The Catholic Doctrine of the Eucharist in All Ages, Part · Book 6 · Chapter 1
CHAP. I.
The ſtate of the Queſtion touching the diſtinct knowledg of the Preſence, or Real Abſence.
DESIGNING particularly to treat in this 6th. and laſt Book of the Change which has hapned (according to us) in the Latin Church, I could not better begin it than by the queſtion, Whether men ever had a diſtinct knowledg of the Preſence or Real Abſence. This diſtinct knowledg being one of the principal means which the Author of the Perpetuity has made uſe of to ſhew that the change which we ſuppoſe is impoſſible, it is neceſſary then to conſider it firſt. 'Tis likewiſe for this reaſon that I reſerved the diſcuſſion of Mr. Arnaud's 6th. Book for this place; for having treated of the Author of the Perpetuity's method, I believed 'twas neceſſary to diſcuſs without interruption whatſoever concerned the Greeks and other Eaſtern Chriſtians, to examin at the ſame time the ſtate of the Latins in the 7th. and 8th. Centuries, and afterwards paſs on to the Conſequences which Mr. Arnaud draws from the pretended conſent of all Churches in the Doctrines of Tranſubſtantiation. Which done, due order requiring us to proceed to the queſtion of the change which hapned in the 9th. 10th. and 11th. Centuries; and this other Queſtion of the diſtinct knowledg which Mr. Arnaud handles in his 6th. Book, being a dependance of that of the change, or to ſpeak better, a preamble to it, I believed this was the moſt fitting place to examin it.
BUT before we enter into this matter, it is neceſſary to ſtate the queſtion clearly, and for this effect I ſhall propoſe ſome remarks which will plainly diſcover wherein conſiſts the point of our difference. Firſt, I grant Mr. Arnaud that the Author of the Perpetuity has not offer'd his Argument drawn from the diſtinct knowledg, but only in reſpect of the Real Preſence, and not in reference to Tranſubſtantiation. But Mr. Arnaud likewiſe muſt grant that this proof does not fully anſwer the deſign which the Author of the Perpetuity propoſed to himſelf at the entrance of his Treatiſe, To make Perp. Faith, pag. 14.us confeſs from the evidence of truth it ſelf, that the Belief of the Roman Church touching the Myſtery of the Euchariſt is the ſame with that of all antiquity. For the Roman Church does not ſimply ſtop at the Real Preſence, ſhe believes likewiſe Tranſubſtantiation. Now in this reſpect that Author's proof concludes nothing. Yet ſeeing he himſelf has reſtrained his Argument only to the Real Preſence, it will not be juſt to give it a greater extent in this reſpect.
IN the ſecond place it muſt be granted that the queſtion here concerns nor perſons that have no knowledg of Chriſtianity, and conſequently perhaps never heard of the Euchariſt nor Body of Jeſus Chriſt. The point in hand concerns perſons that made open profeſſion to be Chriſtians, who Communicated, and knew that our Saviour Chriſt is in Heaven, ſo that they had ſome kind of notion as well of the Euchariſt as of the Body of Jeſus Chriſt. So far Mr. Arnaud and I agree well enough.
BUT our difference begins from the complaint I make againſt the Author of the Perpetuity, in that he would eſtabliſh the ſtate of this queſtion in an illuſory manner. It concerns us, ſays he, to know whether the faithful Refutation, Part. 2. Ch. 2.could remain for the ſpace of a thouſand years in the Church without forming a diſtinct and determinate notion, whether what they ſaw was or was not the true Body of Jeſus Chriſt. Mr. Arnaud maintains this ſtate of the queſtion, Lib. 6. cap. 3.and I affirm 'tis wholly captious, and that the queſtion does not at all concern this matter. Which we ſhall illuſtrate by a third remark. I ſay then the queſtion is properly to know whether during a thouſand years the people that were in the Church ever formed a diſtinct and determinate notion, whether what they ſaw was or was not the Body of Jeſus Chriſt in proper ſubſtance, without ever ceaſing during all this time to have this ſame notion thus diſtinct and determinate. The Author of the Perpetuity and Mr. Arnaud are obliged to prove the affirmative, becauſe in their reſpect 'tis a neceſſary propoſition which they offer in form of a Principle, wirhout which their Argument touching the impoſſibility of the change concludes nothing. I muſt defend the negative, but this negative conſiſts not in affirming that during a thouſand years the faithful could remain without forming this diſtinct and determinate notion here in queſtion, it conſiſts in affirming only that during a certain time comprehended within the extent of theſe thouſand years the people have not formed this diſtinct notion. Theſe Gentlemens affirmation muſt be general for the thouſand years, and if there be wanting but one, or leſs than one Age, their ſuppoſition will be ineffectual, ſeeing 'tis only by this they can prove that the change we diſpute about was impoſſible during theſe thouſand years. But as to my own part, 'tis ſufficient I affirm their ſuppoſition to be falſe during a certain time wherein the change will be made. It will do theſe Gentlemen no harm, perhaps, who ſcoff at that Philoſophy which they call School-boys Exerciſe, to conſult it ſometimes; for it will teach them to diſtinguiſh between a contrary oppoſition, and a contradictory one. Two contrary propoſitions may be both of 'em falſe, and are never very proper to form a juſt ſtate of a queſtion between rational perſons who diſpute to find a Verity, and not to diſcover two falſities. For example theſe two propoſitions, Men are lyars. Men are always lyars, are oppoſite by an oppoſition called contrary. They are both falſe and cannot form a juſt queſtion. To form it there muſt be made this contradictory oppoſition. Men are not always lyars, men are ſometimes lyars; or, men are always lyars, men are not always lyars, they are ſometimes true. That man will juſtly render himſelf ridiculous, who having offer'd this propoſition, That during a thouſand years men always ſpake the truth; and attempting to maintain it, ſhall afterwards give an exchange, and ſay the queſtion is, Whether men could remain a thouſand years without ſpeaking any truth. He may be well told this is impertinently ſtated, and that this is not the point in hand, but only to know whether they always ſaid the truth during a thouſand years without ceaſing ever to ſpeak it, or whether they have been ſometimes lyars. This inſtance alone exactly diſcovers the Author of the Perpetuity's illuſion, who having offer'd this propoſition, That the faithful ever had a diſtinct knowledg whether the Euchariſt was or was not the Body of Jeſus Chriſt, that is to ſay, the proper ſubſtance of the Body of Jeſus Chriſt; for 'tis thus he underſtands it, has afterwards propoſed the ſtate of the queſtion in theſe terms, It concerns us to know whether the faithful could remain a thouſand years in the Church without forming a diſtinct and determinate notion… ▪ whether that which they ſaw was or was not the true Body of Jeſus Chriſt. We have juſt cauſe to tell him that this is not the point, but whether they always were in a condition to form this diſtinct notion, or whether ſometimes they were not.
Mr. ARNAƲD endeavours in vain to excuſe the Author of the Perpetuity, that he only eſtabliſhed this ſtate of the queſtion on the very terms of my anſwer. For ſuppoſing it were true that the terms of my Anſwer furniſhed him with an occaſion or pretence for this, yet muſt he not thus eſtabliſh it to the prejudice of the publick intereſts which require a man to proceed right on in a Diſpute, to find the truth, and not to amuſe ones ſelf in deceitful and fruitleſs conteſts, and prove things which will ſignifie nothing. Now this is what the Author of the Perpetuity has done, and Mr. Arnaud likewiſe by means of this falſe ſtate of the queſtion, as will appear if we conſider that when they have proved moſt ſtrongly and ſolidly, and in the moſt convincing manner imaginable, That the faithful could not remain a thouſand years in the Church without forming a diſtinct and determinate notion, whether that which they ſaw was, or was not the true Body of Jeſus Chriſt, which is a propoſition contradictorily oppoſite to that which they expreſs in their ſtate of the queſtion, they will do nothing in order to the clearing up of our difference. We diſpute whether the change which the Proteſtants ſuppoſe be poſſible or not. Now to prove that 'tis impoſſible by the Argument of the diſtinct knowledge, it ſignifies nothing to ſhew that the faithful could not remain a thouſand years in the Church without forming this diſtinct notion now in queſtion. For they might remain only a hundred years in it, fifty years, thirty years, without forming it; this is ſufficient to invalidate their proof, and give way to the change which we pretend. To ſhew it is impoſſible that a man has entred into a houſe, it is not enough to prove that the door of this houſe could not remain open for ten years together; it muſt be ſhew'd that it was always kept ſhut. For if it has been left open only one day, the proof concludes nothing. It is then evident that theſe Gentlemen beat the air, and that whatſoever they built on their ſtate of the queſtion, is only an amuſement to deceive ſilly people. Whence it follows that perſons of ſenſe may juſtly complain of them, in that they have made my words, be they what they will, a pretence whereby to entertain the world with fruitleſs diſcourſes.
BUT moreover 'tis certain that the Author of the Perpetuity has perverted my words and ſenſe. 'Tis true that in the fifth Obſervation of my firſt Anſwer I eſtabliſhed this general Principle, That error and truth have equally two degrees, the one of a confuſed knowledg, and th'other of a diſtinct one, and that 'tis hard to diſcover any difference betwixt them, whilſt they are in this firſt degree of confuſed knowledg, unleſs a man comes to the other, termed a diſtinct knowledg: that the ideas are ſo like one another that a man cannot eaſily diſcern them. It is true that from this Principle I generally concluded, That before an Error becomes famous by its being oppoſed, the greateſt part of the Church content themſelves with holding the truth in this indiſtinct degree I now mention'd, and ſo it is eaſie for a new Error to inſinuate and ſettle it ſelf in mens minds under the title of an illuſtration of the ancient truth. It is moreover true that in applying this Principle I added theſe terms. To apply this to the matter which we treat of, I ſay that before Tranſubſtantiation came into the world, every one believed our Saviour to be preſent in the Sacrament, and that his Body and Blood are really therein received by the faithful Communicant, and that the Bread and Wine, are the ſigns and memorials of his Death and Paſſion on the Croſs; this was the Faith of the whole Earth; but I ſhall not be miſtaken when I ſay, there were few that extended their thoughts ſo far as to obſerve exactly the difference of the two Opinions, which do at this day ſeparate the Reformiſts, and Romaniſts, there were alſo ſome who knew the truth only in general. When then error came in thereupon, and building ill on a foundation, declared we muſt underſtand our Saviour is preſent in the Euchariſt ſtubſtantially and locally, that his Body and Blood are received in it by the mouth of our bodies, and that the ſign of his Body is his Body it ſelf, this was without doubt in effect an extraordinary novelty, and of which there was never heard any mention; but yet I do not find it ſtrange that ſeveral people were deceived by it, and took this not for a novelty, but as an illuſtration of the common Faith. So far extends my fifth Obſervation.
BUT he ought not to ſtop here to raiſe a ſtate of a queſtion, he ought to ſee likewiſe what I add immediately after in the ſixth Obſervation. Had the Author of the Perpetuity and Mr. Arnaud conſulted it, they would have acknowledged that I gave therein a formal explication, and as it were a limitation to this general Principle which I laid down, that this does not wholly take place in enlightned Ages wherein there are eminent Paſtors for knowledg that take care to inſtruct clearly their Flocks in the truths of Faith. For then their good inſtructions hinder the growth of Error, and render people capable of knowing and rejecting it. But it is wholly applicable to the Ages of darkneſs wherein Ignorance and Superſtition have corrupted the Church. Which I expreſs in theſe words, Which will without doubt better appear if for a ſixth remark we caſt our eyes a little on the time wherein this change has moſt advanced it ſelf. It was not in Hilaries nor Athanaſius's times, nor in that of Ambroſe and S. Auſtin, but in the 10th. and 11th. Centuries, that is to ſay in the moſt dark Ages, &c. 'Tis no marvel then that Error made ſuch conqueſts in thoſe times, rather will it be a greater wonder if ſhe did not. And this diſtinction (methinks) does ſufficiently limit my Principle. To eſtabliſh ſincerely the ſtate of our queſtion theſe two remarks muſt not be ſeparated, but joyn'd together to draw from them my whole ſenſe, for the ſtate of the queſtion in my reſpect depends on my entire ſenſe. Now my whole ſenſe does not conſiſt only in a general Principle which I lay down, nor in the general application I make of it, but in the exception and limitation I give them, But neither has Mr. Arnaud nor the Author of the Perpetuity dealt thus, chooſing rather to run after their own chimerical notions than to follow the truth.
MOREOVER, Mr. Arnaud ſhews he has but little to ſay, when he ſets himſelf on reproaching me, that I ſuppreſſed ſome words of my fifth Obſervation; 'tis not likely I would on purpoſe ſuppreſs words contained in my Book, which might be eaſily found in turning over ſome leafs. If I paſſed over 'em 'twas becauſe they made no more to the ſubject than thoſe which I recite, which contain the whole ſubſtance of my diſcourſe, and which are no leſs ſignificant than the others. But I know not whether he can ſo well juſtifie the Author of the Perpetuity in his making me ſay, That the Church remained in this ignorance till Berenger's time, altho there's no ſuch Lib. 6. cap. 3. p. 577.thing in my Book. Mr. Arnaud's anſwer is, that the Author of the Perpetuity repreſents my ſenſe, and not my words; and becauſe that this propoſition which this Author imputes to me is ſet down in Italick letters, which are thoſe which are uſed for Quotations in proper terms. Mr. Arnaud ſays that 'tis the Printers fault who ought to Print them in a Roman letter. I will believe it becauſe he ſays ſo, but yet my ſenſe ought to be faithfully related, and for this effect plain dealing requires it to be drawn from my expreſs declarations, contained in ſeveral paſſages of my firſt and ſecond Anſwer, rather than from a diſcourſe that is maim'd and which cannot repreſent in this condition but half of that which I would ſay. Whatſoever pains the Author of the Perpetuity and Mr. Arnaud have taken to diſguiſe my ſenſe, Father Maimbourg the Jeſuite, who wrote ſince Mr. Arnaud, ingenuouſly perceived and related it as it is in truth. Mr. Claude, ſays he, aſſerts A Peaceable Method by Father Mainbourg, ch. 3. page 108.there was A CERTAIN TIME wherein through the neglect of the Paſtors, Chriſtians had no more than a confuſed knowledg of this myſtery, without poſitively believing or rejecting either the Real Preſence, or abſence, becauſe they ſtudied not the point. This is in effect my meaning, and not that which the Author of the Perpetuity imputes to me, that the Faithful could remain a thouſand years in the Church without forming a diſtinct notion, whether what they ſaw was or was not the true Body of Jeſus Chriſt.
THE firſt of theſe three Remarks I now made, conſiders the point in reſpect of the Doctrine now in queſtion, and determines it to the Real Preſence alone, excluding Tranſubſtantiation. The ſecond conſiders it in reſpect of the perſons, and determines it to the Chriſtians only, excluding thoſe that have no knowledg of our Myſteries; and the third conſiders it in reſpect of the time, and determines it to the Ages of Ignorance and Darkneſs: that is to ſay, to thoſe wherein, according to us, the change was introduced, which are the 9th. and 10th. and part of the 11th. For altho, according to the exact rigour of the Diſpute the Author of the Perpetuity be obliged to prove his Theſis from the time of the Apoſtles to that of Berenger; yet there being only to ſpeak properly theſe three Ages in queſtion in this Diſpute, we ſhall neither complain of him, nor Mr. Arnaud when they ſhall reſtrain their Argument to theſe.
IT remains only now to know in what diſpoſitions of mind we muſt ſuppoſe the Chriſtians were; when we imagin the Doctrine of the Real Preſence was declared to 'em; for on this depends the queſtion, Whether the change which we pretend was poſſible or impoſſible?
BUT before we enter upon this enquiry, 'tis neceſſary to make two farther Obſervations. The firſt is, that the queſtion is not whether the Chriſtians of that time had knowledg enough to diſcover in ſome ſort, when the Doctrine of the Real Preſence was propoſed to them, that it agreed not with the Principles of nature; but whether in ſuppoſing they believed not this Doctrine, they had knowledg enough to diſcover 'twas an innovation, contrary to the Churches Faith and to reject it under this conſideration. For for to conclude that people would have actually oppoſed the Real Preſence had they not before believed it, it is not enough to ſhew, that it would have oppoſed their ſenſes and notices of reaſon. I confeſs that if men did always what they ought to do, this alone were ſufficient to put them upon rejecting this Real Preſence, as we have elſewhere proved it. But people are liable to be deceived, and receive notwithſtanding the contradictions of ſenſe and common reaſon, that which they are perſuaded is a myſtery of Faith, and generally as ſoon as ever they begin to conſider it as a myſtery, they hearken no longer to ſenſe nor reaſon. We ſhould then proceed, and ſhew that they were in a diſpoſition to reject this Doctrin as a novelty, which the Church never held, and which conſequently was not a true myſtery of Faith.
THE other obſervation which we muſt make, is, that we ought to diſtinguiſh the belief of the Real Abſence in the ſenſe in queſtion, from the belief of the corporeal Abſence. To believe the corporeal abſence, is to form to a man's ſelf the idea of the ordinary and natural preſence of a humane body, ſuch as is that of our Saviour's, and to reject it as falſe and extravagant. But to believe the Real Abſence in the terms of our Diſpute, is to conceive the idea of an inviſible Preſence, ſuch as the Roman Church conceives and rejects as an error. A man may reject the ſubſtantial Preſence of the Body of Jeſus Chriſt in the Euchariſt under the notion of the ordinary exiſtence of a body in a place, and yet not reject it, either generally under every notion, be it what it will, nor in particular under the notion of an inviſible exiſtence, after the manner of a Spirit; as appears from the example of the Roman Church, which does not believe this ordinary and natural Preſence, but yet admits the inviſible one. It would have been well if the Author of the Perpetuity had not uſed in this Diſpute theſe equivocal terms of the Real Preſence, and real Abſence, which give way to ſophiſms, as will appear in what follows; but ſeeing he has uſed them, it is at leaſt neceſſary to diſtinguiſh them, as I have now done.
LET us ſee then upon theſe illuſtrations what are the pretenſions on either ſide. The Author of the Perpetuity maintains that theſe Chriſtians muſt have a diſtinct knowledg either of the Preſence or Real Abſence, that is to ſay, they muſt have known diſtinctly whether that which they receiv'd in the Communion was or was not the Body of Jeſus Chriſt in ſubſtance; for thus he underſtands it, there being no medium ſays he. I affirm on the contrary that they had not for the moſt part of 'em any diſtinct knowledg either of the inviſible Real Preſence, or the Real inviſible Abſence; and that they were not come as then to this diſtinct queſtion. Whether the Body of Jeſus Chriſt was inviſibly preſent by its proper ſubſtance, and after the manner of a Spirit in the Euchariſt or not.
SO far it ſeems that the method and ſtate of this Diſpute is clear, for 'tis likely by the Real Preſence the Author of the Perpetuity means not the viſible Preſence, of which we do not diſpute, and which the Church of Rome it ſelf rejects, but the inviſible Preſence of which we diſpute, and which the Roman Church holds; ſo that we need only propoſe the proofs of both parties for the Readers edification. But Mr. Arnaud who can make clouds when he has occaſion for 'em, has ſo greatly obſcured this matter by diſtinctions, and crafty pretences, that we muſt ſtill ſpend more time to clear the difficulties he has caſt in our way.
TO believe, ſays he, the Real Abſence is to believe that the Euchariſt is not Lib. 6. cap. 2.the Body of Jeſus Chriſt, or that the Body of Jeſus Chriſt is not really preſent in the Euchariſt. Now a man may diſtinctly believe or know that one thing is not another, or that 'tis not in another in three different manners. The firſt by an expreſs and formal reflection, but general when a man generally denies one thing to be another, or affirms that 'tis abſent but without ſpecifying any particular manner. Thus in denying the King to be at Paris, we ſay he is not there in any real manner, altho we ſpecifie not any one. The ſecond by a diſtinct reflection on all the different manners of being a thing, or being really preſent in a place. Which is as if a man ſhould ſay that the King is not at Paris neither viſibly nor inviſibly; and 'tis in this manner the Sacramentaries deny the preſence of Chriſt's Body in the Euchariſt. And the third without any reflection, and by a ſimple view of the nature of things which does ſo comprehend the excluſion of whatſoever belongeth not to their being, that the mind knows as well what they are not, as if it had made an hundred poſitive judgments on 'em. Applying afterwards this diſtinction he aſſures us firſt, That the Author of the Perpetuity never pretended to prove that if the Faithful believed not the Real Preſence, they then believed the Real Abſence in the ſecond manner, which is to ſay, that they poſitively excluded, by a formal reflection, all the ſeveral kinds of preſence, 2. That the greateſt part of his Arguments conclude, that if the Faithful believed not the Real Preſence they would have rejected it in the firſt manner, and by a general reflection which denies the thing without conſidering the different ſpecies. 3. That altho a man may draw this conſequence from ſeveral of his Arguments, yet 'tis ſufficient for his deſign to ſhew that theſe Faithful would have rejected the Real Preſence in the third manner, that is to ſay, without reflection, and by a diſtinct knowledg of certain verities which include it according to the ordinary manner of conceiving things.
WE muſt then examin theſe three manners, and ſee in what ſenſe the Author of the Perpetuity is obliged to maintain that if the Chriſtians of whom we ſpeak believed not the Real Preſence, they then believed the Real Abſence.
THE firſt is chimerical and impoſſible. For 'tis not poſſible for a man naturally to conſider the Real Preſence of the Body of Jeſus Chriſt in the Euchariſt to reject it; without conceiving at the ſame time in particular, ſome kind or manner of preſence. Either theſe perſons, to whom Mr. Arnaud attributes his firſt manner of believing the Real Abſence, knew the inviſible Preſence, or did not know it. Suppoſing they knew it, what neceſſity was there of making them reject it in general, without ſpecifying it in particular? Why not ſay, they rejected it in making a formal reflection on it? If they knew it not, as it ſeems Mr. Arnaud ſuppoſes, it is not at leaſt poſſible but they had formally in their minds the particular idea of the corporeal and viſible Preſence. For as ſoon as ever we conceive a humane Body to be ſubſtantially preſent in a place, the firſt notion that offers it ſelf naturally to the mind is that of the ordinary and corporeal Preſence. It is poſſible we may conceive a humane body without thinking of the place wherein it is, we every day make ſuch kind of abſtractions as theſe, yet 'tis not poſſible according to nature for a man to conceive it to be preſent by its proper ſubſtance in a place without conceiving at the ſame time the idea of its corporeal Preſence. Nature furniſhing us with no other idea of the ſubſtantial Preſence than that, it cannot be, but this idea will ſhew it ſelf to the mind, as ſoon as ever we imagin a body in a place. To be preſent in a place, and that corporeally, are naturally one and the ſame idea in reſpect of a humane body. The Philoſophy of later Ages has made two ideas of this, whether with reaſon, or not, I do not now diſpute; but howſoever, nature makes but one of it, and whilſt we do not diſtinguiſh them, nor know the ſecret of making two ideas of them, the one general, and th'other particular, we ſhall never make this abſtraction, for nature puts not men upon making it. Now we ſpeak here of perſons that think according to nature, and ſuppoſe they never heard the leaſt mention of inviſible and incorporeal Preſence, it is not then poſſible but they muſt immediately form the idea of the viſible or corporeal Preſence, in the ſame manner as 'tis not poſſible for a man naturally to conceive the Sun to be preſent over our Hemiſphere, but he muſt conceive the idea of his viſible and ordinary Preſence. It is then certain that a man conſidered in the ſtate of nature, void of the fancies of this new Philoſophy cannot believe the Real Abſence of Chriſt's Body in the Sacrament, without thinking on the corporeal Preſence. In this condition he can underſtand no other than that, and 'tis it which he rejects, becauſe 'tis on it whereon falls the firſt conception of his mind. This will yet farther appear if we conſider that the eyes of a Communicant will determin his thoughts to the corporeal Preſence, when of it ſelf it were not therein determined; for 'tis not poſſible for a man who never heard of the ſpiritual and inviſible Preſence to raiſe in his mind, at the ſame moment wherein he communicates this queſtion, Is the Body of Jeſus Chriſt ſubſtantially preſent in this Euchariſt which I receive? but that he muſt at the ſame time uſe his eye-ſight, to inform himſelf. This inclination is ſo natural that if he does not follow it, it muſt neceſſarily be ſaid that he has in his mind the idea of an inviſible Preſence, of which his eyes cannot be witneſſes, and that 'tis this idea which diverts him from having recourſe to his ſight; and if he does follow it, his eyes which tell him that it is not therein derermin his thoughts to the idea of the corporeal Preſence to make him reject it.
BUT is it impoſſible that a man in conceiving the idea of the corporeal Preſence, and in rejecting it, ſhould conceive at the ſame time that there may be invented other manners of a ſubſtantial Preſence, but muſt reject them all, be they what they will, without ſpecifying or conſidering them. I anſwer, that in this caſe he will conceive theſe other manners of preſence in oppoſition to the corporeal and viſible one, and conſequently will ſpecifie them at leaſt as incorporeals and inviſibles, and conceive them under this quality, In a word, when nature offers us but the idea of one ſingle ſpecies, there ariſes not up immediately a general conſideration in our minds, our fancy leads us to that particular ſpecies, and if afterwards we conceive any other, 'tis always in oppoſition to that which nature it ſelf offers to our knowledg. Whence it follows that this firſt manner of believing the Real Abſence by a general rejection of every kind of preſence, yet without ſpecifying ſo much as any one in particular neither viſible nor inviſible, is a mere chimera which reſides only in Mr. Arnaud's brain.
AS to the third it is moreover invalid and illuſory, ſeeing it anſwers not the deſign of the Author of the Perpetuity. For as we have already ſaid, he is obliged to ſhew, that if people had not believed the Real inviſible Preſence, they would have had in their minds, diſpoſitions, and prejudices, which would have made them reſpect it not barely as a Doctrin that appears contrary to natural reaſon, (this is not ſufficient to produce actually an entire rejection and oppoſition when the matter concerns a point of Faith) but as an innovation in the Churches Belief. Now this third manner of believing the Real Abſence without any reflection by a bare view of the nature of things, in the ſame manner as we know Paris is not Rome, nor France Holland, that the Sun is not the Moon, nor an Houſe an Elephant, thar the Kings Picture is not the King himſelf, to uſe Mr. Arnaud's examples, without having made this expreſs and formal reflection; this manner I ſay, may make men capable of knowing that the Real Preſence is contrary to the order of nature, that it agrees not with common ſenſe, but not make 'em diſcern whether it be a myſtery of the Churches Faith (as 'tis ſaid to be) or whether 'tis a new humane invention. This ſimple view of the nature of things which conſiſts in knowing, that the Euchariſt is Bread, that the Euchariſt is an image of the Body of Jeſus Chriſt, that this Body is a humane Body, and that 'tis in Heaven, does not hinder a man from being ſurprized with the matter of novelty, by being perſuaded that 'tis the true Doctrin of the Church (as 'tis aſſured to be) and on this perſuaſion Reaſon muſt yield to Faith.
'Tis in vain, Mr. Arnaud tells us, that ſuppoſing the Faithful had no other Lib. 6. cap. 2. pag 564, 565.than theſe ſimple notions, that the Sacrament of the Euchariſt is Bread and Wine, which repreſent to us the Body of Jeſus Chriſt, ſuppoſing they conceiv'd the Body of Jeſus Chriſt to be in no wiſe therein, that they imagin'd this Body to be only preſent in Heaven, and that all the uſual expreſſions form'd only in their minds the idea of a figurative Preſence, they would immediately have judg'd that the belief of the Real Preſence was falſe and impertinent; as we would immediately judg that man who would perſuade us that Paris is Rome, or that the Popes Picture is the Pope himſelf, or that the ſeven ſtalks of Corn which Pharaoh dreamed of were really ſeven years, or the Paſchal Lamb a real paſſage, and Sacrifices for Sins real Sins, to be mad and ſenſleſs. When a man judges of theſe things he ſimply judges of them according to the light of nature, and 'tis certain the light of nature will render that man impertinent who ſhall ſay what Mr. Arnaud makes him ſay. It would be the ſame concerning the real inviſible Preſence, ſhould a man judg of it on this ground. But thoſe that offer it in any age oppoſe againſt the light of Nature the ſplendid name of the Churches Faith. They endeavour to inſinuate it under the pretence of its being a myſtery of the Chriſtian Religion, which has been always believed, and for this purpoſe they ſpare no colours. By which means they ſtop the courſe of nature, and hinder men from judging according to its Principles, reducing the queſtion to know whether it be true that this be the Faith and perpetual ſenſe of the Church, by which means 'tis no hard matter t' impoſe on the ignorant.
'TIS moreover in vain that Mr. Arnaud brings in the Statute of Henry IV. for an inſtance, which all the Pariſians know to be only Braſs, and that his body is only at S. Dennis. He ſays, perhaps they never thought of formally rejecting the opinion that this Statue is really the Body of Henry IV. and yet be ready to oppoſe this opinion, ſhould any extravagant perſon offer to make them believe it. But howſoever the Pariſians ſtand affected towards the Statue of Henry IV. there's a great deal of difference between this example and that of the Euchariſt here in queſtion. The Statue of Henry IV. is a work of humane inſtitution, wherein men ſuppoſe there's nothing ſupernatural; whereas the Euchariſt is a Divine myſtery, in which there has been always believed to be ſomething above nature. The Statue of Henry IV. is a thing abſolutely popular, concerning which every man believes he has liberty of judging according to the principles of Senſe and Reaſon. The Euchariſt is a myſtery which has been endeavour'd to be made long ſince in ſome manner inacceſſible to mens curioſity, by concealing it under a cloud of Ceremonies. Henry the Fourth was indeed a great Prince, whoſe memory will never die; but how great ſoever he deſervedly was, yet is he conſider'd only as a man whoſe body lies interred at S. Dennis in the ſame manner as others do. Jeſus Chriſt is the Son of God, whoſe Body is living, and glorious, and hypoſtatically united to the Divinity. Should any man then imagin that the Statue of Henry IV. is really Henry IV. I doubt not but people would look upon him as a mad man, becauſe 'twould be conſidered according to the light of nature as a thing touching which there can be nothing that's extraordinary and miraculous conceived, which is expoſed to the knowledg of all the world, and wherein there's nothing at all that's Divine. Neither do I doubt but ſuch a dotage would be rejected as a novelty unknown to our Fore-fathers, becauſe 'twould be ſuppoſed that our Fore-fathers had their ſences made as ours, and that in reſpect of natural and ſenſible things their judgments have been the ſame as ours, nature ever remaining in a uniform ſtate. But neither this example nor th'others which are like it do ſignifie any thing in reſpect of the Euchariſt which is a myſtery of Faith, wherein all Chriſtians agree that there's ſomething ſupernatural, altho they agree not in the manner. A myſtery concerning which every man does not think he can ſafely judg, much leſs from the principles of Senſe and Reaſon: in fine, a myſtery of the Son of God, the knowledg of which depends on a light which is not always equal. It is then manifeſt that neither this example nor the reſt of the ſame rank propoſed by Mr. Arnaud are pertinent.
NEITHER is it leſs clear from what I now repreſented, that of theſe three manners of believing the Real Abſence, which Mr. Arnaud propoſes, there's only the ſecond which can be admitted into this Diſpute, to regulate the ſtate of the queſtion, becauſe the firſt, as I have ſhew'd, is impoſſible, and the laſt can yield no advantage to the Author of the Perpeuitty's deſign.
Mr. ARNAƲD may here again call to mind the ſolidity of the diſtinction which I made touching the two expreſſions which are very like one another, as to terms, but very different in ſenſe, not to believe, or not to know that a thing is, and to believe, or know that a thing is not. The firſt denotes a bare negation of Knowledg, and the ſecond a poſitive act of Knowledg and Faith, which formally denies the exiſtence of a thing. Not to believe the Real Preſence, barely ſignifies that this preſence is not held for an Article of Faith; but to believe that the Real Preſence is not, ſignifies ſomething more, which is, that a man reckons it among the Articles which he rejects. The Author of the Perpetuity having ſaid that there's no medium The firſt Treatiſe of the Perpetuity.between having a diſtinct knowledg of the Real Preſence, and having a diſtinct knowledg of the Real Abſence, I had reaſon to tell him, that to make in this matter an immediate oppoſition, he muſt make it contradictory, and not contrary, that is to ſay, he ought to bring in an affirmation, or the negation of the ſame thing, and not the affirmation, or poſitive rejection, that he muſt ſay the Chriſtians have had a diſtinct belief of the Real Abſence, or that they have not had it; and not ſay they have had a diſtinct belief of the Preſence, or Real Abſence.
Mr. ARNAƲD calls this School-boys Philoſophy. But this School-boys Lib. 6. cap. 2. pag. 5.Philoſophy, ſeeing he pleaſes to give it this name, is grounded on common ſenſe. For common ſenſe ſhews us that to make an immediate oppoſition we muſt ſet the negative on one ſide, and the affirmative on the other. We grant, ſays he, to Mr. Claude, that to ſpeak logically we ought to oppoſe believing the Real Preſence, and not believing the Real Preſence, and not believing the Real Abſence. But I affirm, that to ſpeak rationally we may well oppoſe believing the Real Preſence, and believing the Real Abſence; which is to ſay, that not to believe the Real Abſence, and to believe the Real Abſence, may and ought to paſs for the ſame thing in the point in queſtion, becauſe theſe two diſpoſitions of mind have all the ſame effects.
I HAVE been ignorant till now of the diſtinction between ſpeaking logically, and ſpeaking rationally; for I always thought that true Logick, which tends only to cultivate our reaſon, and which explains it ſelf clearly and intelligibly, had not any other language than what was rational. But not to ſtray from our ſubject, if in the matter in queſtion, theſe two expreſſions, not to believe the Real Preſence, and to believe the Real Abſence, muſt paſs for one and the ſame thing, it follows they are both of 'em equally rational at bottom. Seeing then they are both of 'em equally intelligible, and equally popular, why did not the Author of the Perpetuity make uſe of the firſt, rather than the ſecond. For the firſt being as it is rational, intelligible, and popular as well as the other, it has moreover this advantage that Logick approves of it, whereas ſhe rejects the other. The firſt expreſſion does of it ſelf explain juſtly and naturally what a man would ſay, neither more nor leſs; whereas the other, according to Mr. Arnaud's own acknowledgment is equivocal, and does not explain what's meant, but only becauſe of the matter in queſtion. The firſt is liable to no conteſt. The ſecond is diſputable. Wherefore then has not Mr. Arnaud knowing them to be equivalent, left the ſecond to make uſe of the firſt. He had loſt nothing, if it be true, they both ſignifie one and the ſame thing, and he had ſpared the pains of a new diſpute. For I maintain againſt him, that neither rationally ſpeaking, nor logically, theſe two expreſſions ought to paſs for the ſame thing. The firſt cannot produce the effect which the ſecond produces, ſeeing the ſecond will make men oppoſe the Real Preſence as an innovation which Faith rejecteth, whereof the firſt cannot of it ſelf work ſuch en effect. A man that is perſuaded the Real Preſence is a Doctrin which he ought to reject, will oppoſe himſelf againſt it, as ſoon as ever it ſhall be offer'd him. A perſon that never heard it mention'd will eaſily ſuffer himſelf to be ſurprized when told this has been ever the Faith of the Church.
WHEREIN conſiſts then you'l ſay the point of our difference, and what is the ſtate of this queſtion? It may be eaſily gather'd from what I have now ſaid, which is to know whether the people of the 9th. 10th. and 11th. Ages, in ſuppoſing the Real Preſence which was taught them, that is to ſay, the inviſible ſubſtantial Preſence, ſuch as the Church of Rome holds at this day; for 'tis on that we diſpute, was a novelty, which yet was taught them as the ancient Faith of the Church. I ſay, the queſtion is, whether theſe people had notions and prejudices in their minds, which muſt of neceſſity make them reject this Doctrin as a novelty contrary to the ancient Faith, even ſo far as to oblige 'em plainly and openly to oppoſe it. And becauſe theſe prejudices can be no other than this diſtinct belief, That the Body of Jeſus Chriſt is not ſubſtantially preſent in the Euchariſt, neither in a viſible nor inviſible manner, it concerns us to know whether one may rationally ſay in the terms of our ſuppoſition that they had this diſtinct belief. It lies upon Mr. Arnaud to prove the affirmative, and I the negative. This is the true ſtate of this queſtion, as appears from what we have ſeen in this Chapter. But becauſe Mr. Arnaud has ſo openly and plainly renounced this manner of believing the Real Abſence by a formal reflection on the ſeveral kinds of preſence, whether viſible or inviſible, it may be reaſonably ſaid this is no longer a matter of conteſt between us. I grant him (if he will) that people have poſitively rejected the corporeal and viſible Preſence of the Body of Jeſus Chriſt in the Euchariſt, and that in this ſenſe they have believed a Real Abſence. I grant likewiſe if he will that theſe ſame people were in a capacity to know, that the light of nature oppoſes the Doctrin of the ſubſtantial and inviſible Preſence. He grants me for his part, that it does not appear they were for poſitively rejecting, and by a formal reflection this incorporeal and inviſible Preſence. Wherein then do we diſagree? 'Tis clear that that which I grant him is not a ſufficient diſpoſition, whence to conclude that the people would have oppoſed the Doctrin of the inviſible Preſence as a novelty unknown to the Church. For, for to believe that Jeſus Chriſt is not viſibly and corporally preſent in the Euchariſt, this does not hinder but that a man may embrace the opinion of the incorporeal Preſence, and ſo likewiſe to know that the light of nature does not well agree with this inviſible Preſence, this does not hinder men from being deceived by imagining 'tis a myſtery of Faith, which the Church has always believed, and touching which a man muſt not conſult his ſenſe or reaſon. It is no leſs clear that what Mr. Arnaud grants me is ſufficient to conclude that the people here mention'd had no diſtinct knowledg of the Real Preſence, in the ſenſe in which the Roman Church believes it, neither to admit it, nor reject it; and conſequently they had no neceſſary diſpoſition to oppoſe it when 'twas firſt taught them. For as to this general rejection, we have ſhew'd it to be chimerical and impoſſible: The queſtion is then decided, but in my favour, ſeeing the reſult of all theſe illuſtrations is, that the change which we ſuppoſe has been poſſible. Yet if Mr. Arnaud will obſtinately maintain this general manner of believing the Real Abſence, which denies every kind of ſubſtantial Preſence without particulariſing any one of them, altho we have ſhew'd him 'tis fantaſtical, and contrary to nature; yet I ſay we will conſent that the queſtion be this, Whether the people before-mentioned ought, according to our ſuppoſition formally and generally to deny all the ſeveral ſorts of ſubſtantial preſences of the Body of Jeſus Chriſt in the Euchariſt whatſoever they be, without ſpecifying any one of them. But this is what he has ſtill to prove.