The Court of the Gentiles Part 4:2, Treatise · Part 4 · Book 3 · Chapter 2

The Court of the Gentiles Part 4:2 · Treatise · Part 4 · Book 3 · Chapter 2

p. 28CHAP. II. The ſtate of the Controverſie.

(1) Ten general Propoſitions wherein the New Methodiſts and Predeterminants agree. (2) The New Methodiſts differences among themſelves about Preſcience, Futurition, Divine Concurſe, and Gods permiſſion of ſin. (3) The differences of the Predeterminants from the New Methodiſts about abſolute Decrees, the Futurition, Divine Permiſſion, Preſcience, Providence, Predefinition, and Predetermination of Sin.

THE prolixitie we have uſed in explicating and ſtating our Queſtion wil render our ſubſequent work more facile and conciſe. For here that old Proverbe holds true, A good beginning is half the work. But before we enter on the Demonſtration of our Hypotheſis it wil be neceſſary to manifeſt, (1) Wherein we and thoſe who maintain the Antitheſis do agree. (2) Wherein our Opponents, who maintain the Antitheſis, differ among themſelves. (3) Wherein we differ from them. The explication of theſe Particulars wil not a little conduce to the more perfect ſtate and determination of our Queſtion.

§. 1. Wherein we and our Opponents, who maintain the Antitheſis, Wherein we and our Opponents agree.do agree. Some there are who conceive our differences greater than they are; others on the contrary make them leſſe: our firſt work therefore wil be to ſhew, wherein we agree; which I ſhal endeavor to lay down in the following Propoſitions.

1. Prop. That God hath decreed althings that come to paſſe. Herein our Adverſaries generally concord with us; albeit they differ from us, as alſo among themſelves about the manner how God decrees the ſubſtrate mater of ſin. Thus Strangius, l. 3. c. 3. p. 558. But alſo we confeſſe and ſay, that God doth truly decree althings that happen, but not althings in one and the ſame manner; but ſome things effectively, other things permiſſively: which is the commun opinion of Theologues, according to that famoſe Axiome of Augustin: There is nothing done, which the Omnipotent doth not wil, either by permitting that it be done, or by doing of it. Yet the ſaid Strangius, in what precedes, gives us a very dangerous poſition touching the Divine Decrees: It is not needful, ſaith p. 29he, that we appoint ſo many particular Decrees of God, touching his Concurſe to be afforded, as there are actions of the creature and particular objects of them. Sithat that one general Decree or Inſtitute of God may ſuffice, whereby he hath determined to concur with al the actions of the creature, as he hath given them a power to act, &c. This general Decree, foiſted in to ſalve his own Hypotheſis, is moſt unworthy of the Divine Being, in that it overthrows the Preſcience of God, impoſeth imperfection on the Divine Wil, and opens an effectual dore to Pelagianiſme.

2. Prop. That Election of ſome to Grace and Glorie is abſolute, and no way dependent on the previſion of any act of man. This Propoſition, although it be denied by the Pelagians, Socinians, and Arminians, yet it is generally granted by our Adverſaries, the New Methodiſts, Amyraldus, Strangius, Le Blanc, and others. For theſe, albeit they make Reprobation conditional and dependent on mans ſin, yet they grant a particular abſolute Election of ſome to Grace and Glorie: which to me ſeems very ſtrange and inconſiſtent with their Hypotheſis about Reprobation: For if the Decrees of God be abſolute as to Election, why ſhould they not beVolitiones pure conditionales ſunt alienae à ſapientia & prudentia Dei, Ruiz. de Volunt▪ Dei, Diſp. 20. §. 1. alſo eſtimed ſuch as to Reprobation? Can the Divine wil be moved by any thing but itſelf? Are not conditional Decrees inconſiſtent therewith? Doth not God in the glaſs of his own Decrees foreſee al acts and events of the human wil? Muſt they not then be al decreed abſolutely by God? See hereafter, Chap. 5. §. 3.

3. Prop. That God hath a certain Science or Preſcience of ſin, as wel as of al other Events. This Propoſition is univerſally granted by al the New Methodiſts, Amyraldus, Strangius, &c. as alſo by moſt Arminians, although it be utterly incompoſſible and inconſiſtent with the ſentiments both of the one and t'other Partie. For al the wit of man, yea I wil with confidence adde of Devils, wil never be able to explicate and demonſtrate a certain preſcience in God of things future, but what is originated in and dependent on his own Decrees. I muſt ſolemnely profeſſe, I can ſee no way left to evade the force of Socinus's argument againſt the certaintie of Gods preſcience, if we reſolve it not into the free determination of his own wil decreeing al future events: of which more in what follows, Chap. 5. §. 2.

4. Prop. That whatever God abſolutely predefines or predeſtines from Eternitie, he predetermines in time. This Propoſition the New-Methodiſts p. 30ſeem generally to grant. So Strangius, l. 3. c. 2. p. 547. When we ſpeak of abſolute predefinition, we willingly grant, that the predefinition of God from eternitie, and the Predetermination of the create wil in time mutually follow each other; ſo that whatever particular ſingular Act God hath abſolutely predefined ſhould be done by us, to the ſame he doth determine our wil: For whatever God hath by his Decree ſo predefined, it is neceſſary that he effect the ſame, or cauſe that it be done; becauſe the Decree of God, ſeeing it is abſolute and efficacious, muſt neceſſarily have its effect; which it cannot have but by efficaciouſly applying the create wil to the predefinite act: otherwiſe, if the wil ſhould not act that which is predefined, the Predefinition and Decree of God would be fruſtrated, which is abſurd. A good conceſſion, which wil be of uſe to us in what follows, Chap. 5. §. 3.

5. Prop. That God doth predetermine the human Wil to al acts and effects morally good, as alſo to ſome other commun acts and effects. This Propoſition is generally rejected by the Arminians, as alſo by Baronius, yet the New Methodiſts, who have chalked out a middle Way, generally entertain it. Thus Strangius, l. 3. c. 5. p. 584. We have ſhewen, that God doth not in al things predetermine the human Wil, namely not in actions intrinſecally evil, and to which Vitioſitie is neceſſarily annexed; albeit in things lawful, not only in works of Grace, but alſo in others that are commun, according to his own pleaſure, he determines it, with the preſervation of its own native libertie, ſithat he can never offer any violence to the wil, but only moves it ſweetly according to its own nature. See more on this argument in what follows, c. 3. §. 1. on Prov. 21. 1. This great conceſſion of Strangius indeed cuts the nerves and ſinews of al his arguments againſt our Hypotheſis: For if God can and doth predetermine the wil to ſome acts, without any violence offered to its Libertie, why may he not alſo predetermine it to al its acts, without prejudice to its Libertie? The force of this conſequence is ſo ſtrong, that it forceth Baronius and the Arminians to denie al Predetermination. See Chap. 5. §. 4.

6. Prop. That God predetermins the Wil to the ſubſtrate mater of ſome ſinful acts, even of ſuch as are not intrinſecally evil. This Propoſition is granted by Strangius, l. 4. c. 1. p. 766. But although p. 31in the actions of wicked men, when God doth uſe them as Inſtruments for the execution of ſome peculiar works, it may peradventure be ſaid, that God doth determine their wils, yet it ſeems more incommode to ſay, that God moves and predetermines to al other acts, as to acts of hatred of God, blaſphemie, &c. So that he yieldeth, that God may predetermine to the mater of ſome ſinful acts: and indeed it cannot be rationally denied; ſithat Acts imperfectly good are alſo in part ſinful; and the ſubſtrate mater of the act as good and ſinful is the ſame: wherefore if God predetermine the human wil to the ſubſtrate mater of the act as good, muſt he not alſo predetermine it to the ſubſtrate mater of the act as ſinful? When I ſay, that God doth predetermine the wil to the ſubſtrate mater of the act as ſinful, As here muſt not, yea cannot be taken Reduplicatively, but only Specificatively, as it ſpecifies one and the ſame Act, and diſtributes it into its oppoſite Adjuncts of Good and Evil: So that the meaning is no more than this, that God predetermines the wil to the ſubſtrate mater or entitative act which is both good and evil: and if he predetermine the wil to the ſubſtrate mater of the Act which is imperfectly good, (as our Adverſaries grant) he muſt alſo neceſſarily predetermine the wil to the ſubſtrate mater of the act whereunto ſin is annexed: becauſe the ſubſtrate mater of the Act as good and evil is the ſame. When our Adverſaries ſhal have given us a rational and diſtinct ſolution to this argument, I ſhal confeſs they have done much for the ſubverſion of our Hypotheſis. Of this Argument, ſee Chap. 5. §. 4, 5.

7. Prop. That there is no real poſitive Act or Entitie in nature, whereof God is not the efficient cauſe. This is generally granted by al thoſe that denie ſin to be a poſitive Being. So Strangius, l. 3. c. 3. p. 557. There is no Entitie, and no action as it is an action or has any realitie, whereof God is not the cauſe, or which he hath not decreed either abſolutely or reſpectively. So l. 4. c. 11. p. 859. The entitie of the Action is reduced unto God, as the firſt cauſe, on whoſe concurſe and influxe it dependes. So a Reverend Divine, Cathol. Theol. Part 1. Sect. 17. p. 85. `It is certain, that as motus vel actio is quid naturale, it is of God as the firſt cauſe of Nature: and ſo when a ſinner acteth, it is not without the firſt Univerſal Cauſe. One would think that this conceſſion, if well ſtated and proſecuted, would put an end to our controverſie: For al that we demand is, that the real poſitive p. 40act, whereunto ſin is annexed, be from God as the firſt cauſe of Nature: But yet what our Opponents grant, as limited by them wil not anſwer our expectations. For ſome hold with Durandus, that the action is from God, but not immediately; others, that it is immediately from God, yet not by a predeterminative concurſe. Hence,

8. Prop. That God concurs immediately to the ſubſtrate mater or entitative act whereunto ſin is annexed. This Propoſition is not granted by ſuch as follow Durandus either in words or ſenſe, yet by others it is. Thus Strangius, l. 1. c. 10. p. 54. But we muſt judge, that God doth immediately reach every action and effect of the creature, and that both by the Immediation of virtue and ſuppoſite or perſon. For as God himſelf, ſo his virtue is every where preſent and energetic. For the proof whereof he cites Iſa. 26. 12. Rom. 11. ult. 1 Cor. 12. 6. Act. 17. 28. with other Scriptures. So Ch. 11. p. 61. he confeſſeth, that there is a common influxe of God unto al actions, which he cals foreign, the energie and efficace of God, whereby he doth ſubordinate ſecond Cauſes to himſelf; ſo that whatever they are or do act, they eſſentially depend on him in both reſpects. Whereby he ſeems to evince, that Gods Influxe doth not only render the ſubject habile to act, but alſo immediately reach the very act, even that has ſin annexed to it. The like he addes, l. 4. c. 1. p. 760. It may truely be ſaid, and men are wont ſo to ſpeak, That God is the cauſe of vitioſe actions, albeit he be not the cauſe of the actions as they are vitioſe. And more fully l. 4. c. 3. p. 783. From what has been ſaid, it may in ſome manner be underſtood, how in a ſane ſenſe God may be ſaid to impel or incline to ſome ſin, when yet he is void of al ſin: ſpecially if theſe things be obſerved. (1) That it be not underſtood, that God moves or inclines men to ſin in general. (2) Neither that it be ſaid, that God moves to al ſin, but only to ſuch, in which he uſeth depraved wils as inſtruments to execute his good works. (3) Neither that it be underſtood, that God doth properly move to ſin ſimply and formally taken, or ſin as ſin; but only to the material of ſin, i. e. not to the ſin of the Action, but to the Action as ſubſtrate to the ſin, ſo that he be not the Author of the vitioſitie, which he only permits, but of the ſubſtrate Act, and of his own direction and ordination, which he exerciſeth about the vitioſe Action, &c. Yea in Actions intrinſecally ſinful, he ſeems to grant, that the Act, as it is a p. 33phyſic or natural Being, is from God. So l. 4. c. 12. p. 876. That which is alſo true of Actions which are intrinſecally evil, ſuch as the hatred of God, perjurie, &c. In which alſo we muſt diſtinguiſh the phyſic or natural Being from the Ethic or moral evil.—That God concurs to the phyſic action, but not to the moral vice of the action we have above ſhewen. There are two obſervables in theſe conceſſions of Strangius, which, if he were candid and uniforme in granting us, would put a period to the controverſie. [1] That in Actions intrinſecally evil there is a phyſic or natural entitie ſeparable from the ethic or moral vitioſitie. [2] That the phyſic or natural entitie of al ſinful Actions, even ſuch as are intrinſecally ſinful, is immediately from God, as the firſt cauſe of Nature. But I muſt confeſſe, I cannot find that Strangius is candid or uniforme in theſe his conceſſions, but elſewhere he ſeems to overthrow what he has here granted. For, [1] He ſometimes aſſerts, that the natural act of hating God is ſo intrinſecally evil, as that the vitioſitie cannot be ſeparated from it. Again, [2] albeit he ſeem frequently to grant an immediate concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of ſinful acts, yet when he comes to explain what he intends thereby, he doth too much verge unto, if not wholly eſpouſe Durandus's mediate concurſe, as to acts intrinſecally evil. Thus alſo Amyraldus, as it is wel noted by Le Blanc, Theſ. Conciliat. Arbitrii, &c. Theſ. 48. p. 436.

9. Prop. That Gods Providence is univerſally and efficaciouſly active in the directing and governing the Sins of men unto his own Glorie. This moſt of the new Methodiſts grant, albeit ſome ſeem to denie it, at leaſt in part. Our Propoſition is granted by Strangius, l. 3. c. 4. p. 469. Neither doth it follow from our opinion, that any free act is ſubſtracted from the Providence of God, if man doth that which God permits, ſithat whether it be good or evil that man doth, God muſt foreknow, and direct and order it to the end appointed by himſelf. So l. 4. c. 1. p. 760. `Furthermore it muſt be obſerved, which we have oft mentioned, that God albeit he doth not wil ſin as ſin, yet he doth adviſedly permit, direct, and ordain it in the beſt manner, to execute his righteous judgements, and illuſtrate his glorie. The like p. 764. Albeit we denie that God doth ever determine the wil to ſin formally taken, or to the actions unto which ſin is neceſſarily annexed, yet we acknowledge, that God doth ſo rule and order p. 34the ſinful wils of Men and Devils, that by permitting tentations, offering objects, ſubminiſtrating occaſions, denying Grace, which he owes to none, letting looſe the reins to Satan, removing impediments, or by operating in any other ſecret manner, the event which he pre-appoints infallibly follows, and ſpecially that that work be performed, for the effecting of which God uſeth their miniſterie. How much would this conceſſion conduce to put a period to this controverſie, were our Adverſaries but ingenuous in their aſſent and conſent to it? Doth he not ſay here as much as we, abating only the terme Predetermination? and yet elſewhere how doth he ſtart off from what is here granted?

10. Prop. That God doth no way concur or predetermine the human wil to the ſubſtrate mater or entitative act of ſin ſo as to be the cauſe or author of Sin. This Propoſition we chearfully and with our whole Souls aſſent and conſent unto; although it be the grand deſigne and unwearied endeavors of our Adverſaries, both Pelagians, Jeſuites, Arminians and new Methodiſts, to faſten the Antitheſis on us, namely, That we make God to be the Author of ſin. Which Imputation has been in al Ages of the Chriſtian Church faſtened on thoſe that defended Efficacious Grace and Divine Concurſe, as we ſhal ſhew in what follows, Chap. 4.

§. 2. Having laid down the general Propoſitions, wherein ourWherein our Opponents differ among themſelves. Opponents generally, though not without ſome variation, concord with us, it follows, that we ſhew briefly wherein they differ among themſelves. Indeed, ſo great is the difference of our Adverſaries, ſpecially the New Methodiſts, Amyraldus, Baronius, Strangius, Le Blanc, and others among themſelves in this point touching Gods efficacious concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin, as that it is very difficult for us to forme commun principes or Hypotheſes wherein they al agree. And albeit they generally agree in their oppoſing our Hypotheſis, touching Gods immediate predeterminative concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of actions intrinſecally evil, yet they lay down their own Antitheſis with ſo much caution, ſuſpenſion, and heſitation of mind, as if they were afraid the contrary might prove true. Placeus, Tractat. de Liber. Arbit. p. 174. cunningly waves the determination of the Queſtion, with this modeſt concelement of his mind: Truely we, according to the reverence we have towards the infinite Majeſtie of God, dare not define what the Dependence of the ſecond cauſe on the p. 35firſt is: It ſufficeth us, that too much dependence cannot be aſſerted, provided that it doth not aſperſe God with any the leaſt spot of our ſins. Which we readily cloſe with, renouncing al ſuch dependence as brings the holy God under the imputation of ſin. So Baronius, Metaph. Sect. 8. Diſp. 3. §. 78. pag. 147. having given us the mention of the Thomiſts previous predeterminative concurſe, namely, that the human wil is in al its motions excited by God, and efficaciouſly, i. e. irreſiſtibly moved, first to act, and then to act this rather than that, before he undertakes the refutation hereof he thus premoniſhes us: In the mean while we profeſſe theſe two things: (1) That we do much againſt our wil recede from this opinion, and that becauſe we conceive ſo honourably of thoſe great men, which are Patrones thereof. (2) That we are ready, if any thing may follow from this our Doctrine againſt any article of faith, to reject it. Le Blanc, Concil. Arbitr. Hum. Theſ. 55. pag. 438. ſeems to wave the Controverſie; yet Theſ. 56. he inclines to the opinion of Strangius, That God cannot phyſically promove and predetermine free cauſes to acts intrinſecally evil, without being the Author of ſin. But Theſ. 57. he confeſſeth, That provided God be not made the Author of ſin, the dependence of the ſecond cauſes on the firſt in acting cannot be too much aſſerted, &c. And Theſ. 58. he concludes, That the force and efficace of the Divine providence even about ſinful acts, is not to be reſtrained to a certain general indifferent concurſe; but that God doth many ways procure, promove, direct, and moderate ſinful events. So great is the heſitation of our Adverſaries. Yea, how frequently do the very ſame perſons differ from themſelves in their ſentiments about this point? Doth not the ſame perſon ſometimes ſeem to grant an univerſal concurſe immediately influencing al natural acts, and yet elſewhere denie the ſame to acts intrinſecally evil? And ſo in other points controverted by us. But the differences of our Opponents among themſelves are more palpable and viſible as to the following Particulars.

1. They are greatly confuſed and at variance among themſelves as Their differences 1. about Gods Preſcience.to Gods Preſcience of ſinful acts. Al the New Methodiſts generally grant Gods certain preſcience of al ſinful acts, but yet they are at a great difference, yea contradiction among themſelves in the ſtating of it. (1) Strangius, lib. 3. cap. 7. p. 594. tels us, That among al the modes which are wont to be explicated, that ſeems the moſt probable, which is taken from the preſence of althings in Eternitie. Wherein he follows the Dominicans, and ſo muſt by conſequence p. 36reſolve the futurition of ſin into the wil of God permitting it, which overthrows his Hypotheſis. Yet cap. 8. pag. 622. he reſolves the certaintie of Gods foreknowing future events into the more Eſſence of God. And pag. 626. he reſolves it into the actions themſelves and their determinate cauſes. Laſtly, cap. 10. pag. 646. he in down right termes confeſſeth, That the ſcience of future ſins is referred to the ſcience of Viſion. Which is al that we contend for, and that which neceſſarily reſolves Gods preſcience of ſin, into the act of his wil permitting it. Some of our Opponents reſolve Gods certain preſcience of ſin into the infinitude of his ſcience. Thus Le Blanc De Concord. Libert. p 444. Theſ. 39. As for the fourth opinion, which ſecketh the certitude of Divine preſcience in the infinitie of the Divine Intellect, and in the determinate veritie of thoſe things which are contingently future, it layeth down nothing but what is certain and indubitate. Yet Theſ. 40. he confeſſeth, That this opinion doth not ſatisfie the Queſtion, nor take away the principal difficultie. For that which is here moſt difficult to be underſtood is, how future contingents do from Eternitie paſſe from mere poſſibles into the nature of futures, that ſo under that reaſon they may be perceived by God. Which knot he endeavors to untie, by telling us, that the ſame cauſes that give exiſtence to things future give them alſo their futurition. But this is a very jejune and poor evaſion, as we ſhal hereafter ſhew, Chap. 5. §. 1. (3) Others refer Gods certain preſcience of ſin to the Jeſuites middle ſcience, whereby God foreſees, that if the wil of man come under ſuch a connexion of cauſes, circumſtances, and providential concurrences, the effect wil certainly follow, albeit in itſelf merely contingent. Thus Lud. Crocius, Dyodec. Diſſert. Diſſert. 7. where he largely but weakly defends this middle ſcience: which Le Blanc, De Concord. Libert. pag. 449. Theſ. 26; &c. makes to be the opinion of Baronius and others. Le Blanc himſelf, pag. 444. Theſ. 42. confeſſeth, That it wants not great difficultie, how a thing which is ſuppoſed to depend on a cauſe in itſelf indeterminate ſhould be certainly knowen by the Divine Intellect: for the Divine Intellect although infinite cannot ſee what is not, nor yet change the nature of its object. Whence he concludes, Theſ. 43. That ſeing there is ſo much darkneſſe on al ſides, our ſafeſt and moſt ingenuous courſe is to confeſſe our own ignorance herein. The like ſubterfuge Strangius makes uſe of, l. 3. c. 5. p. 576. &c. 6. p. 591. with this pretexte, That the mode of Divine preſcience is not reveled in Scripture. A poor refuge indeed! why then do they ſo daringly ſift p. 37and prie into the Divine preſcience, and draw it down to the model of our corrupt reaſon? We eaſily grant, that the mode of Divine preſcience is incomprehenſible by poor mortals, and therefore can content our ſelves with ſcriptural deſcriptions thereof: but this we aſſert, that it is impoſſible the Divine preſcience, which is in itſelf moſt certain, ſhould depend on the moſt incertain ambulatory wil of man; and ſo much Scripture and Reaſon grounded thereon doth fully demonſtrate.

2. Our Adverſaries differ greatly among themſelves about the 2. The futurition of ſin.futurition of ſin, and Gods predefinition thereof. Strangius, l. 3. c. 11. holds, That ſome free acts are abſolutely future, and knowen of God as ſuch, without any Decree predetermining the free cauſes to thoſe acts: and yet he denies, that thoſe free contingent futures can be knowen by God according to any Hypotheſis, which doth not neceſſarily infer the determination of the create wil; and thence which doth not include an abſolute Decree of their futurition. Whence it wil follow, that God can foreknow no contingent ſinful act as abſolutely future, but what he firſt decreed to be abſolutely future; which yet Strangius admits not. Herein he is oppoſed by Le Blanc, De Concord. Libert. pag. 455.

3. Our Opponents are alſo at variance among themſelves3. Divine Concurſe. touching Gods concurſe, its immediation, totalitie, prioritie, efficace, and predetermination as to ſinful acts. (1) How many of them incline to the ſentiments of Durandus, denying al immediate concurſe to ſinful acts? And of thoſe that grant immediate concurſe in termes, how many yet denie it in realitie? Among thoſe that grant immediate concurſe both name and thing, do not many eſpouſe ſuch conſequences as are inconſiſtent therewith, yea repugnant thereto? (2) Our Adverſaries alſo differ much about Gods total particular concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater or entitative act of ſin. Some grant a total concurſe to the phyſic entitative act in the general, but not in particular: others grant a total concurſe to the entitative act in particular, abſtracting the reference it has to its object: Thus Strangius, lib. 2. cap. 3. who grants, that God doth concur by a ſpecial concurſe to the ſpecial effects as they are ſpecifically diſtinguiſhed not morally but phyſically; which is al that we contend for: Others, on the contrary, make Gods concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin only partial and general, aſſerting with Molina, Part. 1. q. 14. a. 3. Diſp. 6. That God is only a partial cauſe of the entitative act of ſin: So a Divine of name among us; yea he aſſerts, that God never totally permits ſin. (3) Our p. 38Opponents differ alſo among themſelves touching the Prioritie of Gods concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin. Some grant Gods concurſe hereto previous, though not predeterminative; ſo Strangius: but others make it to be only ſimultaneous; aſſerting, that God concurs with the wil of man in the ſame moment of nature and reaſon, to the ſame act. So Baronius, wherein he alſo follows Lud. Molina and the Arminians. (4) Laſtly, the principal difference among our Adverſaries is about the Efficacitie and Predetermination of Divine concurſe as to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin. Some make the concurſe of God to be only general and indifferent, and ſo determinable by the ſecond cauſe, as the influence of the Sun is by the mater it workes upon. Thus Baronius, Metaphyſ. Sect. 8. Diſput. 3. §. 73, 74, 75. pag. 142, &c. where he makes Gods concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of ſinful acts to be the ſame with that of the Sun concurring to the generation of a man or horſe. Wherein he follows the Remonſtrants and Jeſuites, more particularly Molina, Concord. Liber. Arbitr. cum Grat. donis, &c. Quaeſt. 14. Diſput. 26. Thus a reverend Divine of name among our ſelves openly aſſerts, that Gods concurſe is determinable by the creature. But Strangius, albeit he too far fals in with the ſentiments of Baronius againſt predetermination; yet he rejects this Hypotheſis of a general indifferent concurſe as too groſſe and Pelagian. So l. 2. c. 3. p. 154. We ſay not therefore, that God concurs only by a general concurſe, as the Sun concurs in the ſame manner to the generation of a man, and of an horſe, and of a mouſe; but we determine, that the influxe of God is ſpecial to ſpecial effects, as they are phyſically diſtinguiſhed ſpecie, and unto al kind of entitie, but not to the reaſon of moral iniquitie, which conſiſtes in privation. Strangius here ſeems to oppoſe Baronius's Hypotheſis touching a general indifferent concurſe; but yet, I muſt confeſſe, upon a more accurate reſearch I cannot find that he differs materially from Baronius herein: for although l. 1. c. 11. p. 61. he cals this concurſe foreign, efficace, yet he makes it be but commun, and no way determinative, and therefore only indifferent. The like l. 2. c. 19. p. 373. And I am very poſitive in this, that no man living can rationally exemt themſelves from the imputation of the Jeſuites indifferent concurſe, and aſſert an efficacious ſpecial concurſe, but what is determinative as to the ſubject it workes on. And thence Le Blanc, Concil. Arbitr. part. 3. theſ. 36. p. 434. confeſſeth, That Strangius's opinion as to this point differs but little from that of Baronius. Laſtly, p. 39Baronius denies al predetermination both as to good and evil actions; as Metaph. Sect. 8. Diſput. 3. §. 78, &c. p. 146. Strangius allows predetermination to al acts moraly though but imperfectly good, and to many other acts of the wil, whenſoever God pleaſeth, or need requireth; yet he denies it to al acts of the creatures, ſpecially to ſuch as are intrinſecally evil, as lib. 2. cap. 4. pag. 162. and elſewhere. Herein he is followed by ſome Divines of note among our ſelves, who I am very confident wil never be able to maintain their ſingular Hypotheſis, but wil at laſt be driven to the opinion of Baronius, the Remonſtrants, and Jeſuites, or elſe fal under the lode of al thoſe black conſequences they clog our Hypotheſis with; of which hereafter, Chap. 5. §. 4.

4. Our Adverſaries differ much among themſelves about Gods 4. Gods permiſſion of ſin.permiſſion of ſin, its nature and efficace. (1) A Divine of repute among our ſelves aſſertet… that no act of ſin, no not the active ſelling of Joſeph, or crucifying of Chriſt was willed by God; but only the paſſive vendition and crucifixion or effect; yea he ſaith, That God doth not wil ſin as a puniſhment in a proper ſenſe: but others allow, that God wils the acts of ſin as penal, or conducible to his own glorie, though not as ſinful acts. Thus Strangius, l. 4. c. 2. p. 773. where having refuted that diſtinction (at firſt framed by Bellarmine, and of late reaſſumed by a Divine of great name among our ſelves) of active and paſſive vendition and crucifixion, he concludes thus: Therefore here was not an otioſe or idle permiſſion, but an efficax operation in the ſelling of Joſeph, which is more orthodoxe and conſiſtent with itſelf, than the former Hypotheſis which ſeems to be contradictory to itſelf, as hereafter, Chap. 3. §. 2. (2) Some of our Opponents aſſert, Gods permiſſion of ſin to be altogether inefficacious, yea idle and unactive: but others allow it an efficace, and energie for the limiting, directing, and ordering of ſinful acts to their proper ends; albeit not about the act itſelf; which I conceive no better than a modeſt contradiction: for how can Gods permiſſion limit, direct, and order ſinful acts, but by influencing the very act itſelf materially conſidered? See more of this, Chap. 5. §. 6.

5. Our Adverſaries alſo differ greatly among themſelves about5. The nature of ſin. the Nature of ſin, its formal Reaſon, &c. Some, and thoſe of no ſmal repute among our ſelves, hold ſin, as to its formal reaſon, to be a poſitive real Being: which indeed is moſt agreable to their Hypotheſis touching acts intrinſecally evil, which they denie to be p. 40as to their ſubſtrate mater or entitative act from God. I muſt confeſſe this opinion would carry ſomewhat of probabilitie with it, if we could with the Manichees hold two firſt Principes or Cauſes, one of good, the other of evil; but for us that aſſert but one firſt Cauſe of al create poſitive Beings, I cannot imagine how any can maintain this Hypotheſis of the poſitivitie of ſin, without making God the Author of ſin, or making mans corrupt wil independent, and ſo the firſt cauſe of a real poſitive act. Therefore Strangius, lib. 1. cap. 13. to avoid theſe black conſequences ſtrongly argues, with the Orthodoxe, that the formal reaſon of ſin conſiſtes in privation. But withal we are here to note, that this Hypotheſis utterly overthrows his other Hypotheſis touching acts intrinſecally evil, which he denies to be from God as to their ſubſtrate mater; of which more hereafter, Chap. 5. §. 5.

There are other points of moment wherein our Antagoniſts differ among themſelves, as wel as from us; namely, touching the natural or moral libertie of the wil, natural impoſſibilitie and poſſibilitie, Gods decretive and approbative wil, of which before Chap. 1. And indeed we need no way wonder, that our Adverſaries thus differ among themſelves, ſithat their Hypotheſis is liable to ſo many inconſiſtences and contradictions: for how is it poſſible, that they ſhould agree among themſelves, when as their principal Hypotheſis is ſo diſagreeing from itſelf? But more of this when we come to the demonſtrative part, Chap. 5.

§. 3. We procede now to ſhew, Wherein we differ from thoſe of difnewthe new method, Strangius, Baronius, Le Blanc, and others, about Gods concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin. Immediately on the breaking up of the Synod of Dort, wherein the Antitheſes and ſentiments of the Arminians were ſo ſtrongly and fully refuted, there ſprang up ſome Divines, who gave their aſſent and conſent to the Canons of the ſaid Synod, but yet contrived a new method, ſpecially as to univerſal Grace, Reprobation, and Gods concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin, in order to a coalition with the Arminian partie, as we ſhal hereafter demonſtrate. And the principal Agent, who undertook the new modelling this laſt head, was Strangius; which he has copioſely treated of, according to the new method, in his Book, De Voluntate & Actionibus Dei circa peccatum: whoſe ſentiments we are to examine in what follows; but at preſent we ſhal only lay down in ſeveral Propoſitions wherein we differ from him, and thoſe who follow his method in the ſtating Gods Concurſe to the mater of ſin. We aſſert,

p. 411. Prop. God has an abſolute efficacious Decree about the ſubſtrate 1. As to Gods Decrees.mater or entitative act of al ſin. This Propoſition Strangius, lib. 3. cap. 2. pag. 547. grants to be true in althings but ſin; ſpecially the firſt ſin, and ſuch acts as are intrinſecally evil: which ſufficiently proves our Propoſition; for we ſay and are ready to demonſtrate, that the ſubſtrate mater or entitative act whereto ſin is annexed, is not in itſelf or its natural entitie ſinful, but naturally good. What there is of ſin annexed to it ariſeth from its moral eſtimation and relation to the Law of God violated thereby: in which regard we peremptorily denie that it is from God. Yea Strangius, lib. 3. cap. 4. pag. 569. grants, That God is the cauſe of the act, though he doth not abſolutely predeſtine or decree the ſame: and then to that objection of Alvarez, That the Divine preordination and eternal predefinition extendes itſelf to al thoſe things unto which the cauſalitie and efficience of God extendes, he replies, That God decrees althings either abſolutely or reſpectively. But this is a very poor Pelagian evaſion: for reſpective or conditional Decrees are every way unbecoming the Divine perfections of God, as our Divines, particularly Davenant Animadverſ: againſt Hoard, pag. 226. have proved againſt the Arminians. Laſtly, Strangius, lib. 3. cap. 5. p. 576. denies, That God decrees al ſins, ſpecially the firſt ſin: which we ſhal in its place endeavor to prove, with the ſolution of his objections againſt it. Hence,

2. Prop. The Decree of God gives futurition to the ſubſtrate mater 2. The Futurition of ſin.or material entitative act whereunto ſin is annexed. The Antitheſis hereto is defended by Strangius, lib. 3. cap. 5. pag. 585. where he affirmes, That it is not repugnant to the nature of God, or of the thing itſelf, that ſomething be future, which God has not predefined. So c. 9. p. 628. he denies, that God hath decreed al futures, namely the fal of Adam, or the ſin againſt the Holy Ghoſt. This Propoſition is alſo violently impugned by Le Blanc, de Concord. Libert. Hum. par. 1. theſ. 55, &c. But ſpecially I can no way approve of what Twiſſe doth in many places aſſert, That the Decree of God and his wil is the ſole and only cauſe of the futurition of every event. And he inſtanceth in the fal of Adam and the Angels. His Arguments againſt the futurition of the ſubſtrate mater of ſin from the Decree of God, we ſhal examine in what follows, Chap. 5. §. 1.

3. Prop. The permiſſive Decree of God about ſin is not idle but efficacious. 3. Gods permiſſive Decree.This Propoſition is oppoſed by Strangius, l. 3. c. 2. p. 556. Neither do we grant, what ſome affirme, that the permiſſive Decree of p. 42God, whereby he permits al ſin, is efficacious, albeit not effective. For ſo the fal of Adam and al other ſins ſhould procede from the efficace of the Divine Decree: which is an hard ſaying. Neither is that leſſe hard, which ſome affirme, that God hath abſolutely decreed, that men do not more good than what they do, and omit not more evil than what they omit. This Hypotheſis is ſo far from being hard, as that I conceive Strangius's oppoſite perſuaſion is moſt dangerous and deſtructive of the Divine Decrees, as we ſhal ſhew in its place. Yea Strangius himſelf, in what follows, pag. 557. grants what Lombard, lib. 1. diſt. 47. aſſertes, namely, that the wil of God is always efficacious, &c.

4. Prop. Gods Preſcience of things future, and particularly of acts 4. Gods preſcience of ſin.whereto ſin is annexed is founded on his Decrees. Thus Hilarie, de Trin. lib. 9. What God decreed to do, thoſe things he knows in his wil. This ſentence of Hilarie Strangius, lib. 3. cap. 5. pag. 576. ownes as orthodox, but yet denies, that the abſolute Decree of God is the reaſon of knowing althings. So Le Blanc, de Concord. Libert. par. 1. theſ. …3. I ſee no reaſon, why we ſhould denie unto God the knowledge of thoſe things which are freely future under a certain condition, albeit in that condition there be not included a decree of predetermining the free cauſe to this or that. But Scotus and his followers fully eſpouſe our Hypotheſis, aſſerting, That God certainly knows al future contingents, becauſe his Divine Eſſence, which is the reaſon of knowing, repreſentes to the Divine Intellect the thing determinately future from the determination of his own wil. And then as to the preſcience of ſin, they hold, That albeit God doth not predefine ſins as ſuch, yet he predefines the permiſſion of ſins, in which he knows them to be future. Which is orthodox, and that which we ſhal demonſtrate hereafter, Chap. 5. §. 2.

5. Prop. It belongs to the Perfection of Gods wil and providence to 5. Divine Predetermination.predefine and predetermine al the free acts of the wil. This predefinition and predetermination as to gratioſe acts Strangius, lib. 2. c. 8. p. 188. and the reſt of the new Methodiſts, excepting Baronius, grant; but they denie it as to the Fal of Adam and other acts intrinſecally evil. So Strangius, lib. 3. cap. 4. pag. 568. But if it be ſaid, that God predefined and predetermined that Adam ſhould at that very time eat, abſtracting from the object which he did eat of, that cannot be. Then he gives his reaſons, why God could not predefine and predetermine Adam to the act of eating, abſtracting it from the reference it has to its object. And then he addes: Moreover p. 43we denie, that it belongs to the Perfection of God or of Divine Providence, that he abſolutely predefine al free acts, and predetermin the Wil unto them. The Arguments he urgeth for this his Antitheſis we ſhal endeavor to ſolve, and demonſtrate our own hypotheſis in its due place, Chap. 6. §. 1.

6. Prop. Gods predefinition of and predetermination to the ſubſtrate 6. Human Libertie.mater of ſinful Acts deſtroys not their Libertie. Strangius and his Sectators grant, That Predefinition and Predetermination deſtroyes not that Libertie which is eſſential to the Wil, but only that which conſiſtes in Indifference. So Strangius, l. 3. c. 14. p. 681, 682, 683, 685, 686. and c. 16. p. 711. But how frivolous this opinion is, and how unapt to ſerve the deſigne for which it was coined, we have already intimated, c. 1. §. 3. and intend more fully to demonſtrate, Chap. 6. §. 5.

7. Prop. Predefinition in the divine Decree and Predetermination 7. God not the Author of Sin.in time of thoſe entitative Acts whereunto ſin is annexed, do not make God the Author of Sin. This is the principal point in controverſie, the Antitheſis whereof is ſtrongly urged, though weakly defended by our Opponents. Thus Strangius, l. 3. c. 2. p. 548. But I judge it no way conſentaneous to the natural ſanctitie of God, that he wil and decree ſin to be, the vitioſitie to exiſt, and that he predefine ſuch acts, whereunto the vitioſitie is neceſſarily annexed; ſpecially the Fal of the evil Angels and our firſt Parents, from whence al ſins ſprang. So c. 5. p. 579. Whether it be ſaid from the permiſſion, or from the Decree of God permitting, or from the action of which God is the cauſe, that ſin is neceſſarily inferred, truely the neceſſity of ſinning is aſcribed to God as the Author; namely becauſe he decreed and cauſed that from which ſin neceſſarily follows. The like p. 587. Neither hath God predetermined the wil of Adam to the very act of eating the forbidden fruit, which yet as to its entitie is reduced to God as the firſt cauſe: neither was that act or its vitioſitie neceſſarily inferred from the permiſſion of God. That this Antitheſis of Strangius and his Sectators is moſt falſe, and our Hypotheſis moſt true, it remains on us to demonſtrate, Chap. 5.

Thus we have given the true and ful ſtate of our Controverſie; which by reaſon of the ſubtile evaſions and ſubterfuges of our Adverſaries lies under ſo much obſcuritie and confuſion: and indeed it is to me a deplorable caſe, and that which argues mens diffidence of the merits of their cauſe, that they contend with ſo much paſſionate vehemence for their own Phaenomena, and yet p. 44never explicate the termes, or ſtate the Queſtion in controverſie. I have thereby given the Reader as wel as my ſelf the more trouble in this part of our Province, that ſo what follows may be the more facile both for him and me.