Explication of the Decrees and Operations of God, Part 1
PART I. Of the Decrees of God about the Actions of Men.
1. What the Divine Decree of an Event doth import.
TO Decree a Thing, is to will and purpose its coming to pass; and it supposeth that the Thing is judged Convenient. If it be a sure Decree, it implies that the Decreer can and will so provide, that it shall infallibly come to pass.
Gods Decree of an Event, is a willing and purposing of it as Convenient. Its Convenience he knows by the knowledg of simple intelligence; and being decreed, he knows it as a Future Convenient, by the knowledg of Vision, and is pleased with it.
As Gods Efficience is concern'd in the Event decreed, the Decree of the Event includes the Decree of the said Efficience. That whatsoever God doth in time, he hath eternally decreed to do, I suppose is unquestionable. And for as much as no Humane Act comes to pass without his concurse, he hath undoubtedly decreed the concurse that he yields to it. And there is the same reason of the Decree of whatsoever on Gods part is antecedently necessary, as the giving of all Necessary Power, Preparatives, Means, Concauses, Objects, all which are unquestionably decreed of God.
2. The Divine Decree doth not infer the Necessitation of the Event.
THough the Existence of the Event depends upon Gods Efficience, yet something thereof he may put under the Creatures undetermined Liberty. Under this Liberty he may put the comparative determination of the Will to act rather than not to act, and to act towards such an Object rather than another. Surely it is too high presumption for man to say, that God cannot Decree or firmly Will that humane act, which is in part suspended on mans Will; for instance, to say God could not decree Adam's Perseverance in the state of Innocence, if it were in any part left to his own liberty to stand or fall.
Now if such an Assertion be an apparently presumptuous limitation of God, besides other great inconveniences to be objected against it, then it may more safely and rationally be held, that Gods Decree of a humane act is very agreeable to the leaving of it in some part to the undetermined liberty of mans will, though to unfold the Agreement be very difficult to humane Understanding. In short, though the Decree cannot consist with the contrary Event, yet it may consist with the possibility of the contrary, and so it doth not in it self infer a Necessitation of the thing decreed.
3. The Negation of the Decree doth not infer an impossibility of the Event.
GOd's Decree is not necessary to an Event, by way of causation; Consequently the negation of the Decree, is not a negation of what is causally necessary thereunto; and so it doth not infer an impossibility thereof. As for Example, the Negation of Gods Decree of the Persevering Obedience of some Angels, was not a negation of what was causally necessary thereunto, for then their Perseverance had been impossible, which a sober judgment will not admit. The nonexistence of a thing not decreed, follows the negation of the Decree, only by a necessity of logical illation, but not of causal deficiency, or by a negation of any necessary Cause.
There is a Power properly so called, or an adequate Power to an act, wheresoever there is all the necessary causality of the first Cause, also the Object and its necessary Position, and the Capacity and necessary Predisposition of the Subject, and an aptitude of the Natural Powers, and the necessary concurrence of all Concauses. And all these necessary Antecedents to an Act may, and commonly do meet, where there is no Divine Decree of the Act, as is undeniable in the Case of the lapsed Angels, whose Perseverance was fully Possible, yet certainly not Future.
As Man hath a power to do that which God foreknows he will not do, so he hath a Power to do that, which God hath not decreed that he shall do.
As it is rightly said, that it Cannot come to pass that any Good will exist without the Divine Decree; so it is as rightly said, that it Cannot come to pass that any Good will exist without the Divine Prescience. But the Cannot in both Instances is in respect of Illation, not of Causation.
4. The indetermination of Mans Will doth not infer the Vncertainty of God's Decree.
A Thing may be certainly Future that is under the undetermined liberty of the Will. Mans Power and Liberty of doing otherwise than God hath decreed, doth no more infer a possibility of the frustration of his Decrees, than his Power and Liberty of doing otherwise, than God hath foreknown he will do, doth infer an uncertainty of Gods foreknowledg. Now it is undeniable, that God can certainly foreknow, that a man will do that which he hath power not to do; and that he will not do that which he hath power to do. Adam had power to resist the Temptation, which God foreknew he would yield to.
The Power it self to do otherwise than as God hath decreed, is foreknown and decreed; and it is also foreknown and decreed, That the said Power shall not do otherwise, God's Decree is according to his Foreknowledg, which is to us incomprehensible.
5. God decrees all the Good that comes to pass.
IT is the perfection of God, as God, to be the Author of all Good as well Moral as Physical, as well of common as of saving Grace. And to be the Author of it, is to decree and procure that it be done.
As it is the perfection of the Divine Intellect to understand all that is Intelligible; so it is the perfection of the Divine Will to chuse all that is eligible, or fittest to be chosen to come to pass.
It is agreeable to the perfection of Gods Providence, that all the Good that is done in the World, should be decreed, and infallibly brought to pass by him.
As undoubtedly God doth effect every good Act that comes to pass, so undoubtedly he doth decree it. For whatsoever is the Object of Divine Operation is also the Object of Divine Volition.
Every good Act is an End, or a Means to an End, in the Course of Gods Providence; and therefore it is decreed of him. All the Ends of Providence are determined, and consequently the Meanes to be made use of for the same are likewise determined.
Though I do not affirm, that Gods Foreknowledg and Decree are of equal extent, yet it seems not congruous that his Foreknowledg should be active, and his Purpose or Will not active to any future Good.
Gods Foreknowledg of Evil infers, though not a Decree of it, yet a Decree about it, that it shall be so and so disposed of for good; so that by those, who do what he willeth not, he accomplisheth what he willeth.
6. God doth not Will or Decree Sin.
IT must needs be held that whatsoever God doth, he wills to do; and whatsoever is the Effect of his agency, he wills the same. Consequently, whatsoever he doth about a sinful Act, he wills to do it; and whatsoever is the Effect of his Agency about the said Act, he wills the same. Now there is a concurse of God, as the Universal Cause, to every Act, and therefore to every sinful Act as an Act; that is, to so much as is in the general Nature of the said act. And so much as this comes to, he wills, which is not Sin, but only the Substratum Peccati.
But as he doth not concur to the sinful Act, as it is this Act in specie, and not the contrary; so he doth not Will and Decree the Act, as such in specie. How the Divine concurse is yielded to sinful actions, shall be explained in it proper place, under the Head of Gods Efficience.
God Permitteth Sin. But to Permit Sin is not to Will it, but only not to Prevent its coming to pass.
God doth not Will the Essence, therefore he doth not Will the Event or Existence of sin. For the Existence of sin is but its Essence extra causas, or in actual being. To say that God doth not Will the Essence of sin, but that the Essence thereof exist, is very odd, and to me unintelligible. The Event or Existence of Sin is the Object of Gods Hatred, therefore it cannot be the Object of his Will. For the doth not Will what he hates.
If God willeth the Existence of Sin, he willeth the committing of it; and if he willeth the committing of sin, then the committing of Sin is the fullfilling of his Will; and if it be the fullfilling of his Will, it is the Object of his Complacence, and then he hath Complacence in the Violation of his Law.
Sin hath no Good in it, and it works no good. 'Tis not sin, but the feeling knowledg of sin, that works Humillation and repentance.
It is to be noted, That God doth not Will whatsoever he doth not Nill. Between Volition and Nolition there is a middle thing, viz. Non-volition.
Though God doth not simply Nill the Existence of sin, yet he Nills it so far, as that he hates it, and severely forbids it, and gives Necessary Power to avoid it.
7. there is no need of holding that Sin is decreed of God.
IF the aforesaid Arguments be not strong enough to prove, That God doth not decree Sin; yet there is no need for any one, in order to the salving of Gods Providence; to hold that he doth decree it.
The Existence of Sin, foreseen indeed, but not decreed, God makes advantage of for his Holy Ends, it being under his Ruling Power. He Wills the Good occasioned by Sin, but he Wills not Sin as the occasion of Good. All the Good that follows Sin (not as the End follows the Means, but as health follows the disease) is decreed of God.
Seeing God over-rules all the Inclinations and Actions of his Creatures, his not decreeing of Sin doth not at all lessen his Providence about sinful Actions.
8. A Decree to permit Sin is not necessary.
TO Permit, is not to Act, and not to Act is nothing; and of nothing there is no Decree, at least there is no need of a Decree. No more is needful to a Not-being, than Gods not Willing and not Effecting. Consequently, there is no Decree of the Permission of Sin, at least, there is no necessity of holding such a Decree.
It may be Objected, That a Non-esse is the Object of Gods Will, when he wills that some Evil Action shall not come to pass. The answer is, That in such a case the thing that God properly wills, is his restraining and limiting of mens evil Inclinations and Actions, and the Non-esse of those Actions is said to be willed by him, but improperly and reductively, as being the Consequent of that which he properly Wills. And his Will is further terminated on the good Consequence of his preventing the said Evil Actions.
It may be likewise objected, If a man may rightly say, I will or Purpose to permit, why may not God rightly say so? The answer is, that when a man makes such a Determination, it commonly means a Purpose of restraining the Inclination or Will, that is or may be in him, to hinder the thing; and the said Purpose is further terminated on the Consequents of the Permission, and the ordering of them. So God may be said to Will, or Purpose a Permission, as he wills or purposeth the limiting of his restraining Agency, and as this Will and purpose is also terminated on the Consequents of the thing permitted, and the disposal thereof by his Providence.
9. The Effect of Sin may be the Object of Gods Decree.
THough God decree no mans sin, yet he may decree the Effect which sinners cause by sin. So God decreed the death of Christ, and the passive constupration of David's Concubines, but he decreed not the sin of the Actors. Accordingly such places of holy Scripture, as seem to import Gods Willing the sins of men, do indeed signifie no more than the Effects of their sins as willed by him.
Though sin hath no Good in it, and works nothing Good in it self, and cannot be willed of God as a thing convenient, or conducible; yet it may be an occasion of the greatest Good, and it may work an Effect, which, though bad in it self, (I mean Physically bad) may be conducible to Good, and so far the Effect may be willed as convenient.
If it be objected, That a Decree of the Effect (one would think) doth imply a Decree of the Cause. The answer is, 1. That the meer decreeing of a thing, includes no more than a willing that it shall be, joyned with a Knowledg of its convenience. And so a Decree of the Effect of sin, doth imply a Foreknowledg of the conducibility of that Effect to some Good; yet it no way implyes a Decree of the sin, but only a Foreknowledg of it. 2. Though God doth not Decree mans sin, yet he decrees his own concurse to the Act in its general nature, but not as morally specified. He decrees also the disposing and ordering of all Concauses and necessary Antecedents of the Effect, which sinners accomplish▪ And this, with his Foreknowledg of the sin it self, sufficeth to a Decree of such an Effect
10. Of the Futurition of Sin from Eternity.
THat the Futurition of sin is from Eternity, is no Argument that Gods Decree is the Cause thereof. For Futurition in not a real Being distinct from the thing future, but it is meerly a respect of reason or conception of the mind about it; and it requires no distinct Cause from the Future thing it self. No real Being is Eternal, but God, and Eternal Futurition is but ens rationis; and an extrinsick denomination of the Divine Mind as conceiving it.
The Cause whereby a thing doth exist in Time, is the Cause whereby it was Eternally Future; though the Cause did not exist from Eternity; as the Cause, whereby a thing sometime was, is the Cause why it shall be a thing past even to Eternity, though that Cause do not exist to Eternity.
11. Of Gods Eternal Prescience of Sin.
GOd doth Foresee whatsoever is Future, and of determinate verity, by the meer Infinity and Eternity of his Understanding. And no other Cause is to be supposed necessary to his Foreknowledg of sin.
That there can be no Futurity, of a determinate Verity, the Causes whereof are undeterminate, must be proved by the Asserters thereof. That a thing will be, sufficeth to the truth of its Futurity, without consideration from what Cause it will be. And who can say that Futurity is not by it self intelligible, or that God cannot Foreknow what a Creature, acting freely and contingently, will do? Let it be noted, that the thing under consideration is, what the Infinity of the Divine Understanding can reach unto.
12. In what Sense Benefits are absolutely decreed of God.
IN whatsoever Order God doth bring any thing to pass in Time, he decreed from Eternity to bring it to pass in the very same Order.
There … … use of Means requisite to the bringing to p…ss of that Good which is decreed; and God willeth also, that those Conditions shall be performed, and those Means used; and so in the issue he absolutely willeth all those Benefits that come to pass.
That which God doth not, but upon conditions, he absolutely Decreed to do, and he absolutely Decreed to do it upon such Conditions. So that the Decree is absolute, though the thing Decreed be Conditional.
13. Punishments are not alike absolutely Decreed, yet in some sense absolutely.
THough the Favours and Benefits, that are given conditionally, be absolutely decreed, because the giving of the Conditions is decreed also; yet the Punishments, that are inflicted, are not alike absolutely decreed; because the sins, which are the Condition, or the Meritorious Cause thereof, are not decreed. But in regard of Gods certain Foreknowledg of those sins, which merit the decreed Punishments, the Decree thereof doth not hang in suspence, and it may be rightly said, that the Punishments are so far absolutely decreed.
He that certainly foresees the Condition of the decreed Event, absolutely willeth it, though he willeth not the Condition. And so God's Omniscience proves that he hath at no instant a will properly Conditional, that is, suspended upon a Condition, as to the Act it self, though the Event decreed be so suspended.
14. Of the diversity and order of Gods Decrees.
ALl the Decrees of God are one, as in him; but they have a formal diversity in respect of the Objects and Effects, in which regard we must necessarily think and speak of them as divers.
According to this diversity Predestination includes divers Decrees, among which these are notable, viz. a Decree of Redemption, a Decree of the first Saving Grace, or Conversion, a Decree of Perseverance, and a Decree of Glory.
All the Decrees of God are executed in certain Order, the Design whereof was eternally included in the very Decrees. And the Order of the Decrees, as to our apprehension of them, is most safely and conveniently laid down according to the order of their Execution. But to insist upon a Priority and Posteriority of Intention in the Divine Intellect and Will, is found lubricous and incommodious, and it is no way necessary.
15. Divers Decrees have diversly qualified Objects.
IN the Divine Decrees, diversified from their Objects, the Objects are considered as diversly qualified. Gods Decree to glorify a Person, hath the Object otherwise qualified, than the Object of his Decree of giving Faith; it being certain, that the condition which is necessary to Glorification, is not necessary to effectual Vocation.
It is to be noted, That though the divers Decrees have their special Objects, considered or foreknown as diversly qualified, yet none of them have any Exterior Cause. It argues no more dependence of God on the Creature, to terminate his Volition or Decree only on a Qualified Subject, than to terminate his Efficient Power and Will on such a Qualified Subject, and no other, as it is most certain that he doth. And that hereupon his Decree is not a thing in suspence, hath been already shewed.
16. Of Absolute Election.
THere is a Predestination or Absolute Election of Particular Persons to Eternal Life. For God doth decree to give Eternal Life upon certain Conditions, and he doth also Decree to give those Conditions to Certain Persons.
That God doth in Certain Persons effect all the Conditions of Salvation, or that he gives and maintains in them from time to time that Grace that shall infallibly end in Salvation, is undeniable by them, who believe that any are saved. And the Donation of such Grace doth evidently prove his Eternal Purpose thereof. For nothing is more evident, than that God Decrees whatsoever he Effects.
This Absolute Election proceeds according to Gods Foreknowledg, I mean the Foreknowledg both of the infallible Efficacy of his own Grace which he hath purposed towards his Elect, and also of the Free Determination of their Wills by the same Grace. So that God foresees no Good in them, but what he hath decreed to give them; and it is also true, that he Foresees that they will use their own Liberty under his Grace as they ought to do.
17. Of a general Conditional Decree of Salvation.
GOd doth not decree the Salvation of those that are not saved. To say that God doth decree the Salvation of all, upon Condition, is, I think, an improper way of speaking. There is indeed a Decree, that all, without exception, by whom God's Conditions are performed, shall be saved. But this is no other than the decreeing of the general Law of Grace, and is wholly another thing than the Decree of Election. General Election sounds as a Contradiction in the Terms.
18. Of Non-Election.
FOr as much as God hath not decreed such Grace to all, as doth infallibly end in Eternal Salvation, there are some Non-Elect.
Meer Non-Election is no Decree. It is not a Nolition to give that Grace which accompanieth Salvation, but a bare Non-Volition thereof.
There is indeed something more than a bare not-willing, even a nilling to give such Grace. But then it is a positive will of a judicial Denying of Grace, which never takes place, but upon supposition of precedent wilfull sin; and it is a thing much different from Non-Election.
19. The Non-Election of some, agreeable to the Wisdom, and consistent with the Goodness of God.
IT is agreeable to the Wisdom of Gods Government, to Decree the salvation of some, but not of all; And in not decreeing the salvation of all, there is no want of Goodness in God. For that any miss of Salvation, it is not through any omission on God's part, but through mens neglect to do their part.
That the Non-Elect are not under an impossibility of being saved is evident from the Position before proved, That the negation of Gods Decree doth not infer an impossibility of the Event.
20. Of Positive Reprobation.
POsitive Reprobation, or the Decree of Damnation, is not Arbitrary; nor is it absolute in that sense as the Decree of Salvation or Election is. For where God decrees to save, he decrees likewise all the pre-requisite Conditions of Salvation. But he decrees Damnation only upon foresight of final Impenitence, or dying in a state of sin; but that Impenitence or sinful state he doth not decree.
Indeed the Obduration, that is Judicial, God decrees, yet not Arbitrarily, but upon Foresight of mens Voluntary Impenitence and Hardness. And in this Judicial Obduration, I do not mean that God decrees the penal sin it self, but his own Righteous Judgment, upon which the sin follows.
There is no Positive Decree that Few shall be Converted, only the Conversion of the greater number is not decreed.
Nor doth God Decree the Salvation of men upon such Conditions, as make the Salvation of most men impossible; but the Conditions of being saved are such as do abundantly testifie the Goodness of God in the salvability of men in general.
21. In what sense God is said to Will the Conversion and Salvation of all.
THe Conversion and Salvation of men is sincerely designed in Gods Publick Declarations and Proposals, as the nearest and proper End thereof.
That they should turn and live is pleasing to his Will by a simple complacency; and he hath no complacence in their Sin, nor in their damnation, as in it self considered.
He is so far willing of the Event, as that he doth most earnestly and strictly command it, and perswade it by most powerful and gracious Motives, and gives such a measure of help, as will make them happy, if they make use of it; and leaves them without excuse, if they do it not. And nothing is lacking on his Part, that is meet for him to do towards it, in point of Justice or Grace.
But it is certain that he doth not simply and absolutely Will the Event, that never comes to pass. Nor is it congruous to his Government of men in their state of tryal, in order to a Future State of Recompence, that he should absolutely Will the Event of all that he commands to be done.
Nevertheless Gods will is effectual to that which he willeth, so far as he willeth it. His will of the Event is always effectual, as to the Event. His Will of Command, Counsel, and Perswasion is always effectual as to the making of Duty, and to the unfeigned signification of his Grace towards men, and of his simple Complacence in their Happiness.