The Practical Divinity of the Papists Discovered to be Destructive, Discourse · Chapter 8 · Section 10
SECT. X.
THey give as much liberty to violate Faith, as truth; and no leſs incouragement to perfidiouſneſs, and breach of promiſes: either where faith is ingaged mutually, as in compacts, and agreements; or ſingly as in pollicitations. They diſtinguiſh perfidiouſneſs as they do lying, and accordingly make the like deciſions for both. There is a pleaſant perfidiouſneſs, another which they call officious, and a third pernicious: to be perfidious meerly for delight, is Venial; to deal perperfidiouſly, if it be for the advantage of any, and no great hurt to others, is as harmleſs; and they have ways enow to make that which is pernicious, to paſs for innocent. (t)Perfidia quidem jocoſa & officioſa venialis eſt; quoniam ex ſimplici promiſſione non naſcitur majus debitum, quam ſit naturale debitum non mentiendi: nam utrumque debitum eſt debitum morale, ſine quo morum honeſtas ſalvari nequit: & ad eandem virtutem reduci creditur, ſcil. ad virtutem veracitatis: & utrumque ad alterum eſt, pro convictu, utilitate & converſatione humana. Sum. v. perfidia. p. 460.Cajetan gives this reaſon, why the two former ſorts of perfidiouſneſs, are but Venial; becauſe from a ſimple promiſe no duty ariſeth, but that natural duty of not telling a lie…: for in each is a moral duty, without which moral honeſty cannot be preſerved, and both are reduced to the ſame virtue, to wit, that of veracity: and both reſpect others, being for the ſociety, and advantage, and converſation of mankind. One would think, thoſe who regard natural duty, moral honeſty, or veracity, and humane ſociety; ſhould for this reaſon rather judg both to be great crimes, than either of them petty faults. But let us take notice of their rules for conſcience in this matter; (u)Navar. c. 18. n. 6. Sylveſter, v. pact. 4. Angelus, Sum. v. pactum.To make a promiſe, without an intent to …e obliged, is but Venial, if no great hurt be done or intended to others. He promiſeth, but while he is doing it, intends not to perform, though he make others believe ſo; nor to be obliged to it, by that which ſhould ingage any one who has faith and honeſty; and yet offends but Venially. If all men ſhould take the liberty, which this rule gives Roman Catholicks, (x)Niſi fide ſtet reſpublica …pibus non ſtabit. Liv. 3. doc. l. 1. Fides haec non ſolum ad juſtitiam attinet, verum eſt ipſiſſimum juſtitiae ſundamentem. Cicer. 1. de off. periret convictus humanus & fides, ſi ſibi perſuaderent hominus, in promiſſis frauger… fidem, & verba dare non eſſe genere ſuo pluſquam veniale. Lopez. p. 2. c. 30.humane ſociety would disband; all confidence on promiſes and aſſurances vaniſheth; thereby I can never be ſure of another, nor he of me. That which Navar after many others, determines elſe where, does it more fully. He (y)Qui promiſit exterius aliquid abſque intentione promittendi, ſi interrogatur, an promiſerit, negare poteſt, intelligendo, ſe non promiſiſſe, promiſſione obligante, & ſic etiam jurare, Vid. Navar. in C. humanae aures 22. q. 5. q. 1 & 2. pro hoc doctrine adducit, S. Thom. Scotum, Paludan. Ricard. de Sancto Victore. Major. Adriau & alios.that promiſeth any thing outwardly, without any intention to promiſe; if he be asked, whether he promiſed, he may deny it, underſtanding that he made not any promiſe, that was obliging; and he may ſwear it too. He may promiſe, and yet not intend to promiſe, and ſo cheat; he may deny that he promiſed, and ſo lye; and ſwear that he did it not, when he did it, and ſo be perjur'd innocently, becauſe he promiſed, as a peefidious knave. Sylveſter inquires, (z)Quaeritur utrum ex ſola promiſſione ſive ex pacto, quis obligetur in conſcientia: & dico quod ſic ſub peceato mortali in rebus ſcilicet alicujus importantiae. Ibid.whether one by a promiſe alone or a compact, be obliged in conſcience? he anſwers, he is bound under pain of mortal ſin, if it be of important matters ſignifying that in other matters, it is no mortal ſin to break promiſes or agreements. And Navar expreſſes their common opinion, when he tells us, (a)Nec violatio promiſſae rei exiguae erit mortalis, quamvis venialis ſit. c. 18. n. 7. Soto, Canus, Victoria, Sylveſter, in Lopez. pars 2. c. 30.that the violation of a promiſe in a ſmall matter is not mortal, though it be Venial. But why ſhould perfidiouſnneſs be a crime in great things, and not in leſſer; ſince it is no leſs perfidiouſneſs in one than the other, and faith and truth is equally violated in both? The reaſon they give is, becauſe in great matters there is injuſtice, (b)Quando non per ſe eſt perſidus, non iucurret mortale, niſi per accidens, hoc eſt, propter notabile nocumentum ſen …eandalam. Caietan. v. perfidia.great wrong is done, and ſo by acccident perfidiouſneſs becomes criminal, from whence it follows, that perfidiouſneſs, how great ſoever, without the addition of injuſtice, is no crime, a man may be as treacherous, and faithleſs as he will, if he be not withall unjuſt too, there's no danger. And ſo the world muſt believe, that they would oblige men to be juſt, though not to truth or faithfulneſs: as if thoſe who may by their rules, without ſcruple be falſe and faithleſs; will make any conſcience, or find any more reaſon, to be juſt and righteous. However they teach, (c)A mortali excuſantur qui—parva pollicentur (& non implent) etiamſi juramento, aut v…to id ipſum confirmaſſent ſecundum eos quos ſequimur, (viz. Antonin. Sylveſt. Soto,) Navar. c. 18. n. 7. c. 12. n. 10.that they who promiſe but ſmall things, and perform not, are excuſed from mortal ſin; though they confirm the promiſe with an Oath or a Vow. Whether the thing promiſed be little or great, if it be an internal promiſe, though an Oath be added not to revoke it; yet it obliges not, but may be revoked, without mortal ſin. Panormitan. Jaſon. Rebellus & alii cum Bonacin de contract. diſp. 3. q. 12. punct. 2. n. 1. & 3. yea, if it be made in the form of a Vow, yet when it is of a thing indifferent or leſs good; as if a man inwardly promiſe to marry ſuch a woman, and promiſe it to God too, it does not oblige him. Idem ibid. n. 2. And how can it be expected they ſhould be faithful, as to any ingagement to man, who think, they are not bound to obſerve truth or faith with God, how much ſoever concern'd, either as a witneſs (in Oaths) or as a party (in Vows)? Well but when the matter is of great importance, may they not then break promiſes, bargains, or compact; may not perfidiouſneſs, which themſelves account pernicious, paſs commonly for an innocent Venial; yes, they have ways enough ready to make this currant, at ſo eaſie a rate. The worſt perfidiouſneſs in the world, may be excuſed from mortal guilt, according to Cajetan, (d)Excuſatur à mortali—ex parte formae, hoc eſt quia non per ſe, ſeu ex intentione peccatum illud fit—ſed ex oblivione, aut ignorantia fucti, aut ex fiducia quam accipit de eo cui promiſit, aut ex cauſa quae ſibi videtur rationabilis. Sum. v. perfidia.through ignorance of the fact; or through forgetfulneſs (if one forget to be honeſt, he may be innocently a knave); or out of confidence in him, to whom he is ingaged (the good nature of one party concern'd, may be a warrant to the other to break faith with him); or for any cauſe, which he thinks reaſonable. He need have ſaid no more than this, any one may violate all truth, and faith; not only, when there is ſome reaſonable cauſe; but when there there is any that ſeems but ſo to him: when any thing will ſeem ſo to him, who is diſpoſed to play the knave. This is enough to Licence a world of perfidiouſneſs; but this is not all. Sylveſter after others tells us, a (e)Eſt Theologorum doctrina (quod obligatur) ſi habuit animum ſe obligandi ſee…s ſi habuit animum eſſendi liber uſque ad redditionem: vel ſi habuit animam fing… di: quia licet peccet non obligatur tamen, niſi ſubeſſet cauſa de ſe ex praecepto obligans: puta, ſi promiſſa eſt patri veſtis, & frigoribus alget. Ibid. n. 4. Alias ſi non habuit animum obligandi, non tenetur ſubpoena mortalis peccati ad pactum nudum ſervandam: niſi ſubeſſet cauſa quae ad hoc obligaret de neceſſitate precepti, puta, promiſi patri meo veſtem, qui moritur ex frigore, quoniam tenetur quamvis non habuerit animum obligendi ſe. Angel ſum. v. pactum n. 4.man is not obliged to perform, promiſe or compact, if he had not a mind to oblige himſelf thereby; yea or if he had a mind to diſſemble, (to feign that he is ingaged, when he did not mean it): for, ſaies he, though he offend, yet he is not obliged, unleſs there was a cauſe from ſome command, which, of it ſelf, would oblige him: as for Example, if he had promiſed Cloths to his Father, and he is now ſtarving for cold, in ſuch a caſe (would ye think it?) one may be bound to keep his promiſe, to wit, when he would have been a monſter, if he had not done the thing, though he had never promiſed it. He tells us elſe-where, (f)Utrum autem quis obligatur ex pollicitatione? & dico quod ſic quando pollicetur civitati, univerſitati, clero Eccleſiae, vel pauperibus alicujus loci, & ex cauſa: puta, ad honorem Dei & hujuſmodi: ſecus ſi fiat praedictis ſine cauſa: vel aliis à praedictis etiam cum cauſa: quia non obligatur, niſi praetextu promiſſionis aliquid caeperit. Ibid v. pollicitatio. Ità & eiſdem verbis. Angelus ſum. v pollicitatio.that a promiſe does oblige, when it is made to a City, or an Ʋniverſity, the Clergy, the Church, or the poor of a certain place, in caſe it be for ſome cauſe, to wit, for the honour of God, or the like: but if there be no cauſe, it does not bind, though it be made to thoſe foremenrioned; and it does not bind, when it is made to any other beſides tboſe, though there be cauſe for it. Others maintain (g)In Sylveſt. ibid. v. pactum n. 4. promiſſio ſive pactum obligat in conſcientia—hoc antem ſum. Aug. & Roſell. & eſt limitatio Coll. quem ſequitur Panor. quando exprimitur cauſa promittendi.that a promiſe or compact does not oblige in conſcience to performance, if the cauſe why it is made be not expreſſed; ſo Panormitan, Angelus and Roſella, with others: ſo that if a man forbear but to mention the cauſe (which is moſt commonly done, and may be always), though he bind himſelf with ten thouſand promiſes or covenants, he may with a ſafe conſcience break them all, by their rules. They hold that the firmeſt promiſe does but bind under Venial guilt. Cajetan, Armilla, Rebellus, Garzias, in Bonacin. ibid. n. 12. Or if it did of itſelf oblige further, yet he that intends to bind himſelf no otherwiſe, may break any promiſe without any more then Venial guilt, whether the matter be ſmall, or great, which is promiſed. ibid. n. 11. (h)Ut ſit vera requiritur primo quod adſit animus in promittente, dum promittit obligandi ſe ad mortale. Et ſic inter promittendum, niſi adhibuerit juramentum promiſſionis confirmatorium, vel ſcripturam ut pro more hominum contingit, fit ut non ſe cenſeant obligare ad culpam mortalem. Hinc tollitur ſcrupulorum multitudo. Pars 2. cap. 30. p: 175.Lopez, that a promiſe may bind under mortal guilt, concludes it requiſite; that he who makes it, ſhould have a mind to be ſo bound by it: and ſo in promiſing (as he ſaies), unleſs there be an Oath to confirm the promiſe, or a writing, as is uſual: they are not thought to oblige themſelves to mortal ſin, and by this, ſaies he, a multitude of ſcruples is removed. And he ſays true, for hereby a man may without any ſcruplc, break any promiſes that are not under (*)Promiſſio obligat niſi non habuiſti animum te obligandi, ſed ſolum propoſuiſti facere. Navar. Garzias in Sa. v. promiſſ. Vix autem quis promittentium obligari intendit, niſi juret aut faciat inſtrumentum. Idem ibid.his hand or Oath. But what if he had no mind ſo to oblige himſelf by his Oath, or writing? why then, by his own rule, he is no more bound by his written or ſworn promiſe, than by any other. To this purpoſe he concludes again, that (i)Qui dum aliquid promittit verbo tenus, animo & intentione ſe obligandi caret, non fit reus in conſcientia obligationis promiſſi. Idem ibid. p. 176. Secundum cummuniter theologos, nemo ex quacunque promiſſione obligatur…, niſi qui habuit animum obligandi ſe. Angel. ſum. v. puctum. n. 4.he who promiſes in word, without mind, or intenion to oblige himſelf, is not bound in Conſcience to perform it: and this is their common Doctrine. So that if a man intend not to be honeſt, he need not be ſo, whatever he promiſe. Theſe rules obſerved, are more than ſufficient to excuſe men from all ſaith and honeſty in contracts, and promiſes of all ſorts; to fill the world with cheats and perfidiouſneſs; to take away all confidence and ſecurity from men in dealing one with another; to ruine humane ſociety; and to render Roman Catholicks leſs conſcientious, and more faithleſs and intolerable to mankind, than ſober Heathens; nor are they more like the rules of Chriſtianity, than thoſe which bid defiance to it.