Review and Examination of the Doctrine, Part 2 · Chapter 4

Review and Examination of the Doctrine · Part 2 · Chapter 4

p. 67CHAP. IV.

The grounds, upon which the Informer undertakes to prove that the obligation of the Covenant ceaseth, although its oblidging force for the time past were supposed, examined at large. As also his reasoning upon Numb. 30. Wherein his begging of the question, his contradicting of Dr Sanderson and other Casuists, and manifold inconsistencies are made appear.

p. 68OUR Informer having spent his Master pieces, and the cheife products of his invention, or rather of those who have gone before him, upon this difficult task of reconciling the Covenant to Prelacy, doth next (as a liberall bold disputer) undertake to loose the Covenant, even upon supposall of its preexistent obligation against it. And therefore making his Doubter tell him [that he bears off the acknowledgement of anyobligation against episcopacie, either in the national, or solemne league, lest he fall under the charge of perjurie]. In answer to this he will suppose that episcopacy is abjured in both Covenants, and yet undertake to defend that they arenot perjured who now submit to prelacie. The Doubter thinks this strange Doctrine, and so do I. Because [to swear against episcopacie and yet acknowledge it is to do contrary to their Oath.] To this doubt he returns a large resolution, but still follows up the Seasonable case closs, for fear of miscarrying. And first, he begins with a threefold partition, either prelacy (saith he) is an unalterable necessary Government of divine or Apostolick warrand, or it is sinfull and contrary to the Apostolick Government, or thirdly of a middle nature, neither commanded nor forbidden, but left to Christian prudence as found expedient to be used or not. Here I must stope him a little, and minde the reader, that we did upon the first Dialogue, disprove this indifferent Proteus-Prelacie, as a monster to Scripture, since the Scripture condescending so far as to its institution of officers, ordinances, Lawes, censures; and (as we heard himself acknowledge) setting down all substantialls of Church Government, prelacie must of necessity be either consonant or dissonant therunto, and by consequence necessary or finfull, commanded or forbidden. So that he is to be limited to the first two, and p. 69any supposal anent the indifferencie of presacy, is but his petitio prnicipii; and the gratification of his adversary for further clearing of this question: now proceed we. If it be the Apostolick Government derived from their times to all ages of the Church, he hopes we will grant that no Oath oblidges against it. This I willingly grant to him, but what then? Why, we must not cry out perjurie till what he hath offered on this head be solidly answered. Let this bargaine stand, I hope I have made his Scripturae pretences, appear to be vaine, and proven the contrariety of that prelacie now established, both to the Scripture and pure antiquity, and till he hath answered what is offered upon this point, we may impute perjury to him by his own acknowledgment. What next, what if it be sinfull? Then he sayes we need not plead the Covenant obligation. No? may we not plead the Covenant obligation against Schisme, heresie, and profanness? May not the Oath of alledgance be pleaded against treason, because before this Oath treason is a sin? Said he not already that the Baptismall vow is a superadded obligation, though the matter it self doth binde? did not the Oath and Covenant (Neh. 8.) containe an abjuration of many sins, against which the people stood before preoblidged? But he adds, its true a supervenient Oath makes the obligation the stronger. Right, why then may not we plead that which makes it stronger? Especially against this man and his fellows, who have such a mighty faculty of resolving and absolving all S Peters fetters. Sure they had need of Double nets who would catch a Proteus. Then he tell us, That the ablest champions for Presbytrie dar not assert episcopacie to be unlawfull. What champions are these that prove it to be contrary to Scripture, and yet dar not assert it to be unlawfull? Sure they are very faint disputants. We heard that Beza (whom our Informer will sure call a champion for Presbytery) p. 70called episcopacy dia…olicall and the egg out of which Antichrist was hatched. Was not that near the march of calling it unlawfull? But how will he now absolve us? Why, it must be indifferent, neither lawfull nor unlawful, and then the question is with him, if we could by our own Oath, make it absolutely and in every case unlawfull, so that we can never after submit unto it. He adds, that we are mistaken if we think that an Oath against a thing indifferent will in every case bind. Here I shall only tell him that since all his resolving skill goes upon this supposition, he should have travelled to Utopia with this resolution, since we do suppose and have proven Prelacie to be unlawfull, and so are not in the least concerned in what he saith upon this point: Since he is still arguing ex ignoratione elenchi.

But let us see how he will absolve us upon this supposition, which he must in pity be gratified with, before he can draw forth his weapons. Our Informer still stricks hand, with the Seasonable case and the Surveyer, telling us first, that the oath ceases to bind, if the thing sworn against, be a matter wherein our superiours have power to command us, they by their authority given them of God, may require obedience of us in any thing lawfull, and so may in that particular, command us to do or use what we have sworn against, it being a thing in it self lawfull, and in this case our oath ceases to binde. Ans. this simple notion, by our Informer poorly propounded hath no taste in it, and cannot reach our case, even though he had won over that insuperable mountain of the unlawfullness of prelacy, and had proven, or his adversary had granted it, to be indifferent, for 1. his supposition runs thus. That episcopacy is indifferent to be used in the Church or not as it shall be found expedient. Now, I beseech him, who is the proper judge, what frame of Church government best sutes her condition? is not the Church representative, to whom is intrusted the power of p. 71the keys? by what warrand will he bring in the Magistrate primo instanti to alter and set up Church government as he thinks fit, even granting it were indifferent? he sought at first but a grant that prelacy was indifferent, but ere he can produce one reason for his point, he must have a further grant of Erastianisme, and that the Magistrate is the proper competent immediat judge in matters ecclesiastick. Who can stope the mouth of this hungry cause of his, that must have multiplied concessions of the adversary, and yet cannot subsist, but starves with its own weakness when all is done. For 2dly, although this were also granted, what will he say in this case, wherein the superiour hath bound and engadged himselfe with the same Oaths, vows, and bonds that the subject is tyed with, and hath solemnly vowed to God against such a frame of Government? Sure this will tye up his hands if we may beleeve the maxime asserted by Dr Sanderson and other Casuists that juramentum tollit libertatem even in a thing indifferent. Had we not the ratification of the Nationall Covenant with the band and explication against the Scots Prelacie, in plain Parliament by King Charles the first, under his hand writing 1641? Did not the King who now is in the Year 1650 and—51, swear and subscribe both this oath, and the solemn league and Covenant, and gave all imaginable assurances for upholding Presbyterian Government, and in opposition to Prelacy? suppose he had power to command in this matter, sure his commanding power is tyed up, when he hath vowed and Open'd his mouth unto God, and lifted up his hand to the most high, That Prelacy shall never be allow'd within his dominions, far less commanded. Whatever power God hath given to Magistrates over their subjects, sure he hath given them no power to loose themselves from his oath and vow upon them p. 72is. Thirdly, it is too laxe a principle, to hold that in every thing, in it self indifferent, the Magistrates power reaches to supercede or loose, the obligation of an oath or vow of the subject. For a subjects freedome and liberty, as in that capacity, and the Magistrats authority, being coordinate, as the subjects liberty must not justle with the Magistrat's lawfull Command, suited to the ends of government, so neither must the Command of the Magistrate incroach upon this reserved liberty of the subject, who hath many things in his own power and without the reach of any lawfull command of the Migistrate. A Subject, and a slave, are quite distinct things. God restrained & set bounds to the power of Kings, and Magistrates whom he set over his people, so that they might not command such and such things. Therefor in what things soever, the exercise of a subjects liberty, crosses not the designe and end of the Magistrates power exprest in Scripture, his vow is without the reach of the Magistrates suspending or loosing power. Naboth would not give Ahab his Vineyard, no not for money. What if a man in a parentall capacity, interpose a vow as to his childe in reference to some occupation or inheritance, which are supposed, before th…s vow, to be things indifferent? Sure the Magistrates suspending power will not reach this vow. This will be clear, if it be considered, That the preservation of the Subjectes liberty, is one of the great ends of the Magistates Authority.

The Second case wherein the Informer tellsus, that ane Oath in things indifferent binds no…, is when the thing sworn is so altered in its nature, that it becomes sinfull and cannot be lawfully performed. He tells us that Casuists say, That cessat juramenti obligatio cum res non permanent in eodem statu Ans. This other case generally byhim propounded here, shall be considered & spoken to, when we shall see how hereafter he explaines and applyes it. p. 73Therefore we shall in this place dismiss it with one word, That Prelacy is now the same, and worse thn formerly, And therfor the premised maxime cannot reach his Conclusion in the least.

His Third case wherein he tells us, that the Oath in things indifferent ceaseth to bind, is, when it is impeditivum majoris boni, which he sayes the Seasonable case and the survey of Naphtali, do apply to this Oath. And how he applyes it we shall after hear, He tells us, they do prove; that supposing Episcopacie lawfull, though i… were meant in the Covenant, none should think themselves bound to stand out against it, our Superiours having commanded us to obey and submit to that government. And that he solidly repells what is brought by the Apologie or Naphtali to the contrary. But how insignificantly either he, or these new Casuists, do loose the Covenant upon this Pretence, hath already in part, and shall yet further appear.

What a laxe Adiaphorist is this, who by his new divinity, first takes this great duty of vowing or swearing quite away; For, no Oaths must be pleaded in things necessary, in this man's judgment, They canno in things that are sinfull or unlawfull have place, and so all the subject thereof must be things lawfull; and for this, there needs no more to make all Oaths and vows evanish, but a command from the superiour, and then they are gone. Secondly, he makes the Magistrat's posteriour and supervenient command, no…only loose all his subjects from the obligation of what is lawfully sworn, but also himself from his personall Oath: Though he hath sworn and vowed never so deeply, he hath no more to do but to make a Law against it, and then the Oath, as impeditivum boni, ceasethto bind either himselfe or his subjects. Thirdly, he makes all the reserved liberty of the subject (which Government is for preservation of) a p. 74meer nullity and Chimaera, so as this liberty it selfe, or any vow or Oath in things which are properly within it's sphere, evanishes at every arbitrary command of the powers. Hence a subjects liberty resolves into a meer nothing or slavery. Fourthly, thus the Judgement of all Churches in Brittain and Ireland under this Oath, must in relation to the expediency of this supposed lawfull Episcopacy, and its present suitableness to her edification, be at the meer beck of this arbitrary command of the civill power, as the sole and proper judge of this matter. And so.

First, the Magistrate is not only the immediatjudge of all ecclesiastick Government, or what is most suitable to the Churches State and edification in point of Government. But 2dly, all judgement of discretion is taken away from the people of God, in relation to this matter of so high importance, and their acting in faith consequently, in this supposed obedience. So that men are made absolutly Lords over their consciences. Yea 3dly, all regard to the eshewing the offence of the weak, and the Scripture Rules in relation to their scandal, and stumbling, are made void; the meer command of the powers determining that matter, in the principles of this Informer. Yea Moreover, all our Christian libetry in things indifferent, which Christ hath purchased with his precious blood, and which we are commanded so much to hold fast, is close swallowed up, so that both judgement & practise, in matters wherein God hath given a liberty, are tyed unto, and only regulable by, the arbitrary command of the powers: And what monstruous absurdities these are, the meanest capacity may judge.

As for what he adds here, that an Oath about matters not sinfull, is alwayes to be understood with this restriction, [so long as lawfully I may] which the matter thereof requires, because the taker is under prior and greater obligations (viz p. 75obedience to his superiour and the like) then that of the Oath in a thing indifferent, and therefor when the prior obligation crosseth this latter of the Oath, its obligation must cease. Ans. This prior obligation the Informer makes relative to the Magistrats command interposing, which according to his laxe and unrestricted supposalls, makes all Oaths no stronger then a threed touched with the fire, and when applyed to our case, is utterly impertinent, because; first, there are things in their own nature indifferent, yet within the sphere of the subjects reserved liberty; and Consequently not within the reach of any lawfull command of the Magistrat, nor of any anterior obligation, to that of the Oath by further consequence; and that the matters in debate are not such, he hath not proved. 2ly, The Magistrate himselfe hath by his own Oath (in this case) superseded and tyed up any right of commanding, which the Informer may suppose he had. 3ly, upon both these grounds, the performance of this great engadgement, can never justle with any lawfull command of the Magistrat. And by further Consequence, 4ly, There is no greater or prior obligation in this case lying upon the Swearer, from the Magistrat's right, to breake or cut short the obligation of this vow. All which is yet further convincingly clear, if it be considered, that this great supposition of the lawfulnes or Indifferency of Prelacy (which is the grand Topick bearing the weight of his Argumentation) is but begged by him, and as an almes, given by his Adversary. But the contrariety of Episcopacy to the Scripture, which we have alreadie proved, being once supposed, it followes, that there is an obligation Prior to all Oaths, lying both upon King and subjects for it's Extirpation, but which is much more strengthened by the Supervenient Oaths and vows of God upon them, for this great end.

p. 76The Informer adds further, that our obligation to our Superiours, is Gods tye—our Oath a knot of our own casting, and that when two duties at once seeme to require performance, and we cannot get them both satisfyed, the lesser should give way to the greater. Ans. 1. The same God who hath enjoyn'd obedience to Rulers, hath reserved the subjects liberty, and Christian liberty, and by his authority salv'd and authorized Oaths and vows which are within the compass of that reserv'd liberty, so the last knot is of Gods casting as well as the first. And such Alexander-like absolvers or Cutters as our Informer and his fellowes, will find that they are hewing at divine cords, when the curse due to perjury shall enter into their houses and soules, if they repent not. 2ly, Hence in this case and question under debate, our obedience to the Magistrat (especially upon our true supposition of the unlawfullness of Prelacy, and of the Oath against it, lying upon the Magistrat himself) is sinfull; and so the comparison is betwixt duty, and sin, not a greater and lesser duty, which this man must grant is ever to be preferred. And besides, the Informers supposition, that this Oath is a meer voluntary deed of our own, which had so full a ratification of the Magistrates Authority, is among the rest of his gratis supposita and Beggings of the question, which we must send back to him with a lash, untill it be return'd with a due Testimonall of better proof then of his Ipse dixit. 3ly, Even upon his own supposition, Dr Sanderson will tell him, that any law made against an Oath, which is but spontaneous, if the law be alternative, to obey or suffer, the Oath will bind against the active part, and oblige not to obey the power in that supervenient command or Law, which is contrary even to the privat spontaneous Oath, de Iur Promis. Prel. Sect. 9. But a fortiori much more will this oblige not to obey that Law, if the Oath be not p. 77only spontaneous, but hath been fortifyed by the Legislative power, yea and vow of the Superior himself, who Pretends to loose it by his after-Law. 4ly, Whereas he alledges, Gods putting us under the commands of the powers in this case, and his freind Dr Burnet in this Argument, tells us that [our Oath being a voluntary deed of our own (as he gratis supposeth with the Informer) cannot prejudge the commands of our superiours, which are Gods own immediat commands.] They should know (as Timorcus long since Informed them Chap. 6. sect. 35.) That the Topick of this Argument being, The dominion of the superiour over the Inferiour, if the command or Law be the exercise of a dominion in things wherin he hath no dominion, the Oath will bind against such lawes. This man and his fellows are still talking of the prior obligation of obedience to the Magistrat, but they must know that the Magistrats dominion in this point must be instructed by a Patent from God the supreme Legislator, before we can acknowledge it. And if our Oath interferre with the exercise of a dominion which is without its due sphere, sure it interferres with no prior obligation which God hath lay'd upon us. Even Azorius (Mor. Quest. l. 11. cap. 6.) will tell him, that an Oath will bind Contra mores jure civili institutos, if the divine Law be in any thing crossed thereby. Nay, Casuists, even such as Abbas, Silvester, Azorius, Molina, Lessius, Leyman, Sanohes, Swares, do grant. That an Oath will bind against any civill Law, if it oblige ad paenam non ad culpam necessario, to punishment, and not necessarly to sin. And further most of them admit the binding force of Oaths against the Laws or commands of superiours, ubi materia legibus opposita sine peccato fieri potest, where the matter of the Oath, which is contrary to the lawes, may be performed without sin it being non contra jus naturale aut divinum, that is, not p. 78against the Law of nature or the divine Law. See Timorcus ubi supra. 5ly, Even putting episcopacie in the category of things indifferent, this Oaths obligation against it, will countervaile & oversway our obligation to obey the Magistrate, and submit to his laws, In such a case, wherin it is found inexpedient for the Church, and particularlie for this Church, as by its apparent dreadfull effects is evident; such as the desolation and wasting of this Church, the spreading of poperie and Arminianism, the Casting out of many of the godlie Ministry, the fixed division therin, the endless Confusions and broiles, and therby the wide door opened to all Popish invasions &c. For since the Magistrats simple Command cannot determine what Government is expedient or inexpedient for the Church, this must be supposed that Prelacie is best, before the Command can be, so much as supposed Lawfull, els the Magistrat may injoyne an Hundred Oaths this year in such and such things as he calls expedient, and null them all the next year, though himself be engadged therin, upon pretence of inexpediency of the Matter, because of occurring circumstances, which will make mad work of Oaths, and hang them all at the Magistrats sic volo sic jubeo, as to their obligation. Its true that the greater duty (as is clear Math. 9. 13.) counter-balances the less, but I Pray, shall the meer will and Command of the power, determine the greater dutie? and be the sole and supreme rule to determine the Conscience, as to the expediency of a thing hic & nunc. And though (as he sayes) every positive precept oblidge not ad Semper. Yet he must acknowledge, first, that it oblidges semper, and though not as to the act, yet as to the eshewing the Contrary therof. And Secondly, to act semper, except when Gods command superseds it, as to other duties in their seasons. So that till he clear this in the p. 79point of prelacie, and that the renouncing of our Covenant, and presbyterian Government at the Magistrats Command, is in our case the greatest duty, this rule makes against him.

The Doubter, as to his first rule, anent the authority of superiours interveening, objects, that its hard to say that mans authority can loose the Oath of God, since in this Case we must say, that we have opened our mouth unto God, and cannot go back]. To this he answers. 1. That the law of God in the 5th Command layes the first and Primarie obligation upon us to obey our superiours, which Command we cannot bind up our selves from obeying. Ans. 1. the same God who gave that Command, did by the third Command oblidge both superiours and inferiours, to be a ware of taking his name in vain, and therfor not to presume to break their Oaths and vows in any Lawfull matter, unlesse insuch Cases as himself the blest and supreme Lawgiver, excepts; which he hath not yet letten us see as to this Oath, wherin both superiours and inferiours have entered, and therby oblidged themselves to God against what he pleads for. So that Gods reserved Supremacie, and Dominion, which (to use his own argument against him) is the primarie and fundamentall tye, upon which this 5. Command is bottomed, and according to which our obedience therto must be Regulat, will cut short the obedience to the superiour in this case, wherin we cannot obey him in the Lord, and without violating our fealty and alleadgeance to the God of Gods, and wronging his suprem dominion. 2ly, In this same 5. Command, God hath limited the Power of superiours, and tied them under many bonds of duties to their subjects or inferiours, which, in none of their Commands they must transgress, and if they do, their Commands oblidge not Inferiours to obey. Now, that this Loosing the obligation p. 80of these Oaths is in our case an encroachment upon the subjects right and reserved Libertie, as well as christian Libertie, and an encroachment upon Gods sovereign right, is above Cleared. Next he sayes, this were a way to frustrat the superiour of all obedience, and every man might pretend, I have sworn against such a thing commanded, therfor I cannot do it. Thus privat persons might prelimit themselves from obeying in everie thing. Ans. in our case there is no such hazard, for the superiour hath prelimit Himself by his own oath, and this will not prelimit him upon such a pretence, from obedience in any thing that is Lawfull, or which falls within the Compass of his Power As a Magistrate and is suitable to the great ends of his Power, to say, that he cannot Arbitrarly loose people from a Lawfull Oath, sworn also by himself. But on the contrary, this pretended Informer his doctrine herein prelimtes and cuts short Subjects Libertie, and Christian Libertie, and Libertie of Conscience, subjecting it, and all Gods rules theranent, all scripture Rules of Expediency and Edification, and all Oaths and vows superadded to matters subordinat to these ends, unto the Magistrats arbitrary disposal and laws, which is a prelimitation equally if not more dangerous.

Our Informer in the next place for proof of this his doctrine, sends the Doubter to Numb. 30: where (he sayes) the husband or parent is vested with a Power to null and make void the vow of the wife or daughter, and by Proportion the King, who is Pater patriae, hath the same authority. Ans. it will be a harder task then this man can well mannage to bring in the King here within the Compass of the father and husbands right, as to this absolving Power. For first, the Magistrats Power is far different from the Marital and Parental, and the relation betwixt King and subject is nothing so strait, as betwixt husband and wife, parent and Children, the p. 81one being natural, the other Political, the one changeable, the other not. A man may chuse to Live under what Magistrat he pleases, but the woman cannot cast off her husband, nor the Child shake off his relation and dutie to the father. Besides, subjects set up their Magistrats and Limite them: But so it is not as to the Marital and Parental relations. The husbands authority flows not from the wife her donation, nor the parents from the Children. So that a parallel argument can hardly be drawen from the Power of husbands and parents, supposed in this text, in relation to Oaths and vows of the Children and wife, to that of the Magistrat in relation to his subjects. 2ly, in the beginning of that Chap. the Lords way of Laying down this great Sanction touching vows, seems to exclude the Magistrat from this absolving Power. For after the propounding of the Law touching the keeping of voluntary Oaths and vows, viz. that the person vowing shall not break nor profane his Word as the Hebrew signifies, but do according to all that Proceeds out of his mouth. 1. The Case of the wife and the Daughter not foris-familiat, is Gods great and only exception (exprest in the Text) from his own rule, and Law, touching the strick observation of voluntarie Lawfull vows. So that, the rule and Law seems to reach all other Cases, as to free vows, except only this. 2ly, in the Beginning of the Chap. we find that Moses spoke this to the Rulers and heads of the tribes, but the text is silent as to his applying of this exception anent the father and husbands Power in absolving vows, unto these heads & Rulers, which should have been especially intimat to them. Hence it may be probaby Concluded that the Rule and Law touching the observation of vows, stands fast in all other Cases except these here expresly excluded, by the Great Lawgiver. So that ere his argument can reach us, he most give in Sufficient proof that the p. 82Magistrat stands vested with this Power, and falls within the Compass of this exception, in relation to his subjects. Not to detain him here in tasking him to prove, that this Judicial statute, as others of the like nature, doth belong unto the Christian Chùrch. But in the second place, Granting that the Magistrat is here meant, it will never speak home to his Point, but much against him, for 1. the dominion of the Superiour being the ground of this discharge, wherin the husband and Parent have Power, if the matter of our vow be found such as is excepted from the Magistrats dominion, the Informer must grant that this text will not reach our Case. And supposing the matter, antecedaneously unto the vow, to fall under divine Commands, this is evident beyond exception. But because he beggs our concession, that it was before indifferent, I adde, if it be within the Limits of our reserved Libertie as free subjects, or of our Christian Libertie, its still on both grounds, beyond the reach of his dominion, and consequently excluded from this exception, and the vow must stand and oblidge according to the Grand precept here set down; so that a hundred discharges of the Magistrat will never touch it.

We heard him acknowledge, that by [discipline of this Church] in the nationall Covenant, the substantialls of Government is understood, and that consequently it binds therunto; So he must acknowledge that our solemn Covenant will inviolably bind to this divine Frame of Government, & no earthlie power can loose therfrom, no more then from Scripture institutions. And Doctor Featlie acknowledgeth that people may Covenant, without their Superiours, to fulfill Gods Law. Now, give us all Scripture Church officers, and their Rules of Government, & Prelacie shall be quickly gone, So that upon his concession that the national or solemn league p. 83do reach the substantialls of Government, or what is necessary for the ends of Government set down in Scripture, it will amount to that which we plead for; and he must grant it falls not under the Magistrats Dominion, and that his argument from this text is lost. 2dly, this dissent which looses the vow, must be both ane open dissent, and also presentlie in the verie day he heares of it. Qui sero se noluisse significat putandus est aliquando voluisse. That is, he that declares a late dissent, may be presumed sometimes to have given his consent, saith Dr Sand. de jur. prom. This he cannot say as to our King. 3ly, It most be constant, the dissent suspending, but not loosing the obligation. The oblidging vertue being naturall, and inseparable to the vow (as Dr Sand. tells us de jur. prom. pag. 3. Sect. 10.) when ever the consent comes, the obligation returns. Now have not our King and Rulers consented unto, and ratefied all our vows both in the nationall, and solemn league and Covenant? 4ly, This consent of the superiour once given, can never he retracted by a dissent again. Whither it be before or after, he can never make it void, as the Text doth clearlie hold out. See Sand. 16. Prel. 7. Sect. 6. Now have not both the nationall and solemn League, the Consent & vows of all our superiours ratifying the same. So that this text every way pleads for the obligation therof; for this their consent, once given, they can never revoke, far less their Oath and vows, but the vows of the inferiours, are thereby rendered for ever valid; as Casuists in setting down these rules doe grant, so Aquinas, Filucius (Tract. 25 cap. 9.) Azor. (Moral. inst. lib. 11. cap. 10.) Sanches (lib. 3. Cap. 9.) Amesius (cas. lib. 4. cap. 22. Quest. 11.) Sand. (Juram. Prom. Prel. 4. Sect. 16.) But the Doubter objecting [this consent and ratification of our superiours, which therefore they cannot make void.] p. 84He answers, that by comparing the 12. and 15. verses it appears, that after the husband hath by silence confirm'd his wifes vow, yet he hath a power of voiding it again, and she is exonered of her vow, and bound to obey her husbands Commands. Ans. Although this were granted (as the Text stands in clear contradiction to it) that the husband might null the vow, after he hath confirmed it by a silence or tacit confirmation, yet it will not follow that his nulling power will hold, after he hath given not onlie a formall consent positive, but also solemnlie vowed and bound his soule to the Lord, in the same vow, which is most evidentlie our case. Have we not the solemn vows, subscriptions and Oaths of both King and Rulers, concurring with the vows of the subjects in this case? How then shall they loose their own vows. 2ly, this wilde gloss is expresly cross to Dr Sanderson, and other Casuists, their sense of this case and text as we heard, who hold that if once the superiour hath either tacitly or expressly, precedaniously or subsequently consented, he can never by his dissent again either discharge from the Oath or (so much as) suspend the obligation of it. Dr. Sand. saith (16. Prel. 7. Sect. 6.) its a true rule, quod semel placuit amplius displicere non debet, what once in this case hath pleas'd the superiour, ought never to displease; Gods Word declaring it established for ever. If he hath consented (saith the Dr) either before or after, be can never afterwards take away its obligation. 3. He makes the text contradict it self, for (ver. 7.) upon the husbands tacit consent, and holding his peace in the day he heard his wifes vow, the Lord declares that her vow shall stand, & the bond wherewith she bound her soule shall stand. And (vers. 14.) The husbands holding his Peace, establishes her vows and confirms them. Now then, God having declaire that the vow stands, is confirmd, and established as p. 85soule-bond upon their soules, by this consent tacit or expresse how shall it be null, and not stand, by ane after dissent? Sure [to stand] is here opposed unto [not to stand] upon the termes of the present open dissent in the day he heard of it, which is the onlie exception. That which God declares to be confirmed, and to stand, upon the father or husbands consent, admits of no nulling afterward by them; but so it is, that the wife or daughters vow upon the first consent and ratefication, stands and is confirmed, as a soule-bond: ergo, it admits of no loosing by ane after dissent. I prove the major two wayes, 1. standing and Confirming here are opposed, to nulling and making void. And 2ly, this would make more Limitations then God makes, as to the Loosing of the vow; for there is no exception but that one, of the husbands open dissent, or the parents, in the day he hearts of it. This is the onlie exception from the rule in the 2d vers. anent the binding of the vow. But this mans gloss brings in another limitation cross to the very scope and express sense of the words viz. the husbands dissent, after he hath by a previous consent ratefied the vow. That God admits the vow to stand, upon this express or tacit consent, is evident in the text.

As for the reason which he adds, viz. That the wife is under a prior obligation to obey her husband; it is absurd and ridiculous, for will he carve ou… ane obligation in this point beyond what God hath so expresly limit and declard. This were to give the husband a power, not over the wife onlie, but over God himself, and his express declarator. As for that clause (ver. 15.) that if he shall any wayes make them void, after he hath heard them, then he shall bear her iniquitie. What a wilde inference is it, from hence to conclude ane absolving power, in express contradiction to the text, and the limitations previoussie set down. To say that the p. 86vow cannot be loosed, unless the father or husband declare his dissent in the day he heares of it, And that if he hold his peace he hath confirmed it, and the bond and vow shall stand; And yet that after all this, he may loose it by ane after dissent, is so plain a contradiction, that none can be plainer. If we will make the text then consistent with it self, the plain meaning is, that he shall bear her iniquitie, or the guilt which otherwise would have Iven upon the wife or daughter, if not hindered in the performance. That the guilt and punishment of the non-performance shall ly upon him who hindered the same, doth clearlie import the non-performance of it self to be a guilt (which contradicts his pleading and argument.) But the poor votarie being hindered, it lyes upon the hinderer as I said. So that we strongly inferr from this, the binding force of the vow, since the Lord terms the non-performance a guilt: as violent men hindring Ministers to preach, shall bear their guilt and punishment, which otherwise they were exposed unto if neglecting this great work. All do know, what these Scripture-Phrases of bearing his judgement, bearing his iniquitie, being partakers of Other mens sins, do import. Which Confirms this answer. His comments upon this phrase are verie vain [first he shall bear her sin (saith he) if a guilt] what is that? bear a guilt, if a guilt, sure a repugnantia in adjecto. His next gloss makes the husband ane expiator of the guilt because she did her dutie in obeying him, who revoked-his Confirmation upon just grounds. What, upon just grounds contrary to Gods command? this is ane odd exposition. Doth God give the least warrand here to absolve and null the vow, after it is ratefied by his previous consent.

Mr. Poole in his annotations renders thus the sense of this 15. verse [after he hath heard them &c.] p. 87and approved them by his silence from day to day, if now after that time spent, he shall upon further thoughts dislike and hinder it, which he ought not to do. Her non-performance of her vow shall be imputed to him, not to her: Where, as he doth clearly assert (with us) that her iniquity, mention'd in the close of the verse, is the iniquity of the non-performance of the vow, which is imputed unto the husband, so, that he ought not to hinder the votarie, or stop this performance after that he hath confirmed the vow by silence; in plain contradiction to the Informers phantastick glosses and inferences. Wherin altho he pretend a concurrence of Interpreters, expounding this verse of the husbands Lawfull voiding of the wifes vows after his previous confirmation, yet he hath produced none of their names.

The Doubter enquires next how he applies his Second rule, anent things sworn their not abiding in the same state, to the Covenant. He answers, that upon supposition that Prelacie is Lawfull, and abjured in that Oath, the great change now is, that Prelats are again Established, and submission to them commanded. So that we are now bound to obey authoritie herin, and not to keep the Oath. And this is verie sutable to his large absolving glosses, which we have alreadie heard and refuted, and which is Likewise removed by what we have said, anent the matter of this vow, which is not capable of any such absolving trade as is now set up. These mens plagiary faith and divinitie, makes all vows no stronger then straws. Though the Magistrats and subjects universallie vow, yet a Law (if the matter be not absolutlie necessarie, though never so expedient and edifying) makes it ipso facto null and void. If he had letten us see any greater good, expediencie, or necessitie of prelacie, then in keeping this vow, he had p. 88spoken to the purpose. But this neither he nor any of his party will ever do.

In a word this lax rule as here interpret by him, will inferr many absurdities, as 1. that the meer Law looses the obligation of the vow and Oath, though the matter therof falls not under the dominion of the Ruler. Which, 2ly, it doth not if it be either expedient or necessarie, and yet the meer Law (with him) robs it either of expediency or necessity. And thus, 3dly, mans law stepps up above the divine Law, authorizing the matter of the Oath upon the forementioned grounds. 4ly, He makes the expediency of the Law, and its being wholsome or no, cognoscible by no anterior or superiour Rule, but its self, and the meer will and power of the Magistrate, and to be obeyed upon that sole ground. 5ly, hence the obedience therof in faith, is excluded, and no acts of obedience can flow from spirituall knowledge.

The Doubter next objects [that his Oath against Bishops had the first obligation, and therfor he cannot be loosed by the after Law.] To which he answers, that the 5th. command, and submission to the ordinance of man, had the first obligation, and that obedience to authoritie comes under the baptismall vow—that to say our Oath will oblidge against the Magistrats Command to the Contrary, will elude the express precept Ecl. 8. 2. to obey the kings command in regard of the Oath of God Ans. This is nothing but what we have heard, repetitions ad nauseam, and still idem per idem. Our obligation in the 3d command, not to take Gods name in vain, and to keep and stand to all Lawfull Oaths, and vows, unless in cases which God himself excepts, is surly a verie arlie, and a baptismall obligation, prior to any Law of the Magistrat, and such as no authoritie and Laws of men can evacuatand enervat; and our obedience to the ordinance of man, or the higher and p. 89Lower Powers, being for the Lords sake, that is upon the motive of his authoritie, doth infer, that we must not dare to cross his authority, under pretence of obedience to the powers, in breaking lawfull Oaths and vows which he has commanded us to keep. Sure no Laws of men can supersed this obligation. That the Oath under debate is such, hath been already made good, and needs not be here repeated. As for that of Eccl. 8. 20. It makes clearlie against him; the English annotations having upon that text, mentioned the mutuall tye, oath, and Covenants betwixt King and subject, instancing 1. Chron. 11. 3. do tell us that this is not only ane enforcement of the duty of subjects, but likewise, that the clause contains a limitation, by which our obedience to men is bounded: And thus they sense the precept, keep the Kings command, yet so that thou do not violat thine Oath and obedience due unto God. Our service to the one (say they) must be such as will consist with our fealty to the other. We are bound to God and his service by Oath and Covenant, and no subordinat obedience to others, must make us forget our duty to him. Which clearlie crosses this Miss-Informers scope who would perswade to perjurie and breach of Covenant with God, upon pretence of fealty to the Magistrat.

Mr Poole in his annotations having told us That the first branch of the verse is not to be understood universally, but of such commands as do not crosse the commands of God, expones this Oath of God mentioned in the second part of it, either of the Oath we are under to keepe all Gods Laws, or the subordinat Oath of fealty and allegiance. But adds, that this also may be understood, and is by learned Interpreters taken, as a limitation of their obedience to Kings, the words being thus rendred, as the Hebrew (faith he) will very well bear, but according p. 90to the Word of the Oath of God, obey the Kings commands, with this caution that they be agreeable and not contrary to the Laws of God, which thou art obliged by thy own and thy parents Oaths oft renewed, to observe in the first place.

As for what he adds (out of the grand case) anent Iesuites Oath in Rome to preach in England Catholick doctrine, and of a Law made in England against the same. It is, so palbablie impertinent and unsuteable to the point, that I wonder at the mans confidence in presenting to the world such poor trifling fopperies in so weightie a matter. Dare he say that the matter of our vows, which our Rulers themselves have taken, is in any measure like to this. Nay, doth he not suppose the Matte… of this Oath to be Lawfull, he must then confess this instance to be most impertinent. But the knack is, That abstracting from the unlawfullness of the Matter, it was declair'd, that ane Oath cannot bind against a Law, although the Law be made even after the Oath is taken. This was no doubt a lax determination, And such as he dare no… himself subscribe unto in everie case; what, an… Oath cannot bind against a Law in universum, and simply? what if the matter be necessarie, or falling under divine Prescriptions or institutions? What if convincingly expedient in its circumstances? Will thi… Law, yea and after the Oath is taken, overrule th… divine Law determining the same? Well resolve… Mr. Informer. You may go sell absolutions ano… of a high rate.

Come we now to his third case, anent the Oath hindring a greater good, then the performance it ill amount to and the dissolution therof upon that ground. This the Doubter thinks [will furnish people with a readie excuse to free themselves of Oaths, by alledging that some greater good is hindered thereby.] To this he answeres 1. That Casuists admit this rule with these limitations viz. when p. 91that greater good is certain, and no otherwise attainable, but by the discharge of our Oath, and a good to which we are preobliged before we took the Oath. Ans. We shall not much contend about these rules & limitations of this Maxime in thesi, or in the generall, only I shall adde some more limitations here. That 1. This greater, certain, & no otherwise attainable good, must be such, not in our apprehension only, but according to the Rule of the Word, for otherwise we are just where we were as to the hazard of perjurie, if every mans [thinks so], or the Magistrats [arbitrarie Laws] shall be the only Rule to determine this, as this Informer makes all resolve thereunto which he pretends in this case, in relation to that greater good, which he offers in breaking this Oath. Hence Gregorius Sayrus (clav. reg. l. 5. cap. 8. n. 15.) having determined that every man hath a power to commute ane oath for something better, is opposed by Silvester and others, who say, that the Pope must determine the good to be better. So rationall and Consequent to their Principles are even Papists in this point. And must not Protestants be ashamed to refuse this limitation, that the Scripture (with us the onlie, and supreme rule) must determine this greater good. Next, Timorcus will tell him, that the Oath thus irritat, must be onlie made to God, for if it be to our brother, and for his advantage, we must have his consent as necessarie towards the commutation. This he tells us, is agreed upon by Casuists, as well as the other limitations. To these we adde Dr. Sand. rule (de jur. prom. Prel. 3. Sect. 12.) that, precise ob hoc quod videtur impeditivum majoris boni, obligandi vim non amittit. Id est, That the Oath loseth not its obliging force, meerly because it seems the bindrance of a greater good, unless other circumstances also concurr (as usuallie there do) which either evince it unlawfull, or not oblidging. His reason is because in all cases p. 92it is not true that everie one is oblidged to do what is best, he means, simpliciter, and abstracting from the present circumstances) since this would open a flood-gate for all manner of perjury. As for that limitation (presented with an especially as the main one) anent the Oaths hindering the greater good, to which we were preoblidged, which this man foists in, to make way for his nauseating repetition, anent the Magistrats power, it may be alledged that it is not consistent with it self: for if we stood Preobliged to this greater good, it renders the Oath ab initio null, for the same cause on which it is loosed upon the prospect of that greater good. The greater obligation (as he sayes) still overruling the lesser, & ane Oath in prejudice of a greater obligation, and contradictorie therto, can lay on no obligation, for so we might be under contradictorie obligations according to his way of reasoning about the Magistrats power. [I will have merciemercy and not sacrifice] is one of his illustrating instances. So that the obligation of the Oath, according to his reasoning in this matter, was like unto this inverted rule, viz. Sacrifice and not merciemercy, and being such ab initio, it could not bind. I know (as Dr Sand. saith) that which is abstractedly and simplicer a greater good, may hic & nunc, and in such a complex case become the lesser, consideratis considerandis all circumstances taken in. But this he admits not, for he adds unto the known rule anent the greater and certain good in its time and circumstances, that other limitation anent the vower his being preobliged unto it, which can no otherwise be understood then in opposition to the obligation of the vow, unless this his added limitation be redundant, or non-sense.

But 2dly, let us come to the assumption, what is that greater good, attainable in breaking this Oath and vow rather then in keeping it. This he tells us is p. 93obedience to authority (that's the panacea curing allwounds the universall topick, and primum mobile) avoiding of Schisme, Ministers serving God, in the work of the ministry to which they are called; these he sayes are greater and better goods then adhering to the Oath in a thing indifferent Then he adds, that Ministers should consider, whither is be better to lay aside their Oath, then their Ministerie. (Especiallie ane Oath about a thing indifferent) and incapacitat, or do that which by consequence incapacitates them for the Ministerie—that Ministers think that by their Oath they are obliged not to continue in their stations, as matters now stand, and yet divines hold that the lesser duty gives place to the greater, as David did eat the shew bread rather then starve, Paul and those with him, did cast their goods into the sea &c. In Answer to this, we need not much enlarge, it being nothing but what is upon the matter already objected and answered. 1. If the Oath, for its matter contain important duties falling under divine commands, and unalterable obligations, if Prelacie be contrary unto divine prescriptions in point of Government, & the disowning of it consequently be a standing necessarie duty (which we do suppose and have proved, and he cannot disprove) then this man himself will grant that all this tatle about the greater good in breaking the Oath, is to no purpose. 2ly, say prelacie were but indifferent, yet upon the supposall of the greater expediencie of Presbyterian Government for this Church then Prelacie, and upon the certain supposition of all the Rulers engadgement in this Oath and vow to God against it, (the first of which suppositions he hath not disproved, and the 2d he cannot deny) it is certain, that both Rulers and Ruled their keeping the Oath, is a far greater & more certain good, then their breaking it. 3ly, let Dr Sand. limitation here again come in viz. That the Oath is not precisely loosed because it seems to contradict a greater good, unless Other circumstances p. 94do also occurr, which either evince it to be unlawfull, or not oblidging, and that its not true that in everie case we are bound to do what is best, that is unless omnibus pens…is, and caeteris Paribus, all circumstances duelie pondered, it be found best; and then the Question is whither it were best for Rulers or ruled to keep this Oath for these great ends which he mentions, than to break it. Whither it be a greater good to keep a Lawfull Oath, though I suffer under authoritie levelling against it, or break it to please men▪ or whither I shall chuse the evill of suffering or sinning? (for he hath not yet proved that the interposing of the Rulers meer Law or authoritie, will make this Oath unlawfull, & we have shewed that Casuists mantain the Contrary.) Whither peace with God be a greater good in keeping his Covenant, then peace with men and with the world in breaking it? This Question was soon resolved with Elias. The children of Israel have forsaken thy Covenant—and I onlie am left &c. 4ly, This greater good, he acknowledges must be such, as is no Otherwise att…inable then by breaking the Oath. Hence the Question will be, whither the Gospel might not have been preached, schisme avoided, and God served in the Ministerie of the word, by keeping this Oath and Covenant with him? This man will come to a great height of impudence if he deny this. Nay, if he deny that this good might have been thus beter obtain'd. He alledges we have now a great Schisme by Presbyterian Ministers departing from their party, and he will not deny that many excellent preachers are Laid aside, the Magistra… is displeas'd and disobeyed, all filled with confusion and disorder, poperie like to creep in &c. Now, had not all this been eshewed by keeping our Covenant with God? The gospel had been preached by Presbyterian Minist…rs, and he will not deny that all his party of Conformists p. 95too, had keeped their ownstations, this schisme had been avoided, and the Magistrat obeyed while commanding for God. So that this rule everie way makes against him. And in stead of obtaining a greater good by breach of Covenant, we have lost the greatest good, the gospel and peace with God, and incurred much sin and miserie.

I know he will say that he speaks upon the suposal of the Rulers disowning the Oath, and Establishing prelacie. But then I urge him thus, 1. Since he cannot but grant that the keeping of the Oath, or holding fast Presbyterian government, would have had the forementioned advantages following upon it, shall the meer pleasure of the Rulers cast the ballance, and disprove its native tendencie sua natura towards the formentioned effects? the matter of the Oath is still of it self, or of its own nature, more productive of these good effects; & Consequently the keeping is to be preferd to breaking of it, which is attended with evils counterballancing these apparent good effects, which he imagins to attend this breach. 2ly, if the Oath cannot be commuted or changed, but for a greater good, and all these good effects mentioned, might have been better, & more certainlie attaind, by keeping then breaking it, then the Rulers commuting the Oath, or altering or breaking of it, he must acknowledge to be sinfull upon his own ground. Since they might have attaind these good effects of obedience, preaching the gospel, and unity, by keeping this Oath, and might have more surelie and better eshewed the forementioned evils then by breaking it. And then, let him in the third place seriously Consider, whither the Rulers sin in commutting or breaking this Oath, for neither a greater, nor more certain good, will warrand my breaking of the Oath to follow them in that sinfull course; and loose me from my obligation. 4ly, It will p. 96hence follow, that he playes the petty sophister here, in calling disobedience to the Magistrat, in this one point of a sinfull command in relation to this Oath, (which on the formentioned grounds is proved Sinfull) a disobeying of authoritie. For he dare not say that disobeying a sinfull command can come under this character. And the true state of this Question is not, whither it be a greater good, to obey the Magistrat or keep ane oath? but whither it is a greater good in this particular to obey him, in Embracing abjur'd Prelacie, or to stand to the Oath; and the issue of this is, whither it be best for the Church of Scotland to have or want Prelats? which, from what is said is soon determined. 5ly, What if these pretended good issues, be countervaild by greater evills: such as persecution of many thousands, godlie faithfull Ministers and Professors, laying waste Gods heritage, Blood, miserie, confusion, schisme, (the godlie adherers to this Oath, being without all question this Pure Church) famine of the word &c. Nay, according to Dr Sand. rule mentioned, where is the Relaxation of all parties engadged in Covenant one with another, as well as with God? were not the Churches of both nations nay in all the three Kingdoms, engadged to one another in this Oath? now thinks he not that this prospect of a greater good in breaking this oath, should have been laid to the eye of the representative Church in the three Kingdoms, in order to the change of government. And should not all parties engadged in this Covenant, have dispensed with it, and with one another in contemplation of this greater good, and for obtaining this better government? thinks he that such a great question as this: What is this greater good in point of Church Government? And that other Question. Whither such great and solemn Oaths may be laid aside in order to the obtaining of it? Are Finally decided by the Magistrats Law p. 97without the least owning the Church representative? and besides, he dare not say that all are bound to obey the Magistrat in all things indifferent. Is not subjection (by the acknowledgement of most, and even of his Master the surveyer) different from active obedience.

Finally, as for what he sayes of Ministers, the Apologist told him, and his master the Seasonable case, and I do tell him again, that God calls no man to preach the gospel by such ane unlawfull meane as perjurie and breach of Covenant, and that in this case Ministers suffering for truth, is a Confirmation of the gospel Phil. 1. 12. That in deserting and not preaching, they are meerly passive: being persecute for their integritie; so the charge and guilt of not preaching lyes upon their persecutors. Besides, the state of the question in truth, and in our principles importing a competition betwixt sin and suffering, and duty and sin, not a lesser and greater duty, the folly and impertinency of his instance, anent the lesser duty overruled by the greater (exemplified by that, I will have mercy and not sacrifice, repeated here ad nauseam) as also that instance of Paul and those with him, their casting their goods in the sea &c, is most evident. The sin and perjurie of this course of conformitie, being our principle, which he cannot disprove, even though we should grant all his pleading here (which goes but upon a begged supposition of prelacies indifferencie, and the indifferencie of the matter of the Covenant) what a flat folly is it, to tell us of preferring greater to lesser duties? wheras with us the question and case is, anent Ministers duty when the Magistrat refuseth to admit to preach, but upon sinfull terms; which one consideration makes all his tatle here evanish in wind. Suppose the Rulers of a land discharge all preaching, but upon the terms that Ministers should commit some horrid act of wickedness, would this man admit any to p. 98plead as he doth for doing evill that good may come of it, and to tell what a weightie duty it is to preach the gospel, and that the lesser duty of forbearing that evill commanded, is overruld by the greater obligation to preach, &c. Well, he and his partie (like the pharisaik teachers, twixt whom and us he insinuats a comparison) are sure blind Informers and leaders, and may be set to learn better (thou that teachest another teachest thou not self;) For they have vented such principles anent sacred Oaths, as some heathens would be ashamed of, and which banishes all faith out of the world. For what he adds anent the Rechabites, when he shal equiparat the matter of their vow, a thing meerly civil, relating to their abstinence from wine, and the manner of their dwelling, with the weighty and great duties of a Covenant with God, for publick and personal reformation, and withal prove that hazart will equally plead for the laying aside of the last, as in some cases it may warrand a dispensing with some part of the first, the parallel shall be admitted, but till then, it must pass among the rest of the Informers gratis dicta. The Dutch annot. (on Jer. 35. 7.) Shew that Ionadab probably put this ingadgment on his posterity, upon his foresight (by a prophetick spirit) of the judgments and desolations to come upon Israel, in order to their inoffensive walk, and for inuring them to parsimony. And as for their dwelling at Jerusalem in case of hazard they shew (on. 11. V.) that the Rechabits, laid aside in this one thing their fathers command, because it was but a humane ordinance, which in obedience to the law of God, they might in some cases wave, which was also Ionadabs intention, and acceptable to God. And that in giving this account to the prophet of their practise in reference to their dwelling now at Jerusalem upon the Assyrians invasion, they do shew that their fathers charge, and their vow was not to be p. 99extended to this case. So that in their sense there was no breach of the vow properly and strictly taken, but onelyonly the laying aside of a part of a humane ordinance, in case of extreme hazart, and this according to the nature and designe of the vow it self, and the first institution therof.