The Dying Mans Testament to the Church of Scotland, Part 4 · Chapter 15
CHAP. XV. What shall be done in order to union about such decisions, as have practical consequents following thereon.
TO come to the second case, to wit, anent such decisions as have some practicall consequents following thereupon; For the more short answering, we shall lay down these Assertions.
Assert. 1. In such practices as are opposit, and inferContrary practices build a wall of separation. division in the cases mentioned, there can be no union or communion expected, as we see in all the cases where such have been practised, as of the Novatians, Donatists, and such like; there may be more or lesse heat and bitternesse betwixt men that differ so: but there cannot be union, because, such determinations and practices do draw a line, and build a wall of separation betwixt the one and the other, and so makes one side to be accounted as not of the same body.
Assert. 2. Where the consequents only infer someDiversity there may be without division. difference, or are not peremptorily pressed, they do not infer necessarily a division, as we see in the cases of Africk, and others mentioned; and Sozomen in the chapter cited, giveth many instances of diversities of this kind in Churches, without any breach of communion, and saith it is necessary, because, Neque easdem traditiones per omnia similes, in omnibus Ecclesus, quamvis in omnibus consentiant, reperire possis, that is, Ye will hardly find the same traditions alike in all things in all the Churches, even though they agree in all things that are material. And, upon the matter, such determinations are but indeed as if they were doctrinall to such as acknowledge them not, and men are accordingly to walk in them.
Assert. 3. In such practices as are daily practicable,Great folly to make, or keep division for what is rarely or never practicable. in respect of the occasions thereof, union is more difficult (though not impossible) than in such cases where the occasion of practice is not probable, because there being no present occasion to practise the same, it looketh most unwise like, to bring in, or keep in, a more certain and greater evil in the Church, for eschewing of what folks may never be put to; and suppose the case to be past, that may probably never recurre, it is more for the Churches good by abstaining the approbation of such an act, and by not being involved in the apprehended guilt thereof, to make up again the communion of the Church, for the preventing of a greater hurt, because that continueth to be a duty, and is necessary to edification; and the thing being past, ought not to be the occasion of a present and following division, as was formerly said.
If it be said, How can there be union in such a case upon the principle supposed, till (as may be said by one side) those who have decided and acted corruptly should repent, and (as may be said by the other) till those who have divided unjustly from the Church, and wronged the authority thereof, should acknowledge their offence, without which there cannot be union? For answer to which we say, 1. What if neither party shall ever be brought to repent or acknowledge an offence? shall the Church in such a case never attain to union? Repentance implyeth a conviction, and this implyeth information and clearness in the judgment that such a thing is wrong. Now,Union is not impossible notwithstanding diversity of judgment. it being often seen that it is impossible to get men of one judgment concerning such a thing, Must therefore union be impossible till men be of one judgment? This hath been formerly disproved. 2. What if this had been the mind of the Churches and Servants of God from the beginning of the world? there had never been publick-ecclesiastick, nor privat-christian peace; for they were never all of one judgment: and to assert or write what is supposed to be an errour, is proportionably a sin and an offence, as to determine it judicially; and it would infer the necessity of repentance▪ even in such cases, for the attaining of peace and making up of differences; And shall we thus at once condemn the generation of Gods People, who have, without proposing, or, at least, pressing of such a thing, entertained peace and union amongst themselves? 3. This would enervate all the former grounds that plead for union with forbearance, and such like, which, I suppose, will not be warrantably done. 4. This way is indeed either to make union the more impossible, or if union be attained in any measure, both the lesse hearty amongst themselves, and the lesse profitable unto others, as hath been formely cleared. 5. We are not to respect in this, mens particular carriage or desert (which possibly would not be thought of great concernment by others, not engaged in that debate) but the Churches good is to be looked to, and what it doth require, as we may gather from what hath been formerly said. And if Church-censures (such as the enjoyning of publick repentance, or acknowledgment of an offence, are) be to be abstained from, even in reference to open corrupt teachers sometimes for respect to the union of the Church, and for the preventing the stumbling of those that are weak, and prone to divide or miscarry (if such should be censured) as we see in Paul's abstaining to censure the false teachers, Gal. 5. and 2 Cor. 10. (spoken to in the former part) much more are Censures of any sort to be abstained from upon that ground, in the case proposed, as it is considered in its matter and persons differing. Hence we may find what condescendence hath been formerly used in such cases, when union hath been closed, or proposed to be closed, (in matters possibly of greater moment than are supposed) Sine detrimento honoris, aut charitatis, that is, without prejudice to reputation, or charity. 6. We therefore say in opposition to that objection, That union is to be studied, by endeavouring to joyn in what is for the good of the Church, and by burying the resentment of each others wrongs, rather than (as Beza saith in that forecited Epistle to Grindal concerning division) There should be too curious, and, as it were, contention-affecting enquiry made, who is most in the wrong, and thereby a bringing the matter to that passe, that the whole body cannot be saved, but by cutting off of some members. 7. We adde▪ If repentance be necessary, will any think that division is the way or mean to attain the same, which doth imbitter and confirm men in their opinion and opposition respectively, as formerly hath been said?
It will be now no great difficulty to answer in the last two cases, to wit, When the decision is a simple declaration of the lawfulnesse of a thing, without any positive appointment that such a thing should be put in practice, &c. For, if upon the former grounds union may be attained, and division removed in the former cases, it may be much more in this; most of all, where the matter determined, concerneth such practices as actually are to be performed but in some extraordinary case by Civil Powers. Because in such cases men may more easily condescend to forbearance, than in matters of greater necessity and concernment; and there can be but little prejudice alleaged to follow unto the Church (to be put in the ballance with the Churches peace) either by condescending that such a determination should be waved, or stand with the qualifications foresaid; It's true that tenaciousnesse in the least particular, and peremptory refusing to condescend therein, will breed a rent and schism, and make union as impossible, as if it were the greatest matter that were the ground of distance; yet it would seem, that in the case presupposed, (especially these last three being put together) that judicious, sober, and godly men should be very easily induced to condescend to each other, with the qualifications foresaid, for the Churches peace.
For, 1. The matter, although it hath a right and wrong in it, yet it is among the least of the truths that may be accounted to relate to the foundation. 2. It's in a matter most improbably practicable, and which may possibly never occur. 3. It's a determination, or an exercise of Church-power that hath least influence upon Church-matters, seing it positively ordaineth nothing. 4. It's in a thing most extrinsick, which might have been put in practice, and usually is put in practice without the Churches intermedling therein, either pro or contra. It seemeth therefore unsuitable that such a determination in reference to such practices, should be greatly contended-for, when neither the standing of such a decision can procure, nor the removing thereof mar, the practices concerning which the decision is. 5. Supposing the qualifications foresaid, the standing of such a decision doth not strengthen the affirmative opinion, because it doth not infer any bond or obligation upon others who do not of their own accord acquiesce in the same; nor doth it give ground for alleaging such a decision to any but to such as of themselves are swayed with the matter thereof: And therefore seing it hath no force to bind moe than would be bound with the matter if it were not; nor can infer that it is the judicial decision and judgment of such a Church, more than this, to wit, That it is the judgment of the plurality for the time, yet so as it is not acknowledged by others, and who are not to be constrained to any alteration in their judgment, or in their practice, by that determination, more than if it had never been (which is a necessary qualification of the forbearance mentioned) and supposing the said decision to be waved, these particulars would be true. Again, upon the other side, The removing of that decision doth not strengthen the negative (for that cannot be intended by such a composure that either side should be strengthened) nor doth the standing thereof weaken the same; because▪ according to the qualifications foresaid, not only there can be no Censure following upon it, but even as to the Determination it self, though it be not formally removed, to be no decision simply, it is no decision to them, nor can be alleaged to them against their opinion, more than if it were not: And thus it becometh of equall extent with those who approve the matter, and so it doth bind only such as account themselves bound; and if men account themselves bound, the removing of such a decision, will not loose them; and if they account not themselves bound otherwayes, the standing thereof in such a case, will not bind them; and therefore, upon the matter, we suppose, it is hardly imaginable that there can be a lesser ground of division, (the qualifications necessary for union in the cases of greater concernment being granted in this) sure we are there was never division continued upon a lesser account, to whatsoever side we look; for, in effect, it is for the time to come as if that decision had never been, as to its efficacie and weight in producing any effect. And we are sure that the great Divines that have so eagerly pursued, and so much coveted union, would have thought themselves happy if they might have had it by condescending and yeelding either to the one side or the other. And though the moderate divine Bucer, was thought to thirst after peace in the Church so vehemently, that some zealous men said, that out of love thereto he was like almost haurire foeces, that is, to drink down the dregs with it; yet I am confident, that had the state of the controversie come so near, and in such matter, and amongst such men, as is formerly presupposed, he would not have been so charged by the most rigid, although for the peace of the Church he had drunken-over all the dreggs that might be in both the cups, the mentioned qualifications being observed; For, I suppose, that the removing or standing of such a decision in the former respects, will neither be found inconsistent with any Confession of Faith, even the most full that ever was in any Orthodox Church; nor with the Fundamentals of Religion that are laid down in any Catechisms or Writings of any sound Divines; nor with the Constitutions and Acts that have been thought necessary to be inrolled amongst the Acts of any Council or Synod; nor, for ought we know, will be found to have been the matter of debate, even in the most contentious times amongst Orthodox Divines: It would seem then, that if there be a latitude allowed without hazard for one to condescend to another for the good of the Church in any thing, it must be in the case presupposed,