Existence and Attributes of God, Discourse 8 (2 of 4)

Existence and Attributes of God · Discourse 8 (2 of 4)

p. 289The knowledg of Sin doth not beſpot the Holineſs of Gods nature; for the bare knowledg of a Crime doth not infect the mind of man with the Filth and Pollution of that Crime; for then every man that knows an act of Murder committed by another, would by that bare knowledg be tainted with his Sin; yea and a Judg that condemns a Malefactor, may as well Condemn himſelf if this were ſo: The Knowledg of Sins infects not the underſtanding that knows them, but only the Will that approves them. 'Tis no diſcredit to us to know evil, in order to paſs a right Judgment upon it; ſo neither can it be to God.

4. God knows all future things, all things to come. The differences of time cannot hinder a knowledg of all things by him, who is before time, above time, that is not meaſured by hours, or days, or years; If God did not know them, the hindrance muſt be in himſelf, or in the things themſelves, becauſe they are things to come: Not in himſelf; If it did, it muſt ariſe from ſome impotency in his own nature, and ſo we render him weak; or from an unwillingneſs to know, and ſo we render him lazy, and an Enemy to his ovvn Perfection; for ſimply conſidered, the knovvledg of more things is a greater Perfection than the knovvledg of a fevv; and if the knovvledg of a thing includes ſomething of Perfection, the ignorance of a thing includes ſomething of Imperfection: The knovvledg of future things is a greater Perfection than not to knovv them, and is accounted among men a great part of Wiſdom, vvhichwhich they call fore-ſight; 'tis then ſurely a greater Perfection in God to knovv …ure things than to be ignorant of them. And vvould God rather have ſomething of imperfection than be poſſeſſor of all Perfection? Nor doth the hindrance lye in the things themſelves, becauſe their futurition depends upon his Will; for as nothing can actually be without his Will, giving it exiſtence; ſo nothing can be future without his Will, deſigning the futurity of it. Certainly if God knows all things poſſible, which he will not do, he muſt know all things future, which he is not only able, but reſolved to do, or reſolved to permit. Gods perfect knowledg of himſelf, that is, of his own infinite Power and concluding Will, neceſſarily includes a foreknowledg of what he is able to do, and what he will do.

Again, If God doth not know future things, there was a time when God was ignorant of moſt things in the World; for before the Deluge he was more ignorant than after; the more things were done in the World, the more Knowledg did accrue to God, and ſo the more Perfection; then the Underſtanding of God was not perfect from Eternity, but in Time; nay, is not perfect yet, if he be ignorant of thoſe things which are ſtill to come to paſs; he muſt tarry for a Perfection, he wants till thoſe futurities come to be in act, till thoſe things which are to come, ceaſe to be future, and begin to be preſent. Either God knows them or deſires to know them; if he deſires to know them and doth not, there is ſomething wanting to him; all deſire ſpeaks an abſence of the object deſired, and a ſentiment of want in the perſon deſiring: If he doth not deſire to know them, nay, p. 290if he doth not actually know them, it deſtroys all Providence, all his Government of Affairs; for his Providence hath a concatenation of means with a proſpect of ſomething that is future: As in Joſeph's Caſe, who was put into the Pit, and ſold to the Egyptians in order to his future advancement, and the Preſervation both of his Father and his envious Brethren. If God did not know all the future inclinations and actions of men, ſomething might have been done by the Will of Potiphar, or by the Free-will of Pharaoh, whereby Joſeph might have been cut ſhort of his advancement, and ſo God have been interrupted in the track and method of his deſigned Providences. He that hath decreed to govern man for that end he hath deſign'd him, knows all the means before, whereby he will govern him; and therefore hath a diſtinct and certain knowledg of all things; for a confus'd knowledg is an imperfection in Government; 'tis in this the infiniteneſs of his Underſtanding is more ſeen than in knowing things paſt or preſent; his eyes are a flame of fire, Revel. 1.14. in regard of the penetrating vertue of them into things impenetrable by any elſe.

To make it further appear, that God knows all things future, conſider,

1. Firſt, Every thing which is the object of Gods Knowledg without himſelf, was once only future. There was a moment when nothing was in Being but himſelf; he knew nothing actually paſt, becauſe nothing was paſt; nothing actually preſent, becauſe nothing had any exiſtence but himſelf; therefore only what was future; and why not every thing that is future now, as well as only what was future and to come to paſs juſt at the beginning of the Creation? God indeed knovvs every thing as preſent, but the things themſelves known by him were not preſent but future; the whole Creation was once future, or elſe it was from Eternity; if it begun in time, it was once future in it ſelf, elſe it could never have begun to be; Did not God know what would be Created by him, before it was Created by him**Petavius changed.? Did he create he knew not what, and knew not before, what he ſhould Create? Was he ignorant before he acted, and in his acting, what his operation would tend to? or did he not know the nature of things, and the ends of them, till he had produced them, and ſaw them in Being? Creatures then did not ariſe from his Knowledg, but his Knowledg from them; he did not then Will that his Creatures ſhould be, for he had then willed what he knew not, and knew not what he willed; they therefore muſt be known before they were made, and not known becauſe they were made; he knew them to make them, and he did not make them to know them. By the ſame reaſon that he knew what Creatures ſhould be before they were, he knows ſtill what Creatures ſhall be before they areBradward, lib. 3. cap. 14.; for all things that are, were in God, not really in their own nature, but in him as a cauſe; ſo the Earth and Heavens were in him, as a Model is in the mind of a Work man, which is in his Mind and Soul, before it be brought forth into outward act.

2. The Predictions of future things evidence this. There is not a Prophecy of any thing to come, but is a ſpark of his fore-knowledg, and bears Witneſs to the Truth of this aſſertion, in the punctual accompliſhment of it; this is a thing challenged by God as his own peculiar, wherein he ſurmounts all the Idols that mans inventions have Godded in the World, Iſa. 41.21, 22. Let them bring forth (ſpeaking of the Idols,) and ſhew us what ſhall happen, or declare us things to come: ſhew the things that are to come hereafter, that we may know that you are Gods. Such a fore-knowledg of things to come, is here aſcribed to God by God himſelf, as a diſtinction of him from all falſe Gods; ſuch a Knowledg, that if any could prove that they were poſſeſſors of, he would acknowledg them Gods as well as himſelf; that we may know that you are Gods; He puts his Deity to ſtand or fall upon this account, and this ſhould be the point which ſhould decide the controverſy, whether he or the Heathen Idols were the true God; the diſpute is managed by this medium. He that knows things to come, is God; I know things to come, ergo, I am God; the Idols know not things to come, therefore they are not Gods; God ſubmits the Being of his Deity to this Tryal. If God know things to come no more than the Heathen Idols, which were either Devils or men, he would be in his own account, no more a God than Devils or men; no more a God than the Pagan Idols he doth ſcoff at for this defect. If the Heathen Idols were to be ſtript of their Deity for want of p. 291this foreknowledg of things to come, would not the true God alſo fall from the ſame excellency, if he were defective in Knowledg? he would in his own judgment no more deſerve the Title and Character of a God than they. How could he reproach them for that, if it were wanting in himſelf? It cannot be underſtood of future things in their cauſes, when the effects neceſſarily ariſe from ſuch cauſes, as Light from the Sun, and Heat from the Fire; many of theſe, men know; more of them, Angels and Devils know; if God therefore had not a higher and farther Knowledg than this, he would not by this be proved to be God, any more than Angels and Devils, who know neceſſary effects in their cauſes. The Devils indeed did predict ſome things in the Heathen Oracles; but God is differenced from them here by the infiniteneſs of his Knowledg, in being able to predict things to come that they knew not, or things in their particularities, things that depended on the liberty of mans Will, which the Devils could lay no claim to a certain knowledg of. Were it only a conjectural knowledg that is here meant, the Devils might anſwer, they can conjecture, and ſo their Deity were as good as Gods; for tho' God might know more things, and conjecture nearer to what would be, yet ſtill it would be but conjectural, and therefore not a higher kind of Knowledg than what the Devils might challenge. How much then is God beholden to the Socinians for denying the knowledg of all future things to him, upon which here he puts the trial of his Deity? God aſſerts his knowledg of things to come, as a manifeſt evidence of his Godhead; thoſe that deny therefore the Argument that proves it, deny the concluſion too; for this will neceſſarily follow, that if he be God becauſe he knows future things, then he that doth not know future things is not God; and if God knows not future things but only by conjecture, then there is no God; becauſe a certain knowledg ſo as infallibly to predict things to come, is an inſeparable Perfection of the Deity: It was therefore well ſaid of Auſtin, that it was as high a madneſs to deny God to be, as to deny him the foreknowledg of things to come.

The whole Prophetick part of Scripture declares this Perfection of God; every Prophets Candle was lighted at this Torch, they could not have this foreknowledg of themſelves; Why might not many other men have the ſame inſight, if it were by nature? it muſt be from ſome ſuperior Agent;Pacuvius ſaid Siqui quae eventura ſunt provident, aeq… parent, Gell. lib. 14. c. 1. and all Nations owned Prophecy as a Beam from God, a fruit of Divine Illumination: Prophecy muſt be totally expunged if this be denyed; for the ſubjects of Prophecy are things future; and no man is properly a Prophet, but in Prediction; now Prediction is nothing but foretelling, and things foretold are not yet come; and the foretelling of them, ſuppoſeth them not to be yet, but that they ſhall be in time; ſeveral ſuch Predictions we have in Scripture, the event whereof hath been certain. The years of Famine in Egypt foretold that he would order ſecond cauſes for bringing that Judgment upon them; the Captivity of his People in Babylon, the calling of the Gentiles, the rejection of the Jews. Daniels Revelation of Nebuchadnezzars Dream; that Prince refers to God as the revealer of Secrets, Dan. 2.47. By the ſame reaſon that he knows one thing future by himſelf, and by the infiniteneſs of his Knowledg before any cauſes of them appear, he doth know all things future.

3. Some future things are known by men; and we muſt allow God a greater Knowledg than any Creature. Future things in their Cauſes may be known by Angels and men, (as I ſaid before); whoſoever knows neceſſary cauſes, and the efficacy of them, may foretell the effects; and when he ſees the meeting and concurrence of ſeveral cauſes together, he may preſage what the conſequent effect will be of ſuch a concurrence: So Phyſicians foretel the Progreſs of a Diſeaſe, the increaſe or diminution of it by natural Signs; and Aſtronomers foretel Eclipſes by their obſervation of the motion of Heavenly Bodies, many years before they happenCuſanus., can they be hid from God, with whom are the reaſons of all thingsFuller's Pifgab l. 2. p. 2…1.? an expert Gardener by knowing the Root in the depth of Winter, can tell what Flowers and what Fruit it will bear, and the Month when they will peep out their heads; and ſhall not God much more that knows the Principles of all his Creatures, and is exactly privy to all their natures and qualities, know what they will be, and what operations ſhall be from thoſe Principles? Now if God did know things only in their cauſes, p. 292his Knowledg would not be more excellent than the knowledg of Angels and men, tho' he might know more than they of the things that will come to paſs, from every cauſe ſingly, and from the concurrence of many. Now as God is more excellent in Being than his Creature; ſo he is more excellent in the objects of his Knowledg and the manner of his Knowledg; well then, ſhall a certain knowledg of ſomething future, and a conjectural knowledg of many things, be found among men; and ſhall a determinate and infallible knowledg of things to come, be found no where, in no Being? If the conjecture of future things ſavours of ignorance, and God knows them only by conjecture, there is then no ſuch thing in Being as a perfect intelligent Being, and ſo no God.

4. God knows his own Decree and Will, and therefore muſt needs know all future things. If any thing be future, or to come to paſs, it muſt be from it ſelf or from God; not from it ſelf, then it would be independent and abſolute; if it hath its futurity from God, then God muſt know what he hath decreed to come to paſs; thoſe things that are future in neceſſary cauſes, God muſt know, becauſe he willed them to be cauſes of ſuch effects; he therefore knows them, becauſe he knows what he willed: The knowledg of God cannot ariſe from the things themſelves, for then the knowledg of God would have a cauſe without him; and Knowledg, which is an eminent Perfection, would be conferred upon him by his Creatures. But as God ſees things poſſible in the glaſs of his own power, ſo he ſees things future in the Glaſs of his own Will; in his effecting Will, if he hath Decreed to produce them; in his permitting Will, as he hath Decreed to ſuffer them and diſpoſe of them: Nothing can paſs out of the rank of things meerly poſſible into the order of things future, before ſome Act of Gods Will hath paſſed for its futuritionChequell..

'Tis not from the infiniteneſs of his own Nature ſimply conſidered, that God knows things to be future;Coccei ſum. Theol. p. 50. for as things are not future becauſe God is infinite (for then all poſſible things ſhould be future) ſo neither is any thing known to be future only becauſe God is infinite, but becauſe God hath Decreed it; his declaration of things to come, is founded upon his appointment of things to comeCoccei ſum. Theol. p. 50.. In Iſa. 44.7. it is ſaid, and who, as I, ſhall call and declare it, ſince I appointed the ancient people and the things that are coming Gamaul in Aquin, Part 1. q. 14. cap. 3. p. 124.? Nothing is Created or ordered in the World, but what God Decreed to be Created and ordered. God knows his own Decree, and therefore all things which he hath Decreed to exiſt in time; not the minuteſt part of the World could have exiſted without his Will, not an action can be done without his Will; as Life the Principle, ſo Motion the fruit of that Life, is by and from God; as he decreed Life to this or that thing, ſo he decreed motion as the effect of Life, and Decreed to exert his Power in concurring with them, for producing effects natural from ſuch cauſes; for without ſuch a concourſe they could not have acted any thing, or produced any thing; and therefore as for natural things, which we call neceſſary cauſes, God foreſeeing them all particularly in his own Decree, foreſaw alſo all effects which muſt neceſſarily flow from them, becauſe ſuch cauſes cannot but act when they are furniſht with all things neceſſary for action: He knows his own Decrees, and therefore neceſſarily knows what he hath Decreed, or elſe we muſt ſay things come to paſs whether God will or no; or, that he Wills he knows not what; but this cannot be, for known unto God are all his Works from the beginning of the World, Acts 15.18. Now this neceſſarily flows from that Principle firſt laid down, That God knows himſelf, ſince nothing is future without Gods Will; if God did not know future things, he would not know his own Will; for as things poſſible could not be known by him, unleſs he knew the fulneſs of his own Power; ſo things future could not be known by his Underſtanding, unleſs he knew the reſolves of his own Will.

Maimonid. More Nevoch. Part 3. Cap. 21. P. 393. 394.Thus the Knowledg of God differs from the Knowledg of men; Gods knowledg of his Works precedes his Works, mans knowledg of Gods works follows his works; juſt as an Artificers knowledg of a Watch, Inſtrument or Engine, which he would make, is before his making of it; he knows the motions of it, and the reaſon of thoſe motions before it is made, becauſe he knows what he hath determin'd to Work; he knows not thoſe motions from the conſideration of them after they were made, as the Spectator doth, who by viewing the Inſtrument after it is made, p. 293gains a knowledg from the ſight and conſideration of it, till he underſtands the reaſon of the whole; ſo we know things from the conſideration of them after we ſee them in being, and therefore we know not future things: But Gods Knowledg doth not ariſe from things becauſe they are, but becauſe he Wills them to be, and therefore he knows every thing that ſhall be, becauſe it cannot be without his Will, as the Creator and maintainer of all things; knowing his own ſubſtance he knows all his Works.

5. If God did not know all future things, he would be mutable in his Knowledg.

If he did not know all things that ever were or are to be, there would be upon the appearance of every new object, an addition of Light to his Underſtanding, and therefore ſuch a Change in him, as every new knowledg cauſes in the mind of a man, or as the Sun works in the World upon its riſing every morning, ſcattering the darkneſs that was upon the face of the Earth; if he did not know them before they came, he would gain a knowledg by them when they came to paſs, which he had not before they were effected; his Knowledg would be new according to the newneſs of the objects, and multiplyed according to the multitude of the objects. If God did not know things to come as perfectly as he knew things preſent and paſt, but knew thoſe certainly, and the others doubtfully and conjecturally, he would ſuffer ſome Change, and acquire ſome Perfection in his Knowledg, when thoſe future things ſhould ceaſe to be future, and become preſent; for he would know it more perfectly when it were preſent, than he did when it was future, and ſo there would be a Change from Imperfection to a Perfection; But God is every way immutable.

Beſides that Perfection would not ariſe from the Nature of God, but from the Exiſtence and Preſence of the thing; but who will affirm that God acquires any Perfection of Knowledg from his Creatures, any more than he doth of Being? he would not then have had that Knowledg, and conſequently that Perfection from Eternity, as he had when he Created the World, and will not have a full Perfection of the Knowledg of his Creature till the end of the World, nor of Immortal Souls, which will certainly act as well as live to Eternity; and ſo God never was, nor ever will be perfect in Knowledg; for vvhen you have conceived millions of years, vvherein Angels and Souls live and act, there is ſtill more coming than you can conceive, vvherein they vvill act. And if God be alvvays changing to Eternity, from Ignorance to Knovvledg, as thoſe acts come to be exerted by his Creatures, he vvill not be perfect in Knovvledg, no not to Eternity, but vvill alvvays be changing from one degree of Knovvledg to another; a very unvvorthy Conceit to entertain of the moſt Bleſſed, Perfect and Infinite God!

Hence then it follovvs that,

1. God foreknows all his Creatures. All kinds vvhichwhich he determin'd to make, all particulars that ſhould ſpring out of every ſpecies, the time vvhen they ſhould come forth of the Womb, the manner hovv, In thy Book all my Members were written, Pſal. 139.16. Members is not in the Heb. vvhence ſome refer all, to all living Creatures vvhatſoever, and all the parts of them vvhichwhich God did foreſee; he knevv the numbers of Creatures vvith all their parts, they vvere vvritten in the Book of his fore-knovvledg; the duration of them, hovv long they ſhall remain in Being, and act upon the Stage; he knows their ſtrength, the links of one cauſe with another, and what will follow in all their Circumſtances, and the ſeries and combination of effects with their cauſes.

The duration of every thing is foreknown, becauſe determin'd, Job 14.5. ſeeing his days are determin'd, the number of his months are with thee, thou haſt appointed his bounds that he cannot paſs; bounds are fixed, beyond which none ſhall reach; he ſpeaks of days and months, not of years, to give us notice of Gods particular foreknovvledg of every thing, of every day, month, year, hour of a mans life.

2. All the acts of his Creatures are foreknown by him. All natural acts becauſe he knows their cauſes; voluntary acts I ſhall ſpeak of afterwards.

3. This foreknowledg was certain. For it is an unworthy notion of God to aſcribe to him a conjectural Knowledg; if there were only a conjectural knowledg, he could but conjecturally foretel any thing; and then it is poſſible the events of p. 294things might be contrary to his Predictions. It would appear then that God were deceived and miſtaken, and then there could be no rule of trying things whether they were from God or no; for the Rule God ſets down to diſcern his Words from the Words of falſe Prophets, is the event and certain accompliſhment of what is Predicted. Deut. 18.21. to that queſtion, How ſhall we know whether God hath ſpoken or no? he anſwers, That if the thing doth not come to paſs, the Lord hath not ſpoken. If his Knowledg of future things were not certain, there were no ſtability in this Rule, it would fall to the ground: We never yet find God deceiv'd in any Prediction, but the event did anſwer his fore-Revelation; his foreknowledg therefore is certain and infallible. We cannot make God uncertain in his Knowledg, but we muſt conceive him fluctuating and wavering in his Will; but if his Will be not Yea and Nay, but Yea, his Knowledg is certain, becauſe he doth certainly Will and Reſolve.

4. This foreknowledg was from Eternity. Seeing he knows things poſſible in his Power, and things future in his Will; if his Power and Reſolves were from Eternity, his Knowledg muſt be ſo too; or elſe we muſt make him ignorant of his own Power, and ignorant of his own Will from Eternity; and conſequently not from Eternity Bleſſed and Perfect. His knowledg of poſſible things muſt run Parallel with his Power, and his Knowledg of future things run Parallel with his Will. If he Willed from Eternity, he knew from Eternity what he Willed; but that he did Will from Eternity, we muſt grant, unleſs we would render him changeable, and conceive him to be made in time of not Willing, Willing. The Knowledg God hath in time, was alway one and the ſame, becauſe his Underſtanding is his proper Eſſence, as perfect as his Eſſence, and of an immutable nature.

Gamach in Aquin. Part 1. q. 14. c. 3. p. 124.And indeed the actual exiſtence of a thing is not ſimply neceſſary to its being perfectly known; we may ſee a thing that is paſt out of Being, when it doth not actually exiſt; and a Carpenter may know the Houſe he is to Build, before it be built, by the model of it in his own mind; much more we may conceive the ſame of God whoſe Decrees were before the Found…tion of the WorldEph. 1.5. and in other places.Eph 1:5; and to be before time was, and to be from Eternity, hath no difference. As God in his Being exceeds all beginning of time, ſo doth his Knowledg all motions of time.

5. God foreknows all things as preſent with him from Eternity. Gerhard Exeges ch 8. de Deo ſect. 13. p. 303.As he knows mutable things with an immutable and firm Knowledg, ſo he knows future things with a preſent Knowledg; not that the things which are produced in time, were actually and really preſent with him in their own Beings from Eternity; for then they could not be produced in time; had they a real exiſtence, then they would not be Creatures, but God; and had they actual Being, then they could not be future, for future ſpeaks a thing to come that is not yet: If things had been actually preſent with him, and yet future, they had been made before they were made, and had a Being before they had a Being; but they were all preſent to his Knowledg as if they were in actual Being, becauſe the reaſon of all things that were to be made, was preſent with him.

Bradward l. 3. c. 14.The reaſon of the Will of God that they ſhall be, was equally Eternal with him, wherein he ſaw what, and when, and how he would Create things, how he would govern them, to what ends he would direct them. Thus all things are preſent to Gods Knowledg, tho' in their own nature they may be paſt or future, not in eſſe reali, but in eſſe intelligibili, objectively; not actually preſentHornbeck.; for as the unchangeableneſs and infiniteneſs of Gods Knowledg of changeable and finite things, doth not make the things he knows immutable and infinite, ſo neither doth the Eternity of his Knowledg, make them actually preſent with him from Eternity; but all things are preſent to his Underſtanding, becauſe he hath at once a view of all ſucceſſions of times; and his knowledg of future things is as perfect as of preſent things, or what is paſt; 'tis not a certain knowledg of preſent things, and an uncertain knowledg of future; but his knowledg of one is as certain and unerring as his knowledg of the other;Pugio Fidei part I. ch. 19. as a man that beholds a Circle with ſeveral lines from the Center, beholds the lines as they are joyned in the Center, beholds them alſo as they are diſtant and ſever'd from one another, beholds them in their extent and in their point all at once, tho' they may have a great diſtance from one another: p. 295He ſaw from the beginning of time to the laſt minute of it, all things coming out of their cauſes, marching in their order according to his own appointment; as a man may ſee a multitude of Ants, ſome creeping one way, ſome another, employ'd in ſeveral buſineſſes for their Winter Proviſion. The eye of God at once runs through the whole Circle of Time; as the eye of man upon a Tower ſees all the Paſſengers at once, tho' ſome be paſt, ſome under the Tower, ſome coming at a farther diſtance: God, ſaith Job, looks to the end of the earth, and ſees under the whole Heaven, Job 28.24. the Knowledg of God is expreſt by ſight in Scripture, and futurity to God is the ſame thing as diſtance to us; we can with a Perſpective-glaſs make things that are afar off, appear as if they were near; and the Sun, ſo many Thouſand miles diſtant from us, to appear as if it were at the end of the Glaſs; Why ſhould then future things be at ſo great a diſtance from Gods Knowledg, when things ſo far from us may be made to approach ſo near to us?

God conſiders all things in his own ſimple Knowledg, as if they were now acted; and therefore ſome have choſen to call the knowledg of things to come, not preſcience or foreknowledg, but Knowledg, becauſe God ſees all things in one inſtant, ſcientiâ nunquam deficientis inſtantiae Boet. conſolat. lib. 5. proſ. 6▪. Upon this account things that are to come, are ſet down in Scripture as preſent, and ſometimes as paſt, Iſa. 9.6. Ʋnto us a Child is Born, tho' not yet Born; ſo of the Sufferings of Chriſt, Iſa. 53.4. &c. he hath born our griefs, he was wounded for our tranſgreſſions, he was taken from Priſon, &c. not ſhall be; and Pſal. 22.18. they part my Garments among them, as if it were preſent; all to expreſs the certainty of Gods fore-knowledg, as if things were actually preſent before him.

6. This is proper to God, and incommunicable to any Creature. Nothing but what is Eternal can know all things that are to come: Suppoſe a Creature might know things that are to come, after he is in Being; he cannot know things ſimply as future, becauſe there were things future before he was in Being. The Devils know not mens hearts, therefore cannot foretel their actions with any certainty; they may indeed have a knowledg of ſome things to come, but it is only conjectural, and often miſtaken; as the Devil was in his Predictions among the Heathen, and in his preſage of Job's Curſing God to his face upon his preſſing Calamities, Job 1.11. Sometimes indeed they have a certain knowledg of ſomething future by the Revelation of God, when he uſes them as Inſtruments of his Vengeance, or for the Trial of his People, as in the Caſe of Job, when he gave him a Commiſſion to ſtrip him of his Goods; or as the Angels have, when he uſes them as Inſtruments of the deliverance of his People.

7. Tho' this be certain, that God foreknows all things and actions; yet the manner of his knowing all things before they come, is not ſo eaſily reſolved. We muſt not therefore deny this Perfection in God, becauſe we underſtand not the manner how he hath the Knowledg of all things: It were unworthy for us to own no more of God than we can perfectly conceive of him; we ſhould then own no more of him than that he doth exiſt. Canſt thou, ſaith Job, by ſearching, find out God? canſt thou find out the Almighty unto Perfection? Job 11.7. Do we not ſee things unknown to inferior Creatures, to be known to our ſelves? Irrational Creatures do not apprehend the nature of a man, nor what we conceive of them when we look upon them; nor do we know what they fancy of us when they look wiſtly upon us; for ought as I know, we underſtand as little the manner of their imaginations, as they do of ours; and ſhall we aſcribe a darkneſs in God as to future things, becauſe we are ignorant of them, and of the manner how he ſhould know themFicinus in Procl. cap. 19.? ſhall we doubt whether God doth certainly know thoſe things which we only conjecture? as our Power is not the meaſure of the Power of God, ſo neither is our Knowledg the Judg of the Knowledg of God, no better nor ſo well as an irrational nature can be the Judg of our Reaſon: Do we perfectly know the manner how we know? ſhall we therefore deny that we know any thing? we know we have ſuch a faculty which we call Underſtanding, but doth any man certainly know what it is? and becauſe he doth not, ſhall he deny that which is plain and evident to him? Becauſe we cannot aſcertain our ſelves of the cauſes of the ebbing and flowing of the Sea, of the manner p. 296how Minerals are ingendred in the Earth, ſhall we therefore deny that which our eyes convince us of?

And this will be a preparation to the laſt thing.

5. God knows all future contingencies, that is, God knows all things that ſhall accidentally happen, or as we ſay, by Chance; and he knows all the free motions of mens Wills that ſhall be to the end of the World.

If all things be open to him, Heb. 4.13. then all contingencies are, for they are in the number of things; and as, according to Chriſts ſpeech, thoſe things that are impoſſible to man, are poſſible to God; ſo thoſe things which are unknown to man, are known to God; becauſe of the infinite fulneſs and perfection of the Divine Underſtanding.

Let us ſee what a Contingent is.

That is contingent which we commonly call accidental, as when a Tile falls ſuddenly upon a mans head as he is walking in the Street; or when one letting off a Musket at random, ſhoots another he did not intend to hit; ſuch was that Arrow whereby Ahab was killed, ſhot by a Soldier at a venture 1 Kings 22.39.1 Kgs 22:39, this ſome call a mixt contingent, made up partly of neceſſity, and partly of accident; 'tis neceſſary the Bullet, when ſent out of the Gun, or Arrow out of the Bow, ſhould fly and light ſomewhere, but it is an accident that it hits this or that man, that was never intended by the Archer. Other things, as voluntary actions, are purely contingents, and have nothing of neceſſity in them; all free actions that depend upon the Will of man, whether to do, or not to do, are of this nature, becauſe they depend not upon a neceſſary cauſe, as burning doth upon the Fire, moiſtning upon Water, or as deſcent or falling down is neceſſary to a heavy Body; for thoſe cannot in their own nature do otherwiſe; but the other actions depend upon a free Agent, able to turn to this or that point, and determine himſelf as he pleaſes.

Now we muſt know, that what is accidental in regard of the Creature, is not ſo in regard of God; the manner of Ahab's Death was accidental, in regard of the hand by which he was ſlain, but not in regard of God who foretold his Death, and foreknew the Shot, and directed the Arrow; God was not uncertain before of the manner of his fall, nor hovered over the Battel to watch for an opportunity to accompliſh his own Prediction; what may be or not be, in regard of us, is certain in regard of God; to imagine that what is accidental to us, is ſo to God, is to meaſure God by our ſhort line. How many events following upon the reſults of Princes in their Counſels, ſeem to perſons ignorant of thoſe Counſels to be a hap-hazard, yet were not contingencies to the Prince and his aſſiſtants, but foreſeen by him as certainly to iſſue ſo as they do, which they knew before would be the fruit of ſuch cauſes and inſtruments they would knit together? That may be neceſſary in regard of Gods foreknowledg, which is meerly accidental in regard of the natural diſpoſition of the immediate cauſes, which do actually produce it; Contingent in its own nature, and in regard of us; but fixed in the Knowledg of God:**Zanch. One illuſtrates it by this ſimilitude: A Maſter ſends two Servants to one and the ſame place, two ſeveral ways, unknown to one another; they meet at the place which their Maſter had appointed them; their meeting is accidental to them, one knows not of the other, but it was foreſeen by the Maſter that they ſhould ſo meet, and that in regard of them it would ſeem a meer accident, till they came to explain the buſineſs to one another: Both the neceſſity of their meeting in regard of their Maſters Order, and the accidentalneſs of it in regard of themſelves, vvere in both their circumſtances foreknovvn by the Maſter that employ'd them.

For the clearing of this, take it in this method.

1. 'Tis an unworthy conceit of God in any to exclude him from the knowledg of theſe things.

1. It will be a ſtrange contracting of him, to allow him no greater a Knowledg than we have our ſelves.

Contingencies are knovvn to us vvhen they come into act, and paſs from futurity to reality; and vvhen they are preſent to us, vve can order our affairs accordingly; ſhall vve allovv God no greater a meaſure of Knovvledg than vve have, and make him as blind as ourſelves, not to ſee things of that nature before they come p. 297to paſs? ſhall God know them no more? Shall we imagine God knows no otherwiſe than we know? and that he doth, like us, ſtand gazing with admiration at events? man can conjecture many things; is it fit to aſcribe the ſame uncertainty to God; as tho' he, as well as we, could have no aſſurance till the iſſue appear in the view of all? If God doth not certainly foreknow them, he doth but conjecture them; but a conjectural knowledg is by no means to be faſtned on God; for that is not knowledg but gueſs, and deſtroys a Deity by making him ſubject to miſtake; for he that only gueſſeth, may gueſs wrong; ſo that this is to make God like our ſelves, and ſtrip him of an univerſally acknowledged Perfection of Omniſcience. A conjectural Knowledg, ſaith oneScrivene…, is as unworthy of God, as the Creature is unworthy of Omniſcience? 'Tis certain, man hath a liberty to act many things this or that way as he pleaſes; to walk to this or that quarter, to ſpeak or not to ſpeak, to do this or that thing, or not to do it; which way a man will certainly determine himſelf, is unknown before to any Creature, yea often at the preſent to himſelf, for he may be in ſuſpenſe; but ſhall we imagine this future determination of himſelf is conceal'd from God? Thoſe that deny Gods foreknowledg in ſuch caſes, muſt either ſay, that God hath an opinion that a man will reſolve rather this way than that; but then if a man by his liberty determine himſelf contrary to the opinion of God, is not God then deceived? and what rational Creature can own him for a God that can be deceived in any thing? or elſe they muſt ſay that God is at uncertainty, and ſuſpends his Opinion without determining it any way; then he cannot know free acts till they are done; he would then depend upon the Creature for his information; his knowledg would be every inſtant increaſed, as things, he knew not before, came into act; and ſince there are every minute an innumerable multitude of various imaginations in the minds of men, there would be every minute an acceſſion of new Knowledg to God which he had not before; beſides, this knowledg vvould be mutable according to the Wavering and Weathercock reſolutions of men, one vvhile ſtanding to this point, another vvhile to that, if he depended upon the Creatures determination for his knovvledg.

2. If the free acts of men were unknown before to God, no man can ſee how there can be any Government of the World by him. Such contingencies may happen, and ſuch reſolves of mens Free-Wills unknovvn to God, as may perplex his affairs, and put him upon nevv Councels and methods for attaining thoſe ends vvhichwhich he ſetled at the firſt Creation of things; if things happen vvhichwhich God knovvs not of before, this muſt be the conſequence; vvhere there is no Fore-ſight, there is no Providence; things may happen ſo ſudden, if God be ignorant of them, that they may give a check to his intentions and Scheme of Government, and put him upon changing the whole model of it. How often doth a ſmall intervening circumſtance, unforeſeen by man, daſh in pieces a long meditated and well-formed Deſign? To govern neceſſary cauſes as Sun and Stars, whoſe effects are natural and conſtant in themſelves, is eaſy to be imagin'd; but how to govern the World that conſiſts of ſo many men of Free-Will, able to determine themſelves to this or that, and which have no conſtancy in themſelves, as the Sun and Stars have, cannot be imagin'd, unleſs we will allow in God as great a certainty of foreknowledg of the deſigns and actions of men, as there is inconſtancy in their reſolves: God muſt be altering the methods of his Government every day, every hour, every minute, according to the determinations of men, which are ſo various and changeable in the whole compaſs of the World in the ſpace of one minute; he muſt wait to ſee what the counſels of men will be, before he could ſettle his own methods of Government; and ſo muſt govern the World according to their mutability, and not according to any certainty in himſelf. But his counſel is ſtable in the midſt of multitudes of free devices in the heart of man, Prov. 19.21. and knovving them all before, orders them to be ſubſervient to his ovvn ſtable counſel. If he cannot knovv vvhat to morrovv vvill bring forth in the mind of a man, hovv can he certainly ſettle his ovvn determination of Governing him? his Decrees and Reſolves muſt be Temporal, and ariſe pro re natà, and he muſt alvvay be in counſel vvhat he ſhould do upon every change of mens minds. This is an unvvorthy conceit of the Infinite Majeſty of Heaven, to make his Government depend upon the reſolves of men, rather than their reſolves upon the deſign of God.

p. 2982. 'Tis therefore certain, that God doth foreknow the free and voluntary acts of man. Hovv could he elſe order his People to ask of him things to come, in order to their deliverance, ſuch things as depended upon the Will of man, if he foreknevv not the motions of their Will? Iſa. 45.11.

1. Actions good or indifferent depending upon the liberty of mans Will as much as any whatſoever. Several of theſe he hath foretold; Not only a Perſon to build up Jeruſalem vvas Predicted by him, but the Name of that perſon, Cyrus, Iſa. 44.28. What is more contingent, or is more the effect of the liberty of mans Will, than the Names of their Children? Was not the Deſtruction of the Babyloniſh Empire foretold, vvhichwhich Cyrus undertook, not by any compulſion, but by a free inclination and reſolve of his ovvn Will? And vvas not the diſmiſſion of the Jews into their ovvn Country, a voluntary act in that Conqueror? if you conſider the liberty of mans Will, might not Cyrus as vvell have continued their Yoak, as have ſtruck off their Chains, and kept them Captive as vvell as diſmiſt them? Had it not been for his ovvn intereſt, rather to have ſtrengthned the Fetters of ſo turbulent a People, vvho being tenacious of their Religion and Lavvs different from that profeſt by the vvhole World, vvere like to make diſturbances more vvhen they vvere linkt in a body in their ovvn Country, than vvhen they vvere tranſplanted and ſcatter'd into the ſeveral parts of his Empire; It vvas in the povver of Cyrus, (take him as a man) to chuſe one or the other; his intereſt invited him to continue their Captivity, rather than grant their Deliverance; yet God knevv that he vvould vvillingly do this rather than the other; he knevv this vvhichwhich depended upon the Will of Cyrus; and vvhy may not an infinite God foreknovv the free acts of all men, as vvell as of one? If the liberty of Cyrus's Will vvas no hinderance to Gods certain and infallible foreknovvledg of it, hovv can the contingency of any other thing be a hinderance to him? for there is the ſame reaſon of one and all; and his Government extends to every Village, every Family, every Perſon, as vvell as to Kingdoms and Nations.

So God foretold by his Prophet, not only the deſtruction of Jeroboams Altar, but the Name of the Perſon that ſhould be the Inſtrument of it, 1 Kings 13.2. and this about 300 years before Joſiah's Birth. 'Tis a vvonder that none of the Pious Kings of Judah in deteſtation of Idolatry, and hopes to recover again the Kingdom of Iſrael, had in all that ſpace Named one of their Sons by that Name of Joſiah, in hopes that that Prophecy ſhould be accompliſht by him: That Manaſſeh only ſhould do this, who vvas the greateſt imitator of Jeroboams Idolatry among all the Jewiſh Kings, and indeed vvent beyond them; and had no mind to deſtroy in another Kingdom vvhat he propagated in his ovvn. What is freer than the impoſition of a Name, yet this he foreknevv, and this Joſiah vvas Manaſſes's Son, 2 Kings 21.26. Was there any thing more voluntary than for Pharaoh to Honour the Butler by reſtoring him to his place, and puniſh the Baker by hanging him on a Gibbet? yet this vvas foretold, Gen. 40.8. And vvere not all the voluntary acts of men, vvhichwhich vvere the means of Joſephs advancement, foreknovvn by God, as vvell as his exaltation, vvhichwhich vvas the end he aimed at by thoſe means? Many of theſe may be reckon'd up.

Can all the free acts of man ſurmount the infinite capacity of the Divine Underſtanding? If God ſingles out one voluntary action in man as contingent as any, and lying among a vaſt number of other deſigns and reſolutions, both antecedent and ſubſequent; Why ſhould he not knovv the vvhole maſs of mens thoughts and actions, and pierce into all that the liberty of mans Will can effect? Why ſhould he not knovv every grain, as vvell as one that lies in the midſt of many of the ſame kind?

And ſince the Scripture gives ſo large an account of contingents, predicted by God; no man can certainly prove that any thing is un-foreknovvn to him. 'Tis as reaſonable to think he knovvs every contingent; as that he knows ſome that lye as much hid from the eye of any Creature, ſince there is no more difficulty to an infinite underſtanding to knovv all, than to know ſome**The Stoicks that thought their Souls to be ſome particle of God foreign, pieces pull'd off from him, did conclude from thence that he knew all the motions of their Souls as his own mover, as things coherent with him, Arrian Epi…tet. lib. 1. cap. 14. p. 60.. Indeed if we deny Gods p. 299foreknowledg of the voluntary actions of men, we muſt ſtrike our ſelves off from the belief of Scripture-Predictions, that yet remain unaccompliſht, and will be brought about by the voluntary engagements of men, as the ruine of Antichriſt, &c. If God foreknows not the ſecret motions of mans Will, how can he foretel them? if we ſtrip him of this Perfection of Preſcience, why ſhould we believe a word of Scripture-Predictions? all the Credit of the Word of God is torn up by the Roots. If God were uncertain of ſuch events, how can we reconcile Gods declaration of them to his Truth; and his demanding our Belief of them, to his Goodneſs? Were it good and righteous in God to urge us to the Beleif of that he were uncertain of himſelf? how could he be True in Predicting things he were not ſure of? or Good, in requiring credit to be given to that which might be falſe? This would neceſſarily follow, if God did not foreknovv the motions of mens Wills, whereby many of his Predictions were fulfilled, and ſome remain yet to be accompliſht.

2. God foreknows the voluntary ſinful motions of mens Wills.

1. God hath foretold ſeveral of them. Were not all the minute ſinful circumſtances about the Death of our Bleſſed Redeemer, as the piercing him, giving him Gall to Drink, foretold, as well as the not breaking his Bones, and parting his Garments? What were thoſe but the free actions of men, which they did willingly without any conſtraint? And thoſe foretold by David, Iſaiah and other Prophets, ſome above a thouſand, ſome eight hundred, and ſome more, ſome fewer years, before they came to paſs; and the events punctually anſwered the Prophecies. Many ſinful acts of men, which depended upon their Free-Will, have been foretold: The Epygtians voluntary oppreſſing Iſrael, Gen. 15.13. Pharaoh's hardening his heart againſt the Voice of Moſes, Exod. 3.19. That Iſaiah's Meſſage would be in vain to the People, Iſa. 6.9. that the Iſraelites would be rebellious after Moſes his Death, and turn Idolaters, Deut. 31.16. Judas his betraying of our Saviour, a voluntary action, John 6. ult. he was not forced to do what he did, for he had ſome kind of Repentance for it; and not violence, but voluntarineſs falls under repentance.

2. His Truth hath depended upon this fore-ſight. Let us conſider that in Gen. 5.16. but the fourth Generation they ſhall come hither again; that is, the Poſterity of Abraham ſhall come into Canaan; for the iniquity of the Amorites is not yet full Vid Rivet. in loc. exerci 86. p. 329.. God makes a Promiſe to Abraham, of giving his Poſterity the Land of Canaan, not preſently, but in the fourth Generation; if the Truth of God be infallible in the performance of his Promiſe, his Underſtanding is as infallible in the foreſight of the Amorites ſin; the fulneſs of their iniquity was to precede the Iſraelites Poſſeſſion. Did the Truth of God depend upon an uncertainty? did he make the Promiſe hand over head (as we ſay)? How could he with any Wiſdom and Truth aſſure Iſrael of the Poſſeſſion of the Land in the fourth Generation, if he had not been ſure that the Amorites would fill up the meaſure of their Iniquities by that time? If Abraham had been a Socinian, to deny Gods Knowledg of the free acts of men, had he not had a fine excuſe for unbelief? What would his reply have been to God? Alas, Lord, this is not a Promiſe to be relied upon, the Amorites iniquity depends upon the acts of their Free-Will, and ſuch thou canſt have no Knowledg of; thou canſt ſee no more than a likelihood of their iniquity being full, and therefore there is but a likelihood of thy performing thy Promiſe, and not a certainty: Would not this be judged not only a ſawcy, but a Blaſphemous Anſwer? And upon theſe Principles the Truth of the moſt faithful God had been daſht to uncertainty and a peradventure.

3. God provided a remedy for mans Sin, and therefore foreſaw the entrance of it into the World by the fall of Adam. He had a Decree before the Foundation of the World, to manifeſt his Wiſdom in the Goſpel by Jeſus Chriſt, an Eternal purpoſe in Jeſus Chriſt, Eph. 3.11. and a Decree of Election paſt before the foundation of the World; a ſeparation of ſome to redemption, and forgiveneſs of Sin in the Blood of Chriſt, in whom they were from Eternity choſen, as well as in time accepted in Chriſt, Eph. 1.4, 6, 7. which is called a purpoſe in himſelf, v. 9. had not Sin entred, there had been no occaſion for the Death of the Son of God, it being every where in Scripture laid upon that ſcore; a Decree for the ſhedding of Blood, ſuppoſed a Decree for the Permiſſion p. 300of Sin, and a certain foreknowledg of God, that it would be committed by man. An uncertainty of foreknowledg, and a ſixedneſs of purpoſe, are not conſiſtent in a wiſe man, much leſs in the only Wiſe God. Gods purpoſe to manifeſt his Wiſdom to men and Angels in this way, might have been defeated, had God had only a conjectural foreknowledg of the fall of man; and all thoſe ſolemn purpoſes of diſplaying his Perfections in thoſe methods had been to no purpoſeMareſ. cont. Volkel. lib. 1. cap 24. p. 343.; the Proviſion of a remedy ſuppos'd a certainty of the Diſeaſe: If a Sparrow fall not to the ground without the Will of God, how much leſs could ſuch a Deplorable ruine fall upon mankind, without Gods Will permitting it, and his Knowledg foreſeeing it?

'Tis not hard to conceive how God might foreknow it;Amyrald. de Praedeſtin. cap. 6. he indeed decreed to Create man in an excellent State; the goodneſs of God could not but furniſh him with a Power to ſtand; yet in his Wiſdom he might foreſee, that the Devil would be envious to mans happineſs, and would out of Envy attempt his ſubverſion. As God knew of what temper the faculties were he had endued man with, and how far they were able to endure the aſſaults of a Temptation; ſo he alſo foreknew the grand ſubtilty of Satan, how he would lay his Mine, and to what Point he would drive his Temptation; how he would propoſe and manage it, and direct his Battery againſt the ſenſitive appetite, and aſſault the weakeſt part of the Fort; might he not foreſee that the efficacy of the Temptation would exceed the meaſure of the reſiſtance? cannot God know how far the malice of Satan would extend, what Shots he would according to his nature uſe, how high he would charge his Temptation without his powerful reſtraint, as well as an Engineer judg how many ſhots of a Cannon will make a breach in a Town, and how many Casks of Powder will blow up a Fortreſs, who never yet built the one nor founded the other? We may eaſily conclude God could not be deceived in the Judgment of the iſſue and event, ſince he knew how far he would let Satan looſe, how far he would permit man to act; and ſince he dives to the bottom of the nature of all things, he foreſaw that Adam was endued with an ability to ſtand; as he foreſaw that Benhadad might naturally recover of his Diſeaſe; but he foreſaw alſo that Adam would ſink under the allurements of the Temptation, as he foreſaw that Hazael would not let Benhadad live, 2 Kings 8.10.

Now ſince the whole race of mankind lies in Corruption, and is ſubject to the power of the Devil, 1 John 3.18. may not God that knows that corruption in every mans nature, and the force of every mans ſpirit, and what every particular nature will encline him to upon ſuch objects propoſed to him, and what the reaſons of the Temptation will be, know alſo the iſſues? is there any difficulty in Gods foreknowing this, ſince man knowing the nature of one he is well acquainted with, can conclude what ſentiments he will have, and how he will behave himſelf upon preſenting this or that object to him?

If a man that underſtands the diſpoſition of his Child or Servant, knows before what he will do upon ſuch an occaſion; may not God much more, who knows the inclinations of all his Creatures, and from Eternity run with his eyes over all the works he intended? Our Wills are in the number of cauſes; and ſince God knows our Wills, as cauſes, better than we do our ſelves, why ſhould he be ignorant of the effects?

God determines to give Grace to ſuch a man; not to give it to another, but leave him to himſelf, and ſuffer ſuch temptations to aſſault him; now God knowing the corruption of man in the whole maſs, and in every part of it; is it not eaſy for him to foreknow what the future actions of the Will will be, when the Tinder and Fire meet together, and how ſuch a man will determine himſelf both as to the ſubſtance and manner of the action? Is it not eaſy for him to know, how a corrupted Temper and a Temptation will ſuit? God is exactly privy to all the gall in the hearts of men, and what Principles they will have, before they have a Being. He knows their thoughts afar off, Pſal. 139.2. as far off as Eternity, as ſome explain the words; and thoughts are as voluntary as any thing; he knows the power and inclinations of men in the order of ſecond cauſes; he underſtands the corruption of men, as well as the Poyſon of Dragons, and the Venom of Aſps; this is laid up in ſtore with him and ſealed among his Treaſures, Deut. 32.33, 34. Among the Treaſures of his foreknowledg, ſay ſome.

p. 301What was the cruelty of Hazael, but a free act? yet God knew the frame of his heart, and what acts of murder and oppreſſion would ſpring from that bitter fountain, before Hazael had conceived them in himſelf, 2 Kings 8.12. as a man that knows the Mineral through which Waters paſs, may know what relliſh they will have before they appear above the earth; ſo our Saviour knew how Peter would deny him; he knew what quantity of Powder would ſerve for ſuch a Battery, in what meaſure he would let looſe Satan, how far he would leave the Reins in Peters hands, and then the iſſue might eaſily be known; and ſo in every act of man, God knows in his own Will what meaſure of Grace he will give, to determine the Will to good, and what meaſure of Grace he will withdraw from ſuch a perſon, or not give to him; and conſequently, how far ſuch a perſon will fall or not. God knows the inclinations of the Creature; he knows his own Permiſſions, what degrees of Grace he will either allow him or, keep from him, according to which will be the degree of his Sin. This may in ſome meaſure help our Conceptions in this, tho', as was ſaid before, the manner of Gods foreknowledg is not ſo eaſily explicable.

3. Gods foreknowledg of mans voluntary actions doth not neceſſitate the Will of man. The foreknowledg of God is not deceived, nor the liberty of mans Will diminiſht. I ſhall not trouble you with any School diſtinctions, but be as plain as I can, laying down ſeveral Propoſitions in this caſe.

Propoſition 1. 'Tis certain all neceſſity doth not take away liberty. Indeed a compulſive neceſſity takes away liberty; but a neceſſity of immutability removes not liberty from God; why ſhould then a neceſſity of Infallibility in God remove liberty from the Creature? God did neceſſarily create the World, becauſe he Decreed it; yet freely, becauſe his Will from Eternity ſtood to it; he freely Decreed it, and freely created it; as the Apoſtle ſaith in regard of Gods Decrees, who hath been his Councellor? Rom. 11.34. ſo in regard of his actions I may ſay, who hath been his compeller? he freely decreed, and he freely created. Jeſus Chriſt neceſſarily took our fleſh, becauſe he had covenanted with God ſo to do, yet he acted freely and voluntarily according to that Covenant, otherwiſe his Death had not been efficacious for us. A good man doth naturally, neceſſarily love his Children, yet voluntarily: 'Tis part of the happineſs of the Bleſſed, to love God unchangeably, yet freely, for it would not be their happineſs if it were done by compulſion. What is done by force, cannot be called felicity, becauſe there is no delight or complacency in it; and tho' the Bleſſed love God freely, yet if there were a poſſibility of change, it would not be their Happineſs, their Bleſſedneſs would be dampt by their fear of falling from this Love, and conſequently from their nearneſs to God, in whom their happineſs conſiſts: God foreknows that they will Love him for ever; but are they therefore compell'd for ever to love him? If there were ſuch a kind of conſtraint, Heaven would be rendered burdenſome to them, and ſo no Heaven.

Again, Gods foreknowledg of what he will do, doth not neceſſitate him to do: he foreknew that he would create a World, yet he freely created a World. Gods foreknowledg doth not neceſſitate himſelf, why ſhould it neceſſitate us more than himſelf? We may inſtance in ourſelves: When we Will a thing, we neceſſarily uſe our faculty of Will; and when we freely Will any thing, 'tis neceſſary that we freely Will; but this neceſſity doth not exclude but include liberty; or more plainly, when a man writes or ſpeaks, whilſt he writes or ſpeaks, thoſe actions are neceſſary, becauſe to ſpeak and be ſilent, to write and not to write at the ſame time, are impoſſible; yet our writing or ſpeaking doth not take away the power, not to write or to be ſilent at that time if a man would be ſo; for he might have choſe whether he would have ſpoke or writ. So there is a neceſſity of ſuch actions of man which God foreſees; that is, a neceſſity of infallibility, becauſe God cannot be deceived; but not a coactive neceſſity, as if they were compelled by God to act thus or thus.

2. No man can ſay in any of his voluntary actions that he ever found any force upon him. When any of us have done any thing according to our Wills, can we ſay we could not have done the contrary to it? were we determin'd to it in p. 302our own intrinſick nature, or did we not determine our ſelves? Did we not act either according to our reaſon, or according to outward allurements; did we find any thing without us or within us, that did force our Wills to the embracing this or that? Whatever action you do, you do it becauſe you judg it fit to be done; or becauſe you will do it. What tho' God foreſaw that you would do ſo, and that you would do this or that, did you feel any force upon you? did you not act according to your nature? God foreſees that you will Eat or Walk at ſuch a time; do you find any thing that moves you to Eat, but your own appetite? or to Walk, but your own Reaſon and Will? If Preſcience had impos'd any neceſſity upon man, ſhould we not probably have found ſome kind of Plea from it in the mouth of Adam? he knew as much as any man ever ſince knew of the nature of God, as diſcoverable in Creation; he could not in Innocence fancy an ignorant God, a God that knew nothing of future things; he could not be ſo ignorant of his own action, but he muſt have perceived a force upon his Will, had there been any; had he thought that Gods Preſcience impos'd any neceſſity upon him, he would not have omitted the Plea, eſpecially when he was ſo daring as to charge the Providence of God in the Gift of the Woman to him, to be the cauſe of his Crime, Gen. 3.12. How come his Poſterity to invent new charges againſt God, which their Father Adam never thought of, who had more knowledg than all of them? He could find no cauſe of his Sin but the liberty of his own Will; he charges it not upon any neceſſity from the Devil or any neceſſity from God; nor doth he alledg the gift of the Woman as a neceſſary cauſe of his Sin, but an occaſion of it, by giving the Fruit to him. Judas knew that our Saviour did foreknow his Treachery, for he had told him of it in the hearing of his Diſciples, John 13.21, 26. yet he never charg'd the neceſſity of his Crime upon the foreknowledg of his Maſter; if Judas had not done it freely, he had had no reaſon to repent of it; his Repentance juſtifies Chriſt from impoſing any neceſſity upon him by that foreknowledg. No man acts any thing, but he can give an account of the motives of his action; he cannot father it upon a blind neceſſity; the Will cannot be compelled, for then it would ceaſe to be Will: God doth not root up the foundations of Nature, or change the order of it, and make men unable to act like men, that is, as free Agents. God foreknows the actions of irrational Creatures, this concludes no violence upon their nature; for we find their actions to be according to their nature, and ſpontaneous.

3. Gods foreknowledg is not (ſimply conſidered) the cauſe of any thing. It puts nothing into things, but only beholds them as preſent, and ariſing from their proper cauſes: The knowledg of God is not the Principle of things, or the cauſe of their exiſtence, but directive of the action; nothing is becauſe God knows it, but becauſe God Wills it, either poſitively or permiſſively; God knows all things poſſible, yet becauſe God knows them, they are not brought into actual exiſtence, but remain ſtill only as things poſſible; Knowledg only apprehends a thing, but acts nothing; 'tis the rule of acting, but not the cauſe of acting; the Will is the immediate Principle, and the Power the immediate cauſe; to know a thing, is not to do a thing, for then we may be ſaid to do every thing that we know; But every man knows thoſe things which he never did, nor never will do; Knowledg in it ſelf is an apprehenſion of a thing, and is not the cauſe of it. A Spectator of a thing is not the cauſe of that thing which he ſees, that is, he is not the cauſe of it as he beholds it: We ſee a man Write, we know before that he will Write at ſuch a time; but this foreknowledg is not the cauſe of his Writing. We ſee a man Walk, but our viſion of him brings no neceſſity of Walking upon him; he was free to Walk, or not to WalkRawley of the World, lib. 1. cap. 1. ſect. 12.. We foreknow that Death will ſeize upon all men, we foreknow that the Seaſons of the Year will ſucceed one another; yet is not our foreknowledg the cauſe of this ſuccceſſion of Spring after Winter, or of the Death of all men, or any man: We ſee one man fighting with another, our ſight is not the cauſe of that conteſt, but ſome Quarrel among themſelves exciting their own Paſſions. As the knowledg of preſent things impoſeth no neceſſity upon them while they are acting and preſent; ſo the p. 303Knowledg of future things impoſeth no neceſſity upon them while they are coming. We are certain there will be men in the World to morrow, and that the Sea will Ebb and Flow; but is this knowledg of ours the cauſe that thoſe things will be ſo? I know that the Sun will riſe to morrow, 'tis true that it ſhall riſe; but 'tis not true, that my foreknowledg makes it to riſe. If a Phyſician Prognoſticates upon ſeeing the Intemperances and Debaucheries of men, that they will fall into ſuch a diſtemper, is his Prognoſtication any cauſe of their Diſeaſe, or of the ſharpneſs of any Symptoms attending it? The Prophet foretold the cruelty of Hazael, before he committed it; but who will ſay, that the Prophet was the cauſe of his Commiſſion of that evil? And thus the foreknowledg of God takes not away the liberty of mans Will, no more than a foreknowledg that we have of any mans actions, takes away his liberty: We may upon our knowledg of the temper of a man, certainly foreknow, that if he falls into ſuch Company, and get among his Cups, he will be Drunk; but is this foreknowledg the cauſe that he is Drunk? no, the cauſe is the liberty of his own Will, and not reſiſting the Temptation. God purpoſes to leave ſuch a man to himſelf and his own ways; and man being ſo left, God foreknows what will be done by him according to that corrupt nature which is in him; tho' the Decree of God of leaving a man to the liberty of his own Will be certain, yet the liberty of mans Will as thus left, is the cauſe of all the extravagancies he doth commit. Suppoſe Adam had ſtood, would not God certainly have foreſeen that he would have ſtood? yet it would have been concluded that Adam had ſtood, not by any neceſſity of Gods foreknowledg, but by the liberty of his own Will: Why ſhould then the foreknowledg of God add more neceſſity to his falling than to his ſtanding?**Rivet in Iſa. 53.1. p. 16.Isa 53:1 And though it be ſaid ſometimes in Scripture, that ſuch a thing was done that the Scripture might be fulfilled, as John 12.38. that the ſaying of Eſaias might be fulfilled, Lord who hath believed our report? the word That, doth not infer that the Prediction of the Prophet was the cauſe of the Jews unbelief, but infers this, that the Prediction was manifeſted to be true by their unbelief, and the event anſwered the Prediction; this Prediction was not the cauſe of their Sin, but their foreſeen Sin was the cauſe of this Prediction; and ſo the Particle That, is taken, Pſal. 51.6. againſt thee, thee only have I ſinned, that thou mighteſt be juſtified, &c. the juſtifying God, was not the end and intent of the Sin, but the event of it upon his acknowledgment.

4. God foreknows things, becauſe they will come to paſs; but things are not future, becauſe God knows them. Foreknowledg preſuppoſeth the object which is foreknown; a thing that is to come to paſs, is the object of the Divine Knowledg, but not the cauſe of the act of Divine Knowledg; and though the foreknowledg of God doth in Eternity precede the actual preſence of a thing which is foreſeen as future; yet the future thing in regard of its futurity, is as Eternal as the foreknowledg of God: As the Voice is uttered before it be heard, and a thing is viſible before it be ſeen, and a thing knowable before it be known. But how comes it to be knowable to God? it muſt be anſwered, either in the Power of God as a thing poſſible, or in the Will of God as a thing future; he firſt Willed, and then knew what he Willed; he knew what he Willed to effect, and he knew what he Willed to permit; as he Willed the Death of Chriſt by a determinate Counſel, and Willed the Permiſſion of the Jews Sin, and the ordering of the malice of their nature to that end, Acts 2.22. God decrees to make a rational Creature, and to govern him by a Law; God Decrees not to hinder this rational Creature from tranſgreſſing his Law; and God foreſees that what he would not hinder, would come to paſs. Man did not Sin becauſe God foreſaw him; but God foreſaw him to Sin, becauſe man would Sin. If Adam and other men would have acted otherwiſe, God would have foreknown that they would have acted well; God foreſaw our actions becauſe they would ſo come to paſs by the motion of our Free-Will, which he would permit, which he would concur with, which he would order to his own holy and glorious ends, for the p. 304manifeſtation of the Perfection of his nature. If I ſee a man lye in a Sink, no neceſſity is inferred upon him from my ſight to lye in that filthy place, but there is a neceſſity inferr'd by him that lies there, that I ſhould ſee him in that condition if I paſs by, and caſt my eye that way.

5. God did not only foreknow our actions, but the manner of our actions. That is, he did not only know that we would do ſuch actions, but that we would do them freely; he foreſaw that the Will would freely determine it ſelf to this or that; the Knowledg of God takes not away the nature of things; though God knows poſſible things, yet they remain in the nature of poſſibility; and tho' God knows contingent things, yet they remain in the nature of contingencies; and tho' God knows free Agents, yet they remain in the nature of liberty. God did not foreknow the actions of man, as neceſſary, but as free; ſo that liberty is rather eſtabliſhed by this foreknowledg, than removed: God did not foreknow that Adam had not a power to ſtand, or that any man hath not a power to omit ſuch a ſinful action, but that he would not omit it. Man hath a power to do otherwiſe than that which God foreknows he will do: Adam was not determin'd by any inward neceſſity to Fall, nor any man by any inward neceſſity to commit this or that particular Sin; but God foreſaw that he would Fall, and Fall freely; for he ſaw the whole Circle of means and cauſes whereby ſuch and ſuch actions ſhould be produced; and can be no more ignorant of the motions of our Wills, and the manner of them, than an Artificer can be ignorant of the motions of his Watch, and how far the Spring will let down the String in the ſpace of an hour; he ſees all cauſes leading to ſuch events in their whole order, and how the Free-Will of man will comply with this, or refuſe that; he changes not the manner of the Creatures operation, whatſoever it be.

6. But what if the foreknowledg of God, and the liberty of the Will, cannot be fully reconciled by man? ſhall we therefore deny a Perfection in God to ſupport a liberty in our ſelves? Shall we rather faſten ignorance upon God, and accuſe him of blindneſs, to maintain our liberty? That God doth foreknow every thing, and yet that there is liberty in the rational Creature, are both certain; but how fully to reconcile them, may ſurmount the Underſtanding of man. Some Truths the Diſciples were not capable of bearing in the days of Chriſt; and ſeveral Truths our underſtandings cannot reach as long as the World doth laſt; yet in the mean time we muſt on the one hand take heed of conceiving God ignorant, and on the other hand of imagining the Creature neceſſitated; the one will render God imperfect, and the other will ſeem to render him unjuſt, in puniſhing man for that Sin which he could not avoid, but was brought into by a fatal neceſſity. God is ſufficient to render a reaſon of his ovvn Proceedings, and clear up all at the day of Judgment; 'tis a part of mans curioſity, ſince the Fall, to be prying into Gods Secrets, things too high for him; vvhereby he ſinges his ovvn Wings, and confounds his ovvn Underſtanding. 'Tis a curſed affectation that runs in the Blood of Adams Poſterity, to know as God, tho' our firſt Father ſmarted and ruin'd his Poſterity in that attempt; the vvays and knovvledg of God are as much above our thoughts and conceptions, as the heavens are above the earth, Iſa. 55.9.Daillá Melang. part 2. p. 712. 725. and ſo ſublime, that vve cannot comprehend them in their true and juſt greatneſs; his deſigns are ſo myſterious, and the vvays of his conduct ſo profound, that it is not poſſible to dive into them: The force of our underſtandings is belovv his infinite Wiſdom, and therefore vve ſhould adore him vvith an humble aſtoniſhment, and cry out vvith the Apoſtle, Rom. 11.33. Oh the depth of the Riches of the Wiſdom and Knowledg of God! how unſearchable are his Judgments! and his ways paſt finding out! When ever vve meet vvith depths that vve cannot fathom, let us remember that he is God, and vve his Creatures; and not be guilty of ſo great extravagance, as to think that a Subject can pierce into all the ſecrets of a Prince, or a Work underſtand all the operations of the Artificer. Let us only reſolve not to faſten any thing on God that is unvvorthy of the Perfection of his nature, and diſhonourable to the Glory of his Majeſty; nor imagine that vve can ever ſtep out of the rank of Creatures to the glory of the Deity, to underſtand fully every thing in his nature.

So much for the ſecond general, What God knovvs.

III. The third is, How God knows all things? As it is neceſſary vve ſhould conceive p. 305God to be an Underſtanding Being, elſe he could not be God; ſo vve muſt conceive his underſtanding to be infinitely more pure and perfect than ours in the act of it, elſe vve liken him to our ſelves, and debaſe him as lovv as his Foot-ſtool.Maxim. Tyriu… Diſsert. 1. p. 9. 10. As among Creatures there are degrees of Being and Perfection; Plants above Earth and Sand, becauſe they have a Povver of grovvth; Beaſts above Plants, becauſe to their Povver of grovvth, there is an addition of excellency of ſenſe; rational Creatures above Beaſts, becauſe to Senſe there is added the Dignity of Reaſon: The Underſtanding of man is more noble than all the vegetative povver of Plants, or the ſenſitive Power of Beaſts: God therefore muſt be infinitely more excellent in his Underſtanding, and therefore in the manner of it. As man differs from a Beaſt in regard of his knovvledg; ſo doth God alſo from man, in regard of his Knovvledg. As God therefore is in Being and Perfection, infinitely more above a man than a man is above a Beaſt, the manner of his Knovvledg muſt be infinitely more above a mans knovvledg, than the knovvledg of a man is above that of a Beaſt; our underſtandings can claſp an object in a moment, that is at a great diſtance from our ſenſe; our eye by one elevated motion can vievv the Heavens; the manner of Gods Underſtanding muſt be unconceivably above our glimmerings; as the manner of his Being is infinitely more perfect than all Beings, ſo muſt the manner of his Underſtanding be infinitely more perfect than all Created underſtandings.Maimonia… More Nevochim. part 3. c. 20. p. 391 392, 393. Indeed the manner of Gods Knovvledg can no more be knovvn by us, than his Eſſence can be knovvn by us; and the ſame incapacity in man, vvhichwhich renders him unable to comprehend the Being of God, renders him as unable to comprehend the manner of Gods Underſtanding: As there is a vaſt diſtance betvveen the Eſſence of God, and our Beings, ſo there is betvveen the Thoughts of God and our Thoughts; the Heavens are not ſo much higher than the Earth, as the Thoughts of God are above the thoughts of men, yea, and of the higheſt Angel, Iſa. 55.8, 9. yet tho' vve knovv not the manner of Gods Knovvledg, vve knovv that he knovvs; as tho' vve knovv not the infiniteneſs of God, yet vve knovv that he is infinite. 'Tis Gods ſole Prerogative to knovv himſelf, vvhat he is; and it is equally his Prerogative to knovv hovv he knovvs; the manner of Gods knovvledg therefore muſt be conſidered by us, as free from thoſe Imperfections our knovvledg is encumbred vvith.