The Court of the Gentiles Part 2, Book 3 · Chapter 8
CHAP. VIII. Of Plato's Logick, and it's derivation from the Jews.
Plato's forme of Logick conſiſting in Dialogues: their uſe in the Eleatick Schole, but their original uſe amongſt the Jews. Scripture Logick in Dialogizing, as in Job, the Prophets, Mark 8.11. Luke 22.68. Rom. 11.1. Luke 11.53, 54. Logick an Organ, or key to all Sciences. Plato's Logick precepts. 1. A Logicia… muſt be grave, and moderate, not contentious. Contentious Diſputes the cauſe of Scepticiſme. 2. The Matter of Diſputes muſt be weighty. 3. To lay down good principles. 4. To proceed Methodically from particulars to generals, &c. 5. To illuſtrate by examples. 6. To diſtinguiſh duelie 'twixt Truth, and falſhood. 7. To State will the affirmative. 8. Not to expect more exactneſſe, than matters will bear. 9. To keep the Judgment free. 10. To make Reaſon, not Authoritie the meaſure of Truth. 11. Modeſtie, and Candor in Diſputes. 12. In refuting Errors to reduce to abſurditie. 13. To ſhew the riſe of Error. Alcinous of Plato's Logick.
§. 1.Plato's mode, or Forme of Logick conſiſting in Dialogues. PHiloſophie may be conſidered in it's Eſſential conſtitutive particulars; or elſe in its introductorie univerſal Organ· The Introductorie univerſal organ, or key to all Philoſophie is Logick; which Plato makes much uſe of in all his Philoſophizings, though not according to the mode, as now it is in uſe in our Scholes. For Plato imitating his maſter Socrates; and thoſe of the Eleatick Schole, Parmenides, and Zeno (who are ſuppoſed to be the firſt Inventors of Logick) affect a natural, plain, and familiar mode of Diſputing by Dialogues, or Interrogations, and Reſponſions, much like the Scriptural, and Jewiſh way of Diſputation. That the Mode, or Forme of Diſputing in Plato's Academie, was not by way of Syllogiſme (which Ariſtotle brought in) but by Interrogations, and Anſwers, is apparent to any verſ'd in Plato's Philoſophie, which is wrapt up in Dialogues beginning with foreign, or ſuch like Interrogations. This is farther evident from the Origination of the name foreign (which Plato uſeth for the moſt part, if not altogether, to expreſſe Logick by) Dialectick, which is apparently derived from foreign, the primarie notation whereof is to Conferre, or Diſpute by Dialogues, or Colloquies. Thus Alexander foreign, Dialectick makes diſcourſes conſiſting of Interrogations, and Reſponſes: for from theſe it wholly derived it's name. So Laertius l. 3. ſaies, That a Dialogue is an Oration compoſed of Interrogation, and Reſponſion, concerning matters relating to Philoſophie, or Republick Affairs.
The original of this Dialogizing mode, from the Eleatick Schole of Zeno.As for the Original of this Dialogizing Mode, 'tis not certainly determined whence Plato had it. Some ſay he himſelf was the Author of it; others derive it from Zeno the Eleatick, others from others. So Lud. Vives on August. Civit. Dei lib. 8. cap. 7. There are ſome, who refer this kind of Dialectick oration to Plato, as the Inventor thereof; as Favorinus: others to Alexamenus Teius, as Ariſtotle: there are not wanting ſome, who refer it to Zeno the Eleatick. Truly it is evident, that Plato poliſhed, and adorned this mode of Dialogizing (or arguing by Dialogues) which he fils with all kind of neatneſſes, and learning, wherein if the artificial formules of Dialectick (or Logick) are not delivered, yet all the precepts of this Art are really expreſſed, as alſo the method, how to uſe them. Plato gives us Demonſtration in his Timaeus: the ſpecimens of Sophiſtrie are delivered in his Eutydemus; whence Ariſtotle tranſlated not a few of his Sophiſtick Elenches, or Fallacies: Plato's Socratick Induction is of all moſt potent, &c. Thus Lud. Vives: wherein he gives us a good account of Plato's Logick, and its original; which as it ſeems moſt probable, was by him, or by his Maſter Socrates derived immediately from the Eleatick Schole, from Parmenides, and Zeno: for the ſame Lud. Vives (in Auguſt. Civit. Dei lib. 8. cap. 4.) tells us, that Plato diligently examined the Inventions of Parmenides, and Zeno the Eleaticks. And Ariſtotle in Sophiſta, as alſo Laertius in Zeno acquaints us, that Logick was firſt found out by Zeno the Eleatick. So Voſſius de Hiſtor. Graec. lib. 4. cap. 2. agen, Voſſius de Philoſoph. Sect. lib. 2. cap. 11. §. 2, 3. And Hornius who ſucceeded him in his Profeſſorſhip, agrees with him in his Opinion hereabout: Plato primus Dialogos introduxit non quod ipſe primus invenerit, (ante eum enim Zeno ſcripſit) ſed quod expoliverit. Hornius Hiſtor. Philoſ. l. 7. c. 8. Dialogues are ſaid to have been firſt introduced by Plato, not as if he had been the firſt Inventor of them (for Zeno writ in that way before him) but becauſe he very much poliſhed, and perfected that way of Arguing: to this purpoſe Hornius. But whence ever Plato derived this Dialogizing mode of Logick, that it came originally from the Jewiſh Church, and Sacred Scriptures, we ſhall endeavour to demonſtrate both by Artificial, and Inartificial arguments.
§. 2. Firſt, Suppoſe we grant, that Plato, Plato's Dialogizing Logick originally from the Jews.and Socrates received this forme of Dialogizing Logick from Parmenides, or Zeno the Eleatick; yet that theſe had their choiceſt notions from the Jews, we have afore, in our diſcourſe of the Eleatick Philoſophie, endeavoured to prove: and particularly that Zeno the Eleatick (who is ſuppoſed to be the Inventor of Dialectick Logick) was originally of Tarſis, or as others of Sidon, and ſo a Phenician, and borderer on the Jews, &c.
2. But to come to Plato's own confeſſion: In his Thaeetetus, fol. 210. Plato brings in Socrates ſtiling this Art of diſputing by Dialogues a playing the Midwife: The true way of teaching (ſaith he) is by apt Interrogations, and Anſwers to bring forth the faetus, i. e. the ſenſe of our minds into light: which is in regard of Diſcipline a commodious foreign, obſtetrication, or doing the office of a Midwife. This art of playing the Midwife, or Dialectick Logick, Socrates (in the ſame place confeſſeth) that he received from God, his words are, foreign, This Midwife art I, and my Mother received from God. i. e. the true God of Iſrael (of whom he ſeems to have had ſome notices) by ſome Jewiſh Tradition, as we may preſume.
The Scripture mode of diſputing by Dialogues.3. That this Platonick mode of Diſputing by dialogues, or interrogations, and anſwers, exactly anſwers to (and therefore as we may juſtly preſume was derived from) the Jewiſh mode of diſputing, will be more than probable to ſuch, as ſhall conſider ſuch diſputes as are mentioned in Scripture. We find in the book of Job (one of the moſt ancient pieces of Scripture) ſeveral Diſputes 'twixt Job, and his Friends carried on in a Dialectick mode, by queſtions, and anſwers. So in like manner, in the Prophets, God (condeſcending to the Jewiſh manner of reaſoning) frequently argues, and debates matters with his people in a way of dialogue, or interrogation, &c. Yea this manner of diſputing, or debating matters, continued amongſt the Jews 'till our Saviour's time, as appears by his Diſputes with the Jewiſh Doctors, Scribes, and Phariſees, as alſo their reaſonings with him, which were for the moſt part, if not altogether, managed by queſtions, and anſwers; not by Syllogiſmes. So Mark 8.11. The Phariſees are ſaid to diſpute with Chri…: where Grotius on foreign obſerves, that the moſt ancient mode of Diſputation was by Interrogations. Thus in like manner on Luke 22.68. Grotius renders foreign, [if I ſhall propoſe any arguments.] for addes he, the Hebrews, no leſſe th…n the Grecians were wont to diſpute by Interrogations. So agen, on Rom. 11.1. He with whom Paul diſputes propoſeth a queſtion, to which Paul a…ſwers, &c. as Grotius. So on Luke 11.53, 54. Grotius obſerves, that the wo…d foreign is taken from the Scholes, & ſignifies to poſe by queſtions, &c. as before in Socrates's mode of Philoſophizing.
Laſtly, That the Ancients generally, before Ariſtotle, diſputed by Interrogations is evident by what is obſerved by Ariſtotle in his Sophiſtick Elenches, where he makes mention of a Fallacie amongſt the Ancients called a Fallacie of many Interrogations. By all …hich it manifeſtly appears, that the mode of diſputing amongſt the An…ients, particularly in Plato's Schole, was by Interrogations, and Reſponſions, conformable unto, and therefore, as we may juſtly preſume▪ in derivation from the Jews their mode of …ialogizing. Thus was Logick amongſt the Ancients clothed in a more natural, familiar, ſimple dreſſe, ſuitable to things, without thoſe cloudie Niceties, and dark crabbed Termes, which ſerve only to breed needleſſe, and endleſſe contentions, as it has been well obſerved by Jackſon on the Scripture, fol. 57. as all the principal heads of the Grecian invention were derived for the moſt part from the Hebrews; although by ſucceſſive artificial imitation, their varietie grows greater, and their reſemblance of Divine Truth leſſe, ſo likewiſe were Logical conceits firſt clothed like Natures Children, &c. Thus much for the Forme of Plato's Logick, and it's cognation with that in uſe amongſt the Jews.
§. 3. We ſhall proceed to make a more particular diſtinct inquiſition into Plato's Logick, which he makes to be a key,Logick a Key, Organ, or Method for the diſquiſition of Truth. or induction to all Philoſophie: ſo in Repub. lib. 7. fol. 518. Plato calls his Dialectick foreign, an introductorie Art. So agen fol. 532. he calls it foreign, the way to other Sciences: & fol. 533. he ſtiles it a method, wherein by certain ſteps we at laſt aſcend to the higheſt principles. Whence Plato makes his Dialectick but a gradation to his Metaphyſicks, and therefore he oft confounds them, and mixeth them together in his Diſcourſes. So in his Pa…menides, and Sophiſta he mixeth foreign, his Metaphyſicks, and Dialectick diſcourſes together, as 'tis well obſerved by Lud. Vives …n Auguſt. Civit. lib. 8. cap. 4o. And herein Plato is follo…ed by his Scholar Ariſtotle, who calls his Logick alſo foreign, an Organ, or Inſtrument for the diſcoverie of other Sciences; only with this difference, whereas Ariſtotle ſeems to make Logick an organ, but no part of Philoſophie, Plato … it to be both. So Ammonius on Ariſtotle's Categor. pag. 8 foreign. Amongſt the ancient Philoſophers, ſome made Logick to be a part of Philoſophie as the whole Chorus of the Stoa: others made it an Organ, as all thoſe of the Paripatum: but Plato makes Logick both a part, and organ of Philoſophie, &c. The Ancients were wont to diſtribute their Sciences into three parts, foreign, the Dogme, or Principle, the Method, the Praxis. The Method of all Sciences belongs to Logick, for ſo Ariſtotle, as well as Plato defines Logick foreign, a Method for the right diſpoſing of every Probleme propoſed: only Ariſtotle calls this Method foreign Syllogiſtick, whereas Plato makes it to be Dialectick. So then we may according to Plato's mind, define Logick, an organ, meanes, way, or method for the diſquiſition, and finding out of the Truth. This fully agrees with the definition Plato gives of a good Logician. Plat. Repub. 7 fol. 537. foreign Thou calleſt a Logician him who penetrates the eſſence of things. For a Logician is a very accurate Inquiſitor, or Inſpector. This being the nature of Logick, and office of a Logician to make a ſerious Inquiſition into the nature of things, in order to the diſquiſition of Truth, we ſhall endeavour to pick up ſuch Methodical precepts, and Rules as lye ſcattered here and there in Plato's Philoſophie, and ſeem to comprize the chief of his Logick, Plato's Logick Precepts for the diſquiſition of Truth. 1. A Logician muſt be of ripe age, Grave, Moderate, not vain glorious, or contentious.or Method for the finding out of Truth.
§. 4. Firſt, as to the qualification of Logicians, and their regular procedure in Logical ſtudies, and debates. Plato requireth, that a Logician be of a mature, and ripe judgment, moderate, and calme as to his paſſions, modeſt, candid, and ingenuous in all his diſputes; not vain glorious, not contentious, but grave, and moderate in the whole of his deportment. Thus Plato de Repub. 7. (fol. 539. Edit. Stephan.) That the miſerable iſſue of vain contention may be avoided, be it provided that no one under 30 years of age ſhall taſte of Dialectick Ratiocination; and then not without great caution, and circumſpection. Thus Plato; who in what follows gives his reaſon of ſuch his Inſtitute: Becauſe young men, when engaged in Dialetick diſputes doe rather aime at Victorie, and vain glory, than the diſcoverie of Truth; and thence abuſing this Art of Logick unto needleſſe contradictions foreign, uſing it alwaies for contradiction, they like young Puppies often overcome, and are oft overcome again, ſo long 'till at laſt they come to believe nothing at all. But (addes Plato) your grave perſon of mature judgment foreign &c. would not willingly be partaker of this madneſſe, becauſe in his diſputing he ſeeks rather Truth, than Victorie, or Glorie, which is the proper effect of Childiſh Contentious Diſputes. Agen he addes foreign, The Ancient Perſon is more moderate, or regular, and ſo adorneth his Province with gravitie, candor, and moderation, &c.
How far the old Academie was guiltie of contentious Diſputes, which gave riſe to the new Academick foreign.Albeit Plato is thus ſevere againſt Contentious wrangling Logick, yet it cannot be denyed, but that there were, at leaſt after his death, many vexatious queſtions, and contentious diſputes in his Old Academie, which laid the foundation of that foreign, or ſuſpenſion of judgement in the New Academie. For we muſt remember there was allowed by Plato in his Academie, foreign, a peirastick, or probational mode of diſputing: the Laws whereof allowed, that in ſome dubious points it was free for any to diſpute pro, or contra, for, or againſt the poſition, and at laſt to leave it foreign, undefin'd, See more of this Academick foreign in what precedes of Plato's Academie.or undetermined. And that which gave an occaſion to this Sceptick mode of diſputing was this, that although Plato held ſome things certain, and infallibly true, which ought to be certainly aſſented to, as the Exiſtence of God &c. yet he held alſo many other points, eſpecially in Phyſicks, to be very dubious, and uncertain, wherein he preſumed there might be a Libertie granted of diſputing pro, or contra, without prejudice to Truth: whence ſprang many contentious diſputes, which at laſt determined in the New Academick foreign ſuſpenſion, or disbelief of every thing. So Serranus in his Preface to Plato: It is no way to be doubted, but that the foreign, and dubitations of the New Academicks were the foreign, and corruptions of the old opinion: for Plato in ſome Arguments diſputes both waies, &c. And indeed nothing is more natural than that from diſputes, & contentions pro, and contra, if not well mannag'd, Aſſent to Truth ſhould be much weaken'd. This contentious kind of Logick made the Stoicks, & Cynicks ('twixt whom there was a great foreign, or ſymbolization) reject rational, & natural Philoſophie, becauſe it was man's foreign, and chief end, foreign to live virtuouſly, as Diog. Laertius.
§. 5. Secondly, Another Logick Precept laid down by Plato, is this; That the matter of Logical diſcuſſions be weightie, and uſeful,2. R. The matter of Logick debates muſt be momentous and uſeful. not frivolous, or unneceſſarie: So in his Phaedrus fol. 277. Plato compares a Logician to a skilful Seedſman, who ſoweth ſuch Dialectick artificial notions, and diſcourſes, as will bring forth the beſt fruit for uſe and advantage. This is the more diligently to be heeded, becauſe in Dialectick Debates nothing is more eaſie to be found, than an occaſion of diſputing about Chimera's, &c. This Rule follows on the foregoing, and therefore needs not farther illuſtration.
3. A Third Rule given by Plato, 3. Rule for the laying good foundation Principles.in order to a Logical diſquiſition of Truth is that we be ſure to lay down ſound, and ſubſtantial Principles, as the foundation of all following diſcourſe, and concluſions. Thus Plato in his Philebus, being about to diſpute, he will have them firſt lay down by common conſent ſome few foundation Principles: His own words are fol. 20. theſe, foreign, Let us lay down a few confeſſed principles before us: and then addes the reaſon foreign, Principles fairly granted are immoveable. So agen Plato in Cratylus fol. 436. foreign, every man ought about the firſt Principle of any undertaking to diſcourſe much, and to conſider much whether it be rightly laid or not. This is of great moment, becauſe according to that meaſure of ſtrength, or weaknes which is in the Principles, ſuch will be the ſtrength, or weaknes of the Concluſions. Whence that old maxime quoted by Ariſtotle, The Principle is half the whole. i. e. Lay a good Principle, and your work is half done. The firſt Principle gives light to all following Principles, but receives none from them.
4. R. A methodical procedure from particulars to generals, from part to the whole.4. Rule for Dialectick diſcourſe is this, That there be a methodick procedure from certain plain Hypotheſes, or evident conceſſions, to thoſe things, which are more general, obſcure, and of an higher contemplation. Thus Plato Repub. 7. fol. 533. foreign, where Plato makes Logick to be nothing elſe than a Method, whereby we proceed from ſome certain, and plain Hypotheſes, by certain medium's or aſſents, to the higheſt, and firſt Principle, or Truth. This Method which Plato commends, whereby we proceed from the particular to the general, from the effect, to the cauſe, and from the end to the beginning, is uſually ſtiled in the Scholes Analytick method, whereof (as 'tis ſaid) Plato was the firſt Inventor. Certainly ſuch a procedure from effects to their cauſes, and from particulars to generals muſt be of great uſe for the diſcoverie of Truth. For there is nothing can be rightly known, 'till the firſt cauſes, whence it ſprang, be made manifeſt. Particulars receive ſtrength and certainty from generals, out of which they grow, and generals receive light, and evidence from particulars. In all parts of knowledge things moſt general are moſt firme, on which the certaintie of particulars depends. See les conferences par beaux Eſprits. Tom. 1. Conf. 1. This alſo is commended by Ammonius in Ariſt. Categ. pag. 13. foreign, He that will exactly understand the nature of the whole, muſt exactly conſider its parts.
5. R. The uſe of Examples.5. Rule. Plato preſcribeth the uſe of Examples, and clear illuſtrations, as neceſſarie in Logick diſcourſe for the evidencing of Truth. So in his Politicus fol. 277. It is very hard (ſaies he) to demonſtrate any thing, that is great, or tranſcendent without Examples: for every ones knowledge ſeems to be but dreaming: we are indeed ignorant of every thing. And Serranus on this place Comments thus, Plato wils, that in our inquiſitions into the natures of things more obſcure, we place before our underſtanding foreign, or foreign, the exemplars, and adumbrations of things more known, thereby to make our inveſtigation more facile, and ſpeedie. Therefore in ſearching into the natures of great things we are to make uſe of the examples of the leaſt things. Neither was this Plato's advice only, but his practice alſo. For none of the Ancients (yea may not we ſay of the Moderns alſo?) may be compared with him as to the uſe of proper, and accurate examples, and inſtances for the illuſtration of Truth. Whence that Proverbial ſpeech, Plato teacheth, Ariſtotle proveth:
§. 6. Rule for Logical diſquiſitions is this;6. R. To diſtinguiſh rightly 'twixt Truth, and Falſhood. 'To diſtinguiſh well betwixt Truth, and Falſhood. So Plato in his Gorgias, fol. 507 tels us, that we muſt be exceeding exact in ſevering Truth from Falſhood; for the better performing whereof, he acquaints us (Repub. 7. fol. 537.) that a Logician muſt be foreign an accurate Inquiſitor: and elſewhere he laies down this as requiſite for one, that would exactly difference Truth from Falſhood, that he have Sagacitie, good Diſpoſition, and libertie of Judgment. Calvin tells us, this is the beſt method for avoiding Errour, to conſider well the danger imminent on both ſides. And Beza in the life of Calvin gives him this Character: That amongſt other excellent graces theſe Two ſhined moſt brightly in him; viz. 1. A ſingular vivacitie to diſcover where the difficultie of matters lay: and 2. A marvellous dexteritie to couch his reſponſes without loſing one word.
7. Rule, In order to the right diſtinguiſhing 'twixt Truth and Falſhood, it's neceſſarie to ſtate the affirmative well in ſome Theſes, 7. R. To ſtate well the Affirmative, and Truth.or Suppoſitions. So Plato tells us, 'tis but one and the ſame labour foreign, to eſtabliſh the Truth, and revince the Errour: So agen, in his Sophiſt. Plato acquaints us, that he who will underſtand foreign, the Negative, muſt well underſtand foreign, the Affirmative. And the reaſon is evident: Becauſe no Negative hath in it ſelf the cauſe of it's Truth, but it is ſo by the Truth of the Affirmative; neither was there ever any propoſition falſe, but becauſe ſome other was true: nor can the falſitie of the one be known, but by the Truth of the other.
8. Rule. In the Definition, or Deſcription of things we may not expect more certainty, or exactnes than the matter affordeth,8. R. We may not expect more exactnes than the matter will afford or requireth. So Plato (in Critias, fol. 107.) When Painters (ſaith he) endeavour to Limne forth to us Divine things, we find our ſelves abundantly ſatisfied, if they expreſſe but ſome ſmall image of thoſe things. So Ariſt. Ethick. lib. 1. cap. 3. foreign, It is the office of a learner to ſeek after ſo much exactnes in every kind, as the nature of the thing admits. For (addes he) you muſt not put an Orator to demonſtrate by Logick, or a Mathematician to perſuade by Oratorie, &c. in Divinis, & maximis minimum inveſtigare maximum eſt, In great, and Divine matters to find out the leaſt apex of Truth is of greateſt moment: as Plato. It is a Ridiculous ſuperſtition (ſaith Cunaeus) to be alwaies ſollicitous about definitions: for ſome things will not admit them.
9. R. Libertie of judgment.9. Rule. In the examination of things there muſt be uſed Libertie of judgment, without partialitie or prejudice: So Plato de Repub. 6. fol. 494, Truth is acquired by none foreign, but ſuch as, give themſelves up as ſlaves to be poſſeſſed thereby. Hence that great ſaying; it becomes a ſearcher after Truth foreign, to ſacrifice to Truth, not to be enſlaved to an opinion. Whence Ariſtotle gives this good Character of a true Philoſopher, That he muſt yeeld himſelf up a captive to Truth, foreign, to the extirpation of his own Phaenomena. Libertie (ſaith Cunaeus) is an ineſtimable treaſure, which ſome make to be the Soul of a true …udgment. Indifferencie of judgment (ſaith Mede) without prejudice is ſufficient to diſcover much Truth with little diligence, and without much Learning. but the miſerie is, the world loves to be deceived, rather than to be taught; addes another: and yet another, Cujus animo ſemel ſedet pervicax opinio, definit res vere diſcernere, he, whoſe mind is prepoſſeſt with a pertinacious Opinion, ceaſeth to be in a Capacitie for diſcerning of Truth.
10. R. Reaſon more to be valued than Authoritie.10. Whence it follows, that the Authoritie of Perſons is not ſo much to be valued, as the weight of their Reaſons: So Plato Phaed. 91. brings in Socrates adviſing his friends Simia, and Cebes, not to give credit to him with the loſſe of Truth. But doe ye (ſaith Socrates) give credit to me only thus far, as to be ſure ye make very much account of Truth,Non inventionum acumen, ſed rerū ponde…a am…mus. but very little of Socrates. Agen, Plato tells us, that a man is ſoon deceived by Authoritie of others: there is but one good Authoritie, and that is of Reaſon.
11. Diſputes muſt be managed with Modeſtie, Candor, 11. R. Modeſtie, Candor, and Moderation to be uſed in Diſputes.and Moderation. So Plato Protag. fol. 337. They muſt debate things with an amicable familiaritie: the opinions, and reaſons of Adverſaries muſt be related bona fide: neither foreign, muſt they rail, &c. There muſt be modeſtie uſed, which Plato defines thus, foreign, a voluntarie yeelding to what is beſt.
12. For refuting Errors Plato gives this Rule (Hippias, fol. 362.12. R. Of the manner of confuting Errors, See Hoonrb. Sum. Controv. p. 30, 31.54.56.13. R.) This is a commodious way of refelling Sophiſters, to reduce them to abſurd Conſequences, whence the falſitie of their Antecedents will appear.
13. To which adde this. In confuting Errors, we muſt ſhew foreign, the firſt riſe, and ſpring of the Error.
§. 7. If any one expects, or deſires a more artificial account of Plato's Dialectick, the beſt, that I have met with,Plato's Dialectick according to Alcinous, cap. 5. is that of Alcinous (a great Platonick Philoſopher) in his Inſtitution to Plato's Doctrine, where having (cap. 3.) diſtributed Philoſophie (according to Plato's mind) into Contemplative, Active, and Rational; and (cap. 4.) explicated the foundation of Dialectick which has it's ſeat in Nature, he proceeds (cap. 5.) to diſcourſe of the proper Elements of Dialectick, which he reduceth to theſe 5. heads; Definition, Diviſion, Analyſis, or Method, Induction, The Elements of Dialectick 5or Dijudication, & Ratiocination. In the Elements of Dialectick (ſaith Alcinous) this was principally Plato's ſentiment; that Firſtly the nature of every thing ſhould be conſidered, and then it's Accidents. What the Nature of every thing is, he ſearcheth out either from Superiors, by Diviſion, and Definition: or from Inferiors, by Analyſis, or reſolution. As for Accidents, which inhere in Eſſences, he ſeeks them out, either from the Contents by Induction, or from the Continents by Ratiocination. So that Dialectick Reaſons are deſervedly comprehended under Diviſion, Definition, Analyſis, Dijudication, and Raciocination. Diviſion it is either the Diſtribution of the Genus into it's Species, Diviſion.or the Section of the whole into it's parts, or the partition of the word into it's ſignificates. Agen, Diviſion is either of the Accidents into their Subjects, or of the Subjects into their Accidents. The Diviſion of Genus into it's Species is uſeful for the finding out the Nature of every thing, which belongs to Definition. Definition.Now Definition ſprings from Diviſion thus. The Genus of the thing to be Defined muſt be taken, as Animal of Homo. Hence this Genus muſt be divided by it's next difference, 'till we deſcend to the Species. And then by adding the next difference to the Genus, the Definition of the Species is conſtituted, as Homo eſt Animal Rationale. Analyſis has Three Species:Analyſis. the one whereby we aſcend from Senſibles to firſt Intelligibles: another whereby we proceed from Demonſtrates, and Sub-demonſtrates to firſt Propoſitions, which want a Medium: the Third whereby we paſſe from a Suppoſition to thoſe Principles, which are taken for granted, without a Suppoſition. The Firſt kind of Analyſis is thus exemplified: as when we paſſe from the beautie of the Bodie to that of the Mind: from this, to that which appears in men's Morals, or converſations; and from this to that, which ſhines in Politick conſtitutions, and Adminiſtrations: from which at laſt we arrive to that immenſe Ocean of the firſt Beautie. See the other Two Species of Analyſis in Alcinous.
Induction of judgment.§. 8. Thence Alcinous proceeds to Induction which (ſaies he) is a rational procedure from Like to Like, or from Singulars to Vniverſals. This is moſt advantageous to excite Notions implanted by Nature herſelf.Propoſition Affirmative, or Negative, Univerſal, or Particular. As for that piece of Oration which we call Propoſition, it has Two Species: the one is Affirmation, the other is Negation. In Affirmations, and Negations ſome are Univerſal, as All evil is baſe, &c. ſome are Particular, as Some pleaſure is not good. Of Propoſitions ſome are Categorical, ſome Hypothetical, or conditionate. The Art of Ratiocination is uſed by Plato in Arguing, Ratiocination.and Demonſtrating. He Argues, and Confutes what is falſe by Interrogations: but he Demonſtrates by teaching what is true. Ratiocination is an Oration in which ſome Propoſitions being laid down a concluſion by force of thoſe Propoſitions is drawn. Of Ratiocinations ſome are Categorical, ſome are Hypothetical, ſome Mixt, which have a complexion of both. Plato uſeth Demonſtrative Ratiocinations in thoſe Dialogues, wherein he explicates his own opinion: but againſt Sophiſters, and young men he makes uſe of probable arguments: and againſt thoſe, who were properly contentious, he uſeth Eriſtick argumentation; as againſt Euthydemus, and Hippias. As for Categorical Ratiocination (which has Three Figures) Plato Interrogates in each Figure. As in the Firſt Figure thus,Ratiocination Categorick. (in Alcibiades) Juſt things are they not beautiful? and beautiful things, are they not good? therefore are not juſt things good? So in the …econd, and Third Figure Plato Interrogates in his Parmenides, &c. Touching Hypothetical Ratiocinations, Hypothetick.we find many delivered by Plato, though by Interrogations, eſpecially, in his Parmenides. He alſo gives ſome hints of Mixt Ratiocination— If we look for ſome account of Sophiſmes, Mixt.and Fallacies, we ſhall find it in Plato's Euthydemus. Alſo he has given us ſome adumbration of the Ten Categories in his Parmenides, Categories.as in like manner in his Dialogues. He has comprehended the univerſal Forme of Notation in his Cratylus. Notation.And truely this man was admirably perfect in defi…ing, and dividing: which declareth that he had the chiefeſt force, or ſpirit of Dialectick. In his Cratylus he queries, whether names ſignifie from Nature, or from Inſtitution? And he determineth, that what is right in names comes from Inſtitution, yet not caſually, but ſo as ſuch Inſtitution muſt be conſentaneous to the nature of the thing it ſelf. For the rectitude of names is nothing elſe but an Institution convenient to the Nature of the things. This alſo belongs to Logick to uſe names aright: Thus Alcinous. Albeit we may allow this learned Platoniſt, that ſome veſtigia of theſe ſeveral parts of Dialectick are to be found in Plato's writings, yet 'tis moſt certain, that Plato never intended to deliver over to poſteritie any ſuch artificial mode, or forme of Logick. All that he deſignes is, to give us ſome general Canons for a more methodical Inquiſition into the nature of things, and for regular Diſputation, or Ratiocination. The firſt, that gave us an artificial Syſteme of Logick ſeparate from the Praexis, was Ariſtotle (as hereafter) Plato affected a more natural, familiar, and ſimple method of Ratiocination (as before) yea ſo far is he from delivering any exact artificial forme of Logick, as that he confounds his Dialectick with Metaphyſicks, and other contemplations (as elſe where) Yet as to the Praxis of Dialectick, Plato abounds with accurate Definitions, and Diviſions: alſo he gives an excellent Idea of Analytick method, whereof he is ſaid to be the firſt Inventor. And as to Dijudication, and Argumentation, he ſeems very potent in the uſe of the Socratick Induction. And all this with much harmonie, ſimplicitie, and plainneſſe, without that Artifice which Ariſtotle introduced. Amongſt our Moderne Writers, no one ſeems to have made a better emprovement of Plato's Dialectick Precepts, and Praxis, than Peter Ramus, who (notwithſtanding the contumelies caſt upon him by his bloudie Adverſarie Carpenter) ſeems to have had a thorough inſight into Plato's mind, and to have reduced his principles to the beſt method for the Diſquiſition of Truth. The Abſtract of his Logick we intend to give, when we come to Treat of Ariſtotle's Logick.