A Vindication, Part 6
I ſhall now come to the conſideration of Col. 1. 16. By him were all things created, &c. and John 1. 3. All things were made by him, and without him was made nothing that was made: In anſwer to which he thinks he hath acted his part gallantly; but let us hear what it is that he ſaith.
He puts the Scriptures into an argument, after this ſort, He by whom all things were made, is the moſt high God; but all things were made by Jeſus Chriſt; therefore Jeſus Chriſt is the moſt high God.
He grants the major in reference to the principal agent, but denies it in reference to an inſtrumental agent: And ſaith he aſſerts Jeſus Chriſt to be onelyonly an inſtrumental agent in the creation of the world.
Rep. I have already in many places of my other Treatiſe (becauſe he often harps upon Chriſts inſtrumentalneſſe to the Father, in creating all things) confuted this aſſertion; yet if he have any thing to ſay in the defence of it, I am willing to diſcuſſe it with him. And he produceth four reaſons for the confirming of his poſition. I ſhall try the ſtrength of them.
1. The book of the creatures ſpeaks onelyonly of one firſt cauſe, and principal agent of all things; of a Trinity of perſons, in unity of eſſence, as principal agents in the work of creation, the whole creation is ſilent.
Rep. 1. If the book of the creatures were wholly ſilent: yet if the book of the Scriptures be not ſilent, we are to attend the book of the Scriptures; if the book of the creatures would have taught us all things that we ought to believe concerning God, what need had there been of the book of the Scriptures?
2 The book of the creatures doth teach many things which we underſtand not from them; the defect is in us, not in it: we are dul in apprehending, and ſlow of heart in beleeving what the book of the Scriptures doth teach us, therefore may not conceive aright what the book of the Creatures doth teach us.
3 The heathen Philoſophers from the principles of Reaſon have acknowledged a Trinity of Perſons in the unity of Eſſence; as Morneus a French Lord, in that exquiſite piece of his, called The trueneſſe of Christian Religion, largely and ſatisfactorily ſhews, if the Reader will be at the pains to peruſe him.
4 The inanimate creatures have ſome kind of impreſſion of the Trinity upon them; and one God in three Perſons hath in a kind left his image and his reſemblance upon them: The Sun begets beams and rayes, and from both theſe proceeds light; and yet neither is the Sun before the beams, nor the beams before the light that proceeds from them, but in order onelyonly and relation, ſo far as the beams are begotten, and the light proceeds; but not in time: which doth adumbrate the coeternity of the Three Perſons. So alſo there is the Fountain, and there is the water that bubbles up, which is (as it were) begotten of the Fountain; and there is the ſtream that proceeds from both; and theſe are at once in time: for in the firſt moment that there is a fountain, there is the bubling of water, or the riſing up, or boyling of it; and no ſooner is the bubling, but there is an iſſuing or proceeding of water, the water runs from it, if there be paſſage: and yet in order the fountain is firſt, the bubling is next, and the proceeding of water is laſt, but they are together in time; And may it not be ſaid that the impreſſion of the Trinity is here? but the character in which the Trinity is written in the book of the creatures, is ſmaller and darker then that every one can read; when yet things of the God-head, ſome of them may more eaſily be ſpelled forth.
5. Though we affirm that the Father creates, and the Son creates, and the Holy Ghoſt creates, and that theſe three are three perſons, yet we do not hold that theſe three are three reall diſtinct Agents, but one Agent. For they are all of them but one thing, & but one God; and ſo really but one Agent; but this one Agent ſubſiſts divers ways in three perſons, as one God ſubſiſts divers ways in three perſons, and theſe perſons are not another thing from that one God, and ſo not another thing from that one Agent. So that he goes upon a miſtake, while he diſputes againſt three principall Agents. As ſuppoſe there were one ſoul in three bodies, moving them alike in all operations, and acting by them; theſe three bodies would not be three Agents, but one Agent, though all the bodies perform the work. And if there be one God in three perſons, (or which is all one) ſubſiſting three manner of ways, yet the three manner of ways of ſubſiſting, doth not make three Gods, nor three Agents. But there is no ſimilitude that will rightly and exactly, and fully in all things hold forth the working of God in trinity of perſons; only ſome little crevice of light may be opened, to give a little inſight into this truth.
6. Our Divines when they have confeſſed that God is known by the Creation, but have denyed that God the Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt are known thereby; they have meant it of a demonſtrative knowledge which of God men may arrive at; but of the Trinity they cannot; yet there may be ſome things that may ſhadow it out, though very darkly.
7. It is certain, that that which is clearly ſeen of God in the Creation, belongs to his Eſſence. For the Apoſtle tels us ſo much, Rom. 1. 20. his Godhead is ſeen, things belonging to his Eſſence, viz. his power, his wiſdome, the liberty of his will, his goodneſſe, holineſſe; and many more properties belonging to his Eſſence, which are common to all the perſons; but thoſe ſubſiſtantiall, perſonall properties, they are not by any viſible characters to be diſcern'd.
But he objects againſt our Divines, for ſaying, God is known from the Creation, but not Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt; and he objects againſt the reaſon that they render, viz. That the efficient force and vertue by which the world was created, belongs to the Eſſence of God, and not to the perſonall ſubſiſtence; his words are theſe,
Yet by their leave, God is a Perſon, all actions being proper unto perſons, therefore by their grant, the work of creation holds forth but one Agent: for it is not imaginable, that if there were more then one principall Agent, they ſhould not all be equally diſcovered by the work.
Repl. I have anſwered unto this, Gods being a Perſon, and have declared that God rather imports eſſentiality, then perſonality; yet withall, I have ſhewed that eſſence is never ſeparated from perſon, but ſubſiſts in it; and if God be properly ſpoken of, there the eſſence is meant, as it ſubſiſts in three perſons, in Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Yet when it reſpects acting things without them, theſe three perſons act in that which is common to them all, and wherein they are in one, and not wherein they are diſtinguiſhed, and are three; they act by the ſame eſſentiall property, as power, wiſdome, &c. and theſe are one and the ſame in them all, and ſo it is Gods work in Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt; and not the Fathers work alone and apart, nor God the Sons work alone and apart, nor God the Holy Ghoſt's work alone and apart, nor yet the work of all theſe wherein they differ, and are three diſtinct from each other, but the work of all as they are one. And the Father is no more diſcovered then the Son, nor any one more then other, but God in all is diſcovered. So that he is upon a miſtake when he ſpeaks of three principall Agents, that muſt be diſcovered in the work of creation. For theſe perſons that are, work but one thing, one being, one God, one reall Agent; for the very thing that the Father acts, the Son acts, and the Holy Ghoſt acts, and the power is one, and the wiſdome is one, and the act is one.
Or ſuppoſe it were granted, that there are three principall Agents, yet there are not three Agents eſſentially diſtinct, but perſonally only; and ſo it comes all to one, whether one ſay that there are three Agents, that may be called principall; or whether one ſay, there is one principall Agent: for the one Agent is in three perſons, and acts with ſome perſonall diverſity, and the three Agents are but one in eſſence, and but one thing, and act one thing, and by one power; therefore it is not materiall how it is expreſſed.
Agent, as it relates. to God, may admit of the ſame diſtinction as is made when we ſpeak of God: Agent is conſidered either eſſentially, or ſubſiſtentially: Eſſentially, and then there is but one, as there is but one God. Subſiſtentially, and then there are three, as there are three Perſons: But they do not differ really and eſſentially one from another, as the Perſons do not; but onelyonly in the manner of acting.
And Agent taken perſonally, though they ſhould be three, yet need not be diſcovered each of them in the work, becauſe as they are eſſentially one, ſo they work one individuall work by one individuall power, and force, and efficacy, which is numerically the ſame, and therefore cannot leave a diſtinct impreſſion in any work.
His ſecond Argument by which he would prove Chriſt to be but an inſtrumental Agent in creating the world, is fetch'd from Reaſon: his words are theſe.
The ſecond reaſon proceeds from the verdict of pure Reaſon: If Reaſon may obtain credit, ſhe will tell us, that there could be in the work of Creation but one principall agent, becauſe there is by nature but one God; for if there were two principall agents, there muſt be two Gods, the terms being convertible.
Repl. 1. There is neither pure Reaſon nor cleer Reaſon to be found among men; and while he pleads ſo earneſtly for Reaſon, he loſeth himſelf and the Truth in corrupted and darkened Reaſon, which he too much follows; and being in purſuit after Reaſon what it will preſent, he turns aſide from Scripture, and attains not the knowledg of the Truth, which he would ſeem to contend for.
Rep. 2. He argues from plurality of Agents in the Creation, to plurality of Gods: which would have force and ſtrength in it, if we held plurality of Agents really and eſſentially diſtinct from one another: but if the Agent be one in eſſence, and perſonally onelyonly more then one, (which is the doctrine we hold) no ſuch abſurd conſequence will follow, that there ſhould be two or more Gods, becauſe there are two or more Agents perſonally (but not eſſentially) differing from one another.
3. His third Reaſon iſſues from the nature of Chriſts being. Chriſt is the image of the inviſible God, and ſo is diſtinguiſhed from God, becauſe the image and the thing whereof it is an image is not the ſame, in that nothing can be the image of it ſelf. Col. 1. 15.
Repl. Where it is ſaid, that Chriſt is the image of God, God is there taken Synechdochically, or perſonally for the Father, as will appear, if you compare it with Heb. 1. 3. where he is called the expreſs image of his Fathers perſon. Now Chriſt may be the image of the Father, and yet not the image of himſelf; for though God, taken eſſentially, do not differ from himſelfe, and therefore he cannot in that ſenſe be the image of God, and be God himſelf, becauſe he ſhould then be the image of himſelf; yet God taken perſonally for the Father, may differ from himſelf, taken perſonally for the Son; that is, one perſon may, doth differ from another, and one may be the image of another, the Son of the Father; and may in that ſenſe be the image of God, and yet not of himſelf, though he be God.
But he renders a reaſon why Chriſt is called the image of God. Becauſe (ſaith he) God did manifeſt his divine glory and dominion over the creature through him chiefly, for which reaſon alſo man is called the image and glory of God, 1 Cor. 11. 7.
Repl. Chriſt according to his manhood may be called the image of God, becauſe of that glory and dominion that he was lifted up to, for he was made head of all principality and power; but he was the image of God in an higher way alſo: viz. as he was a Son, Heb. 1. 2. 3. which Sonſhip was before this collated Lordſhip, which he had; for he was a Son before there was any creature to rule over, as himſelf hath confeſſed; and if a Son, then the image of his Father: but this was diſcuſſed in my former Treat…ſe▪ therefore I might have paſſed it over in ſilence.
He ſaith further, that Chriſt is called the firſt-born of every creature.
Repl. The urging and the anſwering of this is but to weary the Reader with frivolous repetitions; therefore I referre him to what hath been repreſented already, both in the former, and in this preſent Treatiſe, concerning this Title, Firſt-born of every creature.
To conclude, The force of this argument lies in this; whole Chriſt is a creature, and therefore but an inſtrumental Agent, & to prove the Antecedent, he produceth, Col. 1. 15. produced before. He might have cited & rehearſed all thoſe Arguments, & Scriptures of his which he brought before, & wherewith he filled many pages as aptly & fitly as he hath mentioned theſe, but with little profit or delight to the Reader.
I ſhall conclude my anſwer to this argument, that when ever he ſhall be able to prove Chriſt to be a creature, I will yeild him to be an inſtrumentall Agent. But then it muſt be done with repetitions.
I now come to anſwer his fourth reaſon, which (he ſaith) doth ſpring from the manner of Chriſt's working, ſaith he, though Chriſt had an hand in the Creation of the world, yet was it not originally of him. 1 Cor. 8. 6. All things are of the Father, but not of, but by Jeſus Chriſt; the Father is made the firſt cauſe, and originall of all things, and Chriſt the inſtrument of the Father, 2. In that it is ſaid in Scripture, that God acted by him in the work of creation, Epheſ. 3. 9. where it is ſaid, that God created all things by Jeſus Chriſt, ſo in Heb. 1. 2.
Repl. I find no new ſtrength of argument here, but what I have met with before, & have largely anſwered before, in that former Treatiſe of mine; to which I referre the Reader; for I am aſhamed to follow him in his cauſleſſe iterations and repetitions, yet I ſhall add ſomething to what I have repreſented, ſeeing he gives me an occaſion.
As there is a diſtinct order of ſubſiſting, ſo there is a diſtinct order of working. And the divine eſſence ſubſiſting in three perſons, theſe perſons work in three diſtinct manners; the Son being begotten of the Father, worketh from the Father, The Son can do nothing of himſelf, but what he ſeeth the Father do, John 5. 19. And the Father begetting the Son, worketh by the Son, Col. 1. 16. 20. and in very many more places. So the Holy Ghoſt proceeding from the Father, and from the Son, worketh from them both, in John 16. 13. He ſhall not ſpeak of himſelfe, but as he hears ſo ſhall he ſpeak, and he ſhall take of mine, and ſhew unto you; yet neither the Son, nor the Holy Ghoſt do work as inſtruments.
The Son doth not, for that is the ſubject in hand to be diſcuſſed, nor doth the Greek particle foreign, (which is here tranſlated by) ſhew ſo much; for it is prefixed to the works of the Father, as well as to the works of the Son, Gal. 1. 1. Paul an Apoſtle, not of men, nor by men, but by Jeſus Chriſt, and God the Father. Here we may obſerve three things, 1. That theſe particles, or prepoſitions are not always diſtinguiſhing particles, putting difference betwixt thing and thing, to which they are applyed; but they many times are promiſcuouſly uſed, and are confounded; for [of and by] applied to men, do import the ſame thing. 2. The particle by, doth not declare the perſon to whom it is applied to be an inſtrument; for it is applied to the Father equally as to Jeſus Chriſt. But he will not aſſert the Father to be an inſtrument. 3. That whereas the Father and the Son are mentioned together, they are made equall in manner of working, and they are either both inſtruments, or both principall Agents, and Efficients; for Paul was an Apoſtle by Jeſus Chriſt, and by God the Father, and Jeſus Chriſt hath the leading place. In Rom. 11. 36. For of him, and by him, and to him are all things. Here the particle foreign, which is tranſlated by, or through, is attributed to God, and he will ſay, that the Father is meant, and only the Father; and we may obſerve two things. 1. According to the truth of the thing, the particles of and by are all one; and that by doth not import any inſtrumentalneſs; for God in no ſenſe can be an inſtrument. 2. According to the ſenſe that he puts upon the particle by, God is both the principall Agent, becauſe of him are all things: and he is alſo the Inſtrument of all things, for by him are all things. Alſo in Heb. 2. 10. where the Creation is ſpoken of and attributed to the Father, and not to the Son, it is not attributed to him as ſomething foreign, but as ſomthing foreign, not as of him, but as by him: The words are theſe, It behoved him for whom are all things, and by whom are all things, to make the Prince and Captain, &c. Yet he will not ſay that the Father is an Inſtrument. I ſhall not multiply places, theſe Texts are ſufficient to ſhew the abſurdity and falſeneſs of the gloſs that he puts upon the prepoſitions [of] and [by].
That which he aſſerts of the Fathers, that they frequently call him Gods inſtrument, and ſervant, is true of Chriſt as the ſon of man, according to his humane nature; and they call him no other then the Prophet, Iſa. 42. 1. which muſt he ſo underſtood.
In the next place, after his Arguments, where he placed his own ſtrength for the proving of Chriſts inſtrumentalneſs in Creation, he comes to conſider my Argument againſt it, which was this:
God could not make uſe of an instrument in the work of creating of the world.
To this he anſwers, 1. This Aſſertion derogates from Gods al-ſufficiency: Is any thing impoſſible with God? is any thing too hard for the Lord?
Rep. This Aſſertion, as it is laid down, with a reaſon to explain it, is ſo far from derogating from Gods al-ſufficiency, that it is the magnifying of Gods al-ſufficiency: there is ſuch an infinity of perfection in Gods al-ſufficiency, that it is incommunicable to the creature: God cannot make another as ſufficient as himſelf; that is, It is ſo tranſcendently excellent, that no creature is capable of it. And whereas he demands, Is any thing too hard for God? Is any thing impoſſible to the Lord? he may receive this anſwer, What-ever may be done by power, God can do it, becauſe he hath ſufficiency of power in himſelf to do it: But that which cannot be done in the nature of the thing, which implyes a contradiction if it were ſuppoſed to be done, that is impoſſible with God, or in it ſelf rather: as, It is impoſſible for the moſt high God to make a God moſt high, becauſe God moſt high hath his being of himſelf, and is uncreated and eternall, and gives being to other things. Therefore a created moſt high God carries a contradiction with it, therefore is a thing not to be done, and God cannot do it; yet it argues not any weakneſs in God becauſe he cannot do it.
2. He ſaith I contradict my own teſtimony, and he minds me of the time.
I remember (ſaith he) that in a Conference (where I exerciſed both ſilence and patience, to the glory of God) ſince I received your paper, you did affirm (in the hearing of not a few) that God might have made an Angel, or ſome other creature at the firſt, and by it have made all things.
Repl. I do remember that time he ſpeaks of, and ſo do ſome ſcores of perſons as well as I, & will remember it while they live, wherein he exerciſed not ſilence altogether, for he ſpake at the laſt in the cloſe of the conference, & it had been better he had been ſilent, then to ſpeak as he did, for he aſſerted an untruth in thoſe few words he did ſpeak: he uttered words to this purpoſe, That it was ſtrange to him, that he ſhould be brought upon the ſtage in ſo publick a way, for holding ſuch an opinion, when he had not declared himſelf in a poſitive way at any time about it: Which cauſed me to mind him of his firſt Sermon in which he broached his opinion in a poſitive way, in this aſſertion, That Christ is not the ultimate and last rest of Saints, but the Father; and that Christ was but the way to it. Which, if Chriſt be coeſſentiall with the Father, is falſe; therfore his aſſertion did deny by an undenyable conſequence the coeſſentiality of Chriſt with the Father. And at another time he publickly in his preaching ſpeaking his opinion on John 3. 13. No man hath aſcended up into heaven but he that came down from heaven, even the Son of man which is in heaven, ſaid, that he could not conceive how Chriſt being at that time on earth, could be in heaven, unleſſe it were in reſpect of that knowledg which he had of the Father, and the things of heaven: or words to this effect. In which he denyed the omnipreſence of Chriſt, and conſequently the Godhead of Chriſt: And yet in that ſhort ſpeech of his he would make fair weather of it, and put a face upon it, as if he were not the man he was taken for.
Concerning his patience, not I alone, but many others did judge it ſtupidity rather then patience; for ſcarce any one that had had the ſpirit of a man, could have been dumb, and not open his mouth, when he was ſo palpably called forth to appear in the cauſe. It did certainly ſtrike amazement in very many, that knew he was there, and yet could not hear him ſpeak one word, having ſo many ſtrong invitations thereto; Or if it were not ſtupidity, it was cunning craftineſs; for he knew how to make advantage by being here and keeping ſilence, and he could reſerve himſelf in point of ſpeaking to a more hopefull time, and fairer opportunity; in which he might by ſpeaking propagate his opinion; there was little hope of advantaging his cauſe at that time, when there were ſo many to contradict him. And yet he might feele mens pulſes by being there, and diſcern who were his friends, and who his enemies, and who might probably be wrought upon, and who not.
But (he ſaith) it was to the glory of God, that he exerciſed ſilence and patience. But it was every to way the diſhonor of God, for if truth were in his tenent, then he ſhamefully deſerted it, when he ſhould have committed himſelf to God in the maintaining of it, who ever oppoſed it. And if Errour and Hereſie were in his tenent, then he carried it craftily to do the more miſchiefe, for he thought it wiſdome to forbear when it might be much oppoſed, and to take time to ſpeak, when it might be more prevalent, that he might draw away the more Diſciples after him.
But he tells me of a contradiction. Where lies it? In theſe words, God could make uſe of no Inſtrument in the worke of creation; and God might have made uſe of an Angel, or ſome other creature, and by it have made all things. Here is a contradiction indeed, if theſe aſſertions be taken ſeparately, from other expreſions that expounded them. And here lies the injury that he doth me, which an uningaged perſon, and ſtander by betwixt us, upon his firſt reading of this charge which he makes againſt me, of contradiction, (who was preſent at the conference) ſoone diſcovered, and expreſſed himſelfe to this purpoſe, That he ſhould thinke the worſe of Mr. Knowles while he knew him, for the wrong he did me in this matter. He leaves out thoſe words which cleared it from contradiction; When I ſaid, God could uſe no inſtrument in the worke of creation, I ſpoke of ſuch an Inſtrument by whoſe force, and vertue, and power ſuch a worke might be affected, as my after words clearly ſhew; becauſe creation is the making of things out of nothing, and required an infinite power, which no creature is capable of, for it would make him a God. Theſe words do demonſtrate that I ſpake of an Inſtrument that might be co-operative with God in vertue and efficacy in ſo great a worke. But when I ſpake of an Angell as an Inſtrument, which God might have made uſe of in the creation of the world, if he would, I both meant it, and expreſſed it of ſuch a kind of Inſtrument which contributes no vertue nor efficacy to the worke, but is a means without which God will not do ſuch a worke, rather then a means by which he will do it; ſuch as the blowing with rams horns was for the bringing downe of the walls of Jericho, in which there was no vertue for the effecting of ſuch a worke, and ſo God might have made an Angell, and might have ſaid to it, Go, ſay, Let there be Heavens and earth, and at the Angels ſpeaking, it might have been; not becauſe there was any vertue in the Angels ſpeaking for the production of ſuch things; but the vertue is wholly Gods. But it is otherwiſe with Chriſt in his making of the World, the vertue is his owne, Chriſt is ſaid to ſupport al things by the word of his own power, and ſo by conſequence to create all things by the word of his owne power. Now ſuch an Inſtrument Chriſt could not be, nor any creature, nor could any creature be capable of any ſuch power: and thus I expreſſed it upon that day of conference, as there are many witneſſes. And yet thus he abuſeth me, and then gloryes over me in a large manner, and triumphs exceſſively. His words are theſe:
How to reconcile one with another is unfeaſible, you muſt confeſs you are not alwayes infalible, you ſometimes differ from your ſelfe, and then no wonder if you diſagree with others. What ſhall I take for your judgment, &c?
And thus he goes on in a vapouring way, with a deal of ſtuff ſuch as this, and his glorying over me in this, (ſeeing I am innocent wherein he accuſeth me) is not my ſhame, but his.
Afterwards, when he had teſtified his high eſtimation of reaſon in ſome hyperbolicall, or rather phantaſticall expreſſions, as proſtrating himſelfe to the ſhadow of it, rather then to any mans teſtimony, (if he had ſpoken ſo much of Scripture, I ſhould have liked it better) he examines my reaſon, why God could make uſe of no Inſtrument in creation of the world.
My reaſon was this, Creation is a making all things out of nothing, and requires an infinite power, which God cannot derive to any creature; and therefore he cannot make uſe of any Inſtrument in creating.
His firſt anſwer that he gives is this, That Gods infinite power was manifeſted in the worke of creation, yet was not the infinity of his power manifeſted fully in that, or any other worke; for he hath more power then ever yet he had need to uſe, or then could in any worke be fully declared
Repl. In this anſwer there ſeems to be 1. abſurdity, 2. Impertinency, 3. Evaſion. The abſurdity is in this, there is a diſtinction put without a difference appearing: he would make infinite power manifeſted, and infinity of power manifeſted, to be two things, and yet they are the ſame thing; for infinite power and infinity of power are both one thing, and infinite power manifeſted, and infinity of power manifeſted muſt conſequently be one thing alſo. The impertinence lies in this; My Argument runs of one thing, his anſwer is to another thing; I ſpeake of infinite power derived to the creature, and ſay the creature is not capable of it; he tels me of infinite power manifeſted, and ſo ſpeaks not to the purpoſe. The evaſion appears in this, he ſaith that the infinity of Gods power was not manifeſted fully in that work of creation, or in any other; but what of this? If it was not fully manifeſted, yet was it not truely manifeſted? ſo as that the rationall creature might be able to ſay, the power that was put forth in making ſuch creatures of nothing, is infinite, no leſs then the power of the moſt high God? as ſometimes the Magicians of Egypt ſaid, this is the finger of God, the power of God, which tranſcends the power that any creature is capable of. And if infinite power was truly manifeſted, how is the Argument enervated, or wherein invalidated? And if infinity of power be not fully manifeſted, what is the reaſon of it? Doth it not imply a contradiction in the ſenſe in which he intends it? For to aſſert that infinity of power is in ſuch ſort manifeſted in any work, as that he cannot further manifeſt it, but hath wrought to the utmoſt of his power, and can proceed no further, neither hath any more to uſe, is to deny infinity of power to be in God; and there is a contradiction in it in adjecto, a contradiction implied; and ſuch a manifeſtation would rather be an exhauſtion of power, which is impoſſible where infinite power is.
His expreſſions of more power in thoſe words of his, he hath more power then ever yet he had need to uſe, have truth in them in a ſenſe, but in an other ſenſe have fraud and falſhood in them; if he mean by more power, more of the ſame kind then ever yet he had need to uſe, it will be granted to him, without any advantage to him; for if God could ſpend his ſtore, he could not be ſaid to be infinite in power. It is certain, that God hath an inexhauſtable treaſure of power, and the more he manifeſteth of it, he hath not the leſs to manifeſt, but can declare it millions of waies in which he hath not yet declared it; and there may be yet more glorious effects of it if he ſhall pleaſe, then any that have been wrought. But this conceſſion hurts not my aſſertion, viz that an infinite power is required in creation; and he hath not denyed the truth and clearneſs of the manifeſtation of it therein, though he ſay there may by a fuller manifeſtation of it, which by the multiplication of mighty works which God can effect, muſt needs be; becauſe every work will bear witneſs thereof in reference to it ſelf. But if he ſhould mean by more power a greater power, or more in meaſure, and degree then yet he hath uſed and manifeſted in the creation, and in the works which he hath wrought, it muſt not be yeilded to him; for though there might be a greater work, yet not a greater power, for the ſame power is manifeſted in the one as in the other, viz. an infinite power, and there are no degrees in that which is infinite; though one worke may more fully ſpeak to us that infinity of power which is put forth therein then an other doth.
The work of creation is that work that God glories in in the Scripture, and he doth appropriate it to himſelf, and doth give witneſs therein to the world, that he is the moſt high God, Jer. 10. 10, 11, 12. And the inviſible things of him from the creation of the world are cleerly ſeen, being underſtood by the the things that are made, even his eternall power and Godhead, ſo that the very heathen are left without excuſe, Rom. 1. 20.
And a greater work then creation is, from which an ampler teſtimony of the infinity of Gods power may be fetched for the conviction of the creature, in ſome ſenſe there can be none; for there is an infinite diſtance betwixt ſomething and nothing, and onelyonly an infinite power can get over it: for that which cannot be meaſured is infinite, but the diſtance betwixt ſomething and nothing is ſuch as cannot be meaſured; and creation is a bringing of ſomething out of nothing, therefore the power that effects it muſt be infinite: therefore infinite power or infinity of power is manifeſted in great fulneſſe and cleareneſſe in creation.
His 2d. anſwer that he gives is this,
2. Your aſſertion plainly denyes the man Chriſt Jeſus to be God Almighty, or infinite in power; for you ſay, that God could not give or derive an infinite power to any creature, and that a creature cannot be God Almighty, &c. The man Chriſt Jeſus was a creature, How then can that perſon be God?
Repl. This reaſoning is unworthy a man of parts; a very child that hath learned the firſt principles, might anſwer him. The man Chriſt Jeſus is a creature; that is, the ſon of Mary, the ſeed of Abraham is a creature; and I do deny this ſeed of Abraham, as the ſeed of Abraham, to be God, or Almighty, or capable of an infinite power, and therfore God could not derive it, nor was Chriſt Almighty as man, as the ſon of man; But this man Chriſt Jeſus was God, as well as man, that is, this perſon Chriſt Jeſus, was both God and man; not that the manhood was turned into the Godhead, and ſo became God, but that the eternall Son of God, who is by nature God, with the Father, and the Holy Ghoſt, aſſumed manhood, tooke the nature of man, the ſeed of Abraham, and became one perſon with it, and this perſon was Almighty, as he was the Son of God, not as man; and this almightineſſe was not by derivation from the Father, but was an eſſentiall attribute in him.
His third Argument is this,
The Ground (ſaith he) of your Argument is ſtraw and ſtubble; for infinite power may be manifeſted by them to whom 'tis not communicated. And he gives inſtances many.
Repl. Becauſe I ſoreſaw he might give ſuch an anſwer, therefore on that day of the conference, which he ſpoke of, I mentioned ſuch an inſtrument which he now ſpeaks of, which is not the ſubject of the power, but a meanes without which God will not exerciſe the power which he himſelfe is the ſubject of: and I granted, God might have made uſe of ſuch an inſtrument, but Chriſt in creation (as alſo in preſervation) is the ſubject of the power, and I ſpoke of ſuch an inſtrument which is the ſubject of power, and ſhewed it was impoſſible that there ſhould be ſuch an inſtrument, and therefore Chriſt having ſuch power in himſelfe could not be an inſtrumentall, but the principall Agent.
He comes in the laſt place to conſider of the Minor of the Argument, which he had caſt the Scriptures I produced into, fetched from Chriſts creating, which is this: All things were made by Chriſt Jeſus.
His anſwer is.
It is true, Chriſt being excepted, of whoſe creaturall being I have already ſpoken.
But againſt this anſwer he frames an obction.
Obj. You will ſay (ſaith he) that in Joh. 1. 3. it is ſaid, that without him was nothing made that was made. And he anſwers it,
Sol. The words are to be restrained to all thoſe things which by the uſe of an instrument were made; in the firſt verſe the creation of Jeſus Chriſt is included, and in this 3 verſe he is ſpoken of as the inſtrument of God in creating all things; therefore he is there to be excepted. And he gives ſome inſtances, which I omit the mention of, becauſe I ſhall have no need to return anſwer to them.
Repl. If indeed the creation of Jeſus Chriſt be included in ver. 1. then I ſhall grant that Jeſus Chriſt is excepted in ver. 3. but if not, then ver. 3. is ſtrong againſt him. The words in ver 1. In the beginning was the word, and that is granted by both ſides, that then he was; but that then he began is not aſſerted by the Apoſtle and is denyed by us: if he will have it to be ſo, let him ſhew in his next how he will fetch out creation from theſe words, In the beginning was the word. God the Father was in the beginning; was God the Father therefore created in the beginning?