The Dying Mans Testament to the Church of Scotland, Part 2 · Chapter 8
CHAP. VIII. Holding forth what may be satisfying.
THe answering of the third Question, to wit, what is to be accounted satisfying, and what is to be rested on in such a case by Churchofficers, will clear and confirm this more. Before we answer, we premit, 1. That a difference is to be made between what is satisfying to a Church-judicatory, so as to admit an offending person to all priviledges, as if the offence had not been, and what may be satisfying to sist further procedor, and prevent Excommunication. For, I suppose, a persons satisfaction may not be sufficient as to the first, which yet may be sufficient as to the second, as (for instance) it may be thought of Simon Magus, Act. 8. 24. who, after Peter's rebuke, carried so, as he did not proceed to cast him out, yet may he well be esteemed of, notwithstanding of such professed conviction, not to have had the full priviledge of a Church-member instantly; and this may proceed either from the grossenesse of an offence (such as that was) or the unsatisfyingnesse of a persons satisfaction, or both; in which cases edification requireth some time of triall, before there be a proceeding either to an off-cutting, or to admitting to the former liberty. 2. We would distingish (which is sib to the former) between that which is not fully satisfying, and that which is altogether dissatifying; for there may be a mids, as suppose, that a man by silence should accept a reproof; or in words and carriage expresse something which neither doth speak seriousnesse, nor mocking, We suppose it is hard instantly to judge that person either to be obstinate, or yet to have full accesse to all Ordinances.
To the Question then we answer that for full satisfaction, so as to have accesse to all the priviledges, there is requisit a sober, serious acknowledgement of the offence with the expression of an unfeigned-like purpose to walk inoffensively, especially in reference to these former offences; and where this is we say, it is sufficient. When we speak of a sober, serious acknowledgement, we speak of it as it standeth contradistinguished upon the one side from sincere grace; for, one may have this, and not have that: And, as upon the other side, it is distinguished, not only from grosse contempt and profane mocking, but from grosse dissimulation appearing to be such, or from carnall indifferencie and unseriousnesse. By Divines, this is called morall seriousnesse, or sincerity, (as it is distinguished from that which is gracious) and usually is in subtile legall hypocrites, and sometimes may be in some grosse persons in fits. It cannot be better expressed, than it is by the forementioned worthy Author Mr. Wood, part. 1. pag. …0▪ that is, That which is not openly and discernably simulate, histrionick, scenicall, and hypocriticall in that hypocrisie which is grosse: but all circumstances being considered, by which ingenuity is estimate amongst men, giving credit one to another, there appeareth no reason why the man may not and ought not to be esteemed, as to the matter, to think and purpose as he speaketh from whatsoever habituall principle it doth proceed, viz▪ whether from a saving principle, or whether from a common operation of the spirit only, Thus far he.
If it be asked, how this seriousnesse may be discerned.How morall seriousnesse may be discerned. It may be again enquired, How useth a man to be thought serious in his pursuit after any thing? I grant, this is not only to be gathered from his words, or carriage possibly at one time, But, will not seriousnesse, even in a particular, kyth in a mans manner of urging it? 2. It kyths in a mans using of fit means for attaining of it, which are suitable to that end. 3. By his carriage, abstaining from such things as may any way make his profession to be suspectlike. And▪ 4. not doing this for a day, or upon a particular occasion, but for a time continuing constant and instant therein, with such affectionatenesse and earnestnesse in the circumstances that are necessary, that whatever be the motive that swayeth such a man▪ yet that he appeareth to be morally serious and through in the thing, cannot be denied. So in this case, … … may be a conviction that persons are serious, and are affected so, that we may expect they will endeavour really the preventing of such an offence, and yet we may not be able to judge them so convincingly sincere, because to that there is more required, to wit, a new decision whether that seriousnesse, be morall only, or gracious, according to the principles, ends, motives, &c. which cannot be so evidenced externally, as seriousnesse in the generall may be.
I… any say that charity ought to judge such a manIf alwayes charitie should judge a person to be sincere, who is thus morally serious. sincere seing it can have no more? Ans. 1. What may be a persons p…vat thoughts upon these grounds we are not to determine; we only say, that this acknowledgement cometh not to be judged by a Churchjudicatory upon that account. And, Secondly These who desire more for the constituting of Church members, require beside this, evidences of the work of grace upon the heart, and expressions and narrations to that purpose. And indeed if the accounting of a person …o be gracious and sincere, were the alone account, upon which a person were to be admitted or restored to an actuall right to the Ordinances, such a serious profession would not be sufficient for the convincing of Church-officers of a persons graciousnesse even probibly; for that which is to be accounted a probable signe of saying grace, must be that which though it doth not alwayes hold and be convincing, yet for the most part doth so; for if it doth more ordinarily fail than hold, it cannot be called probable: but experience in all times will confirm this, that more frequently such a profession faileth, and afterward the person is found not to be gracious; therefore it cannot be a probable signe, nor are we to account it such: we suppose, that if all the Churches of Christ that have been gathered, and all the penitents that have been received, were compared together, it will be found, that there have been many moe hypocrites than sincere Believers, yet in these cases this serious profession was called for. And, though it might be pleaded, that charity may construct the best of a person, where the case is doubtfull, yet (to speak abstractly of a signe) to account that a probable signe of sincerity, and such which ought to sway charity to account a person gracious, when yet it is clear in reason, that such a sign is ordinarily but an indicium or evidence of moral sincerity, but not of saving grace, were against reason; for, even in bodily diseases, that cannot be counted a probable signe of health, to ground a judgement of such a persons livelinesse, with which many moe do die than recover. Nor can it be called uncharitablnesse, because the profession is not so accounted; for, it is charity here to account the person serious, and to think as he saith, and not be dissembling therein, although it be not impossible for a dissembler to come all that length in outward evidenc…s and prof…ssion. But to believe that he is indeed so, as he saith, or thinketh, is not a thing which charity is bound positively to conclude, but, at the most, by judgeing nothing to the contrary to forbear any judgeing of the partie till time evidence more afterward. And, I suppose, there are few who have experience, but know that there are many cases wherein they are fully satisfied to judge the person serious, and yet dar not determine of their sincerity and graciousnesse, yea, even as to the probability thereof, although they dar not deny but it is possible; yet durst they not found a Sentence of absolution upon that as such, to their own satisfaction, although upon the former account they can: which evidently sheweth that these two considerations may be separated.
Hence, the first doth follow, that whatever be a private persons account of such a profession, yet it is not considered by the Judicatory as the evidence of sincerity in their being satisfied with it: Because, 1. It can be no evidence thereof, as is said; and we would be necessitated then to say, (if sincerity were the account upon which a Church-judicatory were to be satisfied) that either they behoved to have that evidence proven, and made …vident to them, or they behoved to proceed, without any certain, yea, or probable evidence: for, certainly, that which giveth a Judicatory warrand to proceed to declare a person to have right to any priviledge, must both be a thing that is relevant in it self, and evident in the proof thereof, in reference to that party; But, none of these can be said: Therefore the judging such a thing to be sincere, is not the account on which they proceed. This cannot be said to be a certain proof of sincerity, yea, none will deny but it is difficult, if not impossible, for one to have infallible proof of an others sincerity: Then it must be said, that it is but a probable proof that can be given of sinceritity. To which we reply, 1. That this profession formerly described, cannot be called such, as hath been shown, So it would follow, that a Church-judicatory doth account a man sincere, and doth admit him to such priviledges as they ought to admit only such unto, and yet it was not made so much as probable to them that he was such. 2. Although it did probably evidence him to be such, yet that were not enough, if that were the alone account upon which they were to proceed, because no judiciall procedour in determining a mans right, will go upon probabilities, because the Law decideth not upon a probable, but upon a real right: and indeed, if in this case sincerity were the ground of procedour, no man could judge but doubtingly and upon conjecture, and so could he not have peace afterward, because it was still uncertain to him whether he had determined warrantably or not: yea, if it should be said, (which yet will not be sufficient) that it may give a man peace, if in his charity he account the person sincere, although indeed he be not so: this will not quiet the mind, because I put no question but experience will teach any that are tender, that there are many cases, that if they were put to it, they durst not, even according to their own charity and opinion, determine of a persons sincerity, so as to take upon them a decision in that, either by determining of the person to be sincere or not, and so of his admission or seclusion to, or from Church-ordinances and priviledges.
2. The account upon which we admit, and the proof thereof also, must be proportionable and opposit to the account and proof upon which we debar: for, binding and loosing are both of the same nature, acts of the same power, in reference to the same end, and the one of them answereth to the other. Now, when we bind a man for a Scandal, 1. It is not accepted as a ground of binding, untill it be proven and made evident, and not probably only, Therefore nothing can be the account upon which we can loose but that which may be evidently proven also; for, it looketh not suitable-like to bind a man upon clear evidence, and to exclude him from a right, and to admit him again, only upon probabilities and presumptions, much lesse where the proof doth not amount so high. Again, 2. When a person is shut out, he is not shut out upon the account that he is unrenued, or upon the account that such an act was not sincere, or that he appeared to be such, But he is shut out, because it was scandalous to others, and unbecoming the Gospel, even though the persons sincerity should not be questioned: Therefore, by the rule of contraries, it followeth, that it is not sincerity which is the account upon which Church-officers are to loose.
If it be asked then, under what notion, or upon what account that morall serious profession is to be accepted as satisfying? We answer, upon this account, as it is apparently serious and edifying, without determining whether it be sincere or not, but as convinced that by such a profession the prejudice and offence that came by the former miscarriage, and left a blot upon the Church, and a stumbling-block before others, may be removed. So, that as it was unbecoming a Church-member to commit such a scandalous sin, So now by such a serious profession, that blot of making Christianity to be accounted a fostering of profanity is wiped away, that stumblingblock of his example is taken out of the way, so that this profession may be edifying to prevent the stumbling of any other upon his Scandal, and the accepting thereof may look like a hope…ull mean of edifying the person for the time to come, and recovering of him from that snare he was into; and so as his scandalousnesse in these respects was the account upon which he was actually, or was to have been Sentenced, So oppositly thereto this serious profession having a proportionable edification, or of it self a tendencie to edi…ying, in all the respects mentioned going alongst with it, it is the account upon which it is accepted as satisfying, without determining of the sincerity thereof, leaving the person to answer before God for that, and before men to bring forth fruits meet for repentance, which was Iohns way in dealing with such as came to his Baptism, Matth. 3. upon whose sincerity we think its clear that he did no way decide; but of this enough: We come to confirm our answer.
For confirming of this, to wit, that such sober and serious profession of repentance, is sufficient withoutThat this morall seriousnesse is sufficient, confirmed. further enquiry after the graciousnesse of the sincerity thereof, We may consider these grounds, 1. If such a profession be sufficient for admitting members to the Church, Then such is also sufficient for the … of offending members and continuing them in their former priviledges; for, no reason can be given why there should be greater rigidity for r…admitting to the actuall use of Church-priviledges, a Christain after he hath fallen in drunkenesse, fornication, &c. than was requisit for the admitting of a Heathen, possibly guilty of these same sins beside; But the first is true, as is irrefragably and convincingly demonstrated by the forementioned worthy Author Mr. Wood. Ergo, &c.
2. It may be supposed, that a gracious man, of whose graciousnesse there is no question in the charity of any, doth fall in some Scandal, what is to be accounted satisfying in him, must be satisfying in others. Now, it is not any conviction of the graciousnesse of his state that can be satisfying in this case, nor yet is that the account upon which we can proceed, because that is never questioned even when he is under the offence. If it be said, it must be the sincerity and graciousnesse of his particular act of repentance. Answ. 1. It is difficult to give judgement of the state of the person, but more difficult to give judgement of the graciousnesse of a particular act. 2. Suppose such a person had a particular acknowledgement so circumstantiated as is formerly described in this morall sincerity, would not that be sufficiently satisfying? And if it be satisfying in one, in reference to a particular offence, why not in another? Because, 1. There is one rule given by Jesus Christ to all. 2. The removing of … offence relateth to the offence given, and not to the state of the person who gave it. Therefore if that satisfaction be sufficient to remove that particular offence in one, it must also be so in reference to another, because the question … … not what may be sufficient to evidence a person to be gracious, but what may be sufficient in a person to remove such a particular offence? If it be said, that it is accepted of that gracious person as satisfying, because he is accounted to be gracious, it may still be urged, The Question is not, whether the person be gracious, but whether that act of repentance of his be so, or not? for, it cannot be denied, but a gracious person may have acts of hypocrisie, and in particular acts be carnall: either then such a person must be excluded though he be gracious, and in this respect seriously doth professe repentance, which were hard to do; or, he must be upon that profession admitted, and so that must be sufficient for Church-satisfaction, as is said.
3. That which ought to satisfie a Brother in private, or after his taking of two or three witnesses with him, and which may be accounted a hearing of a private admonition; that sort of repentance ought to be satisfying to the Church-officers: Because, tell the Church, succeedeth to the contempt of private admonition, and therefore they are to obtain by their interposing of authoritative rebukes, what the other did not obtain, and so they are to rest satisfied when that is obtained, as the gradation, Matth. 18. is clear, hearing of the Church, being in respect of the effects, that same which hearing of the private admonitions is, to wit, the obtaining of satisfaction. But the former is true, to wit, a Brother ought to rest satisfied with such a sober serious profession and acknowledgement as giveth him ground to judge him really affected for his offending, and under a purpose to abstain and amend for the time to come: and who will say, that a Brother in such a case can rationally complain of an other, as not having had his admonition? So, neither can the Church procee…d further, when her admonition hath that weight, seing there had been no … for her judicially to have admonished, if so much had formerly been obtained: and if it may be said, that such a private admonition so succesfull, did gain the offending Brother, Is not that same to be said of the Churches admonition having that successe? and when he is gained, are not they to rest satisfied? and yet we suppose, that none will say, that by gaining in that place, real conversion is intended, and that a private Brother should insist to the uttermost, till he be satisfied in that.
4. We may argue thus: If such a profession, and a persons amendement in the manner spoken, be the hearing and gaining that is intended, Matth. 18. Then are Church-officers to be satisfied therewith; But the former is true, as appeareth thus, The Churches satisfaction must be in respect to her speaking, her speaking to the party must be with respect to the complaint made to her by a particular person; that complaint, again, must have respect to what offended him, which is some particular act having offence with it; and it was not the ungracious state of the person, (for so the word, If thy brother offend thee, &c. importeth) Now, from the first to the last, such satisfaction as is described, may be satisfying in reference to such a particular offence, and be sufficient for removing the same, and restoring the person to the esteem and condition which formerly he was into, And therefore it is to be accounted as satisfying by the Church. And if more were to be enquired for, it were to make the satisfaction beyond the offence, which were unjust.
5. That which may be accepted as a satisfaction from an Heretick, as the satisfying fruit of a publick admonition, cannot be refused as satisfaction in other cases; for, if circumspectnesse and rigidity be to be used in any case, it is in this: But a serious acknowledgement of an error▪ and an abandoning of it indeed, is to be accepted for Church-satisfaction from an Heretick, and as the fruit of an publick admonition, and he in that respect is supposed to be gained: Ergo, &c. That this is to be accepted from him, may be gathered from Tit. 3. 10. A man that is an heretick, reject after the first and second admonition. Where these things are clear, 1. That an Heretick that continueth so, and heareth not the Church, is to be rejected. 2. That an Heretick renouncing his errors after admonition, and not continuing such, is not to be rejected, and so is not to be accounted an Heretick or under that scandal of heresie, and therefore his disclaiming of it, is to be accounted satisfying as to the Church-officers; otherwayes, it would follow, that although he renounced his heresie in that serious and morally sincere manner, yet were he still to be dealt with as such by the Church, except they were satisfied in the sincerity of his grace, which is contrary to Paul's direction, and the end of that publick admonition: which is not given him because of his unrenued state, but because of his heresie. Now, that being taken away and satisfied by his submission, the admonition must be acknowledged to be satisfied, and so he is neither to be dealt with as an Heretick, nor as obstinate, but as one who hath heard the Churches admonition.
6. From the 2 Thess. 3. 6, 14, 15. we may gather the same: for we have these things clear, 1. That there were some there who walked disorderly as to some particular acts. 2. That the Apostle accounteth that disorderly walking to be scandalous, and judicially to be taken notice of, if it be not removed. And, 3. what that satisfaction is which removeth the same, is expressed by him, ver. 14. If a man obey not our word by this epistle▪ &c. So that it was actuall amending of what was scandalous, and thereby giving obedience to his direction, which was so to be accounted. And in that case, a brother offending, was neither further to be noted, nor to be esteemed scandalous, without any further enquiry to be had of the graciousnesse of his state, or the principle ends or motives of his obedience.
7. It may appear thus, That which may remove reproach from the Ordinances, and offence in reference to these that are without, is to be accounted satisfying, because that is one of the ends of Discipline to stop the mouths of such as are without: Now as it is not any thing within, or the want of sincerity which doth offend them, and open their mouths, So this morally sincere and reall change, (to speak so) is sufficient to satisfie them, at least, it cannot be said that they can reach further. This argument alone we acknowledge might not seem to be cogent, yet considering, that what is offensive, is some externall …hing having a proportionable offensivenesse, both to those that are within, and also to those that are without, and a thing is offensive, because it is apt to offend such, There ought therefore also a proportionablnesse to be between what removeth an offence in reference to both.
8. If we consider the proper object, nature andDifferences between the key of Doctrine and Discipline. end of the key of Discipline, as it is abstractly considered, as contra-distinct from the key of Doctrine, we will find that no more by it can be expected. For, 1. its proper object is somewhat, that is scandalous, and so it reacheth only to restrain, regulate, and judge the outward man, or somewhat in the outward conversation firstly, though the fruit of that hath a further look mediately. The key of Doctrine again, or the Word reacheth in, and becometh a judge of the thoughts and intents of the heart; and to make Discipline judge the inner-man, in this respect, were to confound these two keys which the Lord hath made distinct: and therfore, if Discipline have any influence upon the inner-man savingly, it is but mediately by condemning his outward practices, and him as such, or making of directions, reproofs, &c. in the Word▪ more weighty. 2. The key of Discipline doth only shut from outward priviledges▪ and doth not shut from any spirituall interest in Christ, but as it concurreth to confirm some threatning in the Word, which debarreth many from saving promises and the things contained in them, which Discipline may admit to outward priviledges. 3. There is a difference in respect of absolution also, to wit, the Word when it absolveth, it doth absolve from the curse of God, and giveth accesse to the promises, and a title to the things promised; Discipline again, doth but absolve from outward Censures and restraints, and doth but give right to Church-priviledges. 4. There are different conditions and qualifications upon which these two keys bind and loose: for, the Word openeth to none but upon condition of sincere faith and repentance, and absolveth none but reall Believers, pronouncing all unbelievers to be under the curse; Again, Discipline (as such) cannot shut out men from externall priviledges, because they are not regenerate, and sincerely gracious; and so in that respect, it must have a different condition of shuting men out, or it must consider them upon another account, in excluding them from Church-priviledges, than the Word doth in excluding them from saving promises, to wit, it considereth them as scandalous, and unbecoming the Gospel whatever their state be, and so it may censure Believers, as the key of Doctrine may shut out the most subtile hypocrite which the other cannot reach. Therefore also must it be a different account upon which Discipline doth admit, or restore men to outward priviledges, and absolve men from outward Censures, than that upon which the Word doth admit to saving priviledges. And seing this last is sincere faith and repentance, the other must have somewhat different from this, upon the account whereof it doth give right, which can be no other thing than the moral sincerity mentioned. 5. Upon these differences followes another (which doth confirm all the former) to wit, a diversity that is in the manner of binding and loosing by these two keys; for, when a Minister useth the key of Doctrine, he doth exclude from heaven and saving priviledges but conditionally, and he can warrantably exclude no particular professour absolutely; So no Minister can absolve absolutely, by the key of Doctrine, but conditionally, to wit, if the person believeth that he speaketh unto; for, it runneth on these tearms, If thou believest, thou shalt be saved. But, again, in the exercise of the key of Discipline it is not so, no Church-judicatory doth debar a man from priviledges conditionally, if he believe not, but absolutely he is debarred because of some present scandal; and although the person were or should become a real Believer, yet he continueth bound from outward priviledges by the key of Discipline, untill that scandal be removed: So when they receive any into Church-communion, they do not absolve them from their former Censure, and give them right to Church-priviledges upon condition they believe, but absolutely that Censure is removed, and they are admitted unto these priviledges.
If it be asked, What is the reason of this difference betwixt these two keys? Answ. It is, first, because the ground upon which we loose and bind with the key of Discipline, is something obvious to men's view, wherein they may warrantably judge and proceed, and therefore that is done absolutely: But in the key of Doctrine it is not so; for, men cannot tell who really believe, and who not, and it cannot by judicial proofs be made-out, Therefore they cannot bind or loose but conditionally. Secondly, God hath committed the outward man to be the object of Discipline, but the inner man and conscience is reserved to the Word and Doctrine, and men have not gotten authority over consciences and hearts; Therefore what concerneth the outward man, and outward priviledges, may be determined absolutely, But what concerneth the conscience and inner man only conditionally, because He hath reserved the absolute decision of that to himself, Therefore there is a sixth difference also. The word may and doth bind indefinitly, that is, persons so and so qualified, without making application in binding or loosing to individual persons, and doth not so bind or loose but conditionally, as is said; But Discipline striketh at individual persons, and as such, doth not otherwayes affect: for, suppose an indefinit Sentence of Excommunication, against persons so qualified, to be pronounced, it doth debar none from Church-priviledges, as it is such; and for what influence it hath further, it is as it cometh under the key of doctrine, which doth bind or loose such, but not as it is under the key of Discipline, and that for the reasons mentioned.
From these grounds we may see how warrantable and necessary it is to put difference betwixt saving grace, which is the condition upon which the key of Doctrine absolveth, and serious profession, and a fair inoffensive carriage, which is the condition upon which the key of Discipline absolveth: And we may see also what absurdities would follow the confounding of these. And indeed we see no other way how these two keys may be kept distinct, but this.
To sum up this from what is said, we may, ninthly, conclude, If every simulat profession be not sufficient, and if gracious sincerity be not to be enquired for, Then this morall sincerity and amendment is to be accepted as satisfying, and that which properly Church-judicatories are to enquire in, for a fourth cannot be conceived. But the former is truth. Ergo, &c.
Lastly, That which was satisfying for giving accesse to the Ordinances amongst the Jews after uncleannesse, must be satisfying now for removing of offences; But such a serious profession was satisfying then: For, 1. it cannot be denied that there was a separating of some for uncleannesse from the Ordinances; and it is at large and strongly made-out by that learned vindicater of Church-government and Discipline, Mr. Gillespie, that there was separation for moral uncleannesse; But however, ceremonial uncleannesse did then prove ground enough of exclusion, because so the Law of God had appointed it, even as now He hath appointed other grosle sinners to be cast-out. 2. It is clear. That there was some satisfaction required, as washing, offering of sacrifices, and such like, before they could be admitted. 3. It cannot be said, that a mocking, palpable, irreverent manner of performing these things would have been accepted by the Priest, but would have been more offensive; nor yet can any say, that enquiry was made after their end▪ principles, or graciousnesse of their act; So the assumption is clear: Neither can the connexion of the minor be denied, if we consider. 1. That there was no lesse moral holinesse called-for from the Jews, than from us. 2. That there was as great external strictnesse for keeping-up the sanctity of external Worship. 3. If we consider that their Ordinances and ours are materially the same. 4. If we consider that Christ, even in respect of the external administration of His Kingdom and Discipline, is not more rigid or restricted in His admitting to priviledges now, nor then, yea, that He is even in that more condescending to us under the days of the Gospel. 5. If we may reason from the Lord's manner of admitting unto His Church then, to His admitting unto the Church now upon the same qualifications that were satisfying then, Then we may also conclude from what was satisfying then for the admitting of persons excluded, unto the admitting of them now; and this is fully made-out, beside others, by worthy Mr. Wood, in that fore-cited solid and learned Treatise, and before him, (to which he relateth) by learned Mr. Baxter, in his dispute with Tombs.