion, is alſo affirmed of al that is contained under that Ʋniverſal Idea. Thus the Notion of Senſe agrees to al Animals; therefore to al Men and Brutes. The Negative modes are founded on this principe: Whatever is denied of any Idea or Notion taken Ʋniverſally, is denied alſo of al that, of which that Idea or Notion is affirmed. Or thus: Whatever is denied Ʋniverſally of any Ʋniverſal Notion, is alſo denied of althings contained under that Ʋniverſal Notion. Thus a Brute is denied Univerſally of al men; therefore alſo of Peter, John, &c. This firſt Figure hath two Rules, [1] The major ought alwayes to be Ʋniverſal. [2] The miner ought alwayes to be Affirmative. The perfection of this firſt Figure, beyond that of the ſecond or third, p. 11conſiſtes in theſe two particulars. [1] In that al manner of Problemes, as Ʋniverſal Affirmatives, Ʋniverſal Negatives, Particular Affirmatives, Particular Negatives may be concluded herein: whereas in the ſecond Figure the Concluſion can be only Negative, and in the third only Particular. [2] In that the neceſſitie of the Syllogiſme conſequence appears more evidently in this firſt Figure, than in the ſecond or third. Hence it is, that Logicians adviſe, that our Arguments be, ſo far as it may be, reduced to this firſt Figure; for which they give us many uſeful Rules. (2) In the ſecond Figure the middle terme is the predicate both in the major and minor Propoſition. The Modes of this Figure are four, expreſſed by thoſe fictitioſe termes of Art: Ceſare, Cameſtres, Feſtino, Baroco. The Rules of this Figure are two. [1] The Major ought alwaies to be Ʋniverſal. [2] One of the Premiſſes, and thence alſo the Concluſion muſt be ever Negative. (3) In the third Figure the middle terme or Argument is the ſubject in both Premiſſes. Its Modes are ſixe: Darapti, Eclapton, Diſamis, Datiſi, Bocardo, Feriſon. Its Rules are two. [1] The Minor muſt be Affirmative. [2] The Concluſion muſt be Particular. So much for the Conſtitution of ſimple Syllogiſmes: whereunto we muſt alſo reduce Enthymemes; which are imperfect ſimple Syllogiſmes, curtail'd of ſome one of the Premiſſes, which lies latent foreign in the mind: thence Enthymeme.

A Compoſite Syllogiſme is twofold: (1) That which has one or both Premiſſes Compoſite: This is either Hypothetic, or Disjunctive, A Compoſite Syllogiſme. Hypothetic.or Relative. [1] An Hypothetic Syllogiſme, is that wherein the Major, or Minor, or both Propoſitions are Hypothetic. If the Major only be Hypothetic, the Concluſion is Categoric: but if the Minor be Hypothetic, the Concluſion alſo muſt be Hypothetic.Disjunctive. [2] A Disjunctive Syllogiſme is that whoſe Major is Disjunctive: which if it conſiſte only of two members immediately oppoſite, we may argue from the Poſition of the one, to the Remotion of the other; or from the Remotion of the one, to the Poſition of the other. If the Major has more members than two, ſome being removed, what remains is concluded. When upon the Remotion of both or al the members the whole is removed, the Syllogiſme is from the enumeration of the parts. [3] A Relative Syllogiſme is that whoſe Major includes a relation of the parts.Relative. (2) A Syllogiſme compoſed of many Syllogiſmes is either a Dilemma, or Sorites. Dilemma.[1] A Dilemma is an argumentation from two members, whereof both p. 12are attended with incommoditie. It conſiſtes of a disjunctive Syllogiſme, wherein from the Remotion of the parts we conclude the Remotion of the whole;Sorites. and two Categorics, whereby the remotion of the parts is confirmed. [2] A Sorites is an Argumentation conſiſting of many Propoſitions, ſo connected, that the predicate of the precedent Propoſition is the ſubject of the ſubſequent; and thence the laſt predicate concludes of the firſt ſubject. Thence a Sorites contains ſo many Syllogiſmes as there are termes between the ſubject of the firſt Propoſition, and the predicate of the laſt: as in that of Paul, Rom. 8.29, 30.

4. The fourth part of Logic is touching Method, Method.which directes the fourth operation of the Mind, called Diſpoſition. For the mind of man, ſo far as rectified, is the Orderer and Diſpoſer both of Notions and Things: and the principal End and Office of Method is to ſuccur and aſſiſt the mind in the ordering and diſpoſing of notions and things. And look as Syllogiſme cures the Mind of Errors, ſo Method of Confuſion. Yea indeed, to ſpeak the truth, Method is very influential on al the former parts of Logic, as alſo on the operations of the mind, about which they are converſant: For how can the mind define, or divide, or diſtinctly explicate ſimple Ideas and Notions without Method? How imperfect and confuſed wil its Judgements, Ratiocinations and Diſcourſes be, unleſſe Method aſſiſt? Hence the Ancients, Plato, and others, reduced the whole of Logic to Method, which without al peradventure is the moſt utile part thereof, if not Comprehenſive of the whole. In the general, Method is an Art, whereby the Mind is rendred capable rightly to diſpoſe a ſeries of many ſimple Notions or Apprehenſions, Judgements, and Ratiocinations, in order to the Inveſtigation, Explication, and Demonſtration of truth; as alſo the deeper impreſſion thereof on the Memorie. In this deſcription we have both the Object, Ends, and Effects of Method. The Object of Method is, (1) Simple Notions and Apprehenſions. Wherein we are to conſider their Definition and Diſtribution: In the Definition we are to conſider, [1] The Name. And herein the principal care is to clear the Name from al Obſcuritie and Equivocation: which is beſt performed by an Examen of and Inquiſition into its Etymologie, or Origination, Homonymie, and Synonymie. [2] The Definition of the Thing; which muſt be expreſſed in termes moſt known and eſſential: for what is a Definition but the Idea or manifeſtation of a Thing? As for Diſtribution, it p. 13is of the whole into its parts; which gives a diſtinct Idea or Notion of a thing. (2) Another Object of Method is, Propoſitions and Judgements. Wherein we are to avoid al Precipitance, Anticipation, and Prejudice; giving to al Propoſitions that Meaſure of Aſſent as their inſite Reaſon, or Autoritie requires; admitting nothing as certain or evident, but what we know or have reaſon to believe is certainly or evidently true. (3) The laſt object of Method is Ratiocination and Diſcourſe. Wherein we are [1] To leave nothing ambiguous or obſcure in the Termes. [2] To deduce al Ratiocinations from principes moſt certain and evident in themſelves, ſuch as no one inveſted with commun ſenſe may gainſay. For firſt principes give evidence and force to al concluſions, but receive none from them. [3] Al Cogitations and Ratiocinations employed for the Inveſtigation of Truth, or Remotion of any error muſt be digeſted and ranged into the moſt natural order: beginning from things more general, ſimple, and eaſily to be known; and thence paſſing on to things more difficult and compoſite. [4] In ſeeking out Arguments and examining Difficulties there muſt be a complete enumeration of all ſingulars and parts, with a diſtribution proportionable thereto; that ſo nothing be omitted, that may conduce to the examen of truth. More touching Method, ſee Court Gent. Part 2. B. 3. c. 8. §. 3. & B. 4. c. 1. §. Thus much for Logic, wherein we have been the more large; becauſe we have no where treated diſtinctly and fully of it.

§. 3. Real Philoſophie may be, according to its different Objects,Real Philoſophie. diſtributed into Natural, Moral, and Metaphyſic or Supernatural. Natural.1. Natural Philoſophie regardes things conſidered in their natural Ideas, and Eſſences: or things conſidered in their notional extenſion. (1) Things conſidered in their natural Ideas and Eſſences belong to Phyſic or Natural Philoſophie ſtrictly ſo termed:Phyſic. which conſiders Things Natural, [1] In their General Principes and Affections. [2] In their parts; which are two, the Macrocoſme or greater world, and the Microcoſme or Man. Of which ſee Philoſoph. General. P. 1. L. 3. c. 2. and Court Gent. P. 2. B. 3. c. 9. (2) Natural things conſidered in their Notional Extenſion or Quantitie are diſcourſed of in Mathematics, Mathematic.which comprehend Arithmetic, Geometrie, Aſtronomie, Muſic, Optics, Geographie, Mechanics, &c. Of which, Philoſ. Gen. P. 1. L. 1. c. 2. ſ. 2.

2. Moral Philoſophie is, according to its object,Moral Philoſophie. diſtributed into p. 14Ethic, 1. Ethic.ſtrictly ſo termed, Oeconomic, and Politic. (1) Ethic ſtrictly ſo termed regards the morals of private perſons. Wherein we may conſider, [1] Its Generic Idea, Moral Prudence: whereof we have copioſely diſcourſed, Philoſ. Gen. P. 2. L. 2. c. 6. and Court Gent. P. 4. B. 1. c. 1. §. 1. [2] Its prime Object, which is the laſt end and chiefeſt good: which we have largely diſcuſſed, Philoſoph. Gen. P. 1. L. 1 3. c. 3. ſ. 1. & P. 2. L. c. 1. ſ. 3. alſo Court Gent. P. 2. B. 4. c. 1. §. 2, 3. & P. 4. B. 1. c. 1. §. 2. [3] The Principes of Human Acts: Practic Judgement, Volition or Intention, Conſultation, Election: of which Court Gent. P. 2. B. 4. c. 1. §. 24-27. & P. 4. B. 1. c. 1. alſo Philoſ. Gen. P. 2. L. 1. c. 1. §. 4. [4] Subjective and Formal Beatitude: wherein we are alſo to conſider Ʋſe, Fruition and Delectation, or Joy. Of the firſt ſee Philoſoph. General. P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. ſ. 1. §. 2. & P. 2. L. 1. c. 1. ſ. 3. §. 2. alſo Court Gent. P. 2. B. 4. c. 1. §. 23. But of Ʋſe, Fruition, and Delectation, ſee Court Gent. P. 4. B. 1. c. 1. §. 4-8. [5] The Moralitie of human Acts: of which, Court Gent. P. 2. B. 4. c. 1. §. 29. & P. 4. B. 1. c. 2. § 1, &c. alſo Philoſ. Gen. P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. ſ. 3. §. 1. & P. 2. L. 1. c. 1. ſ. 4. §. 1. [6] Natural Libertie, which we have copioſely explicated, Philoſoph. General. P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. ſ. 2. & P. 2. L. 1. c. 1. ſ. 4. §. 2. alſo Court Gent. P. 2. B. 3. c. 9. ſ. 3. §. 11, 12. & B. 4. c. 1. §. 28. [7] Moral Good, or Virtue, its Cauſes, Formal Idea or Nature, Parts, and Adjuncts: Of which Court Gent. Part 2. B. 4. c. 1. §. 29-32. & P. 4. B. 1. c. 2, 3. alſo Philoſoph. General. P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. ſ. 3. & P. 2. L. 1. c. 1. ſ. 4. [8] Moral Libertie: of which, Court Gent. Part 4. B. 1. c. 3. alſo Philoſ. Gen. P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. ſ. 3. [9] Sin, its Nature, and Cauſes: of which, Court. Gent. P. 2. B. 4. c. 1. §. 33. & P. 4. B. 1. c. 4. alſo Philoſ. General. P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. ſ. 4. & P. 2. L. 1. c. 1. ſ. 4. §. 6. [10] The effects and ſervitude of Sin: Oeconomic.of which, Court Gent. P. 4. B. 1. c. 4. (2) Oeconomic: of which,Politic. Philoſ. General. P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. ſ. 6. (3) Politic: of which, Court Gent. Part 4. B. 1. c. 5. & Philoſ. Gen. P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. ſ. 6.

3. Metaphyſic or prime Philoſophie, Metaphyſic.which principally regards the ſupreme moſt excellent Being and prime Cauſe of althings, namely God; his Exiſtence, Eſſence, and Attributes; his Acts of Creation, and Providence; his Concurſe and Gubernation, both Natural and Supernatural, and Creatural Dependence, &c. Which we have more copioſely diſcuſſed, Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. more curſorily, Court Gent. P. 2. B. 2. c. 8. alſo Philoſ. Gen. P. 1. L. 1. c. 2. ſ. 5. & L. 3. c. 4.