A Second Parcel of Objections Answered, Treatise · Answer 4
The Answer to the fourth Letter.
Reverend Sir!
YOur's of the sixteenth of August was delivered unto mee the three and twentieth thereof; after which daie, I had occasion to go into the Countrie, which took mee off from these thoughts, almost ever since; but now I am returned unto them, to let you know, that the expressions of love in your Letter, and the encouragements which you give mee, to proceed in the waie wherein I am, are no small refreshments unto my spirit, and a support against the obloquies and reproaches, which I meet withal in the mouths of others: whose bissaed affections will not suffer them to look upon mee without prejudice: so that they cannot discern, in anie waie that simplicitie, by which I endeavor; as to offer my self to all men, so to approve my conscience before God. But som comfort I have, that this is no new thing unto mee; for all along, my lot hath been more or less, to bee misunderstood by all, and thus to bee look't upon a squint by one partie or another: becaus, although I could not but approve alwaies in som things, one partie more then another, and consequently, for the main I did own them, as those amongst whom I was to bee reckoned; yet I never did own them as a partie, or in their partiships: but set my minde to cure them of the distempers, which proceed from the spirit of envie and jealousie, which dwel's in our flesh. Therefore so far as I understood my freedom in the spirit, I never was, nor ever shall bee (I hope) restrained from making use of all parties, and owning them in that which is good and consonant to the truth of Christianitie.
I thank you for the account you are pleased to give mee of the success, which the papers I sent you have had with som; one of the chief aims which I have in this business (next unto the discoverie of Truth, to unite our spirits therein, and give satisfaction to those who are scrupled) is to engage the affections of godlie men, upon the thoughts of mutual forbearance, and compliance by shewing, that as there is no caus of fundamental division, between those that differ in judgment, about the present civil transactions; so there ought not to bee anie such distance of affections, as to produce anie unwillingness of beeing reconciled to each other; or of beeing reunited in the prosecution of their main design, which is a Gospel-Reformation of this Nation: to oblige therefore holie men to entertein the thoughts, which may lead them to this aim, is one of the causes, which make's mee so willing to bee larger upon this subject, then otherwise I would bee; for what is it to mee, whether I stand under the government of one man, or of manie; if I can either waie fulfil my race with joie, and serv my Generation in the advancement of the Kingdom of the Lord Jesus? whatever Government then God doth set over mee, I look upon it, and upon my dutie in it, with a reference, and subordination unto this aim; nor is it at all lawful for mee, by anie humane Engagement whatsoëver, to abridg my self of this libertie, or to forestal my self in this resolution: so that I should bee obliged to scruple the performance of anie Christian duties for publick edification, more in a Common-wealth, then in a Monarchie, or vice versâ: or that I may not (when God so cast's the ballance of humane affairs) determine it to bee my right, to live aswel under the one Government, as under the other, walking in Peace and Truth towards all men inoffensively. In effect by the scanning of matters relating to this subject, I finde that I am fallen upon a branch of the studie of Peace, which heretofore, in the pursuit thereof I never did reflect upon so directly: for in former times my direct aim was to minde onelyonly the Rules of religious Peace and unitie amongst the professors of the Gospel, in reference to Christianitie; but now I have been carried on to minde also the Rules, by which a Christian is obliged to behave himself peaceably, in civil and outward relations; which is, and will bee a necessarie point of knowledg, as wee are in the flesh, and as long as Babylon is not fallen, and the New Jerusalem, the mother of us all, is not com down from above. I have therefore caus to thank God, that as I have not been led forth by anie worldlie end, in medling with this Subject; So I have learned thereby, somwhat more of the waies of Peace, then ever I knew before. And that I may benefit my self by the occasion which you offer unto mee in your last; although you oblige mee not to tell you my sens, of that which your friends conceiv of my last answers to their doubts, yet I shall briefly take into consideration, the thoughts which you have expressed of theirs, concerning som passages of my discours.
The first is concerning active obedience, to bee yielded unto the present powers, which upon the ground of Rom. 13. I think may cleerly bee made out; but they conceiv (as you saie) that by taking the Engagement to bee faithful to the present Government, they binde themselvs not onelyonly to bee subject unto them in all lawful things; but to oppose, and resist anie other, to whom (as they in their conscience think) the right of Government doth truly belong; when ever it shall bee obteined.
I conceiv, that the sens of the Engagement cannot rationally otherwise bee understood; then as the autors thereof in the Act, by which it is imposed upon all, do explain their meaning; and conscionably it may, and ought to bee understood none otherwise, then as it conteineth a cleer dutie prescribed in the word of God: nor can anie man, as a Christian, intend to bee obliged otherwise unto it, then as it is in it self, and so far as it is to him a dutie; nor ought anie man (that will not injure his Superiors in his thoughts) that it is imposed by them in anie other sens, then as it is such a dutie; if godlie men therefore should minde in simplicitie themselvs, and their own duties, what need they set stumbling blocks in their own waie, by conjectural interpretations of things; which they conceiv contrarie to dutie in others? Is not this a subtil corruption of nature to bee so inclined; and a weakness of spirit to do so? and if wee represent things so to our selvs, that wee becom thereby disaffected to our own dutie, becaus wee are willing to conceiv that somthing undutiful in others, may follow thereupon; do wee not deceiv our selvs with the possibilitie of another's failing, in time to com, to make it a pretence to cover our own present failing? for if it bee our present dutie, to becom faithful to the powers that are over us, by doing things good and lawful under them; to what purpose is it to forestal our thoughts with a thing, which wee cannot saie is; or which wee know not, whether it ever shall bee; viz. whether our Superiors will oppose anie, to whom the right of Government doth truly belong? They that are in the full possession of power, are under God, at this time, our onelyonly Superiors and Governors: nor is it lawful for mee at present to have anie relation, and therefore I ought not to have anie respect unto others; for it is cleerly my dutie, in my sphere, to observ with a single heart the relation, under which by God's appointment I stand at present; nor am I to meddle with anie thing els, as a matter of conscience, but with the observation of the Rule, Let all souls bee subject to the superior powers, and the powers that are, are ordained of God, Rom. 13. If then I take upon mee, to make it a matter of conscience to think, that the right of government in chief, doth truly belong to others, then to these that are in place; do not I depose them in my heart, and make my self the judg of their supremacie? and if I suppose that they do oppose, or will oppose those, to whom I have adjudged the supreme Right; do not I renounce the qualitie of a Subject, and of a private man, by taking upon mee, to determine the highest controversie in our humane affairs, which is, to whom the Right of Government in this state doth belong; and how I should bee able, to warrant in my self (who am in no place) and to my conscience before God, this usurpation of Judicature over my Superiors, (who are undeniably in the full possession of all places of Judicature) while's I accuse them of another kinde of usurpation, I am not able to imagine: for there is no Rule, either of God or man, that make's them subject to my tribunal. I would therefore intreat your friends in the fear of God, to examine the ground, and consider conscionably by what Rule, they dare take upon them to engage their conscience thus, to think, that the right of Government doth truly belong to anie other, then to the present Parlament, which is possessed therewith. This presupposal of their's, determining the right to another, not onelyonly beg's the Question in debate; but contein's a high charge against all the Parlamentarie proceedings hitherto, prosecuted against the King's attempts, to rule without Law; It bewraie's therefore not onelyonly a great deal of presumption, but much unadvisedness of Conscience, to cast themselvs thereby into a snare of disobedienee; and the State wherein they live, into all unsettlement and confusion. For private men, if they should bee made judges of publick quarrels: and obliged in conscience, to yield no active obedience towards the maintenance of the settlement, which is in beeing under their Superior powers, except the ground of the quarrel bee referred to them to determine, it is not possible that there could bee anie settlement in a State at all; therefore private men are not to answer for the grounds of the quarrels, which may bee between their own supreme powers, and others that pretend to the same Dignitie; but all that they are obliged unto, is, by lawful means in their places, to defend and maintein in peace, the settlement which is in beeing, and to act with their Rulers to that effect.
The second is, touching the Rule of beeing guided by the major part; where it is granted, that in rebus moralibus my rule held true, but not in rebus Politicis; els (saie they) the foundation of all Government will bee overthrown, if in things to bee determined by Votes of divers persons, the Major part may not carrie it.
I said in matters of extraordinarie concernment, a Minor part is not to bee bound by the Votes of a Major part; hereunto your friends seem to agree so far, as matters are Moral, but not as they are Political; what they mean properly by Political, I do not well know; but I meant matters of Government, which relate unto the fundamental constitution of safetie and libertie; which are alwaies either materially, or formally complicated with Moral Duties, or elsimmediately depending upon the same; but in lesser matters, which relate not unto the grounds of libertie and safetie, which perhaps your friends call Politica, I consent with them, that the Major part should carrie it; and that all rational men should for peace sake, yield in things not worth a great contest: as in matters of meer order, what is to bee don, or taken into consideration first, or last: in matters of circumstance, relating to forms of actions, to times and places, and to the manner of proceeding, which doth not alter the substance of things morally good: and in particular municipal constitutions, which have no influence upon the whole state of a Common-wealth; in all such things the Major part should binde the Minor to a concurrence, lest all the grounds of Societie bee dissolved; but when the business relate's unto the main end, and chief grounds of publick safetie and freedom, then although the thing to bee setled may bee called Political, in respect of the State for which it is desired; yet it will alwaies bee found in respect of the obligation, which thereby will bee brought upon the cours of particular men's lives, a matter of moralitie.
The third thing which you mention, is their sens of my Answer to the second scruple, concerning the judgment of discretion, how far, and to what end, private men may make use of it; here I finde in them, either a mistake of the Notion, which I have of the judgment of discretion, or els a misapplication thereof, in respect of the limits, how far it is to bee extended, or of the end and use for which it is allowed. To cleer their thoughts, I shall desire them to take notice, that, by the judgment of discretion, I mean a rational, free, and disingaged surveying of things, which offer themselves to our consideration, about matters whereof wee may lawfully make enquirie; with an eie of indifferencie to make som discoveries, but may not make anie absolute and final determination thereof; so as to oblige our Conscience to follow the result of our discoveries: for wee may lawfully enquire further then wee may define; and it may bee profitable and advantagious for us, as to the manner of doing our duties, to make discoveries of the waies of those, towards whom in those Duties wee do relate; and yet not necessarie for us, as to the performance of the main of the Dutie on our part, to define anie thing by those discoveries concerning them. For herein the judgment of discretion, and the definitive judgment of Conscience differ in my Notion; that the one is necessarie in reference to our selvs, and is to bee absolute about matters, relating properly to our own sphere of activitie, wherein there is a cleer Rule for everie man to determine, what is his Dutie: but the other is free and voluntarie in reference to others, and is to bee alwaies conditional, about matters relating properly to the sphere of other men's activitie; wherein, although the general rule of dutie may bee known, yet the particular circumstances of fact beeing unknown, no setled judgment can bee made of the lawfulness, or unlawfulness of their proceedings; and therefore no consequences may bee drawn from the discoveries made, concerning other men's actions, whereof wee cannot bee judges, to define matters of dutie concerning our selvs: becaus nothing of dutie, relating to our selvs in our places, can bee suspended upon the doubtful circumstances of other men's actings in their places.
From all which you may perceiv, what bounds I set to the judgment of discretion, viz.
First, that it must rise from our rational facultie, and not from our Conscience, that is, the motive which should put us upon the exercising of this judgment, must not bee a tie of Conscience to resolv a scruple; but a rational contemplation of that, which may bee advantagious to our understanding; by the discoverie of those properties of things, which occur to us in our waie, which will inable us to make good use thereof.
Secondly, that the object of the judgment of Discretion must bee things without, and not things within; for things within, if they bee our own, wee are bound to judg these definitively; but if they bee the secrets of other men, wee must leav them to the judgment of him, that will reveal the hidden things of darkness: as for things without, which others do act; wee are to look upon them discreetly, and with a limitation, upon certain conditions; leaving the definitive sentence thereof to the judgment of the great daie.
Thirdly, that the judgment of discretion is onelyonly to bee entended to the circumstantials of matters, to make a true discoverie thereof; and not to the substantials, to prie beyond our line, into the secrets and main concernments of other men, as busie bodies in other men's matters.
As for the end and use, for which the judgment of discretion is to bee allowed, I conceiv thus.
1. It is to bee exercised to inable us, to discern probably, what the nature and propertie of things are, which from without are incident to us in our waie, as offered from others: that wee may difference that which is useful, from that which is useless; lest wee mistake the one for the other, in that application, which wee shall have occasion to make thereunto.
2. That it is to bee exercised, to keep our spirit in the use of our Libertie; so, as neither to fall under the bondage of an implicite credulitie, to believ everie thing that is told us; nor to take too much upon us, as magisterial Judges, or controlers of men, or things not within our line; but discreetly to ballance our thoughts, between a slavish belief, and a busie prying into, and censoriousness of other men's affairs.
3. That the result of it must not bee to regulate the main of our cours, thereby either in our own place, or towards others; but onelyonly to help us in the manner of proceeding, to do things more completely, and satisfactorie to our own reason, and the edification of others; it must not therefore giuegive us the rule of that, which is, or is not to bee don in our places; but it may discover unto us, that which may tend to the bene or meliùs esse, thereof in reference to others.
These Notions I laie open to your friends, that they may perceiv their mistake in the consequence, which they infer upon my words, whereby they confound the judgment of discretion, with that which is definitive; and misapplie the former to the object of the later: for becaus I saie, that particular men may by the judgment of discretion, take notice of the actions of their Superiors, to swaie their resolutions to a rational concurrence, or non-concurrence in things required of them in their places; they conclude (as they conceiv) by the judgment of discretion, that, what the present powers have don, in setling themselvs in the Supremacie, is not agreeable to the rule of righteousness: wherefore (saie they) they dare not concur in doing, or approving of it, as they shall do, if they take the Engagement.
To this conclusion, I saie it follow's not upon my assertion; but that they mistake the nature, and the use of the judgment of discretion; and misapplie it to make up an absolute definition of a thing, which is not within the line of their Judicature; for they determine upon the whole matter, that the superioritie of their Rulers is unjust; whereas discretion and conscience, both should teach them not to determine anie thing of so high a nature; onelyonly they might modestly take leav to make a rational search into the circumstances, and a discoverie of probabilities alleged in utramque partem, pro & contrà; Nor should that discoverie, how probable soëver it may seem on either side, becom a ground to bottom the main of their dutie upon; but it should onelyonly serv to swaie their resolutions, to a rational concurrence, or non-concurrence, in things required of them in their places. By things required of them in their places, I mean particular matters, which are to bee don in order to their main and known dutie, which is to bee subject to superior powers, in all good things, and by a rational concurrence, or non-concurrence therein, I mean an intelligent discerning of our waie, in respect of the manner, how to act, or not to act with others therein, for the publick good, so as may bee most advantagious, and acceptable to these, towards whom, and with whom the action is to bee intended; therefore when they reflect upon the present powers, in reference to their Supremacie; so as to saie, that in their judgment of discretion, they finde, that what the powers have don for their settlement, is not agreeable to righteousness; they judg not discreetly, but rashly; becaus they indiscreetly applie their thoughts to an object, which is beyond the line, and against the use of the judgment of discretion; and furthermore, upon this their indiscreet judgment of that, whereof they they are not made judges; they infer as indiscreet a conclusion; for they saie, therefore they dare non-concur in approving of the proceedings, by which their Superiors are com to bee setled in the Supremacie: as they think they shall do, if they take the Engagement: here they having misapplied their judgment to a wrong object, they act not discreetly, but definitively about it: for they saie, they dare not concur in approving of what their Superiors have don; but who doth require this approbation at the hand of their Conscience? For that onelyonly should teach them what to dare, or not to dare; and it would bee well, if such as dare not concur in approving, should also not dare to concur, in disapproving what they have don: but when they have defined the matter to bee unrighteous, contrarie to the law of discretion; and then saie, that therefore they dare not concur to approve; they declare sufficiently that they dare concur to the contrarie, viz. to disapprove, which is to make themselvs the supreme Judges of Supremacie; but neither the one, nor the other is to bee required at their hands, or imposed upon their Conscience; for their dutie is discreetly to leav that unto God, and to time to manifest, and in the mean time to do sincerely their dutie. But now, becaus they are out of the waie of dutie in all this, and prepossessed with an indiscreet judgment; therefore they also misinterpret the taking of the Engagement, as if it should oblige their consciences to make a definition of things past, by waie of approbation; whereas, by the verie Act by which it is enjoined, it is evident, that the purpose of taking it, is onelyonly to look from the present state of affairs, foreward, and not backward,. to secure the publick Peace and safetie in time to com, by the present settlement, and not to oblige anie to trouble himself with things past: therefore herein also is no right of the judgment, either of discretion or of definition, for the conscionable and definitive judgment should have taught them, to look upon the sens of the Engagement, onelyonly as it is a cleer dutie, so far as it is expressed in the words, declaring manifestly the purpose thereof, and not otherwise; but they having engaged their thoughts by prejudice, in another waie of Judicature, have not at all regarded this Rule, but made a definition quite contrarie thereunto, to take themselvs off from due respect and obedience to their Superiors, upon a pretence of their failing in the highest point of their dutie, which neither discretion, nor conscience will ever allow them to determine.