The Court of the Gentiles Part 2, Book 4 · Chapter 1

The Court of the Gentiles Part 2 · Book 4 · Chapter 1

p. 357CHAP. I. Of Ariſtotelick, or Peripatetick Philoſophie, it's Traduction from the Jews.

The traduction of Ariſtotle's Philoſophie from the Jews, proved 1. By Teſtimonies of Ariſtobulus, Clearchus, Clemens, Euſebius, Steuch. Eugub. Selden. 2. By rational Arguments; 1. Ariſtotle's converſe with Jews, or, 2. with their books; 3. his chief notions from Plato. 1. His Phyſicks: touching the firſt matter from Gen. 1.2. Gods being the first mover: the ſouls ſpirituality. 2. His Metaphyſicks, object. Adequate ens, Principal God; Gods providence, and the Souls ſeparate ſtate, why Ariſtotle rejected ſome Traditions of Plato. His Ethicks, and Politicks Jewiſh. Ariſtotle's Life, and Character; his Parallel with Plato. His Doctrines Acroatick, and Exoterick. His Works, which genuine, &c. His Succeſſor Theophraſtus. His Interpreters, Aphrodiſeus, &c. The Arabian Commentators followed by the Scholemen. The general idea of Ariſtotle's Philoſophie, and particularly; 1. Of Ariſtotle's Logick. 2. His Ethicks. 1. of mans happineſs, both objective and formal. 2. of the principles of humane Acts. 1. of the practick Judgment, or Prudence. 2. of Volition. 3. of Conſultation. 4. Of Election. 3. Of Voluntarineſs and Liberty, their identitie and combination with voluntarie intrinſick neceſſitie, &c. 4. Of Moral Good or Virtue, its genus, habit; its form, mediocritie; its rule, foreign, or the Law of Nature; its definition, &c. Of Sin, its foreign anomie, &c. 3. His Phyſicks. 4. His Metaphyſicks.

p. 358The Traduction of Ariſtotle's Philoſophie from the Jews proved, 1. By Teſtimonies of Ariſtobulus.§. 1. NExt to the Platonick, we ſhall mention the Peripatetick, or Ariſtotelick Philoſophie, which received no ſmall advantage, and improvement, from the Jewiſh Church, and Scripture; as we may both from Autoritative, and Rational Arguments juſtly conclude. As for Autorities, we have firſt that of Ariſt…bulus, a ſectator of Ariſtotle's Philoſophie, mentioned by Clemens Alexandr. foreign. 5. who brings in Ariſtobulus affirming, that Ariſtotle foreign, depended much upon Moſes's Law, and the other Prophets. So again, Clemens Alexandrinus foreign. 1. and Euſebius Praep. Evang. lib 9. Make mention of one Clearchus Solenſ…s, Of Clearchusa Diſciple of Ariſtotle's, who teſtifieth, that he ſaw a certain Jew, with whom Ariſtotle had converſation. Euſebius's words are theſe, foreign, &c. Clearchus a Peripatetick Philoſopher, in his firſt Book of Sleep, &c. In what follows Euſebius, (quoting Clearchus's own words) ſhews us, That whilſt Ariſtotle lived in the maritime Regions of Aſia, amongſt other Students of Philoſophie, there aſſociated himſelf to him a certain ſtudious Inquiſitive Jew, who converſing familiarly with Ariſtotle, and his Diſciples, foreign, (which according to Clearchus's relation, are Ariſtotle's words) he communicated more than he received. Then Euſebius addes: Honored Clemens makes mention alſo hereof in foreign ▪ 1. concerning which, he thus ſpeaks: foreign. Clearchus the Peripatetick, ſaies he, knew a certain Jew, who had converſation with Ariſtotle. Thus Euſeb. Praep. l. 9. f. 240. Edit. Paris 1544. Auguſt. Steuch. Eugub. abounds much in this argument;Aug. Steuch. Eugubinus. Namely, that the beſt parts of Ariſtotle's Philoſophie were derived originally from the Moſaick Theologie. Thus de Perenni Philoſoph. lib. 4. cap. 1. Eugubinus gives us Ariſtotle's confeſſion, That there was one God, who overraled not only heavenly Motions, but alſo the whole world, anſwerable to Moſes's Theologie. The ſame he confirms cap. 7.8.9. The like he proves of the Divine Beatitude, conſiſting in contemplation, as cap. 11.12.19. But more particularly cap. 20. he demonſtrates, how Ariſtotle confeſſing, that God created man and woman for the preſervation of man-kind, marvellouſly accorded with Moſes herein. For Ariſtotle in Oeconomicis, de Conjugio, ſhewing p. 359how neceſſarie Marriage is, ſaith, foreign, It was thus provided by the Divinitie itſel…, or God, that there ſhould be a Nature both of Male and Female for communion. Whence Eugubinus collects, That as Moſes ſaith, He created them male and female: ſo thou heareſt Ariſtotle in this place (which is a wonder) ſaying, That the Divinitie provided that there ſhould be Male and Female for communion, to the intent that Nature, which cannot ſubſiſt in one Individual, might be propagated by the ſucceſſion of ſpecies: Thou ſhalt ſee therefore in Aristotle, and wonder at the ſame, the ſame Theologie which is in Moſes, touching the creation of man, &c. Thus Eugubinus; who lib. 9. cap. 7. thoroughout Demonſtrates more fully, That Ariſtotle marvellouſly accorded with the Moſaick Theologie, touching mans creation by God, the formation of the bodie, the difference of Sex, and the Infuſion of the Soul from without. And in what follows cap. 8.9. He proves that Ariſtotle conceived the ſame, touching the immortalitie of the Soul. To which we may add the Teſtimony of Selden, (de Jure Nat. Gent. Hebraeor. lib. 1. cap. 2. fol 14.15.) where, having cited the Authoritie of Ariſtobulus, for Ariſtotle's traducing much of his Philoſophie from the Jews, he addes: And certainly there is yet extant an old comment of ſome Hebrews, affirming, That Aristotle being about to die, inſtructed his Diſciples touching the immortalitie of the Soul, alſo of its puniſhment, and reward, according as he had been taught by the peculiar Poſteritie of Shem, id eſt, by the Jews: al…o that having been admoniſhed by Simeon the Juſt (High Prieſt) he changed his old Opinions, in all points, wherein he had formerly held againſt the Law, and Doctrine of the Hebrews, and was tranſformed into another man. MSS: in the Library at Oxford. But albeit there is no ground, why we ſhould believe theſe Figments; yet hence it is ſufficiently evident, that there prevailed an opinion even amongſt the Hebrews themſel…es, of a ſingular communion, and commerce 'twixt them and the ancient Greek Philoſophers, as to the Traduction, and Reception of Sciences, whereunto the Chriſtian Fathers, Clemens Alexandrinus, Juſtin, Theodoret, Ambroſe, and others, are Conſonous. Thus Selden; who fol. 23. addes more of like import.

p. 360Rational Arguments. 1. From Ariſtotle's converſe with Jews.§. 2. But to come to ſome rational conjectures, whence we may with great probabilitie conclude, that Ariſtotles Philoſophie, as to its purer, and more Orthodox parts, was very much traduced from the Jewiſh Church, and Scriptures. If that prove true, which was even now mentioned, that Ariſtotle was in Aſia, yea in Syria, and Judea, (as we may preſume with Alexander) then we may eaſily be ſatiſfied, how he came to acquaint himſelf with the Jewiſh Learning, and Records. For if Ariſtotle attended Alexander unto Phenicia, and Judea, we cannot rationally conceive he would let paſs ſuch a people as the Jews were, ſo renowned for ancient Records and Wiſdom, without acquainting himſelf with their Principles and Doctrine, eſpecially they being thoſe, from whom his Maſter Plato received his choiceſt contemplations.2. Alexander's procuring him all Oriental Books. 2. But on ſuppoſition, that Ariſtotle was not in Judea with Alexander, yet 'tis credibly ſaid, that Alexander furniſhed him with all the choiceſt Books (yea, whole Libraries) that he could meet with in his Eaſtern Expedition: amongſt which, we may rationally conjecture the Jewiſh Records, and Books were not omitted: eſpecially if that be true, which Joſephus mentions of Alexander's coming to Jeruſalem, and vouchſafing particular honours and favours to the Jewiſh Nation,3. Ariſtotle's Philoſophie from Plato. &c. But 3. This is certain, that Ariſtotle received the more choice parts of his Philoſophie from his Maſter Plato, as we could eaſily demonſtrate, by multitudes of particulars, both in his Phyſicks, Metaphyſicks, Ethicks, and Politicks, wherein Ariſtotle follows Plato in many of his choicer Notions, foreign, though he cloaths them in his own Method. Now that Plato received his Philoſophie, both matter and form, for the chiefeſt part, from the Jews, and ſacred Scriptures, has been proved in the former Book.

§. 4. But to give a more full Demonſtration of the Traduction of Ariſtotles Philoſophie from the Jewiſh Church, and Scriptures originally, we ſhall give ſome brief touches on ſome of the more principal materials thereof. As 1. whence ſprang the choicer parts of Ariſtotle's Phyſicks, 1. Ariſtotle's Phyſicks from Plato, and both from Gen. 1.2. &c. Ariſtotle's firſt matter.Gen 1:2but from ſome Traditions imparted to him by his Maſter Plato. Thus Ariſtotle's notions about the firſt matter of all things, and its affections are evidently nothing elſe but ſome broken fragments of thoſe Traditions, which Plato had received originally from the Jewiſh Church, touching the firſt Chaos, or rude Maſs, out of which all things were at firſt created, as Gen. 1, 2. Hence it was p. 361that Ariſtotle ſtiles his firſt matter Informe, yet capable of any form; indeterminate, and indigeſted, a meer paſſive power, &c. which are notions exactly conform to the Moſaick deſcription, Gen. 1.2. as we have before demonſtrated. The ſame may be ſaid for Ariſtotle's two other principles, privation and Forme, Ariſtotle's firſt mover from Plato's deſcription of God.of which we have before treated in Plato's Phyſicks. Again Aristotle in his Phyſicks lib. 1. cap. 1▪ 2.3.6.7. as lib. 8. cap. 6.7.10. is very copious in his Philoſo…hizings on the firſt Mover; proving, that he is immoveable, one eternal indiviſible Being, void of all quantity, &c. wherein he exactly follows Plato, and the Scripture Revelation of God, as Joh. Grammaticus in Ariſtot. de anima. As to the humane Soul, (which takes up a good part of Phyſicks) Diogenes Laertius, in the life of Ariſtotle, aſſures us, that he held with Plato, foreign, that the ſoul was ſpiritual, Of the Soul its ſpirituality&c. The ſame is mentioned by Johan Grammaticus in his Preface to Ariſt. de Anima. This Plato received originally from the Jewiſh Church, as we have before proved, &c. Farther Ariſtotle ſeems to have had ſome Notices of the Soul's creation and infuſion by God.Ariſtoteles mirifice conſentit cum Theologia Moſaica, hominem à Deo conditum, formatum que corpus, datam que ſexus varietatem▪ animam autem exterius inſpiratam. Steuch. Eugubin. de Peren. Philoſ. l. 9. c. 7 Thus Steuch. Eugubinus de Pereu▪ Philoſoph. lib. 4. cap. 24. As Moſes ſaid, God breathed into his Noſtrils the breath of life, Gen. 2.7. So Ariſtotle, in libris de Generat. Animal. ſaies, that the mind came foreign from without. So Ariſtot. de Anima, having proved that it is imp…ſſible that the ſenſitive Soul ſhould come from without, becauſe it is conteined in the ſeed: he concludes of the mind. foreign, It remains that the mind alone be infuſed from without, and that it alone be Divine, whoſe operation communicates not with corporeous action. Whence the ſame Ariſtotle calls the mind foreign, moſt …kin to God. Yea, de Anima, lib. 1▪ text. 4. He makes the ſoul, foreign, to be impatible, and im…ixt, i. e. ſimple and incorruptible. So text 7. he ſaies, foreign, but the mind is ſeparable from the bodie, i e. incorporeous. See more Part. 1. B. 3. c. 7. §. 6. Yea, why may we not ſafely conjecture, that Ariſtotle received the chief Ideas of his Hiſtorie of Animals (which is his Maſter-piece) from Solomon's Books, which he writ of the Nature of Animals? 2.2. Ariſtotles Metaphyſicks from Plato. But we paſs on to Ariſtotle's Metaphyſicks, which indeed ſeem nothing elſe but ſome fragments, or miſcellaneous collections he had gathered up out of Plato's Philoſophie. For the chief object of his Metaphyſicks, he makes to be foreign, &c. ens quatenus ens; which is the proper p. 362notion whereby Plato (as Pythagoras before him) expreſſed God,Principal object of Metaphyſicks from Exod. 3.14.Exod 3:14 traduced originally from Exod. 3.14. as we have fully proved afore in Pythagoras's Metaphyſicks, chap. 8. §. 4. The ſimple affections of this foreign Ens, Being, Ariſtotle makes to be Ʋnity, Verity, and Bonity, The Affections of Ens, Ʋnity, Veritie, and Bonitie.which are the Affections, which Plato attributes unto God, and that in imitation of Jewiſh and ſacred Tradition as before. B. 2. C. 8. §. 4.5. Farther, that Ariſtotle had much knowledge of God, his ſpiritual Nature, and Providence, and that from his Maſter Plato's Philoſophizings,Ariſtotle's knowledge of God. we are informed by Diogen…s Laertius in his Life; where he tells us, that Ariſtotle conformable to Plato, defined God thus, foreign, God is a ſpirit. He alſo tells us,Touching Ariſtotle's Notions of God, and their conformitie to Moſes. See Steuch. Eugubinus de Peren. Philoſ. l. 4. c. 1.7.8.9. &c. that Ariſtotle held Gods Providence to reach foreign, even to Celeſtials, foreign, and that he was immoveable, b…t ordered earthly affairs, according to that ſympathie, or congr…ence they had to Celeſtials. Another piece of Metaphyſicks regards the Soul in its ſeparate State, whereof ſome think Ariſtotle had ſome notices. So Sir Kenelm Digby, in his diſcourſe of the Soul, fol. 431. firſt Edit. Eng.) If we (ſaith he) had Ariſtotle's Book, which he wrote of the Soul, upon the Death of his Friend Eudemus, it's very likely we ſhould there ſee his evident aſſertion of her immortalitie, The Soul ſeparated.&c. This ſome gather alſo from that paſſage, which is ſaid to drop from him whilſt he lay a dying, viz. O Being of Beings have mercy on me. A rational account why Ariſtotle rejected ſome of the more ſublime, and Myſtick Traditions of Plato.But to ſpeak what ſeems to be the truth in this matter: Though Ariſtotle was ready to entertain ſuch notions of God, and his Providence, as were agreeable to the model of his Reaſon, yet ſuch as depended purely on Tradition he rejected, as not agreeable to a Philoſopher. Hence, whereas Plato (as Pythagoras, and all the Philoſophers before Ariſtotle) held the production of the firſt matter by God; he aſſerted an Eternitie of Matter: and whereas Plato aſſerted that all things were made conformable to the exemplar of Divine Ideas, or Decrees; Ariſtotle not fully comprehending what Plato imperfectly received, and imparted, touching thoſe Divine Ideas, utterly expungeth them out of his Philoſophie. This therefore ſeemeth to be the genuine reaſon why Ariſtotle embraced not more readily thoſe greater, and more Divine myſteries of Jewiſh Wiſdom, as well as his Maſter Plato, and Pythagoras; becauſe they were matters of pure belief, p. 363above the reach of his natural Reaſon. Plato, as Pythagoras, converſing much in the Oriental parts, and (as we have endeavoured to prove) with many Jews in Aegypt, &c. They much recreated themſelves with any ancient Records, Traditions, or Reports of Divine matters, though never ſo myſterious, and above their capacities: But Ariſtotle giving himſelf up wholly to the government of his Reaſon, he confined himſelf to ſuch Tradit…ons, as would ſuit therewith, rejecting all other, which his corrupt Reaſon could not comprehend, or reduce to demonſtration. And he himſelf ſeems to give this as a reaſon, why he diſcourſed no more of things future, and Divine; becauſe (ſaith he, Eth. lib. 1. cap. 10.) foreign, what is future, is to us uncertain. He ſo much idolized his own Reaſon (which was indeed very Maſculine and Nervous) as that he ſlighted all Traditions, which carried not with them evidence, and Notices of their Truth. (This made him either wholly to reject, or elſe miſerably to adulterate the more ſublime, and Divine of Plato's Traditions). But 3.3. Ariſtotle'… Ethicks. As to Ariſtotle's Ethicks, there ſeems to be more evident Characters of their Traduction from the ſacred Jewiſh fountain originally, if not immediately, for all the Characters, he gives (Ethic. lib. 1. cap. 1.2. &c.) of the chiefeſt good, are the ſame, which Plato laies down: ſo alſo his Character of Friendſhip, Juſtice, Temperance, and other Virtues, are for the main (though not in the ſame method) derived from Plato, and we need not doubt, but originally from ſome ſacred Author, Solomon, or ſome other. 4. As for Ariſtotle's Politicks, 4. His Politicks from the Jews.great part of them ſeem to have much cognat…on with the Jewiſh Inſtitutes, and we may rationally conjecture, had their derivation thence: So Cunaeus (de Repub. Hebr. p. 21.) tells us, That Ariſtotle in his Books of Politicks, recites certain Edicts, compoſed by the moſt ancient Legiſlators, which are very like to the Moſaick In…titutes. For Oxylus, King of the El…ans, forbids his Subjects to Morgage their Fields for mony And the Locrenſes were forbid to ſell the poſſeſſions of their Anceſtors, &c. And in our former diſcourſe of Philologi…, touching the Original of Pagan Laws, we have proved their Traduction from the Inſtitutes of Moſes, &c.

§. 4.Ariſtotle's Life. But to proceed to ſomewhat a more general account of Ariſtotle, his Life, and Philoſophie, which peradventure may add ſome ſtrength to our particular Hypotheſis. Ariſtotle was born at p. 364Stagira, (belonging ſometimes to Thracia, but at Ariſtotle's birth under the Macedonian Empire) his Parents were Nicomachus, and Phaeſtis, according to that Greek Hexameter foreign. This Nicomachus was Phyſician to King Amyntas, who was Father to Philip, and Grandfather to Alexander the Great. Ariſtotle in memory of his Father, called his Son Nicomachus, to whom he writes his Ethicks, which were thence called his Nicomachia, to difference them from his Eudemia, and Magna Moralia. For Ariſtotle left three ſorts of Ethicks, as Voſſius. Albeit Cicero doubts, whether theſe Ethicks were not writ by Nicomachus himſelf: that this Nicomachus writ Books of Ethick…, is the affirmation of Suidas. Ariſtotle in the ſevent…enth year of his age went to Plato, whom he heard twenty years. After Plato's death, which was in the firſt year of 108 Olympiad (Speuſippus his Nephew ſucceeding in the Academy) Ariſtotle went to Hermias the Eunuch, King of Artana of Myſia, with whom he lived three years. After the death of Hermias, upon the requeſt of Philip, Ariſtotle came to Macedon, where having lived eight years with Alexander, he returned to Athens; And the Academic being praepoſſeſſed by Xenocrates, Ariſtotle made choice of the Lycëum (a place in the Suburbs of Athens, Peripatetici a foreign nominati ſectae ſuae conditorem & caput agnoſcunt Ariſtotelem, qui in Xyſto ſeu horto ambulationi accommodato docebat. Laert. lib. 5. Hornius Hiſt. Phil. l. 3. c. 15built by Pericles for the exerciſing of Souldiers) where he taught Philoſophie, walking conſtantly every day 'till the hour of Anointing, whence his Sect was called Peripatetick. Thus Laertius. So alſo Heſychius in Ariſtotle: foreign The Peripatetick Philoſophie was ſo termed from Ariſtotle, who began it in the Peripatum, or Ambulatorie. So Cicero Academ. 1. Thoſe who were with Ariſtotle, were called Peripateticks, becauſe they diſpated walking in the Lycëum. Ariſtotle taught Philoſophie in the Lycëum twelve years. But after the death of Alexander, who upheld him, ſome of his Emplators conſpiring againſt his Life, he left Athens, and went to Chalcis. He lived after the death of Plato 26 years, and died 63 years aged: Whereof ſee more in Laertius of his life, &c.

Ariſtotle's Character.§. 5. As for Ariſtotle's Character, we find him greatly applauded by the Ancients for his Ʋniverſal skill in Sciences. Plato himſelf (who is ſometimes invective againſt Ariſtotle) ſtiles him foreign, the p. 365Intellect of his Schole; as alſo foreign, the Philoſopher of Truth. Laertius lib. 5. ſaies, That he was a perſon of great Study, and incredible Invention. It is ſaid alſo, That he was the firſt that collected the diſperſed members of Philoſophie into one bodie, and Syſteme: he preſcribed in his Logick a certain form of Argumentation: he perfected Ethicks begun by Socrates: of Phyſicks he diſcourſed ſo accurately, as that he left all, even Plato himſelf behind him: he beſtowed moſt profitable indeavours in ſearching into the Hiſtorie of Animals, of which he writ almoſt 50 Volumns: as Pliny lib. 8. cap. 16. Quintil. lib. 12. cap. 11. & Hornius Hiſt. Philoſ. lib. 3. cap. 15. Quintilian lib. 10. cap. 1. makes this honourable mention of him: Why ſhould I mention Ariſtotle? whom I doubt, whether I ſhould account more famous for his knowledge of things, or for his copiouſneſs of writing, or for his ſ…avitie of ſpeech, or for his Acumen of Invention, or for his variety of Works. Plinie ſtiles him the Co…yphaeus in all Sciences. Arnobius lib. 3. adverſ. Gent. tells us, That Ariſtotle was a perſon of an excellent ingenie, and ſurpaſſing in Doctrine: Nay, is bold to ſtile him, One of an Ʋniverſal knowledge; yea, the meaſure or end of humane underſtanding. Hieronymus in Reg. Monach cap. 11. ſaies, Ariſtotle was the Prince of the Wiſe men, a Prodigie, and the grand Miracle in all Nature, who ſeems to have had infuſed into him whatever the humane ingenie was naturally capable of. And in cap. 3. Ionae, he atteſts, that there w…re certain honorarie pieces of braſs mony, ſtampt on the one ſide with Ariſtotle's Image, and on the other, with this Inſcription, Naturae Miraculum, the Miracle of Nature, as Hornius Hiſt. Philoſ. lib. 3, cap. 15. See a more ample Character of Ariſtotle's glorie, that he was too invective, and invidious againſt ſuch as differed from him, and not ſo candid in relating their opinion, as he ought to have been. This is evident from his ſmiſter treating Democritus, Parmemdes, yea, and his own Maſter Plato, who felt the ſtrokes of his cenſorious Rod, whence Laertius brings in Plato, complaining againſt Ariſtotle, that he was like a young Colt, that kicked againſt its Dam, &c. Indeed we have a juſt, and exact Character of Ariſtotle, in Caſ… ſpeculo Moral. Quaeſt. lib. 1. cap. 6. I conceive (ſaies he) Ariſtotle to be in refuting others a Camel, in Philoſophizing the Prince of all. I call him a Camel p. 366in refuting, becauſe he ſtrikes them with the heels of Envy, from whoſe dugs he ſucked the Nectar of Philoſophie. In Philoſophizing, I call him a Prince, becauſe he diſcourſeth ſo of the ſecrets of Nature, as none more acutely, he demonſtrates ſo, as none more accurately; he defends ſo, as none more ſtoutly. Wherefore, as in ref…ting others, he is ſcarcely to be ſaluted: ſo in his demonſtrating of things, I would have him to be embraced with both arms. If he refels (if I miſtake not) he doth either change the word, or invert the ſenſe, or feign a new one: and as Hercules with the Pygmeys, ſo Ariſtotle with a ſhadow, contends de lana caprina.

A compariſon 'twixt Plato, & Ariſtotle.§. 6. If we conſider Ariſtotle, comparatively with Plato, we ſhall find the learned very differing in their compariſons 'twixt the one, and the other. Some there are, who place Ariſtotle in many degrees of Preeminence above Plato, as the Scholemen univerſally do: Others there are, who give the Precedence to Plato, as ſome Fathers did. But if any degree of compariſon be lawful, I think that of Ludovicus Vives is moſt agreeable, who gives them each, though in different regards, a preeminence over the other. So Lud. Vives in Auguſt. Civ. lib. 8. cap. 12. The Greeks ſtile Plato foreign, the Divine, Ariſtotle foreign, the Daemon, or Intelligent. Ariſtotle, I had almoſt ſaid, excels Plato in the Science of Rhetorick, 1. As to Rhetorick.albeit Plato, Plato omnium Philoſophorum praecipuus uberē, amplam, uno verbo Ulyſ…eam orationē affectabat. Horn. Hiſt. Phil. l. 7. c. 14.without peradventure, ſurpaſſeth Ariſtotle in the exercitation and uſe thereof. For Ariſtotle alwaies loved brevity, both of things, and ſentences: therefore his great care was to admit of no ſupervacaneous word, Plato ſaid, that Xenocrates wanted ſpurs, but Ariſtotle his condiſciple a bridle, &c. As for Plato's Eloquence, it is thus characterized by Quintilian, lib. 10. cap 1. Plato was inveſted with a kind of Divine, and Homerick facultie of Orating: He ſwells much beyond Proſe, and that which the Greeks call Pedeſter Oration; ſo that he ſeems to me to be inſpired not with the ingenie of a man, but with a certain Delphick Oracle. Ariſtotle uſed an elegant Oration, but acc…rate, nervous, ſtrict, and next to an obſcure mode of ſpeech as Horn. Hi…t. Phil. lib 7. cap. 14 If we compare Ariſtotle and Plato in point of Logick, 2 As to Logick.and method of Philoſophizing, it is evident that Plato's Logick, or me…hod of Rat…cination, was more plain and familiar, mixed with many elegant illuſtrations and examples p. 367whereas Ariſtotle's method was more artificial, and accurate, conſiſting of more exact definitions, diviſions, and demonſtrations. Whence that Famous ſaying, Plato teacheth, Ariſtotle proves. Thus Keck. Tract. 2. praecogn. Logic. cap. 2. God has honoured the Peripatetick Sect only with this glory, that what Plato, and others handled, and delivered confuſedly, and imperfectly, without Method, and order, under the ſhadows of Metaphors, and Fables, the ſame things Ariſtotle firſt delivered unto mankind, under the form of a dext'rous Method well regulated, and whoſe parts are full, and complete. But if we compare them in regard of Metaphyſicks, and divine contemplations, its evident, yea,3. As to Metaphyſicks. confeſt, that Ariſtotle was far inferiour to Plato herein: And the reaſon is as apparent; for Plato delighting himſelf much in Jewiſh Traditions, which he had imbibed partly from the Pythagorean Philoſophie, and partly by means of his own perſonal converſation in the Oriental parts, he thereby obtained great notices of Divine Myſteries, eſpecially of ſuch as related to the origine of the Ʋniverſe, the ſpiritual nature, and perfection of God, the Immortality of the Soul &c. But Ariſtotle, as Simplicius obſerves of him, confining himſelf to the ſphere of his own Reaſon, would needs examine Divine matters by Nature, and admit nothing but what was grounded on Natures Light, or rather on his own corrupt Reaſon. Whence he rejected all ſuch Oriental Traditions, as would not ſtoop to his proud Ratiocination, Ariſtotle's Doctrines either Acroatick or Exoterick. Ariſtoteles horis matutinis legebat ea, quae ſubtilioris erant indaginis, ſive foreign; à meridie Exotericis dabat operam. Gell. l. 20. c. 4. Hornius hiſt. Phil. l. 7. c. 4.as before.

§. 7. Ariſtotle's Philoſophizings were (as 'tis preſumed) by himſelf diſtributed into foreign or foreign, Acroaticks, or Acroamaticks, and foreign Exotericks ▪ his Acroatick Doctrines he taught in the morning wa…king in the Lycëum, whereunto he admitted none but the choicer wits, or genuine Diſciples whence 'twas termed foreign; the Exotericks he taught in the evening, whence it was called foreign: theſe were more common. His Acroaticks contain his more ſubtile Philoſophie namely his Phyſicks, and Logick Diſceptations: his Exotericks comprehend his more vulgar Philoſophizings, and other Diſcourſes; as his Politicks, Ethicks, Rhetorick, and ſuch like. Thus Gellius, lib. 20. cap. 4. Ariſtotle' foreign were thoſe his Comments, which conduced to Rhetorick meditatations, the Facultie of wrangling, and the knowledge of Politicks. p. 368His foreign were thoſe, in which more remote, and ſubtile Philoſophie, was agitated, and which appertained to Phyſick Contemplations, and Dialectick Diſceptations. His Acroamaticks he read in the morning to h…s more ripe and choice Wits, but Exotericks promiſcuouſly without choice: whence the former were called foreign and foreign; alſo foreign, as the latter foreign ▪ according to Horn. Hi…t. Philoſ. lib 7. cap. 9. Lucian in his Dialogue inſcribed foreign, divides Ariſtotle's Writings into foreign Exotericks, & Eſotericks; whereof the latter are the ſame with his Acroaticks, which Amm…nius (in Ariſtotelis Categ.) ſaies, were ſo called, foreign becauſe he therein diſcourſed with his genuine and proper Diſciples. Theſe Acroaticks, he farther acquaints us, were foreign, delivered in his own perſon, namely foreign. In which he teacheth in his own proper perſon, his own Phaenomena, the which he endeavours to prove by the moſt exquiſite arguments, beyond vulgar Capacities. Plutarch in the life of Alexander tells us, that the Peripateticks called theſe more Myſtick, and weightie Doctrines foreign Acroamatick, and Epoptick: namely in alluſion, unto the Eleuſinian Sacreds; wherein thoſe who were initiated were for the firſt four years called foreign My…ticks: who ſtood on the threſhold before the Sacrarie, Illud non eſt praetermittendum, circa Ariſtotelis tempora, Grammaticam, quae vocatur Methodica. Philoſoph…ae adjunctam eſſe. Horn. Hiſt. Phil. l. 3. c. 15.but in the fifth year they had the privilege of being admitted into the inner Sacracy, there to contemplate the hidden Sacreds, whence they were ſtiled foreign contemplators. So in like manner the Secrets of Philoſophie which Ariſtotle delivered to his genuine Diſciples were termed foreign Epopticks. As for Ariſtotle's Exotericks, we have them thus explicated by Clemens Alexandr. foreign. His Dialogicks are ſuch, as he writes not in his own perſon, but, as Plato, induceth other perſons ſpeaking; which are alſo called Exotericks becauſe they were written for the benefit of the vulgar ſort. See Voſſius de Philoſ. Sect. cap. 17. §. 9.

Ariſtotle's works what genuine, what not?§. 8. By what has been mention'd of Ariſtotle's Dialogicks as alſo by Laertius's Catalogue of his Works, we may judge how many of his books have periſhed. For amongſt all Ariſtotle's Works we fi…d none written in a Dialogick Style, though it be generally confeſt, p. 369he writ many Dialogues: ſo Cicero to Lentulus ſaies, that he had poliſhed his 3 books of an Orator in a Dialogick Strain, after the Ariſtotelick mode. Such alſo were Ariſtotle's Sophiſta, & Menexenus, which treated of Morals, and are mentioned by Laertius; likewiſe his Nerithus, and Gryllus which treated of the Oratorian Art: alſo his Eudemus or Dialogue of the Soul. All Which Dialogick Diſcourſes, referred by Cicero, and others to Aristotle's foreign Exotericks are not now to be found. Yet we may not conclude with Caelio Eurio the Second, that there remain extant only three genuine pieces of Ariſtotle, viz his Hiſtorie of Animals, his book of the World, and his Rhetorick to Alexander: For there are many other pieces of Ariſtotle, which carry with them evident notices of his ſpirit; as his book foreign, alſo his foreign, both the one and the other; his books foreign, and thoſe of the Soul, &c. Yet 'tis very probable, that the book of the Ʋniverſe, reckoned amongſt Ariſtotle's Works, was not his, becauſe it has too orthodox ſentiments of God, his Providence, and Gubernation, which Ariſtotle ſeems not to approve of. Alſo that other piece of Rhetorick to Alexander, mentioned by Caelio Curio, is ſuppoſed not to be Ariſtotle's but Anaxamines Lampſacenus's who alſo was maſter to Alexander the Great, as Voſſius de Philoſoph. Sect. cap. 17. §. 13.

§. 9.Ariſtotele's books how conveighed to poſteritie. Ariſtotle dying left his Librarie of books to Theophraſtus his ſucceſſor: Theophraſtus leaves them to Neleus who was alſo Diſciple of Ariſtotle, as Laertius tells us. Neleus ſells them to Ptolomaeus Philadelphus, who transferred them into his Alexandrine Librarie, as Athenaeus lib. 1. Thus Iſ. Caſaubon. in Athen. lib. 1. cap. 2. Ariſtotle's Librarie was firſt poſſeſſed by Theophraſtus: whence it by Teſtament deſcended to Neleus. The ſtory is known out of Strabo, Plutarch, Diogenes. You may learn out of Strabo, how true it is, that Ptolomie bought the books of this Philoſopher from Neleus, or his poſteritie, &c. Thus Caſaubon. we have the words of Strabo lib. 13. foreign. Ariſtotle was the firſt, that we know of, who collected books, and taught the Kings of Egypt to erect a Librarie. That Ariſtotle was a great affector of books, appears by an obſervation of Gellius lib. 3. cap. 17. who tells us,Hornius Hiſtor. Phil. l. 3. c. 15. that Ariſtotle paid 3 Attick talents for ſome few books of Speuſippus the Philoſopher, &c. What is ſaid of Ptolemie's buying Ariſtotele's books of Neleus ſome underſtand of p. 370his Library onelyonly: For thoſe books, which Ariſtotle writ himſelf, 'tis reported, that Neleus retained them for himſelf, and tranſmitted them to his poſteritie, who being not learned kept them under keys, without uſe. Hence Strabo calls them foreign, books lockt up. Yea, 'tis ſaid, that they, fearing leaſt the Kings of Pergamus (who erected a great Librarie, which was afterwards by Cleopatra's means transferred to Alexandria) ſhould take them away, hid them long under ground, which brought no ſmall damage to theſe Books; for hereby they grew mouldy, worm-eaten, moth eaten, &c. After this Apellico Teius buyes them, who being as Atheneas characterizeth him **foreign, rather than foreign.more bookiſh then learned, cauſeth theſe worm-eaten books of Ariſtotle to be tranſcribed and made publick, but without judgement, or fidelity. After his death Sylla (about 200. years after Ariſtotle's death) poſſeſſing Athens, takes theſe Books, and ſends them to Rome (as Plutarch in Sylla) where Tyrannio Grammaticus, a great Student in Ariſtotle, obtained from the Keeper of the Librarie, the uſe of them. And the Bookſelle…s got theſe books tranſcribed, but by unmeet Librarians, and ſuch as would not ſo much as compare their Tranſcripts with the Original Exemplar. Whence Ariſtotle's Books received farther detriment.Plutarch. in Sylla. This Tyrannio delivered over theſe Books to And…onicus Rhod…us, who was the firſt that took care for the more exact tranſcribing of Ariſtotle's Books into many Exemplars▪ in order to the publication of them. Thence men began to diſpute more about Acroaticks, whereas in the foregoing time, even from the deceaſe of Theophraſtus (by reaſon of the ſcarcitie of Ariſtotle's choiceſt pieces) they were wont to diſpute onelyonly about Exotericks probably, &c. As Voſſius de Philoſoph. Sect. cap. 17. §. 11. Though indeed to ſpeak the truth, Ariſtotle came not to be in ſo general repute till Alexander Aphrod ſeus began to enterpret him;Ariſtotle's Succeſſors, Theophraſtus, &c. Apud Theophraſtum graviter elaborata eſt Philoſophia. Pic. Mirandul. in Apol. 90. Thes. as hereafter.

§. 10. Ariſtotle's Succeſſor was Theophraſtus Ereſius, who was firſt called Tyrtamus, but afterward, by reaſon of his (as they phraſed it) Divine Eloquence, was by his Maſter Ariſtotle named Theophraſtus. Thus Strabo lib. 13. foreign. Theophraſtus was firſt called Tyrtamus; p. 371for Ariſtotle firſt called him Theophraſtus, both to avoid the aſperity of his former name, as alſo to ſignifie the excellence of his eloquence: for Ariſtotle made all his diſciples eloquent, but Theophraſtus moſt eloquent. See the ſame in Diogenes Laertius, Heſychius Illuſtris, and Suidas. Theophraſtus being a perſon greatly eſteemed for his Learning, and Eloquence, had a huge confluence of Diſciples, at leaſt Auditors, to the number of 2000, as Laertius, and Heſychius. He does in ſome things differ from his Maſter Ariſtotle: as in Meteors, touching the efficient cauſe of the Rains; alſo concerning the cauſe of the Oblique Winds, the matter of hot and dry Exhalations, the original of the ſaltneſs of the Sea, &c. Theophraſtus ſeems to write of ſome things more exactly than Ariſtotle; as of other things, which are not mentioned by Ariſtotle. He has excellent Phyſick diſcourſes of Plants, of the Winds, of Fire, beſides many choice Moral characters. The greatneſſe of his worth, is ſufficiently diſcovered in Ariſtotle's choice of him for his …ucceſſor. For Gellius lib. 13. cap. 5. tells us, That Ariſtotle about the time of his departure, being demanded whom he would have for his Succeſſor, whether Theophraſtus Leſbius, or E…demus Rhodius? commanded them to bring him two ſorts of Wi…e, the Rhodi…, and Lesbian; and having taſted of both, he replye… the Rhodian wine was very good, but the Leſbian was ſweeter: by which lepid, and pleaſant anſwer, he diſcovered his pre… on of Lesbius Theophraſtus, before Eudemus Rhodius. The Auditors of Theophraſtus were Strato Lampſacenus, and Demetrius Phalereus. Strato was ſucceeded by Lycon Troadenſis, Lycon by Ariſto Ceius, Ariſto by Critolaus Phaſilites, Critolaus by Diodorus, and he by Neleus.

§. 11. Amongſt the Commentators on Aristotle, Alexander Aphrodiſeus the chief commentator on Ariſtotle.Alexander Aphrodiſeus has the precellence given him by the Learned, and that both for his Antiquity, th…re being none of Ariſtotle's Enterpreters more ancient (ſave Herminus, whoſe Commentaries are all, except a few fragments, loſt) as alſo for his intimate acquaintance with Ariſtotle's mind, and firm adherence thereto. For as for the other Commentators, they either take part with Plato, wherein he differs from Ariſtotle, as Simplicius; or elſe they endeavour to reconcile Aristotle with Plato, as Ammonito, &c. whereas Alexander Aphroſideus follows Ariſtotle foreign, and defends h…m p. 372ſtoutly againſt the Stoicks, and other Sects. Whence it was, that Plotinus was wont for the underſtanding of Ariſtotle, to conſult Alexander, as Porphyrie in his Life: and the Greeks call him, foreign, the great Enterpreter. Cyril alſo againſt Julian, ſtiles him the Lover of Ariſtotle, and the moſt diligent, and moſt acute of all the Philoſophers. Whence alſo the Arabian Commentators, Averroes, Avicenna, &c. make moſt uſe of him in their Illuſtrations, and Commentaries on Ariſtotle: Yea, to give him his juſt praiſe, Ariſtotle came not upon the Stage to be Maſter of the Scholes, till this Alexander, by his learned Commentaries, advanced him into the Chair, as it is well obſerved by Lud. Vives in Auguſt. Civit. lib. 8. cap. 10. From the times of Plato and Aristotle, even to Alexander Aprodiſeus, who lived under the Emperors, Severus, and his Son (about 210 years after Christ) Aristotle was named, rather than read, or underſtood by the Learned. This Alexander was the firſt that attempted to enucleate, and enterpret Ariſtotle, who greatly promoted others in their Studies of, and Inquiſitions into Ariſtotle. Yet all this while Plato continued more frequent in the hands, and more underſtood by the minds of men. But here we muſt know, that many of thoſe Commentaries, that paſs under Alexander's name, are ſpurious. His genuine Comments are on Aristotle's Meteors, &c.

Greek Commentators.§. 12. There were alſo amongſt the Greeks others, who Commented on Aristotle: as (not to mention Porphyrie his foreign on Aristotle, becauſe he was a Platonist) 1. Themistius Sirnamed by reaſon of his Eloquence,Themiſtius. Euphrades: who lived in the times of Constance, Jovinian, Valens, and Valentinian the Emperors, to whom he dedicated ſeveral Orations yet extant (Augustin calls him his Maſter) 2. Olympiodorus the Alexandrian Philoſopher, Olympiodorus.who flouriſhed about the year 480, and was, according to Suidas, Praeceptor to Proclus Lycius, Proclus.and Auditor to Syrianus, &c. 3. Proclus Lycius Sirnamed foreign, who ſucceeded in the Platonick Schole, and was (as Porphyrie before him) a bitter Writer againſt the Chriſtians. 4. Johannes Grammaticus Sirnamed Philoponus, Philoponus.who anſwered Proclus, and was a great propugnator of the Christian Religion, as well as an excellent Commentator on Aristotle. 5. Ammonius ▪ Ammonius.who was a Diſciple of Proclus Lycius, and a clear Commentator on Aristotle, though he does oft Platonize. 6. Simplicius, Simplicius.who flouriſhed under p. 373Justinian the Emperour, and was very invective againſt Johannes Grammaticus, yet an excellent Interpreter of Aristotle, albeit he doth Platonize. We find a good, though conciſe character of theſe Commentators on Aristotle in Pici Mirandulani Apologia 90. Philoſophie among the Grecians remains very beautiful and chaſt; She is in Simplicius very rich, and copious; in Themistius elegant, and compendious; in Alexander, conſtant and learned; in Theophrastus greatly elaborate; in Ammonius clear, and gratious.

§. 13. After the Grecians followed the Arabian Commentators on Aristotle;Arabians. amongſt whom the principal place is given to Aven-rois, or Averroes, Averroes, &c.who flouriſhed in Spa…n, an. 650. and had undoubtedly proved a better Commentator on Aristotle, had he been better acquainted with the Greek Tongue. He was alſo a Famous Phyſician, as well as Philoſopher, but no friend to the Chriſtians; yet have the Scholemen made his Comments on Aristotle, Which are followed by the Schole-men.the foundation of all their Schole-Divinity. Hornius Histor. Philoſoph. lib. 5. cap. 10. gives us this account of theſe Arabian Commentators on Aristotle. We will begin with Avicenna, who attained unto ſo much by his labour, that he alone may carry the bell among Aristotle's Commentators: neither does any ſeem to reach the mind of the Philoſopher, as Avicenna, whom his diligent tranſlator Andr. Alpagus calls Ebeuſina. He was ſo addicted to Aristotle, that many relate he got all his Metaphyſicks by heart. He had for his Contemporarie Averroes the Arabian, who lived at Corduba in Spain, and had great conteſts with Avicenna, and albeit both profeſſed themſelves Sectators of Aristotle, yet they thought nothing true, which each other affirmed. Averroes writ of many parts of Aristotle, and that with ſo great an acumen, that he hath obtained the repute of the moſt learned Interpreter, and the title of Commentator, foreign. From whom the latter Scholemen have borrowed many things. That the Scholemen extracted the moſt of their Philoſophick notions and distinctions (which they make the foundation of their Scholastick Theologie) not immediately out of Aristotle, but out of the Arabians, Averroes, Avicenna, &c. his Commentators, is evident to any that acquaints himſelf with the original of Schole Divinity, which began in the Pariſian Scholes about the twelfth and thirteen Centuries, by Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, Scotus, &c. amongſt p. 374whom Averroes was greatly in repute.Eſt Arabica gens, uti patrii ſoli, ita & linguae ſuae amans. Igitur cum incidiſſent in ſcripta Ariſtotelis Graeca, jam pene apud ipſos Graecos ignota, caeperunt inde qu…dam, mox plera que vertere in Patriam linguam. Hornius. Hiſt. Philoſ. l. 5. c. 10. Verulam in his Novum Organum ſpeaks truely; that theſe Schole-men, beſides their reduction of Theologie into an order, and forme of Art, have over & above cauſed Ariſtotle's Eriſtick, and ſpinous Philoſophie to have been, more than it ought, incorporated into the bodie of Religion. And in all Ariſtotle's name is pretended, albeit they rather follow his corrupt Interpreters and Commentators. For the Arabians, from whom the Schole-men drew all their ſubtilties being wholly ignorant of the Greek, and well nigh of the Latin, were fain to make uſe of Verſions very ſhort of, and in many points quite differing from the original ſenſe of Ariſtotle, &c.

§. 14. Having given this general Idea of Ariſtotle his Life, and ſucceſſors, we ſhall now treat ſomewhat more diſtinctly and particularly of his Philoſophie, according to that reduction and account we find thereof in Ammonius, Jo. Grammaticus, and others. Ammonius in Ariſiot. Categor. pag. 6. treating of Ariſtotle ſaie… foreign.A general Idea of Ariſtotle's Philoſophie. Thus Ammonius which we may Engliſh thus. This Ariſtotle was in his Morals exact even to an hyberbole; In Philoſophie he exceeded humane Meaſures, leaving no part thereof untouched, but adding much thereto from his own ſagacitie, he reformed the whole of Philoſophie, for he added unto Logick by differencing, or ſeparating the Canons from the things, as alſo by framing Demonſtrative Method. For thoſe, who preceded him, knew how to demonſtrate, but how to frame Demonſtrations they knew not; as it is with thoſe, who cannot make ſhooes, yet can uſe them when made. To Phyſicks he added the fifth Eſſence. As for Theologie, albeit he added nothing thereto, yet left he nothing unattempted therein. For he knew not terreſtial things only, as ſome conceit, but alſo ſupernaturals, as it appears by his fifth book of Phyſick Acroaticks, where he ſaies p. 375that the firſt Cauſe is not moveable either by it ſelf, or by Accident: whence he demonſtrates that the Divine Being is neither a bodie, nor paſſible. This laſt expreſſion of Ammonius, touching Ariſtotle's owning God to be the firſt immobile cauſe of all things, is confirmed, and explicated more fully by Johannes Grammaticus in his Proaem. in Ariſtot. de Anima fol 10. as hereafter.

§. 15.The end of Ariſtotle's Philoſophie the knowledge of God. Hence Ammonius makes this the ſupream end of Ariſtotle's Philoſophie to lead men to the knowledge of the firſt cauſe, God, &c. ſo Ammon. in Ariſt. Categor. pag. 11. treating of Ariſtotle's Philoſophie he demands foreign; what is the ſupream end of Ariſtotle's Philoſophie. To which he replies foreign, we ſay, that the end of his philoſophie is to know the principle of all things, the productive cauſe of all things, which is alwaies the ſame; for he demonſtrates that the principle of all things is incorporeal, by which all things are produced. Thence Ammonius demands foreign; what are the means that conduce us to this end? to which he anſwers foreign. We ſay the means conducing to this end is the doctrine or knowledge of things exiſting in time and mutation: for by theſe things, together with the Mathematicks, we lead our ſelves into the knowledge of the firſt cauſe of all things.

§ 16.Ariſtotle's mode of Philoſophizing ſimple. Thence Ammonius paſſeth on to diſcourſe of Ariſtotle's mode of Philoſophizing. pag. 12. foreign, &c. The forme of Ariſtotle's writings is every way exact as to phraſe. For the Philoſopher ever avoids Rhetorical flouriſhes, and wholly endeavours to ſet forth the nature of things only. Ariſtotle being reſolved to reduce Philoſophie to rules of Art, and reaſon, utterly rejects that Mythologick, Symbolick mode of Philoſophizing, which his Predeceſſors Thales, Pher… cydes, Pythagoras, and Plato had introduced; confining himſelf to a more ſuccinct, and accurate method. Whence alſo he rejects all thoſe more obſcure Jewiſh Traditions, which Pythagoras, and Plato ſo much delighted themſelves in, with reſolution to admit nothing but what he could make ſtoop to evident reaſon, or clear Teſtimony. p. 376So in his Ethicks lib. 2. cap. 2. foreign, we ought in matters doubtfull to uſe clear teſtimonies: whereby he cuts off all thoſe obſcure, and broken Traditions, which his predeceſſors admired, and together with their traditions their Symbolick mode of Philoſophizing alſo.

The Character of a genuine Auditor.§. 17. The ſame Ammonius gives us (pag. 12.) a good character of ſuch, as are genuine Auditors, and Expoſitors of Ariſtotle foreign. The genuine Auditors of Ariſtotle ought by how much the more obſcure the things ſpoken are, by ſo much the more earneſtly to contend, and ſearch into the depth thereof. An Auditor ought to be juſt; of a good natural capacitie for ratiocination; virtuous in his Diſcourſes; Exact in his morals;The Character of a good Expoſitor. and in all things very well adorned. Thus Ammonius, who proceeds to give his character of a good Expoſitor of Ariſtotle: foreign. He, that will expound the things ſpoken by Ariſtotle, muſt not through too favorable inclination, undertake to commend things ill ſpoken, and receive them as from a Tripos or Oracle; neither muſt he receive things good in an ill manner, after the Sceptick mode; but as to the things ſpoken he muſt carry himſelf as a Judge without Paſſion; and firſt of all he muſt explicate the mind of the Ancient, and expound their proper ſentiment: afterward he muſt bring his own judgement concerning the ſame.

The Diſtribution of Ariſtotle's Philoſophie.§. 18. But to come to the Diſtribution of Ariſtotle's Philoſophie; which Ammonius in Arist. Categ. pag. 11. gives us thus: foreign. p. 377Philoſophie is divided into two parts, Theoretick, and Practick. As for Theoretick, that is ſuch, wherein he inquires concerni…g Truth, and Falſehood: Practicks are ſuch, wherein he conſiders concerning Good, and Evil. And becauſe there is a great diſpute amongſt men touching Good, and Evil, as alſo touching Truth, and falſehood; it ſeemed good to him (viz. Ariſtotle) to give us a Diacritick or Diſcretive Inſtrument to meaſure theſe things by, which is Demonſtration. Now Demonſtration is nothing elſe but a demonſtrative Syllogiſme. For as the Carpenter uſeth his Rule as an Inſtrument, whereby to diſcerne what timber is crooked, and what streight, and as a Builder uſeth his Square, to diſcover what wals are right, what not: ſo Philoſophers, make uſe of Demonſtration as a Rule, whereby to diſcerne things. Ammonius having thus diſtributed Philoſophie into its general parts, Theoretick and Practick, and laid down the Ʋniverſal Inſtrument of both, which is Logical Demonſtration, he thence proceeds to diſtribute theſe Generals into their Severals thus foreign. They diſtribute Theoreticks into Phyſiologicks, Mathematicks, and Theologicks. As for his Theologicks, they are ſuch, as he writ after his Phyſick Exercitations, which he undertook after his Phyſicks, becauſe it is proper to Theologie to teach things above Nature (whence his Theologicks are termed Metaphyſicks) and theſe Natural Sciences are accordingly called Phyſicks. Mathematicks are of a middle nature being in ſome regard ſeparate from matter, and in ſome regard inſeparate. As for Practicks, they are diſtributed into Ethicks, Oeconomicks, and Politicks. Thus of the Parts of Philoſophie.

§. 19. Having gone through the general Diſtribution of Ariſtotle's Philoſophie, it may not be amiſſe to touch a little on the Severals, and ſuch obſervables therein, as may deſerve a more particular remark. We ſhall begin with Ariſtotle's Logick, Ariſtotle's Logick and it's diſtribution by Ammonius.which he makes to be foreign a Diſcretive or differencing Organ to all the parts of Philoſophie; ſo Ammonius in Ariſt. Categ. pag. 8. The Stoicks, ſaies he, make Logick a part of Philoſophie, whereas all thoſe of the Peripate make it an Organ, &c. Ariſtotle in ſtiling his Logick an Organ, means nothing elſe, but that it is a method, or a key to all Sciences: ſo Ammonius p. 378in Ariſt. Categ. pag. 13. foreign. Dialectick as Ariſtotle defines it, is a Syllogiſtick way of Procedure about whatever Problem propoſed, from probable Topicks. What Ammonius here appropriates to Dialectick, which the Peripateticks make but a Part of Logick, is equally applicable to the whole thereof. But we have a more full, though conciſe, account of Ariſtotle's Logick given us by Ammonius in Ariſt. Categor. pag. 15.16.17. Which, becauſe the Book is very rarely to be found, and the Author ſcarcely known to young Students, we may not deem it loſt labour to give them his own words, which are as follow foreign. As the carpenter uſeth his Rule, and the Maſon his Squares to diſtinguiſh what is right, and what is not: ſo the Philoſopher uſeth Demonſtration for diſtinguiſhing of Truth, and Falſehood, Good, and Evil. Now Demonſtration is a Scientifick Syllogiſme. But it is impoſſible to treat hereof, unleſſe we firſt declare what a Syllogiſme is; neither can we underſtand, what a Syllogiſme is, unleſſe we learne, what a propoſition is: For Propoſitions are certain words; and of theſe words a Syllogiſme is but a collection. So that it is impoſſible to know, what a Syllogiſme is, without underſtanding propoſitions: for of theſe it is compoſed. So neither is the Propoſition to be underſtood without underſtanding the names, and words of which every diſcourſe conſiſts. Neither are the Names, and words without ſimple voices: for each of theſe is a Significative voice. p. 379It is therefore neceſſary in the firſt place to treat of ſimple voices; of which Ariſtotle diſcourſeth in the Categories. Thence of names and words, and propoſitions, as in Aristotle's book of Interpretation. After this of Syllogiſm ſimply conſidered, as in his firſt Analyticks: then of Demonstration, as in his latter Analyticks. Now the order of this Diſpoſition is manifeſt from the ſcope: for things ſimple ought to precede things compound: and the Doctrine of the Categories is of all moſt ſimple, becauſe as 'tis ſaid, it treats of ſimple voices, ſignifying ſimple things, by means of ſimple notions intervening. Thus Ammonius of Ariſtotle's Logick.

§. 20. We may reduce the whole to this Scheme. A Scheme of Logick.Logick may be conſidered, eith…r in regard of its object, or formal parts. As for the object of Logick, 'tis either material, or formal: The material object of Logick, is foreign, every Intelligible, which is either ſimple, or complexe. The ſimple object of Logick, are all thoſe Notions, both firſt, and ſecond, treated of by Ariſtotle in his Praedicaments, and by Porphyrie in his Praedicabiles. The Complexe object of Logick is compoſed either of ſimple notions, and terms, as a Propoſition, or of Propoſitions as a Syllogiſme. As for the formal object of Logick, or the mode under which it conſiders all Intelligibles, it is as they are means to direct the underſtanding in the diſquiſition of Truth, whence reſult the formal parts of Logick, The parts of Logick.which may be reduced to theſe four general Organs. 1. Definition, which takes away the obſcuritie of our ſimple apprehenſion, by directing the underſtanding to penetrate into the eſſences and natures of things. 2. Diviſion, which removes that foreign, or confuſion, which our compound underſtanding labours under, by reducing all things to their proper Genus, ſpecies, and formal differences, &c. 3. Syllogiſme, which clears the foreign, or diſcurſ…ve Intellect from thoſe errours, and heſitations, which remain thereon. 4. Method, which directs and facilitates the underſtanding in all the foregoing parts; and therefore 'tis made by ſome of the Ancients to comprehend all Logick, &c. So Ariſtotle: 'tis not our work to diſcourſe accuratelie on theſe parts of Logick. It may ſuffice to give ſome glances, and that not from Aristotle's Organ (where he diſcourſeth profeſſedly of theſe Logick Instruments) but from other of his Works, eſpecially his Rhetorick, wherein we find ſome oblique reflections hereon. And to begin firſt with Definition; Ariſtotle Rhetor. p. 380lib. 2. cap. 13. (pag. 218.) tells us in general; foreign, what is not defined, is fallacious, and in his Ethicks, lib. 1. cap. 7. foreign, &c. They muſt take care, that they define accurately, for this has a great influence on what follows. 2. The like Ammonius (in Arist. Categor. pag. 13.) teacheth us, as to Diviſion. foreign. He that will exactly underſtand the nature of the whole, muſt exactly examine it's parts by diviſion, &c. As for Syllogiſme, Aphrod…ſeus tells us, that Ariſtotle was the firſt, that reduced Syllogiſmes to mode, and figure, &c. But that which we ſhall chiefly fix our eye upon, is Aristotle's method; whereof we have ſome general account in his Rhetor. lib. 3. cap. 13. pag. 217. foreign. A diſcourſe has two parts; firſt it is neceſſarie to declare the matter, of which we diſcourſe; and then we muſt demonstrate the ſame. Thus Explication, and Demon…tration ſeem to take in the whole of method, according to Aristotle. 2. As for the kinds of method, we have an account thereof given by Ariſtotle in his Ethicks lib. 1. cap. 4. foreign. Diſcourſes begun from Principles, differ from ſuch as tend to Principles. By diſcourſes begun from Principles, he denotes Synthetick method, which begins with Principles: by diſcourſes tending to principles he intends Analytick method, which proceeds from the end to Principles. This he ſeems to explain more fully in his Ethic. lib 3. cap. 5. foreign, What is laſt in the Analyſis, is firſt in the Geneſis; i. e. the Principle, which is firſt in the Synthetick method, is laſt in the Analytick. Thus for the kinds of method. 3. As for the Principles of a diſcourſe, Ariſtotle tells us, Eth. lib. 1. cap. 4. foreign: We muſt begin with Principles moſt known, which are two-fold, either in regard of us, or ſimply. By things more known, in regard of us, he means ſuch as we know by the effect, more obſcurely: by things more known ſimply, he underſtands ſuch as are known from their cauſes, which give a more diſtinct knowledge. 4. As to our methodical procedure in the handling of any Theme Ariſtotle (in his Eth. lib. 1.) gives us this good Canon, foreign. We ought in the firſt place to give an Hypotheſis, or obſcure adumbration of p. 381the thing, and then a more lively delineation. His meaning is, that when we treat of a point of great moment, we may not preſently fall upon the thing it ſelf, but by little and little prepare the minds of the Auditors, thereby to render them more capable to attend unto, and receive the head of the matter. Hence in points of great moment, he allows of a Proeme, ſo Ariſt. Rhetor. lib. 3. cap. 14. pag. 220. foreign. The moſt neceſſarie and proper work of a Proeme is this, to diſcover the end of a diſcouſe: wherefore, if the matter be evident, or ſmall, there is no need of a Proeme. 5. But one of the beſt rules, that I have obſerved in Ariſtotle, in order to a Methodical procedure in the handling of any point, is that in Ethic. lib. 1. cap. 7. foreign.We may not expect the like exactneſſe in all matters. We muſt remember that in all things we may not ſeek after the ſame exactneſs; but in every thing we muſt content our ſelves with ſuch a method, as the ſubject matter will bear. Neither may we in like manner ſearch after the cauſe in all things, but in ſome things it may ſuffice, that we well demonſtrate foreign, that the thing is ſo; as in firſt principles; for the foreign is firſt, and a Principle, and of Principles, ſome are diſcovered by Induction, ſome by ſenſe, ſome by ſome other uſage and way, &c. This golden Rule ſtrikes at the bold aſſumings of thoſe, who expect the like certaintie, and fulneſs of demonſtration in all ſubjects, though never ſo ſublime. It gives alſo a ſharpe rebuke to Scholemen, who generally bring all matters to their forme; whereas Ariſtotle here (as nature) teacheth us to ſuit our forme, or method to our matter. 6. But then Ariſtotle proceeds to another Canon, Eth. lib. 1. cap. 7. foreign. And we muſt take diligent care▪ that we define exactly: For accurate definitions give an huge advantage to what follows. This beginning therefore being well laid, it ſeems more than half of the whole work, and there is by it a great diſcovery made of the things we inquire into.

p. 37021. If any expect a more full Scheme of Ariſtotle's Logick, the beſt, at leaſt moſt uſeful, I meet with, is that of Ramus, who, albeit he does in many things oppoſe Ariſtotle, yet he ſeems to have done it not without grounds, but with deſigne to render Ariſtotle's Logick more uſeful. This will appear by the following Scheme of Ramus's Logick. As Grammar (ſaith Ramus) has two parts,The parts of Dialectick. 1. Invention. Ram. Logic. lib. 1. Etymologie, which treats of ſingle words, and Syntaxis, which is of words conjoyned: ſo Logick conſiſts of two parts, Invention, and Judgment. 1. Invention is a part of Logick which inſtructs us in the mode of finding out Arguments. An Argument is that, which is affected, or aſſumed to argue ſomewhat by, which is Artificial, or Inartificial. An Artificial Argument is that, which argues from it ſelf; which is either firſt, or ſecondarie; an Inartificial argument is that,2. Judgment. Ram. Logic. lib. 2. cap. 1. which argueth from Autoritie. 2. Judgment is the ſecond part of Logick, which conſiſts in the right diſpoſement of Arguments, in order to a right judgment of things: for every thing is judged by a certain Rule of d…ſpoſition, whence judgment, and diſpoſition paſſe for the ſame. And as Invention treats of ſingle Arguments, ſo Judgment of conjoynd. Now judgment is either Axiomatick, 1. Axiomatick Judgment. Cap. 2.or Dianoetick. 1. Axiomatick Judgment is the diſpoſition of an Argument with an Argument, whereby we judge, that ſomething is, or is not; which by the Latins is called an Enuntiate, Pronuntiate, Effate. 2 Hence followeth Dianoetick judgment. 2. Dianoetick, or diſcurſive judgment, which is, 1. Syllogiſme, therein is, 1. The Antecedent, wherein is, 1. A propoſition. 2. An Aſſumtion.foreign diſcourſe conſiſts in the deducing one Ax…ome from another, which is either Syllogiſme, or Method. Syllogiſme is foreign, a diſcourſe, wherein the Queſtion is ſo diſpoſed with the Argument, as that the Ante…edent being rightly placed, the concluſion neceſſarily follows. For when the Axiome is dubious, the Queſtion is put, and to confirm the ſame, we make uſe of an Argument, which is collated with the Queſtion. The Antecedent of a Syllogiſme has two parts; a Propoſition, and Aſſumption. The Propoſition is the firſt part of the Antecedent, wherein (at leaſt) the conſequent of the Question is diſpoſed with the Argument. The Aſſumption is the ſecond part of the Antecedent, 2. The conſequent, or Concluſion. Cap. 9.which is aſſumed out of the propoſition. The conſequent of a Syllogiſme, is that part which comprehends the Queſtion ▪ and concludes the ſame; whence 'tis called the Concluſion. If any part of the Syllogiſme be wanting, 'tis called p. 371an Enthymeme. A Syllogiſme is either ſimple, or Compound, &c.Cap. 10. Method is foreign a Diſcourſe compoſed of various homogeneous Axiomes propoſed according to the evidence of their Nature whence the convenience of all amongſt themſelves is judged,Method c. 17. and comprehended in memorie. And look, as in an Axiome Truth and Falſehood is regarded, and in a Syllogiſme the Conſequence and inconſequence: ſo in Method it is conſidered, that what is more clear does precede, and what is more obſcure follows; ſo that Order, and Confuſion is wholly the object of this judgement: as Ariſtotle. By how much the more general any Rule is, by ſo much the more it ought to precede. The moſt general Rule muſt be firſt,Cap. 18. becauſe it is firſt in regard of Light, and knowledge. Whence the moſt general Definition muſt be firſt, and then the Diſtribution muſt follow; which if it be various; the partition into Integral parts muſt precede, and then the Diviſion into the ſpecies muſt follow. The Perfect Definition conſiſts of Eſſential cauſes, namely of the Genus, and Form. Thus Ramus of Logick.

§. 22. Having finiſht Ariſtotle's Logick, Ariſtotle's Ethicks.we now Proceed to his Ethicks; the firſt part of Practick Philoſophie; wherein making uſe of an Analytick Method he begins with mans chief end, or happineſſe:1. of human Happineſſe. ſo Ariſt. Eth. lib. 1. cap. 1. foreign, &c. Every ſoul deſires ſome chief good, or laſt end, &c. Ariſtotle makes two chief parts of Human happineſſe, Objective, and Formal.1. Objective. Characters of the chiefeſt good which muſt be He begins with man's Objective happineſſe, and proves firſt, that there is one chiefeſt Good, and then gives ſome Characters of this chiefeſt Good, which may be all reduced to theſe ſeveral particulars. 1 Ariſtotle makes the chiefeſt good to be that, which is moſt Ancient, or the firſt principal of all things.1. The firſt principle. So in his Rhetor. lib. 1. cap. 7. treating of the degrees of goodneſſe he ſaies foreign. That which is the principle of all things is better than that, which is not the principle. 2.2. The laſt End. He placeth the chiefeſt Good in the laſt End of all things. Thus Ariſt. Rhetor. lib. 1. cap. 7. foreign. And the End is alwaies better than that, which is not the End: for this is alwaies for another's ſake, whereas that is for its own ſake. So agen he tels u… foreign. That which is neareſt the end is beſt. 3. Hence it follows, that the Chiefeſt Good is that,3. deſireabl… for it ſelf. which is deſired for it ſelf. So Ariſtotle in his Rhetor. lib. 1. cap. 7. defines the chiefeſt good, thus foreign p. 384foreign. The chiefeſt good is that which is deſired for it ſelf, and for whoſe ſake we deſire all other things. Then he addes foreign what is moſt deſireable for it ſelf, is be…t. This he ſtile… in what followes the Laſt End. foreign the End is that, for whoſe ſake we deſire other things. 4. Hence it follows, that the chiefeſt good is ſimply,4. Simply good. abſolutely, and neceſſarily good. foreign Ariſt. lib. 5. cap. 2. Thence Ariſtotle in his Eth. lib. 1. cap. 7. ſaies, that tis foreign ſimply, and of it ſelf deſirable. 5. Whence he makes the Chiefeſt Good to be the meaſure, and Standard of all good. 5. The meaſure of all good.Thus Ariſt. Ethic. lib 1. cap. 9. foreign. Of other Goods ſome exiſt neceſſarily, but others are only naturally ſubſervient to Happineſſe. This neceſſarily follows upon the former. For what is the Laſt End, and deſireable for it ſelf, muſt neceſſarily be the meaſure of all other goods, which are deſirable only Servato ordine ſinis. 6. Whence he makes the Chiefe…t Good, to be our moſt proper and connatural Good.6. Moſt proper, & connatural. So Ariſt. Eth. lib. 1. cap. 5. foreign the chiefeſt good is proper. And in his Rhetor. lib. 1. cap. 7. Ariſtotle making a compariſon 'twixt leſſer and greater goods, ſaies, foreign that which is connatural, and proper is more Eligible, then that, which is adventitious. 7. The chiefeſt Good muſt be foreign communicative, 7. Moſt communicative.and diffuſive to all. Thence Ariſtotle addes Rhetor. lib. 1 cap. 7. foreign Thoſe things are beſt, which are moſt uſefull in our greateſt need; as in old age, and Sickneſſe. Ariſt. Eth. lib. 1. cap. 1 foreign that is the chiefeſt good which all deſire. The Chiefeſt good though it be proper to every one, yet is common, and diffuſive to all: communitie with proprietie is peculiar to the chiefeſt Good, that is beſt which all need, and all may have Ʋniverſal diffuſiveneſs with Proprietie ſpeaks the object Ʋniverſally good, as God is. 8. That is the beſt Good, which is moſt Rare, 8. Moſt rare.and Choice: So Ariſtot. Rhet. lib. 1. cap. 7. foreign that which is more rare is better than that, which is more common, for its poſſeſſion is better becauſe of the difficulty in attaining it. 9. The chiefeſt Good, albeit it be rare, yet it muſt be poſſible: 9. Poſſible.So Ariſt. Rhetor. lib. 1, cap. 7. foreign that, which is poſſible, is better than that, which is impoſſible. 10. In Degrees of Goodneſſe that is beſt, which is the moſt Real, 10. Real.Subſtantial Good. So Ariſt. Rhetor. p. 385lib. 1. cap. 7. foreign. Thoſe things, which are really good, are better than things which are ſo in opinion only. Again he addes foreign. 11.11. Moſt permanent. That is the choiceſt good, which is moſt immobile, ſtable, and durable. So Ariſt. Eth. lib. 1. cap. 5. foreign, the chiefeſt good is immobile. Again in his Rhetor. lib. 1. cap. 7. foreign. Things, that are more durable, are better than things leſſe durable; and things more firm, than things leſſe firm, &c. In the ſeries of good things, that is beſt, which is moſt Influential, and Effective of Good.12. Moſt effective of Good. So Ariſt. lib. 1. cap. 7. foreign: that, which effects the greateſt good, is beſt; and then foreign. 13. Ariſtotle ſaies that is our chiefeſt good, which admits of no exceſſe in the enjoyment thereof.13. Which admits no exceſs. So Rhet. lib. 1. cap. 7. foreign ▪ that, which admits of no exceſſe, muſt needs be our chiefeſt good. Then he addes foreign, that which may have ſomewhat more than it ought, that is evil. His meaning is, we can never exceed in the enjoyment of the chiefeſt good, though we may in others. 14. Ariſtotle's main Character of the chiefeſt Good, is, that it be perfect, and ſelf-ſufficient. 14. Self-ſufficient, and perfect.So Ariſt. Eth. lib. 1. cap. 7. foreign, that which is beſt, is perfect, and ſimply deſirable; that is perfect, which is deſirable for it ſelf. So again, foreign, that, which is perfect, ſeems ſelf-ſufficient. Farther he ſaies, this chiefeſt good, foreign, i… in nothing defective, foreign, for whatſoever is added, is but ſuperfluous. Again he ſaies, this only enjoyed, makes the man happy. So in his Rhetor. lib. 1. cap. 7. foreign. That is beſt, which leaſt needs one or other things; for this is moſt ſelf-ſufficient. So Ariſt. Eth. lib. 1. cap. 7. foreign; we call that ſelf-ſufficient which alone renders the life eligible, and defective in nothing. This Plato calls foreign, a ſufficient Good, (which he makes God to be) calling his chiefeſt good foreign: a good connatural, uniform, infinite, eternal, ever-being, and everliving, opportune, pure, immixed, and without ſorrow. Yea, he ſaies, this his chiefeſt Good, is foreign, the very Divine, and Godhead p. 386Good, foreign, the ſupream beautiae, foreign, the only ſhining beautie, foreign, very-ſelf-good, &c.

Of Man's formal happineſs.§. 23. As for Ari…totle's notions of formal happineſſe, he tells us firſt, that it is the gift of God. So Ariſt. Eth. lib. 1. cap. 9. foreign.1. Its original from God. If the Gods vouchſafe any other gift to men, it is c…nſ…taneous to reaſon, that happineſs ſhould be a gift of God, and eſpecially becauſe it is the highest of humane perfections: And he gives a farther reaſon hereof in what follows, foreign. To aſcribe the greateſt, and moſt beautiful gift to fortune, is no way rational. Having given this general account of the original of humane happineſſe we now proceed to Ariſtotle's ſpecifick Idea of mans Formal happineſſe, which is thus defined by him,2. Its formal Idea, or definition. Ethic. l. 1. c. 7. foreign. Beatitude is the operation of the rational Soul, according to the beſt virtue in a perfect life. In which definition there are four conſiderables. 1. The formal nature of humane happineſs, which conſiſts in Operation. 2. The proper ſubject of this operation, which is the rational Soul. 3. The qualification of this ſubject, which is perfect Virtue. 4. The ſtate wherein this happineſſe is to be enjoyed,1. The formal reaſon of formal happineſs in operation. that is a perfect life. 1. The formal reaſon of man's formal happineſſe, is by Ariſtotle placed in foreign energie, or operation. This Ariſtotle proveth at large in his following Chapter, Ethic. lib. 1. cap. 8. foreign. The goods of the Soul w… ſtile the higheſt, and moſt ſovereigne, which are the Souls operations, and energies. This he explains more fully in what followeth in the ſame Chapter. foreign. To live well, and to act well, makes an happie man: for a good life is commonly ſtiled Eupraxie, or good action. Thence he proceeds to demonſtrate that Beatitude, conſiſts not in an habit, but action ▪ foreign, &c. There is a vaſt difference 'twixt having that which is beſt in p. 387poſſeſſion, or uſe, in habit, or operation; for a good, ſo long as it exiſts in habit only, is never perfected, as it appears in him that ſleepeth, but 'tis the exerciſe, that perfects, &c. Then he addes, Eth. lib. 1. cap. 10. That theſe Actions proceeding from Virtue, are proper to happineſſe, as hereafter. This is well explicated by Stobaeus de virtute Serm. 1. fol. 12. foreign: Beatitude conſiſts not in the poſſeſſion of Virtue, but in the exerciſe thereof; for he that has ſight does not alwayes ſee. So the Scholes tell us, that every Forme is perfected by its Act; and every Facultie and Habit is ordained to its Act, as to its perfection. So Ariſt. Eth. lib. 3. cap. 7. foreign. All things are perfected by operation: the more active things are the more perfect. Whence again Ariſt. Eth. lib. 1. cap. 8. tells us, that virtuous actions are of themſelves ſweet, and foreign ſelf-ſufficient; as in its place. 2. As for the proper ſubject of this operation,2. The proper ſubject, the whole Soul. Ariſtotle tells us, 'tis foreign, the rational ſoul. Thence in his Eth. l. 1. c. 9. foreign: It ſeems we may not ſtile an Oxe, or Horſe, or any other Animal happy; the reaſon is, becauſe they are meerly paſſive, not active in their reduction to their la…t end. The two main acts of the ſoul, which formalize humane happineſs, are Viſion, and Fruition. The Scholes place formal happineſſe chiefly in the Viſion of the mind &c. 3. The qualification of the Soul, and its operation, in order to humane happineſſe,3. The qualification of the Soul, and its act Virtue. is expreſſed under that notion foreign, according to the beſt Virtue. This is excellently explicated by Ariſtotle, Eth. l. 1. c. 10. foreign ▪ Operations according to Virtue, are proper to beatitude; but the contrarie (Vitious) actions to the contrarie, (Miſerie) and then he addes the Reaſon, foreign. The reaſon he gives,4. The ſtate of humane happineſſe is a perfect life, which connotes perfection. is becauſe theſe Virtuous actions are more ſtable, and ſweet ſo that a good man is truly foreign, immoveable, &c. This is farther evident by what follows. 4. As for the ſtate of humane happineſs, it is ſaid to be foreign, in p. 388a perfect life. This connotes perfection both extenſive, intenſive, and protenſive. 1. formal happineſſe in a perfect ſtate denotes perfection extenſive, i. e. of parts, 1. Extenſive, or of parts.or kinds; a perfect exemption from all evil, with a perfect enjoyment of all good. Thence Ariſt. Eth. lib. 1. cap. 9. foreign. Neither can a child be happie, becauſe he cannot by reaſon of his age practiſe ſuch things. This is more fully explicated in definit. Platon. fol. 412. foreign. Beatitude is a good compoſed of all goods. Again 'tis defined foreign, a facultie ſelf-ſufficient to live well. 2. This perfect life denotes a perfection Intenſive, or of degrees, 2. Intenſive, or of degrees.i. e. every part of this happie life, is in its highest degree of perfection, without the leaſt mixture of any degree of miſerie. So Ariſt. Eth. lib. 1. cap 12. foreign: Beatitude is of things precious, and perfect: for we all undertake every thing in order hereto; and that, which is the principle, and cauſe of all good, we account precious and Divine. Thence in the Platonick Definit. fol. 412. Beatitude is defined foreign, a perfection according to virtue, a ſelf-ſufficient proviſion of life, &c. 3. This perfect life imports alſo a perfection protenſive, or of duration. 3. Protenſive, or of duration.So Arist. Eth, lib. 1. cap. 10. foreign. An happie man is not variable, or eaſily changeable. For he cannot eaſily be removed from his Beatitude. So again, foreign, &c. A bleſſed man is not ſo for a ſhort time only, but for a long and perfect time. Farther he ſaies, foreign, &c. a bleſſed man can never become miſerable. Thus much for Ariſtotle's definition of humane happineſſe, which he himſelf, Ethic. lib. 1. cap. 7. thus explains: foreign. Humane happineſs is the operation of the Soul, according to the beſt, and most perfect virtue: alſo in a perfect life; for one ſwallow makes not a ſummer. Theſe his contemplations about humane happineſſe, agree to no ſtate of life, but that of the glorified Saints, which yet Ariſtotle ſeems to have had no belief of, at leaſt he ſeems foreign to haeſitate touching this future ſtate of the Soul, as 'tis evident from what he laies down, Eth. lib. 1. cap. 10. where teaching that men ſhould endeavour to live thus happily here, and die, according to reaſon; he gives this as a reaſon foreign p. 389foreign, becauſe what is future is to us very obſcure, but Beatitude is alwaies the end, and alwaies perfect. Aristotle dreamed of enjoying this happineſſe here, but Plato ſeems to refer it to the ſouls future ſtate.

§. 24. Having done with Aristotle's firſt Ethick-head, The principles of humane Acts.touching humane happineſs, we now proceed to his Philoſophizings about the internal principles of humane Acts, which may be reduced to theſe four particulars: 1. Ʋniverſal prudence, or practick knowledge in general.1. Practick knowledge. 2. Volition. 3. Conſultation. 4. Election: Of each of which in the…r order, and place. The firſt great principle of humane Acts laid down by Ariſtotle, is univerſal prudence, or practick knowledge in general. So Ariſt. Eth. lib. 1. cap. 3. foreign. It is very profitable for ſuch, as would mannage their affections, and actions, according to reaſon, to know what belongs to theſe things: and Ariſtotle farther informes us, that this knowledge of things practick, muſt be not only ſpeculative, and apprehenſive, but alſo practick, and cauſative, whence ſaith he, Eth. lib. 2. cap. 4. foreign. Many there are, who do not theſe things, yet flying to their reaſon, they would needs ſeem to philoſophize, and ſo to approve themſelves virtuous. Theſe act juſt like ſome ſick people, who diligently hearken to their Phyſicians, but follow nothing of what they preſcribe. As therefore thoſe, who thus uſe the Phyſitians, never cure their bodies: ſo theſe who thus Philoſophize, never cure their Souls. Hence that of Ammonius (in Ariſt. Categ. pag. 15.) foreign, the end of contemplation, is the beginning of practice; and Plutarch. lib. 1. de Placit. Philoſ. tells us, that a bleſſed man ought foreign; To have not only a Theoretick knowledge of beings, but alſo a Practick of what is needful. For ſpeculative reaſon is only apprehenſive of things, but practick is cauſative; according to that Philoſophick diſtinction, foreign. Practick Philoſophie is effective of Virtue, but Theoretick of Truth only. This practick knowledge is ſo termed, not becauſe it immediately acts, but becauſe p. 390it is directive to action. Ariſtotle makes this practick dictate of the underſtanding to be a kind of practick foreign diſcourſe, which he ſuppoſeth to precede either actually, or virtually every Act of the w…ll: as for example, he that will be happie muſt act virtuouſly: I would be happie, ergo. Therefore ſaies Ariſtotle Incontinent perſons have knowledge only in the habit, not actually diſcurſive: for albeit they aſſent to the major, which is univerſal; yet there is ſome defect in their aſſent to the minor, & thence they aſſent not practically to the concluſion, &c. This practick diſcourſe, or knowledge, which neceſſarily precedes the wills motion, is in the general ſtiled foreign, Prudence, which in the Platonick Definitions, is thus defined, foreign. Prudence is a Science effective of Beatitude. So Plato Meno. fol. 88. foreign. Prudence conducting effects the duties of the ſoul, but folly the ills. We have a good account of this Moral Prudence, and its influence given by Alexand. Aphrodiſeus (the chiefeſt of Ari…totle's Commentators) as Stobaeus de Virtut. Ser. 1. fol. 17. foreign. Seeing moral virtue is effective of ſuch things, as are determined by prudence, and right reaſon, it's neceſſar…e, that he who has prudence, has alſo moral Virtue: for it is the office of Prudence to enquire by what means it is poſſible to attain a right Intention, which to determine, is the office of moral Virtue: for it is the virtue of the elective facultie. And this is the difference 'twixt moral prudence, and craft. Prudence ſearcheth out, what things are moſt conducing to a right Intention, whereas craft relates to any, though falſe, &c. Aphrodiſeus gives us here (beſides other characters) a full Idea of the proper office of moral Prudence, which is to direct the Intent…on of the Will as to its end, which follows.

Of Volition, or the will ſtrictly taken.§. 25. The next principle of humane action is foreign, Ʋolition, or Will, ſtrictly ſo termed, which properly refers to the end, and ſo 'tis differenced from foreign Election, which reſpects the means. So Arist. Eth. lib 3. cap. 5. foreign: Ʋolition rather reſpects the end, whereas Election reſpects the means conducing to the end. So Plato in Gorg. foreign, p. 391that is willed for the ſake of which men act; whereby he intends the end. We have a more large explication of the difference 'twixt Ʋolition, and Election, given by Joh. Grammaticus in Arist. de Anima Proaem. fol. 3. foreign. The Gno…tick, or knowing faculties of Rationals being diſtributed, the practick are Ʋolition, and Election. And Ʋolition is only of what is good (i. e. the end) but Election inclines both waies (i. e. to good, or ev…l as means) Again, Ʋolition belongs to the Rational Soul as ſuch; whereas Election has ſome commixture with the irrational. The end, the proper object of Volition.By all which it's evident, that Ʋolition is an Act of the Will, whereby it is extended, or carried forth to its object, beloved for it ſelf, without reſpect to a farther end: ſo that the end, which is amiable for, and of it ſelf, is the alone proper object of Ʋolition. Yea, Ariſtotle makes this extenſion of the Will towards its last end to be connatural, or as he termes it, Phyſical; whereas its extenſion towards the means by Election, is with indifference. So Ariſt. Eth. lib. 3. c. 7. foreign. Where Lambinus on this notion [foreign] thus Comments. We must know that in practicks, the end has the place of the principle; becauſe on it depends the neceſſarie formation of all ſuch things, as belong to the action. Therefore as in Mathematicks there are certain indemonstrable principles laid as the baſis of all Demonſtration: ſo in practicks, the end is fixed as a principle ſuppoſed not to be deliberated about; for a principle as well in practicks, as ſpeculatives, admits not of Demonſtration, but of ſuppoſition only. So again, Arist. Eth▪ lib. 3. cap. 5. foreign. The deſire of the end is not elective, but natural, &c i. e. the Appetite of every thing does naturally tend to ſome end connatural thereto, which is the meaſure of all things conducing thereto So Ariſt. Eth lib. 3 cap. 10. foreign. Every thing is meaſured by its end. But Aristotle Eth. lib. 1. cap. 2. ſpeaks more fully thus foreign. The end is of things practick, which we will for it ſelf, but other things for it. Neither p. 392do we chooſe all things for ſome other (without ſome term) for ſo there would be an infinite progreſſe. It is manifest therefore, that this end is the Good, yea the beſt Good. Wherefore the knowledge hereof has great influence on the life: and as Archers, who have the mark in their eye; we do hereby obtain, what is moſt needful. So again, Ariſtotle Eth. lib. 3. cap. 7. foreign, a virtuous man is naturally carried towards his end, but towards other things voluntarily, or indifferently: then he addes, foreign, ſuch as every man is, ſuch is his end. Whence that Maxime in the Scholes, as the forme is in Naturals, ſuch is the end in Morals, By all which 'tis apparent, what the proper object of this Volition is, namely the end, to which it naturally extends it ſelf, as the meaſure of all its acts, and lower ends. Hence alſo 2. we gather, that this foreign, or volition of the will, is not diſtinct from that Act of the Will, which the Scholes call Intention. For they make Intention to be an efficacious willing of the end, together with the means conducing thereto: which is formally, or at leaſt virtually denoted in foreign, Volition, according to that common rule in Logick. He, that effectually wills the end, wills alſo the means. 'Tis true, there is an imperfect velleitie, or faint Volition, which reſpects the end, without means; but a compleat Ʋolition comprehends both. I know the Scholes make Ʋolition, and Intention, different Acts; and the former to relate to the end ſimply conſidered, but the latter to the end in connexion with the means. But I find no ground for this diſtinction in Ariſtotle, or Nature. 3. Hence alſo we may farther collect, that the end is firſt in Intention, though laſt in Execution; and therefore ought to be greatly heeded, and made the meaſure, or ſquare of all. So Ammonius in Arist. Categ. pag. 12. foreign. He that is ignorant of his mark, or end, is like a blind man, that ſhoots at randome; and he does in vain conſider all things tending to his end. But the conſideration of an uſeful end gives much diligence, and alacritie▪ For every one, that will undertake any deſigne ought firſt to learn its uſefulneſſe, &c.

3. foreign conſultation.§. 26. We now proceed to the third principle of humane acts, p. 393called by Aristotle foreign conſultation, which reſpects the means, and ſo is diſtinguiſhed from foreign Prudence, or the practick Judgement in general, which reſpects both end, and means; and primarilie the end, and the means only in the ſecond place. This Conſultation is ſtiled ſometimes by Ariſtotle, but often by Plato foreign, Counſel, which Plato in Cratyl… deduceth from foreign, a ca…ting, ſo Lambinus in Ariſt. Eth. l. 3. c. 5 foreign, a Metaphor taken from Archers, who are ſaid to caſt, or ſhoot their Arrow towards the ſcope, they aim at. This Conſultation is ſtiled in the Platon. …finit. fol. 413. foreign, good advice, which is defined foreign, a connate virtue of reaſoning. Again 'tis termed foreign, Conſultation, which is defined foreign, an exhortation to another, before he acts, how he ought to act. But there is no definition, that ſuits better with the nature of Conſultation, than that Definit. Platon. fol. 414. foreign, Conſultation is a conſideration of things future, ſo far as expedient, i. e. for our end. For a wiſe man firſt propoſeth, and wills his end, and then makes uſe of Conſultation, as an inſtrument to find out means expedient for this end. We are to take diligent heed, that things paſſe not ſuddenly from Imagination into Reſolution, Affection, and Action, without asking advice of the judgement, and ſerious conſultation. A wiſe man, when he hath made a judgement about his end, weigheth exactly all,Quod inconſul to fecimus, conſulto revocamus. that followeth from ſuch a Judgment, as alſo all the Antecedents, that lead to the obtaining of it. What men unadviſedly undertake, they adviſedly recal. Conſultation ought to be the door to all great reſolutions, and undertakings. This Conſultation is thus defined by Ariſt. Rhetor. lib. 1. cap. 9. foreign. It is a virtue of the diſcurſive facultie, whereby men are enabled to conſult of good, and evil, in reference to happineſſe. But the proper Seat of this diſcourſe about Conſultation, is Ariſtotle's Ethic. lib. 3. cap. 5. where he diſcourſeth at large of the Object, Acts, The Object of Conſultation.and Effects of Conſultation. As to its Object, he laies down theſe Rules to judge it by. 1. Conſultat…n is not of things ſpeculative, but of practick. So Art. 21. foreign. Conſultation is not about the firſt Elements of Sciences, &c. The ſame he addes Art. 27. foreign. Eſpecially 'tis not about Arts, or Sciences. p. 394Yea, he ſaies expreſly foreign, Conſultation is about practicks. 2. Conſultation is not of things impoſſible, but of things in our power. So Art. 48. foreign, if the thing be poſſible, men undertake it; and more expreſly Art. 13. foreign, we conſult of Practicks in our power. This he explains more fully in his Rhetorick, pag. 10. foreign. We conſult about things, which appear to happen either way, not of impoſſibilitie, &c. …. Conſultation is not about the end, but the means, ſo Ariſt. Eth. lib. 3. cap. 5. foreign. We conſult not of ends, but of things conducing to their ends: for Phyſicians conſult not whether they ſhall cure, but taking their end for granted, they conſult how, and by what means to cure. So Art. 57. foreign, &c. Conſultation is about things to be done by us: Now our actions have reſpect to ſome end, wherefore the end comes not under conſultation, but the means. 4. Conſultation is not about an infinite, but finite number of means. So Art. 4. foreign. No man conſults of things infinite, becauſe unmeaſurable. 5. Conſultation is of things permanent, not of things in continual motion, ſo Art. 7. foreign. We conſult not of things in perpetual motion. The reaſon is, becauſe ſuch fluid things cannot be brought under any regular order, or ſubſerviencie to our end, &c. 6. Conſultation is of things contingent, not of neceſſaries. So Art. 29. foreign. Conſultation is of things doubtful, contingent, and indefinite: For ſuch the means uſually are; whereas the end is definite, neceſſarie, and more evident, &c. 7. Yet Conſultation is not of things fortuitous, or caſual, but of things in our power, which come under the conduct of humane Prudence. So Art. 9. foreign. We conſult not about the things of fortune, as touching the invention of a treaſure, &c. 9. Amongſt the means, the main work of Conſultation is to find out ſuch as are moſt conducible to the end. So Art. 39. foreign. If the means be many, the beſt are to be choſen out. This ſuppoſeth an univerſal comprehenſion of, and inſpection into all the means; according to that of Stobaeus, p. 395foreign, conſider the whole: for qui ad pauea reſpicit facilè pronunciat, he that conſiders, but a few things raſhly determines. 9. Conſultation ſuppoſeth a methodical procedure from one to another 'till we come to the firſt cauſe: So Art. 40. foreign, &c. The firſt cauſe is firſt in intention, but last in execution. 10 If the things we conſult about, be arduous, and difficult, Ariſtotle requires conſultation with others: So Art. 30. foreign. In great matters we must take unto us Counſellers, distrusting our ſelves as not ſufficient to penetrate, or d…ve into the things. Thus much for the object. 2. As for the ſubject of Conſultation Aristotle (Eth. lib. 3. cap. 5. Art. 2.2. The Subject of Conſultation.) tells us, that none are fit to conſult, but he foreign, who has his wits about him; whence he excludes fools, and mad men from this work. And upon the ſame account in his Rhetor. lib. 2. cap. 14. he excludes young men from any competent abilitie for conſultation, becauſe firſt they have great paſſions. 2. and are very unconstant. 3. and have ſtrong wills. 4. alſo too credulous, and not cautelous, for want of experience of evills. But (addes he) old men, having virtues contrarie to thoſe vices of young men, viz. ſuſpenſion of judgement, caution, experience, and command of paſſions, &c. are moſt fit for conſultation. 3. As to the Act of Conſultation, 3. The Act of Conſultation.Ariſtotle (Eth. lib. 3. cap. 5. Art. 42.) thus differenceth it from diſquiſition: foreign. Every Diſquiſition is not Conſultation, as it appears by the Mathematick Diſquiſitions; but every Conſultation is a Diſquiſition: wh…re he makes Diſquiſition more generick, and Conſultation to be a practick Diſquiſition, or Inquiſition into means conducing to our end. 4. The main effect of Conſultation, is Election, as it follows.

§. 27. Conſultation being finiſht▪ Election, which is the proper effect thereof, begins. So Arist. Eth lib 3. cap. 5. Art. 68.4 Of Election. firſt its difference from Conſultation, and Volition. foreign. The thing conſulted a… out, and elected, is the ſame: for that which is prejudged by conſultation, is elected. For every one ceaſeth to enquire, how he ſhall act when reduced to his firſt principle, &c. As for the difference 'twixt Election, and p. 396Volition, we have it in Arist. Eth. lib. 3. cap. 7. foreign ▪ &c. The thing willed is the end, but things conſulted about, and elected, are the means referring to the end, &c. So Ariſt. Eth. lib. 3. cap. 4. Art. 27. foreign. Volition is of the end, but Election of the means referring to the end. By which we ſee, that the proper object of Election is the means,2. Its object the means. not the end. 2. Ariſtotle tells us, that Election is not of Impoſſibles, but of things in our power. So Eth. lib 3. cap. 4. Art. foreign. Election is not of things impoſſible: whereby he diſtinguiſheth it from imperfect Volition, or Velleitie, which may be of things impoſſible. So again Art. 31. foreign. It ſeems moſt likely, that Election is of things in our power. 3.3. The Subject of Election the rational Will. As for the ſubject, or ſeat of Election, it belongs to the rational Appetite: thence ſaies Aristotle, Eth. lib. 3. cap. 4. Art. 9. Election is not foreign, of irrational appetites; whence 'tis differenced from Concupiſcence, which belongs to the Irrational appetite. So Art. 13. foreign. Concupiſcence is contrarie to Election, becauſe 'tis common to Irrationals, as well as to Rationals, whereas Election is proper to Rationals. So that the proper ſeat of Election is the Will; whence Ariſtotle makes it incluſive of Voluntarie ▪ though it be not ſully extenſive thereto: Ethic. lib. 3. cap. 4. foreign. Election ſeems to be Voluntarie, though with ſome difference 4. Hence follows the Act of Election, 4. The Act of Election. 1. 'Tis rational.which according to Ariſtotle, Eth. lib. 3. cap. 5. is foreign, a conſulted, or judicious appetition. Thence Ariſt. Eth. lib. 3. cap. 4. Art. 32. foreign. Election is not a meer opinion, or imagination; and more fully Art. 53. foreign. Election proceeds from reaſon, and diſcourſe. Neither is it ſufficient, that this act of Election be rational, but it muſt alſo be determined, and fixed;2. Fixed, and determined. whereby the object of Election ſeems ſomewhat differenced from that of Conſultation, which leaves the determination of the object to Election: So Ariſt. Eth. lib. 3. cap. 5. Art. 63. foreign. The thing conſulted, and elected, is the ſame, but the thing elected is more determinate, or fixed: for what is judged by conſultation p. 397is elected, and ſo fixed. Lambinus here on this notion, foreign, comments thus, foreign ſignifies to determine, and define: when we conſult, we have as yet nothing certain, or determined: but the end of Conſultation, is a definite, certain Election. As therefore in Theoreticks, Aphoriſmes are ſaid to be certain determinate concluſions, or ſentences, whoſe truth is both by reaſon, and long experience evident (as Hippocrates's Aphoriſmes) ſo in Practicks▪ Aphoriſmes may be ſtiled Counſels drawn forth after long conſultat…on. Thus Lambinus, who yet hath not fully hit the mind of Ariſtotle, who by Aphoriſme underſtands the object, or means determined by Election. Whence Ariſtotle tells us, that 'tis not a meer fluid volition, or Ʋel…itie, th…t will make a vit…ous man virtuous, but there muſt be a dete…mined Will, or Election of all means, &c. Arist. Eth. lib. 3. cap. 5. Art. 43. foreign. If an unrighteous perſon have ſome imperfect velleitie of righteouſn…ſſe, he does not preſently ceaſe to be wicked, and become righteous: as a ſick man is not preſently healed, ſo ſoon as he is wills it, &c. 5. Hence we may collect w…th Ariſtotle, 5. Its difficultie.that it is very difficult to make a right Election. So Arist. Eth. lib. 2. cap▪ 1. foreign. It is very difficult to judge, what is to be choſen before another thing, and what is to be preferred before another: and yet 'tis more difficult to cleave to what we know is beſt. 6.6. Its effect as to Virtue. Albeit it be very difficult to make a right Election, yet when 'tis made, it has a Sovereigne influence on Virtue: So Ariſt. Eth. lib. 3. cap 4. foreign. It follows, that we paſſe on to Election, which ſeems to be moſt proper to Virtue, and that whereby moral actions are moſtly meaſured, &c. 7. Hence we come to the definition of Election, 7. Its d…finition.which is thus laid down by Ari…totle, Eth. lib. 3. cap. 5. Art. 68. foreign. Election is a conſulted, or judicious appetition or things in our power. And he …dde… this as the reaſon, foreign, for from conſulting, judging, we chooſe according to that Conſultation made. This Election is term…d by the Platonick foreign, Hereſie, which Platon. Definit. fol. 413. is defined thus, foreign, p. 398Election is a right Probation. Approbation.Under Election is compriſed Conſent, (albeit the Scholes diſtinguiſh them) whence follows Ʋſe, and Fruition. Conſent, and uſe of the means, are called by the Platonicks foreign, alacritie, which Platon definit. fol. 413. is defined foreign, A diſcoverie of a practick Election, &c. 2 Cor. 8.11. foreign, v. 17. foreign, v. 19. foreign.

Of Voluntarineſſe, and Libertie.§. 28. Having go…e through the principles of human Acts, we now proceed to their main eſſential Attribute, or adjunct, which is Voluntarineſſe, or Libertie; we make Voluntarineſſe, and Libertie the ſame; becauſe we find no rational ground either in Aristotle, or Nature, to diſtinguiſh them; for every human Act that is voluntarie, is alſo free; and every Act that is free, is likewiſe Voluntarie. Farther, they both partake of one, and the ſame Eſſential Idea, or Definition. Thence Ariſtotle, Eth. lib. 3. cap. 1. Art. …0. foreign.The definition of Voluntarie. Thoſe things are ſaid to be Voluntarie, whoſe principle is in him, that does them, who has a (radical) power of acting, or not acting. This definition of voluntarie is the ſame, which the Scholes give to Libertie. But we have a more adequate, and proper definition of Voluntarie, given by Ariſt. Eth. lib. 3. cap. 3. foreign. Voluntarie ſeems to be that, which has its principle in him that acteth it, who alſo underſtandeth the particulars of what he acts. This definition of Voluntarie ſeemeth to connote nothing but a rational ſpontaneitie, which is the ſame with humane Libertie. Hence Ari…totle, Eth. lib. 3. cap. 1. makes Involuntarie Acts the ſame with forced, or not free: Art. 5. foreign. Involuntarie acts ſeem to be ſuch, as are done by force▪ or ignorance. A forc't act is that whoſe principle is Extrinſick, it being ſuch, whereto he that ſuffers, or acts, confers nothing. Here Ariſtotle makes Involuntarie the ſame with forced, or not free; and forced or not free, that which has not its principle in its ſ…lf: whence it neceſſarily follows, 1. That Voluntarineſſe is the ſame with Libertie. 2. That Voluntarineſſe, and Libertie exclude not all kind of neceſſitie, but only ſuch as is coactive. 3. That Voluntarineſſe, and Libertie, include no more in their eſſent al Idea, but a rational ſpontaneitie. This is farther evident by Plato's Ideas of Voluntarines, and Libertie. p. 399Platon. defin. fol. 415. foreign, &c. Voluntarie is that which moves it ſelf according to judgment, &c. which is the ſame with the following definition of what is free, foreign, That is free, which acts from it ſelf. This rational Spont…neitie, or Libertie, is ſtiled by Plato ſometimes foreign ▪ Soul-duction; ſometimes foreign, ſelf-ſervice, as alſo foreign, ſelf-action. Thus alſo Libertie is defined by the Stoicks, Laert. in Zeno foreign. Libertie is a power of ſelf-action. Whence the Greek Fathers, Baſil, &c. call free-will foreign, ſelf-power, and the Scripture uſeth a word of the like import, foreign, ſelf-Election, 2 Cor. 8.27. This ſelf-moving power, which is alone eſſential to Voluntarineſſe, or Libertie, is expreſſed by Ariſt. Eth. lib. 3. cap. 8. under this notion, foreign. That is in our power which we uſe, ſo or ſo, for which we are ſaid to be voluntarie, or free. This foreign, which he makes only Eſſential to Libertie, and Voluntarineſſe, is excellently well expreſſed by Epictetus, and Simplicius, on him: Epict. Ench. cap. 1. foreign. The things in our power are the conception, impetus, appetition, and extenſion (of the Soul) and in one word, all our acts. Simplicius here ſpeaks forth Ariſtotle's mind, as well as Epictetus's fully thus. foreign, &c. He ſaies thoſe things are in our power, of which we are Maſters, and of which we have power. Such are the internal motions of the Soul, proceeding from our own judgment, and Election. So again, foreign. When the Soul acts according to its own nature, then it is moved freely, and voluntarily, internally from it ſelf; and from this (ſpontaneitie) foreign, what is free, may be well defined. Thus Simplicious, who makes here all the natural acts of the Soul to be free. 2. This freedom to conſiſt in a rational ſpontaneitie, or voluntarie motion of the ſoul. Hence he proves at large in what follows (p 23.24. Edit. Salmas.) that all Neceſſitie is not contrarie to Libertie, Coactive neceſſitie alone excludes Libertie.but only that, which is Extrinſick, Coactive and Compulſive, foreign p. 400foreign. Therefore we are to ſay, that there is a twofold neceſſitie, one contrarie to Libertie, another conſiſtent therewith. Wherefore external neceſſitie deſtroyes Libertie (for no one externally compelled, is ſaid to do, or not to do any thing freely) but all internal neceſſitie, neceſſitating to act according to their own nature, this does the more preſerve Libertie. For a ſelf-moved, according to the nature of a ſelf-moved, is neceſſarily moved by it ſelf: neither is it for this (ſaid to be) moved by another; for the neceſſitie is not external, but complicated with the nature of the ſelf-moved, yea preſervative thereof, and conducing to its proper operations. Thus Simplicius, who gives us here an excellent deſcription of humane Libertie, and its Combination with internal voluntarie neceſſitie, which, if well underſtood, and embraced, would put an end to all thoſe Scholaſtick clamours of the Pelagians and Jeſuites, againſt God's neceſſitating, determining, efficacious concurſe, which puts only an internal voluntarie, not external coactive neceſſitie on the will; and therefore is no way deſtructive to its Libertie. But then Simplicius proceeds to demonſtrate, that a Libertie of Contrarietie (as the Scholes term it) or an Indifferencie to this, or that, is not eſſential to humane Libertie. Libertie of contrarietie, or Indifferencie not Eſſential to Free-will.Take his own words: foreign. Neither muſt we needs ſay, that in all things free-will ▪ & Libertie ſuppoſeth a power of acting contraries: for Souls, which allwa…es adhere to good, and chooſe good, have both Free-will, and Election (for Election is not forced) of that good, without Ind…fferencie to the contrarie, &c. By which he fully proves, that actual Ind…fferencie is not Eſſential to Libertie. Thence he proceeds to prove, that Libertie is eſſential to the will, Libertie eſſential to the will.and an unſeparable adjunct of every vital humane Act. So pag. 28. foreign. Wherefore they, that deſtroy Libertie deſtroy the natural extenſion and conſtitution of the Soul, &c. So that nothing deſtroys Libertie, but what deſtroys the natural inclination, p. 401or Voluntarineſſe of an human act. This is farther evident by the following definition he gives of a free act. Simp. in Epict. cap. 2. pag. 34. foreign. That is free, which has the ſelf-power, and dominion of its own exerciſe. This he farther explains in the ſame page thus: foreign. It is manifeſt, that the things in our power are our proper acts: and things not in our power, but in the power of others, are other mens acts. Whence it apparently follows; 1. That every human act of the Soul is in the Soul's own power, and ſo free, albeit it be neceſſarily predetermin'd, and act…ated by God's Efficacious concurſe. 2. That this Libertie of human acts implies nothing more as eſſential thereto, but a Rational ſpontaneitie, or voluntarie ſelf-motion We have inſiſted the more largely on theſe notions of Simplicius about human Libertie and its identitie with Voluntarineſſe; becauſe he ſeems, of all Ariſtotle's commentators the beſt to underſtand his mind. Farther that Ariſtotle's foreign, that which is in our power, whereby he expreſſeth Libertie, imports no more than voluntarineſſe, or Rational ſpontaneitie, is evident from that excellent determination of Greg. Ariminenſis in Sent. lib. 1. Diſt. 17. Q. 1. That an action be in the power of an Agent, it is not neceſſarie, that every principle be the forme of the Agent: for then no act of the will, whether good, or evil, would be in its power; becauſe God is the productive principle of every act. Therefore I ſay, that there is nothing more required to beſpeak an action to be in the power of the Agent,Eſt in poteſtate naturali, quod cum volumus ſacimus. Auguſt. than that the action flow from his own will. So alſo Auſtin: That is in our power which willing, we do. The contemperation, and conſiſtence of God's Efficacious neceſſitating concurſe with human Libertie is excellently ſet forth by Plutarch, in the life of Coriolanus fol. 193. thus. But in wondrous,God's neceſſitating concurſe deſtroyes not Libertie. and extraordinarie things, which are done by ſecret inſpirations, and motions. Homer. [foreign] Doth not make God to take away human Election, and Libertie, but to move it, and then he addes foreign. In which God makes not the action involuntarie, but openeth the way to the will, and addes thereto courage, and ſucceſſe. For (addes he) either p. 402we muſt ſay, that the Gods meddle not with the cauſes, and beginnings of our actions, or elſe, that they have no other way to help, and further men by. Thus Plutarch. And whereas 'tis object…d that thus to aſcribe unto God a predetermining, particular immediate Influence upon,God's predetermining concurſe to the wil's … makes h… not the Author of ſin. and Concurſe with the will, to every …ct thereof, is to make him the Author of Sin, &c. Plato Repub. 10. gives us a good ſolution to this objection, in ſaying. foreign …ll blamable Ca…ſalitie belongs to the particular Agen…, which ch…ſeth … God is a blameleſſe cauſe. Agen, foreign. In all Evils, God workes what is righteous, and good only. This is more fully explicated by Simplicius in Epict. Enchir. cap. 1.24. foreign. God is no way the cauſe of ſin: for he being in himſelf good, Acts the Soul in ſinning only according to its own nature (i. e. voluntarilie) out of the riches of his goodneſse: but he do…s not concurre to its ſin otherwiſe, than as the Soul it ſelf wills it. His meaning is, that God concurreth to ſin, only as the Ʋniverſal cauſe of Goodneſſe; ſo that God's Concurſe thereto does not at all hinder, but that the Soul voluntarilie chooſeth it. Neither is the qualitie of the effect to be aſcribed to the Ʋniverſal cauſe, but to the particular, which is the alone Moral, and therefore culpable cauſe of Sin: whereas God's Ʋniverſal cauſalitie thereto is only Phyſical, or natural, and therefore not morally Evil. That the Souls Voluntarie agencie is ſufficient to render its act Morally good, or Evil (albeit we allow God a predetermining Influence, and Concurſe thereto) is evident from that of Ariſtotle Ethic. lib. 3. cap. 3. foreign in things voluntario praiſes, and diſpraiſes have place, i. e. in virtues, and vices: ſo agen Eth. lib. 3. cap. 7. foreign. Virtue is voluntarie, and ſin nothing leſſe is likewiſe voluntarie. Whereby 'tis evident, that Ariſtotle requires nothing more on the part of the Soul to render its acts Morally good, or Evill, but that they be voluntarie.

§. 29. Having diſpatcht Ariſtotle's contemplations about the Wil's Voluntarineſſe, and Libertie, which is the Eſſential adjunct of every humane act;Touching the moralitie of human acts. we now proceed to his ſpeculations about the Moralitie of humane Acts, or their mora clonſtitution as good, or Evill. p. 403This moralitie of human acts in general according to Ariſtotle, has for its foundation, or baſis foreign, a voluntarie free agent (as before) but the chief meaſures thereof are, 1. the End: ſo Ariſtotle Ethic. lib. 3. cap. 10. foreign every thing is defined or meaſured by its end, i. e. the End has the ſame place in morals as the forme in Naturals, or as the firſt principles in ſpeculatives. 2. Not only the End, but alſo the Law of Nature, (which Ariſtotle ſtiles Right reaſon) has an eſſential influence on the moralitie of human Acts: according to which they are denominated morally good, or Evill: for by conformitie thereto they become morally good, and by difformitie morally Evill: ſo Ariſt. Eth. lib. 3. cap. 8. ſtiles a Virtuous act, foreign. That which moves according to the diſpoſition, or order of Right reaſon, &c. We ſhall begin with Ariſtotle's notions about things, and Acts morally good, which he ſtiles Virtues, 1. Of Moral good or virtue.whereof we have this general account in his Rhetor. lib. 1. cap. 9. foreign. Virtue is, as it ſeems, a power conquiſitive, and preſervative of goods: alſo a power well-productive of many, and great matters, yea of all things, about all. But this definition of virtue being too general, & that which agrees as well to Natural, as moral Virtues, we proceed to that, which is more ſpecial. The great ſeat of Aristo…e diſcourſe about moral virtue is his Ethicks lib. 2. cap. 3.4.5.6. cap. 3. he gives us this general Idea of Ethick or moral virtue foreign. It is ſuppoſed therefore, that virtue is ſuch, as being converſant about pleaſures, and griefs, is productive of that which is beſt. But ſin is the contrarie. Ariſtotle Eth. l…b. 2. cap. 4. b…gins to diſcourſe more diſtinctly of moral virtue, and its Genus, whether it be a Power, Affection, or Habit of the Soul, foreign. Seing there are in the Soul theſe three; Affections, Powers, Habits; which of theſe muſt virtue be? ſo Plutar de Virtut Mor. foreign. There are theſe three in the Soul, a Facultie, an Affection, and an Habit: A Facultie is the Principle, and matter of an Affection; an Affection is the motion of a Facultie; an Habit is the p. 404ſtrength, and conformitie of a facultie gained by cuſtome. Arist· demonſtrates. 1. That Virtue cannot be an Affection, or Paſſion;1. Virtues are not Paſſions. becauſe Affections are good or bad only from good or bad Habits foreign. Our paſſions are well, or ill diſpoſed from thoſe Habits, which poſſeſſe them: therefore our Paſſions are in themſelves capable neither of virtues, nor of vices: whence it follows, that virtues, and vices, are habits. 2. He demonſtrates that Virtues are not Paſſions; becauſe they are Elections, foreign. Virtues are certain Elections; or at leaſt not without Election. 3. He demonſtrates the ſame from the different motions of Paſſion, and Virtue foreign. To theſe we may adde, that we are not ſaid to be moved, but to be diſpoſed according to Virtues, or vices: but we are ſaid to be moved according to paſſions. Lambinus on this text of Ariſt. Eth. lib. 2 cap. 4. [foreign] Comments thus. Every thing ſo far as it is moved, ſo far it is ſaid (pati) to ſuffer. Thence amongſt the Greeks our Affections are called foreign, Paſſions; and ſo are oppoſed foreign, to practice. For the very foreign Affection, which is moved, is moved by External objects: and the Paſſive power, as it is moveable, is called foreign. But in the Action of Virtue▪ albeit External objects concurr, yet a good man is not abſolutely moved by them, as in the Affections, but according to the dictate of right reaſon. Therefore in the Affections the principle moving is External ▪ and the principle moved internal viz foreign. But in Virtues the object is External, which of it ſelf has no efficacie, but as it is admitted by right reaſon. The principle moved is foreign, the paſſive power: but the prinple Acting, and moving, is ſome good habit or Virtue. And for this cauſe we are ſaid foreign not to be moved (for we conſider not foreign the paſſive power in virtues, but by Accident) but we are ſaid foreign to be diſpoſed by Virtues, i. e. we are in ſome ſort ſo framed,2. Virtue not a power. that we may with facilitie act Virtuouſly. 2. Hence Ariſtotle proceeds to prove, that Virtue is not a power foreign. For the ſame reaſons alſo virtues may not be ſaid to be powers: p. 405for we are not ſaid to be good, or Evill ſimplie becauſe we have a power of ſuffering: neither are we praiſed, or diſpraiſed. Again we are ſaid to have a power by nature, but we cannot be ſaid to be good, or Evil by nature: Lambinus on this ſaies, that foreign powers are here called foreign affective or paſſive qual…ties, i. e. qualities, wherein there is a certain affective efficacie. 3. Aristotle having proved, that virtue is neither a paſſion, nor a power, he there proceeds to prove, that 'tis an Habit. 3. Virtue an habit.Thus Ethic. lib. 2. cap. 5. foreign. We are to ſay therefore, that all virtue does perfect, and well habituate the ſubject, whereof it is a virtue; as alſo render its work good: as the Virtue of the eys renders the eye good, as likewiſe its work. Hence he concludes foreign. If ſo; then humane virtue muſt be an habit by which a man is made good, and by which alſo he makes his work good. What an habit is,What an habit is. and what is its difference from foreign a Diſpoſition, we may learn more fully out of Aristotle's Commentators, Ammonius, and others. Ammonius in his Comment on Aristotle's Categories makes foreign an habit to be foreign more laſting, and more permanent than a diſpoſition or foreign a diſpoſition becomming by length of time, connatural, or implanted. Galen makes an habit to be foreign a laſting, and hardly d…ſſoluble diſpoſition. So Philo foreign. Qu…nt…lian termes an habit a firme facilitie, i. e. an habit is deeply radicated in its ſubject, whereby 'tis enabled to act with more facilitie. Aristotle Eth. lib 4. cap. 4. ſaies, foreign. An habit is defined by its act, and object. Agen Eth lib. 5. cap. 1. foreign. Oft times a contrarie habit is known by its contrarie, oft times alſo habits are known by their Subjects From which Ariſtotelick notions about habits we learn. 1. That an habit in Morals has much the ſame place, and influence as a forme in Naturals. For by how much the more noble▪ and perfect the habit is, by ſo much the more noble, and perfect will the ſubject, and facultie, which it informs, be. 2. That every habit (as a natural forme) is ordained for, and perfected by its proper Act. 3. That the Nature of an p. 406habit is very congruous to, or agreeable with the nature of its object; whence that determination in the Scholes: That Habits are known by their ſubjects, the mode of their in-being, their objects, and their Acts.

The formal nature of Virtue in Mediocritie.§. 30. Aristotle having diſcourſed of the generick nature of Virtue, and proved▪ that it is not a paſſion, or power, but an habit; he thence proceeds to diſcourſe of its Formal nature, or reaſon, which he places in mediocritie; ſo Ariſt. Eth. l. 2. c. 5. foreign. Virtue is imployed about the affections, and actions, wherein the exceſſe is ſinfull, and the defect alſo blameable: but the mean is praiſed, and held Right. Therefore Virtue is a Mediocritie aiming at the mean, or middle. This Mediocritie of Virtue Aristotle (Eth. lib. 2. cap. 5.) applies to, and makes the meaſure of not only the matter of our actions, but alſo every circumstance. His words are foreign. This mediocritie of Virtue directs when we ought, and in what, & with whom, & for whoſe ſake, and how we muſt act, &c. Whence he conlcudes, that ſin being multiforme, and various is very eaſilie committed; but Virtue by reaſon of its mediocritie being uniforme is very di…ficult, foreign. One may erre many waies (for ſin has a kind of infinitie, whereas good is bounded) but what is right is Simple, or uniforme. Wherefore 'tis eaſie to erre, but difficult to hit the right, for 'tis eaſie to erre from the mark, but difficult to hit it. The like Ariſtot. Mag. Moral. lib. 1. cap. 25. foreign. Virtue is uniforme, but Vice is multiforme. That this uniformitie, or mediocritie is Eſſential to Virtue, and that which gives its formal conſtitution, Ariſtotle Eth. l…b. 2. cap. 6. demonſtrates by comparing it with A…t. For (ſaith he) if exceſſe, and defect do corrupt, but Mediocritie conſerve the perfection of Arts, muſt not moral Virtue which is more excellent than any Art foreign collime, How Virtue conſiſts in Mediocritie.or aim at the Mean, as at its mark? But for the more full Explication of this mediocritie, we are told, that Virtue may be conſidered either foreign, in regard of its Eſſence; and ſo 'tis p. 407foreign a Mean 'twixt defect, and exceſſe, which are the extreams: or elſe Virtue may be conſidered in regard of its perfection foreign, as 'tis good, and best, and ſo it is an extream, which admits of no Exceſſe: for Virtue can never be too good, or perfect, as Ari…t. Eth. lib. 2. cap. 6. where we have alſo the matter, which this mediocritie refers unto, namely foreign, or Affections, and foreign, our actions; in all which there is foreign Exceſſe, defect, and equalitie. Now the mediocritie of Virtue conſiſts in the latter viz. in obſerving that equalitie, or proportion, which is due to all our affections, and actions, to render them morally good. Whence this Equalitie, uniformitie, or mediocritie due to our actions, and affections, is ſtiled foreign a ſymmetrie; as Eth. lib. 2. cap. 3. we find all this excellently explicated to us by Stob…eus Serm. 1. of Virtue, foreign. Virtue is an habit, that keeps a decorum; a decorum is that, which becomes us, and 'tis both an extream, and a medium, or mean: an extream, as it admits neither of ablation, nor addition, but a medium or middle as 'tis betwixt exceſſe, and defect. Whence he concludes againſt the Stoicks foreign.The mediocritie of Virtue harmonie. We may not therefore cut off the affections of the Soul, but harmonize them according to the decorum, and meaſure of reaſon. Hence, elſe where he ſaies foreign that the Mean is be…. This ſymmetrie, or mediocritie of Virtue is ſtiled by Pythagoras, Harmonie. So Laertius tels us, that Pythagoras held foreign Virtue to be Harmonie; yea that all things conſiſted of harmonie. So Polus the Pythagorean in his definition of Justice foreign. Juſtice is the Harmonie, and peace of the whole Soul with uniformitie; as Stob. Serm. 9. which is thus explicated by Plato, Protag. 3. fol. 326. foreign the whole life of man ſhould be compoſed of Ʋniformitie, and good harmon…e. Whence …e cals Virtue the Muſick of the Soul, foreign ▪ and Temperance he ſtiles foreign the harmonie of the affections; and Juſtice foreign a conſent of Virtues: and he gives this general Idea of Vice, and Virtue Phaedo foreign. Vice is a diſharmonie, but Virtue an harmonie. This harmonie, or mediocritie of p. 408Virtue he makes to be alſo foreign, a good order, and foreign, a Symmetrie: yea he makes the Virtue, not only of the Soul, but alſo of the bodie and of every thing elſe to conſiſt foreign in order, and rectitude; whence he ſuppoſeth Eutax…e, ſymmetrie, and harmon…e to be the forme of the Ʋniverſe; Socrates alſo expreſſed this mediocritie of Virtue by harmonie as Stobaeus Ser. 3. foreign. The life being like a muſical Inſtrument harmonized, by intenſion and remiſſion becomes ſweet. So agen foreign. The harmonized life is moſt pleaſant. Theſe ſeveral Ideas of Virtue are all comprehended under, and expreſſed by Ariſtotle's foreign Mediocritie, which implies the Eutaxie, Symmetrie, Ʋniform…tie, and harmon…e of Virtuous affections, and acts: or if we would have all theſe notions of Virtue reſolved into one, we may take that of Plato calling it foreign rectitude. For indeed the harmon…e or mediocritie of Virtue is nothing elſe, but a rectitude of principles, and acts. This ſeems fully expreſſed by Ariſtotle Eth. lib. 4. cap. 5. foreign· all rectitude is from Virtue, and all Virtue implies a Rectitude as 'twill appear by and by.

The meaſure or rule of this mediocritie is Right Reaſon, or the Law of Nature.§. 31. As Aristotle placeth the forme, and eſſence of Virtue in the mediocritie, or Rectitude of principles, and Acts; ſo the formal meaſure or Rule, by which this mediocritie, and Rectitude muſt be regulated, he makes to be Right Reaſon, or the Law of Nature. For every Act is denominated good, from its conformitie to the Law of nature both in matter, End, meaſures, and all circum…tances. So Ariſt. Eth. lib. 3. cap. 8. ſpeaking of Virtue and its mediocritie ſaies; foreign and ſo as right reaſon dictates, or regulates. So agen Eth. lib. 4. cap. 3. foreign. Virtue is not only conſentaneous to right reaſon, but alſo an habit meaſured by, and conjoyned with Right reaſon. So Stobaeus Serm. 1. de Virtut. foreign. Virtue is a Syntaxe, or regular diſpoſition according to right Reaſon. So agen Ariſt. Eth. lib. 2. cap. 2. foreign. Whereby it's evident, Aristotle makes Right Reaſon the meaſure of Virtue, and its mediocritie: So Amyraldus in his Theſes Salmurienſ…s expounds Aristotle's foreign;foreign eſt unicum foreign Virtutis. Right Reaſon (ſaies he) is the only (foreign) Criterion of Virtue's mediocritie. So Parker Theſ. 22. foreign Right Reaſon (as it is the ſame with the Law of Nature) gives the forme to a moral act. But now all the difficultie p. 409is to ſtate what Aristotle meant by his foreign Right Reaſon. For the clearing whereof, we are to know, that Aristotle took up this notion from his Maſter Plato, who by Right Reaſon underſtood the Law of Nature, as we have proved in Plato's Philoſophie, Chap. 7. §. 6. Whence this Right Reaſon is by him ſtiled the Royal Law. So Plato Minos fol. 317. foreign Right Reaſon is the Royal Law, i. e. The Law of Nature, which received a new edition by Moſes, called the Moral Law, (i. e. as 'tis the meaſure of moral good, and Evill) whereof Plato received many notices, and traditions: as elſe where. This Right Reaſon is ſtiled by the Stoicks the common Law. So Diog. Laert. in Zeno ſaith, that the Stoicks held nothing ſhould be done, but what was agreeable to the Common Law, which is Right Reaſon: foreign. The Common Law, which is Right Reaſon, yea Ariſtotle himſelf ſeems to Enterpret his Right Reaſon ſo, as that it can be underſtood of nothing more properly, than of the Law of Nature Common to all men: So Ariſt. Rhetor. lib. 1. cap. 14. foreign. &c. There is a twofold Law, one private, another common. The Common Law is that, which is according to Nature, for it is that, whereby all men learn by Nature, what is juſt, and what is unjuſt, without any particular conſociation, or covenant amongſt themſelves. Thus Ariſtotle: wherein he diſtinguiſheth the private Laws of particular Nations, or Societies from the Common Law of Nature, which he makes the meaſure of Moral good, and Evil. This Common Law of Nature Aristotle makes the Source of all private Laws; and that which gives check unto them when in Exceſſe, or defect: ſo Ariſt. Eth. lib. 2. cap. 25. foreign, all private Laws need to be corrected by the Ʋniverſal Law. Whence this Law of Nature is made the ſame with foreign the Law of Equitie, which is to give check to all private conſtitutions. And that Aristotle's foreign Right Reaſon is the ſame with his foreign Common Law of Nature, 'tis evident by the definition he gives of Justice, or Righteouſneſſe. Ariſt. Rbet. lib. 1. cap. 9. foreign. Juſtice or Righteouſneſſe is a Virtue, by which every one has what is his own, and as the Law dictates to them, who are ſubject to it. Whereby he makes the Law the meaſure of what is Righteous. So in his Eth. lib. 5. cap. 2. foreign p. 410foreign a just man is he, that lives by Law, and Equitie, i. e. according to that Law of Equitie, or Nature, which is common to all. Whence Aristotle Rhet. lib. 3. cap. 17. foreign the Law is the standard, or meaſure in all Judicial proceedings, i. e. all moral good, and Evil is meaſured by ſome Law of Nature Common to all, as civil good▪ and Evil by civil private Laws. Thence Ariſtotle Ethic. lib. 5. cap. 2. ſaies, foreign. That is just therefore, which is according to Law, and Equitie. What Ariſtotle attributes to Justice is by a paritie of reaſon applicable to all moral good, or virtue. By all which it's evident, that Aristotle's foreign Right Reaſon (which he makes the meaſure of moral good and Evil) is the ſame with his foreign Common Law of Nature, which gives the forme, and meaſure to Common Juſtice, and all other moral Virtues. Whence that of Plato Repub. 9. foreign; that is greatly distant from Right reaſon, which is distant from Law, and order. Hence again Plato, Gorg. 504. tells us. That as health, beautie and other Virtues of the bodie proceed from the regular order or exact temperament thereof; ſo the health, beautie, and other virtues of the Soul from its regularitie foreign, whence the Soul's actions are regular, and beautifull. Such is Righteouſneſſe, Temperance, &c. So that we may conclude that 'tis not any ſubjective Right Reaſon, or Light of Nature, which is the meaſure of moral good, and Evil; but an objective Right reaſon, or the Common Law of Nature, which is the ſame with God's Law called Moral, becauſe it gives Forme and meaſure to all moral good. So that Ariſtotle's Right reaſon, which he makes the meaſure foreign of the rectitude, and mediocritie of Virtue, muſt be reſolved into God's moral Law (which is but a new promulgation of the Law of Nature) as the alone adequate Rule, and meaſure of all moral good and Evill. Thence the perfection, or defect of all goodneſſe, or Virtue muſt be meaſured by its acceſſe, and conformitie to, or receſſe and difformitie from this firſt moral Rule, or Law: for moral goodneſſe being nothing elſe, but a relation or conformitie to the Rule of moralitie, it neceſſarily follows, that every moral being is ſo far morally good, or Evil, as it conformes to, or difformes from this moral Rule, or Law. And albeit the leaſt declen…ion, or aberration from this moral Law will denominate an p. 411humane act morally Evill; yet there is required a perfect concurrence of all cauſes, or an entire conformitie to this Rule, to beſpeak an act morally good: according to that approved maxime in the Scholes (founded on the light of nature,Bonum ex cauſis integris malum ex quoliber defectu. and general conſent) Good requires all its cauſes, but Evil ſprings from every defect. Hence alſo it follows, that this moral Law muſt neceſſarily be moſt perfect: For otherwiſe it cannot be the firſt meaſure or Rule of moral goodneſſe, according to that of Plato foreign. A defective meaſure is not a meaſure: for what is imperfect cannot meaſure any thing. This perfection of the natural, or moral Law conſiſteth in two things. 1. In the perfection of its End. Plat. Legib. 1. foreign, &c. All Laws must tend to the best End. 2. In its amplitude or Extention to all objects: a…l Lawgiver, ſaies Plato, muſt regard all virtue as Pſal. 119.96.

§. 32. Having gone thorough all the cauſes of moral virtue;The Idea o… definition of moral Virtue. which are firſt its ſubject foreign a voluntarie Agent, and Act. 2 its Genus, which is foreign an habit. 8. Its Forme, which is foreign mediocritie, or foreign Rectitude. 4 the Rule, and meaſure of this Forme, which is foreign Right Reaſon, called foreign, the Common Law of Nature; it is eaſie hence to forme a Definition of moral Virtue, which Ariſtotle has done to our hands. Ariſt. Eth. l. 2. c. 6. foreign. Virtue is an Elective habit conſiſting in mediocritie of things relating to us, defined by reaſon, and ſo as a wiſe man defines. In which definition are theſe obſervables, 1. The Genus whis is foreign an habit not foreign a power, not foreign a paſſion. 2. The ſpecifick difference, which is foreign Elective; whereby moral habits, or Virtues are diſtinguiſhed from Intellectual Arts, and Sciences, which are alſo habits. 3. Here is the ſubject matter, or object of moral virtue expreſſed by foreign what relates to us, or is in our power, which is the ſame with foreign, what is voluntarie. 4. Here is the Forme of Virtue, which conſiſts foreign in mediocritie or re…itude ▪ 5. Here is the formal meaſure of this mediocritie, expreſſed by foreign which is the ſame with foreign …ight …eaſon; (as before) We find the ſame repeated more particularlie though not ſo exactly, by Ariſtotle Eth. lib. 3. cap. 3. foreign p. 412foreign. We have ſaid of Virtues, that they are mediocrities; and that they are habits, and that they are of themſelves deſireable; and that they are of things in our power and voluntarie; and ſo as right reaſon preſcribes Wherein we have all the ſeveral ingredients of Virtue enumerated. We find a definition of Virtue much the ſame for ſubſtance given by Plato Meno. foreign. Virtue is an habit of the Soul, by the concurrence of the natural power, working that which is beſt, according to reaſon, and tending to the beſt End.1. Virtue conſiſts of the beſt End and beſt work. From theſe Eſſential Ideas of Virtue we may draw theſe concluſions. 1. That true Virtue requires not only a good work, or matter, but the beſt End, which muſt informe this matter, as the Soul the bodie. 2. Hence alſo it follows, that all Virtues have one and the ſame uniforme, 2. All Virtues have one and the ſame Idea.harmonious, ſimple Idea; in that they proceed all from the ſame divine habits, or principles, and tend to the ſame divine End. Thus Ariſtotle Eth. lib. 2. cap. 6. foreign. Good men act ſimplie and uniformelie, but wicked men variouſly. Whence he addes foreign. For ſin is infinite, but good is definite, and uniforme. So Plato Protag. fol 379. foreign. Virtue is one, but its parts are Righteouſneſſe, temperance, and holineſſe. So Plato Rep. 4. fol. 445. foreign to me the face of Virtue ſeems to be one; whence virtue is ſtiled by him foreign, Concent, and foreign ſymmetrie, and foreign harmonie. Whence alſo the Stoicks held foreign all virtues are equal, or alike.

What Vice is.§. 33. Having given a full Idea of Virtue, and that according to Ariſtotle's mind, we need not ſpend time in extracting his Idea of Vice or ſin: for he himſelf acquaints us Ethic. lib. 5. cap. 1. foreign a contrarie habit is known by its contrarie. As in Logick the affirmative being well ſtated, the negative is eaſilie diſcovered; ſo in Morals, virtue being well explicated, the Idea or face of vice is ſoon unmask'd. Thus as virtue requires an integritie of cauſes, and full concurrence of all circumſtances: ſo Aristotle tels us, that vice proceeds from any defect of either moral cauſe, or circumſtance, as Ethic. lib. 3. cap. 10. Art. 5. foreign. Vices ariſe either p. 413when men do what they ought not, or as they ought not, or when they ought not, or the like, i. e. when there is any defect in matter, or forme and manner, or time, or ſuch like. Agen, Ariſtot. Eth. lib. 2. cap. 5. tels us, as good is bounded by mediocritie, and Right Reaſon, and therefore uniforme; ſo Evil, is boundleſſe and infinite foreign. Sin is various; for Evil is infinite. Agen, wh…eas he defines Virtue a mediocritie foreign, according to Right Reaſon; he tels us Eth. lib. 1. cap. 13. that Vice is foreign, ſomewhat beſides, or beyond Reaſon. So Stobaeus Ser. 1. foreign Sin is a tranſgreſſion beſides right reaſon. Farther, Aristotle in his Eth. lib. 5. tels us, that foreign. Juſt is lawfull, and equal, but unjuſt, illegal, and unequal; according to the Scriptural definition of ſin, foreign ſin is an Illegalitie, or a tranſgreſſion of the Law. This Ariſtotle Eth. lib. 5. cap. 2. cals foreign a tranſgreſſion of the Law. So Art. 7. foreign an unjuſt man therefore ſeems to be a tranſgreſſor of the Law. The like Art. 13. foreign what is unjust is a tranſgreſſing of the Law, and unequal. Yea Ari…otle concludes Art. 24. foreign. This Tranſgre…ion of the Law comprehends all injuſtice, and is common to all iniquitie. The like Ariſtotle layes down in his Rhetor. lib. 1. cap. 9. where, having defined Righteouſneſſe to be a Virtue according to Law, he ſaies foreign. Unrighteouſneſſe is that, whereby we invade other mens rights, againſt Law. So Ariſt. Rhet. lib. 1. cap. 10. foreign to act unjustly is Voluntarilie to hurt again… law And in his Eth. lib. 2. cap. 1. he ſaies foreign. The Will of every Lawgiver is ſuch as that they, who act not according to it, ſin. Thus alſo ſin is ſtiled by his maſter Plato foreign Ataxie, foreign aſymmetrie, foreign Pleonexie, or Exorbitancie, oppoſite to the Eutaxie, ſymmetrie, and mediocritie of Virtue. So Plato foreign, Vice is an Exorbitancie, or intemperate Exceſſe: a metaphor taken from the ſu…rabundance of any humour in the bodie called foreign. Thence defin. Plat. fol. 416. foreign Sin is a practice againſt right reaſon. So Agen, foreign injuſtice is an habit, overlooking or neglecting Laws. Whence ſin alſo is held by Plato foreign, &c. But thus much for Ariſtotle's Ethicks in general.

p. 414Ariſtotle's Phyſicks.§. 34. We now proceed to Ariſtotle's Phyſicks, wherein he aſſerts, and demonſtrates 1. God's univerſal Concurſe the firſt mover in all motions;1. Of God's univerſal cauſalitie as the firſt mover. ſo Johan. Grammat. in Arist. de Anima proaem fol. 10. foreign. Aristotle in his Phyſicks about the End, diſputing of Motion, & in quiring into its cauſe, elevated himſelf to the firſt cauſe, and priple of motion. And he ſaid, that the firſt mover ought to be immobile: for if he alſo ſhould be moved, the things moved would not continue in motion, as if there were things alwayes mobile, it neceſſarily follows, that their mobile would be immobile. Thence Aristotle extolling the firſt mover, that he was incorporeous, eternal, and omnipotent ſaies, that on ſuch a principle depends the heaven and world. For it behoveth a perfect Phyſiologiſt, after he has handled the natural cauſes, not to reſt in theſe, but to aſcend to the ſeparate or ſupernatural: thus Aristotle has done in his book of Generation, and Corruption. The ſame is mentioned by Ammon…us in Ariſt. Categ. as before §. 14. ſee Simplicius in his comment. on Ariſt. Phyſ. lib. 8.2. That the Soul is incorporeous and immortal. large here about. 2. Ariſtotle aſſerts alſo in his Phyſicks the immortalitie, and immaterialitie of the humane Soul. So Joh. Gramm. in Ariſt. de anima proaem fol. 7. Ariſtotle, ſaith he, delivered a Canon proving the Soul to be immortal. The Canon is this foreign. We ought, ſaies he, by the operation to judge of the Eſſence, becauſe everie Eſſence has an operation ſuited to it. Agen another Canon is this every Eſſence, that has an operation ſeparate from the bodie, muſt of neceſſitie be ſeparate from the bodie; For otherwiſe the effect will be more noble than the cauſe Then he proves the minor, that the Soul has operations ſeparate from, and independent on the bodie, as the contemplation of God, it ſelf, and other ſpiritual objects. And p. 415Diogenes in Ariſtotle ſaies, that Ariſtotle held foreign that the Soul is incorporeous.

§. 35. As for Aristotle's Metaphyſicks, Ariſtotle's Metaphyſicks.Ammonius ſtiles them his Theologicks. So Ammon in Arist. Categ. pag. 11. Ariſtotle's Theolologicks are thoſe he writ after his Phyſick Exercitation, which he calls Metaphyſicks, becauſe it is proper to Theologie to treat of things above Nature. Hence Ariſtotle's Metaphyſicks paſſe in the Scholes under the ſplendid title of Natural Theologie, though indeed it contains nothing, but a few fragments, he procured from his maſter Plato, and the more ancient Philoſophers (who traded much in Jewiſh traditions) touching God, his Ʋnitie, Veritie, Bonitie, &c. alſo the Angels (which Ariſtotle cals Intelligen…es) and of the Soul in its ſeparate ſtate, concerning which Ariſtotle ſometimes ſeems foreign to heſitate; ſaying foreign as before §. 3. But to come to the generick nature of Ariſtotle's Metaphyſicks, which he makes to be Sapience, whereof he diſcourſeth at large in the Proëme to his Metaphyſicks as 'tis well obſerved by Stobaeus, Serm. 3.Ariſtotle's metaphyſicks called by him the firſt Philoſophie, or Theologie. of Wiſdome foreign. 'Twas Ariſtotle's cuſtome to call the ſame Science, both Wiſdome and the firſt Philoſophie, and Metaphyſicks, and Theologie. Then (Ariſtotle addes) foreign,A character of Ariſtotle's Sapience the object whereof is. 1. Things moſt univerſal. 2. Things moſt difficult. 3. The firſt cauſes. 4. Sapience is deſireable for it ſelf. 5. Sapience is architectonick and Principal. &c. Firſt we conceive a wiſe man knows all things ſo far as 'tis poſſible yet ſo, as that he has not a particular (but only univerſal) knowledge of them. (2.) Thence we count him a wiſe man who is able to underſtand things difficult; not only ſuch as are eaſie (3) farther we judge him moſt wiſe in all Science, who moſt exactly conſiders, and underſtands the firſt cauſes. (4.) And of Sciences, that which is eligible for it ſelf, and for its own knowledge is rather Wiſdome, than that, which is deſireable for its effect. (5.) And that Science which is more principal comes nearer Sapience, than that which is ſubordinate: p. 416for it becomes not a wiſe man to take precepts from others, but to give precepts.6. Sapience is of things moſt univerſal and immaterial. (6.) And for the moſt part things moſt Univerſal are moſt difficult to be known by men; for ſuch things are moſt remote from ſenſe. (7.) Thoſe alſo are the moſt accurate of Sciences,7. Of things firſt, and moſt excellent. which are of things moſtly firſt. Thus Ariſtotle in his proeme to his Metaphyſicks, and Stobaeus out of him. Wherein we have a full character of Sapience or Metaphyſicks, which is here deſcribed both in relation to its Object, and Nature. 1. As for the object of Sapience, Ariſtotle ſaies it is 1. of things moſt Ʋniverſal, and remote from ſenſe. 2. Of things moſt difficult, and excellent or rare. 3. Of the firſt principles, and cauſes of things, as of God, &c. 2. As for the Nature of Sapience, Aristotle tels us, it is 1. moſt deſireable for it ſelf, and for its own knowledge, not for any effect, that flows from it. 2. It is the Architectonick or principal Science, not miniſterial, Sapience or Metaphyſicks The moſt noble, divine, and excellent of all Sciences.or Subordinate, &c, Whence alſo Ariſtotle addes foreign As we ſay a man is free, who is ſu…juris, for himſelf, and not for another: ſo this Sapience is the moſt free, and noble of all Sciences; for it alone is for it ſelf, and not for any other Science, whence alſo it appeares to be divine, and the moſt excellent of all Sciences.Ariſtotle's Sapience applicable to none but God, and things Divine. Theſe Characters, which Ariſtotle gives to his divine Sapience, or Metaphyſicks, are applicable to no Science but the Contemplation of God, and things Divine. For God alone is the Firſt, and moſt excellent being, the firſt principle, and cauſe of all things: and therefore the knowledge of him is the only true Sapience, deſireable for it ſelf, and moſt principal, divine, and excellent. This farther appears by the object of Metaphyſicks; Now though Ariſtotle makes the Adequate Object of Metaphyſicks to be foreign Ens, Being in its moſt Ʋinverſal latitude; yet the Principal Object he makes to be the Prime Being and Univerſal cauſe of all other Beings, God himſelf, as did Plato his Maſter before him, calling God ſometimes foreign very being, ſometimes foreign truely Being, ſometimes foreign the firſt Being, and moſt frequently foreign The Be…ng, clothed with Ʋnit…e, veritie, Goodneſſe, &c. whence perhaps Ariſtotle alſo made Ʋnitie, Veritie, and Goodneſſe Affections of his Ens, in Genere.