The Dying Mans Testament to the Church of Scotland, Part 4 · Chapter 18
CHAP. XVIII. The fears of mis-government for the time to come, and remedies thereof.
THe last thing in Government, which was proposed, as that whereabout differences and divisions do arise, is, in reference to Government for the time to come, and resolves in this, Who shall have chief hand in the decision of matters that after may fall out, supposing the union to be made up. This resulteth from the present diffidence and prejudice which each hath in reference to other, and from that impression that men have, that there will be a driving of sides, according to power, even under a concluded union: And indeed somewhat may be feared and expected, at least for a time, considering mens distance in such a case; for, if diffidence and suspicion be come to that height under divisions, that one will not trust another in some petty particular fact that is past; or lay by jealousie where no proof is, notwithstanding of all solemn attestations; it's no marvel that in matters of greater consequence which are to come, they do not easily give them credit. This is often the greatest businesse to be composed in a difference: hence it is, that sometimes bygones, which have been the rise of the division, may be removed, when as yet this cannot be composed, because there is no way conceivable how both parties may have the chief hand in Government, and neither being willing to cede to the other, either from a secret ground of sleighting one another, or from that root of suspicion whereby they conceive all lost that the other is able to carry over them, whereby from fear of hazarding the Churches good condition, they run here in a certain prejudice, and, in some sense, fall in that inconvenience, which a Writer observeth on the contending of two Bishops, expressed in this as the ground of their division▪ …nus ut prae…sset alter ne sube…et. sed neuter ut prodesset; which is often-times, on the matter, too true in all such contests, this last being a consequent of the former two.
This difference may be considered two wayes, 1. As it pretendeth a dissatisfaction with the persons who are to govern; some, upon the one side, thinking it unfit to joyn with prophane men; some, upon the other, disdaining to joyn with Schismaticks. In this strait were the Fathers of the Council of Carthage in their dealing with the Donatists; some of them asserting, on the one side, That there was no uniting with such as the generality of the Catholicks were; and Augustine often citeth the word of P…tmianus, given-in to them as an Answer to the desire of a Conference, Indignum est ut in unum conventant fi…ii Martyrum, & progenies traditorum; that is, It is a most unseemly thing that the sons of Martyrs, and the brood of Traditors should assemble together in one place. On the other hand, they were pressed from Rome and parts adjacent, not to unite with these Schismaticks the Donatists, as may be seen in that Council; yet did they find it their duty to seek union with them notwithstanding, and to admit, that such of them as were put before from their Churches, should be repossessed by him that was appointed Cognitor, and deputed by the Emperour in that Conference, Ut eo modo eos ad conferendum etiam beneficiis invitaret; that is, That so he might invite them to conference at least by such benefits. This principle, we suppose, ought not, nor will not stick in the hearts of such men, and in such a case, as is presupposed, and it leadeth to a These, That there is no communion in Government to be keeped, where, upon any of the former accounts, men are displeased with such persons as are joyned therein with them: and though affection, and sometimes inclination, being stirred with prejudice and discontent, will be ready to make some such practices to be plausible, which do infer this; yet, I suppose, the Thesis it self will not be maintained, more than such a ground will warrant Separation in any other Ordinance; and the grounds formerly laid down in several parts of this discourse, will not admit of such a principle, which, if admitted, would exclude union for ever, We shall therefore passe this.
The second and main difficulty then, is, In the ordering of things so for the time to come, as the ends of union and government may thereby be obtained, and that nothing that may be justly feared by one side or other, may be altogether sleighted. In reference to this, it will not be expected that we should be particular or satisfying, yet not to leave it altogether imperfect. We shall, first, propose some general considerations, to mollifie the sharpnesse of division upon this account. 2. Offer some general helps, which in such cases may be thought on. 3. Lay down some advertisements upon supposition that full satisfaction be not obtained.
We propose these considerations to be thought on concerning this, 1. In such a thing it is impossibleIt must be such a satisfaction as neither is fully satisfied. that men on both, or either side, can expect full satisfaction to their mind, or even simply to their light; because men have not the carving out of what is good to the Church simply before them, but comparatively and in reference to such and such a circumstantiate case; and therefore must resolve, that respect must be had to the satisfaction of others as of themselves; for, it is not the satisfaction of one side that maketh up union, but of both: and therefore it must be resolved to be such a satisfaction to both, as neither is fully and simply satisfied therein; and for that cause it's not to be expected that in such a case all inconveniences which are possible, can be satisfyingly prevented, or questions concerning the same answered. I doubt if in any case there will be full satisfaction as to these.
2. Let it be considered▪ if the abstaining of uniting will prevent these inconveniences upon either side, and if it doth not rather bring on greater, and moe upon the Church; and if inconveniences sway, which are lesser and more uncertain in the one case, those which are greater and more inevitable, ought to sway more in the other; for, it's already presupposed, that joyning doth not make one guilty in these inconveniencies, more than abstaining doth.
Yea, 3. Let it be considered, if by continued division, men be not necessarily guilty of the inconveniences that follow it; because (to say so) they follow it per se, or naturally and necessarily, whereas the other follows upon union but by accident at the most: Other considerations, formerly mentioned, are also to have weight, and ought to be remembred here.
We come now to consider the helps which may inThe thing feared is not corrupt doctrine nor a wrong Government. part be usefull to prevent these fears. In reference to which we would, 1. consider, that the matter feared, is not the bringing-in of unsound doctrine in the general, nor the altering of practical rules to the strengthening of prophanity, But it is the misapplication of good rules already made, especially in reference to these. 1. The admitting of unfit Officers in the Church. 2. The deposing of such as deserve the same. 3. The decision of some particular differences that may occasionally occur in the carrying-on of Church-affairs, wherein men may apprehend and fear partiality, as they shall occur: which grounds of fear upon either side, we may gather from what hath been formerly hinted.
Concerning the matter of deposition, we have spoken already and shall say no more. Concerning the other two points, we may consider them either as they are concerning things past, before the union be madeup during the division; or, as they relate to what may occasionally fall out afterward.
Concerning what is past in such debated particulars we have spoken already, and, it seems, one of these three wayes must be taken in reference therunto. 1. Either by waving of these things (if they be such as may be waved) so that without insisting in them, they may be buried; or, by one parties ceding; or, by a mutual composure, they may be instantly setled. 2. If that cannot be, the union is not to be suspendedUnion not to be suspended upon every particular. thereon, but some mutually may be appointed to labour in the same afterward, that with consent it may be brought to a point, which is not to be thought desperate, although it be not ended for the time. This way of mutuall conferring is naturall, as being an approven mean for composing of differences of any sort, in any place, at any time. 3. If that pleaseSome particulars to be referred to some acceptable to both not, or attain not the end, the matter may be amicably referred to some acceptable to both, who may be trusted with the ultimat decision in such particulars: neither is this unbecoming Church-authority so to condescend, nor Ministers in such matters to be submissive. For, 1. it is no matter of doctrine wherein they are to decide, or wherein either party is to acquiesce, but it is in some particular practicall thing. 2. The Submission is not in a difference betwixt a thing sinfull and a thing lawfull, but betwixt two things that are lawfull, which of them comparatively is the most expedient to the Church in such a case; wherein I conceive, it were not implicit walking, though men should acquiesce in the judgment of some others in such things, more than in their own. 3. It would seem, that that advice of the Apostle's, 1 Cor. 6. (Is there not a wise man amongst you? &c.) is proposed in the general, to prevent all such strife and contention, as doth bring scandal with it; and therefore ought not to be excluded in this case, seing there is a gift of prudence and wisdom given unto the Church for the governing of her self, and is more eminently given to one than to another, even as the gift of knowledge is for doctrine; and therefore we conceive that in such cases, such may warrantably be trusted with such particulars, seing it might be expected that they would endeavour to make the best thereof for the good of the Church. In that conference with the Donatists, we find that the Donatists are desired to name one for themselves, who might joyn with the Cognitor appointed to judge of such particulars and matters of fact, as were in debate betwixt the Catholicks and them; and their refusing therof was looked upon as an evidence of their not desiring an end of the controversie: Neither is it to be thought, that Augustine and nigh 300. Bishops with him who yeelded thereto, did undervalue the matter in debate between them, though they were content to have differences in fact so decided. We find also, that for the removing almost of all the forementioned schisms, there were particular men, either deputed by Synods, or commissionated by adjacent Churches, or called by themselves, for the composing amicably of such practical differences as were the occasion of their rents: And, it may be, that were this more used for composing of Church-differences, the height that oftentimes they come to in particulars, might be prevented.Such things are not to be decided by a meer authoritative way.
We here think not fit, that such things should be decided by Church-judicatories by a meer authoritative decision: not out of any dis-respect to ChurchJudicatories; but because, as was formerly hinted in the generall grounds, Church-judicatories are fitter for preventing such divisions than for removing of them: And further, a Church-judicatory being in all publick divisions a party, such decision would look liker submission (which men are not so easily induced unto) than union. Beside, such a way i… more ready to breed heart-burnings in such things as have been the matter of contest formerly, and so is palpably in hazard to brangle an union scarce begun: Also, men will more easily bear any decision wherein themselves have a consent, though it were mediately by committing it to some others, than where there is only a necessity of obeying▪ and especially where such prejudice is conceived to be in the Judge, as in the case supposed. This may be clearer from what may be said afterward.
For regulating things which may occasionally fallBetter for a time to forbear many things, than to brangle union. out, for the time to come, we may propose these generall helps to be considered. 1. That there be an abstinence from what may readily seem to prove the occasion of any difference, at least for a time: and it is better to forbear many things, than to brangle union, or grieve a party with whom we have united; Yet generally it appeareth, that it is driving and not forbearing, that breedeth division, and also grieveth men after union, and tempts them to rue the same. Neither is this a bar to any from a necessary duty, it only regulateth men in the doing of necessary duties, so as they may eschew the guilt of renting the Church, or grieving of others; or, at most, it relateth but to the tyming▪ manner, or some other circumstance of a necessary duty: As suppose in the matter of planting a Church, a division should in all appearance be like to arise, It is more fit that it should be for a time suspended, and other endeavours for facilitating the same used, yea, ere a breach be, that even other persons be sought out; for, though it be duty to plant the Church, and that with none but such as are worthy, yet it is not alway a necessary dut… to plant such a particular Church at such a time, and in such a manner, and with such a worthy person; Yea, it were better for the Church, and more peace to the persons mind, that such a particular place should vake for severall years, than that the peace of the Church, or composednesse of her Judicatories, should be marred thereby, and so in other matters wherein forbearance is called-for.
2. In such a case, doubtfull practices would be abstained;Doubtfull practices to be abstained from. and whatever side men choose in any occurring particular, it would be such, and in such a manner done, as may be convincingly approvable unto any of whatsoever side; for, it is often uncertain things, or disputable at the most, that breed differences amongst judicious sober men: men therefore would someway confine themselves within unquestionable things for a time, and not only have respect to their own consciences in such things, and to what is right in it self, but also to others, who want not their own suspicions and jealousies, and who by their deed may either be soon tempted, or grieved; both which they ought to shun.
3. We conceive, that it is usefull in such a time toMany brotherly conferences to prevent abrupt surprisals. have many brotherly consultations, and conferences, concerning such things as may be moved, that things come not in abruptly; for, so sometimes men may be surprised with somewhat they have not heard of, and become jealous where there is no ground: Also, it is an evidence of respect so to communicate thoughts, and men may thus know what is fit to be moved, and what not; whereas otherwayes, men may be soon engaged in opposition to a motion, and not so easily brought off. This communication would not so much be by appointment of others, as voluntary, and out of respect between particular persons: Also, it would be respectively done to the person with submission to his reason, that is, if he seem reasonably dissatisfied therewith, and do not rellish the same, the motion would be forborn, at least for a time, and the other waited upon therein, till he come up to it, or at least connive at it; this would breed confidence and make the designs joynt. And this way that is to be followed in the first moving of things, would also be continued in the promoving thereof.
4. Matters of difficulty would rather be committedMatters of difficulty rather committed, than instantly decided. to deputed persons than instantly decided▪ especially in superiour Judicatories. The reasons are. 1▪ Because ordinarily superiour Judicatories cannot wait the time that fretted spirits will require to bring businesses of difficulty to any cordial close. 2. It seemeth respective like when they are so taken notice of, and sleighting like when things are hastened. 3. Neither so are all after-murmurings and risings of heart prevented, when things are not heard to the full. 4. Because time may do many things, and that may be easie ere long which is difficult now. 5. In such deputations there is more accesse to have respect to the appointing of such persons, as may most probably effectuate the thing for the Churches good; and, no question, a Church-judicatory is to take the way which may do the thing best, aswell as a particular person, and they are to abstain from debatable things and hasty conclusions, even as particular persons are: and oftentimes experience teacheth, that such Commissions expede many things, which more frequent Assemblies could not so well do. Hence we will find, that it was ordinary in the primitive time upon such grounds, to give Commission to some few to do things, and particularly, that often-mentioned Council of Carthage did think good to dissolve, and to depute so many for deciding that, in matters of discipline, which they could not by themselves so well be able to compasse.Not unfit, some persons were designed for a time to com pose occasionall differences.
5. We conceive also, that it were not unfit in such cases (for a time at least) to have some designed by mutual consent, who might compose such occasional differences as possibly might arise; or, who at least might have so much power as to restrain and keep down the same from being a new ground of division to the Church, or matter of great grief to any party. This is not to constitute a new Judicatory, but according to the light of nature to provide a mean for keeping up of order, and preventing of confusion, when, in respect of the present distemper of spirit, there is no possibility for attaining that end by the constituted Judicatory: Nature in such a case teaches all men to seek for order in every society, and it being supposed that there cannot be a joyning in ordinary Judicatories without this, and that it might be attained with this, it's hard to think, that that is denied to the Church which agreeth to all other societies; or, that it can be said, that it is better to want union in Church-judicatories, than to have it so qualified. Sure some Churches would, and do think much to attain this length, as appeareth by the many voluntary associations which worthy men have been led unto, for the keeping of order, and attaining of some union, who are yet good friends to Churchgovernment; and the reason that warranteth them in their deed, to wit, the necessity of union and order in the Church, and the impossibility that there is of any further mean for attaining the same, will warrant this practice in the case supposed; for, the question is not simply, What is the best constituted Government of a Church in a good condition? but it is, Whether a Government with such a qualification, be better than no Government, or a divided Government, it being supposed that no other in the circumstantiat case can be attained?
It would be considered also, That such a voluntary reference to such persons, doth not include any authority, as to ordain Ministers, or depose, &c. but it is to be in matters of fact, as in the fitnesse or unfitnesse of such a Plantation, of such a Processe, and the like; which was mentioned in reference to differences past; for, what was said there, is also binding here.
Neither can this be thought any limitation or weakning of Church-authority and power: For, 1. It doth make that authority and power stronger than formerly it was without this, in the case so circumstantiate; and the question still is to be considered not in thesi, but in hypothesi. 2. Because this isThis tendeth to recover strength to Iudicatories, for the recovery and strengthening of an authority that for the time is not in exercise, at least in such an extent, and it is to give the same a being, as it were, and to bring it to its former lustre; as if a weak man should be led, or get a staff in his hand till he recover; or, as if a disjoynted leg should be fenced about otherwayes than one that is whole, and so be the sooner in capacity to walk without these. 3. This is but a temporary accessory help, and is not pleaded-for as an essential of Government, but only as a lawfull expedient when it cannot be wanted. 4. It may be considered that possibly no use may be thereof, and if so, it can be no encroachment; and if there be need thereof, so as things cannot cordially be composed otherwayes, Is is not expedient then, for the preventing of a further inconvenience? 5. I suppose it is not inconsistent with Civil Authority, when union is made-up betwixt two Nations, or in the same Nations, especially where Authority hath been brangled, that some by joynt consent be chosen for deciding of such things as may occasion a new breach: and there are many instances of this in history; for, the being of Authority is cumulative to the means that men are naturally furnished with, for the preserving of union and order, and therefore it cannot exclude such prudential considerations.
Neither can it be thought inconsistent with the nature of Church-authority and Government: For, 1. If it be agreeable to the principles of nature and▪And is consistent with Ministeriall Church-authority. sound reason, it cannot be inconsistent with Churchgovernment, which hath its own policy grounded upon these: And although the form of Government be not to be gathered from these, nor the ends which they should aim at who govern, yet the manner how such a Government is to attain these ends is in positive things to be regulated by them: hence sometimes men are to use intreaties and perswasions▪ somtimes threatnings and authoritative means, according as the end may be attained. 2. Although Church-government in the general be determined, and men be not free to associate or not, yet there is much▪ as to the exercise thereof in associating, and the particular manner mutually agreed upon, which still may regulate circumstances, though they cannot alter the nature of the thing. 3. It is not necessary that Church-authority should be alwayes exercised in every thing; for, it is not to be exercised but when it is to the Churches edification, and there is no such Church-authority as edifies not; and therefore, if in such cases the interposing of Church-authority in the ultimat decision of matters be not edifying, it is no encroachment upon it to say it should not be exercised in that case; and so at the most, that which dependeth upon this reference, is, only prudentially to discern and judge, if in such and such a case, it be fit for the Churches edification, that Church-authority should decide in such a particular matter, wherein not the authority or power▪ but the prudence, zeal and faithfulnesse of such persons are to be respected for the obtaining of a forbearance. 4. We will find the great Apostle oftentimes condescendingThe great Apostle often layeth aside Authority. to lay by his authority, and to intreat and beseech, especially in the matter of union; and sometimes to advise, when he thought his intreaties might more kindly prevail; or, when he thought his authority might be questioned, or his authoritative acting hazard a schism: which grounds, being moral, may warrant a Church in such a case unto the end of the world to follow his example. 5. Seing union is maintained when it is weak by the same means by which it is begun, (for union is not compleated when some agreement is closed) and seing, as we said, an authoritative way is not fittest for conceiving and bringing forth the same; So neither will it be for giving of it suck and milk till it be able to abide stronger meat. 6. Seing Church-authority is parental, and that of the tenderest sort, it is not unbecoming that it condescend even to the weaknesse and childish distempers of some members, supposing there be such standing in need thereof; and if such condescending may joyn them in and keep them in, in their own place, and prevent even their snares and miscarriages more effectually than authoritative means will do, which are for the time suspected by them; ought not such means to be followed? And if they should continue in their infirmity to stumble at the peremptory using of authoritative means and the denial of this; will it be thought a sufficient ground to exoner men from having accession unto their fall? or will it look like that tendernesse and condescendency which mothers and nurses ought to have to children, even in their childish and unreasonable moodes? 7. This also mis-states the question, because its here to be considered (as was said) not what is the nature of Church-authority simply, but comparatively, what is fittest for procureing the edification of the Church, and for a time to be a mean for recovering her to a full authoritative manner of acting, which is now supposed to be brangled. Beside, if the recovery of Church-authority be a duty requiring means to be used suitable to that end; then the use of this mean must be a duty: because, in the case supposed, it is the most probable mean for attaining to that. If it be said, that it is a more easie way to acquiesce in the authoritative determination, and it were more fit for men to submit to that. Answ. That supposeth no present distemper to be, and answereth not to the case stated, which is upon the supposition that men do not that; Is not this more fit for present edification, and more probable for attaining to a full authoritative way of acting, than the continuing of a division without condefcending in this? In the last place, also it may be considered, That the exercising of Church-authority in particular cases, hic & nunc, is an affirmative precept, and therefore doth not bind ad semper, according to the common rule of affirmative precepts; it cannot therefore be unsuitable to it, or the precepts by which it is commanded, to adde such qualifications as are mentioned in the case presupposed.