The Catholic Doctrine of the Eucharist in All Ages, Book 1 · Chapter 1
CHAP. I.
That I have reaſon to take for granted, as I have done, the Proofs of Mr. Aubertin, againſt the Book of the Perpetuity, till Mr. Arnaud hath ſhewed them to be Invalid.
ALthough the Paſſion, which appeareth throughout Mr. Arnaud's whole Book, doth in a manner perſwade me that his Cenſures are not always reaſonable, yet ſhall not this hinder me from examining them with a compoſed Mind: If they are found juſt, I ought to make my Advantage of them, without minding the ſharpneſs which accompanies them; and if they are not, the Intereſt of my Cauſe requires I ſhould endeavour to manifeſt the Injuſtice of them by a modeſt and Chriſtian Defence.
AND this Method I intend to uſe, not only in the beginning but likewiſe in all the following parts of this Work, which I dedicate to the diſcovery of Truth, and the advancement of Gods Glory, who is the Author and Father of Lights, and of Truth.
IT is certain, ſaith Mr. Arnaud, in the beginning of his Book, that provided Mr. Claude may be granted the Priviledge, which he immediately lays hold on, of inventing, and ſuppoſing, what he liſts, he takes a very ſure way to conclude from thence what he pleaſes. I only admire that while he fancies he has this peculiar Liberty, he yet ſtill buſies himſelf in writing Books: For he can abſolutely determine all our Differences with a great deal leſs trouble. For he has no more to do but only immediately to ſuppoſe that the Reaſon is on his ſide, and that the Catholicks are in the wrong, and ſo the whole Controverſie will be at an end, and thus may he ſatisfie himſelf with writing half a Page inſtead of an entire Anſwer, for it decideth the whole; 'Tis but ſuppoſing that Mr. Aubertin's Book hath gotten the Victory over the Romiſh Schools, and that he has manifeſted to all the World, the Change the Roman Church hath made; That the Proofs are clear, ſtrong, and numerous, which make the Change ſenſibly apparent, and that he hath not been oppoſed with any other than falſe and imaginary Reaſonings: What need is there then of any other reply, and to what purpoſe does Mr. Claude take upon him all this Trouble? Calviniſm hath now won the Day, and Catholick Religion is utterly Routed.
THE right of oppoſing to the reaſonings of the Author of the Perpetuity, the Proofs of the matters of Fact contained in Mr. Aubertin's Book, and to ſpeak our Thoughts concerning it, is not ſo marvelous, nor ſuch an extraordinary deſign that Mr. Arnaud ſhould need raiſe ſuch a Conteſt about it. This Author having undertaken to make us confeſs, if we are not deſperately obſtinate, that the Belief of the Roman Church, touching the Euchariſt, is the ſame with that of all Antiquity, and having made uſe of no other reaſonings for this purpoſe, but thoſe which are taken from the moral Impoſſibility of this Change which we believe hath hap'ned; Common Senſe convinces us that he is bound to examine the Proofs of Matters of Fact on which the Opinion, he would root out of our Minds, is eſtabliſhed, for till then all his Arguings will be to no purpoſe. Neither can we juſtly be denied the Liberty of mentioning theſe Proofs according to our real Thoughts. For ſeeing we offer them againſt the Author of the Perpetuity, only as a prejudication which hinders us from heark'ning to his Arguments, it is therefore very requiſite we ſhould ſpeak our Thoughts about them, to the end that if this Author continues in the deſign of bringing us to an acknowledgment of what he pretends, he eſpecially take care to remove, as much as in him lies, thoſe things which render all his other Endeavours ineffectual.
I do not at all doubt if mens Minds were free from Prejudice, but it would be granted that Mr. Aubertin's Book doth perfectly decide the Controverſie touching the Euchariſt. It being a complete Piece, in which this matter is ſearched to the bottom. He hath anſwered thoſe who have treated on this Subject before his time, and yet his Book has layn even to this preſent unanſwer'd, which is a ſufficient Reaſon to preſume he hath gotten the better, and that his Proofs, let Mr. Arnaud ſay what he will, are plainly evident and numerous; but for as much as it is needful for the ending of a Difference, and quieting Contradiction, to ſuppoſe Principles granted by both Parties, and ſeeing the Church of Rome doth neither agree in the Proofs nor in the Change, here in Queſtion, I do thereupon freely confeſs the Controverſie lyes ſtill open in this reſpect, and that in general we cannot ſtop any mans mouth by the ſimple ſuppoſition of the Strength and Solidity of that Book, for every Man is at liberty, and hath Right (if he pleaſes) to examine and anſwer it.
BUT had not Mr. Arnaud ſuppreſſed a great part of what I wrot on this Subject, as well in my firſt as ſecond Anſwer, it would immediately appear, I have bin ſo far from making ſuch a claim as that wherewith he chargeth me, that I have every where expreſly maintained the contrary.
SEEING that Mr. Aubertin has made it appear, by expreſs Paſſages taken out of the Fathers (theſe are the Words in my firſt Anſwer.) That Tranſubſtantiation was unknown to the antient Church, we may then well conclude there has hap'ned a Change, eſpecially conſidering that this ſame Tranſubſtantiation was not heard of till the 11th. Century; Now conſidering this, for a Man to Philoſophize on the impoſſibility thereof, is to give himſelf a great deal of Trouble to no purpoſe. If there yet remain'd any thing farther to be done, it would be to ſhew that the Paſſages produced by Mr. Aubertin are either falſe, or alleaged impertinently againſt Tranſubſtantiation: but to paſs by theſe matters of Proof, which are clear, expreſs and concluſive, to adhere to I know not what kind of pretended impoſſibility, this is to trifle with the matter in hand.
OBSERVE here again what I ſaid in my ſecond Anſwer. We had reaſon to hope that the Author, treating my Abridgment in the reſpects and relations which the ſequel of its Reaſons oblige him to, ſhould have applyed himſelf unto one of theſe two things.
EITHER to make it appear that Mr. Aubertin's Proofs, on which we have relyed, are falſe, and of no force, or that the Conſequence, which is pretended to be drawn from them, is untrue; That is to ſay, it do's not follow a thing is poſſible, altho it be made apparent that this very thing has actually hap'ned.
WHEN a man makes Suppoſitions of this kind, how abſurd is it to ſay, ſuch a one puts himſelf in Poſſeſſion of any Priviledge, or uſurps that marvelous Right, of terminating Differences, or deciding Controverſies by groundleſs Suppoſitions? For I not only give this Author of the Perpetuity the liberty of oppoſing Mr. Aubertin's Proofs, and to ſhew, if he can, the falſity of them, but I conjure him ſo to do, being engaged thereunto by the conſideration of his own Reputation, and the neceſſity of this Courſe to end the Controverſie. Now if this may be ſtiled by Mr. Arnaud the deciding of a Difference, I am certain that in the ſtyle of a more impartial Judge, this would be called, a diſengaging of the Debate out of an endleſs turning, to bring it back to a neceſſary Diſcuſſion on which dependeth the deciſion of our Controverſie. Mr. Arnaud therefore unjuſtly chargeth me with intending to decide the Queſtion, and terminate the Difference by a ſimple Suppoſition, and 'tis through want of Sincerity he has ſuppreſſed thoſe Paſſages in my Anſwer, which plainly evidence my real Deſign. But beſides theſe two Defaults which immediately offer themſelves to be obſerved in his Proceedings, I muſt ingeniouſly declare that 'tis very hard for me to comprehend what he would have me to do. He ſeems to deſire me to prove that the Proofs of Mr. Aubertin's Book are clear, ſtrong and numerous, before we ſuppoſe them to be ſuch. But pray what means proving of Proofs? How can a man otherwiſe prove them than in producing them, and engaging to defend them when they ſhall be attacked? Now this hath bin done, they have bin produced, in referring to a Book which is eaſily met with, there has bin an Abridgment made thereof, they have bin ſet forth with ſome Enlargments; The Author of the Perpetuity hath bin requeſted to ſhew the inſufficiency or falſity of them. What can Mr. Arnaud deſire more? Would he have Mr. Aubertin's Book reprinted at the Head of mine, together with a Commentary on the Solidity of his Proofs? But yet ſtill perhaps he would not grant us the Liberty to ſpeak advantageouſly of it, we muſt have proved the Solidity of the firſt Commentary by a ſecond, and that of the ſecond by a third, and ſo heap up Commentary upon Commentary till Dooms-Day. For he that would have us prove the Proofs of Mr. Aubertin's Book may, by the ſame reaſon, require us likewiſe to prove the ſolidity of our Commentaries, and having ſet no bounds to his Demands, 'tis probable he would have extended them farther. Theſe are the firſt Fruits of Mr. Arnaud's frollickſom Philoſophy, the next time when he lights not into ſo pleaſant a Humor, we ſhall have others, but perhaps not ſuch diverting ones. But be it as it will, there is (I am ſure) a great deal of diſorder in this proceeding, for the ſtrength of a Proof is with good Reaſon ſuppoſed by that Perſon who offers it, till it hath received a ſatisfactory Anſwer, and ſo likewiſe the ſolidity of an Anſwer is taken for granted by him who makes it, till ſuch time as it ſhall be oppoſed by a good Reply. And certainly ſuch a man would appear Ridiculous, who would offer to put a ſtop to a Diſpute, and exempt himſelf from replying thereunto, by ſaying, prove to me the ſolidity of your Anſwer. If a Proof be not good, it belongs to him who anſwereth it, to ſhew its Defects, and if an Anſwer be impertinent, it lies upon the Opponent to diſcover the abſurdity thereof. For till then every man is at liberty to ſpeak his Thoughts.
ALTHO this is not a proper Place to treat on the different Uſe which may be made of Suppoſitions in a Controverſie, yet will I not forbear to ſpeak ſomewhat thereon to diſcover more plainly Mr. Arnaud's Miſtakes.
THE Suppoſitions then commonly made uſe of, are of two ſorts, ſome of them tend abſolutely to decide a Difference, others ſerve only to regulate it.
WHEN a man makes a Suppoſition to decide abſolutely a Difference, there ought to be ſuppoſed no other things but thoſe which are acknowledged and granted to be true by the Adverſaries themſelves, for theſe Suppoſitions are as common and inviolable Prejudications which ought to ſerve as a Law to direct the Judgment in the whole Controverſie.
BUT when we make Suppoſitions only to regulate the form of a Controverſie, and hinder men from caſting themſelves into fruitleſs Conteſts, it ſufficeth the things ſuppoſed be eſteemed true by them who ſuppoſe them, others remaining ſtill in the liberty of judging and oppoſing them, if they think fit. So that after this manner each Party ſuppoſeth his Sentiment true, and termeth it his Hypotheſis, that is to ſay his Suppoſition; and if a man ſuppoſed it not true, he would not maintain it. We ſuppoſe likewiſe at the ſame time the Sentiment of the contrary Party falſe, for if we ſuppoſed it not falſe, we ſhould not reject it. And this is the true ſtate of a Controverſie. That every man be permitted to ſuppoſe he hath truth on his ſide, and act, or defend himſelf on this Suppoſition, yet allowing others the liberty to ſuppoſe the contrary; And this is not that which decideth a Debate, but that which forms it; For by this means there is given to the Controverſie its juſt Bounds, and a man avoids wand'rings, in running after needleſs things; both parties have a juſt Equality allotted them, and ſo far as this, a Perſon cannot be required to ſhew his Proof for what he ſuppoſeth, provided he fully and unfeignedly declares his Opinion.
IN the following Parts of a Controverſie, there ought to be a diſtinction made between that Perſon who oppoſeth a thing, and he who anſwereth or defendeth it. The firſt of theſe deſigns ſo to order it that his Adverſary ſhall be obliged to change his Opinion, and therefore he ought not to propoſe any thing which he makes not good by Proofs; but he has likewiſe Right (as I ſaid juſt now) to ſuppoſe his Proofs good, till ſuch time as the contrary party has made ſome Anſwer. And it would be very abſurd to affirm ſuch a one deſigns to end the Difference by his Suppoſitions, or is obliged to prove his Proofs are good, ſeeing he grants every one the Liberty to anſwer them, and in effect if there appears no Anſwer, the Difference is decided.
NOW as to him who anſwereth a matter, having upon this account no other aim but that of rendering ineffectual the Attempt of his Adverſary, he has always the Right to ſuppoſe his Opinion true without proving it, being only obliged to anſwer the Proofs which are brought againſt him, and diſcover either the falſity or inſufficiency of them. A man cannot perhaps fall into a greater irregularity, than to conſtrain him that Anſwereth, (and who has no more to do than to refure the Arguments alledged againſt him,) to make Arguments himſelf, and to pretend that he hath no right to propoſe his Anſwers taken from the Opinions themſelves which he defendeth, if he hath not before this proved his Opinion. Either he who oppoſeth muſt make apparent the falſity of the ſuppoſed Opinion, or elſe he muſt yield it to be true.
I know that in a publick Diſpute, mannaged by writing, it commonly happens, that the ſame Perſon oppoſeth another and defendeth himſelf, propounds and anſwers, according as the occaſion and matter requireth, but we are notwithſtanding obliged to diſtinguiſh theſe two Qualities, of Aggreſſor and Reſpondent, and preſerve to each his Right apart; for it would be a very diſorderly matter to expect a man ſhould do that when he anſwereth, which he is not obliged to do but when he oppoſeth, or to expect he ſhould do that when he oppoſeth, which he is not obliged to do but in anſwering. It ſometimes happens that an Adverſary makes an Exchange, and whereas he is obliged to anſwer directly to the Proofs of the contrary Party, or to oppoſe others againſt him of the like Nature and Force, he ſhifts them and falls into a Diſcourſe to no purpoſe, and all this while the contrary Proofs he ſhould have anſwered, remain firm. In ſuch an occaſion we have Power to reduce ſuch a one from his affected Wand'rings, by ſuppoſing the Proofs he has left unanſwered, ſtrong and ſollid. For in ſuch a caſe they are not ſuppoſed good and firm, but only to oblige him to anſwer them, and ſhew their weakneſs or falſity, and if he anſwereth them not, we may reckon as to him the Queſtion in effect is decided, becauſe when a man hath nothing to ſay againſt the Method of proceeding, and that the forementioned Proofs have bin propoſed according to the exact Rules of Diſputation, a man muſt then either acquieſce in them or anſwer them, and to do neither of theſe is mere wrangling.
NOW to apply theſe Maxims to the matter in hand, and to judge of Mr. Arnaud's Cenſure, we need but conſider firſt, That when I ſuppoſed Mr. Aubertin's Proofs to be firm and good, I did not thereby propoſe to my ſelf an abſolute end of the Queſtion touching the Change which hath hapned in the Church of Rome, by this ſimple Suppoſition; but only to regulate the Debate, and reduce it within thoſe Bounds wherein it ought to be. Secondly, that in ſuppoſing them good, I have only delivered my Opinion which I take upon me to maintain againſt the Author of the Perpetuity, without depriving him of the Liberty of defending the contrary. Thirdly, that I have ſuppoſed them to be good without proving them ſo, becauſe we ever ſuppoſe Proofs ſufficiently firm, till ſuch time as ſomething at leaſt is objected againſt them, and hitherto Mr. Aubertin's Book has layn unanſwered. Fourthly, that I made uſe of them as a means whereby to reſiſt the Author of the Perpetuity's attempt, and when a man only defends himſelf in a Diſpute, he is not obliged to prove any thing. Fifthly and laſtly, I did not offer them but only as Prejudices at his Opinion, which ought neceſſarily to be removed out of our Minds, before the Arguments of the Perpetuity be offered us; for as much as theſe Prejudices make the Author's Reaſonings ineffectual and improper to that deſign of making us acknowledg there hath bin introduced no Change into the Roman Church. From whence it follows, that I may not only ſuppoſe theſe Proofs are clear, firm, and numerous, ſeeing that 'tis under this Notion we have entertained theſe Prejudices; but morever ſuppoſe them without proving them, and I do ſo, to the end I may oblige the Author of that Treatiſe to ſhew us (if he can) that they do not amount to what we imagine.
IN ſhort if he would obtain his end, he muſt ſhew us that our Prejudice ought not to hinder us from hearkning to what he hath farther to offer us, (which is to ſay,) ſuppoſing our Proofs to be moſt firm and evident, yet ought they not to avert our Minds from conſidering his moral Conjectures;) or ſhew us that our Prejudices have no grounds, and that our Proofs are neither plain nor ſufficient. The firſt of theſe is abſurd, the ſecond is what we deſire him to take in hand. But inſtead of this Mr. Arnaud has bethought himſelf, and requires us to prove the validity of our Proofs.
IF our Proofs, being ſuppoſed good, are in effect the Calviniſts Victory, and the Romaniſts Defeat, as Mr. Arnaud himſelf granteth, we have reaſon to admire he ſhould think he hath overthrown them, by five or ſix Lines ſtuffed with Raillery.
HATH he bin more concerned at the calling of the Reaſonings of the Perpetuity, imaginary Conjectures, than at the glorious Victory over the Romiſh Church which hath bin attributed to Mr. Aubertin's Book, and this Innovation brought in by the Church of Rome, which is apparent to all the World? Doth he more value the Reputation he thinks he hath gotten by writing a ſmall Treatiſe, than the ſettlement of the Catholick Church? and ought he, for the intereſt of a particular work, to have rifled both Eaſt and Weſt, whilſt in the mean time the Catholick Church periſheth before his eyes, lying proſtrate Mr. de Vence in his Approbation.at the Feet of Victorions Calviniſme. I will grant my Suppoſition reſides but in my own Imagination, and in theirs of the ſame Communion, yet certainly this a man would think, ſhould be ſufficient to ſtir up the Zeal, of a Perſon whom the Son of God hath given to the Church to be a Teacher of Truth, and who hath bin enlightned by his Grace, and filled with his Spirit, on purpoſe to reſcue and vindicate Truth from the Subtilties, and falſe Gloſſes of Error, as ſpeaketh one of his Approbationers.
THIS I think ſhould be ſufficient to make him prefer the Reputation of his whole Church before that of a ſingle Author, of whoſe name the greateſt part of the World is ſtill ignorant. And moreover, as hath bin already ſaid, this Prejudice under which we labour, whether true or falſe, makes a diſtinction between the intereſt of this Treatiſe, and thoſe of the Romiſh Church, for it puts a ſtop to all the pretenſions of the Author, and bereaves him of all the Conqueſts he promiſed himſelf. For to regain the Author of the Perpetuity's Reputation, will be to no purpoſe, ſeeing that Calviniſme will not give over celebrating Aubertin's Victories, and ſtand firm to his Proofs. The Confutation of Aubertin's Book would be to give ſuch a mighty ſtroak, as would ever ſtop the Mouth of Calviniſm, and at the ſame time, raiſe up the Glory of the Catholick Church out of the Duſt. There ought to have bin no waverings between theſe two Parties, and yet Mr. Arnaud, this Doctor who hath bin given to the Church furniſhed with ſuch Gifts, betakes himſelf to the writing of a Treatiſe, and ſends the Church away till another time.
IN ſhort, to finiſh the juſtification of my yet unproved Suppoſition, I need but propoſe the Example of a man who, to ſhew me the Victorys which the Treatiſe of the Perpetuity hath obtained againſt us, if we have any Reaſon left us, ſuppoſeth without proving it, that the Proofs of this Book are plain and ſolid. If I ſhould apply to him Mr. Arnaud's Maxims, and tell him that provided he may have the Liberty which he immediately makes uſe of, inventing and ſuppoſing what he pleaſeth, he is in a ſure way to conclude thence what he will, that theſe kind of diſcourſes founded on unproved Suppoſitions, are not wholy judicious, and that they ſhew he knoweth not how to diſtinguiſh between the things which he is not permitted to aſſert till he hath proved them, and thoſe which may be juſtly ſuppoſed without being proved.
IF this man reply to me, he has only made this Suppoſition to oblige Mr. Claude to acknowledg he hath no other means left to defend himſelf, but by ſhewing (if he can) the Reaſonings of this Treatiſe are not juſt; May I not then juſtly retort upon him, that I only ſuppoſe Mr. Aubertin's Proofs are plain and firm, that I may thereby force the Author of the Perpetuity to confeſs he hath no other way left him to defend himſelf, but to ſhew, if he be able, that theſe Proofs are invalid? Mr. Arnaud perhaps would be ſo reaſonable as not to deny me the liberty of making uſe of theſe Principles, and ſo much the rather becauſe there is a very material and advantagious difference on my ſide, ſeeing, as already mentioned, I am Reſpondent in this Diſpute; whereas this Perſon would be the Aggreſſor. But you will ask me, who this man is, that is ſo little acquainted with Mr. Arnaud's Maxims? Even Mr. Arnaud himſelf, who having produced a long train of Arguments in the fifth and ſixth Chapters of his firſt Book; to ſhew us that the Learned, and Unlearned, the Simple, and Obſtinate, and all Perſons in general ought to acquieſce in the Proofs of the Perpetuity, he thereupon makes this Concluſion, 'Tis true, ſaith he, that theſe Arguments being applyed to the Book of the Lib. 1. Ch. 6. pag. 62. pag. 63.Perpetuity, ſuppoſe the Proofs are clear and ſolid; and therefore I make uſe of them in this place to remove theſe vain Exceptions of Mr. Claude, who would have them rejected without examining them, on this general Reaſon, That they are Argumentative Proofs. Mr. Claude hath no other way of defending himſelf than by ſhewing, if he can, the Arguments in this Treatiſe are not ſound. We ſhall ſee by what follows, whether he had reaſon to make this Suppoſition, I ſhall content my ſelf at preſent with concluding according to his Example, that every man may make Suppoſitions, provided he intends not thereby to end the Debate, but only oblige an Adverſary to come to the Diſcuſſion of that Point which he is not willing to meddle with. And thus doth Mr. Arnaud cenſure in another that which he doth himſelf.