The Catholic Doctrine of the Eucharist in All Ages, Book 1 · Chapter 3
CHAP. III.
THE third Obſervation juſtified, viz. That the Author of the Perpetuity has bin to blame in pretending to overthrow the Proofs contained in Mr. Aubertin's Book, by Arguments which can amount to no more than mere Conjectures.
MR. Arnaud ſeems unwilling to grant, That the Author of the Perpetuity has endeavoured to invalidate our Proofs of Matters of Fact contained in Mr. Aubertin's Book by his Arguments, and thereupon has only propoſed the Queſtion in theſe Terms: viz. Whether a man may not argue againſt matters of Fact: And takes it for granted Lib. 1. Ch. 2.he may in ſome particular Caſes. It is then our part to ſhew, he wanders from the Point, and that the Author of the Perpetuity has not only deſigned to oppoſe, but even overthrow by his arguings our Proofs of Fact, ſo that the Queſtion now is whether this Endeavour of his is juſt or unjuſt, whether according to a regular Courſe or contrary to it.
AND for this purpoſe, I ſhall only deſire Mr. Arnaud to conſider, That the Deſign of the Method, or advantage expected by it, as it hath bin expreſly declared in the fourteenth Page of the firſt Treatiſe, Is to bring any unprejudiced Perſon, to acknowledge the Church of Rome's Belief touching the Euchariſt to be the ſame with that of all Antiquity; and this new Method is propoſed to remedy an Inconveniency, uſually attending that ordinary Method, called Diſcuſſion, wherein it frequently happens, that men ſeldom ſufficiently comprehend the ſtrength of Proofs; becauſe they are not conſidered in their right order, which ever ſo placeth them as that they mutually aſſiſt and fortifie each other. I need but entreat him likewiſe to remember the firſt Title of the Treatiſe, before it was printed, when it was put into my Hands to be anſwered; which was as follows, A Treatiſe containing an eaſie Means to convince Hereticks, by ſhewing them there has no alteration bin made in the Churches Belief touching the Euchariſt, as I already obſerved in the Preface before my Anſwer. Laſtly I have no more to requeſt of him, but only to remember the new Title under which the firſt Treatiſe, and them which followed, were publiſhed, which is; The Perpetuity of the Faith of the Catholick Church touching the Euchariſt. For what elſe can be expected from a man that promiſes to make us confeſs, the Church of Romes Belief is the ſame with that of all Antiquity, and hopes to convince us of the Truth of this, but that he ſhould invalidate all our Proofs of matters of Fact, by which we think we have eſtabliſhed the reality of an Innovation? Would Mr. Arnaud grant me the favour to ſuppoſe a while that I am not obſtinate: and I will likewiſe on the other hand ſuppoſe I was miſtaken in Mr. Aubertin's Book, and that the Perſwaſion I had of the truth of his Proofs concerning an Innovation hath bin falſe. Now ſhould the Author of the Perpetuity pretend, that his Method is able to undeceive me and diſſipate all the falſe Impreſſions which Mr. Aubertin's Proofs have wrought in my Mind; ſhould he, I ſay, pretend to this, he has imagined, as I have already mentioned, that he is able by his Arguments, to invalidate our Proofs; and again on the other hand, if he pretends not to do this, he hath bin certainly to blame in ſaying, He would convince Hereticks, and make them acknowledge, (if they are not Invincibly Obſtinate) the Perpetuity of Tranſubſtantiation, and the Real Preſence. We ſhall ſee by what follows, whether or no Mr. Arnaud has upheld the honour of ſo great a Deſign, or whether he has not abated ſomething of it. I ſhall content my ſelf at preſent with only ſhewing the pretenſion of the Author of the Method.
IT cannot be alleadged in his behalf, he had not theſe aforementioned Proofs in his Mind, but only offered his own; which he judged concluſive; for beſides that when a man lays down a Method as ſufficient to produce an effect, he ought conſider whatſoever may hinder the producing of this or the contrary Effect. We may farther obſerve he aſſaults Mr. Aubertin's Book in this Treatiſe, wherein are contained theſe Proofs, concerning which he could not pretend Ignorance, ſeeing they make up the greateſt part of that Book. It ought moreover to be conſidered, that he refuteth, as I already ſaid in the foregoing Chapter, an Account whoſe whole ſtrength is grounded on theſe Proofs of matters of Fact, an Account which taketh them for its Foundation, and borroweth from them whatſoever it would perſwade, and refutes it not in oppoſing other Proofs after the ſame manner, but by Arguments. Whence it follows he imagins his Arguments are ſufficient to overthrow theſe Proofs, it being impoſſible if they ſtand firm, but that the account of the Change or Innovation ſhould do ſo too.
Mr. Arnaud's way of ſhifting the Queſtion that he might draw on the Reader to another matter, is ſo plainly evident, that I need not give him the leaſt hint of it. For there is certainly a great Difference betwixt barely Oppoſing Arguments againſt our Proofs, and pretending to invalidate them by Arguments. The firſt of theſe may be done without thinking on the ſecond; theſe Arguments may be examined and compared with our Proofs, without any other Pretence than the keeping the Mind in Suſpence, and hindering it from determining on either ſide. Had the Author of the Perpetuity kept himſelf within theſe Bounds, we ſhould have anſwered him after another ſort; but he hath extended his deſign ſo far as to bring us to a final Acknowledgment. The Queſtion then is not ſo much about his bare Oppoſition; altho that ſhall be ſhewed him at length to be uſeleſs, and that he cannot expect any advantage from it, for the Debate at preſent conſiſts either in the Juſtice or Injuſtice of his Deſign, when he imagined this Oppoſition was ſufficient to convince us, notwithſtanding our Prejudices againſt it, occaſioned by Mr. Aubertin's and other Miniſters Proofs.
BUT to ſtate the Queſtion clearly, it ought to be farther ſuppoſed, that we compare not here the Proofs drawn from Arguments, then when they are made uſe of to eſtabliſh Matters argued, with Proofs of matters of Fact, which are intended for a confirmation of the ſame matters of Fact. For I am far from denying, but there may be at ſome times Proofs drawn from Arguments, which are as concluſive in their kind, and bring along with them as much certainty of Evidence, as Proofs of Fact do in theirs. The Debate concerns the comparing theſe two ſorts of Proofs, in reſpect of a matter of Fact; for the Principal Queſtion betwixt us, is whether the Doctrine of the antient Church is the ſame with that of the Church of Rome at preſent, now this is a matter of Fact, which on one ſide is demonſtrated by Proofs of Fact, and which the Author pretends on the other ſide to demonſtrate by Proofs drawn from Arguments; which two ſorts of Proofs form contrary Concluſions on the ſame ſubject.
IT is farther to be conſidered, the Queſtion lies not in ſuppoſing our Proofs are frivolous, or uncertain, for then they might be oppoſed by Proofs drawn from Arguments; by pretending that the Fact would be more plainly demonſtrated by this means than by the other. Had the Author of the Perpetuity made this Suppoſition and well grounded it, we could not any longer keep to our Proofs of Fact, of whoſe weakneſs and inſufficieney he had already convinced us, we muſt then have hearkned to his Arguments. But we are not in this caſe, for he leaves our Proofs of Fact untouched in their whole ſtrength, and we are perſwaded of the truth and ſolidity of them. It being then thus with us, it remains to enquire, whether his Proofs drawn from Arguments can be ſufficient to make us alter our Judgments. The Author of the Perpetuity pretends they are, and I deny them to be ſo, ſo that to decide clearly this Point, we muſt compare theſe two ways of Proving, one with another.
I affirm then firſt of all, our Proofs of Fact are regular and natural, as I made apparent in my ſecond Chapter: whereas thoſe of the Author of the Perpetuity are unjuſt and prepoſterous. Now to compare theſe two Methods one with another, that which is natural is leaſt ſuſpicious, for there can be nothing ſaid againſt it, common Senſe leads us to it, but the other is ever lyable to Exception, by reaſon of its contrariety and obliquity. The latter of theſe leads a mans Mind by ſeveral Turnings and Windings, and the other makes it go ſtraight.
MOREOVER, our Proofs of Fact demonſtrate the matter immediately in it ſelf; but Proofs drawn from Reaſon cannot do this, but by a Proſpect thro other things, and by means of Connexions and Conſequences; Now it cannot be denyed, but of theſe two ways of knowing things, the one being immediate, and the other mediate; the one near, and the other diſtant, but that the firſt of theſe is the moſt diſtinct and certain: for not to ſay, that the Ideas of things grow weak, when they are diſcovered by a Medium, and that the Mind is more attentive, and ſo by conſequence more diſtracted, and leſs able, when it is forced, to apply it ſelf at the ſame time to three different Objects, viz. on the Concluſion, Principle, and Dependance which the Concluſion hath on its Principle, than when it hath but one only Object to conſider; beſides this I ſay, the orderly Connexion of things being leſs known to us than the things themſelves, it is eaſier to take for a Conſequence what is not one, than to take one thing for another. It is eaſier to deceive us by affirming, if an Alteration hath hap'ned, there muſt ſuch and ſuch Accidents have followed it, than it is by only telling us, Loe here the Alteration, and certainly a man is in leſs danger of being deceived this way than the other.
WHEN two Methods are offered as proper to demonſtrate a Queſtion in Debate, it ſeems to me, that a mans Reaſon will incline him to chooſe that way which brings him to the conſideration of the Point debated in all its ſeveral Relations and Circumſtances, rather than that which ſhews it him but in one. The Mind muſt be permitted to make ſeveral Reflections, becauſe divers Reflections ſtrengthen one another, and uniting together, they form a more extended and perfect Knowledg, even as ſeveral Rayes united give the greater Light. Now it cannot be denyed but our Proofs of Fact have this Advantage over them of the Perpetuity. For the latter of theſe reſpects no farther than the only impoſſibility of an Alteration; and concludes from thence, that the Doctrine of the Antient Church hath bin the ſame with that of the Church of Rome at preſent. But our Proofs examine the Belief of the Antient Church, in all the ways it can be examined in it ſelf, by its neceſſary Conſequences, by its Conſequences of Congruity, by way of Negation, and Affirmation, by Circumſtances of Time, Places, Perſons, and Occaſions, and in a word, after all manners imaginable, whereby the Mind may form a more ſolid and certain Judgment. What likelyhood is there then, that being already perſwaded by a conſiderable number of Proofs, which this Method draws from all theſe Particulars, we ſhould receive a contrary Impreſſion by the Author of the Perpetuity's Arguments?
A greater humane Certainty than that of Sence cannot be found, now that of Reaſoning falls commonly under this Degree, eſpecially when we apply it to matters of Fact.
BUT when Proofs drawn from Arguments ſhall be extended to the ſame Degree of Conviction, as thoſe of the Eye-ſight, and common Sence, they can never aſcend higher, or proceed ſo far as to convince us, and make us renounce their Evidence. It ſeldom happens that theſe two Lights juſtle one another, but when this falls out, a mans Mind never fails of taking one part or the other, it may remain for ſome time interdicted and aſtoniſhed; but unleſs ſome vain Philoſophy, as that of the Academicks, or Pyrrhoniens has corrupted it, and made it wander, it will ſoon rally it ſelf on the ſide of common Sence. I will produee an Example drawn from Phyſicks. Our Eyes and Sences ſhew us that a grain of Sand is not only finite, but far leſs than a Mountain, or the whole Globe of the Earth; yet there are People who endeavour to demonſtrate by the force of their Arguments, that this little grain of Sand comprehends an infinite number of Parts actually exiſtent, becauſe it may be divided ad infinitum, and it is not, ſay they, well conceivable how a thing can be ſo divided, if there be not in it actually an Infinity of Parts, ſeeing each Diviſion ſuppoſeth the actual Exiſtence of its Parts, from whence it ſeems, that this grain of Sand is as bigg as a Mountain, and the whole World beſides, it being impoſſible, ſay they moreover, there ſhould be a greater and larger heap than that which actually contains an Infinity of Parts. I doubt not but a mans Mind would be ſoon entangled in this Labyrinth, but he would extricate himſelf thence, not by the help of his Senſes but his Reaſon, he will turn it on every ſide, and invent Diſtinctions which will ſignifie nothing, as are the greateſt part of them which have bin made on this Subject; yet will he ſtill keep firm to his Eye-ſight and common Senſe.
IT will be replied perhaps, that unleſs we are extream Obſtinate, we cannot pretend our Proofs of Fact are of this kind, which is to ſay, that they have the certainty of our Senſes; for they are taken from the Teſtimony of the Fathers, whoſe Faithfulneſs may be called in queſtion, by ſetting up this fantaſtical Hypotheſis, mentioned by Mr. Arnaud, which is, That all our Paſſages are falſe, and invented by the Diſciples of John Scot, or elſe in ſaying, that the Fathers are miſtaken, or ſome ſuch like matter, which may Lib. 1. Ch. 2. Pag. 1.make the Truth and Validity of theſe Proofs to be called in Queſtion; and moreover that our Paſſages are not ſo plain, but they may well be queſtioned, ſeeing there have bin great Volums written concerning them on both ſides. To which I anſwer, in ſuppoſing two things which ſeem to me, to be both undenyable by Mr. Arnaud, we can pretend againſt him our Proofs of Fact have ſuch a kind of Certitude, as is that of our Senſes.
MY firſt Suppoſition then ſhall be, That the Writings of the Fathers are faithful Witneſſes of the Belief of the Antient Church. He cannot diſagree with me in this Point, for we have not receiv'd it but from them of the Church of Rome, they produce it themſelves, and we uſe it only out of Condeſcenſion to them, not having need, as to our own particular, of any thing but the Word of God to regulate our Faith in this Myſtery of the Euchariſt. And when this Point ſhould be queſtionable, yet muſt then the Author of the Perpetuity put it out of Queſtion by his refuting of it, before he propoſes to us his Arguments, and not having done it, we are at liberty to act againſt him on this Principle. The other Suppoſition we muſt make is, That we know very well, what is the Church of Romes Belief touching the Euchariſt, and that we rightly apprehend it, ſo that there is no danger of our Miſtake in this matter, and this is that which hath never yet bin diſputed againſt us. In effect, we neither ſay, nor imagine any thing on this Subject, more than what we find in Books, and hear diſcourſed on every Day, which is, that the whole Subſtance of Bread is really converted into the Subſtance of the Body of Jeſus Chriſt, and the whole Subſtance of Wine into the whole Subſtance of his Blood, there not remaining any thing more of the Bread and Wine but their meer Accidents, which are not ſuſtained by any Subject; and further, that the Subſtance of our Saviour's Body, is really preſent at the ſame time both in Heaven and Earth, on all the Altars whereon this Myſtery is celebrated: that they which communicate, eat and drink this Subſtance with the Mouths of their Bodies, and that it ought to be Worſhipped with the Adoration of Latria. This is undenyable.
I ſay then, on theſe Grounds, we have reaſon to preſume our Proofs of Fact are evident even to Senſe it ſelf. For we read the ſeveral Paſſages of the Fathers which ſpeak of the Euchariſt, our Eyes behold them, and our Senſes are Judges of them. But there are not any of theſe Articles to be met with, which do diſtinctly form the Belief of the Roman Church, neither in expreſs Terms, nor in equivalent ones. We are agreed in the Contents of theſe Articles, and in what they mean; we are likewiſe agreed of the Place where they were to be found, in caſe the Antient Church had taught them. We know likewiſe, that it belongeth to our Eyes and common Senſe to ſeek them, and judge whether they are there, or no; for when a Church believes and teaches them, ſhe explains them diſtinctly enough to make them underſtood, and we muſt not imagine they lie buried in far fetched Principles, or couched in equivocal Terms which leave the Mind in Suſpenſe; or wrapt up in Riddles, from whence they cannot be drawn but by hard Study. If they are in them they ought to be plain, according to the meaſure and Capacity of an ordinary and vulgar Underſtanding. Yet when we ſeek them, we cannot find 'em: if they were ſet down in expreſs Terms, our Eyes would have diſcovered them; had they bin in Equivalent ones, or drawn thence by evident and neceſſary Conſequences, common Senſe would have diſcovered them. But after an exact and thorow Search, our Eyes and common Senſe tell us, they are not to be found in any manner. This altho a Negative Proof, yet is it of greateſt Evidence and Certainty. After the ſame manner as when we would know whether a Perſon be at home, we are agreed both touching the Houſe and the Perſon, that one might not be taken for the other; and after an exact Search, if a mans Eyes and Senſes tell him that he is not there, the proof of a Negative Fact hath all poſſible Force and Evidence. Yet we are upon ſurer Terms, for a man may eaſily hide himſelf in ſome corner of his Houſe, and ſteal away from the ſight of thoſe that ſeek him; and therefore the Negative Proof ſerves only in this Reſpect, to juſtifie we have made a full and thorow Search. But if the Articles of the Romiſh Creed were eſtabliſhed in the univerſal Conſent of all Ages, (as is pretended,) it would not be ſufficient they were hid in ſome one of the Fathers Writings, they muſt near the matter have appeared in all of them; whence it follows, our Negative Proof is yet more certain, by the Confirmation it receives from an Affirmative Proof, which conſiſteth in that our Eyes and Senſes find out many things directly Oppoſite to theſe Articles, and theſe two Proofs joyned together do form one, which appeareth to be ſo plain and intire, that there needs nothing to be added to it. And yet this is it which the Author of the Perpetuity doth pretend to ſtrip us of by his Arguments. But let him extend his Pretenſions as far as he will, I believe he will find few Perſons approve of them, and who will not judge, that even then when our Eyes ſhould have deceived us, which is impoſſible after ſo diligent and careful a Search, the only means to diſabuſe us would be; to deſire us to return to the uſing of them again, and to convince us our Inquiry hath not bin ſufficient, we ſhould at leaſt have bin ſhewed what we our ſelves were not able to find. For whilſt nothing is offered us but Arguments, they will do us no good, we may be perhaps entangled with them, if we know not how to anſwer them, but they will never make us renounce the Evidence and Certainty which we believe to be contained in our Proofs of Fact.
WE are confirmed in this Belief, when we conſider the Nature of the Author of the Perpetuity's Arguments. For they are not Demonſtrations which convince a mans Mind, or of equal force with them which appear in our Proofs; being at fartheſt but mere Probabilities. They are Moral Impoſſibilities which he finds in the Alteration we ſuppoſe; as tho it were not poſſible but that the Biſhops and others of the Clergy, together with the People, would have oppoſed theſe Innovations, and diſturbed the Peace and Unity of the Church, under ſo great a Contrariety in their Opinions; and many ſuch like things doth he alledge, which are not grounded on any certain Principles, nor drawn from undeniable Conſequences. In general, its a hard matter to determine which are impoſſible Events, if you except them which carry along with them a palpable Contradiction; for the Cauſes or Principles of things are at a great diſtance from us, we know little of them but by their Effects, and theſe Effects not always ſhew themſelves at the Bottom, ſo that a man cannot poſitively ſay, this can be, or this cannot be. Moral Impoſſibilities are for the moſt part doubtful, eſpecially thoſe grounded on the Inclinations of the People, whoſe ways are many times ſo uncertain, and have ſo little of Uniformity in them, and ſo great Dependance on particular Circumſtances, that we cannot take any certain Rules from thence. Had the Author of the Perpetuity ſhewed us, That the Alteration we ſpeak of, doth imply a Contradiction, That 'tis contrary to the Nature of things, That there follows from it evident and intolerable Abſurdities, we ſhould then have examined his Arguments without troubling our ſelves with his Method. But to tell us what the Clergy and People would do in this, this can amount to no more, at fartheſt, but meer Conjectures, and even Conjectures very uncertain; for he is not the Arbitrator of all humane Actions, neither doth he know all their Principles and different Intereſts, nor underſtands all the Cauſes which concur in great Accidents, or all thoſe things which hinder them from hap'ning.
IT is then a great piece of Injuſtice to deſire, our Proofs of Fact ſhould yield to his way of Reaſoning, and I hope Mr. Arnaud will not take it ill that in making uſe of his own Terms, and accomodating them to my Subject, I tell him, That 'tis in vain that he conteſteth, and heateth himſelf about Lib. 10. Ch. 7 Pag. 55this Subject of an Alteration. Arguments ſignifie nothing in matters which are obvious to Senſe, and we can make them appear to be ſo in this Caſe.
IT remains, for the finiſhing of this Chapter, I ſhould ſatisfie ſome of Lib. 1. Ch. 1 P. 10.Mr. Aruands's minute Obſervations. The firſt of which is, That it is every whit as bad to oppoſe vain Arguments againſt Proofs of Fact which are firm and ſolid, as to object ſolid and convincing Arguments againſt vain and Frivolous Proofs. But there is no body who doubts of the Truth of this, and this is not the matter in Queſtion. When he ſhall have made it appear our Proofs are vain and frivolous, he ſhall be permitted to oppoſe againſt them his Arguments: Yea, and call them ſolid and convincing ones, 'till ſuch time as they be refuted. But our Proofs muſt always be begun withal, their weakneſs and vanity laid open, for without this we ſhall ſtill be at liberty to hold them for good, firm and Concluſive.
HE addeth, That not only Proofs of Fact are Invalidated by Proofs of Reaſoning; But likewiſe, that Proofs of Fact are reducible in ſome ſort to Proofs of Reaſoning; and even all of 'em grounded on Arguings like unto thoſe of the Author of the Perpetuity, that is to ſay, on the impoſſibility of certain Events, and that 'tis from theſe Arguings they borrow whatſoever they have of Solidity. And this he proves by the Example of the literal Proofs taken from Hiſtory, to eſtabliſh certain matters of Fact, and by the Proofs of Moſes's Miracles, and the Refurrection of our Saviour; concerning which the humane Certitude depends on a Moral Impoſſibility, which yet is not perceivable but only by force of Reaſoning. From thence he concludes, That a Proof is not to be Rejected, becauſe it is called a Proof drawn from Reaſon; no more than it is to be believed, becauſe 'tis called a Proof of matter of Fact; but that both one and the other are contemptible, or eſtimable, accordingly as they are Obſcure or Evident, True or Falſe, Slight or Solid, and that 'tis on the Quality of a Proof and not by its Kind, we ought to form our Judgment.
TO which I anſwer, we muſt diſtinguiſh two kinds of Proofs of Fact, the one Immediate, the others Mediate; the Immediate depend on our Senſes, the Mediate conſiſt in the Depoſition of Witneſſes. The certainty of the firſt of theſe doth not depend on Arguments, it being evident in it ſelf by its own Nature and Original; for in that we believe our Senſes; this Perſwaſion cometh not ſimply from Reaſons dictitating this to us; but becauſe their Teſtimony is perſwaſive in it ſelf, and that we cannot doubt of the things we ſee, unleſs we have corrupted our own Natures by a ſtrange Extravagancy.
AS to the ſecond kind of Proofs, we muſt conſider them either abſolutely, or in their Circumſtances; if abſolutely it is clear, their Certitude dependeth on Arguments, for we do not give Credit to Witneſſes, but only upon the account that Reaſon dictitateth we ought to believe them. Yet doth not this hinder them from being commonly ſtronger, in reſpect of the Fact they prove, than the Reaſoning grounded on the ſame matter of Fact; and that which diſtinguiſheth them is not their ſimple kind, but the Matter, or Subject to which they are applyed, ſeeing that an Argument is more Juſt and Certain, when it eſtabliſheth the Fidelity of Witneſſes, than when it would decide the Fact it ſelf concerning which the Witneſſes make their Depoſitions, whence it follows that the Teſtimony authoriſed by ſtronger Arguments, ought to be preferred before thoſe which are weaker. And after this manner do we prove the Truth of our Saviour's Reſurrection, beauſe the Teſtimony of the Apoſtles, being grounded on mighty Arguments, ſtands more firm, than all that the Wit of man is able to deviſe againſt it. But if the Proof taken from Witneſſes is attended with this Circumſtance, that is to ſay, that the Fidelity of the Witneſſes be agreed upon, and that this be an acknowledged and uncontroulable Principle, then, I ſay, this is no longer a Mediate Proof, but an Immediate one, it depending no longer on Arguments. For the Validity of a Teſtimony being a Point once decided, which ent'reth not into the Proof, but only as an undoubted Principle, it then remains only to know what the Witneſſes depoſe, and this is a Matter of which we may be informed by our Senſes, whence it follows, we muſt examine their Teſtimony, and that this way is to be preferred before that which is Argumentative on the ſame Fact.
IF we conſider the Fathers, not in reſpect of their own Belief, but as Witneſſes of the common Belief of the Church, I confeſs, their Authority dependeth on Reaſonings, and that it may be queſtioned; but beſides, it would not hence follow that the Proofs drawn from Arguments in this matter, that is to ſay, on the Churches Belief, would be more certain than their Teſtimony, ſeeing their Teſtimony may be eſtabliſhed on a Reaſoning ſtronger than theſe Proofs, and conſequently may be preferable to them. I ſay, beſides all this, this Point of the Fidelity of the Fathers is a Principle, we have the Advantage of ſuppoſing againſt Mr. Arnaud, ſeeing that hitherto the Church of Rome hath never queſtioned it, and that we take the Fathers only from his Hands, and deſcend to the Examination of their Teſtimony only out of complyance with him, as I have already mentioned: ſo that to ſpeak properly, we have no more to do, but only to know what hath bin their Doctrine. Now this is another matter of Fact, of which we think we can be informed by our Eyes, and by the Light of common Senſe, and we cannot imagine without a great Miſtake, that there hath bin more perſpicuity and certainty, in the Proofs drawn from Arguings; whence I may conclude again, that we are at Liberty to reject theſe Proofs, without troubling our ſelves with any farther Examination of them.
IT appeareth then clear enough (I think) that Mr. Arnaud's ſecond Chapter is but a vain Amuſement. And I cannot but be troubled, finding my ſelf obliged to alleadg ſeveral things which cannot but be grievous to them who ſhun Contention. But I could not but mention them, to follow Mr. Arnaud, to the end he might not take Advantage by my leaving him unanſwered.
WHAT he ſaies concerning pretended Proofs of Fact, viz. That they are often invalidated by Proofs fetched from Arguments, toucheth not our Queſtion. For there is no body denys that Reaſon doth not ſometimes correct a Miſtake in Senſe; and ſometimes again invalidates the Depoſition of Witneſſes, whether by making it appear that theſe are Falſe-Witneſſes who impoſe on us, or elſe in ſhewing they themſelves are miſtaken, or laſtly that their Teſtimony contains quite another thing than what is pretended. But altho that Proofs of Fact ought to be tried by Arguments, to know their Goodneſs, yet doth it not follow that when the Queſtion reſpects a matter of Fact, but that the way of Proofs is to be preferred before that of Arguments, on the ſame Subject; it doth leſs follow that when Perſons are prevented by Proofs of Fact, that they can be made to alter their Judgments, by ſimple Proofs drawn from Arguments, without ſhewing them that their pretended Proofs of Fact are not good. What he addeth concerning the Proofs of Fact, that they are all of 'em reducible in ſome ſort to Proofs of Reaſoning, is not true, in reference to immediate Proofs, and whatſoever there may be of Truth in this, yet is it uſeleſs, becauſe the Queſtion is not about a general Compariſon of Arguments with Proofs of Fact, but concerning the Compariſon applyed to the Fact it ſelf, which the Proof eſtabliſheth, and which lies now in Debate. All the following Diſcourſes, touching the Fidelity of Hiſtorians, the Battle of Canes, of Pharſalia, of Philippes, Actium, Caeſar, Pompey, and the City of Conſtantinople, are Digreſſions which our Diſpute hath nothing to do with. The Proofs of the Truth of Moſes's Miracles, and them of the Reſurrection of our Saviour, are good, but they belong not to our Subject. If the Queſtion concerned the proving the Fidelity of the Fathers Teſtimony, we would conſent to the making uſe of Arguments, after the ſame manner as they are made uſe of to prove the Fidelity of Moſes and the Apoſtles Teſtimony. But this is not the Point, our whole Queſtion is only to know what the Fathers have believed; and for this, Arguments are far leſs fit than Paſſages faithfully collected from their own Writings. Mr. Arnauds Hypotheſis, that all our Quotations of the Fathers have bin foyſted in them by John Scot and his Followers, is, as he is pleaſed to expreſs it on another Occaſion, a Fantaſtical Hypotheſis, from whence he can draw no Advantage, and what at fartheſt can have no Ground but in the Diſquiſition of the Paſſages themſelves. And laſtly his Concluſion that the Proofs of Fact, and the Proofs taken from Arguments, are either to be valued or ſlighted, as they are either Obſcure or Evident, Falſe or True, Vain or Solid, and that 'tis by the Quality of the Proof, and not by the kind of them that we muſt judge, this is I ſay a diſingenious Concluſion, for it is true that Proofs are eſtimable or deſpicable by their Quality, and not by their Kind: but their Kind and the Matter to which they are applied ſerve to foreſhew us their Quality, and their Quality being foreknown, rendreth them Eſtimable or Contemptible. A Proof drawn from Arguments, being made uſe of to ſubvert a matter of Fact, which is found eſtabliſhed by the ſight of our Eyes and common Senſe, bears, in this ſimple Compariſon, a ſufficient Number of falſe Characters, to make us conclude that it belongs to the number of thoſe ſubtile and looſe Proofs Mr. Arnaud mentions, which evaporate of themſelves, and vaniſh out of the Mind, Lib. 1. C 2. P. 10.as the Ayr doth out of our Mouths, it not being neceſſary to enter into a more particular Examination of them. Seeing then we have Reaſon to ſuppoſe our Proofs are good and Subſtantial, as I made it apparent in my firſt Chapter, we may likewiſe well conclude in this, that the Author of the Perpetuity's Reaſonings are vain and groundleſs, and conſequently to be rejected without troubling our ſelves any farther with them.