The Court of the Gentiles Part 4, Part 4 · Book 2 · Chapter 7

The Court of the Gentiles Part 4 · Part 4 · Book 2 · Chapter 7

p. 387CHAP. VII. Of Gods prime Cauſalitie, Efficience, and Concurſe in general.

God the first Cauſe demonſtrated. The Object of Divine Concurſe. Gods Concurſe not merely conſervative of the Principe. Durandus's Objections anſwered. Divine Concurſe as to the human Wil, and al create Objects. Gods Concurſe principal. How ſecond Cauſes are Inſtruments. Divine Concurſe as to its Principe the ſame with the Divine Wil. No executive Power in God diſtinct from his Wil. The Divine Wil of it ſelf omnipotent and operative. Gods Concurſe (1) Immediate both as to the ſecond Cauſe, its Act, and Effect. (2) Independent. (3) Previous. (4) Total. (5) Particular. (6) Efficacious. (7) Connatural.

§. 1. HAving explicated the Divine Nature and Attributes,God the first Cauſe of althings. we now deſcend to the explication of the Divine Cauſalitie and Efficience; which properly belongs to metaphyſic or prme Philoſophie. Thence Sapience, which takes in the generic notion of metaphyſic, according to Ariſtotle, conſiſtes in the contemplation, not only of moſt excellent Beings, but alſo of the prime Cauſe of althings. That God is the prime Cauſe of althings, not only ſacred, but alſo Platonic Philoſophie doth aſſure us. As for ſacred Philoſophie, it gives frequent and great demonſtrations of our Hypotheſis. Thus Eſa. 66.2. For al theſe things have my hands made, and al thoſe things have been. So Pſal. 104.24. of which more in Gods Creation. Plato alſo hath left us great notices of Gods prime Cauſalitie and Efficience. So in his Phaedo, pag. 96. he demonſtrates, how great the ignorance and folie of ſuch is, who wholly buſie their thoughts in the contemplation of ſecond Cauſes, but neglect to inquire after and into the first Cauſe, who is not only foreign, the principal ſupreme Cauſe, but alſo foreign, the Cauſe of cauſes: whereas al ſecond Cauſes are only foreign, Concauſes and Inſtruments of the first Cauſe. Thence pag. 97. he addes: But when I ſometime heard ſome one reading and relaeting out of a certain Book, as he ſaid of Anaxagoras, foreign, p. 388&c. That the Divine Mind doth orderly diſpoſe and governe althings, and is the cauſe of althings; I was indeed greatly recreated with this Cauſe, and it ſeemed to me to be rightly determined, namely that the Divine Mind was the Cauſe of althings: and thus I reaſoned with my ſelf: if it be ſo, that the gubernatrix and diſpoſitrix Mind do thus diſpoſe althings, it doth therefore place each particular in that place, where it may be beſt conſtituted. If therefore any one be willing to inquire after and into the cauſe of every thing, both of its exiſtence and corruption, he muſt alſo inquire, in what regard it may be best, either as to being, or as to ſuffering or doing any other thing. Ʋpon this account there is nothing more needful for man to inquire after, either concerning himſelf or other things, foreign, than what is best and most excellent: for it is neceſſary, that ſuch an one alſo know what is worst; becauſe the ſcience of theſe things is the ſame. When I pondered theſe things in my mind, I much pleaſed my ſelf in this, that I had got a Maſter, who would inſtruct me in the cauſes of things, according to mine own mind, namely Anaxagoras. In theſe great Philoſophemes of Socrates we have theſe obſervables. (1) Theſe contemplations about the firſt Cauſe, were ſome of his dying thoughts, and therefore ſuch as his mind were moſt intent on. (2) He greedily imbibes and cloſeth with that great Tradition of Anaxagoras, derived originally from ſacred Philoſophie, That the Divine Mind was the first cauſe of althings. (3) That the Divine Mind diſpoſed, ordered, and governed althings in the best manner. (4) That he who would inquire into the cauſes of this, must have his eye on thoſe two, the mater and efficient. For Plato makes but two Principes of things, the Mater, out of which things were made, and the Efficient that formed the mater into ſhape or that particular forme or eſſence. This Efficient he elſewhere ſtiles foreign, Idea, making foreign, the Idea and mater the two Principes of althings. So the Stoics made two Principes of althings, the Efficient and Patient. Plato ſometimes makes foreign, Efficient and Cauſe termes ſynonymous: ſo foreign, the efficient precedes and the effect follows. (5) That as to efficients, we must alwaies inquire after the beſt and moſt excellent, namely God the first Cauſe: for he that knows the beſt, i. e. God, may eaſily know the worſt, i. e. ſecond Cauſes. So Plato, Leg. 4. p. 715. p. 389makes God to be foreign, the Principe and End of althings. Thus in his Sophiſta, pag. 265. foreign; Namely, doth Nature, by the force of ſome caſual fortuitous cauſe, without the efficacitie of the Divine Mind, produce theſe things? Or, on the contrary, ſhal we not determine, that theſe things have their exiſtence with Divine Wiſdome and Science from God? Wherein note [1] that he layes down an Hypotheſis, contrary to that of Leucippus and Democritus, That things exiſte not by the caſual fortuitous confluxe of Atomes. [2] That althings exiſte by the Divine Mind. Hence, [3] That althings are framed and diſpoſed in the beſt order, with the higheſt wiſdome. [4] He makes mention of foreign, the Word; which ſome would underſtand of the ſecond Perſon in the Trinitie, but I ſhould rather take it here for wiſdome, as foreign muſt be underſtood of Science. The like in his Theaetetus: foreign, We muſt remember, that nothing can be of it ſelf; therefore althings are from ſome firſt Cauſe, of which more fully before, C. 2. §. 2. So Repub. 6. he makes God to be the Firſt cauſe foreign, giving eſſence to althings: for foreign, every thing receives eſſence from the efformative words of the great Opificer. Again, Repub. 2. pag. 379. he ſaith: foreign, And of good things there is no other ſupreme cauſe to be acknowledged beſides God. So pag. 380. he proves, That God is the cauſe of al good, whether natural or moral. And Epiſt. pag. 312. he expreſſely ſaith, That God is foreign, the cauſe of althings good or beautiful. Thus Damaſcene, (out of Dionyſius Areopagita, who doth much Platoniſe) Orthod. Fid. l. 1. c. 15. foreign, &c. God is the cauſe and principe of althings, the eſſence of Beings, the Life of things living, the Reaſon of things rational, the Intellect of things intellectile, the Reſtitution and Reſurrection of them that fal from him, but of thoſe things that naturally periſh the Renovation and Reformation: of thoſe things which are moved with a ſtrong impetuoſitie the great confirmation, of ſuch things as ſtand the ſtabilitie, of thoſe things that aſcend up to him the way and reductive manuduction. Thence he addes: foreign, p. 390Of the illuminated the ſplendor, the perfection of the perfect, the Deification of the deified, the peace of the diſcordant, the ſimplicitie of the ſimple, the union of the united, the ſupereſſential and ſuperprincipal Principe of every Principe.

For the more diſtinct demonſtration, that God is the prime Cauſe of althings, theſe Platonic Philoſophemes may be thus formed into Arguments. (1) That which is ſuch by Eſſence, is neceſſarily before that which is ſuch by Participation: but now God is a Cauſe by Eſſence; whereas al other cauſes are ſuch only by participation. God gives eſſence to althings, but receives it from nothing. Thus Plato, Leg. 6. pag. 509. God the ſupreme Good gives efficace and force to things, not only for their being known, but alſo for their exiſtence: foreign, when yet that chief good is not properly Eſſence, but ſupereſſential; becauſe greatly tranſcending the whole nature of things create, both in dignitie and virtue. (2) Al Imperfectes receive their origine from that which is more perfect: and is not God the moſt abſolutely perfect of al Beings? Muſt not althings then receive their origine from God? (3) That which is the laſt end of althings muſt needs be the firſt Cauſe of al? For the firſt Cauſe is of equal latitude and extent with the laſt end: nothing can terminate and bound the appetite of man, but that which gave Being to him: that which is laſt in order of final cauſes, muſt needs be firſt in order of Efficients: And is not God the laſt End of althings? Are not althings ſo far good, as they participate of the Divine Goodneſſe? Is not God, to ſpeak in Plato's language, foreign, the univerſal Idea and meaſure of al good? And muſt he not then neceſſarily be foreign, the chiefest Good? It's true, there are other foreign, inferior derivative goods, but is there any univerſal, eſſential, independent good but God? And muſt not the order of Efficients anſwer the order of Ends? If God as the laſt End gives bleſſed Being, muſt he not as the firſt Efficient give natural Being? Can any thing returne to God as the laſt end, but what flows from him as the firſt Cauſe? Thus Simplicius, a Sectator of Plato, in Epictet. cap. 1. pag. 9. foreign, The Fountain and Principe of althings is the chiefeſt Good: for that which is deſired by althings, and unto which althings are referred, that is the Principe and End of althings. Whence he concludes: foreign, p. 391For the one firſt Being, Principe, chiefest Good and God are one and the ſame: for God is the first and cauſe of althings. (4) Muſt not every multiforme, variable, defectible Being be reduced to ſome uniforme, ſimple, invariable, indefectible Being as its firſt Cauſe? And is there any uniforme, ſimple, immutable Being but God? Thus Simplicius, in Epictet. cap. 1. pag. 9. foreign, &c. It's neceſsary, that the firſt Being be most ſimple: for whatever is compoſite, as compoſite it is after one, and multitude, and ſo produced, &c. Whereby he proves, that the firſt Cauſe is moſt ſimple. (5) Do not al finite, dependent cauſes need ſome infinite independent cauſe to conſerve and actuate them? And is there any infinite independent cauſe but God? Can any thing be the firſt cauſe, but he who is foreign without al cauſe? (6) Is not the order of cauſes proportionable to the order of effects? Where then there is an univerſalitie of effects, muſt there not alſo be an univerſal firſt Cauſe, which gives Being to al thoſe effects? Is it poſſible, that the univerſitie of effects which are in Nature ſhould exiſte, but by the univerſal efficace of the firſt independent Being and Cauſe? Thus Simplicius, in Epictet. cap. 1. pag. 10. foreign, It's neceſſary, that the firſt cauſe have the higheſt and univerſal influence; for there is an amplitude and abundance of efficace in him, ſo that he can produce althings of himſelf.

§. 2. Having demonſtrated God to be the Firſt Cauſe of althings,The Object of Divine Concurſe. we now procede to explicate the mode and nature of his Cauſalitie, Concurſe, and Efficience. The prime Cauſalitie and Concurſe of God may be conſidered with reſpect to (1) Its Object, (2) Its Subject or Principe, (3) Its Mode of Operation, (4) Its Termes or Effects produced. Firſt, we may conſider the prime Cauſalitie, Concurſe and Efficience of God as to its Object, and that (1) Negatively. (2) Poſitively. We ſhal ſtate and determine both in the following Propoſitions.

1. Prop. Gods concurſe, as to its object, Gods Concurſe not merely conſervative of the Principe.conſiſtes not merely in the communication of force and virtue to the ſecond cauſe, and conſervation of the ſame. The Antitheſis hereto was anciently maintained by Durandus (contrary to the Hypotheſis both of the Thomiſtes and Scotiſtes) in Sent. l. 2. Diſtinct. 1. q. 5, who ſuppoſed, That the concurſe of God conferred nothing more on ſecond cauſes, than p. 392a virtue or power to act, and the conſervation thereof; without any immediate actual influence on the ſecond cauſe or its Act in order to the production of the effect. The foreign, or principal motive, ground, and reaſon of this Antitheſis is this; If we make God to concur immediately to the Acts and Operations of ſecond cauſes, he muſt then concur to the ſinful Acts of the wil, and ſo be the cauſe of ſin. This Antitheſis of Durandus was generally exploded by the ancient Schole-men, both Thomiſtes and Scotiſtes, and is ſtil by the more ſober Jeſuites. Only in this laſt Age one Nicolaus Taurelius, in his Book, De rerum aeternitate & triumpho Philoſophiae, has undertaken the patronage of Durandus's Antitheſis, with this advance, even to the ſubverſion not only of the concurſe, but alſo of the conſervation of God. And ſince there has ſtarted up another, Lud. A Dola, a Capucine Friar, who has taken greater pains to defend and promove this Antitheſis of Durandus; pretending this as the only expedient for an accommodation between the Thomiſtes and Jeſuites. And for the confirmation of this Hypotheſis they give this commun inſtance: On the ſuppoſition that a ſtone ſhould hang in the air, and God withdraw al his concurſe for the actuating the ſtone, yet if the force which ſuſpendes its motion downward were removed, it would, notwithſtanding the ſubſtraction of Divine concurſe, move naturally downward, or to the ſame purpoſe. Albeit I am no friend to thoſe vexatious diſputes, which the Scholes of Theologie, as wel as Philoſophie, now ring of, yet this Antitheſis being, as I conceive, of dangerous conſequence, I cannot but, with modeſtie, expreſſe my juſt averſation from, yea indignation againſt it; with the reſerve of that reſpect and honor, which is due to that learned and pious Divine among our ſelves, who hath undertaken the defenſe of Durandus's Opinion. I ſhal not now enter on the ſolemn ventilation and debate of this Antitheſis, having reſerved this taske, if the Lord favor my deſires, for another ſubject and ſtile, which may be of more public uſe to forrain Nations; but only touch briefly on ſuch arguments as may confirme mine own Hypotheſis, with brief ſolutions of the contrary objections.

That Gods concurſe is not merely conſervative of the Principe, Virtue and Force of ſecond cauſes, without any influence on the Act, is evident; (1) becauſe ſubordination and dependence of ſecond cauſes on the firſt, not only for their Beings and Virtue, with the conſervation thereof, but alſo in their Acting and Cauſing, p. 393doth formally appertain to the eſſential Reaſon and Conſtitution of a Creature as ſuch. For the Dependence of a Creature on God, not only in Being, but alſo in Operation, is, not extrinſee to its eſſence, but involved in the very intrinſec limitation thereof, as Suarez ſtrongly argues, Metaph. Diſp. 31. §. 14. Hence God, by his Abſolute Power, cannot make a Creature, which ſhould be Independent, and not ſubordinate to him in operation: for this implies a contradiction, namely, that a Creature ſhould be, and ſhould not be a Creature. For if it depend not on God in al its Operations, it is not a Creature. (2) If the Created Wil cannot ſubſiſt of it ſelf and maintain its own Virtue and Force, much leſſe can it Act of it ſelf, or by its own power. The force of this Argument lies in this: If the Create Wil cannot of it ſelf conſerve its own Act in Being, when it is produced, how is it poſſible, that it ſhould produce the ſame of it ſelf? Yea, is not the very conſervation of an Act in Being the ſame with the production thereof? Do not Divines ſay, that Conſervation is but continued Creation? how then can the Wil produce its own Act of it ſelf, if it cannot of it ſelf conſerve the ſame? Or, why may it not as wel conſerve its Being and Virtue, as conſerve its Act of it ſelf? If we then, as Durandus doth, allow God the conſervation of the Being, Principe and Virtue; muſt we not then alſo allow him, by a paritie of Reaſon, the conſervation of the Act? and if the conſervation of the Act, why not alſo the production thereof? This Argument is wel managed by Bradwardine, l. 2. c. 24. and 32. (3) Whatever is independent in Acting, muſt alſo neceſſarily be ſo in Being: for termes of Eſſence always bring with them termes or bounds of Activitie: a limited cauſe neceſſarily is limited in its Operations: and where there are limits and termes, there muſt be Subordination and Dependence. Nothing can operate of it ſelf independently as to all Superior Cauſe, but what has Being in and from it ſelf: for Operation and its limitation alwaies follows Eſſence and its limitation, as Ariſtotle aſſures us. (4) What ever is variable and mutable neceſſarily dependes on ſomewhat that is invariable and immutable: but every Act of a Create Wil is variable and mutable; therefore dependent on the immutable firſt Cauſe. See more fully Suarez, Metaph. Diſput. 22. Sect. 1. Hurtado de Mendoza, Phyſ. Diſput. 10. Sect. 10. §. 17.

p. 394But here it is objected by Durandus and his Sectators,Durandus's Objections anſwered. (1.) That this deſtroyes human libertie, &c. This objection is fully anſwered in what precedes of the Wils Libertie, Part. 2. B. 3. c. 9. ſect. 3. §. 11, 12. and B. 4. C. 1. §. 28. alſo Philoſoph. General. p. 1. l. 3. c. 3. ſect. 2. §. 8, 9. Where we fully demonſtrate, That the neceſſary concurſe of God is ſo far from deſtroying human libertie, that it doth confirme and promove the ſame; in that it produceth not only the Act, but its mode alſo, determining the Wil to act freely. (2) Durandus objectes, That God can enable the ſecond cauſe to produce its effect, without the concurſe of any other: As it is manifeſt in the motion of a ſtone in the air, which would move downward without a concurſe. To which we replie, [1] That this ſuppoſition is not to be ſuppoſed: for as the concurſe of God is neceſſarily required to conſerve the Being and Virtue of the ſecond cauſe, ſo alſo as to its motion: neither is it more repugnant to the nature of a ſtone to conſerve it ſelf, than to move it ſelf, on ſuppoſition that the Divine concurſe be abſtracted. [2] Suarez wel reſpondes, That it involves a repugnance and contradiction, to ſuppoſe the creature potent or able to act independently as to the Creators concurſe. And the contradiction ariſeth both on the part of the ſecond cauſe, as alſo of the effect; which being both Beings by participation, eſſentially depend on the firſt cauſe. And God may as wel make a Being Independent in Eſſence, as an Agent Independent in Acting: both being equally repugnant to the perfection of God, and imperfection or limitation of the creature. (3) Durandus objectes: That it cannot be, that two Agents ſhould immediately concur to the ſame action, unleſſe both be only partial and imperfect Agents. The ſolution of this Objection wil be more completely manifeſt when we come to treat of the Immediation of the Divine concurſe, §. 4. 1. Prop. at preſent let it ſuffice, [1] That where total cauſes differ in kind, it is no impediment or obſtruction to either, that both act immediately in their kind: for the whole effect is totally produced by each. [2] That it implies no imperfection in God to act immediately in and with the ſecond cauſe; becauſe it is not from any Inſufficience or Indigence, that he makes uſe of the Creature, but only from the immenſitie of his Divine Bountie, that he communicates a virtue to the ſecond cauſe, and together therewith produceth the effect.

p. 395(4) But the main objection of Durandus and his Sectators is taken from ſinful Acts, unto which, if God immediately concur, Gods concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin, what.he cannot but be the Author of Sin. [1] This Objection, albeit it may ſeem to favor the Divine Sanctitie, yet it really deſtroyes the ſame, in that it ſubvertes the Sacred Majeſtie, his Eſſence and Independence as the firſt cauſe, wherein his Eſſental Holineſſe doth conſiſte, as before. [2] We eaſily grant, that God is the cauſe only of good, not of moral Evil as ſuch, as before, c. 6. §. 3. out of Plato. For indeed moral Evil as ſuch has no real Idea or Eſſence; and therefore no real efficient cauſe, but only deficient. But yet, [3] we ſtil aver, that God doth concur to the whole entitative Act of ſin, without the leaſt concurrence to the moral obliquitie thereof. For the entitative Act of ſin is of it ſelf (abſtracted from the moral deordination) phyſically or naturally good. Whence that commun ſaying in the Scholes, Al evil is founded in good, as in its ſubject. There is no pure Evil, but what has ſome natural good for its ſubſtrate mater or ſubject: Now al good, that is not God, muſt be from God, as the prime cauſe: if God were not the immediate eſſicient of the entitative Act of evil, he were not the cauſe of al good. Yet, [4] Gods immediate concurſe to the material Act of ſin, doth no way render him obnoxious to that imputation of being the Author of ſin: For he concurs to the material Act of ſin, not as a moral cauſe, but only as a phyſic cauſe. God neither commands, nor invites, nor encourageth any to ſin, but prohibits the ſame; and therefore is not the Author thereof. An Author, both according to Philoſophie and Civil Law, is he that Perſuades, Invites, Commands, or by any other moral influence promoves a thing: But God by no ſuch waies doth cauſe ſin. [5] Albeit God concurs with the deficient cauſe to the material entitie of ſin, yet he concurs not as a deficient cauſe. For the Soverain God is not tied up by the ſame Laws that his Creature is. The ſame ſinful Act, which is a Deordination in regard of man, as it procedes from God is a conformitie to his Eternal Law or Wil. The great God breaks no Law, albeit the Creature is guilty thereof. (6) God, as the firſt cauſe, brings good out of that very Act, which is evil in regard of the ſecond cauſe. The crucifying of our Lord, which was a ſin of the firſt magnitude in regard of the Inſtruments, was yet by the wiſe God turned to the greateſt good: Thus the Moral Evils of men, which are oppoſed to the Creatures p. 396good, are yet ſo wiſely ordered by God, as that they are made ſubſervient to the good of the Creator. As wicked men oft extract evil out of good, ſo the bleſſed God extractes good out of evil. Touching Gods concurſe to, and gubernation of ſin, ſee more copioſely, Chap. 9. §. 2.

2. Prop. The prime cauſe doth by his concurſe influence not only the Effect, The Divine concurſe reacheth the Wil.or Act of the human Wil, but alſo the Wil it ſelf. This Hypotheſis is expreſſely laid down both in Sacred and Platonic Philoſophie. In Sacred Philoſophie we find great demonſtrations hereof. So Pſal. 110.3. Thy people ſhal become very willing in the day of thy power: and Phil. 2.13. It's God that worketh in us, foreign, both to wil and to do. Thus alſo Plato, Alcibiad. 1. p. 135. brings in Socrates inſtructing Alcibiades, that God alone could change the wil. And the reaſons which enforce this Hypotheſis are moſt demonſtrative. (1) To ſuppoſe the Wil to Act, without being actuated and influenced by God, is to ſuppoſe it Independent and not ſubordinate to God in ſuch acts. (2) Either the wil of man muſt be ſubordinate to and dependent on the wil of God in al its acts; or the wil of God muſt be ſubordinate to and dependent on the wil of man. For in cauſes that concur to the ſame effect there muſt be ſubordination on the one part, if there be no room for coordination; as here is none. (3) If God by his concurſe produce the act of willing, as our Adverſaries the Jeſuites and others grant, how is it poſſible, but that he muſt influence and actuate the wil? Doth not every efficient cauſe, in producing an Act in a ſubject connatural to the power or facultie of the ſaid ſubject, influence and actuate the ſame power? (4) Al grant, that the effect of the wil is produced by God: and may we not thence ſtrongly argue, that the volition or act of willing is alſo produced by God, and that by immediate influence on the wil? Is it not equally neceſſary, that the concurſe of God reach, as wel the active as paſſive efficience of the wil? What reaſon can there be aſſigned by the Jeſuites and Arminians our Antagoniſtes, why the wil ſhould not as much depend on the concurſe of God for its act of volition, as for its effect? If the effect of the wil cannot be produced, but by the immediate concurſe of the firſt cauſe, how can the wil it ſelf act, without being actuated by God? (5) Can any act paſſe from the wil, but by the concurſe of the firſt cauſe? and if ſo, muſt not alſo the ſame firſt cauſe influence the wil for the production of ſuch acts?

p. 3973. Prop. Gods Concurſe is univerſally extenſive to al create Objects. Gods Concurſe univerſally extenſive. Rom. 11.36.Rom 11:36This Hypotheſis is frequently inculcated in ſacred Philoſophie, as alſo in Platonic. Thus Rom. 11.36. Of him, and by him, and for him are althings. foreign of him, notes Gods Operation in framing althings; foreign by him, his Cooperation in and with al ſecond cauſes; foreign unto or for him, his final Cauſalitie, as althings are for him. This univerſal Cauſalitie is termed by Cyril Alexandr. in Eſa. foreign, the multiforme Energie; becauſe it produceth al manner of effects. Plato alſo mentions God's univerſal Cauſalitie as to al objects. So Repub. 6. he makes althings, not only viſible, but alſo intelligible, as Sciences, &c. Yea al moral goods, as foreign, things righteous, honeſt, and good, to fal under the prime Cauſalitie of God, who is foreign, Righteouſneſſe it ſelf, Honeſtie it ſelf, and Bonitie it ſelf; and therefore foreign, the cauſe of al goods. Thus alſo in his Parmenides, pag. 144. foreign, Eſſence therefore [i. e. God] is diffuſed throughout al varietie of Beings, and is abſent from nothing, neither from the greateſt, nor yet from the least of Beings. Thence he addes: One therefore [i. e. God] is not only preſent to al eſſence, but alſo to al the parts thereof, being abſent from no part, either leſſer, or greater. Wherein he aſſertes, that God is diffuſed through and preſent with al parts of the Univerſe, and al create Beings, giving Eſſence, Force, Perfection, and Operation to al Beings. Aquinas makes the Concurſe of God to extend univerſally to althings, (1) As it gives forces, and faculties of acting to al ſecond cauſes. (2) As it conſerves and ſuſtains them in Being and Vigor. (3) As it excites and applies ſecond cauſes to act. (4) As it determines al ſecond cauſes to act. (5) As it directes, orders, governes and diſpoſeth them ſo, as that they may in the beſt manner reach their ends. See Aquin. Part. 1. Quaeſt. 105. & contra Gent. l. 3. c. 70. That the Concurſe of God the prime univerſal Cauſe is univerſally extenſive as to al objects, may be demonſtrated, (1) From the ſubordination of al ſecond cauſes to the firſt cauſe. Are not al cauſes, not only efficient, but alſo final, ſubordinate to God? Yea do not al material and formal Principes depend on the Concurſe of God for al their operations? Of which ſee Suarez, Metaph. Diſp. 21. Sect. 1. (2) From the comprehenſion and perfection of God. Doth he not, in his own Simplicitie, Actualitie, and Infinitude, comprehend al perfections p. 398both actual and poſſible? Is he not then virtually and eminently althings? And doth not this ſufficiently argue, that his Concurſe is univerſally extenſive unto althings? (3) From the Superioritie and Altitude of God as the first Cauſe. Is not God the moſt ſupreme and higheſt, becauſe the firſt Cauſe? Muſt not then his Concurſe be moſt extenſive as to al effects? Doth not every cauſe, by how much the higher it is, by ſo much the more extend it ſelf to varietie of effects? Muſt not God then, by being the firſt Cauſe, neceſſarily extend his Concurſe to al effects? (4) From the Providence of God. That althings fal under the Providence of God Plato, as wel as Scripture, greatly proves, as we ſhal hereafter Ch. 8. §. 2. ſhew: and if ſo, muſt not then the Concurſe of God univerſally extend to althings, ſo far as they partake of Being, either natural or moral?

4. Prop. Gods Concurſe in regard of al ſecond cauſes and objects is principal. Gods concurſe principal.The Principatie and Soveraintie of Divine Concurſe, ſpecially as to gratioſe effects, is frequently aſſerted in ſacred Philoſophie.Eſa. 53.11.Isa 53:11 So it's ſaid of Chriſt, Eſa. 53.11. He ſhal ſee the travel of his Soul. Which aſſures us, that Chriſt is the principal Parent of the New Creature, as wel as of the old: and that al Miniſters, or other Inſtruments are but, as it were, Midwifes unto Chriſt. Thence Plato, in his Theaetetus, pag. 151. brings in Socrates uſing the ſame phraſe touching himſelf and his Philoſophemes. Socrates being about to inſtruct Theaetetus, one of his Diſciples of great ingenie, the more effectually to engage his attention and diligence, he profeſſeth, That for his part he was but (as his Mother) a Midwife, to aſſiſte the Soul in the bringing forth of moral virtue: foreign, God compels me to play the Midwife, but forbids me to generate. Whereby he aſcribeth the principal efficience of al moral virtue to God, reſerving only a miniſterial ſubſervience to man. So great was the modeſtie of this poor Philoſopher, beyond many that profeſſe Chriſtianitie. Thus Plato, Repub. 6. makes God to be foreign, the firſt and moſt ſoverain cauſe of althings; whereas al ſecond cauſes are but foreign, yea foreign, as it were children, or effects and products; and therefore al their efficience and cauſalitie is only foreign by commiſtion with, and participation from God the firſt Cauſe. Thence in his Phaed…, pag. 99. he affirmes, that ſecond cauſes, if compared with the firſt, deſerve not the name of cauſes: foreign, p. 399to cal theſe cauſes is very importune, or abſued. Thence he addes: foreign, That which is a cauſe indeed is one thing, and that without which a cauſe is not a cauſe another. Plato here makes mention of two ſorts of cauſes. (1) One, which is truely a cauſe, i. e. the Firſt cauſe. (2) Another, which is only cauſa ſine qua non, a cauſe without which the effect is not produced: ſuch are al ſecond cauſes, whoſe miniſterie the Firſt cauſe makes uſe of; yet ſo as that the principal efficience belongs only to the Firſt cauſe, in reſpect of which ſecond cauſes are only foreign, concauſes, or ſubſervient cauſes, employed by God for the production of things. So in his Timaeus, pag. 46. foreign, Theſe are concauſes, whoſe miniſterie God uſeth to perfect, ſo far as it may be, the idea and forme of what is best. But very many eſtime theſe to be not concauſes, but cauſes of althings. But, he ſubjoins: Such have no reaſon or ſenſe for what they aſsert: foreign, For we muſt ſay, that there is a Soul of althings that exiſte, to whom only belongs the power of Ʋnderſtanding: but he is inviſible. Whence, in what follows, he expreſſely diſtinguiſheth between the firſt and ſecond cauſes, aſcribing principal cauſalitie to the former, and miniſterial or inſtrumental to the later. There are in theſe Philoſophemes of Plato obſervable, (1) That God is the principal prime cauſe of althings. (2) That al ſecond cauſes, if compared with God, deſerve not the name of cauſes; but are only concauſes, or inſtruments to transfer the efficience of God unto the effect. (3) That ſuch as aſcribe any cauſalitie to ſecond cauſes, more than what as inſtruments they receive from the Firſt cauſe, have neither ſenſe nor reaſon on their ſide. (4) That there is an univerſal Spirit or Soul, which diffuſeth it ſelf throughout al create Beings, and gives vigor, determination, and motion to al ſecond cauſes and effects.

But now the more fully to explicate Plato's mind touching the principal Concurſe of God the firſt cauſe,How ſecond Cauſes are Inſtruments of the first. and the miniſterial or inſtrumental cauſalitie of ſecond cauſes, we muſt firſt diſtinguiſh, and then ſtate and determine our Hypotheſis. We muſt diſtinguiſh, (1) between principal cauſalitie ſimply conſidered, and that which is ſuch in its kind, and in ſome reſpect. (2) Between p. 400the ſecond cauſe its reſpect to the firſt, and its reſpect to the effect. (3) Between an inſtrument taken in a laxe notion, and in a ſtrict: alſo between a moral and a phyſic Inſtrument: again, between an active and paſſive Inſtrument: laſtly, between a pure Inſtrument, and a vital elevate Inſtrument. (4) Between effects natural and ſupernatural. Theſe diſtinctions being premiſſed, we ſhal ſtate and determine our Hypotheſis in the following Propoſitions. (1) The Cauſalitie of God is ſimply and univerſally principal, yet that of ſecond cauſes may be principal in its kind. The concurſe of God is ſo far principal, as that it can and oft doth produce its effect without the concurſe of ſecond cauſes; but ſecond cauſes can never produce their effects, without the concurſe of God the firſt Cauſe.Hinc eſt, quod omnes operationes hominis bonas, quantumcun que fiant à libera voluntate, tribuere ſolet auguſtinus ipſi Deo, tanquam qui per voluntatem ut per inſtrumentum, quod pro libero ſuo beneplacito agit, impellit, flectit, vertit, inclinat quoliber motus ipſius voluntatis operetur. Ipſe, inquit, cantat in nobis, cujus gratia cantamus. Nempe dicuntur iſta, non ut homini libera voluntas, ſed ut gloriatio de ſua voluntate tollatur, ne puter à ſe eſſe quod Deus donat. Janſenius, August. Tom. 3. l. 2. c. 24. There is no effect which the ſecond cauſe produceth, but the firſt cauſe can produce it alone: for his omnipotent concurſe reacheth to al effects that implie not a contradiction, without the leaſt dependence on any ſecond cauſe: the ſecond cauſe needs the firſt in al its operations, but the firſt cauſe needs not the ſecond in any. Yea, where the firſt and ſecond cauſe concur to the ſame effect, the concurſe of the firſt cauſe is infinitely more principal, than that of the ſecond: becauſe the ſecond cauſe actes not, but as acted by the firſt cauſe: The Excitation, Application, Determination, and Actuation of the ſecond cauſe is from the firſt. Yet we may not denie a principal efficience to ſome ſecond cauſes, ſo far as the firſt cauſe has communicated to them a virtue of their own to be communicated to their effects, as it wil appear by what follows.

(2) Al ſecond Cauſes, if compared with the firſt, are but inſtruments of his principal concurſe. Thus not only Aquinas, Bradwardine and the more ſane Scholaſtics, but alſo Averroes, de Somno & Vigilia; where he affirmes, That ſecond cauſes are moved by the firſt, as inſtruments by the Artificer. But here occurs a ſpinoſe knotty queſtion much ventilated in the Scholes, Whether the Wil in the reception of ſupernatural habits be an inſtrument or principal cauſe? According to the former diſtinctions I ſhould anſwer, [1] That, according to the general notion of an Inſtrument, the Wil may be termed ſuch in the reception and acting of Grace. As it receives Grace it is a paſſive inſtrument, yet as it actes Grace it is an active inſtrument. [2] That the Wil in the receiving and acting Grace is a vital inſtrument. Hence it is termed by Greg. Nazianz. Orat. 8. foreign, p. 401a Divine Inſtrument, a rational Inſtrument, an Inſtrument compoſed and knocked at by that preclare Artificer the Spirit of God. In receiving the firſt Grace the Wil is only naturally, remotely and paſſively vital, as it is a piece of human Nature; but in the actuating what Grace is received, it is a ſpiritually vital inſtrument. Grace received elevates the human Soul to a ſpiritual Vitalitie and Inſtrumentalitie for the acting of Grace. Hence, [3] the Wil may, as to the acting of Grace, ſo far as it is clothed with Divine habits, be termed in ſome reſpect a principal Agent, under God, ſpecially if compared with the effect produced. It's true, if the Wil be compared with God, even in the acting of Grace received, it is but a mere inſtrument; becauſe both Habit and Act are received from God: yet if we conſider the Wil as inveſted and qualified with ſupernatural habits, which are the ſame to the Soul that it is to the Bodie, whereby it is informed and capacitated to produce ſuch or ſuch ſupernatural Acts and Effects, in this regard we may ſtile it a principal cauſe: though, I muſt confeſſe, the notion of an Inſtrument, uſed by Aquinas and others, ſeems more adequate and genuine to expreſſe its cauſalitie by, in as much as al is from God by ſupernatural infuſion.

§. 3. Having inquired into the Concurſe of God in regard of its object,Divine Concurſe as to its Principe the ſame with Gods Wil. we now procede to conſider it as relating to its Subject or Principe, which wil afford to us great notices of its genuine nature. The Scholaſtic Theologues, in their debates about the concurſe of God to the ſupernatural Acts of the Wil, are greatly divided: ſome placing it in a certain efficacious impulſe or motion of God, whereby the Wil is determined to conſent and act: others, in a certain actual premotion in the manner of a tranſient qualitie, together with the operation of the Wil: others, in the very operation of the ſecond cauſe or Wil, as it procedes from the influxe of God premoving. Theſe make it to be an efficacious premotion or phyſic predetermination, whereby the firſt cauſe makes the ſecond to act: others place this concurſe, as to gratioſe effects, in certain pious inſpirations, cogitations, and indeliberate motions of love injected by God. Albeit ſome of theſe ſcholaſtic ſentiments may have their place, if we conſider the concurſe of God with relation to its paſſive Attingence, or as it terminates on the ſecond cauſe and effect, yet if we take it ſtrictly, according to its formal Idea, I conceive, no one of theſe opinions p. 402explicate the true nature thereof. Therefore to explicate the genuine nature of the Divine concurſe we muſt conſider what relation it has to the Divine Wil, whether it be really diſtinct therefrom, or not. And here we muſt in the firſt place reflect on what was aſſerted and proved in the former C. 5. §. 4. touching the ordinate or executive power of God, and its Indentitie with the Divine Wil: which being ſuppoſed, as it has been demonſtrated, it naturally follows, that Gods concurſe, as to is active Attingence and effective principe, is nothing elſe but the omnipotent efficacious volition of God. For Gods executive power being the ſame with his Effective Wil, it thence neceſſarily follows, that his concurſe is the ſame alſo. Hence Sacred Philoſophie every where makes Gods Wil the Effective Principe whereby althings are made, and governed, or directed to their proper Actions and Ends. As Pſal. 39.9. and 115.3. and 135.6. Mat. 8.2, 3. 2 Chron. 20.6. and elſewhere, as before C. 5. §. 4. Thus alſo Plato, Alcibiad. 1. p. 135. brings in Socrates dialogiſing with young Alcibiades, that Athenian Gallant, in this manner: Doeſt thou know, ſaith Socrates, by what means thou mayst avoid this inordinate motion of thy mind? Alcibiad. Yes. Socrat. How? Alcibiad. If thou wilt, O Socrates, i. e. by thy precepts and inſtitutes. Socrat. Thou mayſt not ſay ſo. Alcibiad. How then? Socrat. foreign, if God wil. Meaning, that Gods wil was omnipoten, and ſo could without more ado, merely by his act of volition, worke virtue in young Alcibiades. But now to explicate and demonſtrate this Hypotheſis, namely, That the Divine Wil is of it ſelf operative, we ſhal reſolve the whole into the following Propoſitions.

1. Prop. God as the firſt cauſe of althings doth not concur by his Eſſence abſolutely conſidered. Gods concurſe not his eſſence abſolutely conſidered.For, (1) If God ſhould concur by his Eſſence abſolutely conſidered, he ſhould act althings by a natural neceſſitie, not with any precedent Libertie: and then Gods making the world, yea things moſt contingent would be as abſolutely and naturally neceſſary, as his loving himſelf. It's true, Gods loving himſelf and al other immanent Acts have a concomitant Libertie or Divine ſpontaneitie attending them, yet they admit not any Antecedent Libertie or Indifference of any kind. But now Gods workes ad extra, ſuch as terminate on the Creature, have not only a Concomitant, but alſo Antecedent Libertie, or ſome kind of Indifference; ſo that God could, according to a ſignum rationis, or prioritie of nature, not have willed them. p. 403(2) If God ſhould worke althings by his Eſſence abſolutely conſidered, things poſſible ſhould have one and the ſame Idea with things future; and ſo Gods Science of ſimple Intelligence ſhould be the ſame with his Science of Viſion. And the reaſon of the conſequence is moſt evident; becauſe the Eſſence of God abſolutely conſidered is equally indifferent to things poſſible, which ſhal never be, as to things future, which are to be. (3) Again, Gods Abſolute Power ſhould be the ſame with his Ordinate, and his Sufficience the ſame with his Efficience, if he wrought al things by his Eſſence abſolutely conſidered. (4) Hence alſo it would follow, that God ſhould alwaies worke and put forth his Omnipotence to the utmoſt extent in al operations. For Cauſes that worke from a Neceſſitie of Nature worke to the utmoſt of their power.

2. Prop. Gods concurſe procedes not from any executive Power in God. No executive power in God, diſtinct from his Wil.This Propoſition has been already demonſtrated, C. 5. §. 4. Yet for more abundant conviction, let us examine the Origine, Neceſſitie, and Ʋſe of an executive Power in the Creature; and then we ſhal ſee what little ground there is to aſcribe the ſame to God. The great Aſſertors and Promotors of executive power have been Ariſtotle and his Sectators; who, on falſe Hypotheſes, preſume, That a ſubſtance cannot act immediately without ſome executive power; which they make a ſpecies of Qualitie. Albeit ſuch kind of Qualitative Powers are now generally exploded by al, who reſolve not to ſerve an Opinion of Ariſtotle, yet there ſtil remains a place for executive powers in nature, when the principal Agent cannot reach the effect immediately. Thus the Soul of Man puts forth al Acts of ſenſe and motion by ſome executive powers. Yet the human Soul can and doth oft act immediately, ſpecially in its immanent acts, without any executive power. And thus God in al his Effects actes immediately by his omnipotent wil, without any executive power: For he is preſent in and with al effects, and therefore needs no executive power to ſupplie his abſence. Again, the Wil of God is Omnipotent, as c. 5. §. 3. and we ſhal anon prove it more fully, and therefore it needs no executive power to execute what it wils. Is not the Divine Wil propoſed to us in Sacred Philoſophic as Irreſiſtible? and if it be ſo, can it not then execute its own pleaſure, without any executive power? Indeed the greateſt Scholaſtic wits have eſpouſed and defended this Hypotheſis, namely, That the Wil and Executive Power of God are really the ſame, and not ſo much as rationally p. 404or formally diſtinct. Thus Joan. Major, 2. Sent. Diſt. 1. q. 1. proves, That God Created the World by his Intellect and Wil, without any executive Power formally diſtinct, of which hereafter, §. 5.4. Prop. Thus Bradwardine, l. 2. c. 29. Alvarez de Auxil. l. 2. p. 129. with others, of whom in the next Propoſition. And indeed Suarez Metaph. Diſp. 22. S. 2. p. 555. doth in part grant our Hypotheſis, in that he acknowlegeth, That the concurſe of God, as it regardes the effective principe, is the ſame with the Divine Wil, which concurs with the Creature to its act. This he cals concurſus ad intrà, the interne concurſe, which he makes to be the principe of al Acts adextrá. Yet I muſt confeſſe elſewhere, namely Diſp. 30. S. 17. he makes mention of an executive power in God, the ſame with his Eſſence, containing in it eminently al create perfections. And ſo ſome Divines, as wel as Philoſophers, aſſert an executive power in God. Thus Heereboord, Select. Ex Philoſoph. Diſp. 8. endeavors to prove, that Gods concurſe, whereby he influenceth things ad extra, is not ſimply his volition; becauſe Gods volition ſimply is an immanent Act, but his concurſe is a tranſient Act ad extra. But this Argument ſeems to be of no weight; becauſe we eaſily grant, that the concurſe of God, quoad Attingentiam paſſivam, as to its paſſive Attingence is diſtinct from God, and the ſame with the concurſe of the ſecond cauſe or effect; but that which we are now diſcourſing of is the concurſe of God in regard of its active Attingence, as it regardes God the Principe, and in this reſpect we only aſſert, That the concurſe of God is the ſame with his volition ſimply conſidered. This wil be further evident by the next Propoſition.

3. Prop. The Divine Wil is of it ſelf Omnipotent and Efficacious. The Divine Wil Omnipotent.This Propoſition is moſt evident; (1) becauſe the Divine Wil cannot be fruſtrated. Thus Suarez, 1.2 ae. Tract. 3. Diſput. 11. Sect. 2. p. 311. We muſt ſay, ſaith he, that when God wils abſolutely and efficaciouſly that man wil ſomewhat, the human Wil cannot diſcord from the Divine. The reaſon is clear; becauſe the Divine Wil efficacious and ſimply abſolute cannot be fruitrated, ſeeing it is infinite. So Bradward. l. 1. c. 10. Now it remains to ſhew, that the Divine Wil is univerſally efficacious, inſuperable, and neceſſary in cauſing, nor impedible and fruſtrablein any manner. Who knows not that it neceſſarily follows: if God can do any thing and wils, it, he doth it? (2) The Divine Wil being the univerſal firſt cauſe of althings, it cannot but be moſt efficacious. For is not this the main difference p. 405between the firſt and ſecond cauſe, the univerſal and particular cauſe, that this may fail of its effect, but that can never? A particular cauſe oft comes ſhort of its effect, by reaſon of the interpoſition of ſome other particular cauſe, that may impede the ſame: but the firſt univerſal cauſe can never come ſhort of its effect; becauſe there is no other cauſe can interpoſe to hinder it. (3) The Wil of God is infinite: therefore Omnipotent and Irreſiſtible: for where the power of the Patient doth not excede or equaliſe the power of the Agent, there can be no prevalent reſiſtence: what then can reſiſt the Divine Wil which is infinite? (4) If the Divine Wil were not omnipotent God were not infinitely happy. For every one is ſo far happy, as his Wil is fulfilled, as Ariſtor. Rhet. l. 2. c. 20. (5) It's a common Hypotheſis in the Scholes, grounded on the higheſt Reaſon, That it is impoſſible but that the Divine Wil ſhould attain its effect. So Aquinas, Part. 1. q. 19. a. 6. as others, Hence,

4. Prop. The Divine Wil is of it ſelf operative and influential on al ſecond cauſes and effects. Thus Auguſtin, De Trinit. l. 3. c. 4.The Wil of God operative of it ſelf. The Wil of God is the firſt and ſupreme cauſe of althings. Again, A thing is ſaid to be done by God acting, when it is done by God willing. Apud Dominum hoc eſt velle quod facere; qura ex ejus voluntate res habent eſſe Auguſtin. in Pſal. 144.Ps 144And the reaſons of this Hypotheſis are moſt manifeſt: For (1) if Gods Wil were not of it ſelf Operative and Effective, it were not the firſt principe and cauſe of althings. (2) The wil of man is in ſome things Operative of it ſelf: and muſt we not allow the ſame Prerogative to the Wil of God? And if it be in ſomethings operative of it ſelf, why not in althings? May we not then hence conclude, That there is no active operation or motion received from God into the Wil, or any other ſecond cauſe; but from the ſimple volition of God the motion of the human Wil or any other ſecond cauſe neceſſarily follows? This is evident in the firſt Creation of althings: for by Gods fiat or volition, which is eternal, althings were made in time, without any other impreſſion or concurſe received: and if Gods firſt Creation of althings was by his ſimple volition, without any tranſient concurſe, what hinders, but that al other efficience of God ſhould in the ſame manner conſiſte in the ſimple volition of his wil, without any tranſient concurſe? Thence in ſacred Philoſophie the Divine Efficience is frequently expreſſed by the Word of God, as the Word of Creation, Gen. 1.3. Conſervation, Pſal. 107.20. Gubernation, Deſtruction, Reſtitution, &c. thereby to denote the efficacitie of the Divine p. 406Wil, as mans Wil is expreſſed by his word, of which hereafter §. 4.6. Prop. See this Hypotheſis wel demonſtrated in Bradward. Cauſ. Deil, l. 1. c. 9. p. 190. & c. 10. p. 196. Ariminenſi…, Sent. 1. Diſtinct. 45. Joan. Major Sent. 2. Quaeſt. 3.

§. 4. Having diſcuſſed the Concurſe of God,The Adjuncts of Gods Concurſe. 1. It is immediate as it relates to its Object and Subject or Principe, we now come to treat of it in its Adjuncts and Modes of operation, which wil give us great indications and notices of its nature. 1. The concurſe of God is as to its Mode of operation immediate. This Adjunct or Mode of operation follows immediately on the origine or principe of Divine Concurſe: for it being nothing but the ſimple volition of God,Particularly as to gratioſe effects. it thence neceſſarily follows, that it muſt be immediate as to al objects and effects.Eſa. 55.10, 11.Isa 55:10Isa 55:11 This immediation of Divine Concurſe is frequently inculcated in ſacred Philoſophie. So Eſa. 55.10, 11. For as the rain cometh down and the ſnow from Heaven, and returneth not thither, but watereth the earth, and maketh it to bring forth and bud, that it may give ſeed to the ſower, and bread to the eater; ſo ſhal my word, that goeth forth out of my mouth; it ſhal not returne unto me void, but it ſhal accompliſh that which I pleaſe, and it ſhal proſper in the thing whereto I ſent it. (1) This muſt be underſtood not only of Gods reveled word, but alſo of his efficacious word of concurſe, productive of things.Pſal. 72.6.Ps 72:6 So Pſal. 72.6. (2) Gods effective operative word or concurſe is compared to the Rain, which by Gods ordinance fals to water the earth, ſtraining it ſelf through the liquid Air, as through a Sieve, dividing it ſelf into millions of drops, and immediately watering every inch of earth, that ſo every herbe may receive its proportion of moiſture, gradually and immediately according to its exigence: juſt ſo proportionably doth the efficacious concurſe of God immediately inſinuate it ſelf into al ſecond cauſes, operations, and effects, ſpecially ſuch as are gratioſe.Hoſ. 14.5.Hos 14:5 The like alluſion we find, Hoſ. 14.5. I wil be as the dew to Iſrael: he ſhal grow as the lillie. Eſa. 26.19.Isa 26:19The like Eſa. 26.19. For thy dew is as the dew of herbes. The dew, you know, fals in a ſilent quiet night, in millions of ſmal imperceptible drops; and being of a gentle inſinuating nature, gradually and inſenſibly ſokes into the erth, tempers and allays the heat thereof, ſpecially in thoſe hotter countries, and immediately inſinuates it ſelf into the roots of plants; which, by reaſon of its moiſt benigne nitroſe qualitie, it comfortes, refreſheth, and encourageth; calling forth the fruits hereof, and cauſing the face of things to flouriſh with beautie and p. 407delight, much more efficaciouſly than ſudden great ſhours, or land-flouds; which are more violent, but leſſe beneficial: Thus Chriſt's gratioſe concurſe and influence fals like dew on the Believers heart, in millions of drops; which grad…aly, inſenſibly, and immediately inſinuate thereinto, cauſing it to fructifie and flouriſh much more effectively, than al the ſhours of Divine wrath, or Land-flouds of ſpiritual Bondage, which ſuddenly break in on the conſciences of many convict legal conſciences; but ſoon drie up again, and leave them more barren and hard-hearted than before. The Greek Theologues expreſſe this immediation of Divine Grace various ways: ſometimes they terme it, foreign, the inhabitant or indwelling Grace: ſometimes, foreign, the inhabitation of the holy Spirit; becauſe it is wrought by the Spirit of God immediately as dwelling in the Believers heart.

But to treat more generally of Divine Concurſe and its immediation as to al Objects, Operations, and Effects, Plato, Leg. 4. pag. 715 aſſures us, That, according to the ancient Tradition, God has not only, foreign, the beginning and the end, but alſo foreign, the middle of althings: i. e. God by his efficacious concurſe penetrates althings, and is more intimate and immediate to them, than they are to themſelves. So alſo in his Parmenides, he tels us, That the prime Idea or cauſe is intimately preſent with althings, influencing al both ſmal and great. Whence he termes al ſecond cauſes, foreign, Concauſes and Cooperators with God. But before we come to the demonſtration of our Hypotheſis we muſt premit ſomethings by way of explication and limitation. (1) When we ſay, Gods concurſe to al ſecond cauſes and effects is immediate, we do not thereby exclude al means, as if God did ſo concur as not to make uſe of ſecond cauſes and inſtruments; but that God concurs immediately in and with al means. As in order to health God preſcribes and uſeth means, yet he concurs immediately in and with thoſe means; ſo in ſupernatural effects, God uſeth Miniſters and Ordinances, yet concurs immediately in and with them. (2) God concurs immediately to al ſecond cauſes and effects, not only by the immediation of Virtue, but alſo [immediatione ſuppoſiti] by the immediation of his Eſſence: for indeed the virtue of God is nothing elſe but his Eſſence, or Wil as the effective Principe of althings. The Divine Suppoſite is not ſo much as ratione or formally diſtinguiſhed p. 408from his Virtue, which is his effective omnipotent Wil. Theſe premiſſes being laid down we procede to explicate and demonſtrate the Immediation of Gods Concurſe in the following Propoſitions.

1. Prop. God concurs immediately unto every Act of the ſecond Cauſe. God concurs immediately to every Act of ſecond Cauſes.This Propoſition is aſſerted not only by the Thomiſtes, but alſo by the Jeſuites, Suarez, Metaph. Diſp. 22. ſect. 1. and others. And the reaſons are invincible: (1) From the ſubordination of al ſecond cauſes to the firſt. Ariſtotle, in his Phyſics, l. 8. c. 5. & Metaphyſ. l. 2. c. 12. aſſures us, That in Agents per ſe and properly ſubordinate, the inferior cannot act without the influxe or concurſe of the ſuperior cauſe. And the reaſon is evident: becauſe if the inferior cauſe could act without the influxe of the ſuperior, it were not ſubordinate unto the ſuperior in that act. Neither is it ſufficient to ſay, that the ſecond cauſe is ſubordinate to God, as its Eſſence and Virtue is conſerved by God, according to the ſentiment of Durandus and his Sectators: for ſuch a ſubordination of the ſecond cauſe to the firſt is only accidental and remote as to its acting: And who knows not, that an accidental remote cauſe is not properly a cauſe? Al proper ſubordination implies dependence of the inferior cauſe on the ſuperior, not only quando but quatenus agit, both when and as it actes. (2) From the limitation and dependence of al ſecond cauſes. Every Being by participation is limited: and where there are limits of eſſence, there neceſſarily are limits of Activitie and Operation. A Creature can as wel give Being to it ſelf, as actuate it ſelf independently as to the Firſt cauſe: whatever receives its Being by participation, receives alſo its Operation in the ſame mode of Participation. Dependence on God in Operation is as eſſental and intrinſec to the nature of a Creature, as dependence on God in eſſence and conſervation of that eſſence. Yea, it is no leſſe than an implicite contradiction to ſay, that a Creature actes without dependence on God for that act, as Suarez and others prove. And the reaſon is moſt demonſtrative: for, as Ariſtotle tels us, The mode of operating alwaies follows the mode of eſſence: If the eſſence depend on God for its production and conſervation, ſo muſt the operation. Whatever is a Being by participation, muſt alſo be an Agent by participation. Yea, the very Act of the ſecond cauſe is a Being by participation; and therefore it requires the concurſe and influxe of the Firſt cauſe for its production, conſervation, and promotion. (3) From p. 409the nature of the First cauſe and its perfection. If God concur not immediately to every Act of the ſecond cauſe, he is not the univerſal cauſe of althings, neither is he omnipotent, and moſt perfect. For that very Act is a real Being, or if you wil a mode of Being, and ſo reducible to real Entitie: it cannot be pure nothing; becauſe pure nothing cannot be the terme or effect of a real production: If then the Act of the ſecond cauſe be a real poſitive Entitie or Mode, and yet God not the Firſt cauſe thereof, then it neceſſarily follows, that God is not the univerſal cauſe of althings: neither is he omnipotent; becauſe he cannot produce that real Act: neither is he moſt perfect; becauſe there is ſomething in nature phyſically perfect, which he is not the cauſe of. Dependence on God as the Firſt cauſe, albeit it implies ſomething of imperfection in the Creature as a Creature, yet it importes perfection in God: neither can his abſolute perfection as the Firſt cauſe be preſerved and maintained without it. (4) From the Providence of God. If God as the Firſt cauſe concur not immediately to al Acts of ſecond Cauſes, how can he order, direct, and governe them, ſo as they ſhal al determine in his own glorie? Again, how can he hinder ſuch Acts as impugne his own ends and deſignes? Doth not this Antitheſis of Durandus and others, who denie God to concur immediately to al Acts of ſecond cauſes, cut off the chiefeſt part of Divine Providence, which conſiſtes in the ordering and directing al human Acts for his own glorie?

2. Prop. God as the First cauſe immediately concurs, not only to the Act, but alſo the ſecond cauſe it ſelf, and its wil, if it be a free Agent. God immediately concurs to ſecond Cauſe ſelf.This Propoſition may be demonſtrated, (1) by al the fore mentioned Arguments, which prove Gods immediate concurſe to the Act of the ſecond cauſe: for every efficient cauſe producing in a ſubject an Act connatural to the power of he ſubject, muſt needs influence and actuate that power: wherefore God the Firſt cauſe producing in the wil of man an act connatural thereto, muſt neceſſarily actuate and influence the ſaid wil in ſuch a production. (2) That gods immediate concurſe reacheth the human Wil, and not only its Act, is evident, becauſe it determines the Wil to act. For grant but this, that the human Wil is not the Firſt cauſe of its own act, but dependent on God for the production thereof, which the Jeſuites grant; it neceſſarily follows, that it is actuated and determined by God in al its p. 410Acts. It's true, the human Wil is a free Agent and ſo a ſelf-determining power; but yet this hinders not but that it is alſo determined by God as the Firſt cauſe: God determines the Wil to determine it ſelf; as he moves the Wil to move it ſelf. If God did not determine and move the Wil, it could not determine and move it ſelf. (3) Sacred Philoſophie is expreſſe herein, that God workes immediately on the Wil, as wel as on its Acts and Effects. So Philip. 2.13. God is ſaid to worke foreign, to wil and to do. And how can he worke to wil unleſſe he worke upon the wil? Can there be any way aſſigned how God ſhould worke to wil, and yet not immediately determine and move the wil?Pſal. 139.9, 10.Ps 139:9Ps 139:10 So Pſal. 139.9, 10. If I take the wings of the morning, [i.e. ſlie moſt ſwiftly as the morning] and dwel in the utmost parts of the Sea: even there ſhal thine hand lead me, and thy right hand ſhal hold me. His mind is, that he cannot flie from the immediate preſence of God; becauſe whereever he goes, his immediate hand or concurſe muſt lead him. To lead a man by the hand, and to hold him here denotes Gods immediate concurſe on the Wil and its Acts.

3. Prop. God concurs immediately to the effect by one and the ſame act with the ſecond cauſe. The Act of the firſt and ſecond cauſe the ſame.For the explication of this Propoſition we are to note, that the cauſation of the firſt cauſe is not the ſame with that of the ſecond, but only the action whereby the firſt and ſecond cauſe concur to the production of the effect. For albeit the influxe of the firſt cauſe be diſtinct from that of the ſecond, yet the Act whereby the firſt and ſecond cauſe produce the effect is one and the ſame.Duo individuo opere operantes neceſſario agant unum & idem, cùm indiviſa ſit corum actio: ſi autem agerent diverſis actionibus, oporteret operata eſſe diviſa: ficut è contrà actio indiviſa non poteſt ſacere diviſa opera. Groſſeteſle, de Libero Arbitrio. This is incomparably wel demonſtrated by our Learned and great Groſſeteſte, Biſhop of Lincolne, in his Tractate, De Libero Arbitrio, in M. SS. where he acutely proves, That the Action of God and the ſecond cauſe, whereby the effect is produced, cannot be deverſe; becauſe the Effect is but one and the ſame; which procedes totally from God as the firſt cauſe, and totally from the ſecond cauſe, as hereafter, Prop. 4. For the more ful explication whereof we muſt diſtinguiſh between the Active and Paſſive Efficience of God: Gods Active Efficience is nothing elſe but the immanent efficacious Act of his Wil; which, without al peradventure, differs infinitely from the efficience of the ſecond cauſe: yet Gods Paſſive efficience, as it relates to the Act of the ſecond cauſe, is not really diſtinct therefrom: for it's no way incongruous or inconſiſtent, that one and the ſame act procede from two p. 411different total cauſes of different kinds, ſuch as the firſt and ſecond cauſe is. Whence it follows, that one and the ſame act both of firſt and ſecond cauſe immediately and eſſentially depend on both in their kind. That the firſt and ſecond cauſe immediately concur to the ſame effect, by one and the ſame indiviſible Act may be demonſtrated, (1) from the Dependence which the Act of the ſecond cauſe has on the active cauſation of the firſt cauſe. The Act of the ſecond cauſe doth not, as ſome conceive, depend on any real influxe or concurſe tranſient from the firſt cauſe, and diſtinct from the act of the ſecond cauſe, but on the mere efficacious volition of the firſt cauſe; which is the effective principe of al effects. This is acutely demonſtrated by Suarez, Metaph. Diſput. 21. ſect. 3. p. 568. where he proves. That the action of God is not the way or fluxe to the action of the Creature, but to the effect: neither is an action the terme of an action. Therefore to the univerſal influxe of the firſt cauſe there is no more required, but that the action of the ſecond cauſe procede from his Wil—not that it procede by another externe action; but it can procede immediately by it ſelf from the wil of God. Whence, when the action of the Creature is ſaid to depend on the influxe of God, either this influxe muſt be taken for the immanent interne Act, as it influenceth the externe Act of the ſecond cauſe; or the manner of ſpeech muſt be taken not tranſitively, ſave according to ſome rational conception. If we would ſpeak properly, it muſt be ſaid, that the action of the Creature is from God. Whence he concludes, in the ſame page thus: By comparing the action of the Creature to the interne action of God, it is clear, that the action of God is in order of nature before the action of the ſecond cauſe. Whence it's ſaid, that the concurſe of the firſt cauſe is before that of the ſecond; becauſe the ſecond cauſe doth not act but in the virtue of the firſt. Hence, (2) we may farther demonſtrate the Identitie of the act, whereby the firſt and ſecond cauſe concur to the effect, by the Independence which the act of the ſecond cauſe has as to al tranſient acts of the firſt cauſe diſtinct from it ſelf. For if the action of the ſecond cauſe be from God, by ſome tranſient influxe diſtinct from it ſelf; then that influxe being a Creature wil neceſſarily require ſome other tranſient influxe for its production and preſervation: and ſo into infinite. (3) That the action, whereby the firſt and ſecond cauſe concur to any effect, is one and the ſame p. 412may be demonſtrated from the Inutilitie and needleſſe ſuppoſition of any diſtinction between them. For if there be ſuppoſed two diſtinct actions, one of God, another of the ſecond cauſe, as neceſſarily concurring to the production of one and the ſame effect, then the action of the ſecond is from God, or not: It cannot be ſaid, that it is not from God, but only from the ſecond cauſe; becauſe then it would be ſaid, that the Effect of the ſecond cauſe is from God, but not the Act, which is againſt the nature of a finite limited Being, as we have proved in the precedent Propoſitions: If it be ſaid, that the act of the ſecond cauſe is from God, then there is no neceſſity of ſuppoſing any other act of God diſtinct from this, whereby he concurs to the production of the Effect. Is it not every way ſuperfluous and unneceſſary to ſuppoſe two diſtinct actions, one of the firſt and another of the ſecond cauſe, as concurring to the ſame effect, when as it is granted, and cannot rationally be denied, that the very act of the ſecond cauſe is from God? This Argument is wel managed by Suarez, Metaph. Diſp. 21. S. 3. p. 567. The ſum of al is this: Both the firſt and ſecond cauſe concur immediately to the production of the effect by one and the ſame action; yet the influxe or concurſe of the firſt and ſecond cauſe conſidered formally as to the effective principes is really diſtinct.

2. Having diſpatcht the Immediation of the Divine concurſe,Gods concurſe Independent and Abſolute. we now procede to a ſecond Adjunct or mode of operation appendent thereto, namely its Independence and Abſoluteneſſe. That the concurſe of God is Independent and Abſolute we are aſſured both by Sacred and Platonic Philoſophie. The Abſolute Independence of Divine concurſe, as to gratioſe effects, is frequently inculcated in Sacred Philoſophie.Pſal. 51.10.Ps 51:10 Hence we find a creative efficace aſſcribed to Independent Medicinal Grace.Eſa. 43.1.Isa 43:1 So Pſal. 51.10. Create in me a clean heart. Eſa. 43.1. The Lord that created thee O Jacob, &c. So Eſa. 57.19. as elſewhere. Now what more Independent and Abſolute than a Creative concurſe? (1) Workes of Creation are out of nothing; and ſo their Efficient muſt needs be Independent as to mater. (2) Workes of Creation require an infinite independent Agent, which admits no ſocial cauſe: for Creation being the production of ſomething out of nothing, which are termes, as to Efficience, infinitely diſtant, none but an Infinite independent cauſe can effect the ſame: who can reconcile ſomething and nothing, but he who has al Being in himſelf? p. 413(3) Workes of Creation are in an inſtant, and therefore depend not on any Preparations, or material Diſpoſitions of the ſubject. (4) Workes of Creation are Perfect, and therefore require the moſt perfect independent abſolute concurſe. How Independnet and abſolute efficacious Grace is in its manner of working, is farther evident from that Royal Prerogative which it uſeth in the converſion of ſinners. Doth it not oft let ſome run on in ful career, til they have one foot in Hel, and then ſnatch them as flaming torches out of that ſire? Thus Ezech. 16.6.Ezech. 16.6Ezek 16:6 I ſaid unto thee when thou waſt in thy bloud, Live. Chriſts Omnipotent, Independent Word carries a viviſie efficace in it. How many Lions has this Omnipotent Word turned into Lambes? What timber or heart is there ſo crooked, knottie, and crabbed, out of which he cannot frame a Veſſel of MercieMercy? What heart ſo ſtonie, ſo rocky, out of which he cannot raiſe up a Son to Abraham, as Mat. 3.9?Mat. 3.9.Matt 3:9 Now to change one ſpecies or kind of Creature into another, a Lion into a Lamb, a ſtonie heart into a Son of Abraham, doth not this argue Independent, Abſolute and Omnipotent Efficace? So little is this gratioſe concurſe tied to, or dependent on the leaſt Moral Diſpoſitions, Obligations, Merits, Cauſes, Conditions, or moving Conſiderations without it ſelf: it is the freeſt thing in the world, and therefore compared to the motion of the wind, which bloweth where it liſteth, Joh. 3.8. Can we ſuppoſe,Joh. 3.8.John 3:8 that any thing the Creature performes ſhould lay the leaſt obligation on Soverain Free Grace? Is it not a childiſh thing to ſuppoſe, that the infinite occan of Independent Grace ſhould ebbe and ſlow, according to the various changes and conditions of Mans Free Wil, that moſt mutable Moon? But that not only Eſſicacious Grace, but al Divine concurſe is Independent and Abſolute, may be proved by theſe invincible Reaſons. (1) From the Independence of the Divine Wil, the firſt cauſe of althings. The firſt cauſe, according to Sacred and Platonic Philoſophie, is foreign, without al cauſe and dependence. Thus Plato, Repub. 6. p. 509. where bringing in God, under the notion of the chiefeſt good, and the firſt cauſe of althings, he gives him this character, foreign, He is not mere eſſence, but ſomewhat more auguſt than eſſence, tranſcending al finite eſſence both in Dignitie and Virtue. So elſewhere he makes God to be foreign, the ſupreme effective cauſe of althings, and therefore Independent as to al ſubſervient inſtrumental p. 414cauſes. Yea, he wil have God the firſt Cauſe to be foreign, Being it ſelf and Eternitie it ſelf; and thence no way dependent on ſecond cauſes. And the Platoniſtes generally make God to be foreign, ſupereſſential, and ſo moſt independent. And, alas! how abſurd and monſtroſe is it, that the concurſe of the firſt Cauſe ſhould depend on the ſecond cauſe? Is not the Divine Wil the firſt effective Principe of althings, the ſame with the Divine Eſſence? May we not then as wel make the Eſſence of God to be dependent as his Wil. (2) From the pure actualitie and ſimplicitie of the Divine Wil. Al dependence implies a paſſive receptive power as to that on which it dependes: there is no dependence without ſome paſſive power either phyſic or metaphyſic: But now Gods Wil as it is the effective Principe of althings has not the leaſt paſſive power: therefore no dependence. (3) From the Primatie and Superioritie of the firſt Cauſe. Thus Damaſcene, Orthod. Fid. l. 2. c. 1. foreign, God ſolely being without Principe, or independent, he is the Framer of althings, &c. God being the firſt Cauſe of althings muſt neceſſarily be independent in his Cauſalitie and Eſſence. For where there is dependence, there is inferioritie and ſubordination: And may we preſume, that the concurſe of the firſt Cauſe is inferior and ſubordinate to that of the ſecond cauſe? Doth it amount to leſſe than a contradiction, to ſay the firſt Cauſe dependes on or is ſubordinate to the ſecond cauſe? What! can it be firſt and yet ſubordinate? What is this but to be firſt, and yet not firſt but ſecond? For dependence and ſubordination is an effential mode of the ſecond cauſe, as independence of the firſt. (4) As the concurſe of the firſt Cauſe is independent, ſo alſo abſolute; yea therefore abſolute, becauſe independent: for that which dependes on nothing without it ſelf, muſt needs be abſolute. That the Concurſe of God is abſolute and no way dependent on any conditions of the ſubject, or object it workes upon, ſpecially as to gratioſe effects, is moſt evident from ſacred Philoſophie.Eph. 2.8, 9, 10.Eph 2:8Eph 2:9Eph 2:10 So Epheſ. 2.8, 9, 10. He ſaith, v. 8. For by Grace ye are ſaved through faith, and that not of your ſelves, it is the gift of God. It's true, it workes through faith; but yet not as a condition in the power of Free-wil to performe, but only as Faith is the Organ or Canal through which medicinal Grace is conveighed into the Soul: the whole is the Gift of God: and why? v. 9. Not of workes, lest any one ſhould boaſt. As if he had ſaid: Alas! if p. 415this medicinal Grace ſhould be ſuſpended on any moral or Evangelic conditions to be performed by us, then there were indeed room for boaſting: which Chriſt wil not allow of. Are the derivations of the fountain ſuſpended on any conditions the ſtreams can performe? doth not the ſtream owe al that it has to the free, independent, and abſolute communication of the ſpring? Thence it follows v. 10. For we are his workemanſhip created in [or by] Christ Jeſus unto good workes: i. e. look as God created and formed the firſt rude confuſed Chaos, not for any foreſeen goodneſſe in it, but out of a pure nothing; ſo Chriſt frames the New Creature, not for any foreſeen conditions it can performe, but unto al conditions or good workes, as Eſa. 19.25. We have an excellent diſcourſe againſt conditional Grace, in Janſenius, August. Tom. 3. l. 2. c. 24. pag. 83. By the predication of this conditional Grace, which enables us to act if we wil, there is nothing gained but the total ſubverſion of Chriſt's medicinal Grace, and the ſubſtituting in the room thereof the Grace of a ſound Wil, ſuch as Adam had and Angels now have: and thus Chriſt hath died in vain: for the proper Grace of Chriſt, which he by his Paſſion hath brought to heal our infirmities,Gratia medicinalis non eſt talis, quae dominatrici ſamulando voluntati, vel influit, vel non influit, prout imperanti ſeſe determinare, vel haerere placet; ſed prorſus talis, quae ſimulac pulſat fores rumpit oſtia, repugnantém que domat voluntatem, tollit omnem ejus reſiſtentiam, rapit eam ſecum, & ex invita volentem ineffabili ſuavitate facit. Janſen. August. Tom. 3. is ſuch as doth not only worke the effect if we wil, expecting when our Wils wil move, but it enables us to wil: for herein lies the preciſe difference between a ſound and ſick Wil. That the influxe and concurſe of God is abſolute may be demonſtrated from the abſurditie, yea impoſſibilitie of a conditionate concurſe in God. How abſurd is it to conceit, that God wil concur with the human Wil in the act of willing upon condition that it wil! Yea, how impoſſible is ſuch a conditionate influxe! For if there be any condition required to Gods Concurſe, then he concurs to the working of that condition, or not: if not, then there is ſome act of the Creature produced without the Divine Concurſe: If God doth concur to that condition, then abſolutely, or on ſome other condition: if abſolutely, then his former concurſe is not conditionate: for he that requires any condition of his act, and gives that condition may be ſaid to act abſolutely: beſides if God concur abſolutely to the later condition, why not alſo to the former act? If God concur to the ſecond condition conditionately, then alſo to the third, &c. and thus there wil be a dore open to a progreſſe into infinite, which Nature, but much more the God of Nature abhors. Hence,

p. 4163. Gods Concurſe is previous and antecedent. Gods concurſe previous and antecedent.For the explication of this Adjunct or Mode of Operation we are to conſider, that he Prioritie here meant is not of Time but of Cauſalitie, as the cauſalitie of the Firſt cauſe is in order of nature antecedent to the cauſalitie of the ſecond cauſe: for therefore the ſecond cauſe cooperates; becauſe the Firſt cauſe operates. The Prioritie and Antecedence of Divine Concurſe is moſt evident in gratioſe Operations and Effects. Thus Iſidorus Peluſiota, lib. 2. Epiſt. 72. (Edit. Commelin. 1605.) pag. 121. An evil tree, ſaith he, cannot bring forth good fruit, Mat. 7.18.Matt 7:18Mat. 7.18. How did Paul, when he was a Perſecutor, become a Preacher? How did Peter, when he had abjured Chriſt, get off this ſpot? By what means was the wild Olive implanted into the good Olive, Rom. 11.17.Rom 11:17Rom. 11.17? How did the Thief get admiſſion into Paradiſe? foreign, having perceived therefore the force of precedent Divine aide, every one that wils both labors, and moves althings, (for a naked wil ſufficeth not) and learnes, and attains Salvation. Wherein he aſſertes, (1) foreign, that ſupernatural antecedent aide or Grace workes al in maters of Salvation. (2) That the naked wil ſufficeth not to performe any good. Chryſoſtome, in Geneſ. Hom. 9. cals this prevenient Grace, foreign, the Grace that ſeeks what is loſt, and is found by ſuch as ſeek it not. Baſil termes it, foreign. Anticipant Grace. So de Baptiſ. lib. 1. foreign, By the prevenient Grace of God we worke and confer our duties, according to ſaith, by love. This antecedence and Prioritie of Divine Concurſe may be demonſtrated, (1) From its effective Principe the Divine Wil, which neceſſarily precedes the Act of the ſecond cauſe; becauſe eternal and independent, as before. (2) From the efficace of the Divine Concurſe, as it infallibly determines the ſecond cauſe to act, and ſo muſt be neceſſarily antecedent thereto, not only. ſimultaneous, as the Jeſuites hold. (3) From the Dependence and Subordination of the ſecond cauſe to the Firſt. Al ſecond cauſes are but foreign, Concauſes, dependent on and ſubordinate to the Firſt cauſe, as Plato: now where there is dependence and ſubordination, here muſt neceſſarily be Prioritie and Antecedence of that on which the ſubordinate dependes. Thus Suarez, Metaph. Diſp. 21. Sect. 2. pag. 568. By comparing, ſaith p. 417he, the action of the Creature to the interne action of God, it is clear, that the action of God is in order of nature before the action of the Creature: whence it is ſaid, that the firſt cauſe doth firſt influence or concur; becauſe the ſecond cauſe actes not, but in and by its virtue. Yet it cannot be denied, but that the Jeſuites generally allow God only a ſimultaneous Concurſe as o the acts of the Wil; becauſe otherwiſe, as they conceit, the libertie of the Wil cannot be preſerved. This ſimultaneous concurſe they make to be nothing elſe but the very action of the ſecond cauſe, as it procedes from God. Burgerſdicius, Metaph. l. 2. c. 11. grants, that Gods Concurſe in ſupernatural Acts is previous; but yet in naturals he allows it to be only ſimultaneous. But that Gods Concurſe not only in ſupernaturals, but alſo in naturlas is previous the Dominicans ſtrongly prove from the very nature of the Firſt cauſe, and dependence of the ſecond: for where there is ſubordination and dependence in cauſalitie, there is poſterioritie, &c.

4. Gods Concurſe to and with ſecond cauſes is total. Gods Concurſe total.This Totalitie of the Firſt cauſe doth not exclude the Totalitie of the ſecond cauſe in its kind, but only its partialitie and coordination in the ſame kind. For it's a trite Rule in Philoſophie, that in cauſes ſubordinate there may be diverſe total cauſes in different kinds concurring to the ſame effect, but not in the ſame kind. So we ſay that God, and the Sun, and Man are al total cauſes in the production of a Man; becauſe they al have different kinds of cauſalitie. When therefore we ſay, that Gods Concurſe is total, we do only denie the Coordination or Copartialitie of the ſecond cauſe. We allow the ſecond cauſe to cooperate with God in a way of ſubordination, but not to be a coordinate, ſocial, or copartial cauſe with God. Divine Concurſe, ſpecially as to gratioſe effects, workes al totally and ſolitarily: it admits not of a Corrival or Copartner: it is no partial cauſe, but workes the whole effect, though not without the ſubſervience of inferior cauſes and inſtruments. As in natural cauſes, you aſcribe the whole efficace and cauſalitic of the inſtrument to the principal cauſe; ſpecially if the inſtrument be purely paſſive, without any inherent virtue of its own. As you aſcribe not the victorie to the Generals Sword, but to his Valor: ſo here the inſtruments which Chriſt uſeth in the workes of the new Creation are purely paſſive; they have no efficace, but what is imparted to them by him the principal p. 418Efficient; and therefore they cannot be partial, ſocial cauſes. This Totalitie of Divine Concurſe is wel demonſtrated by that great and pious Witneſſe againſt Antichriſt, even in the darkeſt times of Poperie, Robert Groſſeteste Biſhop of Lancolne, in his MSS. de Libero Arbitrio: Efficacious Grace ſo workes with the Freewil, that at firſt it prevents the act of the Wil, and afterwards concurs; yet not ſo, as if part were wrought by Grace and part by Free-wil, but each in its kind workes the whole: for two individual Agents muſt neceſſarily worke one and the ſame effect when their action is indiviſe— This Augustin illuſtrates by a Rider and the Horſe; by whom one and the ſame act or motion is totally produced: ſo the Action of God and of the Wil concur totally— And ſo in every effect of every Creature, God and the next ſecond cauſe produce the ſame conjointly not apart, or one this part and that the other part, &c. This Totalitie of Divine Concurſe as to gratioſe effects is frequently and lively illuſtrated and demonſtrated by the Greek Theologues. Thus Chryſoſtome, Hom. 12. ad Hebr. foreign, &c. We ſee houſes beautifully built, Hoc, inquit Bonaventura, piarum mentium eſt, ut nihil ſibi tribuant, ſed totum Gratiae Dei: unde quantumcun que aliquis det Gratiae Dei à pietate non receder, etiamſi multa tribuendo Gratiae Dei aliquid ſubtrahit poteſtati Naturae: cùm verò aliquid Gratiae Dei ſubtrahitur, & Naturae tribuitur quod Gratiae eſt, ibi poteſt periculum intervenire. Caſſandri Conſuloat. Art. 18.and we ſay; the whole is the Artificers: albeit he has worke men under him: ſo the whole of good must be aſcribed to God. So in Geneſ 715. foreign, The whole is from the Grace of God. So ad Epheſ. Hom. 18. ſpeaking of Paul, he ſaith, foreign. Thou ſeeſt how in althings be conceles what is his own, and aſcribes al to God. So Greg. Nazianz. Orat. 31. ſpeaking of Paul, ſaith, foreign, he aſcribes al to God. Thus alſo Cyril Alexandr. and others, as Court Gent. P. 2. B. 3. Ch. 9. Sect. 3. §. 12. This partial concurſe ſuppoſeth God and the Creature to act together in the ſame kind of cauſalitie, which is repugnant both to the nature of God, as alſo to the condition of the Creature. (1) This partial Concurſe is repugnant to the independent, ſimple, perfect nature of God, as alſo to his prime, ſoverain, efficacions cauſalitie. What more incongruous and unbecoming the ſupreme infinite Being, than to be yoked with his Creature as a partial, ſocial, coordinate cauſe? (2) This alſo is inconſiſtent with the Subordination, Dependence, and Inferioritie of the ſecond cauſe. For al ſocial, partial cauſes are as ſuch coordinate and equal: the effect dependes on each, but they depend not each on the other. To make the ſecond cauſe ſocial and coordinate with the firſt, what p. 419is it but to make it a firſt cauſe? (3) This alſo is inconſiſtent with the prioritie and antecedence of Gods concurſe: for a partial cauſalitie is only ſimultaneous, which has been already refuted. (4) The ſober Scholaſtic Divines have ever owned and approved a Totalitie of Divine concurſe. So Aquinas, contra Gent. l. 3. cap. 70. It's manifeſt, ſaith he, that the ſame effect is aſcribed to the natural and ſecond cauſe and to the Divine Efficace; not as if it were partly from God, and partly from the natural Agent; but the whole effect is from both in a different mode: as the ſame effect is attributed totally to the Inſtrument, and yet totally to the principal cauſe. The like Alvarez, Diſput. 85.

The Totalitie of Divine concurſe, as to the new Creature and Gratioſe Effects, is lively illuſtrated and demonſtrated in Sacred Philoſophie. Thus Eſa. 43.7.Eſa. 43.7Isa 43:7 Even every one that is called by my name: for I have created him for my Glorie, I have formed him, yea, I have made him. Here Chriſt aſſumes to himſelf, as the ſole, total, principal Agent, the Creation, Formation, and Conſummation of the New Creature. As in the old Creation, God made firſt the rude Chaos out of nothing: then out of the rude Chaos he formed the ſeveral ſpecies of the Univerſe, and particularly the Bodie of Man out of the duſt of the Earth; which was Formation: thence in the laſt place, he breathed into Man a Rational Soul; which gave Conſummation to him: So proportionably hereto Chriſt here aſſumes to himſelf a threefold concurſe, and each total, in the framing of the New Creature. he ſaith, (1) I have created him. foreign. I have educed or called him out of nothing, as I did the firſt rude Chaos. The new Creature is not educed out of the potence of corrupt Nature, but out of nothing by Divine Omnipotence. But if this be not enough to expreſſe the Totalitie of his efficacious Eſſicience, he addes, (2) I have formed him foreign. This alſo is a terme whereby the formation of Creatures out of the firſt chaos is expreſſed: The ſenſe is; I have not only given him ſome first lines, a rude maſſe, or ſhape of a new Creature; but I have faſhioned and formed him, as I at firſt formed Adam out of a piece of Red Earth or Clay: For ſo the word ſignifies, to forme or ſhape a thing, as the Potter doth his Clay, to this or that forme. And if al this wil not ſuffice to demonſtrate, that Chriſt is the total Creator and Formator of the New Creature, he addes yet farther, (3) Yea, I have made him, foreign. i. e. I have perfected p. 420and completed the whole worke: I have made him ſuch as I would have him, conforme to mine eternal Idea concerning him: he has no part wanting or miſplaced; not a finger or little toe defective: he is a complete, perfect new Creature, and that by virtue of my Creation, Formation, and Conſummation. Thus the whole of the new Creature, as wel as of the old, is to be aſcribed to Chriſt totally and ſolely as the Creator, Fictor, and Effector thereof. And here we are alſo to note, that it was uſual with the Hebrews, to expreſſe the workes of the interne new Creation, under the ſymbol of the externe old Creation. The Totalitie of the Divine concurſe is alſo we expreſſed, Eſa. 63.5. and Pſal. 94.17.

5.Gods concurſe particular not general only. The concurſe of God as the firſt cauſe is particular and proper, not only general. This Adjunct or mode of operation may ſeem novel, but really it is not ſo. Before we come to the demonſtration of it, we muſt premit ſome Diſtinctions and Limitations. (1) We muſt diſtinguiſh between a general providence, and general concurſe: we denie not but that Gods Providence, as it extendes to althings univerſally, may be termed general, which yet doth no way induce or ſuppoſe a general concurſe, i. e. ſuch as is alike commun to al effects and determinable thereby; as the concurſe of the Sun is determinable by the effects it workes on. Such a general concurſe is unworthy of the firſt cauſe, who determines al effects, but is determinable by none. Bradwardine de Cauſd Dei, l. 3. c. 7. p. 668. undertakes to give us the origine of this general influxe or concurſe, which he makes to be from the Pagan Philoſophers, 'ſpecially the Aſtrologers, who aſſerted an emanation or irradiation of general influxes from celeſtial Bodies, which they ſuppoſed to be Gods, on al ſubjects or maters. (2) We muſt diſtinguiſh between a particular cauſe, and a particular concurſe. We do not affirme that God is a particular cauſe, but an univerſal cauſe concurring in a particular manner to al ſecond cauſes and their effects. And here Heereboord, Select. Diſputat. Vol. 1. Diſput. 10, and 11. whiles he juſtly oppoſeth his Maſter Burgerſdicius, for denying Gods concurſe to be particular, he himſelf falſe into this eaſie miſtake of making God a particular cauſe. For the obviating of which, as alſo for the taking away the foundation of al the objections urged againſt our Hypotheſis, we ſay, that God is an Ʋniverſal Cauſe, and yet his concurſe, as to the mode of its operation is particular. God is ſaid to be an Ʋniverſal Cauſe, in p. 421regard of the extent of his cauſalitie, as it extendes to al objects, effects, and ſecond cauſes univerſally: and yet his concurſe is particular, as it is not, like that of the Sun, determinable by its object, but doth in a particular manner, according to the exigence and condition of the ſubject, determine the ſame. Theſe things being premiſſed we procede to demonſtrate, that the concurſe of God is not general but particular, as to its manner of working with al ſecond cauſes. (1) From the nature of a General concourſe; which is of it ſelf indifferent, but modified and determined by the mater it workes on: So the influxe of the Sun is only general and indifferent; becauſe modified by the mater it workes on, as it is evident by the colors in a Rain-bow, as alſo by the oppoſite effects it has on the waxe and clay. To ſuppoſe Gods concurſe to be thus General and Indifferent is every way unworthy of the firſt cauſe, which determines al ſecond cauſes, but is determined by none. To aſſert, that the concurſe of God is in the power of the ſecond cauſe or mater it workes on, what is this but to ſuppoſe the ſecond cauſe to be firſt and the firſt ſecond? (2) From the manifold imperfections that are hereby impoſed on God. For if the concurſe of God be only General and Indifferent, it then hangs in ſuſpenſe, and has not efficace enough to reach its effect, unleſſe it be ſo or ſo diſpoſed. Whence alſo it follows, that it is in the power of the ſecond cauſe to reſiſt or fruſtrate the concurſe of God, ſo that it ſhal not reach its effect. Hence laſtly it follows, that the concurſe of God is not efficacious and omnipotent, which we ſhal anon prove. (3) That the concurſe of God as to its manner of working is not general but particular is aſſerted and demonſtrated by ſome of the moſt acute of the Scholaſtic Theologues. So Bradwardine l. 1. c. 4. and l. 3. c. 7. Joan. major in Sentent. 2. Diſt. 28. q. 1. p. 122. Alvarez de Auxil. Diſput. 23. with ſeveral others.

But here it is objected, 1. by Burgerſdicius and others:Objections againſt Gods particular concurſe. (1) If God concur by a particular concurſe to the ſpecification of the action, then he may be ſaid to walke, diſcourſe, eat, &c. To this Objection we reſpond, [1] by denying, that God concurs to the ſpecification of the action, albeit he concurs by a particular concurſe: for an action is ſpecified from its particular cauſe, not from the firſt univerſal cauſe. So that here is that which they cal a fallacie of many interrogations, whereof one is true the other falſe. Or, we may cal it a begging of the Queſtion, in that they ſuppoſe, That, if p. 422God concur by a particular concurſe, he concurs alſo to the ſpecification of the action, which is an inconſequent conſequence. [2] Thoſe Animal acts of walking, eating, &c. aſcribed to the ſecond cauſe, cannot be aſcribed to God the firſt cauſe, albeit they more principally belong to him; becauſe they procede not from pure efficience, but from information, (to uſe the Ariſtotelean phraſe) or a bodie ſo organiſed. Thoſe actions ſignifie a relation to the particular ſubject whence they ſlow, and therefore cannot be properly attributed to God, as Bradward. l. 1. c. 4. p. 178. and Suarez Metaphyſ. Diſput. 21. S. 3. acutely replie, ſhewing that ambulation, eating, &c. do not denote pure efficience, but a ſubject informed by ſuch motions, which are therefore proper to the ſaid ſubject. (2) But the main objection of Burgerſdicius and others againſt Gods particular concurſe is taken from ſinful actions, unto which, ſay they, God cannot be ſaid to concur by a particular concurſe, unleſſe we make him the author of ſin. This objection makes a great noiſe, but has little of weight in it. For (1) The deordination of any ſinful act can only be aſcribed to the ſecond cauſe, who is the Author of it, not unto the firſt cauſe, who only produceth the phyſical entitative Act. [2] That which is moſt ſinful in regard of the ſecond cauſe, is ſo ordered by God, as that it ſhal conduce to the greateſt good, as before, and hereafter in the providence of God.

6.Gods Concurſe Efficacious. Gods concurſe is moſt Potent and Efficacious. This Adjunct and Mode of operation is moſt expreſſe in Sacred Philoſophie, ſpecially as to gratioſe Influences, which are moſt potent. Sin is a mighty ſtrong poiſon, ay but medicinal Grace is a much ſtronger Antidote. The powers of darkeneſſe and Hel are very ſtrong; but Chriſt the Captain of our Salvation, hath Samſon-like carried away the Gates of Hel upon his ſhoulders and led captivitie captive: His Grace is moſt potent, irreſiſtible, and victorions. Thus Janſenius, Auguſtin. Tom. 3. l. 2. c. 24. p. 43. having in what precedes ſufficiently refuted the Conditional Grace of the Molimſtes, he addes: This therefore is the true reaſon, why no medicinal Grace of Chriſt ever wants its effect, but al workes both to wil and to do; becauſe with Auguſtin Grace and the good worke are ſo reciprocated, that as from Grace conferred the effect of the worke may be inferred, ſo on the other hand, from the defect of the worke, it may be inferred, that Grace was not given. By which manner of reaſoning it appears, that Grace as the p. 423cauſe, and the operation of the Wil as the effect are, as the Philoſophers ſpeak, convertible, and mutually inſeparable each from other. For ſo Auguſtin ſpeakes of the Conflict againſt Tentations: Agis ſi ageris, & bene agis, ſi à…bono ageris: ſo efficacious is medicinal Grace. Yea Janſenins a voucheth, that there is no manner of ſpeech among the Scholaſtic Theologues ſo efficacious to expreſſe, that the determination, or predetermination of the Wil is from the Grace of God, but Auguſtin aſſumes the ſame, to demonſtrate, that the Grace of Chriſt is not ſuch, that the effect ſhould be ſuſpended or dependent on any condition to be performed by the human Wil, but that the effect is moſt potently produced by it, not if the Wil willeth, but by working and determining the Wil to wil. So Habak. 3.4.Habak. 3.4.Hab 3:4 And his brightneſſe was as the light: he had bornes coming out of his hand: and there was the hiding of his power. And his brightneſſe was as the light. The brightneſſe of Chriſt was exceding glorioſe, even like the brightneſſe of the Sun, in its meridian glorie. Thence it follows: he had hornes coming out of his hands. foreign properly ſignifies, to ſend forth beams as hornes, to irradiate and ſhine forth. Beams and hornes have ſome analogie and reſſemblance, and therefore the ſame word among the Hebrews ſignifies both. Hence the vulgar Verſion renders foreign Exod. 34.29, hornes, whereas it ſignifies there beams, as here. Whence it follows: out of his hands. Hands here denote Chriſt's power, as Act. 11.21. foreign hand ſignifies power, the hand being the inſtrument of the bodie, whereby it puts forth its power. Thence he addes: There was the hiding of his power: i. e. his ſecret power lay wrapt up in his efficacious rays, or concurſe, which is exceding influential and potent, like hornes. We find ſomething analogous hereto in Plato, Repub. 6. pag. 509. where treating of God as the firſt Cauſe of al good, he compares him to the Sun, and his concurſe to the rays thereof, in this manner: Thou wilt ſay, I preſume, that the Sun doth not only cauſe that things are ſeen, but alſo that they are generated, do grow, are nouriſhed: although it be not the generation of thoſe things. Thus therefore determine, that the chiefeſt good, [namely God] doth give to thoſe things that are known not only that they are known, foreign, but alſo force and efficace for their exiſtence, &c. Wherein he compares the efficacious Concurſe of God to the ſpermatic potent influxe of the Sun, which gives life, ſenſe, motion, nutrition, angmentation and vigor p. 424to al manner of Inſects. Whence thoſe blind Gentiles made the Sun, under the fictitious names of Apollo and his Son Eſculapius, the ſupreme God of Medicine; becauſe the Virtues of Plants depend on the Sun,See Court Gent. P. 1. B. 2. C. 8. §. 11. its heat and influence: whence they conſecrated the Laurel to Apollo, which ſignified with them the heat and influence of the Sun: the Laurel being a Plant, as they ſay, hot and alwaies green. Such a ſoverain efficace did the Grecian Philoſophers aſcribe unto the Sun, in regard of its influence, not only on Plants, but alſo on animal Bodies; and therefore it is deſervedly made by Plato a ſymbolic image of Gods efficacious Concurſe on al create Beings and Operations. Thus in ſacred Philoſophie we find Chriſt, as the firſt cauſe of al Grace, compared to the Sun, and his gracious influxe to the beams of the Sun. So Mal. 4.2.Mal. 4.2.Mal 4:2 But unto you that fear my Name ſhal the Sun of righteouſneſſe ariſe with healing in his wings, and ye ſhal go forth and grow up as calves of the ſtal. Chriſt here, as the firſt original Spring of al Grace, and compared to the Sun: whence he is ſaid, to ariſe with healing in his wings: i. e. his Beams: for the Beams of the Sun are its wings, whereby it conveighs an healing prolific influence to althings that have life. The Sun indeed vouchſafeth warme efficacious influences to al natural bodies, both vegetable and animal: it has an univerſal prolific influence on al ſublunarie bodies. Thence it's ſaid Pſal. 19.6.Pſal. 19.6.Ps 19:6 And there is nothing hid from the heat thereof: i. e. its warme benigne influxe reacheth, as ſome conceive, unto al natural effects, even to the very Minerals and Metals. But certain it is, that Vegetables and Plants are greatly influenced by the Sun.Job 8.16.Job 8:16 Hence that Job 8.16. He is green before the Sun. Whence is the beautie of Roſes, the delicious ſuavities of Fruits, the medicinal virtues of Herbes, the nouriſhment of Corne, the fatneſſe of Olives, the cordial and heart-reviving influences of Grapes, but from the Sun? So for the animal life, are not al Inſects produced by the Sun? Yea doth not the health, ſtrength, vivacitie, and comforts of mans bodie receive much influence from the efficacious beams of the Sun, as Job 30.28. Eccleſ. 11.7? Is not then the Sun, both in Sacred and Platonic Philoſophie, made an apt Symbol to repreſent the efficacious Concurſe of God as the firſt cauſe of althings, but more ſpecially of ſupernatural effects? O! what Soul-reviving influences are there in the warme beams of Divine concurſe? What univerſal, inexhauſtible, infinite treaſures of Divine light and heat are there in the Sun of Righteouſneſſe? p. 425Are not his beams the light of life, as Joh. 8.12. Pſal. 84.11? Such is the efficace of Divine concurſe. There is moreover a great emphaſe and elegance in that phraſe, Mal. 4.2. And ye ſhal go forth and grow up as calves of the ſtal: i.e. as weak, feeble Calves, which in the winter, by reaſon of the cold, are kept in the ſtal, at ſpring, when they go forth and ſport themſelves under the warme healing beams of the Sun, how greatly do they grow and thrive: ſo the ſick, infirme friends of Chriſt, when they lie under the warme, refreſhing, corroborating influences of his medicinal Grace. Yea, this efficacious ſoverain Grace doth not only cure infirme conſumtive Souls, but alſo give life to dead Souls. Thus Eſa. 9.2. The people that walked in darkeneſſe have ſeen a great light, Eſa. 9.2.Isa 9:2they that dwel in the land of the ſhadow of death, upon them hath the light ſhined. (1) This Prophecie refers to our Lords firſt Preaching among thoſe that inhabited the land of Zabulon and Nephthali, mentioned v. 1. and ſo applied Mat. 4.14, 15, 16. who were indeed, at the coming of our Lord, under very black Egyptian darkeneſſe: whence they are ſaid, to walke in darkeneſſe. (2) They are ſaid, to dwel in the land of the ſhadow of death. [1] foreign they that dwel denotes a fixed immobile ſtate, not only of ſuch as travel or paſſe throwo a countrie, but of inhabitants. Then [2] we have the place of their habitation, the land of the ſhadow of death. foreign of the ſhadow of death, whereby we may underſtand either a deadly ſhade, ſuch as by the dampe thereof ſtrikes dead; which is very frequent in ſome darke cavernes of the Earth: or elſe, by the ſhadow of death, we may underſtand the Grave, which is the darke ſhadowy habitation of the dead; as Job 10.21. the Grave is ſtiled the land of darkeneſſe, and the ſhadow of death. And look as dead men are loged in the darke, ſhadowy Grave; ſo were theſe dead Souls in the land of Zabulon and Nephthali loged in the Grave of ſin, under the darke, deadly ſhade thereof; which implies a total privation of ſpiritual light and life. Now (3) on theſe dead Souls dwelling in the Grave of ſin the light ſhined, i. e. Chriſt the Sun of Righteouſneſſe aroſe with healing under his wings, or warme beams of efficacious Grace. Yea, how oft doth this omnipotent heart quickening Grace picke out the worſt of ſinners as fit mater to exert its ſoverain efficace on?Eſa. 19.18.Isa 19:18 Thus Eſa. 19.18. In that day [i. e. when the Sun of Righteouſneſſe ſhal ariſe on Egypt with healing under his wings] ſhal five cities in the land of Egypt ſpeake the language of Canaan, [i. e. be converted to p. 426God] and ſwear to the Lord of Hoſtes: [i. e. bind themſelves inviorably to Chriſt, by an Oath of Allegeance and Supremacie] one ſhal be called the Citre of Deſtruction. foreign which we render the Citie of Deſtruction is rendred by Grotius, Gataker and other Critics, the Citie of the Sun, called by the Grecians who poſſeſſed it, Heliopolis; which the Hebrews expreſſed by Bethſenes, the houſe of the Sun, i. e. conſecrated to the Sun, their principal God, which was with al manner of idolatric Rites worſhipped in this Citie. For Herodotus aſſures us, that this Citie Heliopolis was one of the ſixe, unto which the Egyptians uſed at ſome ſolemne times to repair out of al parts, to celebrate the Worſhip of the Sun; becauſe here was their renowned Temple of the Sun; as alſo Mnevis one of their ſacred Buls, which they worſhipped as God, of which ſee Court Gent. P. 1. B. 2. C. 8. §. 9. Now this Heliopolis ſo much addicted to and immerſed in Idolatrie is made one of the principal objects, on which the Sun of Righteouſneſſe ſhould ariſe with healing under his wings or beams of efficacious medicinal Grace. So v. 22. And the Lord ſhal ſmite Egypt, he ſhal ſmite and heal it, and they ſhal returne even unto the Lord, &c. What! ſhal Egypt, yea the moſt idolatrous Citie of Egypt, Heliopolis, be healed by the ſoverain Grace of the Sun of Righteouſneſſe? O! what a potent demonſtration is this of the omnipotent efficace of medicinal Grace? May not this Argument be further promoved by a reflexion on theſe Britannic Iles and their prodigioſe Idolatrie, when the Sun of Righteouſneſſe at firſt aroſe on them with healing under his wings of Evangelic medicinal Grace?

But for the more ful explication and demonſtration of the officacitie of Divine Concurſe, we are to conſider, that there is a twofold Concurſe of God, one moral; the other efficacious; which ſome terme phyſic Concurſe, becauſe it workes according to the manner of phyſic Efficients. For a phyſic Cauſe is that which really and properly influenceth the Effect: but a moral Cauſe, as dictinguiſhed from phyſic, is that which contributes not any real and proper influxe for the production of the effect, yet he doth ſo far morally concur, as that the effect is imputed to him, as it's wel determined by Suarez, Metaph. Diſput. 17. Sect. 2. pag. 402. A moral cauſe doth not reach the effect immediately, neither doth it properly move and determine the Agent, but only objectively and remotely, by Commands, Arguments, Incentives, Motives, and ſuch like moral influences: which is only a metaphoric, p. 427indirect, remote, improper, and inefficacious kind of efficience. But now a phyſic Cauſe, is that which alone deſerves, and therefore in the Scholes has appropriated to it ſelf the name of an efficient Cauſe; becauſe it doth by a proper, real, direct, and efficacious influxe or cauſalitie reach its effect. God has both a moral and phyſic or efficacious concurſe in and for the production of moral good. He commandes, propones arguments, invites, perſuades what is good; as alſo efficaciouſly workes the ſame in thoſe he intendes to do good to. But as for ſinful acts God doth not by any moral concurſe concur thereto, and therefore they may not be imputed to him as the Author of them.

This being premiſſed, we procede to demonſtrate the efficacitie of Gods Concurſe. (1) From its ſoverain nature and omnipotent manner of working, ſpecially in ſupernatural, gratioſe effects. The efficacitie of actual Grace in the Infuſion, Conſervation, Promotion, and Actuation of Habitual is lively illuſtrated by the Grecanic Fathers of the Primitive Churches; who ſtile this efficacious medicinal Grace, foreign, the ſuperne or ſupernatural vocation and motion: they terme it ſometimes, foreign, the operant and cooperant Grace: alſo foreign, the Energie, Aide, and Aſſiſtence of God: foreign, the ineffable Virtue of God; foreign, the aſſiſtent Power. It's termed alſo by them, foreign, the ſuperne and Divine impulſe, or inclination; alſo foreign, the Divine hand; foreign, the Grace of protection; foreign, the univerſal Spring of Energie; foreign, of it ſelf perfect and ſufficiently operative: Chryſoſtome termes it foreign, a gift above nature overcoming nature: alſo foreign, inſuperable Aſſiſtence. But none among the Greek Theologues ſeems more lively to deſcribe it, than Cyril Alexandr. lib. 1. de Adorat. Tom. 1. where he aſſertes, That men are turned from ſin, foreign, not only by words injected into the Soul; [i. e. according to the Pelagian perſuaſion, by moral ſuaſion only] but that God puts forth foreign, an energetic efficacious Aide, whereby the infirme Wil is led as by the hand. Clemens Alexandr. l. 1. Paed. c. 3. cals it foreign, the Inſpiration of God: alſo foreign, the ſubtile and ſpirituale inſtructive force of Divine words. And Athanaſ. contr. Gent. foreign, the power communicated from God. Again he ſaith, foreign p. 428foreign, the Grace of God hath overcome. Whence the Greek Theologues termed it, foreign, the invincible Aſſiſtence. And Chryſoſtome ſaith expreſſely, that foreign, al good comes from the Grace and efficacious Virtue of God. (2) From its effective Principe, the Divine Wil. We have before, §. 3. demonſtrated, that the Divine Concurſe ſuppoſeth not any tranſient influxe form God, but only the act of the Divine Wil: which being omnipotent, it thence neceſſarily follows, that his concurſe is alſo omnipotent and moſt efficacious. Whence it is worthy our notice, that the Concurſe of God is in Scripture expreſſed by his fiat or word, as Gen. 1.3, &c. And what is this Word of God but the omnipotent Act of his Wil? Hence in ſacred Philoſophie, the Hebrew foreign, and Greek foreign, ſignifie both Word and Thing, denoting to us, that there is an intimate reciprocation between Divine Words and Things: whatever God ſpeakes and ſayes ſhal be done, is done: and whatever is done, is but the effect of his Word or Wil: every Word and Wil of God, which regardes the event and iſſues of things, is omnipotent and operative. (3) From the Determination of the ſecond cauſe by the firſt. Gods Concurſe is not only moral, by propounding objects and perſuading thereto; but really operative and productive of things. Now in al cooperation the cauſes cooperating are either coordinate or ſubordinate: the firſt and ſecond cauſe cannot be coordinate, but the later muſt be ſubordinate to the former: and if ſubordinate to, then it muſt be determined by the firſt Cauſe. It's certain, that either the ſecond cauſe determines the firſt, or the firſt the ſecond: and is it not more likely, that the firſt cauſe ſhould determine the ſecond, than that the ſecond ſhould determine the firſt to act? Can we imagine, that the concurſe of the firſt cauſe is in the power of the ſecond? Is it not more agreable to the Nature of God, and the condition of a Creature, to determine, that the cauſalitie of the ſecond cauſe is ſubordinate unto, and therefore determinable by the concurſe of the firſt cauſe? This argument is more fully managed by the Dominicans and Janſeniſtes. See Bradwardine de. Cauſa Dei, l. 3. c. 7. p. 669. Alvarez, de Auxil. l. 3. Diſp. 18-21. & l. 4. Diſput. 32. Janſenius, Auguſt. Tom. 3. l. 2. c. 22.

7.Gods Concurſe connatural. Laſtly, Gods concurſe, albeit it be moſt potent and efficacious, yet is it alſo moſt Connatural and Congenial: there is not more of force, than Divine ſuavitie mixed therewith. So Pſal. 110.3.Pſal. 110.3.Ps 110:3 Thy people ſhal be willing in the day of thy power. Willing. p. 429foreign willingneſſes. foreign nadib ſignifies (1) Free, ready, chearful, ſpontaneous. (2) Metonymically, a free gift or oblation. (3) Princes, who ought to be free-ſpirited, generoſe, liberal, as Luke 22.25 (4) The word is here uſed in the abſtract, which carries a great emphaſe: for abſtractes ſpeak eſſences. (5) It is here alſo in the Genitive caſe plural; [of thy willingneſſes] which the Hebrews uſe as expreſſive of a ſuperlative degree. So that the meaning is: thy people ſhal be in the moſt ſuperlative degree free, ready, willing, as Noble and Free-borne Princes, to offer up themſelves a Free-wil-offering, gift, or oblation unto thee. Hence efficacious Grace was termed by the Greek Fathers, foreign, the interne philtrum or charme: by Baſil, foreign, the Grace which is ſweetly received: by Chryſoſtome, Hom. 31. in Mat. foreign, an opportune vocation. Of which ſee more Court Gen. P. 2. B. 3. c. 9. S. 3. §. 12.Nihil Auguſtino certius eſt, quàm in Scripturis S. Gratiam illam efficacem, per quam ſolam operamur quicquid. boni operamur, nominedulcedinis, ſuavitatis, delectationis, nempe ſpiritualis & coeleſtis eſſe ſignificatam. Delectationi Dilectionem, Ardorem, Inflammationemque ſubnectit. Sunt emim effectus qui immediatè ex illa coeleſti ſuavitate germinant. Janſen. Auguſt. Tom. 3. De Grat. l. 4. c. 1. Ubi fuſiùs de ſuavitate hac ſpiriruali Gratiae Medicinalis tractat. So ſweetly doth Medicinal Grace Worke. And yet it workes nevertheleſs omnipotently: for ſo it followeth: in the day of thy power. foreign ſignifies (1) force, and ſtrength of bodie, or mind: and thence, (2) Metonymically, richeſſe or militarie Forces; becauſe in them men place their ſtrength, job 21.7. Pſal. 49.6. We may underſtand it in both ſenſes: (1) of Chriſts powerful, efficacious, heart-conquering Grace; which is the cauſe: or (2) for his powerful Forces and Armies; which are the effect of this Omnipotent day of Chriſt. Thus we ſee what an admirable combination here is of Divine Omnipotence, with human Libertie: how powerfully this medicinal Grace actes, and yet how ſweetly: it actes ſo Omnipotently, as if there were no room left for human Libertie; and yet ſo connaturally, and ſo ſweetly, as if there were not the leaſt dram of Omnipotence, and Force in it. Oh! what an omnipotent Suavitie, or ſweet Omnipotence is there in this Medicinal Grace? Who would not come under ſuch a ſilken, ſoft, ſweet violence as this is? Need we then fear, that any prejudice can befal human Libertie, ſo long as this Wiſe, Soverain, Soul-phyſician workes upon the Wil? Doth he not underſtand perfectly what are the proper anſae, or handles of the Soul, and ſo ſuit his Medicinal Grace thereto? Hath he not a key exactly ſitted to every lock, yea, to every ward in the lock of the wil? Is not his Medicinal Grace full of the deepeſt and highest reaſon, ſo that the Mind ſees all the reaſon in the world, why it ſhould embrace the offers made to it by Chriſt? And doth not the Wil, upon this Divine, heart-logic infuſed by Christ, move as freely, as chearfully, as connaturally, as if there p. 430were no power mixed with medicinal Grace? Doth not Chriſt take the Wil by the hand and teach it to go, as he did Ephraim, Hoſ. 11.3? and doth he not alſo draw it with cords of a man, Coeleſtis illa ſuavitas mollit viam ut voluntas ex carnaliu rerum viſco emergere poſſit, & ſeipſam in juſtitiam diligendam figere. Cum enim non poſſit morus niſi ab immobili fieri, ſuavitas illa immobilem quodammodo reddit animum, ut poſſit in motu liberum ſpiritalis voluntatis, ac dilectionem erumpere. Ex quo fit conſequenter, ut ſi illa deſit, voluntas veluti emortua ſit. Janſ. Auguſt. Tom. 3. de Grat. l. 4. c. 7.and hands of love, i. e. with rational arguments, and moral perſuaſions, as Hoſ. 11.4? Thus Eſa. 10.21. The remnant ſhal returne, even the remnant of Jacob to their mighty God. Here is a ſpontaneous chearful returne of back ſliding Iſrael; and yet it is to their mighty God, foreign the name given the Meſſias, Eſa. 9.6. Chriſt drawes them by a mighty power, and yet they returne as freely, as if there were no power and efficace put forth. So Eſa. 11.6, 10, 11. The like Eſa. 44. Having ſpoken v. 3. of the effuſion of the ſpirit of Grace, he addes what followed thereon, v. 5.—and another ſhal ſubſcribe with his hand unto the Lord, &c. A Metaphor taken from ſuch Volunteers as do freely and ſpontaneouſly with their own hand liſt and enrol themſelves under a General. So ineffable and admirable is the ſuavitie of efficacious Grace. Yea may we not conclude hence, that look by how much the more powerfully and invincibly this Medicinal Grace actes on the Wil, by ſo much the more connaturally, and ſweetly it actes? For hereby it determineth, confirmeth, and preſerveth the Wil in its highest Libertie, both of State, and Act. For what more natural to the Wil, than to adhere to its chiefeſt Good? Or when doth it act more freely, than when it is moſt peremtorily, most inviolably, and moſt immotably determined to love, and enjoy its beſt friend, and choiſeſt Good? Thus the Omnipotence, and Efficace of Medicinal Grace, is ſo far from deſtroying the Libertie of the Wil, as that it doth moſt effectually preſerve, confirme, and promote the ſame.