The Divine Triunity of the Father Son and Holy Spirit, Chapter 6

The Divine Triunity of the Father Son and Holy Spirit · Chapter 6

p. 63CHAP. VI.

The Divine Subsistence being the most excellent Subsistence that is or can be, the word Subsistence or Person cannot be attributed after the same manner to God, Angels and Men.

IT is not my businesse at this time to make any Metaphysicall distinction between p. 62duplicate page p. 63duplicate page p. 64the Persons of Men and Angels; b… I desire to distinguish between created an… uncreated Persons▪ because uncreated Persons subsist in one single and infinite ess…nce▪ It may seem strange to some Metaphysical wits that one Person, and much more th… three distinct Persons should subsist in o… single and undivided essence; but these discoursing wits do not distinguish betwee… created and uncreated Persons. 2. … ground their faith on scholastical subtiltie… ▪ 3. Do not study the Holy Scriptures wi… humility and faith, and beg a blessing o… their studies by fervent Prayer▪ foreign. Phil. 2. v. 6.Phil 2:6For they might read in the Scriptures of a divin… Person subsisting in the divine nature. Phil 2. 6. Being in the forme of God, &c. That is subsisting in the Nature of God, because it presently follows, that therefore he thought it no robbery to be equall with God; for Persons that are coessentiall … needs be coequall; Christ and his Father do both subsist in the same divine essence, for Christ is the expresse image of his Fathers subsistence, and he and his father are one, one in essence, Iohn 10. 30. Heb. 1. 3. We find this interpretation was received in the time ofaaJustinian. Edict. de Fide. foreign. Iustinian the Emperour, and therefore it is not an interpretation lately p. 65coined. Because it is said [who being in the forme of God,] the Holy Ghost doth demonstrate the Hypostasis or Subsistence of the Word in the Essence of God. And because it is said that he took upon him the forme of a servant, it signifies that God the Word, [that is God the Son,] is united with the Nature, not the Subsistence or Person of man. He did subsist in the nature of God, but he did assume the nature of man, and therefore Christ hath a divine subsistence, no humane Person; no humanebbSolis personis divinis ob infinitam & simplicem Essentiam convenit in Essentiâ subsistere. Nulla enim persona Angelica vel humana subsistit in Natura vel essentiâ. Person subsists in the nature of man; nor doth the Person of an Angel subsist in the nature of an Angel; but the divine Person of Christ doth subsist in his Divine Nature, nay all the three Persons do subsist in the single and infinite nature of God. From whence I conclude that there is not onelyonly a manifest, but an infinite difference between created and uncreated Subsistences or Persons; And I speak ofccPersona propriè est quid concretum ex essentiâ intelligente & Personalitate. Persons, rather then Personalities, because those abstract notions are not very well understood by the most discoursing men; for even they acknowledge thatddAbstracta faelicius intelliguntur mentione Subjectorum. Intellectus potiùs de Concretis omnia praedicit quàm de Abstractis▪ quia actiones sunt Suppositorum. Abstracts are not well, or not happily understood, unlesse you descend to the consideration of their subjects. My purpose therefore upon most mature deliberation, is, 1. To distinguish between created and uncreated Persons. 2. To treat of uncreated Persons rather p. 66then Personalities, that is to treat of the three Persons not abstracted from, but subsisting in the divine nature. I will not speak simply of the Son, as a Son in that abstract relation, or of the Son as a Person, or as the second Person, by abstracting his Personality from the Divine Nature in which he subsists; but I desire to speak of Iesus Christ, as subsisting in the nature of God, according to that expression of the Apostle, Phil. 2. 6. who subsisting in the nature of God. For I am resolved to follow the Scripture, and I do not think it safe to abstract the incommunicable Subsistence of Christ, from the Divine nature in which he subsists, least I fall into vain speculations, as many learned men have done. Now if you take in the Divine Nature of Christ, (and there is the same reason of all three Persons, because all have the same Divine Nature) there will be I say not only a manifest, but an infinite difference between the Person of Christ, and the Person of the most glorious Angel in Heaven. Created Persons.They who have long studied the most refined and curious part of Metaphysicks, when they come to discourse of the distinction between a singular Nature and a Person, are forced to confesse that they do confine their speech to created Natures and Persons, because eeDe Naturâ & Personis divinis ex lumine rationis fer… nihil dici potest; mysterium de Deo Trinuno universam transcendit Philosophiam.there is even almost nothing evident to them by the light of reason, concerning the Divine p. 67nature and uncreated Persons. And therefore on the other side, it well becomes me to confine my discourse to uncreated Persons, because there is so vast a difference between them, and the most excellent of all created Persons; only something I must say of created Persons, that by comparing them with uncreated Persons, I may demonstrate wherein they agree, and wherein they differ.

Boetius relates, that when there was an Epistle of the Councell of Chalcedon read, in which there was this Orthodox Position, That Iesus Christ is a single Person, and yet there are two distinct natures in his single Person; Boethius desired the learned men then present, to assigne the difference between a singular Nature, and a Person, and no man, saith he, was able to tell me the difference, or to declare what a Person was. But though Boethius smiled at the ignorance of others, yet he was not wise ffVide Ch… ̄nitium …e Trinitate c. 4.enough to conceal his own; for he defines a Person thus; A Person ggPersona est naturae rationalis individua Substantia▪ Boehbius l. de duabus naturis & una persona Christi▪is the undivided substance of a rationall nature. I am not at leasure to reckon up the defects of this imperfect definitiō. Vasquez is bold to say that Aristotle knew not how to distinguish a Person from a singular nature. And there is no doubt but veryhhPhilos. distinctionem naturae & Personae vix intelligebant, quia nihil de mysterio Incarnationis audiebant. wise men have erred grossely in this point for want of studying, … ▪ The state of the soule in its separation from p. 68the body. 2. The humane nature of Christ assumed without any humane person. 3. The difference between the Divine Nature, and Persons which subsist in it. I believe Aristotle did not study the first so exactly as he should have done; and I am sure he knew nothing of these two last most considerable points. I shall not stand to shew the vanity ofiiLaurentius Valla. lib. 6. Elegant. In Deo poni personam, quod verè Deo sit triplex qualitas, tales qualitates statuo in Deo & has dico esse personas. Laurentius Valla, who seems to forget all his Elegancies when he comes to discourse of a Person, and drawes his arguments from the flourishes of an Oratour, or the severall passions, humours, relations, conditions, or offices of men that are personated upon a Stage; and therefore this Whiffler deserves to be hissed off from his stage, for he doth only make sport for Atheists and Familists by such ridiculous discourse. And he is sufficiently absurd, when he stoops so low as to say, that a Person is a Quality, and that there is a triple Quality in God. AndkkVide sis Soaligerum in oratione de verbo Inepti satis inepte disserentem. in Epist. p. 374. Scaliger shewed his Critical skill in Divinity to purpose, when he was so foolish as to say that a Person doth not signifie a substance, but a quality. llBellarm. lib 2. de Christo. cap. 5.Bellarmine is Orthodoxe in this point, and proves at large that the word Person doth usually signifie a Substance, in very approved Authors both sacred and profane. Well may we then say, that the Church of God hath not offended the curious eares of such as are the great Masters of language p. 69the Oratours,An uncreated Person. Civilians, Grammarians and others, when they say that a Divine Person doth at least connote the Substance or Nature of God; and the self-same substance being in all three persons, it doth not follow as Gostavius, or Mr. Fry would have it, that there are three Substances in the Godhead, because there are three Persons subsisting in the Godhead; for the substance or nature is the same in all three Persons, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. And we speak of the substance of the Persons, when we describe them, not that we may shew wherein they differ, but that we may shew wherein all three Persons agree. And if we should abstract the Personality of these uncreated Persons from their Divine Substance or Nature, when we describe them, we should seem to rob them of their Divinity even in the very description of them. We must not say that a Divine Person is a meer mmNulla persona est purus foreign sive existendimodus, & mera proprietas, vel relatio; Triniratē imprudenter tollunt qui Patrē Filium & Spiritū Sanctum tres existendi modos definiunt; sunt enim Personae Coessentia…esrelative Propriety, or a pure manner of being, existing, or subsisting: for every person is God, and all three Persons but one Jehovah, one God. They do imprudently destroy the divine and coessential Trinunity, who affirme the Holy Trinity to be nothing else but three Proprieties or three manners of subsisting. For what is that consubstantial Trinunity, of which the Ancients speak, but the single and infinite substance or essence of three Divine Subsistences or Persons? If you leave out p. 70the Divine Essence or Substance out of the definition, how is it a Consubstantial or Coessential Trinunity? The Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, all three doaaCa…olus Magnus apud Genebrardū cap. 20. Liturgiae; Pater prima, est divinitatis persona in quâ▪ caeterae duae naturaliter manentes existunt. naturally subsist in the same divine and undivided nature. I must therefore describe Divine persons as divine persons, when I am to put a difference between them & uncreated persons; and if I describe them as Divine persons, I must not abstract their personal proprieties frō their divine nature, though what isbbQuicquid Patri proprium & peculiare est, Patri sano modo naturale dicitur; est enim perfectio Rela…iva Patri quà sic natur…liter debita, tanquam primo principio Perso…al…. Personal may in some sense be affirmed to be naturally due to that particular person. But besides those Personal cc…aivinus Personas divinas proprietates vocavit, sed nudas proprietates esse negavit.Proprieties or Characters whereby the Father, Son and H. Ghost do appear even to our weak understanding, to be three distinct Subsistences; the whole and undivided ddforeign, quicquid tribus commune est cum pr…prietate habet peculiari. Proprietatibus dignoscuntur personae, non constituuntur,Godhead dwells in every one of these three Subsistences, though it do subsist after a different manner in every one of the three. The Father is God subsisting after that peculiar manner, which is proper to the Father: Now that peculiar manner of subsisting superadded to the Divine nature, doth make a true distinction between the Father, and the other two Subsistences, but it makes no Composition at all, either in the Father, or in the Godhead. HenceeeVide Bisterf. de uno Deo, &c. lib. 2. §. 1. cap. 4. Essentia divina est modo substantiali modifica…a; Subsistentia enim est modus substantialis, qui ab ipsa essentia divina separari nequit, imò persona divina est ipsam et essentia divina certo modo se habens. Est enim persona divina ipsissima Essentia Modificata. Persona autem non est essentia Simpliciter, sed cum modo subsistendi considerata. Vide D. Alting. Loc. Com. Part. 1. & Problem. Calv. Inst. l. 1. c. 13. Bezam. part. 1. quaest. & Homil. prima adversus Sacramentarios. Zanchium de tribus Elohim. Melancton. Loc. Com. Polanum in Syntag. Chamierum de Trinitate. lib. 1. cap 3. it is p. 71that divers profound and Orthodox writers maintain, that A divine Person is nothing else but the very Divine Essence it self modificated. Give me leave to explain this abstruse notion a little, by giving an instance in the 1. Personal Principle, God the Father.

God the Father is the first Person of the Godhead distinguished from the Son and Spirit (who are one and the same God with him) by his peculiar maner of subsistence, singular relation, & incommunicable properties.

Here is, as they love to speak, the ffforeign. Persona divina est ipsamet natura divina peculiari modo se habens.Divine Essence modificated with a peculiar manner of subsistence, a singular relation and incommunicable properties. What this peculiar manner of Subsistence, singular Relation, and incommunicable Properties are, I shal demonstrate when I come to treat of the distinction of these 3 Divine Subsistences in the very next Chapter. I hope I need say no more to prove, that A Divine Person doth at least connote the Substance, Essence, Nature of God; and therefore it will not be p. 72safe to abstract the Personality of an uncreated Subsistence, from that single and infinite Nature which is one and the same in all three Subsistences. I do not find the most raised ggPersona directè denotat subsistentiam, consequenter connotatnaturā. Vasquèz. Persona est individuum subsistens vivum, intelligens, incommunicabile, independendens, non sustentatū ab alio nec pars alterius. foreign. Persona est suppositū intelligens Persona in Concreto naturam includit, quia Persona naturam participat, & personalitas est substantiae sive naturae modus Substantialis & separabilis, rarissime autem separatus. Persona est substantia completa intelligens, per se subsistens▪ incommunicabilis, & independens.Metaphysical wits very forward to define or describe a Personality; but they speak of a Person in concreto, of a Subsistent rather then a Subsistence; and of a Suppositum, rather then an abstract Suppositality. The imperfect Definition of Boethius is commonly too commonly received in the Schooles; and he saith, a Person is an undivided substance. They who have studied the point more exactly, and correct his definition, do all agree that a Person is an undivided substance, an understanding substance, a complete, incommunicable, independent substance, which doth not depend upon any thing else by way of inhaesion, adhaesion, union, or any other way, for its sustentation. This is the general andhhPersona conficitur ex essentia & proprietatibus distinctivis ita ut quaelibet persona in se sit perfecta substantia. vide Hilarii Sermon. in F…st. S. Trinitatis. common opinion. I know there are some private opinions, as I may call them, concerning the Formality of a Person; which I shall but point at, and easily confute with the light & gentle touch of a running p. 73pen. It is very absurd to say that a Person is made compleat in his subsistence by any iiPersona subsistit per se; accidentia autem sunt in alio; ex natura Substantiali & accidentibus non potest fieri unum per se. Vide Ferrariens. contra. Gen. 4. c. 39.Gen 4accidents or any formality arising from an heap of accidents, because a Person is the most perfect substance, and therefore cannot be made complete by any accidental subsistence; there is a manifest contradiction in that ridiculous expression.kkAristot. Categor. cap. 5. Aristotle saith that singular substances do subsist foreign most properly, principally, perfectly; To subsist by its self, is the most perfect kind of subsistence; and that cannot be said to subsist by it self, which doth subsist by an heap of accidents. Others say that a person is completed by a meer llComplementum Personae dicit negationem unionis cō municationis & dependentiae tum aptitudinalis tū actualis, ut omnes partes tam integrantes quàm essentiales ipsaque etiam anima separata à ratione Personae excludantur. Vide Joannem de Neapoli in Quodlibet.Negation, but Subsistence is positive, though Subsistence may be described by some expressions that are negative. The second person of the Trinity doth supply and performe all that an humane person can performe to the humane nature of Christ. Now to say that the Divine person of Christ doth supply the room of ammVide Suarez. Disp. 34. Sect. 2. n. 8. Negation, and do all that a Negation can do, is to say it doth very little or nothing at all. Finally, some say that a person is completed by the nnExistentia communicabilis non potest este Subsistentia Personalis. Tria sunt in Supposito; Natura, Existentia, & Subsistentia, sive Personalitas. Pantusa. Natura humana existit in personâ divina sine propriâ personalitate, non sine propriâ existentiâ. Vasquez. Natura existens producitur non tantum in supposito proprio sed & in alieno, uti patet de natura humana in Christo; non est enim in Christo duplex Suppositum. Caie…anus. Subsistentia est modus positivus & Substantialis incommunicabilis & Independens, naturae intellectivae, integrae, & completae conveniens. Anima rationalis separata habet Modum per se, quem non habebat in corpore, sed est incompleta, & habet non tantum obedientialem sed & Aptitudinalem dependentiam, quia ex naturâ suâ est forma materiae, & proinde non habet perfectissimum modum subsistondi per se.Existence of its nature. But it is cleare that a soule in the state of separation doth p. 74exist, and yet that soule is not a Person, nay never was a Person at the first instant of its creation or union. And it will be most absurd to say, that the humane nature was assumed by Christ, and hypostatically united without or before the existence of that nature, because it was united before it had any humane subsistence, and consequently before it had any existence, if that subsistence be nothing else but existence, as these Discoursers suppose. But it is high time to leave pursuing of these wanderers; For it is cleare, that Subsistence is a Positive and Substantial Mode, because the most perfect manner of being, which we expresse as well as we can, when we say, A Person doth subsist by it self, without union unto, or dependance upon any thing else for its sustentation; nay, that it is uncapable of any such union, though it be for the present in a state of p. 75separation. And therefore the Schoolmen usually say, Quod subsistit per se, nec est nec esse potest in alio, ullo modo; quia subsistere per se sumitur pro perfectissimo modo subsistendi per se. It is evident by what hath been said, that even created persons are defined by their substance or nature which is in stead of a Genus when we define a Person in Concreto; and when we speak o… the Formality of a Person, we say it is a substantial mode, and the most perfect manner of subsisting; and therefore a created person is not completed by any quality or accident whatsoever. Now if a created person be a substance, and the Formality of a created person be substantial, I have no ground to abstract a Divine Person from the Divine Substance or Essence, because a Divine person cannot be separated from the Divine nature; as the humane nature may be from an humane person; and though a Praecisive abstraction doth not lay any ground either for a Rational negation, or a reall separation; yet if the Divine Nature be not considered and taken notice of in the description of every Divine Person, men will be apt to conceive that the Divine Nature and Persons may be separated. The Scripture doth not present any such abstract notion of the Father, Son, or Holy Ghost unto us, but teaches us to consider them as Divine Persons, that is, Persons p. 76that have a Divine nature; for else we should make aaaNon est Trinitas modorum, sed personarum coessentialiū trinū itas. Trinity of Modes, no Trinunity; abbQuod excipiunt Trinitatē igirur fore sine Deo, ex eadem insulsitate nascitur. Vide Calv. Instit. lib. 1. cap. 13. Sect. 25. Trinity without God or Godhead, and give our adversaries cause to say what they have said, without cause, contrary to their own principles as well as ours; E… Trinitatem sine Deo! for even they themselves acknowledge the first Person of the blessed Trinity to be God. It is our wisest course therefore to describe every Person as a Divine Person, as God, and acknowledge all three Persons to be one and the same God, according to the Scriptures. For we must not only consider three Personalities, but threeccNam Deus ita se praedicat unic… esse ut distinctè in tribus personis considerandum proponat quas nisi tenemus, nudum & inane duntaxat Dei nomen sine vero Deo in cerebro nostro volitat. Calvin. Instit. lib. 1. cap. 13. §. 2. Persons, and the same single Godhead in all three Persons, and all three Persons in the Godhead. I must not treat of the first Person simply as a Father, but as a Divine and Eternal Father, as God the Father, Rom. 15. 6. Ephes. 5. 20. Coloss. 2. 2. Joh. 17. 3. For God is to be so considered as he is to be worshipped by us, and we are not to worship an abstract Personality without reference to the Godhead. We must consider what is Common, as well as what is Incommunicable; we must treat of that which is Absolute, as well as of that which is Relative; and whilest we speak of a Trinity of Persons, we must not forget the Vnity of the Essence, that so we may not hold forth a Trinity of Modes without p. 77ddVide Calvinum Melanct. Oecolampadiū, Bucanura, D. Altingium, D. Gomarum. Wendelinum, Bislerfeldium. Persona divina est essenti. ae divinae subsistentia incommunicabilis. Personam voco subsistentiam in Dei essentiâ, quae ad alios relata, proprietate incommunicabili distinguitur. Calv. Instit. foreign. Vide Cyrillum Exposit. fidei Orthod. Anastasium Theopolit. Damascen. de Orth. fid. lib. 3. c. 4. 5, 6. Persona divina est substantia spiritualis ad alios sibi coestentiales relata, & tamen ab illis incommunicabili proprietate distincta.the Godhead, or tempt weak heads to dream of a Trinity of Gods. Judicious Mr. Calvin did not think fit to discourse much of Created Persons, and therefore described none but a Divine Person; and he would not adventure to abstract an uncreated Personality from the Divine nature in which every of the three uncreated Persons doth subsist. In our most accurate definition of any created nature, which we are best acquainted with, we judge it reasonable to take in that which the nature defined hath common with other natures, as well as that which is proper to it alone. And certainly it is very fit, in our description of every Divine Person, to take in the Nature which is common to all three Persons, and not only what is proper and peculiar to any one. I call a Person (saith Calvin) a Subsistence in the Essence of God. And then he descends to take notice of the Relation of a Divine Person to the rest of the co-essential Persons, and his distinction from them by some incommunicable property. It will be a very dangerous attempt then to treat of the Divine Persons in such abstract expressions as do only hold forth some curious notions about the relation of these persons p. 78to,The Godhead is not to be abstracted from the persons or the persons from it The Godhead described, not abstracted. De omnibus & sing…lis & solis his tribus personis tota Deitas perfecta & omnibus numeris una dicitur. and distinction from one another, without taking notice that all three Persons … coeternall and coequall, because coessential▪ If we will discourse soberly of the Godhead, we must speak of it as one single infinite perfection common to Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, to all three, and none other The single Godhead, the whole Godhead is i… every single person, and it is common to a… three in a singular and glorious way. For the divine nature is not communicated to these Three, as a Genus to its Species, for it i… undivided and indivisible; nor as a Speci… to its Individua, for it is not multiplicable nor as a Totum or whole to its parts, fo… the Godhead hath no parts, it is impartible, and as hath been said, indivisible; nay the Godhead is not communicated so to any one Person, as a created nature to… created person, which may be separate… from a created subsistence; for the Divin… Nature cannot possibly be separated from all, or any one of the Divine Subsistence… or Persons. And therefore we must no… discourse of the Godhead in such a Notional way, as if the Godhead did exist out o… the three Persons without any relative subsistence; for that is clearly to dream of som… strange Absolute God,The strange God idolized by some▪ who is neither Father, Son, nor Holy Ghost. When we describe the Godhead according to our be… understanding, we dare not abstract it from p. 79the three Persons; but say, that▪

The Godhead is one single,The single Godhead. spiritual, infinite Essence, in which the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost do subsist.

And when we describe a Divine Person, it is absurd to abstract the Personality from the Divine Nature; for how can you describe a Divine person, if you do abstract his Personality from his Divinity. Every single Person is God, nay every single Person is the Godhead, the Nature, the Essence of God, considered with that subsistence, relation, and propriety which is peculiar to that Person. Every single Person is God of himself,How the three Persons are one God. Deus non est per alind Deus. Finally, …ake all the three Persons together, and …hey are nothing else but one God; and …hey are one God, not Absolutely consider…d in his abstract nature,How the Name God is used in Scripture. but Relatively considered with those peculiar relations, …nd incommunicable properties whereby …he three Persons are distinguished from one another. When theaaVox Deus de eo proprie dicitur qui naturâ De…s est, & de eo quidem vel foreign Communiter sine certae per…onae determinatione, vel, foreign de una aliquâ personâ …er Synecdochen. Nomen Deus sive Absolute dicatur de to…â simplicique Deitate, sive Relate de unâ aliquâ personâ u…am eandemque essentiam designat; quaelibet enim persona est foreign, & in Deo non distinguuntur esse & essentia; tota De… as est ex se, & à se, & singulae personae sunt ipsissima essentia …um distinctis relationibus personalibus considerata. name of God is …aken Essentially or Commonly in Scrip…ure, we say it doth belong to all three p. 80Persons, because it is spoken without any determination or restriction to any one particular person, as Iohn 4. 24. God is a Spirit, Mat. 4. 10. Mat. 19. 17. There is none good but God. These places must needs be interpreted of all three Persons; for it is certain, that Christ did not by these speeches exclude himself or the Holy Spirit from being good, or being worshipped. And when the Name of God is taken personally or singularly in Scripture, we say it is understood of one Person by a Synechdoche, because though the other Persons may be excluded from what is proper and peculiar to any one Person, because it is personal, and therefore incommunicable, yet they cannot be excluded from any thing that is essential, because the same Divine essence is common to all. Now the Title of God is essentiall; and what hath been said of that, is true of all Essential Titles and Attributes: but Personal relations, properties, and actions, are all peculiar, as we shall shew at large in the next Chapter.

All that I need inferre from hence for the present is, That when we describe the Divine nature, we should not abstract it from the three Persons; and when we describe a Divine Person, Created Personali▪ t…es not abstracted.we should not abstract him from the Divine Nature. When the Scripture speaks of Created persons, it doth not abstract the personality from the singular p. 81substance or nature. When the Apostle saith, 2 Cor. 1. 11. that thanks shall be given by many persons, he doth not mean many personalities, but many humane singular substances; thanks should be given by a multitude of men, particular men. Actiones sunt suppositorum, non suppositalitatum. In like manner when we read that Christ is the Character of his Fathers person,How Christ is the Character of his Fathers Person. Heb. 1. 3. the word is Subsistence; the meaning is not, that the Son is the character or expresse image of the Fatherhood of the first Person; for Christ doth not beget a Son, as the Father doth; but Christ is the image of the Subsistent, (that is) of God the Father, and not of the mere Subsistence or Personality, as it is abstracted from the Divine Nature.

Jesus Christ hath two natures in one single person:The Person of Christ is single and Divine. now that person is a Divine person, the second person of the Godhead; and if I describe the person of Jesus Christ, I may abstract his person from his humane nature, and not mention that nature, which doth infinitely differ from his Divine person: but I must not abstract the person of Christ from his divine nature, Christus non solùm officio Deus est, ut blasphemant Sociniani, sed Naturâ Deus est; coessētialis enim filius est. Con…equens est, si in Deum credius, & in me cred…re debeatis, quod non esset consequēs si Christas non esset Deus. Iohan. 14 1. foreign non est Patri peruliaris, sed tribus personis Cō munis.because he hath no other then a divine person, which cannot be separated from, (and should not be described without consideration, and mention of) the divine nature. For this Second Person is not barely considered as a p. 82person, or as a second person, but as a divine person, as the second person of the Godhead, as the naturall, coessential, coequal, coeternal Son of God as his own Son, his first begott… Son, his only begotten Son. Rom. 8. 32. Ioh. 1. 14. And therefore he must be considered as God, the true God. God blessed for ever, Ioh. 1. 1. 14. 18. Rom. 9. 5. 1 Ioh. 5. 20. and therefore he must be described as God … himself; for the Son is Iehovah, as hath been proved and we are obliged to believe in the Son as well as in the Father, Ioh. 4. …. Iesus Christ is one and the same God with the Father. Now Papists and Socinians wi… both confesse, that the Father is foreign God of himself; and therefore it will follow that the Son **The unbegotten Nature of the only begotten Son.is God of himself. If the Godhead of the Son were begotten, and the Godhead of the Father unbegotten, there would be two distinct Godheads in the Father and the Son, the one begotten, and the other unbegotten. Take it thus the… in brief: The second Person ††The second Person of the Godhead.of the Godhead is the only begotten Son of God subsisting i… the unbegotten nature of God▪ because he is the naturall and coessentiall Son of God the Father, and therefore hath one and the same unbegotten nature with the Father; the subsistence of the Son is begotten, but the divine nature of the Son is unbegotten.The Divine …erson of the Holy Ghost.

The Holy Ghost is an infinite Spirit, coessential with the Father and the Son, and p. 83not a mere Subsistence proceeding from both; and yet he is distinguished from both by his personal relation and incommunicable property.

These grounds being laid for a foundation,Certaine Conclusion… concerning Divine Persons. it is easie to build on, and inferre— 1. That the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are not mere Personalities, but Divine Persons. 2. A Divine Person is not a Quality or any other Accident, but an infinite Substance subsisting after the most perfect, and glorious manner that is, or can be. 3. The Divine nature being infinite, doth contain all manner of perfection within it self, both Absolute and Relative; and therefore the relations which are between the Divine Persons, are naturall, perfect, divine. 4. The Divine Nature cannot be separated from all▪ or any one of the Divine Persons. 5. These three Divine Persons are one and the same God, one Infinite Spirit; and therefore they are Coessential, Coequal, Coeternal. 6. These three Divine Persons are distinguished (as shall be shewen in the next Chapter) but cannot be divided or separated either from the Divine Nature, or from one another, because they do al… three subsist in the Divine nature, and in one another; for they have one and the same single and infinite nature, and are one infinite Spirit, the same omnipresent God. 7. The**The Word Subsistence explained. word p. 84[**foreign sumitur pro re per se Subsistente, pro supposito intelligente, pro divinâ Dei Patris Subsistenrià, Heb. 1. 3. F…lius est imago Personae Patris, est enim filius essentiae ejusdem cū Patre, non imago essentiae.Heb 1:3 Subsistence] is a consecrated word, which as we find upon record in the holy Scripture, is fit to be made use of when we speak of that Divine manner of being which the Father, Son and Holy Ghost have in the Godhead and in one another. The heathen Oratour could say, Verbis consecratis utendum; He meant words that were consecrated by the use and approbation of Classical Authors; but I mean, words consecrated by the Holy Ghost. The word foreign which we render Subsistence, and by way of Analogie, PERSON; hath many aaforeign in Scripturis frequē ter sumitur probasi, seu fundamento quo aliquid nititur, 2 Cor. 9. 4. 2 Cor. 11. 17. Heb. 3. 14. fundamentum in quo spes nostra & gloria nititur. Fides etiam foreign dicitur Heb. 11. 1. ut Hypostasis significat essentiam; haereticoru… est tres Hypostases as…erere in divinis. Vide Theodor. Hist. Eccles. lib. 2. c. 8. Patrum consensum hac de re videas apo… Damascenum, Nazianz. &c.2 Cor 9:42 Cor 11:17Heb 3:14Heb 11:1other significations; but when it is used on this occasion, upon this subject, we may after so many disputes about this Argument, easily understand the proper, and consecrated importance of the word. We may take warning by the mistakes of others, and avoid those rocks on which others have suffered shipwrack. Some who understand that foreign did signifie essence, were offended with such as said there were three Hypostases in God; because according to that signification of the word, to say that there are three Hypostases in God, is to say that there are three Essences in God p. 85and consequently, that there are three Gods. It is readily acknowledged that the ccforeign significat naturam verè Subsistentem & per se subsistentem hoc est modo perf…ctissimo subsistentem.word foreign doth sometimes signifie the nature or essence of a thing, not the generical or specifical nature in their latitude and abstract universality, but the nature ddHypostatica Emphaticis opponuntur, quia omnia Hypostatica veram habent essentiam. foreign. Aristot.truly existing, and subsisting in the world. This acception of the word may, all things duly considered and soberly expounded, be admitted, with some grains of allowance for the infinite difference which is between created, and uncreated Subsistents. For if Hypostasis be described in concreto, for which we have with invincible reason contended all along this Chapter, theneeforeign est Essentia divina charactere hypostatico insignita, sive proprio subsistendi modo distincta. Magnum discrimen est inter Personam & proprietatem Personae: proprietas Patris Absoluta, est esse foreign, Respectiva esse Pa…rem; Persona autem Patris est Deus filium gignens in unitate essentiae ingenitae. Hypostasis doth connote the Divine Nature, and signifies not an Abstract Subsistence, but a Complete Subsistent. When I say that Jesus Christ is the Character of his Fathers Subsistence, I do not (as I have formerly shewn) understand it thus, that Jesus Christ is the Character of his Fathers Abstract Personality, but he is the Character of God the Father; I take in the Divine Nature. But you must then consider that the glory of the Trinunity must be preserved in this acception; p. 86for there is not a new nature in every one of the Three but the Divine nature which is connoted in these three Hypostas…s is the very same; there is the glory of the Mysterie which dazles the eye of carnal reason; And therefore whatever we say on this argument, must be taken cum granosalis and expounded foreign, because of the infinite difference between a finite and infinite nature, and between created and uncreated persons, as I shall (God willing) shew at large before I conclude this Chapter. Three Persons may, and do subsist in one and the same Infinite Nature: and therefore though e…eryffforeign significat naturam Absolutam Communem: foreign significat Naturam subsistentem cum proprietatibu… Relativis & distinctivis Hypostasis doth connote the Divine nature, yet all … here connote one and the same infinite ggPersonae divinae sunt per se subsistentes; nihil autem per se subsistit sine subsistentiâ.nature in which all three Persons dohhSubsistentia divina est ipsamet essentia divina peculiari modo se habens; unius autem essentiae sunt plures modi, sive respectus diversi juxta nostrum concipiendi modû Scripturis conformem. Singull autem modi singulas essentias non postulant in rebus creatis, & proinde ejusdem essentiae infinitae plures modi & re…pectus diversi esse possunt. subsist. To subsist, is (as Aristotle the great Interpreter expounds it) to have the most perfect manner of Being by it self, that a Substance the best of Beings can attain to; and it is very proper to say, that the Father Son and Holy Ghost have the most perfect manner of Subsistence in the Divine nature p. 87that is or can be. The Divine iiforeign apud Craecos Logicos Personam significat, & foreign non raro essentiam, sed vocum earum in Theol. jam fixa est & limitata significatio, & proinde Logicos istos nobis … non licet.Nature considered with all Absolute & Relative Perfection in Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, doth most truly, properly, and perfectly subsist; for there are three illustrious Subsistences in that one undivided infinite Nature; The Divine Persons do most perfectly s…bsist.and therefore the Godhead thus considered, doth subsistkkAristot▪ Categor. foreign. Singular substances have the most perfect subsistence. A Spirit is the most perfect Substance; God is the most single and singular Substance, and he is the only Infinite …pirit, the best of Spirits, and therefore he must needs have the most perfect Subsistence. Every single Person is foreign and therefore I will be bold to inferre, that these three Persons only do perfectly subsist by themselves, though in llClamamus, siquis tres Hypostases, aut tria foreign hoc est tres subsisten…es personas non confitetur, Anathenia …it. Hieronym. Epist 57. How there are three in on…. & one in three.one another; for they have one Independent, Spi…itual, Infinite Nature, which is of it self, and is complete in it self, because Infinite in Perfection, and therefore contains all absolute and Relative perfection in it self: but when we speak of the Relative perfection, we speak ofmmforeign. Athan…s. Symb. Naz. orat 37. Sophron. act. 11. Concil. Oecum. sexti. Damas. Anasta…. Syn. three in one, because the Relative properties are distinctive: and when we treat of the Absolute perfection, we speak of One in Three, one Essence in three Persons, p. 88who do all three subsist with their Relative and Incommunicable properties, in that most perfect and single Essence. This is that Divine Trinunity which contains all Absolute and Relative Perfection, And therefore hath the most perfect and excellent Subsistence, that is, or can be, Finally, though these three Persons do mutually subsist in one another, yet they are said to subsist by themselves,

1. Because these Persons do not subsist in one another,How the divine Persons subsist by themselvs, and yet in one another. as Accidents do exist in a Subject; for Accidents exist in another, because of their imperfection; but these subsist in one another, because of their perfection, because they have the same single infinite nature, and are one infinite and omnipresent Spirit.

2. They subsist mutually in one another; the Father subsists in the Son, Ioh. 14. 10, 11. as well as the Son in the Father; and therefore this subsisting in one another doth not argue any imperfection, but doth demonstrate the infinite perfection of all Three Subsistents: but there is no mutuall inexistence of an accident in a subject, and a subject in that accident or any other.

3. These three Subsistents have one and the same spirituall, nnHypostases dicuntur, nulla tamen est in divinis personis suppositio vel subjectio, sed coessentialis aequalitas. Vide Aquin. p. 1. q. 39. art. 1.independent, infinite nature, which is complete of it self, and in it self; and the whole Creation doth not afford one Example to illustrate, much p. 89lesse to parallel these three illustrious Subsistences in one undivided Nature. And it is impossible it should: for, this one undivided Nature in which these three glorious Persons do subsist, is an infinite nature, and there can be but one Infinite; and therefore the Socinians seem to have lost what they do so much idolize, their Reason, when they desire us to illustrate this Mysterie by an Example.

4. These three Subsistents are Coequal, because Coessential. The Fathers upon some of these considerations did agree to use the phrase of three Hypostases and one Essence, though the word Hypostasis was not so plain and familiar at first, especially to Latine eares, and thereforeooHieronymus Epist. 57. Novel. lum a me homine Romano nomen exigitur—Interrogamus quid per tres Hypostases posse arbitrentur intelligi. Tres Personas subsistentes aiunt. Respondemus nos ita credere. Non sufficit sensus, expressum nomen efflagi…ant—& quia vocabulanon ediscimus haeretici judicamur Hieron. Epist. 57. si quis tres subsistentes personas non confitetur Anathema sit. Hierome complains that some were too rigorous in imposing that word without expounding of it to such whose judgment was Orthodox, though their skill but small in the Greek.

To conclude my discourse upon this word Subsistence, be pleased to consider that we read of the Nature of God, we read of the Subsistence of the Father, and we read that these three, Father, Son and Holy Ghost are one; having these two words [Nature & Subsistence] in Scripture, we are prompted by the Spirit speaking in the word to explain this Mystery thus; The Father, Son and Holy Ghost are three p. 90in Subsistence, but one in Nature. No Mystery can be explained with lesse Violence and more Sobriety; for we are precise in keeping to the very words of Scripture in explaining this grand Mystery to the plainest of men; and therefore they were sentenced of old that did not beleeve this plain truth.

IX. We have no reason to be offended with the Vse of the word Person,Concerning the word Person. when we treat of this Argument, if we adde a fit Epithet, and say the Father is a divine Person, or an uncreated Person, and say the same of the Son and Holy Ghost▪ The word Person signifies the most excellent kind of Subsistent, an understanding Subsistent, as is acknowledged by all the Masters of Language, sacred and prophane, as hath been proved; and that place 2 Cor. 1. 11. is very cleare; of all the derivations of Persona, that pleases meppPersona quasi per se Sonan… fic non nemo. Persona quasi per se una; sic Criticorū facile principes Persona quasi à verbo foreign vel foreign quasi cinctum quid, vel foreign quasi habens aliquid circa corpus. best, Persona quasi per se una; because it doth expresse the unity and excellency of a personall subsistence. Per se notes the excellency, because subsistere per se notes the most excellent kind of subsistence. Nay, the word qqforeign quamvis substantiam prim…m significat, tam animatam quàm inanimatam, P…sona verò, tantùm substantiam singularem intelligentem qualis Deus, Angelus, homo.Person doth expresse more excellency then the word subsistence alone, doth import, p. 91for it is proper to say that a Beast doth subsist,Vncreated Persons. but it is absurd to say that a Beast is a Person because a Person is an understanding subsistent. But neither of these rrMagnâ prorsus …opiâ humanum laborat eloquium. Dictum est tamen tres personae, non ut illud diceretur, sed ne taceretur omnino. Non enim rei in, effabilis eminentia hoc vocabulo explicari valet. Aug. lib. 5 de Trinitate cap. 9.words doth expresse the excellency of that subsistence which the Father, Son and Holy Ghost have in the Godhead. And therefore we do not only say that these three are Persons or Subsistenc…s, but we say they are uncreated Persons, Divine Subsistences, Persons subsisting in the Divine Nature, Persons of the Godhead, that so we may take in all the excellency which these words Subsistence and Person do afford; and then by other Epithets superadd that excellency which is proper to Father, Son and Holy Ghost, and leave out all that imperfection which is in created persons and subsistences. The word Subsistence is in the Scripture; Heb. 1. 3. The word Person is in Scripture applyed to men, 2 Cor. 1. 11. who have a more excellent subsistence then beasts▪ An understanding subsistence; and therefore bothssforeign. Damascen. in Dialog. cap. 43. Nazianzen. orat. 31. in laudem Athanasii. Greek and Latine Fathers did at last agree to use the word Person, because it signifies an understanding subsistent. And if you adde divine or uncreated Person, then there is no danger of any mistake; unlesse men will be so vain as to say p. 92the wordttVocibus non semper cum respectu suae originis, sed ex receptà consuetudine utendum. Anti-Trinitarians aequivocate in abusing the various significations of the word Person. Person doth sometimes signifie a visible shape, an outward form or appearance, the countenance or gesture of a man, or else some office, relation, or quality; and say that we do make three shapes, countenances, &c. in the Godhead; as Sabellius, Servetus, and such bold Atheists as have sucked in their poyson, are wont to say. We do therefore vindicate the Church of God from these insolent and groundlesse aspersions, and freely declare what we mean by Person, namely an understanding Subsistent. Every of the Three Divine Persons hath an office, and hath a relation; but no Divine person is an Office, or a mere uuPersona significat Relationē prout est Subsistens in naturâ divinâ. Aquin. p. 1. q 39. art. 1. In creaturis relationes sunt accidentales, & proinde accidentaliter insunt, relationes autem in Deo sunt subsistentes, & ipsamet essentia divina, Aquinas ibidem. Pater non genuit meram nudamque relationem, sed correlatum, Filium subsistentem, nec non coessentialem.Relation; but the Godhead doth contain all relative as well as absolute perfection within it self, as hath been said.**How a divine Person is said to take upon him two severall Persons. God, as represented to us in Scripture, doth as it were take upon him the person of a displeased Father, and sometimes of a well-pleased Father; but we do not say there are three such Persons in the Godhead: for one Divine Person may sustain the person of a well-pleased Father at one time, and the person of a displeased Father at another. And if any man will be p. 93so ridiculous us to conclude from thence, that then one person may be two persons; I hope he will see his own vanity, and be sensible of the equivocation, by considering what hath been said already in this very Chapter.

When we say, God doth take upon him the Person of a well-pleased Father, we speak foreign after the manner of men; just as when we speak of the eyes and hands of God, but we must be understood aaLocutiones Impropriae Dei essentiam non exprimunt, sed ejus notitiam tenuitati nostrae accommodant.foreign after such a manner as becomes the infinite dignity and pure majesty of God.

If men do not wilfully mistake,Vnwritten words hold forth the written truth. they may then know what we mean by Person, when we say there are three uncreated Persons in the Godhead. The word Person is in Scripture; and if it were not, yet as long as the thing signified by it is there, we have no reason to account thatbbVoces tanquam consecratas omni jure judicamus, si earum conjugata, & Synonyma in Sacrâ paginâ reperiantur. Si enim talibus vocibus sensum mentemque Scripturae exprimentibus uti non liceret, nec explicare Scripturam pro concione liceret, neque in alias linguas vertere. word, or any other such like, an Exotick word, because we find it very proper and pertinent to the point in hand, in the sense which we have so often declared, that there might be p. 94no mistake, but a full agreement in such an high and weighty point.ccTemerè non sunt inventa nomina quae per evidentem consequentiam mentem Domini in Scripturis loquentis fideliter exprimūt; cavendum est ne vocabula repudiando, ipsam repudiemus veritatem, superbaeque temeritatis simul & haereseos arguamur. It is out of question, that we may expound the Scripture by words and phrases which are not in those very letters and syllables to be found in Scripture, as long as we do not affect a needlesse curiosity in inventing new and obscure phrases▪ & a rigid superstition in defending them; for that would not conduce to edification; but beget or foment an endlesse contention. Our expressions must be sober and plain; grave and usefull, such as may hold forth the godly and prudent simplicity of the Scripture. That is al that needs be said for the use of such words and phrases as are fit and necessary to be used in this and divers other obscure points.

There are some that mistake the Attributes of God for Persons, Persons are not Attributes as Sabellius dr…am't.and they make more then three persons; and therefore I shall not go about to reckon up the innumerable absurdities which follow upon that one mistake. Vno absurdo dato, mille sequuntur. I read, indeed, that Sabellius conceived the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, to be different Attributes of God: But the Orthodoxe Christians desired him to remember that there were more then three Divine …ttributes, and pressed him to acknowledge, p. 95that A Trinity of persons do subsist in the unity of the nature of God; Vnwritten words hold forth the written truth.and then they would close with him and give the right hand of fellowship unto him.

The fraud and subtilty of Arius, Sabellius, and the rest of the old Heretiques, gave the reverend Doctors of the Chu…ch cause to use the wordsddCùm Scriptura testetur tres dici quorum quisque in solidum sit Deus, nec tamen plures esse Deos, nimis morosum est de voce contendere, cùm res in aperto sit. Colon. Anal. Paraphrast. Calv. Inst. pag. 34. In Scripturis occurrit vox Trinitatis numero namerante. 1 Iohan 5. 7. & numero numerato passim, ut in Baptismo Christi. Matth. 3 & in Baptismo nostro Matth. 28.Matt 3Matt 28 Trinity, Coessential, Consubstantial, and the like, that they might more clearly and fully manifest this profound and glorious mysterie: And they who did wrangle about these Words, did indeed deny the Mystery and thing it self; and therefore did but manifest their pride, fraud, obstinacy, for the maintenance of their damnable Heresie, when they quarrelled with those eminent Writers, for making use ofeeHi…ar. lib. de Synodis. Inane enim est calumniam verbi pe…timescere ubi res ipsa cujus verbum est non habeat difficultatem—expertus pridem sum & quidem saepius quicun que de verbis pertinacius litigant fovere occultum virus, ut magis expediat ultrò provocare, quàm in …orum gratiā obscuriùs loqui. unwritten words & phrases, upon so just and necessary occasion, that the written truth might be more clearly explained and fully defended. It is not in the judgement of any man, any fault at all, to make truth plain; unlesse in the deluded judgement of such who are enemies to truth. Now we have removed the rubbish, we begin to build.

p. 96A Divine Person is a Spiritual and Infinit Subsistent, A Divine Person described.related indeed to those other uncreated Persons, which subsist in the same Divine Nature with it, but distinguished from those Coess…ntial persons by its peculiar manner of subsistence, order of subsisting singular relation▪ and incommunicable propertie. In these few line there is matter enough to fill many sheets, and I am to treat of the distinction of persons at large in the next Chapter.

A Divine Person is Spiritual,The description of a Divine Person explained and confirmed. for God is a Spirit, the Father of Spirits, the Spirit of Spirits, an infinite Spirit, and therefore hath life, the best of lives, nay is life it self in perfection, and therefore we read of the understanding and will of God; an understanding life is the best life that we are acquainted with; and the life of God is a subsisting life, every one of the Divine persons is subsistent, and therefore, every one of them hath subsisting life. We may then safely conclude, that every one of the Divine persons is a spiritual and infinite Subsistent: I say Subsistent, to shew that I do not abstract the Subsistence of the person from the Divine Nature in which the person doth subsist; herein all the three Persons do agree.

Moreover, every Divine Person hath some Relative perfection, for they are mutually related to one another.

p. 97Finally, every Divine Person hath some peculiar and incommunicable propertie. But if we come to treat of any peculiar manner of subsisting, or the Order of subsisting, or that singular relation which is proper …o every one of the three, or any certain …ncommunicable propertie, whereby any one person is distinguished from the rest, …hen we must leave treating of what is common to all three persons, and shew wherein these Coessential persons differ, or whereby it doth appear to us, that they are distinguished. We will therefore for Orders sake enquire,Three distinguishing questions propounded which are in their order to be stated and resolved.

1. What distinction there is between the Divine Nature, and the Divine Persons, Father, Son and holy Ghost.

2. What difference there is between …reated and uncreated persons.

3. How these three uncreated persons are distinguished from one another.

This question concerning the Distinction of the DivineffVox Nat…rae a …ascendo derivatur, sed pro quavis essentiâ usurpatur; vocibus enim non semper cū respectu suae originis, sed ex receptâ cō suetudine utendum. Hypostases in divinis non dicunt aliquam suppositionē vel subjectionē sed aequalitatem coessen…ialem. Nature and these three most glorious persons which subsist in it, is the most difficult point in all Divinitie, …nd therefore I humbly beg the assistance of all these glorious persons, that I may conceive and write judiciously and reve…ently of this profound and glorious My…erie of Faith. I remember that excellent …peech of judicious Calvin; Non minori …eligione de Deo nobis loquendum quam cogitandum p. 98sentio; quicquid autem de Deo a nobis cogitamus stultum est, & quicquid loquimur insulsum. What ever we think… or speak of our own heads concerning God, will be like our selves unsavourie, foolish and vain. No language is rich enough, no words are significant enough to declare this profound Mysterie, which the understanding of men and Angels cannot comprehend, nor the tongue of men and Angels express; if all the Saints and Angels in heaven and earth should sit in Councel and communicate their notions to one another about this Argument, they would acknowledge this Mysterie to be not onelyonly inexplicable and unspeakable, but unconceiveable and incomprehensible.

1. Concerning the Distinction which is between the Divine Nature,The difference between the divine Nature▪ and Persons. and a Divine Person, it is to be considered that I have most studiously declined the describing of a Divine Person in abstracto for the reasons mentioned above, and I might add many others; but it is enough to say that the most cleanly Abstraction doth but suggest an inadaequate Conceit of a Divine Person;The Inac… quade conce…t of a divine Person and when you abstract the nature of God from the personalities, men are apt to dream of some strange God that is neither Father, Son nor holy Ghost, and so to create a new God, or to conceive that the Divine Nature may, as the humane nature p. 99of Christ doth subsist in alieno supposito.

2. They who denie the Trinitie, must if they be not worse then Turkes or Socinians acknowledge,The Socinians engaged to state the point in question. that God the Father doth subsist, and therefore they are engaged to shew the difference between the Essence and Subsistence of the Father, as well as we are, who believe the Trinitie. But there is no greater a distinction between the Person of the Father, and the Nature of the holy Ghost, then there is between the Person of the Father, and the Nature of the Father; for the Nature of the Father and the holy Ghost is one, and the same Divine Nature, which is as impossible to be divided, or multiplied in two or three Persons, as it is in one single and undivided person, because the Divine Nature is single and infinite, and the Divine Persons do mutually subsist in one another, and all three Persons subsist in this single and undivided Nature, which is indivisible, immultiplicable and most purely and singularly one and the same infinite perfection in all three Persons, and there can be but one most single absolute and infinite Perfection.

3. The Divine Nature is subsistent, necessarily and perfectly subsistent; the most perfect manner of subsisting by and of it self is due to the most perfect Nature.

p. 1004. The Divine Nature is not indifferent to subsist in the Father,Divina natura salvâ omnimodâ perfectione Dei non potest carere aliquâ personarum divinarum. Son and holy Ghost, or out of them; for in regard of its infinite Perfection and actualitie it can neither subsist without, or otherwise then in the Father, Son and holy Ghost; because the Divine Nature cannot subsist without all, or any of that Relative perfection, which shines in these three glorious persons, who do all subsist in the same Divine Nature, and yet mutually subsist in one another with all Relative Perfection. The reason is most clear, because the Divine Nature being infinite in perfection must needs contain and comprehend all Relative as well as all absolute Perfection.

5. God is not compounded (as Angels are) of Nature and Subsistence; for whatsoever doth belong to the Perfection of God, doth belong to the Nature of God, and therefore God doth not subsist by the superadding of any thing or manner of a thing, any. Modus that is (as the Schooles speak) Extraessential, or really distinct, and separable from the Essence and Nature of God. And we have formerly shewen, that the Essence of God is intrinsecally necessary, and infinitly perfect, and therefore the most perfect manner of subsisting by, and of it sel… is due to the most perfect Nature.

6. Although Men and Angels are not p. 101able to comprehend,Deus est idem quod sua essentia vel natura; de Deo loquentes utimur nominibus concretis ut significemusejus subsistentiam, & utimur nominibus abstract is ut significemusejus simplicitatem. Quod ergo …icitur Deitas vel vita, velaliquid hujusmodi esse in Deo referend… est ad diversitatem quae est in acceptione intellectus nostri, & non ad aliquam diversitatem rei. Aqin. Sum. p. 1. q. 3. art. 3. in corpore Art. & resp. ad primum. Est de essen iâ cujusliber personae divinae & cujuslibet personalitatis divinae esse ipsum esse per essentiam saltem a parte re…, quicquid sit de modo concipiendi nostro. Vide Suarez. Metaph. D…sp. 34. much less express this incomprehensible Mysterie, yet we may set satisfactorie bounds to our thoughts and discourses by the Analogy of faith; for the Scripture saith that the Father and the Son are one, and that all three Persons are one, and therefore we do conclude that as the infinite Perfection and Actualitie of the Divine Nature doth require three Subsistences, because this infinite Perfection doth contain all Relative, as well as all absolute Perfection, so doth the single and most singular Nature of God, require that these three glorious Persons subsist in the Vnitie of the Godhead. Now we are sure that the One-nesse, or singlenesse of Gods Nature doth well agree with the infinitness of his Nature, because there can be no multiplication of that which is infinites; there cannot be two or three infinites, and therfore we must needs conclude, that these three Subsistents are one infinite God subsisting with all absolute and Relative Perfection. This is the Sum and Substance o… all that can be said a parte rei as we use to speak; but because we are not able distinctly to p. 102apprehend the absolute and Relative Perfefection of God, God doth make himself known to us in a way most suitable to our weak apprehensions in representing himself to be an eternal Father, and then we are ready to enquire after and willing to heare of an eternal Son; Now according to our weak manner of conceiving we must needs apprehend that there is a Divine Relation between the eternal Father and his coeternal Son, and conclude that these two are distinguished from, and in a well qualified Sense opposed to, one another with a mere Relative Opposition, for there can be no contrarie Opposition between the Persons; but this Relative and friendly Opposition assures us, that the Father is not the Son, and that the Father did not beget himself, but did beget his Son; But then we consider again, that this Son is an eternal Son, and therefore is God, and we are sure God did not beget another God, for the Power of God is not nay cannot be exercised about any thing repugnant to the Nature of God, and nothing is more repugnant to the Godhead then a Pluralitie of Gods; and therefore we must conclude, that the Father and Son are one, and the same God; Now we are come to the Mysterie which faith must receive, and reason admire.

7. We may best resemble all that difference p. 103which is between the Essence of God and the Divine Subsistences, by considering the transcendent Affections of Ens simpliciter and the Attributes of God, foreign.who doth infinitely transcend not only a Praedicamental Substance, but a Metaphysical Entity, as the most Metaphysical men who are sound in the Faith▪ do honestly confesse.

1. Concerning the transcendent Affections of Ens, The transcendent affections of Ens.which are unum, verum, & bonum; we say, these three affections, and Ens in latitudine, do not make foure things really distinct; and yet we say they are reall and positive affections; for our Metaphysical science hath too much serious Majesty, to be pleased with the pretty fictions of Reason, when our understanding hath got leave to play, and recreate it self with its own artificial inventions. The thing is most cleare and evident to all at the very first proposal, because the things which God hath made, are not beholding to God only for their Entity, and to us for their goodnesse; for the things do not cease to be good, when our understanding ceaseth to work; but the things are truly and really good, whether we think them to be so, or no.

Moreover we say, that these Positive and reall affections of Ens do not make any composition at all in Ens transcendently considered, because then the most simple p. 104and uncompounded Being would lose its Being. For Simplicity would be repugnant to Entity, if that Entity it self did involve any Composition. And therefore it is agreed on all sides, that this proposition, Ens simplex est Ens, is a true proposition. Finally, from what hath been said it is reasonably and commonly inferred, That Entity, Truth, Goodnesse, and Unity, make but one Real thing, though they do all foure differ quoad modum significandi; Because the thing adaequately signified by all those foure words is but one Real Thing, namely the very Entity of Ens transcendently considered. For when I say, Ens est unum, this Praedicate Vnum doth not superadde any new Entity, but doth imply and connote the very Entity of Ens. Nay more, if you ask these Metaphysical men, what this transcendent Unity is; they will not answer, that Vnity is Indivision, but Unity is the very undivided Entity it self; not that Unity alone doth signifie simply and adaequately the same that Ens doth in tota latitudine, as Res or Aliquid do; for Unity doth not signifie Truth and Goodnesse, which are the two other transcendent affections of Ens, but Ens in its complete compasse and adaequate signification doth import Entity, Truth, Unity, and Goodnesse also. Truth is a single affection of Ens, and therefore it doth signifie or rather p. 105connote Entity under an inadaequate conceit or notion▪ for it doth represent Ens not in its full latitude, but as considered with respect to the understanding. If we may now make so bold as to compare the Essence of Essences with these Metaphysical notions, we may in some weak measure resemble that difference which is between the Essence of God and Divine Subsistences, at least in some few particulars: For if when we compare creatures with creatures, there appear to be some dissimilitude even in the most apt similitude, and no similitude runs (as we say) upon four feet; it is not to be wondered at, if this comparison be rather a resemblance, then an illustration. When Divine revelation hath gone before,Rationes praecedences minuunt, rationes subsequentes augent fidem. and we have built upon that as the groundwork and foundation by a serious faith, these Metaphysical notions may be subservient helps in a subordinate way.

1. The Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, do all Three really, positively, truly subsist in the Divine Essence; and yet these three Subsistences, and the Divine Essence, do not make four, no nor two things really distinct; even as Entity, Truth, Goodnesse, and Unity, do not make four things really distinct, as you heard but now, but are one reall thing and no more.

2. Ens is not compounded of Entity, and its three Affections; nor is God compounded p. 106of the Godhead and three Subsistences; nor is any one Person compounded of the Divine Nature and Subsistence.

3. As Truth is not Goodnesse, nor Goodnesse Truth, nor either of them Unity, and yet all three are Entity; so the Father is not the Son, nor is the Son the Father, nor is either of them the Holy Ghost, and yet all three are God, for they are all three but one God subsisting with all absolute and relative perfection, as hath been shewen.

4. Every one of the three Affections of Ens, doth connote Entity: Every one of the three Subsistences doth connote the Godhead, the Divine nature, as hath been proved at large.

5. Not any one of the three Affections of Ens doth, nor do all three together super-adde a new Entity; not any one of the three subsistences doth, nor do all three together super-adde a new Deity, a new Divine nature, or Godhead: For Ens aaEns est unum, verum, bonum. Ens est essentiâ unicum, affectionibus autem trinū, trinum & unum, Ens trinunum. Unum est quod prius de unoquoque ente cognoscitur: Verum quod proxime cognoscitur; intellectus enim est prior potentia, quàm intellectus; & verum dicit ordinem ad intellectum; bonum ad voluntatem. Denique si res sit ficta, non est bona; & proinde bonitas quodammodo fundatur in veritate; omnes autem tres passiones sunt à parte rei. Entitas quoad significatum intrinsecum; entitas est bonitas & è converso.is one; Ens est trinum, non triplex, trinum et unum Ens trinunum: Deus est trinus non triplex, trinus et unus, Deus trinunus; This instance doth in some measure resemble the mystery of the Trinunity.

6. No affection of Ens can be really separated from Ens: Nor can one of the Divine Persons be separated from the Divine Nature, or the Divine Nature from any one of the Divine Persons, or any one of the Persons from either of the other two.

7. All the Affections of Ens are distinguished, but none divided: all the three Subsistences are distinguished, but they cannot be divided.

8. Truth and Goodnesse which are two of the Affections of Ens, are distinguished by their severall and peculiar relations; Truth hath relation to the understanding, and Goodnesse to the will: The Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are known to be distinguished by their severall and peculiar relations; and if it be not unreasonable to say that there is in Entity three affections, and two relations in ente simplicissimo, without any Composition in, or Multiplication of the Entity, why should it seem unreasonable, or at least why should it seem incredible that there are three subsistences and severall relations in the Godhead, without any composition in, or multiplication of the Godhead?

9. One affection, nay all the affections in abstracto, do but inadaequately represent Ens, unlesse you take notice of the Entity p. 108it self, as well as the three Affections. One single Subsistence, nay all three Subsistences in abstracto, do but inadaequately represent God, unlesse you take notice of the Godhead in which they subsist; and therefore this praecisive abstraction of the Subsistences from the Divine nature, is but an inadaequate conceit of God, as hath been demonstrated above in this very Chapter: for we must not dream of a Trinity of Modes, but assert and believe the glorious and Coessential Trinunity. The Father is truly God, that God who is the only true God; but the Father alone doth not bbUna subsistentia divina non plane prastat idem quod praestat altera; est enim inter per…onas divinas differentia relativa numerica Nec est essentia divina bis aut pluries id quod est, per tres subsistentias. Nam per subsistentiam Patris essentia divina est Pater, non Filius: per subsistentiam verò Filii nec Pater est nec Spiritus Sanctus: non itaque bis est Pater, vel bis Filius, vel bis Spiritus Sanct…s; nec possibile est ut eodem respectu essentia divina sit Pater, quo est Filius. Tanta autem est essentiae divinae perfectio, ut una subsistentia ipsi non possit esse adaequata. Per subsistentiam itaque Patris divina essentia adaequatè est Pater, non verò adaequatè Deus. vid. Bisterfeld. lib. 2. sect. 1. cap. 5.adaequately represent God to us as he is described in the Holy Scriptures. It is true that the Divine Essence is by the Subsistence of the Father adaequately the Father; but as God is represented by that Divine subsistence only, he is not Deus Trinunus, he is not Father, Son and Holy Ghost; the Father alone is not all those three Witnesses who are one God. And therefore the acute Socinians with their precise abstractions do but suggest an inadaequate p. 109conceit of God: that only true God whom we worship, doth not subsist only in the Person of the Father. We worship God subsisting with all Absolute and Relative Perfection in Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; for these three are that one God who is the only true God blessed for ever. This is the adaequate representation of God in the Scriptures of truth. And we are resolved to regulate all our Metaphysical notions by the holy Scriptures, that we may make the highest of Sciences to acknowledge the supremacie of that Divine science which is nowhere to be learnt but in the Word of God; for the purestccIn quibus ratio estintegra, religionis nostrae mysteria cum ratione consentiunt: in quibus corrupta, cum ratione pugnant mysteria, ut rationem corrigant potius quàm superent. In omnibus enim mysteria supra rationem sunt omnino re, ratione, & …odo. reason must be elevated by the Word and Spirit of God, for the discovery of this mysterie.

10. These affections of Ens represent the manner of that Being which Ens hath as it is transcendently confidered; and the three Divine Subsistences do represent that manner of Being which God hath as he is mostddDeus est essentia univocè sive Ens entium, transcendens transcenden…ium, & proinde essentias non solùm Physicas, sed & Metaphysicas omnes infinitè omnibus modis superat; & proinde discrimina multa incidere ne mireris propter similium istorum inaequalitatem maximam. transcendently considered, namely as subsisting after the most glorious manner with all Absolute and Relative Perfection. It is the manner of a transcendent p. 110Entity to be one, and true, and good, and it is the manner of Gods being to be one God in three Subsistences; These three are one single God, there is no Composition or Multiplication imaginable in this single and infinite being.

I was bold to adventure upon this enquiry because soeeVeritatem convenienter Naturae ex sacris Scripturis asserimus; exiguum autem lumen tam est simile maximo, ut prout natur… unum sunt, ita conjunctione in unm transeant, & in majore ac perfectiore minus sorbeatur, vide I unium Trinit. defens. 1 many reverend learned Orthodox and pious Doctours of the Church have declared that the Divine Essence differs from the Divine subsistences as the manner of the thing doth from the thing it self; and the Persons differ from one another, tanquam modi a modis. I conceived that there was something more in the expression then was commonly known. Moreover I considered that if there might be so great simplicity or singlenesse in a Created and finite Entity, notwithstanding there are three affections and two relations which do affect that Entity, it seemed to me somewhat easie to beleeve that there are three subsistences in one infinite Godhead without any composition in, or multiplication of the single Godhead. Finally I perceive that some youthfull towring wits are drawn away from the simplicity of the Gospel by some froathy speculations presented to them as most sublime curiosities andffCurandum est quod mentem errantium occupat, tumor rationis humanae ina…i Philosophiae Metaphysicae spe cie abre…tae; unu… aut alterum Scripturae locum in transcursu vellicat, ne sine Christo aut Scripturâ (quod vel imperitis foret odiosum) videantur esse: et proinde quia ratione humanâ intumescunt, ex ijs ipsis principi…s quae natura docet, et approbat, falsas esse ipsorum hypotheses, et Argumentationes demonstravi. Ab ijs quae nobis notiora sunt explicatio petenda est, et proinde explicatio Metaphysica non contemnenda est; quae enim docet Natura minimè cum verbo Dei pugnantia, docet Deus. Metaphysicall notions; and p. 111therefore I humbly submit what hath been said to the judgement of the learned, and conclude this discourse with the same prayer wherewith Augustine shuts up his books of the Trinity, Domine, Deus unus, Deus Trinitas, quaecunque dixi in hoc libro de tuo agnoscant et tui; si quid de meo, et tu ignosce & tui. O Lord, who art one God, O God, who art a whole Trinity of Persons in the Godhead, what ever I have said (in this discourse) of thine, let all that are thine acknowledge, what ever I have said of mine own, Lord let it be pardoned by thee and thine.

II. Concerning the Attributes of God, IIwe may observe that they are al perfect, glorious, The Attributes of God are the Essence of God.infinite, because they do signifie and declare the infinite Perfection, Happinesse, Majesty and glory of God; and to speak higher yet, these glorious Attributes though they be very many, are nothing else but the single undivided indivisible Essence of God, we may be instructed, but are evenggQuanto diutius cogito, tanto mihi res videtur obscurior. Cicero de Simonide lib. 1. de Natura Deorum. confounded with the glory of this mystery.

p. 112There are three reasons why we do not readily apprehend this truth.

1. The defect ofhhQuam admirabilis est Deus, cum omnibus linguis sit ind…cibilis, omnibus cordibus incogitabilis! Aug. de cognitine verae vitae. cap. 3. Lombard. 1. sent. distinct. 8. Homo imbecillitat…s Soboles, ignorantiae alumnus, in tan…â mysteriorum caligine Dei ignarus vocibus tenebrosis utitur ad lucem significandam; in verbo veritatis tenebrae appellamu…, est cato in nobis tenebrarum interiorum subjectum, exterio…um illex: est peccatum in nobis depascens carnem ut hedera parietem, mentem obscurans, et voluntatem à vera luce abripiens tanquam unco Carnifex. words to expresse it, especially in English, but indeed the most rich and copious languages are onelyonly happy in the confession of their penury when we come to treat of this argument, because the mystery of the Godhead doth transcend all our eloquence, and teaches us to admire and adore with silence what we cannot expresse without a manifest demonstration of our ignorance.

2. The imperfect manner of signifying is easie to be observed in our most significant words, and therefore we must confesse that the Excellency of God doth transcend the significancy of the most significant words in the most rich and copious tongues.

3 The imperfection of our owniiPaucae lectionis, nullius intellectionis mancipia, intellectione satis mutilâ perfecton…m metiuntur infinitam. understanding, and of our manner of apprehending and judging of things whiles we are p. 113in thekkVisio quae caelestis Reip. cives beat, non fit per principia nobis connaturalia: ibi intellectio sine ratiocinatione, scientia sine disciplina, quies sine motu: istius coeli Sol ipse Deus est sine occasu & sine ortu. body. If any man desire to know a reason why he cannot readily apprehend these divine Mysteries, let him consider the perfection of the mystery, and the imperfection of his own reason, & he hath a sufficient reason, a reason from whence he may draw a most invincible argument against idolizing of his own reason, so far as to make his reason judge of the mysteries of faith.

Let us then prudently consider that we are not able to apprehend thellIntellectus finitus quod est simple… & infinitū unico simplici que actu non capit. infinite and impartible Essence of God but as it were by parts, by many incomplete and inadaequate conceits and apprehensions. The most profound and seriousmmAccipiendo Perfectionem p…o re ip…a quae perfecta est, non sunt in divinis plures perfectiones Attributales; omnia enim in divinis quae sunt Communia tribus non plurificantur, sed sunt unum simpliciter & una simplex Essentia. Biel 1. Sent. dist. 2. quaest. 2. schoolmen have fairely expressed this truth: there are not (say they) many Attribut all Perfections, nay there is but one Perfection in God; for all the Essentiall Attributes of God are nothing else but that single and undivided Essence which is singularly and altogether the same Essence in all three subsistences. Nay, to speak properly the Div…ne Essence is one single infinite perfection, and we cannot say that Perfection is in the Essence p. 114of God; but rather that the highest nnPropriè & de virtute sermonis loquē do non est concedendum quod in Deo vel divinâ Essentiâ sit perfectio, sed perfectio summa est omnibus modis divina essentia ipsa ab eâ penitus indistincta. Biel. 1. Sent. dist. 2 quaest. 2.perfection, even infinite Perfection is the Essenc… of God; it is every way his Essence, and no way at all distinguished from it. Finally, if by Attributal Perfections you mean the Conceits or Signs of Perfection, they say these Signs do indeed signifie the Divine Essence, but the Signs themselves are so far from being the Essence of God, that they do not all of them signifie the same Divine Essence after the same way and manner of signifying; for it is clear, that some of the Attributal Terms are affirmative, some are ooMulti termini Attributales Affirmativi, Negativi, Absolu…i, Connotative, & Relativi ipsam …andamque Essentiam Divinam simplissimam sed diversimode significant.negative, some are absolute, some connotative, and relative. For observe that, when the Perfection of God is declared per viam negationis, byppVide Basil. lib. 1. contr. Eunomium. negative Expressions, as when we say God is immaterial, incorporeal, invisible, immortal, immutable, immense, and the like, we intend to remove all imperfection from the …ssence of God, and leave his pure Essence single and alone, because it is one single and infinite Perfection; we denie that there is any thing in God which might make him like to the Creature in imperfection: For what ever there is which betokens matter, change, privation, or imperfection, we denie that to be in God, because God is one entire, infinite Perfection, and therefore we say as p. 115qqI…dor. Clarius Orat. 5. tom. 1. pag. 21.Isidore Clarius doth, that in these negatives there doth lay hid, not only a positive but an infinite Perfection, and what is infinite, must needs be single; you see still the Perfection is a single Perfection. And when the Perfection of Go… is declared per viam eminentiae, as the Schooles speak, by attributing all Perfection which we find in the Creatures unto God, after we have removed all imperfection, we say the perfection rrAttributa illa quoad rem significatam magis proprie Deo quam creaturis attribuuntur; accipiendo autem perfectiones Attributales prosignis vel conceptibus▪ perfectionem significāt, sed imperfecto modo significant, & proinde modus significandi creatu… is proprie conv…nit, perfectio significata Deo convenit, sed secundum modum Eminentiorem. Vide Th, pag. 1. quaest. 13. art. 2. 3. 6. Zanch. de Naturâ Dei. cap. 8. quaest. 3.signified is most perfectly and properly in God; but the manner of signifying of that Perfection by Attributes taken from the Creatures, doth somewhat rellish of that imperfection, which is in the Creature; and therefore we say such Attributes in respect of the imperfect manner of signifying do not clearly hold forth that single and infinite Perfection which is in God; Hence it is that reverend Divines have laid down so many rules as Cautions to direct us in this weightie point.

1. A finite and compounded understanding cannot apprehend the glorious perfection of a single and infinite Essence, but by distinct proprieties or Attributes.

p. 1162. The Essential Attributes are all of them common to all the three Persons of the Godhead, and to them **Omnes proprieta tes Dei nō possunt creaturis communicari, quia sic multiplicaretur ess…n ia: necaliquae, quia sic divideretur.onelyonly.

3. These Essential Attributes are not distinguished from the Divine Essence, but are the very Divine Essence or Godhead it self.

4. All these Essential Attributes are infinite and eternal, because they are the infinite and eternal Essence of God.

5. These Essential Attributes dossAttributa Divina non distinguuntur actualiter in reipsa, neque à Dei Essentiâ neque inter se, quia perfectio Divina est simplici…er infinita. vide Irenaeum l. 2. contr. haeres. cap. 8. Iust. Mart. q. 144. August. de Civ. Dei l. 12. cap. 2. Hen. quodlibet. l. 5. q. 1. Durand. Ocham. in 1. d. 2. q. 2. not differ from one another, because the Essence of God is single, uncompounded, undivided, indivisible, and one of these Attributes doth Essentially praedicate of the other. The power, wisdom, goodnesse of God, are single, eternal, immutable, infinite.

6. These Essential Attributes do differ from one another,The Eminent Distinction …f Divine Attributes. onelyonly according to our weak apprehension; for our finite and compounded understanding not being able to comprehend what is single and infinite, doth frame different conceits of the properties of God, according to the different objects and effects of these Attributes. Now because our understanding doth ground all its conceits upon the several p. 117Objects and Effects of these Attributes,Plures enim sunt conceptus objectivi virtualiter distincti qui respondent pluribus conceptibus formalibus realiter distinctis. Conceptus autem objectivi non sunt varii realiter, actu, in se, sed eminenter & virtualiter in effectibus distincti. we say, the Difference is not purely Rational, or a meer fiction of reason, but we call it a virtual or eminent Distinction, framed by reason upon the grounds aforesaid, for the help of our weak understandings. For we must consider, that this Virtual Distinction is not attPerfectiones omnes creaturarum quatenus sunt in Deo nihil aliud sunt, quam ipsamet creatrix Essentia Dei. Vide August. lib. 4. Gen. ad lit. cap. 24. lib. 4. de Trinitate. Anselm. Monolog. cap. 34. 35. Real Distinction; because it doth not import, that the Attributes of God are actually many, or really different; but it signifies, that the infinite Essence of God doth eminently contain all real Perfections which are many indeed in the Creatures; but all Perfection in God is but one single and infinite Perfection, which single and infinite Perfection in regard of itsuuDeus solâ & suâ eminenti virtute omnes creatas perfectiones creaturis communicat, & quicquid est perfectionis in creaturis eminen…er continet. eminency, and our weaknesse cannot be expressed by one single Act, or by one Formal and adaequate Conceit of ours, because we do apprehend things according to those several Objects about which they are exercised, and those several Effects which are by their Virtue and Influence really produced. NowxxNullus effectus est infinitus, & proinde nullus effectu… est Divinae Virtuti adaequatus. no Effect in the world is adaequate to the infinite Virtue p. 118and eminent Perfection of the Divine Nature, and therefore we cannot apprehend the eminent and infinite Virtue of the Divine Nature, but by considering of those many Objects and manifold Effects in the world, which do all represent the eminent and infinite Virtue of the Divine Nature; and hence it is that we call it a virtual and eminent Distinction, whereas indeed it is rather an Eminence yyEm…nens & v…rtual… dist…nctio in …e, non est distinctio sed eminentia; est …amen respectu nostricon cipiendi virtutem eminentem secundum distinctos respectus ad diversa obj…cta & effectus distinctos.then a Distinction, because the Divine Nature doth eminently contain all Perfection in its infinite Perfection, and the Divine Virtue doth manifest it self upon diff…rent Objects and various Effects; and therefore our weak understanding frames different concei…s of it according to those different Objects and Effects, and consequently gives so many different Attributes to God. And God hath so far condescended to our weakness in Scripture, as to declare his single Perfection by several names and Attributes, answerable to those different Objects and Effects, in which the eminent and infinite Virtue of God doth gloriously shine throughout the world. I have insisted long upon this virtual and eminent Distinction, that I might by so many several expressions beat this grand Mysterie into the heads of the meanest Christians.

7. When one Attribute of God is abstractly considered from the rest of the p. 119Attributes,All the Attributes are included in every Attribute. that Abstraction must be purely Praecisive, not Exclusive; I must not consider Gods Iustice alone, so as to exclude his merciemercy, or any other of the Divine Attributes, from being comprehended within the single and undivided Perfection of the Divine Essence. When the Justice of God is considered abstractly, and the Abstraction is purely praecisive,aaQ…odlibet attributum divinum est infinitum simpliciter in genere en…is, & proinde essen…iam divinam & reliqua omnia Essentialia Attributa… in suâ Essentiali ratione includit. Vide Caietan. de ente & essentiâ, cap. 6. quaest. 12. Communicable Attributes. all the Attributes of God are at least implicitely included within the abstract Consideration of Divine Justice; for Divine Justice is Essential Justice, infinite Justice; God is just by his Essence, not by any Virtue, or good qualitie; and he that is just by his Essence, is perfectly just, infinitely just; you see that infinite Perfection is implyed, and infinite Perfection is Essentially all Perfection, and therefore all the other Attributes of God are implyed, when I do consider one single Attribute within an Abstraction purely praecisive; for there is the same reason of all other Attributes of God; because God is essentially good, wise, mercifull, &c. as well as just.

8. The Attributes which are called Communicable Attributes, are as truly the single and undivided Essence of God, as those Attributes, which we call incommunicable; for if we speak properly and strictly, no attribute of God can be communicated to a Creature, any more then p. 120the Divine Essence it self, Isa. 42. 8. Matth. 19. 17. 1. Tim. 1. 17. For all the Attributes of God are his Name, his Perfection, his Glorie, his Essence, his Godhead; and if any of the Attributes were communicated, the Essence of God must be multiplied, divided, or distracted from it self; The communicable Attributes are infinite, and there cannot be more infinites then one, and therefore they must all signifie one single and infinite Perfection. For if any of the Attributal Perfections were finite, then the Perfection of God would be made up of manybbPerfectio simplex & infinita non est ex multis & finitis perfectionibus conflata. finite Perfections; and God would not beccPerfectiones quae sunt in creaturis distinctae sunt in Deo simpliciter & unitè; perfectio enim divina est infinita, & proinde simplex & uniciss…ma. infinitely perfect in himself, of himself, and by himself, but by some finite Perfections superadded to his Essence, which is utterly repugnant to the single and infinite Perfection of God. Yet true it is, that some Attributes of God are said to be communicable byddQuicquid est perfectionis in creaturis Deo attribuitur, salva Analogiâ quae inter Deum & creaturam perfectissimam semper intercedit. Perfectio creata ut sicnon est Formaliter in Deo seclusis imperfectionibus creaturae; nam seclusâ omni imperfectione non remanet Formalis perfectio creaturae ut sic. Vide Suar. Metaph. Disp. 30. Analogical Accommodation, not in respect of the properties themselves, which are all infinite, but in respect of the Effects of those properties; there is something in the Creature by the bountie of our Creatour, and Grace of our Redeemer, which p. 121doth after a weak manner resemble the Perfection of God, and therefore we are said to be partakers of the Divine Nature, 2. Pet. 1. 4. when we bear the image of God in righteousnesse and holinesse of truth.Nomen Analogum nullā naturā communem rebus Analogis significat. For we are still to remember that God is to be known per viam eminentiae, when we make an Eminent Distinction between one Divine Attribute and another, or ascribe any of the Perfections which are found in the Creatures by way of Attributal Perfection unto God. ForeeIn his quae non mole magna sunt idem est majus esse, quo… melius esse. Aug. Trinit. lib. 6. cap. 8. God is not great in quantity, or good by a qualitie, but by his own infinite Essence. We must remove all imperfection from God, that we may know him per viam negationis; and therefore we say merciemercy and goodness are notffNulla perfectio creata est in Deo Formaliter secundum adaequatam rationem quam habet in creaturâ, sed eminenter tantùm, quia imperfectio includitur in intrinseca ratione & conceptu creaturae; S…pientia creat… est accidens, Sapientia creata est finita, & imperfecta. Perfectio itaque est in Deo Formaliter secundum proprium conceptum Dei. accidents in God, his understanding and his will are not faculties, his anger and hatred are not passions, his many Attributes are but one single Perfection; the Perfections which are in the Creature are imperfect, but the Perfection of God is infinite. Finally we must consider God as the cause of all Perfection in the Creature, that we may know him per Viam Causalitatis.

p. 122These grounds being laid, let us consider what great difference there doth to ou… weak understanding appear to be between the Divine Attributes, whether they be compared with the Divine Nature, or with one another, and yet that indeed and truth there is no real difference between the Attributes and the Divine Nature, or between the Divine Attributes themselves, and we shall more easily conceive what great difference there is between the Father, Son and holy Ghost without any Essential difference between them.

The holy Scriptures speaking to our weak capacitie, describe God and his Attributes after such a distinct manner to us, that we cannot but conceive, that there is some ground even in the word of God for this virtual andggDistinctio non est Pura fed eminens, quia formatur & fundatur in verbo Dei quod distinctè de iis loquitur ad captum nostrum. D. Alting. Problem. part. 1. Pr…b. 10. pag. 49. D. Voet. pag. de unica & simplicissimâ Dei Essentia. Vide. Wallaeum. Gomarum. eminent Distinction between the Attributes, as will-be most evident to any that observe the usual phrase and language of the Scriptures in these and the like places, Exod. 34. 6. 7. 1. Tim. 1. 17. Psal. 103. 8. 9. 10. 1. Tim. 6. 15. 16. But it is as clear that God doth herein gratiously condescend to our weakness, because we know that the Divine Nature is p. 123…ngle, and infinite, and therefore doth con…ain in it all Actual Perfection eminently, …nd allhhDeus est ex seipso Ens essentialiter summe perfectum & proinde ess…n…ia divina includi…omnem possibilem per…ectionem; nam perfectiones illae, quae sunt in Deotant…m eminenter prout in ipso, sunt Formalissime de conceptu Essentiali Dei. Vide Suarez. Met. Disp. 30. Sect. 6. …dcir…o ne quae…amus qui sit, cū sit omnia, & super omnia, & p…aeter …mnia, foreign. Vide Iul. … calig. Exercitat. 365. p. 2. de D…o. possible Perfection both singly and …ctually, because all true and pure Perfection is most Formally included in the Na…ure and Essence of God; and therefore this eminent Distinction grounded on the Phrase of Scripture, and upon visible Ob…ects and Effects, gives us no ground at all …o conceive, that the Divine Nature is not one single infinite perfection, because the Scripture speaks distinctly of God, and of his several Attributes, only to teach us to apprehend the impartible perfection of God by degrees rather then parts, because we cannot apprehend it altogether. Our conceits of God are inadaequate, and collected by way of Analogy from the perfection of the creatures; but we must consider that what the creatures do performe by many and distinct qualities and acts, God doth performe by his owne Essence which is one most single▪ and most pure act. And therefore we conclude that this distinction is not really grounded upon God himself, upon his Nature, or Essence, but upon the Effects of God. The objective conceits or things conceived, are not really or actually different in themselves, but virtually and …minently in the several Effects, Egresses, Terminations of Gods eminent vertue, and p. 124single power, which is every way boundlesse and infinite, and therefore never works according to its full and adaequate vertue. TheaaHanc distinctionē vocant rationis ratiocinatae virtualem aut Emin…ntem. Nonnulli autem distinctionē appellant ex Natura Rei Formalem, non Actu, sed virtute, aut Eminenter. Vide sis Rhadam Controvers. inter Thomam & Scotum part. 1. Contro. 4. Scotists do indeed seeme to say more, because they say that this distinction of the Attributes is Formall and ex natura Rei; but then they come off againe in their explication of these termes, and say that their meaning is that they are distinguished Formally, not Actually, but Virtually and Eminently, and therefore we meane the same thing. For the divine Essence is not only a single bbQuicquid in Deo est essentiale unum est: à primâ autem unitate omnis differentia, omnisque numerus abesse debet▪Unity, but the first Unity, which is uncapable of any difference or number whatsoever; only we cannot by accPluribus conceptibus Formalibus inadae quatis realiter destinctis unam eandémque essentiam simplicissimam divisim vel potius gradatim concipimus. Conceptus autem ejusmodi Analogicè desumimus à rebus creatis, quae per multas distinctasque qualitates praestant ea, quae essentia divina per se. single act comprehend Gods single perfection, because our understanding is finite, and his perfection is infinite.

But it will be said that the Attributes of God have to our apprehension not only different, but contrary effects: the Justice of God doth punish, and the mercy of God doth spare.

p. 125The answer is easie:The justice of God is not contrary to the mercy of God. the Effects are to our apprehension contrary, nay they are contrary in themselves, but the Attributes are not contrary; for the Attributes do both belong to the same God, nay they are the same God; and these Attributes do not overthrow, but preserve one another. Now we readily grant that the Effects are really different, nay contrary; but we deny that the Attributes of Justice and Mercy are really different, or contrary in themselves.

Finally, we grant, that according to our manner of apprehension, it is very improper to say that the Attribute of Gods mercy is the Attribute of his Punitive Iustice, because the termes are here taken in ddIstae propositiones falsae sunt in sensu Formali quae significant aliquid Deo convenire secundum eam rationem secundum quam verè non convenit; ex. gr. misericordia divina punit, justitia divina miseretur: attributum Justitiae punitivae est attributum misericordiae: intelligere est velle: voluntas intelligit: intellectus vult, voluntas est intellectus. Verae autem sunt istae proposi…iones in sensu Identico acceptae, quia essentia divina est simplicissima, & proinde res illa quae est voluntas intelligit; res illa quae est misericordia punit. Vide D. Vo…tium. Select. Disput. p. 1. de unicâ & simplicissima Dei essentia.sensu formali, as we use to speak, and therefore that manner of predication is improper; yet if you take the termes in sensu identico, the thing is true, because Mercy and Justice are the same thing, the same Essence. We may say that the same God, the same Essence, which is mercy it selfe, p. 126doth punish; but it is very improper and absurd to say that God doth forgive by his punitive Iustice, because God who speaks distinctly of his own: Attributes in his word, that he might help our weak understanding, will not give us leave to speak so confusedly of his glorious Attributes, as to puzzle the understanding of our weak brethren.

What I have said concerning the Justice and Mercy of God, might Consideratis considerandis, be applyed to his other Attributes; and I might discourse in like manner concerning the understanding and will of God, concerning the Acts and Decrees of God, and enquire whether they are distinct from the Essence of God? that so we may the better understand the distinction which is between the Divine Subsistences and the Divine Essence, by comparing the Divine Attributes, Acts, Decrees, Subsistences and Essence altogether; but I shall be brief in that.

IX. The Decrees of God,The Decrees of God. which we, according to our weak apprehension, are apt to conceive as many, are but one single and eeDeus in seipso semper agit intellectu & voluntate ut purus Actus.pure Act in God; nay, to speak strictly, they are nothing else butffDe actionibus Dei quas Decreta vocamus rotundè dicimus, Decreta Dei secundum perfectionem quam dicunt in Deo esse necessaria, aeterna & essentialia. Decreta autem quoad speciem, terminationem & extensionem ad externa esse libera, nec deo estentialia esse, nec ipsum Deum. Voluntas enim divina liberè terminatur ad creaturas sine ullâ sui mutatione, vel reali additione; accedit autem externa quaedam denominatio, & respectus rationis ex parte Dei in ipso decreto jam liberè terminato fundatus, ex parte creaturae in ipsa futuritione seu existentia illius. God himself decreeing; for the Divine Essence is one pure and single Act. In Deo non distinguuntur Esse p. 127Posse & Operari, The Decrees and Acts of God, his knowing, willing, &c. are not many in their owne Absolute nature, for they are the Nature of God considered as a pure and Vital Act; and hence it is that we say the Decrees of God (in their Absolute Nature, or as they are considered with reference to Gods owne uncreated truth and goodnesse) are all Essentiall and Necessary, they did not begin to be, they cannot cease to be; God did not begin to know or love himselfe, he cannot cease to know his owne Almighty power, or to love his owne uncreated goodnesse.

The Decrees of God upon this account, and in this consideration, are not capable ofggVoluntas & volitio divina una est & simplex; nec multiplicitatē aut divisionem & distractionem, nedum oppositionem, nec prius & posterius aut successionem, nec dependentiam causalitatis & effectus aut cujuscunque alterius ordinis admittens; haec autem omnia rebus volitis competere possunt; res autem volitae à voluntate & volitione divin… realissimè & infinitè distinguuntur; de rebus enim externis libere volitis loquimur. Vide Maccovium Miscell. qu. Disp. 17. 20. 23, 24, 25, 26. Voetium. ubi supra. multipicity, or division, opposition or succession, dependance or order. For here is nothing but one pure, vitall, eternal, unchangable Act, which is God himselfe, knowing and loving of himselfe for himselfe. Take it all thus in brief, in a few short conclusions.

p. 128I1. God is a Pure Act, The Acts of God.and therefore he cannot buthhActus divini considerati secundum id sunt, quod nil differūt ab essentia divina, & proinde nulla est in illis vel mutatio, vel libertas, sed summa necessitas. Sicut enim Deus non potest non esse, sic neque potest non velle, non intelligere. Imo actus divini considerati secundum respectum quem dicunt ad objectum Primum ac principale, ad ipsissimam nimirum Dei essentiam, sunt etiam necessarii; quia Deus non potest non essentiam suam scire, & tanquam summum bonum amare. Act vitally; Vitall acts considered with out reference to any object.he must needs understand, and will; here is no such Liberty or Mutability as Vorstius dreamt of, opposed to unchangable necessity; for as God cannot cease to be because he is the first, necessary and Independent Being, and his necessity of being speaks his infinite perfection: so he cannot cease to Act, because he is a pure Act; he must needs act vitally, who is life it selfe; he must needs know and will because he is the best life, and purest Act; and this necessity speaks his purity and perfection also.

II2. If this Pure and vitall Act be considered with reference to Gods owne Essence,Vital Acts considered with reference to Gods Essence. they cannot be distinguished, because Gods Essence is a PureiiVita divina est intellectu, voluntate, & potentiâ actuosa. Deus novit seipsū ut primum & infinitū objectum, amat seipsum necessariò, necessitate naturae, sed absque coactione, quia non potest nolle gloriam suam, aut seipsum negare. Act. The self-same divine Essence is both the Act, and p. 129Object in these immanent Actions, which do not passe out of God towards, and therefore have no relation at all to, or denomination from, anykkActus immanentes nullum dicunt respectum ad, quia non transeunt in objectum externum. external, Object. God doth know and will all things within himself naturally, and necessarily; it's his nature to love himself; here is no distinction imaginable.

3. Personal Acts (such as the begetting IIIof the Son,Personal Acts. and breathing forth of the Spirit) are not arbitrary, but necessary and natural Acts, and therefore aeternal; now acts that are absolutely necessaryllActus Personales sunt aeterni, & proinde horū est absoluta necessitas absque potentiâ ad oppositum. sine potentiâ ad oppositum, as we use to say, being natural and aeternal, are nothing else but God acting in, and by some one or more of the three Divine Subsistences. Nothing that is eternal can be out of God, and there is nothing in God that is not God, and therefore I need say no more of those Personal Acts in this place, because I am to treat of them at large in the very next Chapter.

4. The Intrinsecal Acts of God which IVdo connote some habitude and respect to some thing that is out of the Godhead, Intrinsecal Acts considered with reference to extrinsecal Objects.are the will of God, or the Essence of God considered after the manner of an Act of p. 130his will, Esentiâ ex se actuosa (as the Schooles speak) concepta per modum actus volendi. If this Act be considered in it self, it is nothing else but the will or Essence of God, because it is an intrinsecal mmActus intrinseci in Deo connotantes respectum ad extra sunt ipsa Essentia Dei concepta per modum actus, sed relativi, & quidem ad extra. Omnia enim novit Deus quae sunt extra se, substantias, & accidentia. Gen. 1. 31. Universalia, & singularia, Psal. 33. 13 14. Iob c. 1 & cap. 2. Magna & parva. Matth. 6. 25. bona & mala. Psal. 33. 15. Genes. 6. 5. interna & externa. Matth. 6. 4. praeterita. Isa. 38. 3. futura. Isa. 41. 23. praesentia: possibilia denique 1. Sam. 23. 11. & impossibilia. Tit. 1. 2. Omnia etiam liberè vult extra se, quaecunque nimirum statuit vel permittere vel producere; non enim quicquid potest facit.Gen 1:31Ps 33:13Job 1Matt 6:25Ps 33:15Gen 6:5Matt 6:4Isa 38:3Isa 41:231 Sam 23:11Titus 1:2and vitall Act. But now if this Act be considered as Relative, and as related to some thing that is out of God; we say this Act is not necessary, but free in respect of all those things which God decrees to produce or permit in the World; for God doth Arbitrarily decree to permit or produce this, and not that, according to the Counsel of his own will, it being as truly and fully in his power to permit or produce that, as this: both were alike possible, but this is made future, and will in the fullnesse of time be present in Act by virtue of the free decree of God; for all Creatures are produced and do exist by the will of God. It is most evident that the will of God is the same whether it act upon himself or something that is out of the Godhead.

V5. The Relation which is between the will of God,Extrinsecal Relations. and the Creature, whether p. 131in futurition, or existence, is extrinsecal.

6. The Denominations grounded upon VIthe termination,Extrinsecal Denominations. or relation of the will of God towards the Creatures, is extrinsecal also.

7. These Actions of God which are VIIsaid to be rather from God,Extrinsecal Actions. then innnActus excrinseci s…nt a Deo effectivè, non sunt in Deo Subjectivé… God, as to create, govern, redeeme or the like, are called extrinsecal, and therefore the Denomination of God from them must needs be extrinsecal.

8. We have no ground to conceive that VIIIthe Essence of God is compounded with extrinsecal Terminations,The single Essence. Relations, or Denominations.

9. Though the Objects which God doth IXwill are very different,Necessitie and Libertie. and their production is successive, yet the will of God is the self same, and is one single and pure Act: the Power of willing and the Act of willing are not distinct in God; nay God doth will his own happinesse necessarily, and the happinesse of men and Angels freely by the same will;ooforeign naturale & foreign liberum nō constituūt diversas potentias in Deo. necessity and liberty do not make distinct Powers or wills in God.

10. There is no Potentia Executiva in XGod,No Potentia Executiva in God. and therefore all those conceits of Vorstius concerning any Change or Composition p. 132in God by several Acts or decrees are but meer dreames, and vain conceits, though they be now published to the World, not with less blasphemic then impudence in this licentious age.

It is evident by what hath been said that the eminent Virtue of God (notwithstanding its several Objects, Egresses, Terminations, Relations, Denominations and Effects) is one single and infinite Perfection. This will be the constant result and Conclusion of all sober debates, and Christian discussions. For if the Perfection of God be not single, then it must be compounded: but it cannot be compounded either of things that are finite, or of things that are infinite; the Perfection of God cannot be compounded of finite things, because it is infinite; for many nay all finite things cannot make up one infinite; and God cannot be compounded of many infinite things, because there can be but one thing thats infinite, and that is God. And therefore since Gods Perfection is his Essence, and his Essence is single, uncompounded, undivided, indivisible, it must needs follow that whatsoever is in God, is God, and God is (as hath been often shewen) one single infinite Perfection. This is our first Principle, and last Conclusion into which all our debates, and by which all our doubts about this p. 133Argument may and ought to be resolved.

X. The Distinction between the Divine Nature and Persons may be considered,The Distinction between the Divine Nature and Persons.

1. In respect of predication; the Divine Essence is predicated of every Person, because every one of the three Subsistences is God, nay is the Divine Nature considered with this or that Personal Propriety and Relation respectively. But one Person is not predicated of another, the Father is not the Son, nor is the Son the Father, or the holy Ghost.

2. In respect of Communication, the Divine Nature is not onelyonly communicable but communicated to all three Persons; but it is of the Formal Reason of a Person to be incommunicable.

3. In respect of Relation. The Divine Nature doth indeed eminently containe all absolute and relative Perfection; but the Formal ppDistinctio in Deo nascitur ex relationibus pr opriis sive personalibus quales sunt paternitas, filiatio, spiratio, processio; quaedam enim relationes sunt omnibus personis communes quales sunt Identitas fundata super Vnitatem Essentiae, similitudo fundata super Vnitatem Attributorum, & aequalitas fundata super unitatem magnitudinis.Relations whereby the Persons are not onelyonly distinguished from, but opposed to one another, cannot be Essential under that consideration, because they are peculiar to the several Persons, and not common to all three Persons, as the Essence and Nature is. Peculiar and distinctive Relations are not essential, because the Persons who are relatively distinguished, are not essentially distinguished. p. 134The Divine Nature of the Father is qqEssentia & paternitas virtute & eminenter Formalem distinctionem continent, quia ita se habent ac si Formaliter distinguerentur.not his Father-hood: for if it were, then every one of the three Persons would be God the Father, all three Persons would be one Person, which is a manifest Contradiction.

4. In respect of Generation and Procession; the Divine Essence doth not beget, nor is it be gotten, it doth not proceed; and yet the Father doth beget, the Son is begotten, and the holy Ghost doth proceed; the Person of Christ is begotten, but his Divine Nature unbegotten.

5, In respect of number; the Persons are three, the Divine Nature most simply single, and singularly one.

6. In respect of Order; there is an Order to be observed amongst the Divine Persons; the Father is the first Personal Principle, the Son the second, and the holy Ghost who is breathed forth by the Father, and the Son, is the third; the Scripture saith there are three, and doth commonly reckon them in that Order; and we have no ground to reckon the holy Ghost before the Son because he proceeds p. 135from the Son; but the Divine Nature being a single Vnitie, and the first Vnitie, is as uncapable of Order as it is of Number.

XI. Notwithstanding all these and some other distinct Considerations, I shall be bold to make this Peremptorie Determination; The three Divine Subsistences are not really distinguished from the Divine Nature, or Essence. The Scripture saith, Christ and his Father arerrEgo & Paterun… sumus nempe …ssentiâ, Potentiâ & Gloriâ. Ergo Christus dedu…it fidem nostram ad hoc fundamentum, …mirum ut ipse sit unus cum Patre Deus—necesle habemus ut videamus in Christo Deitatem, in facie ejus personam Patris, cum sit Character Personae ipsius; in facie ejus gloriam Dei, cum sit splendor gloriae ipsius: in manu ipsius manum & potentiam Patris; denique in illo …otam Dei Patris majestatem. Rolloc. in Ioh. 10. 30.John 10:30 one, Ioh. 10. 30. and that all three are one, 1. Iohn 5. 7. Essentially one, and therefore really one. I have said enough above to prove all three Persons to be essentially one. The three Persons are one God subsisting with all possible Perfection, Relative as well Absolute in one pure Act ex parte Rei. The three Divine Persons do not differ from the Divine Nature, as an humane Person doth from the humane Nature singularly considered: for a singular humane Nature may be separated from an humane Person as is evident in the Incarnation of our Lord and Saviour. But the Divine Nature cannot subsist in alieno supposito; the Nature of God cannot subsist in any other or any fewer then these three Persons, who are one and the same p. 136God; And therefore the Divine Nature doth not differ really from the Persons, tanquam res à re, as we say, nor tanquam res à modo separabili; they do not differ really either way; nor do the Persons differ really, that is realiter separabiliter from one another, as shall be proved, when we come to speak of the Distinction of the Divine Persons in the next Chapter.

XII. The Distinction between the Divine Nature and three Divine Subsistences is not a groundlesse Conceit or a meer fiction of reason, because it is grounded on the ssCredimus tres esse H…postases nobis in Scripturâ significatas per nomina quae relationem significant. Non est enim Pater nisi Filii, nec Filius nisi Patris, nec Spiritus nisi Spirantis. Itaque relationes quidem ipsas habemus in divinis literis. Chami…r. de Canon… lib. 9. cap. 10.Word of God. For our apprehension of God must be agreeable to that Divine Revelation, which God hath vouchsafed us of himself in Scripture. Now it is most clear and evident, by what hath been said in this whole Discourse, that the holy Scriptures teach us to conceive distinctly of some things in God, which are not really distinguished in him. And therefore M^r. Fry may do well to consider, and retract that rash Censure which he passes upon this Doctrine of God, when he saith that the Doctrine of three distinct Persons or Subsistences in the Godhead is a chaffie, grosse, Carnal and absurd Opinion, in the Title and 22. page of his blasphemous book; For this distinction is not onelyonly p. 137grounded on attHaec distinctio habet fundamentum non tantum in effect is aut phraseologiâ Scripturae, quia fuit ab aeterno. Nam ab aeterno Essentia fuit non tantùm Communicabilis sed Communicata, persona autem incommunicabilis; persona filii, genita, essentia ingenita. Phrase of Scripture, but is eternal.

XIII. The Distinction between the Divine Nature and Persons is an Eminent distinction; I have told you above, what we mean by that expression. The Persons are the Essence of God, and not any thing separated or divided from it; every one of the three Persons is a Person of the Godhead, nay every one of the three Persons is the Godhead considered with some particular property and relation; and the Godhead being absolutely single, we must conclude that the Divine Nature and a Divine Person is the same Essentiall Reall thing, though they are Eminently distinguished by sundry considerations, as hath been shewen.

But it is objected that every one of the three Persons is a Substance,The grand objection. and if there be three substances subsisting in the Godhead under sundry Formal considerations, then there will be three Divine Substances, three Substantial Relations and Properties, and therefore the Godhead will be compounded by these three Substances, substantial properties and relations, or else there will be p. 138three substantiall and formall Gods.

To this grand objection, I make these few returns by way of answer.

1. Every one of the three Persons is a Substance, a Divine Substance,The Answer. but they are the same Divine Substance, because they are the same God: these three are one, they are unum, one divine substance, one God; they are all three divine Persons, but they are Coessentiall Persons, anduuforeign. Inessentiall persons of the same Godhead.

IIII. The peculiar relations do distinguish, but they do not compound, Peculiar Relations do destinguish, but not compound.for they do not super add any new Entity, much lesse any new Godhead, because all these relations are Natural, eternal, and therefore they are God; Absolute and Relative perfection in God, are but one single perfection.

1. The parts or extremes wherewith any thing is compounded must be really, Compositiô described by its severall requisites.or at least Modally and Separably distinct; for all created Natures and Persons being compounded, are not only Modally, but separably distinct.

2. The parts compounding must be united by somexxQuae actuex naturâ rei distinguuntur, non possunt inter se uniri nisi per actionem causae efficientis: nulla autem causa essiciens prior Deo est; ergo. efficient cause, and one of the parts must be a meere power or passive p. 139potentiality, that is capable of farther perfection; and the other an Act to make that poweryyEssentia in creatis est divisibilis & perfectibilis; persona enim creata actuat et perficit essentiam perfectibilem; personalitates autem increatae non sunt actus naturae divinae ut sic & praecise consideratae eam perficientes vel informantes. perfect and complete.

3. There must be by vertue of this union and perfection some dependance, multiplicity and change. Now it is clear that the nature of God in which the persons subsist is not capable of these imperfections; for,

1. There are no compounding parts in God.

2. The persons are not made one person by their Inessentiali subsistence, but remaine three distinct Persons.

3. The Persons are not separably distinct from the divine nature, or from one another.

4. The Persons do notaaEssentia in creatis est imperfectae actualitatis & proinde perfectibilis. Essentia autem divina non habet se ad modum potentiae perfectibilis, nec persona divina ad modum actus naturam divinam infinitam simplicissimam perficientis. Ratio quidditativa, & ratio Relativa in Deo tanquam diversae rationes Formales à nobis concipiuntur, sed ambae illae rationes Formales sunt in Deo secundum ultim…m unitatem & actualitatem propriam. Nihil enim perficit essentiam divinam in actu quidditativo praeter ipsissimam essentiam; nihil perficit personam in esse Personali praeter propriam Subsistentiam, nihil perficit personam in esse Relativo praeter propriam relationem: Pater per ipsam paternitatem perficitur in esse Relativo. perfect the divine nature, for it is infinitely perfect of it selfe, and the three Persons are by vertue of the same divine Essence Essentially the same God, and really one, as hath been laid. The divine nature is not like a created nature, which is (imperfectae actualitatis as we say) so imperfectly actuated, as that it p. 140is capable of farther perfection; for the divine nature hath no weak, imperfect, defective, Passive Potentiality in it, and therefore cannot be contracted, determined, actuated by any personal properties or relations. If God be Essentially considered, he hath a singular existence of himselfe by his owne Essence, and hath most perfect unity and quidditative or Essential Actuality, because his Essence is the most perfect Essence that is, or can be. If God be Persosonally considered, he hath the most perfect personality that is, or can be, and every person hath a perfect, proper and peculiar subsistence, which is not capable of any farther perfection in Esse Personali. Every person is complete in Esse quidditativo per essentiam, in esse Personali per propriam subsistentiam. I need say no more on that Argument, because I have upon severall occasions said so much already.

III. The Essence of God is not multiplyed by sundry considerations of the same Essence.

p. 141IV. The three Formall considerations are not bbIn Deo est essentia & tres relationes, sed non sunt tres essentiae relativae. Propri…ta. tes personales praecisè & formaliter sumptae non uniuntur inter se, & in se: nam unio in & cum essentiâ est in aliquo tertio.Essentiall, but Personall considerations, and we grant that there are three Formall Persons in, and of the Godhead; but it will not follow from thence that there are three Gods, for these three Persons are one God.

V. A. divine Person may be presented to our most serious thoughts under a three-fold consideration, as learnedccVide Junium contra Bellarminum, Controv. 2. lib. 1. Praefat. Ut res planior sit, id praemittendum est personae considerandae triplicem rationem esse; Communem in essentiâ quà Deus est: Singularem Absolutam in Persona quà subsistit in unitate Essentiae; & Relativam in distinctione & ordine personae unius ad alteram. Iunius observes.

1. The first consideration of a Person is Common or Essentiall, because the same divine Essence is common to all three Persons; when a Person then is considered as God, we call this an Essentiall or Common consideration, because the persons areddRatione Communis Deitatis & communium essentialiumque attributorum, nulla distinctio cogitari debet, sed tantùm ratione Personae & proprietatum personalium. no way distinguished under this first consideration, but are one thing, the choycest and chiefest of things, and are one p. 142with the most single and singular kind of unity: Father, Son and …pirit are one Jehovah, one God and the same God.

2. The second consideration is Personall, and yet eeEssentia notat naturam divinam cum proprietatibus communibus: Persona notat naturam divinam cum proprietati bus dist inctivis, sive istae proprietates sint Absolutae, sive sint Relativae; habere subsistentiam à seest quid Absolutū: foreign est quid Positivum Nomen autem Personae, nomen Relativum communiter dicitur originationis aut originis respectum includens, quo Pers…na divina à se, vel ab aliâ subsistentiam habere significatur. Habere autem subsistentiam à se, quantum m…hi videtur non dicit respectum ad aliud, vel alium.Absolute, whereby the person is considered as subsisting in the Vnity of the divine Essence. This consideration is more singular, because every person hath its proper and peculiar subsistence; for the Father doth subsist of himselfe, but the Son hath subsistence from his Father; Now the selfsubsistence of the Father is proper, peculiar, personall, that is, proper and peculiar to his person, and yet this self-subsistence is Absosolute, for his self-subsistence is not his Fatherhood, and therefore it cannot be esteemed Relative. But though this consideration is more singular, because every person hath his peculiar subsistence, yet herein all three persons agree, that they do all three subsist in the unity of the same Godhead, though every person hath his proper subsistence, & his peculiar way of subsisting; here are indeed three subsistences under this consideration, and yet but one divine Substance, Essence, Nature, Godhead, because all three do subsist in theffTres sunt in eadem naturâ divinâ indivisâ Coexistentiâ Coessentialiter subsistentes; tres enim personae inconfusè uniuntur & indivisè discernuntur. Vnity of the same Godhead; p. 143for we must still keep our eye fixed upon that Text, These three are one.

3. The third Consideration is Relative in the order of one person to, and distinction of one Person from another. ggEst aliquid in persona Ab solutum quod est Proprium, est aliquid in Deo relativum quod est Commune. Identitas, similitudo, aequalitas, mutua praesentia personarum inter se propter inconfusam in se mutuò comprehensionem, sunt relationes ad intra omnibus personis communes; relationes autē distinctivae sunt propriae.This distinction of persons is to be handled at large in the next chapter; our point in question here in this chapter doth not concerne the distinction of one person from another, but the distinction of all three persons from the divine Nature.

Now, they who speak most largely of the distinction between the persons, and say it is in some sense ahhOmnis distinctio essentialis est realis, sed omnis distinctio realis non est essentialis. D. Voetius. Reall distinction, do yet confesse that the reall distinction which they treat of is not iiPersonae divinae non differunt realiter essentialiter, nec realiter separabiliter, sed proprietatibus realibus personalibus; tales autem sunt istae reales proprietates quae essentiae divinae non superaddunt novam entitatem. Vide D. Alting. Problem. X.Essentiall, and therefore still here is an Essentiall union of the three persons under all these three Considerations. We do still make much of that Text, and hold it fast for our direction and support, 1 Iohn 5. 7.

p. 144VI. This Argument will be best answered by shewing the vast difference between created and uncreated persons, and I have with a great deale of patience waded through all these perplex disputes, that I might make way for the clearing of this grand Mystery, and glad I am that I am now got within sight of it, though I have had as hard a passage as Hanibal had over or through the Alpes, and yet I have made my IIway without fire, or vinegar.

II. Concerning the difference between created and uncreated persons,The difference between created and uncreated Persons. we may observe that

1. All created persons have a finite and dependent Nature.

2. They have a Compounded Nature.

3. They have a different Nature.7. Observations concerning created Persons.

4. They have a different understanding, will, power.

5. They have a different place and presence.

6. They have different Accidents, and are distinguished by an heap of Accidents.

7. Humane Persons with whom we are best acquainted, may differ in time also; one humane person may subsist a long time after another is dissolved.

Having laid down these Positions, let us now make the comparison, and observe the difference between created and uncreated persons.

p. 1451. All created persons have a finite and dependent Nature,1. The infinite Nature of uncreated Persons. but the nature of all uncreated persons is Independent and Infinite; this one difference is an infinite difference, The difference between created and uncreated Persons is Infinite.and surely if there were no other difference, that wonld suffice to discover and overthrow all the Arguments of Socinians and Familists. I do often admire that the acute Socinians who pretend to be wholly ruled by reason, should have no more reason in them then to argue after this absurd manner. Three humane persons are thus and thus distinguished, Ergo if there be three divine persons, they must be thus and thus distinguished also, even just as humane persons are. Is not this a grosse fallacykkVide Nazian, orat. de Spiritu Sancto. Damasc. orthod. sid. lib. 3. c. 5. Athanas. Dialog. de Trinitate & in Mat. 11. Nazian. orat de pace Orat. 37, & 51.Matt 11, because of the imparity and infinitellAbsurdum est personas coessentiales & infinitas ad creatarum quae finitae & diversae essentiae sunt modulum redigere. inaequality? if the divine persons must be called into question, let them be tryed by their Peeres. They say they cannot comprehend this Mystery; I say the reason is because it is a Mystery; and if they cannot comprehend it, they may the better beleeve it to be incomprehensible. The single Nature of these three persons is infinite, and if men wonder that they cannot comprehend what is infinite, it is because they do not consider that they themselves are finite.

2. The nature of these three glorious p. 146subsistences is Independent; the nature of all created subsistences is dependentmmNatura creata est dependēs; persona creata est Independens, quia non est in alio per dependentiam ab illo tanquam sustentante., and therefore it is no wonder if a dependent nature do subsist in its proper person, and depend upon its proper person for sustentation; but the divine Nature doth not depend upon the three subsistences for its sustentation or subsistence; but all three persons do subsist in this Independent and infinite Nature. Philip. 2. 6. subsisting in the Nature of God; so the Scripture expresses it, and we must apprehend and beleeve these holy Mysteries according to the holy Scriptures, because no man hath seene God, and God is the only all-sufficient Witnesse concerning his owne essence and subsistence, concerning himselfe; and therefore we must not think or speak otherwise of God then according to the Scriptures of truth, in which God hath sufficiently and graciously revealed himself, Iohn 1. 18. Matth. 16. 17. Matth. 11. 26, 27. The Scriptures direct us how to distinguish uncreated persons from created persons. Our finite and dependent Nature doth subsist in a created person, but uncreated persons do subsist in an Infinite and Independent Nature; there is a manifest difference. Our nature indeed doth subsist in the divine and uncreated person of the Son of God, but that is not according to the common course of nature, there is a peculiar reason and another p. 147Mystery in that wonderful subsistence; And yet even in that wonderfull Mystery our dependent Nature doth subsist in a person, Cum humanitas Christi consequuta fuerit personalitatem propriâ infinite perfectiorem, nonest cur propriam personal… tatem amplius appeteret. Si enim adhuc inclinaretur ad propriam perso…alitatem, vi quadam detineretur in verbo, & ita status illius esset violentus, & quasi contra naturam. Cajetanus.which notes its dependance; and our Nature is more satisfied and quieted by subsistence in a divine, then in an humane person, because it hath a more glorious sustentation, and is more powerfully upheld by that divine and uncreated person. The divine person of Christ doth subsist in his divine Nature, and the humane Nature of Christ doth subsist in his divine and onelyonly person.

III. All created persons have a compounded and divisible nature,The third difference. but uncreated persons have a single undivided and indivisible nature. The Socinians, Arminians and Vorstians of this age do not love to hear any discourse of the single Nature of God, in Father, Son and Holy Ghost; this Doctrine, they say, is Philosophical, Scholastical, Metaphysical, and therefore there is nothing which concernes Faith, Piety, or manners in it.

But it is most clear and evident that all the glorious Attributes of God are united by an Eternal bond which cannot be dissolved, and we have invincibly proved, p. 148that they do all signifie but one single and infinite perfection. If you take away the singlenesse of Gods being, you take away his Incommunicable, unchangable, incomprehensible, independent and infinite perfection. This point is excellently discussed and opened bynnforeign. Damascen. Orth fid. lib. 1. c. 4. Damaseene. Composition (saith he) doth beget strife, strife may well cause a separation, and separation dissolution, which all who know any thing of God, will acknowledge to be repugnant to the perfection of the Godhead. The learnedooVide Iren…um lib. 2. cap. 16. Athanas. in decret. Synod. Nicen. Nazi…. lib. de Fide. Cyrill. lib. 10. contra Iulian. Euseb. Praeparat. Evangel. lib. 8. c. 2. Athenagoram, Talianum, Augustin. de Trinit. & passim. Doctours of old did consider that God is a most pure and perfect Act, the first and Independent Being, that he is what he is by his owne Essence, and not by participation. ButppVorstius Deum contemnendum pingit Corporeum, visibilem, mutabilem, accidentibus subjectum, in quo sunt plures res, &c. Vide Eglisem. Cris. & Hypocris. Bogerman contra Grotium. Synod. Nat. Dodrac. Vorstius was bold to publish his dreames co… trary to the Analogy of Faith and unanimous judgment of the reverend Doctours of the Ancient Church. The Socinians in theirqqRacov. Catechis. de cognitione Dei cap. 1. Catechisme, therrRemonstrant. Con…ess. Apolog. p. 41. 42. Arminians in their Confession and Apology are exceedingly too blame in this point. The Socinians do expunge the single and infinite perfection p. 149of GodsssDeus est Spiritus. Joh. 4. 24. Jehovah Exod. 33. 19. Eheje. Exod. 3. 14, 15 foreign Apocal. 1. 4. Summe perfectus Genes. 17. 1. summeque unus. Deut. 6. 4. & proinde omnem de Deo compositionem imò & quasi compositionē de Deo negamus. vide Rhadā Episcop. Pact. Controvers. in… ter Thomam & Scotum, part. 1. Controv. 4. append. 2. pag. 82. 83, 84.John 4:24Exod 33:19Exod 3:14Exod 3:15Rev 1:4Gen 17:1Deut 6:4 spiritual nature out of their Catechisme, that they may more securely deny the Coessentiall Trinunity of Father, Son and Holy Ghost; and therefore I do insist upon this difference between created and uncreated persons, because if the Doctrine concerning the single and infinite perfection of Gods spirituall nature be overthrowne; All the ttEglisem. contra Vorstium.Fundamentals of the Christian Religion will be overturned. vvMaccov. Mis. quaest. Disp. 17. 20, 23, 24, 25. 26. Vasquez. disp. 16. Deus est liber ab omni compositione et…am improprie dictâ, qualis est ex essentiâ & esse, ex natura & supposito seu ex essentia & subsistentiâ, ex genere & differentia: & proinde liber ab omni distinctione in essentia su…. Nam distinctionis & multitudinis transcendentalis personarum atque adeo modorum & relationum longe alia est ratio. D. Voet.God is Jehovah, he is what he is by his owne Essence, he can neither cease to be, or to be what he is; for he cannot be any other thing, or any otherwise, then now he is, and ever was, Exod. 3. 14, 15. Revel. 1. 8. Iames. 1. 17. Psal. 10. 2. 27. Gos is called Light, and Love, & Life in Scripture, to note the singlenesse of his being, because whatsoever is in him, is himself, and he himself is one single infinite perfection, he is light it self, and in him is no darknesse at all, 1 John 1. 5. God hath not such an imperfect singlenesse of being, p. 150as we say, is in thexxMareria Prima formae, differentiae ultimae, &c. simpliciter simplices dicuntur; Angeli sunt Comparative simplices; essentia autem divina est Absolutè & … simplex. En… summum est …, & proinde essentiti… unitate unum, simplicissimè unicum. Vide. D. Vo…tium de Natura Dei sa…pl. first matter of last difference and the like; nor such a singlenesse as is in Angels, or the souls of men, for theirs is but a Comparative singlenesse, there is some kind of composition even in the most glorious Angels. God is not compounded of a Nature,yyNon de…emus proprietates Dei ab essentia ejus vel cogitatione scpara…e, quia in essentiae forma & vir…ute omnes continentur, & Deus sine proprietatibus ejus cogita…i non potest. D. Wallaeus de Deo. pag. 127. Atrributes, and Relations, as hath been shewen, nor is any of the Divine Persons compounded; nor can the Godhead be said to be compounded of three Persons; for though the Persons be distinguished, they do not compound, nor can they be compounded. Distinction connotes perfection, because it is opposite to confusion: but Composition denotes multiplicity and imperfection; we must then consider that

1. The Essence of God is mostzzEssentia divina non est i… poten…iâ, quia est paras actus, non est perfectibilis, quia omnes perfectiones complectitur. perfect, and therefore nothing can be added to it to make it more perfect, because it is infinitely perfect.

2. Whatsoever is compounded may be p. 151dissolved into the parts whereof it is compounded; The Godhead cannot be dissolved, because it cannot be changed.

3. Whatsoever is compounded, must needs be dependent both in being and in working. But God isaaDeus non depender à subjecto à …a …sis vel internis, vel externis, à principio quocunque priori aut superieri. Independent. Ergo.

4. The parts compounding are bbEssentia divina non est in se composita, nec aliquid ipsi componibile, nec ipsa alicui componibili. Essentia aeterna nec s…ipsâ nec ullâ realiâ posterior esse potest.before the whole that is compounded; but God is the Former of all things, and therefore nothing can be before God. The divine Essence cannot be later then it selfe, or later then any thing else, because it is the first and eternall being.

Now if neither of the Nature or Attributes ccProprietates De… non minùs … sunt quàm ejus essentia… … non essent ipsissima Dei essentia sim…l … Joh, 5. 26. est vita; Joh. 11. 25.John 11:25of these uncreated persons, nor the persons themselves be compounded, nor God compounded of the Nature and Persons; here is another very great difference between created and uncreated persons, who have life, and are life it self, because they are one single perfection.

p. 152IVIV. Three created persons have three different Natures, The fourth difference.but these ddUnius personae in creatae tota est essentia divina, sed non solius.three uncreated Persons have the selfe same most single and singular nature. Three created persons may have the same specifical nature, but they have not the same singular nature; created persons in respect of their specificall nature which is universall, are foreign of like nature, but in respect of their singular nature they are foreign. But now these uncreated persons are foreign in respect of their eeSingula sunt in singulis, & omnia in singulis, & singula in omnibus, & omnia in omnibus, …num omnia. August. lib. 6. de Trinitate cap. ultimo. Nec major est essentia in tribus quàm in duabus, nec in duabus quàm in unâ, quia tota est in singulis. August. ubi supra.singular Essence: Look how manyffTot sunt sustantiae singulares quot personae creatae. created persons there be of the same species, so many singular substances there are of that species. For, a ggEssentia creata est finita, circumscripta, imperfecta, divisibilis, perfectibilis: per differentiam enim individualem sive personalem contrahitur, perficitur. Essentia partibilis per partes & separatim inest singulis individuis Angelicis & humanis. Essentia autem divina est perfecta infinita simplex, & proinde eadem etiam numero & individuo (quod aiunt) tribus personis communis citra omnem multiplicationem, divisionem aut separationem; eadem quippe natura singularis est tota in singulis personis divinis.finite nature cannot be communicated to severall proper persons of the same species without a multiplication of singular natures or substances, because every finite nature is imperfect and divisible. The humane nature is communicated to Paul, Peter and Iohn: Now these three p. 153persons are three men, for they have three distinct singular natures, though they have one universall nature; and no wonder, for their nature is imperfect and divisible; their universall nature is unum multiplicabile. But the nature which is common to these three divine Persons is not universall but singular; it is unum immultiplicabile, because the divine nature is infinite, and that which is infinite cannot be multiplyed; the unity of the divine nature is reall hhUnitas specifica non est rei sed rationis extra men tem enim nostram non est unitas naturae humanae in personis diversis sed pluralitas. Unitas autem essentiae divinae est realis, & singularissima, quia ita Deus est unus ut etiam sit solus, & ita solus ut non possit esse alius.and most perfectly singular. The same singular nature, the whole nature being of bound lesse perfection is really and eternally communicated to all three persons without any division of the nature, separation of the persons or composition of nature and persons: the persons are distinguished, but not separated; and if we speak properly and strictly, the divine iiPersona multiplicatur & proinde distinguitur; essentia autem divina nec distinguitur, nec multiplicatur.Nature, as it is common to all three persons, is neither distinguished nor multiplyed; for the nature is not distinguished from kkUnitas ad essentiam proprie pertinet, distinctio autem personarum non ad essentiam propriè & per se, sed ad rationem in essentiâ respicit. Iunius contra error. Samosat.it self, nor are the persons distinguished from one another by the Nature, or naturall properties, but by personall p. 154properties,Essentiall Attributes are common but Personal Attributes are Incommunicable. which are not naturally common to all three, as the Attributes are (which we call Naturall, because they are Essentiall,) for these personall properties are naturally peculiar and incommunicable, and yet they do nor superadd any new Nature; because the divine Nature doth containe all Relative as well as Absolute perfection in it; and the Godhead considered with all these incommunicable properties is but one single Godhead, as hath been shewen: this is a transcendentllIn omnibus mysteria supra rationem sunt Re, Ratione, & Modo. Mystery indeed.

VV. Created Persons have a different Understanding,The fifth difference betweene created & uncreated Persons. a different Will, a different Power, because they have a different Nature. But uncreated persons who have one and the same undivided and infinite Nature, must needs have one and the same Understanding, Will and Power. For, we cannot comprehend God as one pure vital act, but as his life is actuous mmVita Dei est actuosa intellectu, voluntate, & potentiâ.or active in his Vnderstanding and Will, in his Essentiall and Almighty Power. Now, what isnnQuod essentiae proprium est hypostasibus commune est. Essential, that must needs be common to all three persons.

Whatsoever the Father is as he is substance, as he is life, as he is eternity, as he is perfection, as he is God, the same is the Son of God, and the Holy Ghost, as Augusti… doth frequently discourse. When theooQuicquid dicitur de praedicato essentiali, dici…ur de Subjecto. Attribute or praedicate is Essential, p. 155whatsoever is affirmed of the Attribute or praedicate, that must needs be true of the subject, as the Philosopher and all that have any reason in them, do unanimously conclude. The Essentiall power of God is the very Essence of God; God doth Act by, and of himself, and not by any faculty or power superadded to his Essence; Christ is called theppFilius foreign dicitur ab Epiphanio contra Marcellianos haeresi▪ 72 pag. 358. foreign inquit Basilius de Filio contra Eunomium lib 2 pag. 339. power of God, and the Holy qqVide D. Go…ari Diatriben de Christo foreign & D. Voe…ii notas in select. Disp. D. Voetii par. 1. pag. 442. 445. 449.Ghost is called the power of the most high. 1 Cor. 1. v. 8. 24. Luke 1 35. to shew that they have the same Essential power that the Father hath Christ saith, that none can take his sheep out of his hand, because none can take them out of his Fathers hand; for saith he, I and my Father are one, John 5. 28, 29, 30. We have one nature, one hand, that is one Power. For the hand of God can be nothing else but the power of God. And therefore since all the three divine Persons are one God, because they have one and the same divine Nature, th…se three are rrOmnes tres personae sunt Coessentiales, & proinde essentialiter unum sunt; tres enim persone non sunt tres essentiae, sed ipsissima & unicissima essentia, quia simplicissima. Personae autem Coessentiales sunt coaequiles; licet enim filius & Spiritus Sanctus vitam, potentiam, omnia habeant à Patre, omnia habent per naturam, nihil per gratiam.one with the most perfect and singular manner of unity. Finally, since the Power of God is the Essence of God, it must reeds follow that all three persons have the same power, because they have the same divine essence, and they have the self-same essence by nature, not by meere indulgence or grace.

p. 156But then some who have a great mind to cavill,The grand objection. tell us that we do but equivocate when we say these three Persons have the same Essentiall Power, because we do conceale the other member of the distinction, which is Relative or ssPotentia divina distinguitur in Personalem & Essentialē Personalis est quâ Pater generat filium, &c. Essentialis est quae cō munis est tribus personis. Potentia Patris videtur esse Activa, quia Pater est gignens; generatio autem filii videtur esse Passiva, quia filius est genitus Psal. 2. 7. Joan. 1. 14. There is no Passive Generation in the Son of God. The divine Essence of Christ is not changed, or begotten. The Answer.Ps 2:7John 1:14Personall Power. Now it is impossible, say they, that these three should have the same Personall or Relative power, because the Father doth beget a Son as he is God the Father, as he is the first personall principle, and not simply and absolutely as he is God; But the Son hath not power to beget himselfe, or to beget another Son, because there can be but three divine Persons, and there is but one of the three called a Son in Scripture. Moreover, the Son is begotten, and therfore his power is rather a Passive then an Active power. But the power of the Father whereby he did beget his Son is an Active power. Nor did the Holy Ghost breath forth himselfe by his owne power, for he did not proceed from himselfe, but from the Father and the Son; and therefore though there be but one Essentiall power, it should seeme that there are three Personall or Relative powers truly distinct in the Godhead.

p. 157This Argument is the most plausible Argument which is urged by them, and therefore it must be most warily answered.

1. We do not equivocate in this or any other point, but do readily acknowledge that God the Father doth beget a Son as he is God the Father, and not simply and absolutely as he is God; because this eternal generation points at a personall property considered after the manner of a vitall Act. But then as this personal property and relation doth not differ really from the divine Essence, so this personal power of begetting doth not differ really from the Essentiall power, because God doth beget a Son in the unity of his owne divine Essence; his Son is ttNullu… horum alium aut praecedit aeternitate aut excedit magnitudine aut superat potestate August. lib. 6. de trinitate cap. ultimo.equall to him, and therefore not uuIdeo non est Pater major filio, quia aequalem sibi genuit. Originis enim quaestio ista est, quis de quo sit; aequalitatis autem qualis aut quantus sit. Aug. Cont. Max. l. 3. c. 18.essentially xxPater non genuit filium exse per seminalem rationem, nec extra se per Physicam productionem, sed in se, hoc est in unitate essentiae genuit. Philip. 2. 6.Phil 2:6different from him, John 5. 18. 26. John 10. 30. Nulla fuit mutatio essentialis in filio, cujus essentia est immutablis.

2. We deny that there is an active Power in the Father,aaPotentia passiva est propria materiae, ex quâ producitur genitum. In deo autem nulla est generatio Materialis. In passiva generatione genitum à non esse ad esse producitur; Filius autem semper actu exticit; genitus non est gignente posterior, quia ab aeterno genitus. and a passive Power in the Son in respect of generation, because a Passive power notes materiality and imperfection; but this eternall generation cannot p. 158be materiall, for God is a Spirit infinitely more spiritual then the most glorious Angel. Pater genuit filium & filius genitus est—spiritualiter, immutabiliter.

3. The two words of begetting and beingbbGeneratio considerata respectu filii geniti est filiat…o sive proprietas filii; generatio autē respectu Patris est Communicatio vitae subsistentis; per hanc autem communicationem filius est unum cum Patre ab aeterno. Mich, 5. 2. non sunt itaque duae generationes sed duae personae gignens, & genita. Vide D. Alting. Problem. XI. par. 1. begotten which are used in Scripture do not point at two different powers, an Active and a Passive, but at two different persons; the Father who did beget, and the Son who was never unbegotten, Micah 5. 2. for he was of old, from the dayes of eternity.

4. It was not in the power of the Father to forbeare the begetting of his Son, because the Son is Ens ccQuod est in potentia gignentis, id non semper extitit, sed potest esse vel non esse. Filius autem semper exticit imò non potest non esse, quia est foreign Ens summe necessarium non minus quàm ipse Pater.summe necessarium, as well as the Father, the Son is foreign, God of himselfe, and not God by participation, nor a different God from the Father, but the same God with the Father, and therefore an Independent, Eternall God, who did not begin to be God, p. 159who cannot cease to be God, but hath life in himselfe as well as the Father, Iohn 5. 20. and hath the self-same divine life, divine nature, divine power which the Father hath; and therefore the Schools conclude well that the Father and the Son have the ddEadem essentia quae in Patre est paterni…as, in filio est filiatio; eâdem potentiâ generat Pater, filiusque generatur. Habetitaque silius eandem potentiam quam Pater, sed cum ali… relatione; Pate… ut commuicans, filius ut accipiens, Johan. 5. 26. foreign generare est dare potentiam, foreign gènerari est acci…ere potentiam vide. Aquin. Sum. part. 1. qu. 42. art. 6.same power, but with a different relation; but these different relations do not superadd a new Essence, a new divine Nature; and they who have the same Essence, must needs have the same power, because the Power of God is not distinguished from the Essence of God, and the Father doth communicate the same Essence and Power which the Son receives.

5. There is the same reason of the Son and Holy Ghost; for these three areeeNon potest autem qui accepit ei qui de…it esse i…qual…, qu… … accepit ut esse… …qualis. Aug. lib. 3. cont…a Maximinum. cap. 14. equall, nay one, Essentially one, one God with the most perfect kind of unity, as hath been shewen: and some that are Metaphysical acknowledge that nothing is simply ffId solum … unum est, quod simplicissimum est; Solus itaque Deus s…mpliciter unus est in quo nihil omnino est quod Deus non est. Vide Fonsecam in Metaphys. Aristot. lib. 4. cap. 2. qu. 5. Sect. 7.one, but that which is most … and nothing is most singly … but God, who p. 160hath nothing in himself but that which is himself. ggAristot. Metaphys. lib. 4. foreign 1. foreign. 2 foreign. 3. foreign. 4. foreign. 5. foreign. 6. foreign. 6 Kinds of Unity. All the three persons have the same Power.Aristotle discoursing of six kinds of unity saith that things may be said to be one▪

1. in respect of Continuity, because they are one Continued body.

2. In respect of their Subject, as two accidents in the same subject.

3. Because they are under the same Genus.

4. Because they are of the same Species.

5. Because they have the same definition; but then he concludes that all these are but imperfect kinds of unity, if compared with the last unity, which is

6. When a thing is one in respect of its single and indivisible Essence.hhOmnia habet filius à Patre, sed Pater & filius unum sunt: filius itaque nihil accipīt ab ilio, qui est a Filio aliud; filius enim est idem cum Patre unicusque Deus.

Now the Father and Son are one, Iohn 10. 30. The Father, Son andiiPater & Filius spirando communicant vitam subsistentem Spiritui Sancto per quam Spiritus Sanctus est unum cum Patre & Filio. 1 Joan. 5. 7. Spiritus itaque spiratus vitam accipit subsistentem, nec non potentiam Coessentialem; eandem itaque potentiam habet Spiritus, sed cum diversa proprietate sive ratione personali.1 John 5:7 holy Ghost are one, 1 Iohn 5. 7. and they are one after the most perfect manner, they are one in respect of the most single and indivisible Essence, because the divine Essence is most p. 161single and perfectly one. And therefore sincekkPatres dicunt essentiam generare▪ hoc est essentia relative accepta, essentia cum modo & proprietate personali considerata generat, hoc est Deus Pater generat Filium. Essence and Power are not distinguished in God, it followes undenyably that these three who have one Essence, have one and the same power, but with different properties and relations.

This truth will be more evident when we have discoursed of the distinction of these three divine persons, of which we are to treat in the next Chapter.

VI. Created Persons have a different place and presence,The sixth difference. but Uncreated Persons are omnipresent, they cannot be separated or divided from one another in respect of place or presence, but do subsist in one another. The Father didllEssentia non generat essentiam quia est unica, simplicissima: persona non generat personam extra essentiam, quia essentia infinita extra se fundi non potest. beget the Son in the unity of the divine nature, and the Son doth subsist in the nature of God, Phil. 2. 6. and all three persons subsisting in the mmTota natura divina est in tribus personis, tota in singulis singularissime unica, servatis tum essentialibus essentiae, tum relativis personarum in unitate essentiae proprietatibus.same single & omnipresent nature, they must needs subsist in one another. The divine nature of the Father is in the Son, and therefore the Father is in the Son; the divine nature of the Son is in the Father, and therefore the Son is in the Father, and the like may p. 162be said of the Holy Ghost, for the divine nature of the Holy Ghost is in the Father and the Son. These three glorious persons are distinguished from one another, and yet they do subsist in one another. They do subsist in one another without any contraction nnforeign, propter in confusam in s… … cō prehensionem & praesen… … circum incessionem ut satis barbare loquuntur. Vide Gomari Diatrib… de Trinit. Inconfuse uniunt…r indivise discernuntur. The divin Persons subsisting in one another, commixtion, or confusion, as ooVide …amascen lib. 1. Orth. fid. cap 19. Vide … in sent, dist 19. q. 2. Thom p. 1. q. 42. at…. 5. John 14. 10, 11.John 14:10John 14:11Damascen taught the Schoolmen to speak; when Philip desired Christ to show him the Father, our Saviour answers, He that hath seene me hath seene the Father, John 14. 9. because he is the Image of his Fathers Person, and the illustrious brightnes of his Fathers glory; nay, because the nature of his Father is in him, and the person of his Father is in him; and therefore he calls upon Philip to beleeve that his Father is in him. Iohn 14. 10▪ Beleevest thou not that I am in the Father and the Father in me? as if he had said, I wonder you should not beleeve this truth, it is a special Article of your faith if you be a Christian: and it is a very plaine Article, for you have some sensible Arguments to confirme your faith in this point, both from my words, and from my works; you may hear the Father speaking in me, and see my Father working in me. The words that I speak unto you, I speak not of my selfe, but the Father that dwelleth in me, he doth the works. Joh. 14. 10.

And then he presses the point home upon him by a Peremptory Injunction in the 11. verse. Beleeve me that I am in the Father, p. 163and the Father in me: or else beleeve me for the very works sake. Philip might hear what was truly divine in the saving words of Christ, and see what was divine in the miraculous works of Christ, and by the words and works (and Spirit of Christ making both effectuall) he might be brought to beleeve this necessary point, that the Nature of God the Father, and the Person of God the Father is in Christ. The nature and Person of God the Father is in Christ. John 10. opened. John 10. 38.John 10John 10:38Give me leave to insist upon this point, for there is more in it then we can well observe at first view, and therefore our Saviour did presse this point home very frequently, and require that men would expressely beleeve it, Iohn 10. 38. beleeve the works—but to what end? Why, that yee may know and beleeve that the Father is in me, and I in him. This is the end of Christs working so many miracles amongst them, to bring them to beleeve that he and the Father did mutually subsist in one another. Credite operibus, beleeve my works saith he, they speak me to be God, and the Son of God, and therefore I am not guilty of blasphemy, because I say I am the Son of God, and equall to God, for I am God, I and my Father are one God; and if you beleeve that I and my Father are one God, John 10. from the …5 v. to the 39.John 10you must beleeve that I am in the Father, and the Father in me. This is the summe and substance of our Saviours discourse from the 25. verse of the tenth p. 164chapter of Iohn to the 39. verse of that chapter; and our Saviour did enter into this discourse at the request of the Jewes, who came round about him, and desired him not to hold them in suspence any longer, but to tell them plainly whether he were the Christ or no. John 10. 24. all then who beleeve Jesus Christ to be the Christ, the true Messiah, the onelyonly Saviour, and an all sufficient Saviour, must beleeve, confesse and acknowledge this truth, That the Father is in Christ, and Christ in the Father. From what hath been spoken it is clear and evident, that this is a point of life and death, as we say, a fundamentall point, a point necessary to salvation, and therfore our Saviour did so often insist upon it. In the 8^th. of Iohn, John 8, 16. 18, 29. John 14. 10, 11, 21. John 10▪ 38 John 16▪ 27. 30. 32. Joh. 17▪ 21 The sixth difference betweene created & uncreated persons.John 8:16John 8:18John 8:29John 14:10John 14:11John 14:21John 10:38John 16:27John 16:30John 16:32John 17:21our Saviour tells them more then once, that he was not alone, and therefore his testimony of himselfe was not a single testimony, but his Father who was with him and in him did bear witnes with him, and of him, John 8. 16. for I am not alone, but I and the Father that sent me; I am one that beare witnesse of my selfe, and the Father that sent me beareth witnesse of me, v. 18. And he that sent me is with me, the Father hath not left me alone, v. 29. This point is difficult to beleeve, that Christ who is man is very God, the same God with the Father, a different Person from the Father, yet subsisting in the Father, who is the only p. 165true God; but as Rollock saith well, though this point be mostaaUt autem difficillimum sit hoc credere, & naturam longè ex…perat: ita necessarium est adeo ad salutem, ut sine fide illâ non sit salus. Hinc sequitur quòd cum à naturâ alienum sit, & tamen necessariū, oportere nos ex naturâ exire & supra na turam efferri, ad hoc ut videamus Deum in Christo habitantem. Rolloc. Cō. in Iohan. 14. v. 10, 11 difficult, yet it is most necessary, and therefore we must beg the spirit of God that we may get above nature, and see the Father in Christ, and Christ in the Father, for the naturall man doth not relish, receive or perceive the things of God, 1 Cor. 2. 14, Our Saviour told his Disciples, that when the Spirit was poured out more plentifully upon them, then they should know him to be in his Father. The Father will give you another Comforter even the Spirit of truth, and at that day yee shall know that I am in my Father, John 14. 16, 17, 20. and in the sixteenth of Iohn the Spirit had convinced the Disciples of this weighty truth; for they say, By this we beleeve that thou camest forth from God; Iesus answered them, Do you now beleeve? Behold the houre cometh, yea is now come, that ye shall be scattered every man to his owne, and shall leave me alone, and yet I am not alone, because the Father is with me, John 16. 30, 31, 32. In these and divers other places our Saviour doth declare this truth unto us, that he is in his Father; and if it were not a weighty truth of very great consequence and high concernment, he would not insist so much upon it; it is the mutuall in-subsistence, and Coessential bbDeus est ubique totus in seipso: …uōmodo ubi que si in seipso? ubique quia nusquam est absens: in seipso autem quia non Continetur ab eis, quibus est praesens; anq…ā sine eis esse non possit. August. Epist. 57. ad Da…danum.Omnipresence of the Father and the Son.

p. 166And the Spirit beingccQui ubi que est in seipso est; qui in seipso est, in omnibus sibi Coessentialibus necessario est, volens tamen gaudensque. Coessentiall with the Father and the Son, must needs be in them both, from whom he proceeds in the unity of the ddNaturae est in tribus personis non foreign tantùm, sed & foreign: per sona…um non foreign quasi vas esset in va…se, sed foreign, neina…qualitas inveheretur.Divine Nature; for it is cleare that an infinite Nature cannot be poured forth beyond it selfe, because it is boundlesse, and therefore when we read 1 Cor. 2. 11. What man knoweth the things of a man, save the spirit of man, which is in him? Even so the things of God knowes no man, but the Spirit of God, (we may safelyeeSpiritus Dei dicitur esse in Deo, 1 Cor. 2. 11. qui tamen est Deus ipse, 1 Cor. 6. 20. nempe ad intimam inexistentiam trium personarum in seipsis exprimendam. D. Wallaeus de Simplicitate Dei pag, 128.1 Cor 2:111 Cor 6:20 adde) which is in God, because he did proceed in the unity of the divineffIn processionibus divinis nulla est partitio foreign, vel foreign quibus tribus modis res creatae producuntur, quia eadem natura singularis simplex, indivisibilis & infinita sine divisione vel multiplicatione communicatur. indivisible and boundlesse nature. The Holy Ghost hath the same Nature with the Father and the Son; and a Nature of infinite and boundlesse perfection▪ cannot be communicated to any thing that is not infinite, to any thing that is not it selfe, because there can be no other infinite thing but it selfe, there can be but one infinite, and every one of the three glorious persons is one and the same infinite God; upon these grouds we may answer many questions.

p. 167If you ask Where God was before the World was made? I answer, that he was then, just where he is now, in himselfe gg… seip… …bique est Deus noster omnipraesentissimus, totus in mundo, totùs extra mundum totus super mundum, totus & unus in omnibus & singulis, nusquam inclus…s, nusquam exclusus, ubique immensus, non per essentiae multiplicationem, extensionem aut divisionem, sed per infinitatem simplicissimam..

Dic ubi tunc esset, cum praeter …um nihil esset;

Tunc ubi nunc, in se, quoniam sibi sufficit ipse.

If you ask where the Father was; I answer, in the Son; if you ask where the Son was; I answer, in the Father: If you ask where the Spirit was, I answer, he was both in the Father and in the Son, and they both in him. God hhAnte omnia Deus erat solus ipse sibi & lo…us, & mu…dus & omni…. uti Tertulli…us contra …ax.was in all three persons, and all three persons in the Godhead, and in one another, and so they do, and will remaine to all eternity, because they are Coessentiall, because they are one omnipresent and eternall God. The Godhead is not shut up in the narrow circle of the universe, the whole Godhead is in the world, and the whole Godhead is out the world, for the world cannot containe the true God, who did create, and doth uphold the world, and the single Godhead cannot be divided; and therefore we must not conceive that part of the Godhead is p. 168in the world, and part of it out of the world, but the whole Godhead isiiEssentia Dei non miscetur cu…splen didis, n…c a sordidis contaminatur, sed in utero virginis fuit hypostatice unita cum carne nostrâ sine ullâ commix…ione, confusione, contamin…tione, vel diminutione. foreign. Si homo tantummodo Christus, quomodo adest ubique invocatus, cum haec hominis natura non sit, sed Dei ut adesse omni loco possit? Tertulian. de Trinitate. foreign. Anastasius Antiochenus. Angeli sunt substantiae spirituales separaim & per se subsistentes, & proinde sunt alicubi definitive. every where, it is not included in any place, or excluded from any place; the heaven and heaven of heavens cannot containe him, 1 King. 8. 27. his perfection is higher then heaven, and deeper then hell, Job 11. 8.

From what hath beene said, it is most cleare, that since the Essence of God is omnipresent, and the selfe same indivisible Essence is in Father, Son and Holy Ghost, all three must needs mutually subsist in one another; though the persons be distinguished, they cannot bekkTres personae sunt foreign quia foreign, & non tantum foreign. Tres homines quibus una competit definitio, sunt tantum foreign, quia natura eorum est finita, & divisa; non enim tota esten…ia patris crea…i sed par… tantum filio communicatur, & hypostase… eorum sunt separatae. Non sunt itaque ejusdem naturae indivisae, ejusdem naturae singularis, & proinde licèt communi ratione homines dicantur, tamen reipsa non sunt unus homo. Personae autem divinae foreign sunt propter unius communis, & tamen sing…laris naturae identi tatem, quam simul & pariter, & totam habent Pater Filius & Spiritus Sanctus. separated, divided or contracted; and therefore this sixth difference between created and uncreated persons, p. 169is so remarkable, that I need not go about to prove that humane persons are separated as well as distinguished; tot sunt humanitates quot homines; and it is most certaine that Angelicall persons have a limited presence, because they have a finite essince. But it is otherwise in divine persons, for the Father works in the Son, and by the Spirit the Father subsists in the Son and in the Spirit, and cannot be separated from these Coessentiall and Omnipresent persons, who do subsist with him (as they are both from him) in the unity of the Godhead.

I need say no more concerning Angels then what is commonly said, Angeli sunt Alicuòi Definitive; sunt enim in suo Vbi non per operationem vel circumscriptionem, sed per Designationem Definitivam, Angels are naturally somewhere; though they are not in any place by extension of parts yet their finite nature is contained within certaine bounds and limits. HencellImmensa Dei prae sentia non est accid…s vel modus essentiae ejus sed ipsamet essentia. Deus non est alicubi sed ubique; quod est Alicubi est in ubi Definiti…o. Vide Aug. qu. lib. 83. qu. 20. & lib. 8. Geres. ad lit. cap. 26. Chrysost. Homi…. 5. ad Coloss. Dan. as…en. Nazian. orat. 34. Basi…. Hom. 16. Hieronym. in Isa. 66.Isa 66 it is that some learned men affirme that it is improper p. 170to say, that God ismmQui est ubique Repletive non est Alicubi Definitive. Vide Scalig. Exercit. 159. §. 5. somewhere because he is every-where; Somewhere is a definitive word.

VII. Created Persons have many other different Accidents besides Place, The 7^th. difference.of which we have spoken; and …ime or Duration, of which we are to speak. It will not be necessary or usefull to discourse of every particular; but that which I intend to insist upon under this head is, That Created Persons are distinguished from one another by an nnPersonae creatae differunt intelligentia voluntate, potentiâ, essentiâ, operatione, locorum intervallis imo propriâ accidentium congerie. Vide Gomarum de Trinitate Tom. 3. pag. 24.heap of Accidents, and therefore it will be sufficient for the making good of this seventh Difference, to show that divine Persons are not distinguished by a Congeries, or heap of Accidents, because there is no Accident at all in God. For the being of God is infinitely perfect, and singularly single, as hath been proved; and therefore it is infinitely below the single perfection of God to be compounded of a substance and accidents for the adorning or perfecting of his glorious being. Relations are not Accidents in God. TheooPersonae divinae non dicuntur Relativae propter essentias Relativas, sed propter modos sive proprietates Relativas, quae quidem proprietates non differunt realiter essentialiter, imo nec realiter separabiliter ab essentiâ divinâ. Personae autem divinae sunt extra omne genus omnemque dependentiam. reltion of one Coessentiall person to another is agreeable p. 171to the Essence of God; it is a necessary relation which did never begin to be, and cannot cease to be.

The relation of God to the creature cannot be reall, because it is such a relation as might not have been; but there is no reall thing in God which might not have beene.

2. There can be no reall relation between two extremes, one of which two extremes is unchangeable, and the other might not have been.

3. God was not in any passive Potentiality or Power, before he did create the world, to receive any reall act, because he is really appVide Metaphys. Fonsec. lib. 5. cap. 15. Sect. 7. pure act; and it is evident that a new reall relation is a kind of act wherof the pure, single, perfect and unchangeable essence is uncapable.

4. Our weak understanding comparing God with the creatures, is apt to frame many denominations, which according to the manner of signifying, seem to import as if God were in potentiâ qqVide Scotum, Estium &c. in 1. sent. dist. 30. omn…s … respectiva concipitur in Deo ad creaturam est tantùm secundum rationem, & modum concipiendi nostrum, quia divina natura est Absoluta in se, & ab omni ordine creaturarum independens, sive creaturae existunt sive non. Vide Suarez. Disp. 47. Sect. 15. Num 25.Num 25ad multa; yet if we do consider the thing signified, as we ought in a way agreeable to the pure, single and infinite Perfection of God, we p. 172shall find that these are but extrinsecall denominations. This point is much beaten upon by the most acute Schoolmen, and Writers of Metaphysicks, and therefore I need not insist upon it; only observe that when I say created persons are distinguished by a heap of Accidents, I do not mean that a person is made compleat in his subsistence by any Accident, or an heap of Accidents, for I have refuted that conceit, in this present chapter pag. 73. I hasten to the eighth Difference.

VIII. Humane Persons with whom we are best acquainted,The eighth Difference betw…ene created & uncr…ated Persons is in respect of their different duration. may exist in a very different time as well as in different places; some lived before, some since the flood: some before the Incarnation, others since the Death and Resurrection of our Lord and Saviour; but herein all agree that time is the measure of them all; their duration is very imperfect, their duration is not always contemporary, never Coessentiall. But all three uncreated Persons are Coeternal, because they are Coessential, because they have the same divine eternal Essence: Angels are said to have an eternall duration, but they are not yyAecernitas proprie dicta est increata; duratio itaque Angelorum non est vera aeternitas. Aeternum dicitur quod est extra terminum, & ex se incapax termini, quia in sua intrinsecaratione infinitatem in durando includit.eternall in the same sense that the Father, Son and Holy Ghost are Eternall.

1. Because they were created, Coloss. 1. p. 17316. and therefore did begin to be,Angels are not coaeternall with God. they have not (as the Schools say) an interminable or interminated duration à parte ante.

2. If they had been created from eternity, yet they could not have beene esteemed Coeternall with their Creatour, who did create them out of nothing, and did not beget or breath them forth in the unity of his own divine Essence.

3. There can be no lesse then an infinite difference between the finite, dependent, ssAliud est esse aeternum, aliud sempiternum, quia omne aeternum est immutabile. Richard. Victor. lib. 2. de Trinitate. c. 4. Ratio aeternitatis consequitur immutabilitatem sicut ratio temporis motum. Th. p. 1. qu. 10. art 2. c.changable, defective duration of an Angel, and the infinite, independent, immutable duration of these three uncreated, and all creating persons, who are one independent, unchangeable, eternall, infinite God the eternity of the three glorious persons is interminable, indefectible, immutable.

4. If Angels had been created from eternity, yet they would not have been essentially ttDeus est aeternus, imo & sua aeternitas; Deus enim est infinita perfectio, & proinde simul, & ex se, atque immutabiliter habet totam perfectionem suam, ratione cujus ex se sit sufficiens ad coexistendum omni durationi, quantacunque illa sit; & proinde sicut Deus est sua essentia & perfectio, ita est sua aeternitat. Vide Suarez. Metaph Disp 50. Sect. 4. Th. p. 1. qu. 10, a. 2.or intrinsecally eternall, because their essence doth not include any repugnancy to an actuall beginning.

p. 1745. If Angels had been created from eternity, yet God might have annihilated them afterwards, and then they had actually ceased to be.

6. Although they were not actually annihilated, yet the veryuuEst in Angelis potentia Obedientialis ad corruptionem, quae natural…s dicipotest, quia in natura Angelorum quae à creatore dependet foreign desinere posse ad nutum creatoris fundatur. Omnis enim potentia Naturalis est quae in rerum naturis fundatur. Vide si… Suarez. Disp. 43. Sect. 4. n▪ 2. possibility of being annihilated is enough to prove their duration terminable, changeable, defectible; and therefore though they had been created from all eternity, they would not have been coeternall with their maker, nor would three Angels have been coessentially coeternall with one another.

7. If Angels had been created from eternity, they would have been eternall, not by any intrinsecall or naturall duration, as hath been proved; and therefore they would have been eternall only by an xxSi Angeli ab aeterno creati essent à Deo, non sequeretur eos esse Deo coaeternos per durationem intrinsecam, sed potius ab aeterno esse, & aeternitati coexistere per denominationem extrinsecam à Dei aeternitate sumptam; durarent enim ex aeternitate, non tamen duratione quae sit aeternitas, quia aeternitas est duratio per se, & abintrinseco necessaria, independens, immutabilis, quae nullam variationem aut successionem admittit neque in esse, neque in propriis & internis actibus aut motibus; vel per internam capacitatem, vel extrinsecam potentiam. Angeli non sunt Deo coaeterni, multo minus aequaeterni, sed sunt potius aeviterni quàm aeterni.extrinsecall denomination, taken from the Eternity of God.

p. 1758. Upon consideration of the Premises, many Reverend Doctours of the Church conclude, that Angels are eternall only à parte post; and they are eternal à parte post, not by their own nature, but by the free favour and appointment of God; and therefore there is an infinite difference between the duration of these three uncreated persons, and the duration of the most glorious Angels in Heaven. Angels areyyUnum est primum, alia dependent igitur. Ergo suâ naturâ omnia praeter unum corruptibilia. Tame…si enim sunt entia absoluta a subjecto & a termino: tamen haud sunt absoluta à causa. Sunt igitur per aliud, & ab alio; at omne dependens ab eo, à quo dependet, si est voluntarium principium, mutari potest; ergo ipsae quoque mentes immateriales etsi ponantur, à Peripateticis coaeternae Deo, tamen ut à Primo pendent à Primi nutu deponi possunt ab eâ essentiâ, in quâ sunt ab illo constitutae. Vide Scalig. exerc. 307. mu…able, and God is free Agent both in respect of Creation, and in respect of preservation; and therfore God and Angels are not Coeternall as the Peripateticks dreamt. God did voluntarily engage himself to create and preserve Angels by his own Decree; and therefore that subordinate aeternity which they have à parte post, is vouchsafed unto them by the free and undeserved favour of God. For (asaaDamasc. Orth. fid. lib. 2. cap. 3. & 12. Iust. Mart. qu. 13, 14. Hieron. contra Pelagium lib. 2. Cyrill. 8. Thes. c. 2 Angelus auem non potest destrui per Physicam corruptionem, quia non componitur ex partibus Physicis. Viri itaque gravissimi ideo dicunt Angelos natura incorrupti…iles esse, quia Angelus non habet aliquid intra naturam sui corruptivum. Damascen saith well) whatsoever had a beginning would soon have an ending, if he who gave a beginning to it by his infinite power should think fit to suspend his upholding and preserving influence, or put forth his Almighty and irresistible power against it in a destructive way.

p. 176I will not take this faire occasion to speak of the acts or motions of Angels to make this difference seeme greater; for that which hath been said is su…cient to make it evident that Angels do not coexist with God the Father with the same duration wherewith God the Son and God the Holy Ghost do coexist with him; because these three coessentiall persons are Coeternall; they are all three one God, who is his owne Essence, his owne Eternity; The Scripture calls the God of Israel the Eternity of Israel, 1 Sam. 15. 29. andbbforeign. Aristot. lib. 11. Metaphys. cap. 7. Aristotle calls him life it selfe, the best life, an Eternall life, that hath neither beginning nor ending, nor succession; and therefore it is evident that he did not beleeve God to be subject toccId enim Deus est (inquit Aristoteles) & proinde Deum ipsam vitam esse intulit; aeternitatem ae vum continuum, aeternumque vocat sine successione, sine terminis. change or variation. God is (saithddforeign dicitur foreign. Legimus etiam foreign apud Aristot. 1. de Caelo text. 100. foreign inquit Phavorinus, foreign, aevum semper existens, quod nunquam caepit, neque desinit. Plutarchus insuper foreign Deo …ribuit. foreign. Deus est, secundum aevum immu…abile, qui u…us in uno nunc aeternitatem implevit. Psal. 146. 6 first Verses. Dan. 9. 24. Heb. 9. 12. 15. Heb. 5. 9. 1 John 3. 9. 1 Pet. 1. 20 23, 24▪ 25.Ps 146:6Dan 9:24Heb 9:12Heb 9:15Heb 5:91 John 3:91 Pet 1:20 he) a self-sufficient and eternall life. God is truly self-sufficient, because he is alsufficient, he is infinite in perfection, and therefore infinite in duration; his infinite perfection and duration is nothing else but p. 177but his infinite Essence; and this infinite Essence is the self-same in all three Coessentiall, Coeternall and Coequall persons, as hath been proved. And therefore we have good cause to rejoyce and triumph in this glorious difference between created and uncreated persons.

Give me leave to sweeten this dispute with some devotion. We have an everlasting Father, an everlasting Saviour and an everlasting Comforter: and we have good cause to lay a charge upon our immortall souls to blesse & praise all three Coeternal persons, for their eternall love, our eternall redemption and salvation. Praise the Lord O my soule, while I live will I praise the Lord; whilst I have any being will I sing praises to my God, and put confidence in him, for with the Lord there is plenteous and eternall redemption. But O put not your trust in Princes, nor in those sons of men in whom there is no salvation, for their breath goeth forth, they returne to their first earth, and in that day all their thoughts and counsels perish. p. 178Happy is he that hath the God of Jacob for his help, whose hope is in the Lord his God, which made heaven and earth, the sea and all that therein is, which keepeth truth for ever; read and consider the six first verses of the 146. Psalme▪ there is a great Emphasis in the sixth verse, which keepeth truth for ever. O let us declare it to the following generation that …his God is our God for ever and ever, and he will be our guide even unto death, Psal. 48. 13, 14. Happy it is for us that we are redeemed by the pretious bloud of Christ, who offered up himself by by his eternall spirit, his divine and eternal Nature, Heb 9. 14. that he might bring in everlasting righteousnesse, Dan. 9. 24. obtaine eternall redemption, and purchase an eternall inheritance for us, Heb. 9. 12. 15. Happy, thrice happy it is for us that we are born of incorruptible seed, which will abide in us for ever: for we are born of the eternall spirit, who will perfect his work in us, and be our everlasting Comforter. Finally, all three uncreated Persons will be our all-sufficient and satisfactory portion and reward for ever-more.

IX. Three Created persons have different actions and operations,The ninth difference betweene c…eated & unc…eated Persons. because they have different singular natures, different powers, &c. as hath been shewen in this very chapter. All actions of Father, Son and p. 179Holy Ghost upon the creatures are undivided, nay indivisible; how Personall Actions ad infra differ, I am to declare at large in the next chapter, where I am to shew how these three glorious persons who cannot be divided, are truly distinguished from one another; onelyonly before I conclude this chapter, it will be requisite to note, that though the Son cannot be said to beget himself, yet he is not Passive in that eternall generation, as hath been proved above; the divine nature which is communicated to the Son by generation, is the nature of the Son as well as of the Father: the Father doth necessarily beget the Son in the power of that Nature, and in the unity of that self-same single and indivisible Nature; and that divine Nature which is communicated to the Son,Christus est foreign non foreign ▪ est enim filius à Patre, Deus à seipso. is not begotten by the Father, but is of it self; and therefore we say that Christ is God of himself, though he be not a Son of himself, but of the Father by eternall generation, because the Father is the first principle of subsisting life.

I might proceed to treat of other differences: that common Rule, Actiones sunt suppositorum, See Mr. Estwicks learned Treatise in confutation of Mr. Bidle, pag. 41.is true of divine actions and uncreated Persons; but it is manifest that there are many actions of the soule of man, both when it is in a state of union with, and when it is in a state of separation from the body, which cannot be properly and truly called p. 180actions of a person, but I shall not descend so low, as to take notice of such differences.

The nine differences which have been insisted on are all considerable. And from them all we may safely conclude that the word Subsistence or Person cannot be attributed after the same maner to God, Angels and men. A divine Person is a Spirituall and Infinite Subsistent, which must not be considered as abstracted from, but as Subsisting in the Divine Nature, and as related to those other Coessentiall persons, from which he is sufficiently distinguished by some Personall and Incommunicable property; And therefore Subsistence is attributed to God after the most excellent and glorious manner. A Person signifies the most excellent kind of Subsistent, an understanding subsistent, as hath been shewen; but then an uncreated person, a divine person doth infinitely excell and transcend the person of the most glorious Angel in Heaven; and therefore we must remove all those imperfections from our thoughts, which are in created persons, when we meditate or discouse of these divine and uncreated persons, that we may think and speak according to the Analogy of faith.