The Court of the Gentiles Part 4:2, Treatise · Part 4 · Book 3 · Chapter 1

The Court of the Gentiles Part 4:2 · Treatise · Part 4 · Book 3 · Chapter 1

p. 1CHAP. I. The Explication of the Terms.

(1) The Origine of the controverſie about Predetermination to the entitative act of Sin; with the method we procede in. (2) The Nature of Sin, its Origine and material conſtitution; al acts in their p. 2generic nature indifferent: Al Morality determined by the Moral Law: Sin as to its formal reaſon a privation: Of actions modally and intrinſecally evil. (3) The Libertie of the Wil: The newcoined diſtinction of Libertie, largely and ſtrictly taken, with its abuſe: A true Idea of Libertie. (4) Moral Libertie or Free-wil to good: Neceſſitie, Impoſſibilitie, Poſſibilitie what. (5) The Wil of God, its Diſtribution into Significative and Decretive. (6) Divine Concurſe, its Immediation, Efficacitie, and Predetermination: foreign, with the Nature of Predetermination explicated.

§. 1. THE Doctrine of Divine Concurſe, and Creatural Dependence The Origine of the Controverſie.has in al Ages of the Church, but more ſpecially ſince the riſe of Pelagianiſme, received vigorous aſſaults from many learned and potent Adverſaries: and indeed no wonder, ſithat corrupt Nature propagated from Adam has, in imitation of its firſt parent, been ever aſpiring after an equality to the Deitie; and that not only in being the laſt End of its Acting, but alſo the firſt Principe of its Dependence. This vain attemt has appeared more viſibly in ſome daring and proud ſpirits, ſuch as Nebuchadnezar, Dan. 4. 30. Is not this great Babylon that I have built, &c? But in others the Deſign and oppoſition againſt the Concurſe of God has been more refined, under a pretext of vindicating the Divine Majeſty from the blaſphemous imputation of being the Author of ſin. And becauſe al pious Souls have ſo great a veneration for the Bleſſed Deitie, as to abhor the very ſhadow of ſuch Blaſphemie, therefore the Adverſaries of Divine Concurſe have in al Ages pitcht on this as the moſt puiſſant argument to oppoſe the ſame, that it brings the moſt holy and bleſſed God under the black imputation of encouraging, yea impelling men to Sin. And albeit thoſe that aſſert Gods efficacious Concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater or entitative act of ſin, do moſt vehemently deteſt in their own ſouls, and ſolemnly proteſt againſt the leaſt thought or opinion that makes God the Author of ſin, yet nevertheleſs this direful piece of blaſphemie is ſtil charged on them. Moreover, there being in this Doctrine of Efficacious Concurſe (as in al other great Myſteries of Faith) ſome intricate difficulties, which the wiſe God has left us under, to trie our faith and ſubmiſſion to divine Revelation; hence alſo many learned, and ſome pious p. 3men have been at a great loſs in their Inquiries, how to reconcile the Libertie of the human Wil with the Efficace of Divine Concurſe, ſo as to free the bleſſed God from the imputation of impelling men to Sin. Theſe and ſuch like conſiderations made me the more prolixe in the philoſophic metaphyſic contemplation of the Divine Concurſe, its Nature, Origine, and manner of working, particularly as to the entitative act of what is ſinful; together with the creatures Dependence thereon: which I have more fully diſcuſſed, Court of the Gentiles, Chap. 7, 9, 11. with deſign and endeavours, if it might be, to give the bleſſed God and his ſinful Creature both their dues, and remove thoſe extremes which men are apt to fal into.

But theſe my ſincere deſires and endeavours have not had thatThe method of our procedure. ſucceſs which was deſired; which brings me under a freſh obligation to vindicate mine own Hypotheſis, touching the efficacious concurſe of God to the ſubſtrate mater or entitative act of what is ſinful. I muſt confeſs, the province before us is difficult on many accounts, but principally, becauſe whiles we endeavour to defend the Concurſe and Providence of God about the entitative act of ſin, it is ſuggeſted by ſome, and believed by others, that we make the holy God the Author of ſin, which is the dregs of blaſphemie, and that which every ſerious ſpirit abhors more than Hel. Yet we need no way to dout, but that, with divine aſſiſtance, we may firmly aſſert and demonſtrate the efficacitie of Divine concurſe to the material entitative act of that which is ſinful, and yet fully vindicate the Divine Majeſtie from that blaſphemous Imputation of being the Author of ſin. And for our more diſtinct and demonſtrative procedure herein, we propoſe this method or form as moſt apt for the ſubject mater before us. (1) To examine and explicate the Terms formally implied in, or virtually relating to, the ſubject in controverſie. (2) To ſhew wherein the oppoſite parties agree, and wherein they differ both among themſelves and each from other; together with the original and principal motives, grounds, and cauſes of ſuch Differences. (3) To give a Scriptural Explication and Demonſtration of our own Hypotheſis, touching Gods efficacious concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of that which is ſinful; with an anſwer to thoſe falſe gloſſes and comments, which our Adverſaries the Jeſuites, Arminians, and ſome new Methodiſts give to thoſe Scriptures for the evading the force of them. (4) To draw up a brief Hiſtorie p. 4or Narrative of this controverſie, and its ſtate in al periods of the Chriſtian Churches to this day. (5) To give the Demonſtration of our Hypotheſis from Reaſons grounded on Scripture, with the Vindication of thoſe Reaſons from the ungrounded invalid anſwers given to them by our opponents, Strangius, and others. (6) To ſolve and anſwer the Objections urged by thoſe that oppoſe our Hypotheſis, particularly Strangius, Baranius, Le Blanc, with others. (7) And finally, to lay down the proper Sentiments and Hypotheſes of the Orthodoxe about this ſubject, in oppoſition to thoſe falſe Opinions which their Adverſaries charge upon them: as alſo to produce the proper opinions of the adverſe party, and the dangerous conſequences that naturally and neceſſarily flow from them.

§. 2. Our firſt and indeed principal task, in order to a clearThe explication of the Termes. and demonſtrative procedure in this controverſie, wil be, to explicate the termes, and diſabuſe them from thoſe ambiguities, confuſions, and falſe impoſitions, in which at preſent they are involved. And here indeed I cannot but break forth into a doleful Lamentation over the bleeding ſtate of the Churches of Chriſt, by reaſon of thoſe vexatious controverſies which rend and tear out their very bowels, and al from the ſophiſtic abuſe or Ambiguitie of termes. And I no way dout but to make it moſt manifeſt, when opportunitie is offered, that moſt of the controverſies of this Age are ſomented and maintained from the obſcuritie and abuſe of termes miſapplyed by ſubtile wits, for the eſtabliſhment of their own Hypotheſes. This is moſt evident in our preſent caſe, which makes it a duty abſolutely neceſſary, before we enter on our province, to clear up the way by a diſtinct and particular explication of thoſe termes that relate thereunto.

The firſt Terme we are to conſider is Sin: wherein we are toOf Sin▪ examine its Origne, Cauſes, Conſtitution, both material and formal, and Kinds; particularly the nature of Acts ſubſtantially or intrinſecally ſinful: al which we ſhal diſcuſſe with that Brevitie and Perſpicuitie the mater wil admit. 1. As for the Origine of Sin, it1. Its Origine. came firſt into the world from the Defectibilitie of our firſt Parents their Free-wil, and has been ever ſince maintained and fomented by the Vitioſitie of human nature depraved by Adams ſin, as we have copioſely demonſtrated, Court Gent. P. 4. B. 1. c. 4. §. 2. and Philoſ. Gen. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. ſect. 4. §. 3.

p. 52. Sin, as to its material conſtitution, has for its ſubſtrate mater2. Its ſubſtrate mater. or ſubject ſome natural good: For al ſin being, as to its formal nature, but a moral privation or relation, it neceſſarily requires ſome natural good as its ſubſtrate mater or ſubject. The wiſe Creator and Gubernator of althings has by his Law ſo conſtituted al moral Beings, both Virtues and Vices, as that they cannot ſubſiſt but in ſomething natural: albeit ſin be, according to its formal reaſon, a mere privation, yet it requires ſome poſitive, real natural Being for its ſubject, according to the nature of al other privations. Thus Auguſtin: That which is evil by reaſon of vice, Quod malum eſt per vitium, bonum eſt per naturam, Aug. contra Adverſ. Leg. & Prophet. cap. 5.is good by nature. Again he ſaith, That ſin is not nature, but the vice of nature. And that trite Maxime communly received by al the Ancients, That al evil is founded in ſome good, i. e. natural, ſufficiently demonſtrates this our aſſertion. Thus Auguſtin, Enchirid. 97. Although therefore things ſinful, as ſinful are not good; yet not only that good things, but alſo that ſinful be, is good: i. e. things ſinful are good, not morally, but naturally, as means utile and conducible to the promoting of Divine glorie: for albeit they oppoſe the bonitie of the creature, yet materially conſidered they oppoſe not the bonitie of the Creator; who can extract the greateſt good out of the greateſt evils. Doth it not then belong to the infinite bonitie of God, to permit ſins to be? Yea, doth not the ingreſſe of ſin into the world belong to the perfection thereof? is not then the ſubſtrate mater thereof ſome natural good? This is wel demonſtrated by Suarez, Metaph. Diſput. 11. ſect. 3. p. 252. Sin as ſin has a material cauſe, which is always ſome good. So Auguſtin ſaith, That there can be no evil but in good, becauſe if there were pure evil it would deſtroy itſelf: and the reaſon is, becauſe ſin, as to its formal cauſe, is not purely poſitive,Abſurdum eſſet, ſi diceretur, ullum defectum aut peccatum, aut ullum peccatum aut defectum, poſſe per ſe exiſtere, cùm nullum detur ſeparatum malum, ſed omne malum ſit in bono, Strang. de Volunt. l. 3. c. 19. p. 629. or a pure negation, but a privation of debite perfection, therefore it requires a ſubject unto which ſuch a perfection is due; which ſubject muſt be ſome good, &c. Yea, Strangius himſelf, our principal Adverſary in this Controverſie, grants in this particular as much as we demand, pag. 629. That it is abſurd to ſay, any ſin or defect can exiſt of itſelf, ſithat there can be no ſeparate evil; but al evil is [ſeated] in good. Yea, he ingenuouſly confeſſeth, pag. 245. That hatred of God, [which is an action intrinſecally evil] as it is an Act and Being, ſo it is from God, namely as it is hatred. For, adds he, So hatred truly, as it is abſtracted from this or that object is a phyſic action, to which the metaphyſic bonitie of Ens p. 6or Being agrees, and it is morally indifferent; but as it is determined to God, hence is its foreign, Obliquitie. This conceſſion of Strangius, if wel conſidered, would not only overthrow his own Antitheſis againſt our Hypotheſis, but alſo put a period to this Controverſie, as in what follows we ſhal demonſtrate, Chap. 6. §. 1.

3. But the principal thing to be examined in the explication of ſin is its formal Conſtitution or Reaſon, which we ſhal endeavour to manifeſt in the following Propoſitions. (1) Al human acts conſidered Al Acts in their generic nature indifferent.in their generic phyſic Entitie or natural Being, abſtracted from their moral conſtitution, are neither good nor evil, but morally indifferent. Al moral Beings or Acts are ſcated, foreign, in proper nature, as Cyril; neither can they exiſte without that proper nature whereunto they are appendent. There is no virtue or vice which has not ſomething of nature for its ſubject and ſeat: it's true, there may be nature where there is no moralitie, yet there cannot be moralitie where there is not ſome nature to ſuſtain the ſame. Now al human nature, as alſo al natural Acts conſidered in their generic natural Idea, albeit capable of virtue or vice, yet are in themſelves morally indifferent. Al thoughts, words and actions conſidered phyſically and abſtractly, without regard to their moral determination by the Wil and Law of God, are neither good nor evil. For Moralitie is a mode not phyſically or intrinſecally inherent in human acts, but appendent to them from the determination of the Divine Law: The very acts of loving and hating God, conſidered in their generic, phyſic and entitative nature, as abſtracted from the moral relation they have to their object, are morally neither good nor evil; becauſe moral Bonitie and Vitioſitie are differences of human acts merely accidental or modal, as Suarez and other Scholemen generally grant. Thus much Strangius frequently grants; as pag. 158. he ſaith, That moral Bonitie and Vitioſitie are accidents of natural Actions. So pag. 875. The Actio ſeorſim per ſe & phyſicè conſiderata indifferens eſt moraliter, nec minùs virtuti quàm vitio ſubſterni poteſt. Al moral conſtitution from the Divine Law.action conſidered apart and phyſically is morally indifferent, neither may it be leſſe ſubject to virtue than to vice. Hence,

(2) Al Moralitie and moral Acts, whether good or evil, receive their Conſtitution and Determination from the moral Divine Law. This Hypotheſis is defended by Scotus, and other Scholemen, and that on the higheſt reaſons: For the Divine Wil is the ſupreme meaſure and rule of al Juſtice and Sanctitie: Things are therefore juſt and good becauſe God wils them; and whatever God wils is for that very reaſon, becauſe God wils it, good and juſt. Therefore p. 7that Platonic notion defended by ſome learned men, That the reaſons of good and evil are eternal, is of dangerous conſequence, albeit it hath ſomewhat of Truth (as other errors have) mixed with it: we grant, that in things morally good, there is a natural condecence or congruitie to human nature, even antecedent to the Divine wil and conſtitution. As on ſuppoſition of mans being created, he immediately falls under a neceſſary and eſſential obligation of loving God, hating ſin, &c. Theſe are duties naturally congruous, yea morally neceſſary to human nature. Whence it is, that Divines uſually determine, That Original Righteouſneſs was natural to Adam, i. e. moſt condecent, congruous, and morally neceſſary to his Nature. Yet all this hinders not, but that the formal Determination of al Morals ariſe from the free conſtitution of the Divine wil and Law. The Law of God is the great Expanſum or firmament, which God has ſpread over the rational world, whereby al Mankind are moderated and regulated in al their moral Acts, and by which they ſhall be at laſt day judged: whence it neceſſarily follows, that al moral conſtitution muſt procede hence, as we have more amply demonſtrated, Court Gentiles, P. 4. B. 1. c. 2. §. 1, 2. Thus alſo Voetius, Diſput. Theolog. Par. 1. de jure & juſtit. Probl. 10. p. 351. proves, That the divine wil is the fountain and rule of al Goodneſs. So much alſo Strangius grants us, p. 89. namely, That, as whatever is true is therefore true, becauſe conform to the firſt Truth; ſo whatever is good, is therefore good, becauſe conform to the firſt Goodneſs: and as the Truth of God belongs to his Intellect, ſo Goodneſs to his Wil. The like Mr. Baxter, Catholick Theolog. Part 1. p. 100. Al created Juſtice and Holineſs is ſuch, i. e. good (for goodneſs is their eſſence) becauſe Gods efficient wil made them ſo. Hence,

(3) The formal reaſon or nature of Sin conſiſts in its being a Deordination, or Tranſgreſſion of the Divine Law. This Propoſition is fully ſtated and demonſtrated in Sacred Philoſophie, as we have copioſely proved, Court Gent. P. 4. B. 1. c. 4. §. 1. and Philoſ. General. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. S. 4. §. 1. ſo that it requires not further Explication or Demonſtration. Hence,

(4) Sin as to its formal conſtitution and nature is not a poſitive Sin as to its formal nature a privation.real Being, but privative. This Hypotheſis has found general aſſent to it among al the Ancients both Pagan Philoſophers and Chriſtians, excepting ſome few, Marcion and Manes, with others. It's true, the Manichees held Sin to be a poſitive Being, and they p. 8took up principes ſuited thereto, namely, That there were two firſt Beings or Cauſes, one of good, the other of evil: But the ſober Philoſophers and Chriſtians abhorred ſuch ſentiments. Simplicius on Epictetus, c. 34. p. 171. has an excellent Diſcourſe to prove that ſin is not in the nature of Beings, but foreign, a privation of Good, which we have largely explicated, Philoſ. Gen. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3 §. 4. §. 2. And this was generally aſſerted by the Greek and Latin Fathers. Thus the ſpurious Dionyſius aſſures us, that Sin muſt neceſſarily be, foreign, without nature, without ſubſiſtence. So Greg. Nyſſen. foreign, Sin is an inſubſiſtent Being, or privation. And it was a general concluſion in the Greek Scholes, that ſin reſulted, foreign, from the abſence of good, as darkneſs from the abſence of light. Thus alſo among the Latins, Auguſtin aſſerted, that Sin was not Nature, but the evil of Nature. Again: the Amiſſion of Good has taken up the name of Sin. And Strangius, who is our principal adverſary in this controverſie, yet l. 1. c. 13. p. 97, &c. he ſtrongly demonſtrates this Hypotheſis, That the formal reaſon of ſin conſiſts in Privation. This I conceive deſerves a particular remarque, becauſe ſome late Authors, and thoſe not of inferior note, make great uſe of this Antitheſis, namely, That Sin is as to its formal nature poſitive, as their chief engine to oppoſe our general Hypotheſis, touching Gods efficacious concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of that which is ſinful. They tel us, that Sin, as to its forme, is not a mere privation, but a moral Relation, which has ſo much Realitie as a relation. But to obviate al miſtakes and verbal conteſts, we grant, [1] That Sin may be termed a moral privative relation, or rather, relative privation, as it is a tranſgreſſion of, and ſo muſt have relation to, the Moral Law. [2] That Sin is not a mere nothing, but has ſome kind of logic poſitivitie or notional entitie, ſo far as to render it capable of being the terme of a Propoſition, as we have more fully ſhewen, Philoſ. Gen. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. S. 4. §. 2. But, [3] We may not yield, that Sin is a moral poſitive Relation, much leſs a poſitive act or real Being, ſuch as is the term of a natural production: For ſuch a perſwaſion wil neceſſarily force men to grant, that God is the Author of Sin, or to hold with the Manichees, that there are two firſt Cauſes, one of good and the other of evil.

4. Touching the kinds of ſinful Actions, that which principally concerns our preſent controverſie is the diſtinction of ſinful p. 9Actions, into ſuch as are modally only, or ſuch as are intrinſecally evil.

(1) By actions modally evil they generally underſtand ſuch as areActions modally ſinful. ſubſtantially good, yet have ſome modal accidental vitioſitie or ſinfulneſs appendent to them. Such are al the ſincerely pious acts of good men in this imperfect ſtate; which have an evangelic perfection and goodneſs in them, yet mixed with much corruption and imperfection. For ſuch is the profunde myſterious wiſdom of God, that he permits a mixture of ſin even with the beſt good works on this ſide Heaven, thereby to render the methods of his Grace the more illuſtrious: ſo that the ſame Act, which is in evangelic eſtimation ſincerely good, is alſo modally ſinful and imperfect. Thus Strangius, l. 2. c. 9. p. 205. Sithat al tranſgreſſion of the Law is ſin, men ſin both by doing what is forbidden, as alſo by doing what is commanded, if not in that manner as commanded: Again, both by not doing what is commanded, as alſo by abſtaining from what is forbidden, if they abſtain not in a regular manner. Thus oft it comes to paſs, that the action may be good according to the ſubſtance of the work, and yet evil as to the mode of acting. As for example; to give Almes to the poor is a work ſubſtantially good, yet if it procede not from Faith and Charitie, and reſpect to the glorie of God, it is evil as to the mode of acting. Thus Strangius. But I adde, that the beſt works of Unbelievers are ſubſtantially evil, in that they have nothing of ſincere good in them; but ful of hatred of God; and the beſt works of pious ſouls in this imperfect ſtate are modally evil, becauſe they have a tincture of vitioſitie appendent to them.

(2) By Actions intrinſecally evil, they generally underſtandActions intrinſecally evil. ſuch as being referred to and determined by ſuch or ſuch an object, carrie in them an intrinſec vitioſitie and malignitie; ſo that whiles under ſuch a reference and determination they can never become good. And the commun inſtance is in hatred of God, and Blaſphemie. Not that thoſe acts are in their phyſic material entitie or ſubſtance ſinful, but only in their moral conſtitution and formal determination or reference to their object. Thus much is alſo acknowledged by Strangius, l. 1. c. 13. p. 89. When, according to the commun ſentence, it is ſaid, that ſome alſo are in themſelves or intrinſecally evil, the acts are not underſtood as abſtracted from their Object, but as they refer to their object, in regard of which they have their vitioſitie.—It ſeems to me, that the vitioſitie, which is in the hatred of God, doth not belong to the material, p. 10but formal of Sin. Which is an ingenuous confeſſion, and wil be of much uſe to us in what follows. At preſent we ſhall only remarque; that this notion of Acts intrinſecally evil, if duely examined, wil be of no uſe to our Opponents, albeit they ſeem to lay the moſt ſtreſs on it. For [1] They grant, as Strangius here, that the vitioſitie, which is in the hatred of God [and ſo in all other acts intrinſecally evil] doth not belong to the material but formal of ſin: ſo that Gods concurſe to the material or ſubſtrate mater of ſin doth not ſuppoſe his concurſe to the formal obliquitie of ſin. [2] In acts ſincerely but imperfectly good, and modally evil, the ſubſtrate mater or material act, which is both good and evil, is one and the ſame: now our Adverſaries grant Predetermination to the material act as good: how then can they denie predetermination to the ſame material entitative act which is evil, though not as ſuch? But of this more hereafter, c. 5.

§. 3. The next terme to be diſcuſſed by us is the Natural The Libertie of the Wil.Freedom, or Libertie of the Wil; which is indeed the hinge on which our whole controverſie turns, as our more intelligent Opponents confeſs. A reverend Divine, Cathol. Theologie, Part 3. p. 80. ſaith, I do readily confeſs, that, as the ſum of al the controverſie is, Whether man hath truely any free-wil; &c. I do readily concur with him in this, That the ſum of al the controveſie muſt be reſolved into this notion of free-wil; and therefore if we cannot make good our ground here, we muſt neceſſarily fal under the efforts of our Antagoniſts. And I muſt confeſs this conception has been deeply engraven on my thoughts, for twenty five years or more, that the whole of the Pelagian and Arminian controverſie centers in this point, touching the Libertie of the Wil: and he that endeavours to remove thoſe maladies, but overlooks thoſe Pelagian infuſions that lie hid in the heart of Freewill, doth act but like the unskilful Phyſician, who, to remove an Hectick Feaver, endeavoured to cure the Itch. What made Durandus drive Gods immediate Concurſe to human acts, but this perſwaſion, that it deſtroyeth the Libertie of the wil, and ſo makes God the Author of ſin? And what makes the Jeſuites denie Predetermination, but the like groundleſs perſwaſion? So alſo Baronius, in his Metaphyſics, Sect. 8. Diſp. 3. §. 79. p. 147. Here it was that the Pelagians of old took Sanctuarie, and under the ſhadow of this terme Free-wil conceled al their venimous Infuſions: here, by their ſophiſtic logic and ambiguous cloudy p. 11diſtinctions, they fortified themſelves againſt the Defenders of Efficacious Grace. Thus Janſenius, Auguſt. de Natur. Lapſ. Tom. 2. l. 4. c. 24. proves largely out of Auguſtine, that the principal fraud and cheat of the Pelagians lay in their philoſophic hallucination about natural free-wil, which they placed in Indifference, but Auguſtine in a rational ſpontaneitie. Herein they are followed by the Jeſuites and Arminians, who indeed differ not ſcarcely one hairs breadth from the Pelagians and Semi-pelagians. Yea Baronius, (whom Rutherford rangeth among the Arminians) with confidence maintains Bellarmines definition of Libertie, as juſtifiable and orthodoxe, Metaphyſ. Sect. 12. p. 285.

But other of our Antagoniſts, Strangius, Le Blanc, &c. perceivingThe new coined diſtinction of Libertie largely and ſtrictly taken. that our Reformed Divines have generally placed Natural Libertie in a Rational Spontaneity, and ſo preſumed, that voluntary neceſſitie is very wel conſiſtent therewith, hence they have found out an artificial diſtinction for the reconciling the Calviniſts with the Jeſuites, Pelagians and Arminians: They diſtinguiſh Libertie, into that which is largely, or ſtrictly taken: and they confeſs, (1) That Libertie taken largely, as it is a perfection of the Soul, ſo it has one and the ſame notion with Rational Spontaneitie; and ſuch is the Libertie of glorified Souls. This Libertie they make eſſential to the wil; of which ſee Strangius, l. 3. c. 14. p. 686. alſo p. 691, 702, 703. But, adde they, (2) There is alſo a libertie ſtrictly ſo termed, which conſiſts in the Indifference of the wil to this or that object, alſo to act or not to act: and this Libertie is moſt proper to this our imperfect ſtate, as Strangius, p. 188. 687. 689. 711. So likewiſe Le Blanc, p. 435. and others. There were ſome firſt lines of this diſtinction drawn by Camero, who makes libertie ſtrictly ſo termed to be about the means, not the end; yet his Notions about Libertie are tolerable, in that he makes Divine Predetermination conſiſtent with human Libertie. But the firſt creator of this diſtinction touching a two-fold Libertie, among thoſe who owned the Synod of Dort, was Strangius, who aſſerts a two-fold Libertie, one conſidered in its own Nature, which is eſſential to the wil, and the other as limited to lapſed man, which includes Indifference, &c. as in places above cited.

What theſe new Methodiſts mean by this new-coined diſtinction of Libertie, unleſs it be a gratification to the Pelagians, I cannot conjecture: Certain I am, that I never could find it p. 12among the ancient Philoſophers, Primitive Fathers, Scholaſtic Theologues, or any other but theſe new Methodiſts or their Sectators. Do any of the Greek Philoſophers make mention of any libertie, but what is eſſential to the wil and al human acts? Can we find among the Greek Theologues any notices of this two-fold Libertie? Yea do not the very Jeſuites herein concur with us, that Liberty is eſſential to al moral acts, both in the future, as wel as the preſent ſtate of the Soul? Is not Libertie conſtituted by them and the Arminians as the foundation of al Moralitie? Doth not Amyraldus, de Libero Arbitrio, as wel as we, make Libertie properly taken eſſential to the wil and al its Acts? Of what uſe then can this diſtinction of a two-fold Libertie be? Wil it ſatisfie the Pelagians, Jeſuites or Arminians? No; becauſe they al make Libertie ſtrictly taken eſſential to al Moral Acts. Or, wil it any way relieve the Calviniſts in their conflicts both with Jeſuites and Arminians, to ſay the wil is ſometimes free and ſometimes not? If it be ſuppoſed, that Indifference be eſſential to libertie in this imperfect ſtate, wil it not then be replied by Pelagians and Arminians, that the wil is not, according to theſe new Methodiſts, free in Converſion, becauſe not indifferent? It were not difficult to demonſtrate, how invalid this newcoined diſtinction of Libertie is, and unapt to reach thoſe ends for which it was deſigned by the authors thereof.

As for the true Idea and notion of Natural Libertie, we have,The True Idea of Libertie. with what ſtudie and diligence we could, inquired into and diſcuſſed the ſame, Court of the Gentiles, P. 2. B. 3. c. 9. S. 3. §. 11, 12. & B. 4. c. 1. § 29—32. alſo Philoſoph. General. P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. S. 2. & P. 2. L. 1. c. 1. S. 4. §. 2. the ſum whereof may be drawn forth in theſe following Propoſitions. (1) Natural Libertie, as it denotes a power, has one and the ſame Idea or Nature with the Wil. This is copioſely demonſtrated, in the forementioned places. Hence, (2) Al acts of the Wil have libertie in the ſtricteſt notion eſſentially appendent to them. (3) The Dominion which a free Agent has over his own Act is not abſolute, but limited and conditionate. (4) The neceſſitie which ariſeth from the concurſe of God the firſt cauſe, no way diminiſheth, but eſtabliſheth the Natural Libertie of the Wil. For nothing offers violence to the Wil, or is injurioſe to its Libertie, ſo long as the act it puts forth is voluntary: ſo long as the wil doth voluntarily elect and embrace what it is predetermined unto, the act is in its own power and free: p. 13for as Ariſtotle, Eth. l. 5. c. 12. wel obſerves, foreign, nothing happens to ſuch an one, but what he wils. (5) Actual Indifference to varietie of Objects or Acts, is no way eſſential to natural Libertie, but only an Accident reſulting from its imperfection. (6) The formal, native and genuine Idea or notion of natural Libertie, both as to ſtate and exercice, includes no more than a rational ſpontaneitie. This laſt propoſition, which is the principal, Strangius ffLibertas voluntatis in genere nihil aliud eſſe videtur, quàm foreign ſpontaneum intellectuale. Strang. l. 3. c. 14. p. 686.owns; and Le Blanc de Libr. Arbit. Theſ. 19. p. 405. confeſſeth this to be the general opinion of our Reformed Divines, even of Amyraldus, Placeus, and other new Methodiſts. That this alſo is aſſerted by our Judicious Davenant, ſee his Determinations, Quaeſt. 22. That the Divine Decree takes not away Libertie. Theſe Propoſitions about natural Libertie, we have in the forecited places more amply demonſtrated, becauſe the whole Pelagian and Arminian controverſie, and particularly this about Gods concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin depends thereon: and he that ſhal undertake this Province of reſolving our preſent Queſtion, without a clear Explication and Demonſtration of the Wils natural Libertie, doth nothing to purpoſe.

§. 4. Next to the natural Libertie of the Wil, we are to conſiderMoral Libertie or free-wil to good. Moral Libertie or Free-wil, as alſo what is poſſible or impoſſible to corrupt Nature. By Moral Libertie or Free-wil is generally underſtood the moral potence or ſpiritual abilitie of the Soul to do good. This moral and ſpiritual Libertie, our Adverſaries the Pelagians, Arminians and new Methodiſts confound with natural Libertie, and from our denying the later in corrupt Nature, they falſely charge us with denying the former: therefore to remove this confuſion of the termes, and thoſe falſe imputations which are charged on thoſe that defend efficacious concurſe, the following Propoſitions wil be of uſe unto us.

1. Natural Libertie is eſſential to the Wil and al its acts, but moral Libertie or free-wil to good only accidental and ſeparable. The Wil is not a Wil if it be not naturally free in al its acts; whatever act is voluntary, is for that very reaſon free; Voluntary and free being in Scriptural eſtimation, as alſo by the determination of the beſt Philoſophers, termes ſynonymous and equipollent, as we have demonſtrated, Philoſ. General. P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. S. 2. §. 1. But now as for Moral Libertie and free-wil to good, that is only accidental to the human Soul; it may come and go, be preſent and abſent without the natural deſtruction of the p. 14Soul, or violation to natural Libertie. It's true, that Moral Libertie, conſiſting in virtuoſe Habits, Inclinations and Exercices, is the Perfection of Man, yet ſo as the Eſſence of the Soul is not diminiſhed or deſtroyed by the loſs thereof.

2. Our firſt Parents in their innocent ſtate were inveſted not only with natural but alſo with moral Libertie or free-wil to good. This is granted on both ſides, and therefore needs not further demonſtration.

3. Since the fal corrupt Nature in its unregenerate ſtate lies under a total, univerſal and naturally moral Impotence as to al Moral and ſpiritual good. I cal this Impotence total and univerſal, as it overſpreads the whole ſoul, and has ſtript it of al ſeeds of, or inclinations to, any ſpiritual or truely moral good. I terme it alſo natural, or naturally moral, in that, albeit the ſubject be moral, yet the Impotence being communicated together with corrupt Nature, connatural or congenite and proper thereto, as corrupt, and as to al natural power inſeparable therefrom, it is become a moral Nature. I am not ignorant, that ſome new Methodiſts, together with the Arminians, ſtiffely contend, that this Impotence is not natural but only moral; but either they intend under the ambiguitie of the termes to concele ſome Pelagian Infuſions of natural ſeeds of virtue and Free-wil to Moral good, or elſe they muſt wreſt the termes Moral and Natural from their native ſenſe, and what is intended by thoſe that defend a natural impotence. For al know, that by moral Impotence is generally underſtood an Impotence contracted by frequent Acts of and Cuſtom in Sin; and ſo on the contrary by natural Impotence is underſtood ſuch as is traduced together with, and through the miſerable contagion of ſin inſeparably appendent to corrupt nature. Of this ſee more Philoſoph. General. P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. S. 5. §. 1. Hence,

4. Sin in corrupt Nature becomes neceſſary, and the obſervation of Divine Precepts impoſſible. This Propoſition has ever been in al Ages of the Church, the great bal of contention between the Patrons of Free-wil, and the Defenſors of Free-grace. The Pelagians of old as the Arminians of late have made this their main Refuge for the defenſe of their Diana of Free-wil. If Sin, ſay they, be neceſſary, and ſo inevitable, then it ceaſeth to be ſin: if it be voluntary, then it may be avoided. But theſe Pelagian Armes Auguſtin and his Sectators have ſtoutly refelled, by ſhewing, p. 15(1) That the Law was not originally impoſſible to mans Nature, but only is become ſo accidentally by reaſon of Sin, and the impotence of corrupt Nature. (2) That this Impotence is not leſs voluntary than neceſſary, yea the more neceſſary it is, the more voluntary: The neceſſitie of this Impotence is ſeated in and ariſeth from the Wil, and therefore moſt voluntary. Thence Auguſtin termes it dura Neceſſitas, an hard Neceſſitie, becauſe the more neceſſary this impotence is the more voluntary, and the more voluntary it is the more neceſſary. Plato, Phileb. p. 22. gives it the character, foreign, of a miſerable neceſſitie; which he oppoſeth to that bleſſed neceſſitie of adhering to the chiefeſt good, of which ſee Court Gent. P. 4. B. 1. c. 4. §. 7. (3) That albeit the avoiding of ſin and the obſervation of Divine commands be legally impoſſible to corrupt nature, yet both are Evangelicly poſſible through the habitual and actual aſſiſtances of the Spirit of Grace. See more of the impoſſibilitie which is in corrupt nature for the obſervation of Divine precepts in Janſenius, Aug. Tom. 3. l. 3. c. 15, &c. Philoſoph. General. Part. 1. lib. 3. cap. 3. ſect. 5. §. 1. Court Gent. P. 4. B. 1. c. 4. §. 8.

5. Notwithſtanding the neceſſary impotence of corrupt nature as to what is morally and ſpiritually good, yet it ſtil retains a phyſic or natural facultie and remote paſſive power capable of receiving spiritual good. No one denies, but that the Soul, as a rational and voluntary ſubject, is remotely, paſſively, and naturally capacitated for the reception of gratioſe infuſions; al the Controverſie is about a proxime or next, active, and moral power, which we denie to remain in corrupt nature.

6. The Neceſſitie of conſenting and Impoſſibilitie of reſiſting which Neceſſitie, impoſſibilitie and poſſibilite what.attends the wil on the ſuppoſition of Divine concurſe efficaciouſly moving and applying the ſame to act, is only conſequential, hypothetic, or conditionate and voluntary, not ſimple, abſolute, and coactive or violent. Here we are to inquire what a ſimple and abſolute impoſſibilitie is, and how it is differenced from a conditionate and limited Impoſſibilitie. A thing is ſaid to be ſimply and abſolutely impoſſible, when it is in no regard poſſible: for if it be in any reſpect poſſible, it cannot be ſaid to be ſimply and abſolutely impoſſible. Now nothing can be ſaid to be in no regard poſſible, or ſimply and abſolutely impoſſible, but what in its own nature implies a repugnance of exiſting: and ſurely nothing in its own nature implies a repugnance of exiſting, but what involves a contradiction: that which involves a p. 16contradiction comes not within the compaſs of poſſible, becauſe contradictions have no paſſive power of being verified; for the affirming of the one is the denying of the other; the truth of the one makes the other falſe: But whatever implies not a contradiction or repugnance of exiſting, that may be; and therefore cannot be ſimply and abſolutely impoſſible, of which ſee Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. c. 5. § 4. Now that the Concurſe of God predetermining the wil to the ſubſtrate mater of ſinful acts cannot render the oppoſite act of obedience ſimply and abſolutely impoſſible is evident; becauſe (1) the oppoſite act of obedience implies no contradiction or repugnance of exiſting: For God can and doth work it in ſome: albeit it be in a limited ſenſe impoſſible to corrupt nature, yet it is poſſible to Grace, as before. (2) The wil predetermined to one act has an habitual indifference or radical flexibilitie to the oppoſite act; and therefore the impoſſibilitie is only conditionate and limited. A reverend Divine ſuppoſeth, That Gods determinative concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin leaves it undeniable, that the mater of al his Laws, in reference to al ſuch actions, are a ſimple and moſt ſtrictly natural impoſſibilitie. Which I conceive to be a great miſtake, and that according to the confeſſion of our principal Adverſary, Strangius, who lib. 3. cap. 8. pag. 625. ſpeaks thus: Therefore the Divine determination either by efficacious grace, or any other way [which includes concurſe to the entitative act of ſin] being granted, there is truly inferred a neceſſitie of the conſequence; becauſe that act of the wil unto which it is determined by God muſt neceſſarily follow, but it is not a neceſſitie of the conſequent, which in its own nature remains contingent; and therefore in a compoſite ſenſe the wil, when it is determined by God to act, cannot but act. Whence ſome Scholemen ſay, That in free-wil there is a ſimultie of power to oppoſites, In libero arbitrio eſt ſimultas potentiae ad oppoſita, ſed non potentia ſimultatis, Alvarez.but not a power of ſimultie, i. e. a power of embracing oppoſites at one and the ſame time: whereof the reaſon is this, becauſe a power to one act is not oppoſed to the power unto the negation of the ſame act, or to a contrary act, but two contraries or contradictories cannot be together in the ſame ſubject. Of which mater Alvarez diſcourſeth learnedly, de Auxil. l. 9. Diſp. 94. & l. 12. Diſp. 115. Note wel here, that Strangius in this point fals in with the Dominicans, and fully aſſents and conſents to their mode of conciliating Divine determination with human libertie, which if the fore-mentioned reverend Brother and others would do, I ſhould judge our Controverſie very near, if not fully at an end. The ſum of al is this, That the determination p. 17or predetermination of Divine concurſe to this or that act doth not make the negation of that act, or a contrary act a ſimple or moſt ſtrictly natural impoſſibilitie, as ſome would perſuade us, but only infers a neceſſitie of the conſequence, the wil having ſtil, in ſenſu diviſo, i. e. on ſuppoſition of the withdrawment of Divine concurſe, an habitual indifference to act or not to act, though, in ſenſu compoſito, as predetermined by Divine concurſe, it cannot but act. Or ſummarily thus: The wil has at that very time, when it is predetermined by God to this or that act, an habitual power or radical indifference to the negation of that act, or to the putting forth a contrary act: So that Divine predetermination excludes only a contrary act, not the radical power to that act. Thus alſo Davenant, Animadv. againſt Hoard, p. 240, 333, 341, 360, 402. proves ſtrongly and accurately, That abſolute Election and Reprobation may ſtand with a poſſibilitie to contrary events, though not with contrary events. Of which more hereafter.

§. 5. The next terme that fals under conſideration is the Wil of The wil of God, its diſtributions, &c.God, its different Ideas and various Acceptions in the Scriptures, under which our Opponents concele themſelves, and their miſrepreſentations of our ſentiments. The ancient diſtinction of the Divine wil, (which they ſay Hugo de S. Victore firſt formed) was, into voluntatem ſigni & voluntatem beneplaciti, Gods ſignificative wil and his beneplacite wil. (1) Gods ſignificative wil they make to conſiſte of Precepts, Promiſſes, Prohibitions, Permiſſions, Counſels, and Admonitions. By Permiſſions here we muſt underſtand ſuch as are moral, not natural, which as to ſin properly belong to Gods beneplacite wil, as anon. This ſignificative Wil of God ſome Divines terme his Reveled wil, from Deut. 29. 29. others terme it his Legiſlative or Preceptive wil: others his Approbative wil, whereby he declares what he approves and what he diſapproves, of which ſee Davenant Animadv. againſt Hoard, pag. 222, 356, 391—399. Laſtly learned Chamier, and Daillé out of him, terme this ſignificative wil of God, his wil foreign, of complacence, or complacential wil, whereby he declares, what is moſt agreable to him, and what not. Our judicious Davenant makes uſe alſo of this terme, as having one and the ſame Idea with the former notion of Gods Approbative wil. Theſe ſeveral notions of Gods ſignificative wil, albeit they may differ in ſome formalitie, yet they agree in ſubſtance and import, denoting Gods reveled wil touching mans dutie, and that which is moſt agreable to his holy wil and nature. p. 18(2) As for Gods Beneplacite wil, commonly …iled his wil foreign, of good pleaſure, it is that whereby he decrees, effects, or permits al events and effects: whence it is diſtributed into effective and permiſſive. Gods effective beneplacite wil, is that whereby he decrees and produceth al natural and ſupernatural effects: Gods permiſſive beneplacite wil, is that whereby according to his eternal Decree he efficaciouſly permits the exiſtence of ſin.

This diſtribution of the Divine wil is greatly oppoſed by the Pelagians, Arminians, and new Methodiſts. (1) The Jeſuites, whom we may without breach of charitie terme Pelagians, do what they can to baffle this diſtinction: ſo Molina, the Head of that Faction, in Thom. Part. 1. Quaeſt. 19. Art. 12. tels us, That theſe ſigns of the Divine wil ſignifie properly and formally ſome nolition or volition in God; and therefore Gods ſignificative wil cannot be contradiſtinguiſht to his beneplacite wil. The ſame is urged by the Arminians. But the Orthodox both among Papiſts and Proteſtants replie, that Gods reveled ſignificative wil is only equivocally, analogically, figuratively and improperly termed his wil, as the Edicts of Princes, and Laws of States. So Sanderſon de Obligatione Conſcientiae, Praelect. 4 ſect. 20. tels us, That Gods beneplacite wil is that whereby God has from al Eternitie conſtituted with himſelf what he wil do: his ſignificative wil is that whereby he has appointed unto us a Law, by ſignifying what he wil have done by us. Whereof the former is properly and univocally the wil of God, but this later improperly and analogically ſo called. The like Davenant, Animadverſ. pag. 392. It's true, Divines grant, that this ſignificative wil of God has ſome Decree or Act of the beneplacite wil anſwering thereto: for the wiſe God decreed, that this or that ſhould be mans dutie; but they denie that this reveled wil of God touching mans dutie is the ſame with his decretive wil touching events. (2) Our Adverſaries pretend, that by this diſtinction of the ſignificative and beneplacite wil we make two oppoſite wils in God, and ſuch as claſh each with other. This makes a reverend Brother to reject this diſtinction, as of no uſe in our preſent caſe. But Divines anſwer, that theſe wils are not oppoſite in God, but only diſparate and diverſe: the things decreed, and the things reveled and conſtituted by Gods ſignificative wil may oppoſe each other, but the decretive and reveled wil never oppoſe each other. The moſt holy and wiſe God really intends whatever he commands, or approves, with an intention that it ſhal be mans dutie, and rewarded if performed, p. 19but not alwayes with an intention that it ſhal be effected. (3) Our Opponents, and particularly the new Methodiſts, confound Gods Beneplacite Decretive Wil, with his Wil of Complacence and Approbation: and under this confuſion endeavor to ſecure their oppoſition againſt Gods willing the Permiſſion of Sin. Thus Strangius, l. 3. c. 2. p. 548. None can be ſaid to wil what he doth not approve. Thence others make Love of complacence eſſential to al acts of the Divine Wil: and thence conclude, if God wil the permiſſion of Sin, he muſt neceſſarily take complacence therein. But the replie hereto is not difficult: we ſay, that God takes complacence in al his own Acts, but not in al the objects they refer unto: but now love of complacence is not ſo termed from the act, but object about which it is converſant; which muſt be ſome good either natural or moral. Whence it is evident, that God may wil the permiſſion of Sin, and its exiſtence as a conſequent thereto, and yet not take complacence in or approve of ſin. See more of Gods Wil and its various Diſtributions, Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. c. 5. §. 3.

§. 6. The laſt terme that needs our Explication is Divine Concurſe, Of Divine Concurſe.its Immediation, Efficacitie and Predetermination. Strangius, l. 1. c. 11. p. 59. diſtinguiſheth Concurſe from Influxe thus: (1) Influxe is more large than concurſe: for the cauſality of every efficient is termed Influxe; and therefore the Influxe of God is ſeen in many things, in which his concurſe is not, as when he acts without the concurrence of a ſecond cauſe. Thence, (2) the terme Influxe is abſolute, not denoting the reſpect of any other cauſe, but that of concurſe is relative. I have no mind to quarrel about termes without juſt ground, and therefore can eaſily admit this diſtinction, though it make neither for nor againſt either party. But that which more immediately concerns ourImmediate Concurſe what. preſent controverſie is, 1. To give the true Idea and Notion of Immediate Concurſe, as generally aſſerted and ſtated in the Scholes: which we ſhal endeavour to explicate both negatively and poſitively.

(1) Negatively, Immediate concurſe to an Act conſiſtes not in the preſervation of the principe, or rendring of it apt and habile for any congenerous action. I know a learned and pious Divine, who ſeems in termes to grant immediate Concurſe as to the ſubſtrate mater of ſinful actions, yet in the cloſe placeth it only in this, That God as the firſt Mover, ſo far excite and actuate thoſe p. 20powers, as that they are apt and habile for any congenerous action, to which they have a natural deſignation; and whereunto they are not ſinfully diſinclined. But al this, as I conceive, no way reacheth the true notion of Immediate concurſe, neither is it conſiſtent with it ſelf. For, [1] If God as the firſt mover excite and actuate thoſe powers, then are they neceſſarily by him drawn or applied to act, which is more than being apt and habile for any congenerous action: certainly to excite and actuate a power is more than to render it apt and habile for an action. [2] If the Powers by Gods exciting of them are rendred only apt and habile for any congenerous action, then where is immediate concurſe as to the Act? Did or would any terme this immediate concurſe, ſo far to excite and actuate thoſe powers, as that they are apt and habile for any congenerous Action? [3] What this Aptitude and Habilitie is, which the Powers receive by being thus excited and actuated by God, I cannot divine: Are not the powers of the ſoul as powers apt and habile for natural actions, ſuch as the ſubſtrate mater of ſin is? What other Aptitude or Habilitie doth God give unto the natural faculties as to ſinful acts, but merely the facultie of acting? Need ſinners any other facultie, power, Aptitude or Habilitie to ſin, but the rational faculties depraved? It's true, God applies thoſe faculties to the entitative act of that which is ſinful, but yet doth not adde any aptitude or habilitie to ſin. [4] Doth not Durandus and his Sectators grant al this, and yet denie immediate concurſe as to the entitative act of ſin? The Hypotheſis of Durandus doth no way exclude any kind of Aptitude or Habilitie, but rather include the ſame; it only excludes the immediate application of the power to its act; which alſo is excluded by this laxe notion of Immediate concurſe. [5] Laſtly, if they who oppoſe Gods concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of al ſinful acts, do indeed and in truth aſſert and owne an immediate concurſe to any one entitative act that is ſinful, al thoſe black and direful conſequences, which they caſt on the aſſertors of Predetermination, may with as much facilitie be retorted on them, as we ſhal demonſtrate, chap. 5. §. 4. Hence,

(2) Affirmatively, Immediate concurſe as to its formal Idea not only gives an Aptitude or Habilitie to act, but alſo immediately produceth the very act it ſelf. That this notion of immediate concurſe is univerſally received in the Scholes, is moſt evident. I ſhal deſire the Reader to conſult our Countrey-man Compton p. 21Carleton, a learned and acute Jeſuite, who had his firſt education in Cambridge, and is more moderate than moſt of that faction. He ſaith, Philoſoph. Diſput. 28. de Cauſa prima, Sect. 3. p. 319. God therefore concurs with al his Creatures immediately to al their actions, not only by the Immediation of Virtue, but alſo of Suppoſite, i. e. that action, whereby the creature operates, doth alſo flow immediately from God himſelf, and not from any other ſubſtituted in his place. A clear explication of Immediate concurſe, ſo far as it regards its Immediation. Whence Diſput. 29. Sect. 2. he determines thus, touching Gods Immediate concurſe to the act of Sin: We muſt ſay therefore, that God doth phyſically and immediately concur to the act of ſin, together with the create Wil. And he confirmes this Hypotheſis by Arguments out of Aquinas, Suarez, Vaſques, Anſelme, Tanner, Zumel, Monteſinus, Mulderus, Arriaga, and Oviedo. So that this notion of Immediate concurſe ſeems to have been generally entertained by al parties, both Thomiſts, Scotiſts, and Jeſuites, as that which is moſt rational and ſelf-evidencing.

2. But the principal point in controverſie is touching the Efficacitie Efficacious and predeterminant concurſe.and Predetermination of Divine Concurſe; wherein the Jeſuites and Arminians oppoſe the Dominicans and Calviniſts. I muſt confeſs, when I firſt undertook the explication of Divine Concurſe, ſpecially as to the ſubſtrate mater of Sin, I ſtudioſely avoided the terme Predetermination, (although it be frequently fathered on me) as is intimated Court Gentiles, P. 4. B. 2. c. 11. §. 7. partly to avoid needleſs counteſts about words, and partly becauſe I would not profeſſedly eſpouſe the intereſt of any one Sect, but adhere to Scriptural termes; but ſince, upon a more accurate inquiry, finding the terme expreſſely laid down in Scripture, and that as to the very mater in controverſie, touching Gods concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin, I ſee no reaſon why we may not make uſe of it, notwithſtanding the prejudices ſome endeavor to load it with. Therefore for the more ful explication of this terme I ſhal endeavor to ſhew, (1) What efficacious concurſe notes; and (2) How this efficacious concurſe may be termed Predeterminative.

1. Divine Concurſe is termed efficacious as it doth moſt potentlyEfficacions concurſe what. and invincibly produce its effect. The Grecanic terme, whereby the efficacitie of Divine Concurſe is expreſſed in the Scriptures, is foreign, efficacitie, or energie, which notes the puiſſant p. 22force of any operation. So Epheſ. 1. 19. foreign,Eph. 1. 19.Eph 1:19 acccording to the energie or efficacious working of the might of his power. Here is, (1) Power or force. (2) Might of power or moſt potent power; and (3) The efficacious working of this moſt potent power: Which note the puiſſant efficacitie of divine concurſe. Thence the Syriac renders it foreign, according to the efficace. So Epheſ. 3. 7. foreign,Epheſ. 3. 7.Eph 3:7 according to the energie or efficace of his power. The like, Phil. 3. 21. foreign,Phil. 3. 21.Phil 3:21 according to the efficacious working, whereby he is able even to ſubdue althings unto himſelf. So Col. 1. 29. foreign, according to his efficacious working, which worketh in me mightily. In al theſe Texts we have mighty power, yea omnipotence joined with the efficace of divine Concurſe; which demonſtrates its invincible manner of working, in the production of al its effects. So that foreign ſignifies Gods intime preſence with al ſecond Cauſes, and efficacious concurring with and actuating of them in al their operations. The like import may be applied to its conjugate foreign, which notes, to effect any thing in the moſt efficacious manner, ſo as to overcome al reſiſtence made againſt the force of the Agent. So 1 Cor. 12. 6.1 Cor. 12. 6, 11.1 Cor 12:61 Cor 12:11 foreign, who efficaciouſly worketh althings. The like v. 11. of which hereafter. This efficacious concurſe, as it cooperates with the ſecond cauſe is termed foreign cooperation or concurſe, and foreign, to cooperate. So Mark 16. 20. foreign, the Lord cooperating, or efficaciouſly concurring. So elſewhere, that foreign as applied to God notes his actuoſe, efficacious, and predeterminative concurſe in and with althings, is evident from the uſe of the word both in ſacred and profane Authors. So with Phavorinus foreign, is foreign, to work readily. It's rendred by the Syriac, ſometimes foreign, to work, as 1 Cor. 12. 6. foreign where it notes not only an univerſal general concurſe, but a particular, preſent, certain, efficacious force or efficacitie of Divine Concurſe, exerting it ſelf in al individual acts and effects. Again, foreign is rendred by the Syriac, Rom. 7. 5.Rom. 7. 5. 2 Cor. 4. 12. 1 Cor. 12. 11.Rom 7:52 Cor 4:121 Cor 12:11 and 2 Cor. 4. 12. by foreign, to work, to act with diligence, to be efficacious, as Boderianus. And 1 Cor. 12. 11. it is rendred by foreign, to act, to work, to perform, to effect, as Boderianus. Laſtly, it is rendred by the Syriac, Epheſ. 1. 11. foreign, who hath Eph. 1. 11.Eph 1:11efficaciouſly wrought althings. Which ſufficiently demonſtrates p. 23the predetermination of Gods concurſe, as to al ſecond cauſes and acts. Hence,

2. This efficacious Concurſe, as it determines and applies theDeterminative Concurſe what. ſecond cauſe to act, is both in ſacred Scripture and by ſcholaſtic Theologues termed Determinative and Predeterminative. We find both theſe termes in Scripture applied to Divine Concurſe. Thus foreign, from foreign a terme or limit; (1) primarily and properly ſignifies to termine, ſet bounds or limits to any cauſe, effect, or thing. So Acts 17. 26. foreign, and Act. 17. 26.Acts 17:26hath determined the times before appointed, and the bounds of their habitation: i. e. God has determined or predetermined to every Man, Nation, and Kingdome their fixed termes of duration and life. So Arrian, Epictet. lib. 1. cap. 12. ſpeaking of God, he ſaith, foreign. And Virgils Song is remarquable: Stat ſua cui que dies, Every ones day ſtands fixed or determined: which Servius underſtands, of the fixed determined period of human life. So that we ſee that not only ſacred Philoſophie, but the very Pagans by their dim light, aſſerted a fixed period of Divine life, as determined by God; albeit ſome that profeſſe themſelves Chriſtians denie the ſame. Then he addes, foreign, and the bounds, or the poſition of termes: for foreign properly ſignifies the poſition of termes or limits to any cauſe, action, effect, or thing. God by his eternal Decree has predetermined or ſet termes and limits to al ſecond cauſes, their actions, effects, and events: there is nothing ſo contingent in nature, but it is predetermined by the Divine wil. We find the Verbe foreign applied to times and places, as wel as to cauſes and acts: So Heb. 4. 7. foreign, he determines or limits Heb. 4. ….Heb 4a day. Thence in the Gloſſarie, foreign is a ſtated or determined day: and ſo foreign, I termine or limit as to place. Whence Heſychius makes foreign, he determines, to be the ſame with foreign, he gives terme or limit. Thence alſo foreign with the LXX. anſwers to foreign to termine, determine, or conſtitute termes to any place or thing, Num. 34. 6. Joſh. 13. 27. & 15. 11. alſo to foreign to be bounded or determined. Whence laſtly foreign ſignifies a definition, which is the terme or boundary of an eſſence, according to Cicero, who renders it, the circumſcription of a thing. (2) From this primary notion of foreign follows a ſecondary, namely, to decree, deſtine to a certain end, predeſtine, predetermine. In which ſenſe it ſignifies the ſame with foreign, to predetermine: and ſo it is transferred to predeſtination, predetermination, or the decree and p. 24purpoſe of the Divine wil, even about the ſubſtrate mater or entitative act of ſin; as Luke 22. 22. foreign, as it was determined, Luke 22. 22.Luke 22:22or predetermined, decreed. Our Lord ſpeaks of his Crucifixion, which was the greateſt of ſins and intrinſecally evil, and yet lo! as to the ſubſtrate mater or entitative act, predetermined and decreed by God. The ſame Acts. 2. 23. Him, being delivered Acts 2. 23.Acts 2:23by the determinate counſel, and foreknowledge of God: foreign, by that defined, determined, or predetermined counſel: of which more Chap. 3. §. 2. Hence foreign to decree, deliberate, determine is expounded by Theodotion, Job 22. 28. foreign And Heſychius makes foreign he determines ſynonymous to foreign, which when applied to the Divine wil note predefinition and predetermination.

As the ſimple foreign, ſo alſo the compoſite foreign, to predeſtine Predeterminative concurſe what in Scripture. 1 Cor. 2. 7. Rom. 8. 29, 30. Eph. 1. 5, 11. Acts 4. 28.1 Cor 2:7Rom 8:29Rom 8:30Eph 1:5Eph 1:11Acts 4:28or predetermine is uſed ſix times in the N. T. (1) of things appertaining to ſalvation, 1 Cor. 2. 7. (2) of perſons elect, Rom. 8. 29, 30. Eph. 1. 5, 11. (3) of the ſubſtrate mater or entitative act of ſin, yea that which was intrinſecally evil. So Act. 4. 28. For to do whatſoever thine hand and thy counſel determined before, or predetermined to be done. For ſo foreign may more properly be rendred. foreign primarily ſignifies to predefine, predeſtine, predetermine, to ſet limits, bounds, termes to perſons or things. Thence, as to this preſent text and point, when it is ſaid here, that thoſe who crucified Chriſt did what Gods hand and counſel predetermined to be done, it muſt be underſtood of the ſubſtrate mater or entitative act, which was predetermined by God, as in what follows, Chap. 3. §. 2. The Syriac verſion interprets foreign by foreign to ſeal, conſtitute, or make firm any thing, which is rendred by the LXX. foreign, to order, diſpoſe, conſtitute, inſtitute. The Divine Wil and Decree gives order, constitution, limitation, determination, yea predetermination to althings: al perſons and things, times and places, ends and means receive termes, limits, deſtination, and predetermination from the Divine Wil and Decree. Hence foreign in the N. T. is made ſynonymous to foreign, to foreknow, 1 Pet. 1. 20. to foreign, to preordain, Act. 17. 26. to foreign, to propoſe, or purpoſe, Rom. 1. 13. Eph. 1. 9. to foreign, to prepare, Rom. 9. 23. 1 Cor. 2. 9. By al which we evidently ſee, what footſteps predetermination, and as to the ſubſtrate mater or entitative act of ſin, has in the ſacred Scriptures.

p. 25We now procede to examine this notion as uſed by ſcholaſticPredeterminative Concurſe active and paſſive. Theologues, and how far their ſentiments thereof are applicable to our preſent Controverſie. (1) Some diſtinguiſh between Gods predefinition and his predetermination: his predefinition they reſtrain to his Decrees, and his predetermination to his Concurſe. Others diſtinguiſh the predetermination of God into extrinſec and intrinſec: by extrinſec predetermination they underſtand the act of the Divine Wil or Decree, whereby the creature is predetermined to act: by intrinſec predetermination they mean the previous motion of God upon the creature, which continually moves and applies it to act. But I ſhould rather diſtinguiſh predetermination, (as Creation and al other Acts of God ad extrà) into active and paſſive: [1] By active predetermination I mean nothing elſe but the Act or Decree of the Divine wil, whereby al ſecond cauſes, perſons, acts, effects and things receive their termes, order, and limitation as to power and activitie. This is the ſame with predefinition, predeſtination, and extrinſec predetermination. That this active predetermination procedes only from the efficacious previous act of the Divine wil, without any impreſſion or actual influxe on the ſecond cauſe has been defended by Scotus and others of great name in the Scholes, and that on invict reaſons: for if God wil, that the ſecond cauſe, (ſuppoſe it be the human wil) act, immediately on the volition of God the action of the ſecond cauſe wil follow, not from any previous impreſſion on the ſecond cauſe, but from its natural ſubordination and as it were ſympathie with the firſt cauſe: as at the beck of the human wil every inferior facultie of man moves. See Suarez, de Auxil. l. 1. c. 5. n. 3. and Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. c. 7. §. 3. [2] By paſſive predetermination I underſtand the concurſe of God as applying the ſecond cauſe to its act, and not really, but mentally or modally only diſtinct therefrom: For as active predetermination is the ſame with the Divine wil, ſo paſſive predetermination is the ſame with the ſecond cauſe, its act and effect, as we have demonſtrated Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. c. 8. §. 1.

(2) Predetermination is uſually diſtinguiſhed into phyſic or natural, Predetermination phyſic and moral.and ethic or moral. This diſtinction dependes on that of cauſes into phyſic, and moral: a phyſic or natural cauſe is that which is truly efficient, and ſo doth really influence the act and effect, in a way of proper efficience or cauſalitie: whence an Ethic or moral cauſe is that which doth not immediately, directly, or in a way of real proper efficience produce the act and effect, but only morally, p. 26by propoſing objects, motives, precepts, promiſſes, or the like moral means and influences, with excitements and perſuaſions. Thus proportionably we may diſtinguiſh predetermination into phyſic and moral. [1] By phyſic predetermination we muſt underſtand not corporal, or natural in a ſtrict notion, which is proper only to things inaminate or Brutes, but ſuch a predetermination as really applies the Agent or ſecond cauſe to its act, and really, yea immediately influenceth both act and effect. Thus Suarez, Metaphyſ. Diſput. 17. ſect. 2. num. 2. A phyſic cauſe [and ſo predetermination] in this place is not taken for a corporal or natural cauſe, acting by corporeous and material motion; but it's taken more univerſally, for a cauſe that truly and really influenceth the effect: for as nature ſometimes ſignifies any eſſence; ſo phyſic or natural influxe is that which by true and proper cauſalitie worketh the effect: to which when a moral cauſe is oppoſed, it is to be underſtood of ſuch a cauſe which doth not of itſelf and truly act, yet it doth ſo carrie itſelf, as that the effect may be imputed to it: ſuch a cauſe is he that comforts, beſeecheth, or hinders not when he may and ought. Hence [2] by moral predetermination, as it regardes Gods influence on the moral rational world, we muſt underſtand his moral influence on man as his laſt end, his ſtating mans dutie by moral precepts, inviting thereto by Evangelic promiſſes, dehorting from ſin by penal comminations, and al other moral influences. Here we are to note, that albeit phyſic and moral predetermination be comprehended under phyſic and moral cauſalitie, yet the later is more comprehenſive than the former: for phyſic predetermination properly belongs to a ſuperior cauſe as acting on an inferior, but phyſic cauſalitie to any efficient, as Strangius doth wel obſerve.

But to ſum up the whole, both the Dominicans and Calviniſts agree with the Jeſuites and Arminians in this, That the holy God doth not morally predetermine any to ſin: for he neither counſels, encourageth, commandes, or invites any one to the leaſt ſin. The Queſtion therefore muſt be underſtood of phyſic predetermination; which I ſhal deſcribe according to the explication of Strangius, l. 2. c. 4. p. 159. thus: By the phyſic predetermination of God in this place is underſtood the action of God, whereby he moves and applies the ſecond cauſe to act, and ſo antecedently to al operation of the creature; or in order of nature and reaſon before the creature workes, God really and efficaciouſly moves it to act in al its actions: i. e. he actes and cauſeth, that the creature p. 27actes and cauſeth whatever it actes and cauſeth: ſo that without this premotion of God the creature can do nothing: and this premotion being given it is impoſſible, in a compoſite ſenſe, that the creature ſhould not act and do that, unto which it is premoved by the firſt cauſe. And more particularly, though conciſely, as for Gods predetermination of the human wil, Strangius, Praedeterminare voluntatem eſt applicare voluntatem ad agendum, & facere ut faciat, Strang.l. 2. c. 11. p. 244. gives it us thus: To predetermine the wil, as they teach, is to applie the wil to act, and to make it act. Which deſcription of predetermination I do readily cloſe with, and ſo the Queſtion before us wil be ſummarily this,

Whether God doth by an efficacious power and influence move and predetermine men unto al their natural actions, even thoſe that have ſin annexed or appendent to them? Affirm.

I am not ignorant, that a reverend and learned Divine who oppoſeth our Hypotheſis, ſtates the queſtion otherwiſe, as if we held, That God doth by an efficacious influence univerſaelly move and determine men to al their actions; even thoſe that are most wicked. But this Hypotheſis, as propoſed and intended, I know no ſober mind but abhors: whoever ſaid, that God determines men to the moſt wicked actions as ſuch? were not this to make him the Author of ſin, which every pious ſoul deteſtes? For to determine to wicked actions as ſuch, implies alſo a determination to the wickedneſſe of thoſe actions: and this determination cannot be phyſic; becauſe ſin as ſin has no phyſic cauſe or determination: therefore it muſt be moral: and ſurely whoever determines morally to the moſt wicked actions cannot but be the moral cauſe, and Author of them: and is not this an high piece of blaſphemie? We are ſo far from aſſerting, that God determines men to the moſt wicked actions, as that we ſay, he determines men to no wicked action; no not the leaſt: Yea we adde further, that in actions ſincerely but imperfectly good, and in part ſinful, albeit God predetermines men both naturally and morally to the goodneſſe of the action, and naturally to the ſubſtrate mater or natural act, yet he predetermines not to the vitioſitie of the act, or the act as ſinful. So the ſum and whole of our Hypotheſis is this, That God doth by an efficacious power and influence move and predetermine men unto al their natural actions, even ſuch as have ſin appendent to them. This Hypotheſis we no way doubt but to make good both by ſcriptural and rational demonſtration.