The Catholic Doctrine of the Eucharist in All Ages, Book 1 · Chapter 6
CHAP. VI.
A farther Examination of the pretended Advantages which Mr. Arnaud attributes to the Treatiſe of the Perpetuity.
THE Subject of my fourth Obſervation is taken from what Mr. Arnaud aſſures us, viz. that all that are of Mr. Daillé's Mind (that Lib. 1. C. 5. P. 47.is to ſay, who are perſwaded they muſt not decide the Queſtion touching the Euchariſt, by the Writings of the Fathers, (ſeeing they are ſo obſcure and intricate, that it is a hard matter to make them agree,) cannot refuſe to render themſelves up to the Proofs of the Perpetuity, in caſe they judge them evident; whence he concludes that all-knowing Perſons who are ſincere, on the one hand, and on the other, all they who cannot judge by themſelves, will acquiecſe in theſe Proofs. This Pretenſion is as ill grounded as the former. For there being, as I already ſaid, two Queſtions before us, the one, touching what we are to believe concerning the Euchariſt, and the other concerning what has bin believed by the antient Church, the firſt of theſe, which is that of Right, reſpects in general all them of our Communion; but the ſecond, for as much as it may be decided by Hiſtory, only reſpects them amongſt us, who have ſufficient Leaſure and Curioſity to inform themſelves. So that the Prolixity, Difficulty, and intricacy which we meet with in the Writings of the Fathers, do ſufficiently evidence that their Books are very improper for the Deciſion of the firſt of theſe Queſtions, whereon depends that of our Controverſies, ſeeing theſe Difficulties will be inſuperable to the greateſt part amongſt us; altho they will not render them unfit to decide the ſecond, becauſe they are not inſuperable to them who would apply themſelves thereunto as they ought, to ſatisfy their Curioſity, neither will they hinder them in ſhort from making a moſt certain Judgment in our Favour. If then the Treatiſe of the Perpetuity be only offered to them to whom the firſt Queſtion belongs, they will anſwer they have no need of it, being ſatisfied with the Word of God; and if they be demanded what they believe touching the antient Church, they will anſwer, that they judge of it according to the Rules of Chriſtian Charity, and our Saviours Promiſes. But if we proeeed farther, and ſuppoſe it be enquired of them, how it has come to paſs that the Church of Rome has altered the antient Doctrine; they will anſwer, their Salvation depends not on this Knowledg, but that it muſt needs be, it has made an Alteration; ſeeing it believes at this day what it ought not to believe, and which without doubt hath not bin believed heretofore, as they judge out of Charity to the Antients. Should they be urged to tell how this has hapned, they will anſwer again, this is not an account wherein their Salvation is concerned, and that this Queſtion ought to be propoſed to thoſe Perſons who know it, and in all this they will have Reaſon. If this Treatiſe be offered to thoſe of the ſecond Rank, that is to ſay to them who are learned, and have had the Curioſity of informing themſelves, and to whom properly the ſecond Queſtion belongs; they will likewiſe anſwer, they have no need of this Method, having already informed themſelves by a natural and direct way, which is of more value than all theſe Conjectures, or if they have not done it, they will do it, being not ſo ſilly as to ſhut their Eyes, and reject the Evidence of their Senſes, to betake themſelves to a Method wherein there can be nothing but Confuſion to be expected, and theſe laſt will have Reaſon too.
BUT ſaith Mr. Arnaud, we muſt ſuppoſe that the Proofs of the Treatiſe are evident, for they cannot be ſuppoſed falſe, till ſuch time as they are examined. You ought then to have begun here, wherefore your Exceptions ſignify nothing. I anſwer that theſe Suppoſitions are not juſter than his Arguments. For if theſe curious Perſons whom I mentioned, have already taken the Pains they ought, whereby to aſcertain themſelves in the Proofs of Fact, they will be prepared to judge, that the Arguments of the Treatiſe are falſe and captious, becauſe that moral Impoſſibilities, ſuch as theſe are, and in ſuch a Subject as this, cannot ſubſiſt againſt Proofs of Fact, which are immediate, certain, and evident as ours are. If they have not yet taken this Pains, I ſay that without examining whether the Proofs of the Treatiſe be good or bad, they will only mind the Method, and by comparing it with that of Diſcuſſion, if they are men of Reaſon, they will prefer this laſt before the other, becauſe that 'tis in effect moſt natural in it ſelf, and more certain in its Proofs.
WHAT ſhall we do then with the Treatiſe of the Perpetuity, which has made ſuch a Noiſe in the World? Will it be of no uſe? There are a crue of People in the World, who are curious and idle both together, who are willing to know the Opinions of former Ages on theſe famous Articles, about which Europe is at this day divided; but yet will be at no Pains for this, becauſe Labour is diſtaſteful to them, and they have other things to do. It is then for ſuch Perſons as theſe, this Treatiſe has bin written. For it courteth them, and preſents it ſelf to 'em, whether at Eaſe or in Buſineſs; it only deſires them to ſpend two Hours on its Reading, whereby to decide a Point of this Importance. The Style of it is curious and enticing, and its Expreſſions emphatical, it winneth on the Mind, and leads it inſenſibly where it pleaſes. All this flatters mens Curioſity and Lazyneſs both together. But if this ſort of People loved their Salvation, as we may ſuppoſe they ought, we ſhould then have but two or three things to ſay to them. Firſt, that they beware of theſe ſhort Methods, which favour at the ſame time two Inclinations, which ſeldom agree, I mean Idleneſs and Curioſity. For we cannot arrive at any certainty in theſe kind of Queſtions, if we do not earneſtly apply our ſelves to them, for Labour and Knowledg do always go together, and it commonly happens that they who thus promiſe us ſuch great Knowledg, without any trouble, do cheat us two ways, for they lead us into tedious Prolixities, and dreadful Difficulties, and at laſt having tired us, they leave us as wiſe as we were at firſt.
AND this is exactly the caſe of the Treatiſe of the Perpetuity, if we rightly conſider it; for it promiſes us immediately, nothing but Perſpicuity, Facilities, and Convictions, it being made up of undenyable Truths. Yet let a man take but the Pains to examine only his fixt Point, which is his firſt Suppoſition, on which the whole ſtreſs of his Book lies; and he will find that 'tis impoſſible to be certain in it. I mean the Year one thouſand fifty three, wherein Berengarius was at firſt condemned, and in which time the Author of the Treatiſe pretend's the univerſal Church was agreed in the Belief of Tranſubſtantiation and the real Preſence. Now to be ſatisfied in this particular, we ſhould have an exact Knowledg of the eleventh Century, to the end we may diſcern whether this Condemnation of Berengarius was the real Effect of the Churches Union, or only that of a Party, which was then the ſtrongeſt at the Court of Rome. We ſhould know each particular matter of this great Affair, that we may be able to judge whether humane Intereſt had no ſhare in it: whether thoſe that were concerned in it did not act againſt their Conſciences; and whether the Procedings were juſt and regular. We muſt examine the State of Princes, Eccleſiaſticks, and People, to be ſatisfied in this ſuppoſed Union. We ſhould have before us the Writings of Berengarius and others who held the ſame Opinions, to underſtand their Arguments and Defences. But all theſe things are impoſſible. We have no other account of this Hiſtory, than what ſome intereſſed Writers have bin pleaſed to give us, and in which there are Relations juſtly ſuſpected to be falſe. The ſecret Deſigns and Motives which then prevailed are out of our reach. We know ſcarcely any thing more of the Perſons who then made up the Church, but that they were the greateſt part of them buried in profound Ignorance. The Writings of Berengarins and his Followers are loſt, for there has bin Care taken to extinguiſh the Remembrance of them. In ſhort, this is an Abyſs wherein we behold nothing, whereby we may be able to affirm with any certainty, that the whole Church was united in the Belief of Tranſubſtantiation and the real Preſence. For a man to give Credit to any Relation of Berengarius's Adverſaries; (who bragged that their Opinion was that of the whole World,) it would be to be over Credulous, in any Affair of this Importance, and ſo much the more, becauſe the contrary appeareth by ſubſtantial Proofs, which ſhould be examined, before we reſt ſatisfied in them.
SO that here we are already ſufficiently perplexed in the firſt Particular, and ſhall be no leſs in the others. If we would be aſcertained in the Proofs of the Treatiſe, we ſhould know perfectly the Tempers of the People, their Condition and principal Circumſtances, in the Ages which preceded the eleventh Century. We ſhould know, how the Body of the Eccleſiaſticks was compoſed, what was the Humour and Temper of them who held the firſt Rank, even how far their Credit and Authority reached, what kind of Inſtructions they gave the People, and after what manner the People received them. We muſt likewiſe examine the nature of the Change we ſpeak of, by what degrees we ſuppoſe it has bin introduced, by how many ways and means it may be ſaid to be poſſible. For if all this be not diſtinctly known, how can it with any Confidence be affirmed, that this Change is impoſſible. Moreover before it can be affirmed as an undoubted Truth, that had an Innovation touching the Euchariſt bin attempted, the People would have riſen into Tumults, the Religious clamour'd againſt it, the Eccleſiaſticks oppoſed it, and the Councils taken notice of it, and in ſhort the Bands of an external Communion would have bin broken; how many particulars muſt be cleared up firſt! We ought to know what kind of Zeal People had for the Glory of God in thoſe Days; whether the effects of this Zeal could not be hindred by I know not how many things which occur in theſe different Orders of men, whom I mentioned, as Ignorance in ſome, ſimplicity and meanneſs of Spirit in others, the fear of diſturbing the publick Peace, the Favour or Hatred of Perſons, and ſeveral other humane Cauſes, which ſet men on acting or deſiſting from it. We ſhould likewiſe have a true and particular Account of the Condition of the ſchiſmatical Churches at that time, when Berengarius was condemned, which is not an eaſy matter, as will appear in the ſequel of this Diſcourſe. In a Word, to attain the ends of the Deſign of this Treatiſe, when even its Proofs ſhould be Subſtantial and Concluſive, a man muſt be more knowing than an Angel; for unleſs we knew the Thoughts of all mankind, for the ſpace of two hundred Years together, or could raiſe the Dead to inform our ſelves by them of what they have done; and what they have not done, it is not otherwiſe poſſible to be at any certainty. But it will be perhaps anſwered, we muſt judge according to the Light of common Senſe, and what we ſee in our times▪ to which I reply, that even common Senſe ſhewes us, that there is no certainty in theſe kind of Proofs, and that the Experience of our own Age contradicts them. And when it ſhould be imagined that all theſe Difficulties are ſurmounted, I come then and trouble this Victory with my Aubertin, and Proofs of Fact, requiring, before the Queſtion be decided, that my Objection be anſwered. Now ſhould Mr. Arnaud pretend my Objection is groundleſs, and that I ſhould be ſilenced in being told, that theſe Proofs have bin conſidered, and their pretended Clearneſs appears only to them, who ſuffer themſelves to be tranſported by the Enthuthiaſms of my Rhetorick, I ſhall make him anſwer, that I ſpeak here only of curious and lazy People, to whom the Treatiſe of the Perpetuity is offered as a ſhort Method▪ to eaſe them of the lengths of a way of Diſcuſſion: which ſort of Perſons cannot ſay they know all our Proofs.
I ſhall tell him moreover, that the reading of my Book, has not yet ſo far tranſported People with Enthuſiaſtical Raptures, as the reading of his has done to his immortal Praiſe. For there are Latin Verſes under this very Title of Enthuſiaſms, which Mr. Arnauds Friends its ſeems have not bin aſhamed to print, in which there appears all the lively Characters of a Poetical Fury. For they ſpeak of his Book, as of the Sun, which contains in it ſelf a great meaſure of the Divine Light: His Lines are called new Darts of the Sacred Cupid; and his whole Book is ſaid to be full of God. Puro Numine, mi Libelle, Plenus. It is compared to our Saviour himſelf, when he came down from Heaven; and is ſaid to have done the ſame Miracles; there is one of its Readers introduced, who being filled with its Divinity, cries out, Numen ecce Numen, ibi Numen. Mr. Arnaud is termed, Vir ſacro & numinis entheatus oeſtro, and his Wit, Mentis vigor entheus, and again he is ſet forth to us as an Hercules armed with Coeleſtial Weapons, trampling all things under his Feet, conquering the Conquerours themſelves, and triumphing over the Triumphers. In ſhort, France is congratulated upon the Glory it receives. Tanto prodigio ſuperba fulge, felix prodigio futura tanto. All which conſidered, has not Mr. Arnaud pertinently mentioned Enthuſiaſms? Certainly never the Tripos of Delphos, nor the Grove of the Sibyl Cumeé, inſpired ſuch like Ravings.
BUT to return to the matter in hand. Is it not poſſible will ſome ſay, to be aſcertained of the matter in Queſtion, by ſome way leſs tedious and intricate, than the examination of ſuch a great Volum as Mr. Aubertin's Book? Yea without doubt; for, to know as much as is neceſſary, to the ſatisfying of a mans Mind, he need but judge according to the inſtincts of Charity, and the Confidence he ought to have in our Saviours Promiſes. Now if a man keeps to theſe Principles, he will draw a Concluſion as ſatisfactory as can be deſired. The Promiſes of our Saviour aſſure us that his Spirit ſhall be with the Faithful to the end of the World; and Chriſtian Charity obliges us to believe that the Fathers are of this Number. From whence I conclude; that there has ever bin a conſiderable number of true Chriſtians, whoſe Faith has not bin corrupted by damnable Errors. This is a ſure Concluſion, and ſufficient to ſatisfy my Mind. I conclude likewiſe, that the Fathers have bin of this Number, this is a Judgment of Charity, and is ſufficient to acquit me of my Duty. Should it be told me, if I proceed farther, it would be to give my ſelf a great deal of Trouble, viz. to Read, Study, and Meditate, to compare the Proofs of both Parties, and if this offends me, I can complain of no body but my ſelf, that is to ſay of my own Lazyneſs or Curioſity.
IT is then neither juſt nor neceſſary to require any other abridged Methods, than thoſe which I now obſerved. Yet it muſt not be thought but that there may be ſuch offered, it being no difficult matter. For 'tis but looſing from the Body of the Diſpute, one of thoſe captious Arguments, which ſeem to decide the whole Controverſy by the Deciſion of one only Point. Which the Author of the Perpetuity has done, for he has ſingled out Bellarmins Argument of the Impoſſibility of a Change, and propoſed it with greater Enlargments, tho with leſs Force than he, and this is all the Myſtery of this great Method of Preſcription. So that this is not ſuch a famous Undertaking; ſeeing every little Sophiſter could do as much. Take the Argument of the ſilence of the Fathers on Tranſubſtantiation and the real Preſence; inſiſt largely thereon, write a Treatiſe on it; and here's then an abridged Method. Take the Argument of the certainty of our Senſes; ſhew that the Fathers ſuppoſed it as an inviolable Principle of the Chriſtian Religion; ſhew the Abſurdities which would follow, had they believed that what we ſee in the Sacrament is not real Bread; here is then another Method of Preſcription. Take likewiſe if you will, the Argument of the Silence of the Heathens, and accommodate it to the Treatiſe of the Perpetuity; and you will make another Method. It is the ſame with the Argument of the Accidents without a Subject, in reſpect of Tranſubſtantiation; and of that of the Adoration of the Sacrament; and almoſt of all others.
TO ſpeak my Sence of theſe Arguments reduced into Methods, I think they muſt be conſidered either abſolutely, or in relation to ſome Circumſtances. If we conſider them abſolutely; we muſt not reject them, for this only Reaſon that they are called Methods of Preſcription. A rational Man will accept of them in a Controverſy, as Arguments, he will weigh their Force; but whatſoever Strength they may have, he will not forme his Judgment by them alone, becauſe perhaps there may be on the other ſide things more conſiderable. What is there, for Example, of greater Force than the Argument taken from the Silence of the Fathers, touching the Exiſtence of Accidents without a Subject? Yet is it certain that this Argument alone muſt not determine a Man; for ſhould it be demonſtrated that the Fathers expreſly taught the Adoration of the Sacrament, and Converſion of the Subſtance, with all the other Conſequences of Tranſubſtantiation, excepting this Exiſtence of the Accidents without a Subject, our Argument would not be ſtrong enough to invalidate theſe contrary Proofs. They muſt then be ranked in the order of the Controverſy, to the end they may be conſidered in a deciſive Judgment.
THERE is not, to ſpeak properly, but one particular caſe wherein we ought to be determined by a Method of Preſcription, which is when God does or does not declare his Will in Points of Religion; for what is there in the World that can excel, or equal the Validity of his Teſtimony or Silence. In matters of Religion, 'tis the Word of God which determines us to believe poſitively ſuch and ſuch Points, and 'tis its Silence which determines us to reject others. Our Faith imitates the Wiſe Men of the Eaſt, it follows the Star that conducts it, (which is the Heavenly Revelation) and ſtops where this Star ſettleth, as knowing 'twould be to wander, to go farther. This then is the only true Method of Preſcription in Queſtions of this Nature.
BUT ſuppoſing the Argument was taken from the Evidence of all the Senſes, and in the Circumſtances which make this Teſtimony Valid and Infallible, may we not determine our ſelves, without proceeding any farther? I anſwer that to ſpeak abſolutely, the Senſes may be deceived, even with all the Circumſtances which render their Teſtimony allowable, for the Devil may impoſe upon them by his Illuſions; yet becauſe a judicious man muſt judge of things, not out of regard to theſe extraordinary and rare Caſes, but according to rule and common uſe, it is certain, that ſuch an Argument muſt decide the Queſtion of Fact.
THE ſame may be required touching thoſe Arguments which are called in Philoſophy, by the name of Demonſtrations. If a Method was grounded on a Proof of this Force, would it not wholly decide the Queſtion? I anſwer there are few Demonſtrations, ſo evident and certain, that nothing can be oppoſed againſt them. Yet were there one offered which convinced the Mind, by an immediate and uncontroulable Evidence, (as thoſe which manifeſt an apparent Contradiction, and a formal Incompatibility in the Terms; or thoſe which are eſtabliſhed on a neceſſary and inviolable Dependance, and which cannot be hind'red, or which ſuppoſe one only Cauſe, without which 'tis not poſſible that a thing ſhould exiſt; or laſtly, ſuch as are grounded on an indiſſolvible connexion of two Subjects which cannot be one without the other;) I confeſs we ought then to yield; as when 'tis ſaid, the Sun is riſen, it is then day, or it is day, the Sun then is riſen; there is a Son, there muſt then be a Father; I ſay, we cannot but acquieſce in theſe kind of Arguments. But becauſe in things about which we diſpute, theſe ſort of primary and immediate Demonſtrations are very rare, a judicious Perſon will not ſuffer himſelf to be ſurprized with every thing which bears the Name of Demonſtration, or that has the Colour and appearance of it, and eſpecially when it relates to a matter belonging to another Light than that of Reaſon, as are the Objects of Senſe, and thoſe of Faith: he muſt then ſuſpend his Judgment, and reduce his pretended Demonſtrations into the Order of the Diſpute, to be compared with the contrary Proofs, to the end he may make a right Judgment.
AND this is what may be ſaid in general of theſe abridged Methods. In their Circumſtances, they are to be conſidered, either as relating to the Perſons they are offered, or to the Queſtion which they decide, or the Rank which they hold, and according to the quality of their Proofs. If they be offered to Perſons to whom the Queſtion doth not belong, it is in their Power abſolutely to reject them, in alleaging, that this concerns not them, and they cannot juſtly be blamed when they ſhould do thus. Should they be offered to Perſons intereſſed in the Queſtion, or who would take part in it, they ought ordinarily to proceed according to the Rules I have laid down, and eſpecially if the Queſtion which they decide is of that importance, as that it ought not to be ſlightly handled. But if we do ſuppoſe on one hand, that the Order of theſe Methods is indirect and unnatural, and that their Arguments are not taken but from Probabilities, and on the other, that we may be informed by a more natural Courſe, and a more certain and infallible Means. I ſay, that a wiſe Man ought to prefer this laſt way before the other, altho it be more tedious and difficult, for tho he cannot anſwer theſe Arguments, yet this does not argue he muſt be determined by them; for it will be time enough to conſider them, when after a due Examination of every thing that may be alleaged on both ſides, he ſhall make his deciſive Judgment. In fine, I ſay, that if we ſuppoſe a man already aſcertained in the Queſtion, by an orderly way, by numerous and concluſive Proofs, and by a Knowledg humanely Certain, and Infallible, as is that of his Eyes and common Senſes on their proper Objects, he cannot reaſonably be deſired to change his Opinion by an indirect Method, which is from hence ſuſpected to be artificial and deceitful, in that the Proofs which it offers can amount to no more than Probabilities. If he be wiſe, he will keep to his firſt Concluſion, and reject this Method as uſeleſs, without troubling himſelf with a particular Examination of it, unleſs to give himſelf the greater Satisfaction, he determines to diſcover the falſity of it.
WE ſee already what uſe muſt be made of the Treatiſe of the Perpetuity, together with all its long train of Arguments and Suppoſitions, which Mr. Arnaud has made in its Favour. For firſt, there is little Sincerity in the Objection he ſtated in the beginning, in which he doth not explain our real Pretenſion. Secondly, He paſſeth over in Silence, amongſt the Number which he makes of the Perſons of our Communion, ſeveral who trouble not themſelves with the Diſpute touching the Queſtion of matter of Fact, that is to ſay touching the Belief of the antient Church, and in relation to theſe, who are the greateſt number, we may already affirm that the Treatiſe of the Perpetuity is of no uſe. Thirdly, He has very ill proved that the moſt knowing Miniſters do doubt whether the Fathers are for us, whence it follows, that not being able to finde his Proſelytes, neither amongſt the …k of the Illiterate People, nor amongſt that of the Learned, it is to be feared he will find them no where. Fourthly, He hath bin ſhewed, that when it ſhould be granted, there were Miniſters, who doubted whether the Fathers were for us; yet would it not follow, that they would leave the Word of God, on which alone their Faith depends, to yield themſelves up to the Arguments of the Perpetuity. Fifthly, He hath bin ſhewed that when one or two ſhould be of this Opinion, yet could they not carry it away from all the reſt who have bin, or are of a contrary Mind: whence it follows, that if the leaſt judicious among us regulate their Opinions on this Point by that of the moſt knowing, they will 'tis probable range themſelves on the ſide of the greateſt Number, rather than on that wherein there is but one or two; ſo that here is almoſt all of 'em eſcaped the Treatiſes Conqueſt. Sixthly, It has bin likewiſe ſhewed him that the Prolixity and Difficulties to be expected in the common way, which is that of Diſcuſſion, yield no advantage to the Treatiſe to make it received under the Title of an abridged Method. Seventhly, He has bin moreover ſhewed the inſuperable Perplexities wherein this Method engages People: So that thoſe who are moſt in Love with ſhort Ways, and new Faſhions, cannot but be diſguſted at this. Eightly, It has bin demonſtrated, that Perſons who were never informed of the real Doctrine of the Fathers, and would willingly be aſcertain'd of it, ought in all Reaſon to prefer a Method of Diſcuſſion, whatſoever tediouſneſs and difficulty there may be in it, before that of the Perpetuity. We have likewiſe manifeſted that the Proofs of his Method, have not that juſt and due extent, neceſſary to the forming of a judicious man's Mind: and which ours have. Tenthly, and laſtly, It has bin proved to him that diſcreet Perſons, who know our Proofs of Fact, and have examined them, may juſtly reject this Treatiſe as uſeleſs.
WHAT he then ſaies concerning theſe two contrary Evidences that hold the Mind in ſuſpence between our Proofs of Fact, on one hand, and the Arguments of the Perpetuity on the other, is a meer Fancy. For this Unreſolvedneſs is impoſſible in a man of Judgment. And Mr. Arnaud does not ground it but only on a Suppoſition, which he has no right to make, That Lib. 1. C. … P. 54.the Proofs of the Treatiſe intimate the impoſſibility of a Change, to that degree of Evidence, as will convince the Mind as much as the contrary Evidence. Which I deny him, and that with good Reaſon, when I compare his Proofs with ours. His Proofs are grounded on a Suppoſition, in which it is impoſſible to be aſcertain'd, they are of the kind of moral Impoſſibilities, which never carry in them a Certitude beyond Exception, and moreover, the Subject or Matter they handle, makes them ſtill a thouſand times more uncertain and doubtful; for what is more uncertain than that which depended on Peoples Inclinations, who lived ſeven or eight hundred Years ago, and on the Conjunction of a thouſand things, of which we ſcarcely know one. We need but conſider theſe Proofs in this reſpect, to declare them uncertain; But to demonſtrate the falſity of them, we muſt compare them with ours, againſt which there can no general Objections be made, ſeing they are numerous, and throughly handle the Queſtion, and which taken ſeverally, have all poſſible Strength and Evidence.
TO find out diſtinctly and clearly the knot of this whole Controverſy, and judge of it with leſs Trouble and more Solidity, it needs only be conſidered that Mr. Arnaud and I do make almoſt the ſame Suppoſitions, and draw the ſame Conſequences, but each of us in his own Favour. He ſuppoſes my Proofs of Fact are uncertain, and I do not only ſuppoſe they of his Treatiſe are ſo, but that they are moreover Falſe. He ſuppoſeth that they of the Treatiſe are Evident. I ſuppoſe that mine are ſo. He concludes mine are to be Rejected, and them of the Treatiſe Embraced. I conclude that they of the Treatiſe are to be Rejected, and mine Entertained. For to judge aright ſo far, it needs only be conſidered which of us two has moſt reaſon to make theſe Suppoſitions, and ſettles them on ſureſt Grounds; for he that does ſo, has the Conſequence for him. Mr. Arnaud grounds his on the Enthuſiaſms of my Rhetorick, on ſome pretended Teſtimonies of the Learned, and his own Judgment on Mr. Aubertin's Book, and that of the Perpetuity. I build mine on the Right a Reſpondent has to ſuppoſe his Opinion in a Diſpute. Whence I conclude, I may ſuppoſe my Proofs of Fact to be good and firm; I ground them on a general Compariſon I make of his Proofs with ours, and manifeſt that ours are according to a natural and direct Method, and his according to an indirect and forced one; That ours are ſufficient to enable a man to make a ſound and ſolid Judgment, and that his are not ſo, that ours are obvious to Sence, whereas his are but meer Conjectures. And 'tis upon this we ought to be judged. But we muſt proceed farther; for Mr. Arnaud goes ſo far as to ſuppoſe his Proofs and mine appear equally evident, and 'tis upon this that he grounds the whole Argument of his ſixth Chapter. He would have that theſe two contrary Evidences forming a Suſpenſion of Mind, a rational Man is thereby obliged to determine himſelf by the Advantages which appear moreover in the Church of Rome, and here we begin to take two different ways, for I will not grant him the Evidence of his Treatiſe, as he grants me that of my Proofs. And in effect no man may make groundleſs Suppoſitions, which being impoſſible, cannot therefore be reaſonable. Now it is not poſſible that a man who is perſwaded of the Evidence of our Proofs, can find any Evidence in his, being ſuch as they are, becauſe they have a Defect in their kind, which makes them vaniſh before ours. 'Tis moreover on this we ought to be tried.
YET let us ſuppoſe, by way of Divertiſement, theſe two contrary Evidences which hold us in Suſpenſe, what follows thence? that we muſt be determined by the Authority of the Church of Rome. This indeed Mr. Arnaud ſaies: and I maintain we ought wholly to apply our ſelves to the Scriptures, and leave thoſe Perplexities touching the Opinions of the Fathers, that we may ground our Faith only on the Word of God; and I pretend by this means we ſhall adhere to the reformed Church. What muſt we then do about this new Difference? Mr. Arnaud and I muſt Diſpute concerning the Scripture and Church of Rome, to know which of us two has moſt reaſon. And theſe are the Effects of this admirable Method, the Glory of our time, and Quinteſſence of Humane Wit, which after ſeveral windings and turnings, ſeveral hot Debates and ſharp Diſputes, and after an Invitation of all France; and all them of either Communion to the beholding of this famous Conteſt, refers the matter at length to the Holy Scripture and the Church. And this is the fruit of the Treatiſe of the Perpetuity. And indeed if we continue to diſpute after this manner, I think the World has little reaſon to concern it ſelf in our Debate, ſeeing 'tis a vain amuſement. We wreſtle againſt one another with all our Might, we ſweat, and take a great deal of Pains, and make our Books be bought dear: and after all we are to begin again. For if we muſt now diſpute concerning the Holy Scripture and the Church, wherefore did we not do ſo in the beginning? Wherefore muſt the Treatiſe of the Perpetuity be for a Preludium to this? Is it becauſe the Gate of this Controverſy is not yet wide enough of it ſelf, but that the Treatiſe of the Perpetuity muſt introduce us? Or is it not worthy our regard, and therefore the Treatiſe of the Perpetuity muſt be its Mediatour. Is it that either the Church of Rome, or the Scripture have need, (to the end they may be recommended to us,) the one of the Treatiſe of the Perpetuity, and the other of my Anſwer, and that no man can betake himſelf to either of theſe without our Guidance. For my part I pretend not to this, and therefore think it beſide the Purpoſe to begin a new Controverſy.