Bulk and Selvage of the World, Chapter 6
CHAP. VI.
HAving thus ſeen how far body or the world of bodies may be bigned, how far a piece of it may be leſſen'd, and how ſlowly or how ſwiftly bodies may be ſtirr'd, The next thing to be handled is, Of what ſtanding the world may be, or might have been? Whether it might not have been ſo far of old, as to have had no beginning; or may not be ſuch a while to come, as to have no end?
To this we muſt ſay, That as we learn from holy Writ, that the world had a beginning, ſo from the grounds by us laid down, it could not chooſe but have ſo; It being as eaſie for God, who is without beginning, to have beginning, as for the world which had it, to have had none. God who is every way unbounded, may as well be brought down to the timeſomneſs of that which is bounded, as that which is every way bounded, may be lifted up to the alwayneſs of him who is unbounded; the farneſs being the ſame, 'tis all one, for this to come to that or that to this, the Hill to come to Mahomet or Mahomet to the Hill. If it be ſaid, That Gods coming down to the world would ungod him, but not the worlds coming up to ſomewhat that he is. I ſay, the worlds driving up to any thing of Gods being, would as much ungod him, and over and above unworld it ſelf. For it does as much ungod him who is everlaſting, to make another ſo, as it does to make him not ſo; for why, if he be not only everlaſting, he is not everlaſting at all. Two times may as well drive on by each others ſide, and not be one, as two everlaſtingneſſes; and two things unbounded in bulk, may as well dwell together in the ſame unbounded room, and not be the ſame bulk, as two things unbounded in laſting, may dwell together in the ſame abiding, and not be the ſelf-ſame abiding.
If God has the whole perfection or fulneſs of everlaſtingneſs, then cannot the world go ſhares with him, without he ſhould ungod himſelf, by making himſelf leſs perfect; and if he has it ſo wholly, as that whole thing to be himſelf wholly, then cannot he make it over to another, without making that to be no other but himſelf. Inſomuch that I do think the begetting and forthſtepping of the Son and Holy Ghoſt could nere have been, had they not been Very God of very God.
If any ſhall ſay as ſome have done already, that the world is ſomewhat beſides God for all his boundleſsneſs, and has a bounded fulneſs or perfection, over and above his boundleſs perfection, and ſo why may there not be infinitely more than gods infinite whole perfection as well as finitely more? I anſwer, Methinks whoever ſays it, ſpeaks thick, in both meanings, as taken for haſty and groſs too. For though the world be ſomewhat that is not God, yet 'tis not ſomewhat that is not Gods; 'tis not he but 'tis his; 'its perfection is his perfection, and ſo his, as that it had never been his nor never been, if he had not been Infinite or Almighty. Had the world or any thing elſe perfection or being, though in never ſo low and ſcant a way, and not ſpringing from God, I could not tell how to think God an infinite maker; ſomething being made, or being, that he did not make: but that Gods making a boundedly perfect world, from his unboundedly perfect power, ſhould be a taking up of, or leſſening to, that his whole perfection, I no more conne, than that a mans doing a thing wiſely, ſhould make him not to have the whole of that wiſdom which he had. Indeed if God were ſuch a kind of Being, as ſome have made him, by ekeing him out with boundleſs ſcopes, nothing could then be roomthy beſides him, without carving a piece out of him. Which he that ſtickles ſo much for ſhould do well to mind a little the twitchings of; For ſure he muſt be ſtockt with forehead, as well as brains, to hold it.
As that Bayard muſt ever be as bold as blind, that comes hobling with his blundring houghs, on Hallowed be thy name. God is an infinite maker as well as an infinite God, infinite in doing, as well as in being; when therefore he does or makes, he does or makes ſomewhat: but that the ſomewhat, ſhould end in a thing that is not God, falls out by luck, and is not a thing that muſt be; for Gods making of ſomething into nothing, is as much an Almighty work, as making of ſomething out of nothing. Whence I think, that God by making any things, does not make any new perfection beſides, or out of, his own, which is the whole infinitely; but gives a new ſhow of it, in that, which ſtill lives, or moves, or has its being in him, not out of, or beſides him, as when he be nothings a thing that is, he does not benothing any perfection, it being too hard to think how that can be an infinitely perfect deed, as all his are, but only ſhift the ſhow or ſight of his own infinite whole perfection, which is not more by doing this, nor leſs by doing that; (or gives the ſame in another dreſs).
The way to drive the world up to everlaſtingneſs, is not to give it a being ſooner and ſooner, on and on: For when you have driven it as far as you can that way, you are as far off from Gods everlaſtingneſs as when you firſt ſet out; and 'tis no better than if you ſhould go about to make a man as wiſe as God, by making him every day a little wiſer than other. We have ſaid it and muſt ſtand to it, that Gods everlaſtingneſs is a beginningleſs, endleſs now; and if you mean, to get the world to go ſhare in it, you muſt turn its way of being one now of time after another, into that of being all at once, or you do nothing; any more than you ſhall make it all filling, unleſs you can put it out of its wont of having here a piece and there a piece, into the way of being altogether.
If otherwiſe, look for brain-breaks from ſuch kind of killing things as theſe; As an infinite tale of years to have run before the time in which the world, as 'tis, began; and that is ſuch a cannot be, that we need ſay no more againſt it, becauſe we have ſaid enough already: and then a more than infinite tale now, becauſe more have run by now, than had then: and a more than that more, becauſe more are to come to the end of the world, than have already been: and then a moſt behind that after more, for why there is to come an unknown tale of years after the worlds end: and after that after as endleſly as ever were before. Thus ſhall we ſort out eternity into as many kinds and lengths, as the Darbyſhire huſwife does her puddings, when ſhe makes whitings and blackings, and liverings and hackings: and 'tis pitty for fooling ſake that we cannot tye a ſtring at the ends of all alike. But ſtill that which kills after all this death is, that in this infinite tale of years, more than infinite, more than that more, and moſt at the end of it, there muſt yet have been a more infinite than all thoſe infinites of moneths, and in that a more than that infinite of weeks, and in that a more than that infinite of days; in that, a more of hours, in that, of halves quarters and moments: and yet the firſt infinite tale, as much as all of them together, neither more nor leſs.
Pag. 400. 402. And if any man think to come flouriſhing off with this, That 'tis not the infinite ſucceſſion but the infinity of the ſucceſſion that thus wracks the mind, and that it would bear as hard upon any other infinite but Gods, that is. I think ſo my ſelf and would have others think ſo too, that a things infinity in whole, which is finite in parts, is enough to crack all the ſtrings in the backbone. Therefore all the hurt I wiſh men, is That as they love their eaſe, they would never crack their brains nor rend their ſouls, with thinking that there are any ſuch things, while they live, but only in the Mathematicks, where ſuch are ſuppoſed, but are not, nor ever were ſaid to be. And then, as for Gods ever bleſſed and only infinity, to a man who is as he ſhould be, it comes as full of good cheer and heart taking, as the other comes empty of it.
Pag. 413, 414. Our Author indeed is clearly of the mind, the world might have been from everlaſting, and that for ought I can ſee for theſe reaſons only.
'Tis clear, ſays he, the world might have been made ſooner than it was made; and if there never was a time in which the world could not be made, it follows that it might have been made from eternal ages?
Anſw. Before world was, there was no ſoonerneſs at all: and therefore the world could not have been ſooner made than it was. And the reaſon why there never was a time in which the world could not be made, is only this; Becauſe there never was any time at all, till the world that was the firſt timeſom thing, was made, and by it time was. Nor does it follow from thence, That it might have been from eternal ages; For why, there were no ages at all, until that which began at the beginning of the world.
Secondly, Pag. 415. Could not God thenmake the world, when he ſet with himſelf that he would do it? What bound him up, that he could not give ſhew of his power, together with his will?
Anſw. The words having a twofold meaning, one true, the other untrue, I ſay he could, and he could not; he could in one meaning, and he could not in another. The when has two faces, one with which it looks inwards into the decree, the other with which it looks onwards unto the world. As to the firſt, 'tis not true; as to the latter, 'tis. God could bring forth the world at that then, wherein or when he had caſt with himſelf the world could afterwards be made, and that was when it was made: But God could not do it then, when he was ſetting with himſelf to do it afterward, (if I may word it ſo to be better underſtood;) and that when only was from everlaſting; for he had decreed from everlaſting, that he would do it in time, and it could be done no otherwiſe.
That forecaſt or decree by the power of which the world was, was nothing but God forecaſting or decreeing; and if the world had been of as long ſtanding as that was, that had been God too. That everlaſtingneſs that made one to be God, would have made the other ſo. Inſomuch that the Argument is nothing but this, God was from everlaſting, therefore the world might have been ſo too. And that is indeed a pretty little brat, that has been ſo lovingly dandled by old Father Hobbes, that it will never call other man Daddy while the world laſts.
Methinks decreeing is ſo much forecaſting or foredooming that which is to be, and is not, till ſo foredoom'd, that do but once yield that the world was, becauſe God from everlaſting did decree it ſhould be, and for the ſake of that alone it cannot be from everlaſting. The world being no world but as it was a decreed world, and the decree by which it was ſuch, being from everlaſting decreed, and never a decreeing, then I ſay, The world muſt be after the decree, not in the paſſing of it; for it was ever paſſed, never paſſing. So the decree paſſed, was the cauſe of the world made. Now the decree which was paſs'd before it, being from everlaſting, it was thereupon from everlasting before it. So that by making the world as much as you can of old, you can make it no more everlaſting than 'tis; for it would alwayes be alike after the decree, which was from everlaſting before it.
If you ſay the world was juſt as everlaſting as the decree, rather made in it than by it, or upon it: Not to ſay, How can that be made, that was never a making? I ſay then, The world muſt needs be before ever God was aware of it, or could ever decree it; and ſo as much the cauſe of the decree, as the decree of that; and the decree as much a worlded decree, as the world a decreed world; and that decree being God himſelf, he muſt be alſo a worlded God, or a begoded world.
'Tis ſtill a truth, and owned ſuch, That what binds up God from doing, binds him alſo from willing: But as God had not a power from everlaſting, to make the world from everlaſting; ſo neither did he ever will it ſhould be ſo: but his will from everlaſting was, That it ſhould be in time. Accordingly his power holding an evenneſs with this his will, brought forth the world at that time and no other, than we read it took beginning.
Obj. There is yet another Argument much befriended by the ſame hand, as alſo to be met with good broadly ſomewhere in the Morean Philoſophy, and that is, Why could not God as well make the world everlaſting a parte ante, on the behalf of formerneſs, as he did the ſoul of man a parte poſt, on the behalf of latterneſs? Why could not the one as well have no beginning, as the other no end?
Anſw. This all flows from a very great miſtake about the very being of that thing which we call Everlaſtingneſs. Gods everlaſtingneſs, and that of the ſoul, are two things under one name; and ſo wide aſunder too, that they lye infinitely off each other, as to their very kind. As Gods everlaſtingneſs was always without ſucceſſion, ſo 'tis now, and ever ſhall be. And as the everlaſting ſoul of Adam has liv'd as ſucceſſively ſince his death, as the world it ſelf, that we ſee holds on to do ſo ſtill; ſo ſhall it abide for what is to come, as it has for that which is paſt▪ it ſhall never wear otherwiſe than it has or does. And it ſhall never be ſaid, That his, or any mans ſoul, has liv'd to an infinite number of minutes; but whatever minute you pitch upon, in the boundleſs laſting of the ſoul, it will have a bounded tale of minutes behind it; and it ſhall never live in other to come, than ſuch as are already paſt; the ſoul being rather indefinite than infinite in its abiding, rather of an unmarkt laſting than everlaſting; and that everlaſtingneſs or endleſneſs which it has, (ſo call'd,) ſhall come no nearer Gods everlaſtingneſs or endleſneſs, than if it laſted only for a while, and then ended: For ſtill it ſhall be rightly ſaid, That God is every way infinitely beyond the ſoul, in his way of abiding. Gods everlaſtingneſs is without beginning and without end; and theſe two are ſo together, and bound up in one, that you can no wayes halve them, and ſay, This half is unbeginningly, and that unendingly; this unlike the ſouls abiding, and that like it: For that is this, and this is that in God, and both are one, and one God too, and you can no more ſunder them than cut a now in two. From everlaſting to everlaſting is God's whole eternity, and nothing leſs can be it, or any thing of it; If it be otherwiſe dealt out, we muſt remember, 'tis for our ſakes only.
But now the alwayneſs of the ſoul is ſuch a thing, as of which it may be ſaid, it evermore was not, as well as it evermore will be. Now as that which evermore was, ſtands off infinitely from that which evermore was not, ſo does Gods everlaſtingneſs, which was the former, from that of the ſoul which is the latter. And as for that which is to come, the ſoul muſt creep on to it ſtep by ſtep, now after now: Whereas to Gods everlaſtingneſs, as there was nothing before it, ſo there is nothing to come after it; nothing to come, nor nothing paſt in reſpect of it; but all to him is now, and he is ſhier out of the length of our line, from everlaſting before it, to everlaſting beyond it.
Should it be otherwiſe than we have ſaid, this unbecomingneſs would tread upon the heels of it, to wit, That the world might as well get up with Gods all-fillingneſs by growing bigger, as with his everlaſtingneſs by growing older. For let us but ſuppoſe the world every week it laſts, to wax as big again, (he that made this in ſix dayes, can make it as much more in ſix more,) and to have the ſame everlaſtingneſs the ſoul has, or might have had; if by its ever growing older it would reach or hold up with Gods everlaſtingneſs, then by its ever growing bigger it would reach or hold out with Gods all-fillingneſs: ever to ever, or infinite to infinite being the ſame.
Why could not God make the world boundleſs in its bigneſs one way, as the ſoul in its laſting another way? As ſuppoſe an infinite line to cut the infinite roomthineſs in the midſt, (as ſomebody will ſhew you how,) might not God have made in one half, a Being boundleſs in bulk one way, ſo as we might ſay, that God were infinitely beyond the bound of its infinity one way, as well as ſay, God was everlaſtingly before the beginning of our everlaſtingneſs one way. Its immenſity might as well have a firſt part as to outſtretchedneſs, and no laſt, as our everlaſtingneſs have a firſt now of its abiding, and no laſt. Extenſion that is infinite as to bulk one way, is no more uncouth than an abiding that is everlaſting as to length one way.
But now ſhould there ever be ſuch a thing as this, it muſt needs ſhare in the half of Gods all-fillingneſs; but ſeeing that Gods all-fillingneſs cannot be halv'd, but is what it is wholly, and this is what it is halfly, it follows, That becauſe this Being cannot reach half of it, or all of it, it can reach none at all of it. In like manner, Gods everlaſtingneſs not being to be halv'd, any more than his all-fillingneſs, the everlaſtingneſs that the ſoul has, muſt reach the whole of it, or none of it.
Beſides, the thing would be too ill matcht with it ſelf, ever to be at all. If that which is once infinite can never be finite, 'tis impoſſible, that even while 'tis infinite it ſhould be finite too, infinite one way and finite another, whether it be ſo in its laſting or in its roomthineſs. Finite one way and infinite another, is worſe than man one way and horſe another, or woman one way and fiſh another, which yet is that Centaur and Meremaid, that never were but in the wildeſt thoughts of him that ſometimes roved at them.
But indeed the ſelf-ſame Writer has told us roundly, (p. 399.) That Gods being everlaſting, is nothing but his having the root of it ſo in him, as to be call'd everlaſting in the ſelf-ſame meaning that the ſoul of man is; not that it has been together with that which is to be, but that 'tis put into ſuch a way that it muſt needs ever abide, and be together withevery now, when once it comes. But that God ſhould be in actu, or already, together with thoſe moments that are to come, is both abſurdand impoſſible.
Now I muſt beg leave to ſay, That however this everlaſtingneſs may ſet well enough upon the thing that Mr. Hobbes has made a God of, that he might play with him: yet I am ſure it would full ill become that God who has made us, that we might worſhip him. For I will be bold to ſay, 'tis prov'd, the ſoul ſhall never have liv'd everlaſtingly, and that that everlaſtingneſs which the ſoul has in the root, and is to come, is of the ſame kind with that abiding which it has already grown up to, and is paſt: Nor is it any thing elſe but time eked out, now after now, a laſtingneſs that is indefinite, but not finite; for why, a thing that is finite backwards, cannot be infinite forwards, any more than a thing may be boundleſs in bulk one way and bounded another. Now, that God Almighty ſhould have an everlaſtingneſs that is as much finite as infinite, growing as grown, or be only indefinite, is a thing that I will not call by its right name: but be it as it can be, it lights full upon the head of him that ſays, Gods everlaſtingneſs is ſo ſtrainedly ſuch as that of our ſouls is. If it be allayed with this, That only that part of Gods everlaſtingneſs which is to come, is akin to ours; he that ſhall do it, is himſelf more akin to Waltham's Calf, that was to ſuck part of that Bulls milk that had none at all. He that breaks aſunder Gods everlaſtingneſs, breaks the Godhead; for why, his everlaſtingneſs is no leſs than his very Being: and he that makes part of it like to ours, makes the whole ſo; for whatſoever part you pitch on fore or aft, it is the whole, and now for evermore.
The ground we go upon here is this, That whatſoever God is, or is in God, is actualiter or in a readineſs, and that he is not towards any thing which now he is not, or in potentia ad aliquid. That the bare Eſſence or Being of God is ſo in actu or forthwith, that 'tis as impoſſible he ſhould be in potentia, as that he ſhould be leſs perfect, is owned as well by our Author as any man. But I ſay then, That Gods everlaſtingneſs muſt needs be as much in a readineſs, becauſe Gods Being, as 'tis everlaſting, is as far from not being, and as every way perfect as his Being barely taken. And if that be reaſon enough to make one actually or forthwith, 'tis ſo too to make the other; the latter being bound in the former, and Gods being alone without being everlaſting, not being at all, but as we think it, by it ſelf. If then Gods Eſſence or Being, taken only as ſuch, cannot be made up of being and not being, neither can that his Being, taken as everlaſting; the everlastingneſs of it being as much of the Eſſence as the nakedneſs, and rather too, inaſmuch as one is, the other lonely, is but thought. If then Gods being as ſuch, ſhut out as well the may be, poſſe eſſe, as the may not be, the poſſe non eſſe, Gods Being as ever being, ſhuts out both too; elſe God ſhould be more perfect in the being which he has ſunderly in our thoughts, than in that being which he has truly in himſelf. If that of Gods everlaſtingneſs which is to come may be, but is not; then that of Gods Eſſence which it is, may be alſo, but as yet is not. He then that ſayes that Gods bare Eſſence muſt be forthwith or actu, but his everlaſting Eſſence, or his everlaſtingneſs which is all one, muſt be forth-coming or in potentia, muſt either ſay he does not know what, or he does not care what; it being true blew Gotham or Hobbes ingrain'd, one of the two.
To make it yet out, that Gods everlaſtingneſs muſt be like that of the ſoul, growing ſtill more and more, our Author goes on, by ſhewing the aukneſs or great abſurdity on the other ſide, which is, That all that which is to come ſhould already be.
That that which is ſo unto us ſhould already be with us, I acknowledge is auk enough; but that that which is ſo to us, but not to God, (to whom nothing can be to come or paſt) ſhould be now together with him, is no more odd, than that that which is a great way off in place from us, ſhould be at hand to God-ward. As for what we read in Holy Writ, that God was, and is, and is to come, 'tis a coming down to our meanneſs: As when he ſaid, Before Abraham was I am, and This day have I begotten thee, who was begotten from everlaſting, he kept as near to the thing that he was, as he kept off from the Grammar that we ſpeak by. And if we ſhould but reaſon from the likeneſſes that God has given us of himſelf to other things, as 'tis here done from the likeneſs given to time, unto his being ſuch indeed, we might eaſily make as odd a thing of the Godhead▪ as ſomebody elſe has done of his everlaſtingneſs.
Beſides, 'tis owned too, That all the moments which are to come ſhall never be, [p. 399.] and therefore God ſhall never be▪ together with them. Not to ſay how hard 'tis, that that which is not at all, nor ever will be, nor can be at all, nor can come nearer at all, ſhould yet be a coming; I muſt yet mark, that this onward everlaſtingneſs which is faſtned upon God Almighty, is all along made up of things which before were not, afterwards are not, and leaves ſtill beyond it things that never ſhall be: So that Gods everlaſtingneſs, or everlaſting God, is made up of ſomething that now is, and ſomething that was and is not, and ſomething that neither is, nor ever was, nor ever will be: And that is a ſomething that never was ſomething, nor is now ſomething, nor ever will be ſomething: but a ſomething that is now nothing, and alwayes was nothing, and alwayes will be nothing; unleſs the Reader will let it be ſomething that is now awake, and alwayes was awke, and alwayes will be awke.
But we are not only to be burden'd withawke, but knockt down with a Can't be too. For ſo we read, If there be nothing to come of Gods infinite ſucceſſion, then 'tis come to an end: but 'tis a Contradiction that what is unbounded ſhould ever be ended: 'tis therefore impoſſible that God ſhould be in actu or at hand with that, which is not ſo yet, but will be.
This indeed ſmells pretty ſtrong of quirk, but reliſhes as faintly as may be of reaſon. For it has no crutches to lean its crippled burden on, but what we have already pluckt from under it, to wit, a ſucceſſion in Gods everlaſtingneſs; whence 'tis thought becauſe things are to come to us, who are growing onwards, they muſt be ſo to God likewiſe, who is not, but calls the things that are not as though they were: and I think enough has been ſaid to ſhew, that neither is extendednes the meaſure of Gods immenſity, nor is ſucceſſive laſtingneſs the meaſure of his eternity. But if the man who is ſo all to benighted, will needs be ſetting up a Will in the wiſp, no wonder if the glare of it ſometimes roblet him into bogs and marlpits.
But if another gates anſwer muſt be given, I do ſay, that when ever any man dogs me with this, If there be nothing to come of Gods eternity tis at an end? Then will I ſay too, If there be nothing to come of half of it, that half is at an end. So at the very time of my writing this, Half Gods everlaſtingneſs ſhould be fairly tript off; and though God Almighty were whole God from everlaſting, yet he is to be but half-God to everlaſting; his everlaſtingneſs being of his very Godhead, and this halving of it being a knack of our Authors owning long ſince. Again I muſt ſay, If there be no part of Gods immenſity beyond the room where I now am, then tis wholly here, and if wholly here tis wholly finite; for ſuch is the whole room that is here: But tis a Contradiction that boundleſs being ſhould be bounded. For the rightning of all which there is nothing in the world to be brought forth but this, that He that talks of one or other, talks idle, and jumbles holy Ghoſt and body, laſtingneſs and everlaſtingneſs both together, which ſhould always be kept wide aſunder. Something to come, and part beyond, have nothing to do, with Gods everlaſtingneſs or alfillingneſs, but are wholly taken up by body and time. And becauſe we ſee that every body has a middle and that our laſtingneſs has an onwardneſs, we are haſty to make over theſe to God and his everlaſtingneſs: Whereas nothing has a middle, that has not two ends, between which the middle muſt evenly be, nor is any thing growing older that was not ſometimes young, or young that was not ſometimes nothing: If then Gods Eternity has neither beginning or end, he muſt be hugely out, that talks of the middle of it; and if God were never younger than he is, he is but a brainſick wight that dreams of his growing older. If nothing of his everlaſtingneſs be paſt, nothing of it is to come, and if any be paſt then ſomething of Gods being, was, but is not; and if any be to come, then ſomething of Gods being is not yet, but forſooth ſhall be, and yet his own ſelf ſtiffly and rightly holds, that Gods being as ſuch is altogether in a readineſs or actualiter. Now do but put theſe two together, and ſee how huge luckily and unluckily they ſpell abſurd and impoſsible, which yet are the two hard things that are caſt into the Folks diſh for them to gnaw upon: Sometimes he that is buſie in hurling ſtones at random to pelt other mens Geeſe, may unluckily brain ſome of his own Swans.
Though the thing we are upon be ſo a Noneſuch, that there is no other thing in being, or can be, to which we may fully liken it, yet ſome things there are by our looking unto which, the underſtanding, I think, will a little the better cope with this. One is the way of the ſouls being in the body, or together with it. Let us then with Michaelius (a late Hoorns man) take eternity to be as it were the ſoul of time as then the ſoul takes in all the body, without being partable as that is, but being as cleaveleſs as if it were but the leaſt point of it; So eternity hems in all time, without creeping on & on as that does, but being as free from all ſucceſſion as the leaſt now of it. Little otherwiſe Gods working or knowing differs from ours, as ſealing or printing does from limning and drawing, one asking time, and the more done the more time; the other is done in a moment, and much may be done in that moment as eaſily as a little.
Another likeneſs may be that of the wheel, beſet with a row of cogs or pegs, in the whirling about of which, to an eye that is plac't within, the ſtirring of each cog comes into ſight, one after other, all on a row; ſo that the firſt look't on, muſt turn about to the point at which its ſtart began, before all of them can come to be ſeen; but to an eye that is ſeated without the wheel, the running of the wheel is taken in the twinkling of an eye. Now God is beyond the wheel or line of our time; for why, he is beyond the ſelvedge of this our timeſome world, by way of perfection, that is, not ſtowage, to him then the whole wheeling about or revolution of times, is as much in an inſtant, as the leaſt now of it is to us.
Nor is it right down trifling to mark how time has a great deal of its length or ſhortneſs, from the plight that our ſouls or bodies are in: for when we are ill at eaſe, the ſhorter time is alwayes long, and the wheel thereof drives on heavily; but when we are blith and happy, the wheel is laid aſide for wings, and that which could ſcarce go of late, now flies, and overſwiftly too for us to mark its ſpeed. Now God who is infinitely more happy than we are, muſt needs drive on the ſpeed of this wheel to an infinite height, beyond what we can; ſo that it muſt do no leſs than wind up into it ſelf, even in a very moment. If it can take the ſlowneſs of one now after another, from us, why may it not take the ſwiftneſs of all its nows together from God? And though indeed many things are to us otherwiſe than they are, yet ſo as all things are to him, even ſo they are indeed.
But to make ſhort with our Author, to whom it ſeems the world might have been from everlaſting, we ſhall only mark what an ugly train this carries after it. His news is, That the world might have been as unbeginningly as God himſelf, and then to be ſure it may be as endleſly as he is; for the ſoul which is one thing that God had made, being ſo already, the world which is another, may be ſo too, if God will: So God may give away his whole everlaſtingneſs, to a world that is as much as he can be from everlaſting to everlaſting: And when he is thus on the giving hand, he may give away his immenſity too. And this indeed our Author is ſo forward to yield, that he has taken it up for a thing that all men elſe have done; for ſo he lanches out, (p. 391.) Our laſtingneſs cannot be of another kind from Gods everlaſtingneſs; for then if God ſhould make a body of an all-filling, outstretchedneſs, it would not be all-filling, becauſe it would have dimenſions of another kind from what God has. So he does not only take it for a truth, That ſuch a thing may be, but a more owned truth than that which this is brought to ſtrengthen. But indeed, whether he will hold ſo or not, he muſt, or elſe break with himſelf. For if the reaſon why the world might be from everlaſting, was, (as p. 414. is ſaid,) Becauſe there was no part of that laſtingneſs which was before the world, in which it began to have a power to be, but ſtill it might have been ſooner and ſooner unbeginningly, then the ſame gives the world leave to have been all-filling as to bulk: For why, there is no ſcantling of that roomthineſs beyond the world, beyond which the world had no power to be, but ſtill it might have been bigger and bigger boundleſly. Beſides, for fail, he has found out another way to make the world as immenſe as God is, though it were made bounded from everlaſting; and that is by growing every day bigger and bigger endleſly: ſo having laſted an infinite while, it muſt needs have grown up to an infinite bulk, though made otherwiſe at firſt; for ſo he ſays, God is call'd everlaſting, not that he is gotten up to all the nows of time that are to come, but that he is hieing thither as faſt as he can, in the ſame road with our ſouls. Which is indeed a moſt curious, pretty, dainty thing if you mind it narrowly: For, in likeneſs, Gods immenſity may be call'd ſo, not that he has fill'd all roomthineſs from all eternity, or was everlaſtingly every where; but from his growing ever more and more in bulk, he may be ſaid to be immenſe, as from his growing ever older and older in time, he may be ſaid to be eternal: ſo have we gotten a world as everlaſting and as immenſe as God himſelf. Now he that will but cut out ſuch a God for me and make it thus far, Ile undertake to make it up for him with ſtuff of the own; for now Gods Almightineſs, All-wiſdom, and whatever elſe comes under the name of attributum incommunicabile in the Dutch Divinity, ſetting no cloſer to the Godhead than his everlaſtingneſs and all-fillingneſs, he might from everlaſting have thrown them in too after the other: or however, if he gave them but a bounded mightineſs and wiſdom, yet inaſmuch as there might be a growing every day more mighty and more wiſe from everlaſting, that Being muſt needs be as infinite in wiſdom and mightineſs as God himſelf, becauſe as infinite in thoſe two as he is in his everlaſtingneſs, in which he is no leſs infinite than in them.
All that we want now of making the world a God Cap-a-pe, or up to the Brim, is only this, That ſuch a world would be made by God ſtill, and not from everlaſting of it ſelf, as he is. But do but put it next into that ſame boundleſs roomthineſs and abiding, whereupon 'tis ſaid, they would jump into one roomthineſs and abiding; and, which are as much of themſelves as God himſelf is, and were and will be for all him from everlaſting to everlasting; and then I think he will have ſet before us ſuch a Hoghen moghen Leviathan, that that of Holy Job would be but a kind of Spratkin to it ward, and the bigger one of Mr. Hobbes would never be enough to make Anchovy-ſauce for it. Though indeed I cannot think he meant no better, yet weighing theſe things, I muſt needs ſay, He ſeems to be a ſetter forth of ſtrange gods, and looks as if he had given us Tentamina de Deo for the nonce. And for my part, if I did but think there were or could be any ſuch thing as ſprings thus kindly from the ſeed which he has ſown, it would give me for ever frolicking on't again, and I ſhould go in fear of my life on't every day I riſe, and dream full dradly on't every night I went to bed. For I being at no agreement vvith this ſame hideous Roomster, as to the vvay hovv I ſhould behave my ſelf tovvards it vvhile in it, hovv to beſpeak its forgiveneſs after doing amiſs, or how to know when I have done ſo; it may be, while I am thinking how all is well, and a coaks a coming, I may, for ought I know, be ramping on the ſnout of it, and ſo have my harmleſs miſtake paid home by a vile miſchance and a ſudden too, with nothing leſs than the dreadfulneſs of a grim nip, and a dead-doing gripe.
And this ſhall be enough to have ſpoken to the firſt part of our fourth Head, How far of old, the world or body, has or might have been: The other part is, How long it ſhall or may laſt. The Anſwer to which muſt be twofold, according to the twofold ſtate of the world; to wit, That in which 'tis, and that in which it ſhall be. As to the latter, There ſticks nothing with me, but that the world or body may be as everlaſting as the ſoul: For I think 'tis as impoſſible, that that which is ſomething ſhould make it ſelf nothing, as that that which is nothing ſhould make it ſelf ſomething. And when we ſay, the body is dying or timeſom, the ſoul deathleſs or endleſs, we do not mean the body ſhould thereby loſe its bodyhood, but only its ſuchneſs: It ſhall be or may be alwayes body, but it never ſhall be, or at leaſt never was it body unſhifted; but after its kind, ſending forth and taking in of ſteams and reeks, even all along.
But as to that plight in which the world now is, the May be of its laſtingneſs is not to be gathered from the inwardneſs of the thing; for, for ought we know, body as now 'tis, may laſt as long as body renewed and cleanſed by fire, as hereafter it ſhall be: But we are altogether to look outward to the will of God, who, as he hath ſaid to the Sea, Thus far ſhalt thou go and no further in room, ſo has he ſaid to the World, Thus far ſhalt thou go and no further in time: The laſt day and hour of which, though no man knows, yet I think 'tis not much harder to pitch a time beyond which it ſhall not be, than 'tis to find out a ſcantling beyond which the roundle or globe of the earth is not, as now.
For whether we hold, That the ſame body which ſlept ſhall riſe again, that very fleſh, blood and bones which it lay down, as Holy Church ſeems all along to have believ'd; or whether we will have it, That the ſame body, becauſe the ſame Man with body beghoſted, riſes, as ſome of the uppermoſt ſeat of Philoſophers at this day have themſelves thought, and wonne upon others to think ſo too; Inaſmuch as both of them are acknowledged to be made of ſtuff already in being, it comes all to one: As ſure as we are that the body ſhall riſe again either way, ſo ſure are we that this world ſhall hold no longer, than till all the ſtuff that is now in the world be wrought up into bodies riſing again.
But then we are not only ſure that the body ſhall riſe again, but we have the ſame Word of God for it, That it ſhall do ſo in the world in which now 'tis, though not in the world as now 'tis, but chang'd in its kind of worldhood, as that ſhall be in its kind of bodyhood; the new heavens and the new earth being (as we think,) but old bodies new dreſt. So that we are ſure too, that at the ending of the world there muſt be ſtuff enough left, unmade up into Maniſh bodies, wherewith to frame a new heaven and new earth, without making more of nothing; and that this world ſhall hold no longer than till then.
Now though the heavens and the earth have dealings with one another, yet they do not make over to each other any thing that is bulky or weighty, that we can find ſo: whence we may make bold to ſay, over and above, That all bodies that are to riſe again, are made of the ſame mold or ground that the firſt was; that is, taken out of the earthly world, not out of the heavenly bodies. Whence the world is to laſt no longer than till the earthly ſtuff for rifing bodies be ſpent, with leaving enough for an earthly world beſides.
If then we do but know how the earths globe, or that of it that lyes fleſhward, bears it ſelf to the throng of mens bodies made out of it, we may at length come at ſuch a bound of time or term of years, beyond which we may be ſure the world ſhall not hold out. And if we were but well aware, how much the innermoſt bodies enwomb'd in the earth, had to do with the making of ours, we might come a great deal nearer the buſineſs, than otherwiſe we are like to do. But, ſetting aſide the Excellent Mr. Boyle and Kircher, almoſt all men that have delved into the bowels of the earth to fetch us any tales of under-ground bodies, have done it rather to make themſelves more rich and wealthy, than either themſelves or any body elſe more wiſe or knowing. So that we are much at a loſs as to the kind of thoſe things that are hidden there, and whether according to the Laws that God has ſet to himſelf, in drawing one thing out of another, in thoſe Workhouſen which we find he has ſet up, the fleſhly body of man may at length be carved out of them, or Whether there be any little ſpungholes or crannies by wch one may ſoak through to the other? Again, What we do find at our utmoſt depths or bores, whequarries of ſtone, Mines of metal, or layers and veins of barren earths and ſapleſs medlies, we can't tell how far they may be tiew'd, and dreſt, and mingled, ſo as at length to be be made fit for the food of body, to make it wax when well, as we ſee they may for the health of the body, to make it well when ſick. And yet again, The ſundry unevenneſſes in the depth of thoſe layers, that are made of ſapful and growthſom earths, lead us into another Wilderneſs and leave us there. For like as ſometimes we find Gold (a thing that changes us much, but feeds us little) as fleet as the roots of ſhrubs in Peru or the Weſt Indies, ſometimes among the ſhallow waters that drill between the pebbles in the Falls of Guiny or Africa: whilſt the Gold Mine at Chremnitz is no leſs than 160 fathoms deep, (as we have it from a good Hand upon the place:) So in like manner, thoſe things that feed and biggen us, lye in the earths globe at full us uneven depths. For while ſalt, a thing that helps as much to live, and get life for others too, ſometimes floats on the top of the Sea, and is thickned in the open Beds, at the ſalt-making Marſhes of the Iſle of Rhe and Xantoign, Provence and Meſſina, or digg'd in the Iſle of May, and fetcht up at the Wiches in England from eaſie depths. We have it for truth, That near Eperies is a Salt-Mine 180 fathoms deep, and a Sal gemma Mine in Poland no leſs than 200. Though for the moſt part it will hold good, that you cannot dig many ſpades in mold or growthſom earth, before you come at a dead ſoyl. Suppoſing then (to make ſhort of a thing that may more eaſily be made long) That the wet and dry ſurface of the earths roundle, to the depth of mans height, one place with another, may be made up into the bodies of mankind, and with the well-skill'd F. Taquet, That at Dooms-day a leſs cantling of it than England, which we reckon above the thouſandth part of the Globe, will be enough to hold all the dwellers of it and their children, that ever have been, or in likelihood may be hereafter till then, though the world ſhould laſt 10000 years, Then are we ſure this world ſhall never laſt beyond a thouſand times ten thouſand years, how much ſoever it may be gueſt to fall ſhort of it. Which being the whole that we think needful to ſpeak, under an Head that has ſo much room to ſpread upon, and ſo little of boundedneſs to winde up in, we ſhall take forth to our laſt, which is,