The Practical Divinity of the Papists Discovered to be Destructive, Discourse · Chapter 8 · Section 18 – Section 19
SECT. XVIII.
AVerſation to, or grief at Spiritual and Divine things, is another capital crime in their reckoning, which is called Acedia. The object is God, as to mans friendſhip and communion with him, and the ſpiritual acts and duties requiſite thereto: the act they expreſs by ſloth, and lothneſs to meddle with theſe things, coldneſs tepidneſs about them, not caring for them, nauſiating and accounting them a grievance▪ This ſome of them do not deny to be a mortal ſin, but they will have it mortal only upon ſuch ſtrange terms, that any one may have a great averſation for God, and the things of God, without danger of deadly guilt; for they define (p)Definiri poteſt, eſſe vitium inclinans ad triſtandum de bono ſpirituali divino, quatenus eſt divi…um ſecundum mentem utriuſque Thomae. 2. 2. q. 35, art. 2. Navar. cap. 23. n. 124. Triſtitia de bono ſpirituali in quantum eſt divinum. Sylveſt. ſum. v. Acedia. n. 1.it by an agrievedneſs at what is Spiritual and Divine, quatenus eſt divinum, as it is Divine, and not otherwiſe: not (q)Non prout eſt laborioſum vel moleſtum corpori aut delectationis ejus impeditivum. 22 q. 35. art. 2.becauſe it is laborious or troubleſome to the fleſh, or any impediment to its pleaſures, which are Aquinas words; but under that formality, in that it is divine, (r)Navar. ibid. Sylveſt. ibid.as his followers underſtand it. So that the greateſt diſaffection to ſpiritual things, if it be becauſe they are unſuitable to corrupt nature, not agreeable to the fleſh it's eaſe and pleaſure (which is the common and ordinary cauſe of it), if it be not on an account (s)Peccatom eſt valde grave, generoque ſuo mortale, cum deliberato, & advertente animo admittitur, quod raro videtur contingere. Navar. ibid,that rarely falls out, as they acknowledg, and which a man can ſcarce ever deliberately be ſubject to; it brings him not under this guilt. So Cajetan tell us, (t)Si vero de hoc (ut ſit civis ſanctorum & nomeſticus Dei, &c.) non tristatur ſecundum affectum, ſed ſecundum effectum, quia parum de hujuſmodi amicitiae bono curat; negligens adipiſci illum, quia vacat delectabilibus humanis, peccatum Acediae non incurrit. Cajet. ſum. v. Acedia.if a man not as to his affection, but in effect, be grieved at this (viz) that he is to be a Citizen with the Saints and one of Gods family); becauſe he little cares for the happineſs of this Divine friendſhip, neglecting to attain it, becauſe, he gives up himſelf to other delights; he is not guilty of this ſin. Angelus, that he may diſcover when this diſaffection to Spiritual and Divine things is mortal, and when Venial, tells us, that (u)Aut (conſiſtit) in omiſſione eorum quae non ſunt neceſſaria & ſic eſt veniale peccatum. Sum. v. Acedia. n. 1. Si omittit ea quae ſunt de neceſſitate ſalutis, peccat mortaliter: ſi vero alias debita peccat venial…ter. Cajetan. ſum. v. Inconſt.when it conſiſts in the omiſſion of things not neceſſary to Salvation, it is Venial; that is, it is little or no fault, if all the duties of real worſhip, all the acts of grace and Chriſtian vertues, are omitted: for we cannot yet diſcern that they account any of theſe neceſſary to Salvation, and by the premiſes it appears that they do not. It is Venial, ſays Sylveſter, (x)Eſt autem veniale, quando homo quidem in operando attaediatur, ſed tamen ea ad quae tenetur, non omittit. Ibid. n. 2.when a man counts the doing of it grievous, but yet omits not what he is bound to. Angelus expreſſeth it more ſignificantly; by this it appears (y)Et ex hoc patet quid dicendum de eo qui attaediatus abhominatur divina & ſpiritualia: quia niſi ſint neceſſaria ad ſalutem, & ea dimittat vel deliberate diſponat dimittere non peccat mortaliter. Sum. ibid.ſays he, what is to be ſaid of him, who counts grievous, and abominates Divine and Spiritual things, ſince unleſs they be neceſſary to Salvation, and he declines them or is deliberately diſpoſed to decline them, he ſins not mortally. So that Spiritual and Divine things (all that they count not neceſſary; that is, all in a manner which is requiſite for a Chriſtian) may be abhorred, without any mortal guilt. And herein the two ſums agree well enough, though they ſeem to be at ſome odds. It is falſe, (z)Falſum eſt, quod dicta abominatio (ſpiritualium) ſemper ſit peccatum mortale. Sum. v. malitia.ſays Sylveſter, (not limitting it to things neceſſary) that abominating of Spiricual things, is always a mortal ſin. Accordingly he determines, that (a)Rancor 1. diſplicentia hominum inducentium ad ſpiritualia & eſt veniale. v. Acedia n. 4. Neque mortaliter peccat, qui faſtidiam, indignationem, & quandam averſionem concipit in eos, qui ſpiritualiae conſulunt, ut in concionatores, aut alios. Bonacin. 1. praeeept. d. 3. q. 4. p. ult. ſect. 1. n. 6.rancour againſt thoſe who would induce us to Spiritual things (that is, would draw us to God or the things of God), is a Venial fault. It is no mortal ſin (ſay others) to conceive an indignation and loathing of thoſe who perſwade to what is Spiritual (ſo as not to indure to hear or ſee them), whether Preachers or others. We ſee by this (as by other inſtances) that ſins ſo ſtated, as they are ſcarce ever practicable, they can be content to have them counted mortal; but common provocations, and ſuch of which there is moſt danger, muſt paſs for Venials; yea, there are ſome amongſt them, who will have this capital crime, though it have ſuch a deadly aſpect, both in itſelf, and in its effects, to be no mortal ſin. Laiſius Turrian. ibid. ſect. 3. n. 2.
SECT. XIX.
ANger ſtands in their general account, as another capital crime. I have touch'd it before; but here let us ſee how criminal they make it, when in particulars they bring up their reckoning. It is conſidered in reſpect of the mode or degree; and the tendency or effects of it. As to the degree of it, how high ſoever it riſe, to what exceſs ſoever it tranſport one, inwardly or outwardly, (b)Attenditur orde rationis in ira—ut ſcil. motus irae non immoderate ferveſcat interius vel exterius, qui ordo ſi praetermittatur non erit fine peccato—ſed non erit mortale ex genere ſuo: ſed poſſit eſſe mortale peccatum, puta ſi ex vehementia irae excidat à dilectione Dei vel proximi. Angel. ſum. v. ira. n. 1. Sylveſt. ibid. n. 4. Cajetan. ſum. v. ira.it is not in its own nature mortal, unleſs it be ſo vehement as to bear down both love to God and man, and leave the paſſionate perſon, neither which yet it will not do, though it ſally out furiouſly into curſes or blaſphemies againſt God or man, if this be but meerly Verbal, as (c)Navat. c. 23. n. 117. & alii ſupra.we ſaw before. The tendency of it, that which it leads to, is revenge; and as to that, it will be Venial if the revenge be but little, or it may be great when it can be taken legally; or it may be great and illegal too if the paſſion he but quick and great enough. The more exceſſive it is, the more miſchief it may do, and be innocent, if the paſſion (d)Paſſiones niſi ad deliberatum conſenſum vindictae inducant, veniales ſunt. Cajetan. v. rixa. poſſit eſſe veniale propter imperfectionem actus, quia praevenit deliberationem. Sylv. v. ira n. 4. Angelus ibid.prevent deliberation when it comes, and hinder it while it ſtays: both it, and the effects of it, how horrid ſoever, will be Venial. So that if one be angry enough, he may Blaſpheme God, renounce Chriſt, perjure himſelf, kill or burn whom or what he will, with little, or no fault. Thus by their Doctrine, this capital crime ſeems more like a vertue, than a vice, ſince the greater is the better; or at leaſt the leſs it has to do with reaſon, the more excuſable and Venial. Other extravagant paſſions meet with as favourable meaſures. (e)Indigratio (qua ex ira afficitur homo proximo tanquam indigno ſua affabilitate, corverſatione & hujuſmodi), peccatum eſt propter inordinatam paſſionem; & communiter veniale. Cajetan. Sum. v. Indignatio. Sylv. v. Indignatio. Angel. ſum. v. diligere. n. 2.Indignation, which makes a man diſdain others, as unworthy of his converſation or affable treatment, it is commonly Venial. (f)Audacia ſi pura eſt communiter eſt, peccatum veniale: Sicut immoderata iracundia, & immoderatus timor; quia non contrariantur charitati, ſed a recta exorbitant rationis regula. Cajetan. v. audacia.Audaciouſneſs, in it ſelf, is no worſe; nor exceſſive wrath and immoderate fear, becauſe they are not contrary to Charity, but exorbitant from the right meaſures of reaſon. So Intimidity, or (z)(g) Veniale autem peccatum hoc eſt, quando ex ſtultitia excuſabili procedit—tantaque poſſit eſſe ſtoliditas, quod nullum eſſet peccatum.Fool-hardineſs is Venial, when it proceeds from tolerable fooliſhneſs; but the folly may be ſo great, that the fault will be none. Alſo (h)Idem. ibid. v. Incontinentia.incontinent deſires, or Luſts: Love likewiſe, whether of the Fleſh, or the World. Of the former thus Angelus; (i)Amor ſui eſt, quum quis nimis diligit ſeipſum quaerendo delectationes corporis nimis, & quietem carnis, & procedi ex luxuria, quod eſt peccatum mortale ſolum, ſi propter eum non implet praecepta aut facit contra: aliter communit… eſt veniale, Sum. v. Amor ſui.Immoderate ſelf-love, when one exceſſively ſeeks the delight of the body, and eaſe of the fleſh, it proceeds from Luxury, yet it is commonly Venial, when it cauſes not other mortal acts, or neglects. As for love of the world (k)Diligitu… ad neceſſitatem, & ſic non eſt peccatum—Eſt etiam diligere mundum i. e. longo tempore velle ſtare in mundo propter delitias, & ſic eſt veniale peccatum. Idem. ibid. v. diligere. n. 3.to love it for neceſſity, is noſin, and to love to ſtay a long time in the world, for the pleaſures of it, is but a venial fault.
Sect. 19. Envy is another capital crime, and in general they inveigh againſt it, as (l)Soto de Juſt. & jur. l. 4. ar. p. 176.a Deviliſh wickedneſs; yet when they come to give particular rules for Conſcience and practice, they leave room enough for the entertainment of it in the hearts and lives of their Catholicks: the general notion of it, is an exceſſive grief at the good of others, but all are acquitted from mortal quiet, who grieve at others good, becauſe it may be prejudicial to themſelves, or becauſe they want it. So far a man may envy all in the world, who have more worth, honour, or power, or proſperity than himſelf. (m)Si vero ſit cirea temporalia, poteſt eſſe cum peccato vel ſine, eo modo, quo & appetitus temporalium. Sylv. v. Invidia. ut ſi mediocris homo tr…ſtetur, quia non eſt rex, quia non eſt papa: & hoc veniale eſt ex ſe. Vid. Cajetan. v. Invid.This may be good or evil, but evil in no other degree, than the deſire of temporals, which when it is exceſſive, is of it ſelf, by their doctrine, but Venial. Or they may grieve at others good, (n)Idem. ibid. n. 2. quia indignus est tali bono, hujuſmodi indignatio, ut dicit S. Thom. & Cajetan.—mala eſt & ex ſe veniale; Nam cum id, de quo dolet, nec ſit malum culpae, nec paenae, videtur quodammodo arguere Deum, & dolere, quaſi injuſtitia ſit ex parte Datoris, in Tol. l. 8. c. 65.becauſe they think thoſe who have it, unworthy of it. Grief or Indignation at the outward happineſs of others, upon this account ſolely, is of it ſelf a Venial fault with Aquinas and Cajetan. But why evil at all? the reaſon is becauſe, ſince that which is grieved at, is neither an evil of ſin or puniſhment, it ſeems in a manner to reprove God, and to grieve, as though there were injuſtice in the Diſpenſer of theſe things. All the envy in the world may find ſhelter and ſecurity in theſe deciſions as a harmleſs Venial. If this laſt mentioned be not Envy, what is? why a grief at the good of others, as it leſſens and obſcures our proper worth or excellency. But he that thinks others more unworthy, and himſelf far better, will think it a leſſening and obſcuring his own worth, to have it ſo over-look'd; and that which they diſtinguiſh and mince in ſpeculation, will go down together in practice. However, two limitations they add, which will commonly excuſe Envy: it muſt be betwixt equals (o)Invidia qua homo triſtatur de proſperitate alterius ſimilis ſen aequalis, Cajetan. Sum. v. Invid., and ſo Grief at the proſperity of Inferiours, or Superiours at leaſt, will be acquitted. Alſo, if it be for little things, (p)Nec etiam (eſt mortale) ſi bonum de quo dolet, ſit quid minimum, Sylv. ibid. n. 2. (Cajetan. ibid.) Poſſunt magna videri non aſpicientibus aeterna. Idem. ibid.it is Venial. Now all Temporals are little things to him who has the Eternal in his proſpect; ſo way is made to acquit all envy for outward proſperity, which yet they make the only (q)Cajetan. ibid.object of envy. And if envy, upon a ſmall ground, may be excuſed as a little fault, envy upon a great occaſion, will be excuſable, as leſs; except when they derive the ſinfulneſs of an act from its exorbitancy as to reaſon; that will be leſs ſinful which is more unreaſonable. They might as well have concluded directly, and without circumlocution, as Lorca the Dominican doth, that Envy is no more a mortal ſin than Vain-glory or Covetouſneſs, which they count Venial, unleſs heightned with ſome ſuch circumſtance, as will make an act otherwiſe good to be a deadly evil (*)Vid. Bonacin. 1 praecept. d. 3. q. 4. p. ult. Sect. 2. n. 3..