The Practical Divinity of the Papists Discovered to be Destructive, Discourse · Chapter 9 · Section 16
Sect. 16. Thirdly, another probable ground is a conſiderable Authority, or the opinion of one whom we may truſt; hence this is their Doctrine, that he who does what is ſinful following the judgment of an able Doctor, is excuſed from ſin. This principle is without ground appropriated to the Jeſuits, with the pernicious conſequences of it: it was currant in the Church of Rome, before the Fathers of that Society where infants. Panormitan thus determines (m)Panormitan. in C. Capillan. de feri. dicit quod ſequens opinionem alicujus Doctoris non ſubtiliter inveſtigatam, quae poſtmodum apparet f…lſa, excuſatur a peccato quamdtu non apparuerit falſa. Sylv. v. opinio. n. 1. & Angel. Sum. v. opin. n. 2. Ubi Gloſſa cum textu. Innocentius. Gofredus, & alij.he that follows the opinion of any Doctor, not curiouſly examined, which afterward appears falſe, is excuſed from ſin; ſo long as it appears not to be falſe. In Sylveſter, this is confirmed, and he directs to ſeveral proofs, out of their Law, for it; (n)Ibid. ſecundum Antoninum.removes what, by miſtake, is alledged out of Aquinas againſt it; and ſhews, that both their great Saint, and their great Abbot agree with others, that this is ſafe, in points, which concern either faith or manners, when they are not evident (not clearly and manifeſtly determined). To him, (o)Opinio probabilis erit, ſi illam affirment boni nominis Doctores, imo & ſi unus Doc…t. Angelus. Sylveſter. Navar, &c. Jo. Sancius. diſp. 44. n. 61. Bonacina. Tom. 2. diſp. 2. q. 4. punct. 9. n. 1. & alij ibid. For this 24 Doctors are produced by Verricelli. Q. moral. Tom. 1. tr. 2. q. 5.one Doctor may be ſufficient. In morals we muſt be ſatisfied with probabilities, and according to the rule amongſt them, (*)Probabiliter quis ſequitur opinionem ſui Doctoris: ſed ne que ex multitudine authorum quid melius & aequius eſt, judicato; cum poſſit unius, & forte deterioris ſententia muitos in aliqua parte ſuperare.a man may probably follow one Doctor. And by a multitude of Authors we are not to judge, what is better, or more equal; the opinion of one, and he worſe than the reſt, may be preferr'd before many in ſome particular. So (p)Ibid. n. 2.he and Angelus (q)Ibid. n. 1.before him, after others. They conclude (r)Multo mogis excuſatur ſequens opinionem Doctoris non reprobatam, cum voluntate non adhaerendi, ſi vera non apparet, uter que ibid.in reference to Joachim, who was not accounted a Heretick (though his opinions were againſt the faith) becauſe not condemned by the Church: that he is much more to be excuſed, who follows the opinion of a Doctor, not rejected by the Church, and if he thought it not true would not adhere to it. (s)Certe in iſto non poteſt eſse contem…tus, & ſic nec peccatum inobedientiae. Ibid.Certainly (ſayes Angelus) in him, there can be no contempt, and ſo no ſin of diſobedience. 'Tis true, that which is maintained by more and better Authors, ſeems more probable; but they will not have us alwayes bound to follow that which is more probable: for though this be more ſecure, yet the rule, that what (t)Nec obſtat, quod in dubijs tutior pars eſt eligenda—ut videtur ſe exponere periculo, qui in diverſitate opinionum non eligit tutiorem: quoniam hoc verum eſſet quum proprie dubium eſt, ſed quum eſt opinio ſecus est, quia nec tunc ſumus in dubio: nec conſequenter exponit ſè quis periculo. Angelus. ibid. n. 2. & Sylveſt. n. 1.is ſafeſt is to be followed holds not (they tell us) but in points, that are properly dubious; and where there is opinion, we are not properly in doubt. Thus Navar alſo explains it, (u)Rectus intellectus illius vulgati tutior pars eſt eligenda in dubio, nempe in eo quod eſt proprie dubium, quale non eſt, cum ſuffi…ienti authoritate, aut ratione altera pars creditur, ne que cum ex multis opinionibus una pro vera eligitur. cap. 27. n. …84.having told us, (x)Non ſemper eſſe neceſſarium, partem tutiorem eligere, quia ſatis eſt quoad praecep…i implementam tutam eligere, ut late probavimus, etiam in his quae ad fidem & mores pertinent: in alijs enim, nec de conſilio quis tenetur eligere tutiorem. n. 281. Vid. Autoninum. Angel. Sylveſt. Navar. Gutier in Jo. Sanc. diſp. 42. n. 12.that it is not always neceſſary to chooſe what is ſafer, becauſe it is enough for the fulfilling of the precept, to chooſe that which is ſafe, even in thoſe things which concern faith and manners: for in other things, it is not ſo much as under Counſel, to follow the ſafeſt. Accordingly Metina (in (y)Dicit opinionem poſſe teneri ſine peccato, quae eſt peritorum virorum, licet contrarium ſi… planius & ſecurius. cap. 52. p. 271.Lopez) ſayes, the opinion of expert Divines, may be held without ſin, although the contrary be more clear, and more ſafe. In ſhort, that an opinion which is leſs probable, may be followed; is aſſerted (we are told) both by the greater part, and the graver ſort of their Divines. (z)Licitum eſſe ſectari opinionem minus probabilem, relicta probabiliori, docent Mercado, Medina, Sairus, (naming 20 beſides, and adding, & alij plures) Jo. Sauc. diſp 42. n. 12. Poſſumus ubſ que peccato ſequi opinionem probabilem, relicta probabiliore, & tutiare. Bonacin. Tom. 2. diſp. 2. q. 4. punc. 9. n. 4. Clavis Regia, & alij communiter. ibid. n. 5. For this Barnabas Gallego a Dominican produces near Fifty of their Doctors, many of them of the ſame order, and ſays it is ſententia communior inter Thomiſtas. tract. de conſcient. dubi. de conſc. probabili. So that if we may truſt thoſe whom who we ſee no reaſon to think partial to the Society, this is not a ſingular conceit of the Jeſuits; but the opinion of their other Divines generally, and the more common Doctine of Aquinas his Diſciples, otherwiſe moſt oppoſite to the Society.above Forty of their grave Doctors are alledged for it, and amongſt them, Martin Navar, Medina, Peter Navar, Arragon, Bannes, Du Vallius, with others, beſides Jeſuits. A… preſent take only the words of Navar, who ſpeaks fully. (a)In foro tamen conſcientiae ad effectum non peccandi ſufficit eligere pro vera ejus opinionem, quem merito cenſemus eſſe virum idonea & ſcientia & conſcientia praeditum. cap. 27. n. 288.In the Court of Conſcience (ſays he) it is enough for the avoiding of ſin, to take his opinion for true, whom we probably think, to be a man of ſufficient knowledg, and Conſcience; and quotes their Gloſſe and Panormitan for it. To whom let me add Sancta Clara, who, not only tells us (as we have heard before (b)Deus. nat. gr. probl. 15. p. 99. ſupra.that at this day it ſeems to be the common opinion of their Schools and Doctors; that the people erring with their Teacher, or Paſtor, are wholly excuſed from all fault: but alſo, when any has a probable ground for what he does: (c)Probabilis eſt quando quis habet fundamentum probabile; ut dum ruſticus credit aliquid eſſe licitum, ductus teſtimonio ſui parochi vel parentun:—tunc iſte (licet contra veritatem erret) nulla culpa errat: ſic Doctores communiter, ſecundum illud: ignorantia juſta & probabilis excuſare debet. ibid. p. 78.as when a Countrey-man believes any thing to be lawful, induced thereto, by the teſtimony of the Pariſh-Prieſt, or of his Parents: although he miſtake, yet his miſtake is void of ſin; according to the rule in Law, juſt and probable ignorance ought to be excuſed. So that to make a ſin to be no ſin, not only the judgment of a grave Doctor ſo determining, but of a Pariſh-Prieſt (who are known to be ſufficiently ignorant); yea of Parents alſo (more ignorant than they) will ſuffice, and herein (ſays he) the Doctors generally concur. In fine, if it be the common opinion, that invincible (as Divines) or probable ignorance (as the Canoniſts call it), is excuſed from all ſin: and that it is an inſtance hereof, (d)Durandus—.cum excuſet probabilis ignorantia, puta, ſi habet aliquem Doctorem authenticum & famoſum, cujus opinioni n…titur in Sylveſt. v. confeſſ. n. 2. Vervec. dubitans & conſulens viros Doctos falſo conſul…n…s, laborat ignorantia invincibili. ibid. v. Ignor. n. 5. Juſta ignorantia—qualis eſt, cum quis petit conſilium a viris habitis pro praeditis ſcientia & conſcientia in id ſufficienti, qui falſo ei conſulunt, & haec omnino excuſet. Navar. c. 23. n. 46. Graff. l. 2. c. 131. n. 2…. & l. 4. c. 9. n. 8. Sancta Clara. ibid. p. 96. Herrera & Faber. ibi. …onacina. de peccat. d. 2. q. 8. p. 2 n. 9. & 16.when one is miſlead by a ſufficient Authour; then this is the common Doctrine of the Romaniſts, and not the extravagancy of ſome particular Sect, or Order amongſt them.
If then this principle be ſo deſtructive to Religion, the Souls of men, and humane Societies, as ſome of the French Romaniſts brand it, in reference to the Jeſuits: the charge falls upon the common Doctrine of the Roman-Church; for there it is generally taught and received, and was ſo, before Ignatius had founded his Order. And this prevents their ordinary exception, againſt our alledging particular Authours againſt them; they cannot with reaſon or modeſty make uſe of this ſhift longer: for a ſingle Doctor is ſo far Authorized, by the common Doctrine of their chief Writers (and ſo of their Church); that any, or all in their Church, have warrant to rely on him. And ſo, in producing a particular Author, in eſteem with them; we do, in effect, alledge their common Doctrine. And indeed by the premiſes, the opinion of a grave Doctor, is the Doctrine of their Church ſo far, that any of their Church are allow'd to folow it, both as to belief, and practice. Their Church (if we know her ſenſe, by the declaration of the generality of her approved Authors) does allow all Romaniſts, to follow the opinions I have charged them with; though they be plainly deſtructive, of worſhip, faith, and holineſs, both of heart, and life. For I have charged them with nothing, without a conſiderable Authour; and what is ſo grounded, is with them probable, and what is probable is ſafe, and allowed both as to faith and manners. Or if there be any particular in the charge, in which there is not a common concurrence, or which is contradicted, though by a multitude of their Writers: yet ſince there is at leaſt one grave Doctor for it, it is in their account ſafe; and any Romaniſt has liberty by the Doctrine now inſiſted on to follow it (if he pleaſe); rather than that which upon the account of more Aſſertors may be thought ſafer.
But as to the purpoſe for which I now take notice of it, this Principle ſerves to rid their Church of all ſin; that is, of all Conſcience to avoid any. For if that be ſafe which is probable, and that will be probable, which is countenanced by the opinion of particular Doctors: then all the ſins which they, or any of them, have already concluded to be no ſins (and theſe are an infinite number) may be ſafely committed: and all that any of them hereafter may determine to be no crimes, may be practis'd with as little Conſcience, and as much ſecurity. So that a Train is laid hereby to blow up the whole rule of Chriſtianity, and all innocency and holineſs, which conſiſts in conformity thereto: It has done horrible execution already, and what has hitherto eſcaped, is at the mercy of it; being wholly under the Mine, and may be diſpatch'd, when ever the Caſuiſts (their Engineers) who are daily at work about it, ſhall think fit.