The True Doctrine of Justification Asserted and Vindicated, Lecture 12
LECTURE XII.
HEBREWS 4.13.
All things are naked and opened to him, &c.
2. Antinomians ſecond anſwer.THe ſecond anſwer made by the Antinomians to this Argument from Gods omniſciency, is this, For when we ſay, how weak and abſurd is it, to hold, God doth not ſee that, which we ſee? They anſwer (Honey-Comb pag. 61.) Here we oppoſe the power of God against his will, for he ſeeth all things, ſaving that which he undertakes to aboliſh out of his own ſight, that he may not ſee it, ſo that by his myſticall cloathing of us with his ſons righteouſneſſe, he hath aboliſhed it out of his own ſight, though not out of ours. Now we told you that this anſwer is not univerſally to be ſlighted, for our Divines, Pareus and others (as I mentioned before) (maintaining that remiſſion of ſin, though it be the utter deletion of the guilt, yet not the ful eradication and abolition of the filth, but that it ſtill continueth in us) make this objection to themſelves, Nothing is hid or covered from Gods eyes, if therefore ſin be there, God cannot but ſee it. To this they anſwer, God ſeeth all, but what he will not ſee, and that is a known ſaying of Austins, Noluit advertere, noluit animadvertere, noluit agnoſcere, maluit ignoſcere, God will not take notice of the ſins of juſtified perſons, he will not puniſh them, he had rather forgive them. It ſeemeth then by this, that God will not ſee ſin in Believers to condemnation but yet he will to caſtigation; but if Chriſt hath fully ſatisfied Gods wrath, and it be a meer arbitrary thing in God, whether he will chaſtiſe or no, why then ſhould not Gods anger and his chaſtiſements be removed from the godly by Chriſts death as well as his juſtice and puniſhments? It's therefore worthy the inquiry, how far Gods taking notice of ſin ſo as to chaſtiſe or puniſh it, is ſubject to the meer liberty of his will: And in anſwering of this, I will not range as far as this queſtion will carry me, for the totall diſcuſſion of it in its large extent will be when we ſpeak of the meritorious cauſe of juſtification againſt Socinians.Propoſitions ſhewing how far Gods taki…g notice of ſin, ſo as to pu…iſh it, is ſubjec… to the meer liberty of his vvill▪ To ſpeak therefore in a more reſtricted way of this matter: Conſider theſe Propoſitions, ſome whereof are ground-works and foundations, the other more immediatly reaching to our ſcope in hand.
Firſt, There is in God a liberty and free-will, whereby he doth whatſoever he pleaſeth, ſo that as the Pſalmiſt ſaith, He that made the eye to ſee, ſhall not he ſee? He that maketh man to know, ſhall not he know? and thus he that gave man and Angels this perfection of freedom, ſhall not he much more be free? 1. There is in God a lib…rty whereby he doth whatſoever he pleaſeth.Therefore thoſe titles of foreign and foreign, which the Greek Fathers ſometimes give to the will of man, are too proud and lofty, and do more properly belong to God. Indeed ſo far as freedom is conceived in creatures to have ſome potential foreign indifferency, or foreign, a ſuſpendedneſs to be determined by ſome other, ſo far we are not to conceive it in God; for this mutability or Potentiall indetermination, is an imperfection; and ſo that ſame poteſt as peccandi, power to ſin, which ſome make neceſſary to liberty, and which they call a perfection ▪ though they grant the action of ſin it ſelf to be an imperfection (though this ſhould be granted, which muſt not) yet neither could this be found in Gods liberty, and no marvell, ſeeing that it is not in the liberty of Chriſts humane will, for though Chriſts obedience was truly and properly ſo, being under a command of God, yet not only as he was God, but as he was man, he was foreign, and foreign impeccablo, or free from the temptation of ſin. Therefore its deteſtable blaſphemy of Durand and other Schoolmen, ſaying, Christ might have ſinned, lib. 3. Sentent. diſt. 12. quae. 2. as alſo of the Remonſtrants who ſay, Chriſt after he had taken this Office of a mediatorſhip, might have forſaken it, and given it over, but of this more in its proper place; God therefore is a free agent, Pſal. 135.6. He hath done whatſoever he pleaſed in heaven and earth, ſo that he made not the world as the fire burneth, or the Bees make their Honey-Combs, by a naturall neceſſity, but according to the counſel of his will; hence it is that all his ſpiritual mercies become commended unto us, under the title of grace. There was no naturall or morall neceſſity, obliging God to elect us, to give his Son for us, or to ſave us, and indeed it could not be liberality, if it were not a libero, from one that is free.
2. How freedom may be extended to God.Propoſ. 2. According to the different deſcriptions of liberty and freedom; ſo it may be extended larger or narrower unto the actions of God. Thoſe who make liberty conſiſtent with a neceſſity of immutability, and do not think indifferency neceſſary, but only knowledge, and judgement going before, they extend it even to the goodneſſe and holineſſe of God; ſo they ſay, God is liberè bonus, freely good, and doth freely love himſelf, ſo they make the confirmed Angels and Saints, freely to love God, though neceſſarily, thus we ſin freely, though neceſſarily: But others, who make a power to do, or not do, neceſſary to liberty, think it a kinde of blaſphemy to ſay, God doth freely will that which is good: hence they make liberty not an attribute of his nature, as holineſſe, omnipotency, &c. are, but an affection of his will only, and they think that neceſſarium and contingens, under which liberty is comprehended, are differences of ens in its full latitude, as finitum and infinitum; therefore as the ſame thing cannot be finite and infinite, ſo neither neceſſary and free, but this is to put the definition of liberty into too ſtrait fetters, as in time may be ſhewn. I join with thoſe, that think immutability and liberty may be in the ſame act, and that God doth freely, though unchangeably love himſelf; but that freedom of his actions to the creatures, is with a power to do otherwiſe if he pleaſeth.
There is alſo another kinde of liberty mentioned by the learned, which is oppoſed to ſervitude, and is the ſame with ſui juris; now God in all things is this way free: He hath no law impoſed upon himſelf by any other, but only what he preſcribeth himſelf, that doth he work by; therefore when we ſay, its juſt with God to damn an impenitent ſinner, this juſtice ariſeth not from any obligation put upon him by another, but what he hath eternally preſcribed himſelf.
3. We cannot prope…ly ſay God ſeeth all things becauſe he will ſee them.Propoſ. 3. Gods omniſciency, or his bare ſeeing and taking notice of ſin, when it is, is not ſubject to his liberty, He cannot but ſee, whatſoever is, and alſo poſſible to be, ſo that we cannot ſay properly God ſeeth all things becauſe he will ſee them; for this is an attribute founded in the nature of God; but if we take knowledge or ſeeing for the effects accompanying them, as the Scripture for the moſt part doth, becauſe God is not an idle ſpectator of things, but upon his ſeeing, there is either care and protection, or anger and puniſhment, then in this ſenſe, all theſe effects are ſubject in ſome ſenſe to the liberty and free-will of God. God cannot but ſee the adultery of David, but whether he will ſo ſee it, as to puniſh David for it in his own perſon, or in Chriſt; or whether he will chaſtiſe him at this time, or in this manner; that is meerly at the good pleaſure of God. Whether indeed he is free to puniſh at all, or chaſtiſe at all, you will hear in the other Propoſitions; thus much we may conclude, That God cannot aboliſh ſin ſo out of his ſight, ſo that with his eyes of omniſciency he ſhould not behold it, when it is there.
Propoſ. 4. In reſpect of Gods liberty and freedom, 4. Great difference in reſpect of Gods freedom betwee… the attributes of God, and the actions of them.there is great difference between the attributes of God, as alſo the exerciſes and actions of them. There are ſome properties that require no object for their exerciſe, but they make it; thus the omnipotency of God, doth not finde, but make its object. Again there are others, which though they require an object, yet not any condition, or circumſtance in it; ſo the wiſdom of God, can and doth order every object, let it be what it will be, to a glorious end. It ordered an harmonious world out of a Chaos, he made all things, qua omnipotens, as omnipotent, and ordered them all qua ſapiens, as a wiſe God. But then there are other attributes, which though eſſential to him, yet cannot be exerciſed, but where the objects are ſo and ſo conditionated; as that mercy of God, whereby he doth forgive ſins, requireth an object penitent and believing: ſo that Juſtice of God, whereby it is punitive and vindicative of ſin, requireth an object, that is a ſinner and impenitent. Now in the actions about the objects of the former ſort, God is every way free, he might have created the world, or not have created it; but in the actions of the latter ſort, though he be alſo free, yet not ſo as to uſe Juſtice, or not Juſtice, when there is an object with its due condition. As now it was free to God, whether he would make man or no, it was free for him, whether he would permit man to fall or no, but when fallen, not free whether he would be juſt or no: Thus God is free, whether he will procure, or prepare an object of juſtice; but then when he hath ſo prepared an object, then he is not looſned from the obligation of Juſtice. To procure an object of Justice ariſeth from the Soveraignty and meer freedom of God: Hence Gods permiſſion of ſin, or reprobation negative. which is the paſſing by of ſome, are not acts of Juſtice properly ſo called; but condemnation for ſin is truly and properly Juſtice. The former ariſe from Gods ſupream dominion and freedom. When an Object of Juſtice is, there is an obligation to execute the ſame upon it, but not when an object of mercy is, becauſe its neceſſary to mercy, that it ſhould be indebita, but to juſtice, debita.
I do not here intend to meddle with that Queſtion, Whether God abſolutely might not have let ſin go unpuniſhed, and yet forgive it, as we ſee men can: (This is diſputed even among the Orthodox; ſome are for the Negative, as Piſ…ator, Lubertus, &c. Others for the Affirmative, as Davenant, Twiſt, &c. but the proper place for this will be, when we ſpeak of Chriſts ſatisfaction) nor yet with that other of the Schoolmen, Whether God may abſolutely accept of a ſinner to pardon, and eternal life, though he do not regenerate, or ſanctifie him; theſe are to be handled in their proper place. You ſee by this delivered, how far the actions of Gods Juſtice may be ſaid to be free, or not free.
5. God cannot in juſtice but puniſh ſinners.Propoſ. 5. Whatſoever may be ſaid in an abſolute ſenſe about Gods Juſtice, yet ſince that threatning promulged (In the day thou eateſt thereof, thou ſhalt die the death) God cannot in Iuſtice, but puniſh ſinners. Though it be in his freedom whether he will give thee a being, or no, yet if thou art an obstinate ſinner, it is not in his freedom, whether he will damn thee or no; ſo that as God cannot but love that Image of his holineſſe where he ſeeth it, ſo he cannot but hate the contrary, whereſoever it is, though that hatred ſhall not alwayes fall upon the perſon in whom it is, becauſe removed by Chriſt.
It is Camerons opinion, That the word Iuſtitia, foreign, when attributed to God, doth alwayes ſignifie Goodneſſe, Salvation, Redemption, but never in the Scripture (ſaith he) doth it denote an affection in God, whereby he avengeth himſelf upon ſinners; but that the words Ira and Iudicium, Anger and Iudgement expreſſe this; But though the word ſignifie ſo ſometimes, yet in ſome places it muſt needs mean this diſpoſition in God, Pſal. 9.5. 1 Tim. 4.8. 2 Theſſ. 1.6. ſo that in ſome ſenſe, we may with ſeveral Orthodox men, ſay, Iuſtice is eſſential to God. Sin is not indeed Phyſically contrary to God, as water is to fire, for if it were ſo, God would not ſuffer it to be, becauſe he is an infinite good; as if there were infinite fire, or light, there could not be any water or darkneſſe; but it is morally contrary to him, Hab. 1. Thou art of purer eyes then to behold iniquity; even ſins againſt any poſitive command of God, that are ſins only becauſe prohibited, they are thus far againſt his nature, and not his will only; becauſe it is againſt his nature, to have his will and commands diſobeyed in any thing, he being the ſupream and moſt holy Lawgiver. If God did only puniſh ſin becauſe he will, and not becauſe he is eſſentially juſt, there could no true cauſe be given, why Heathens ſhould have terrour in their conſciences after ſins committed, ſeeing the Word is not revealed unto them, declaring Gods will: and when the Scripture ſpeaks of God puniſhing ſins, it doth not attribute it to Gods meer will, becauſe he will do ſo, but to his Iuſtice, Rev. 16.5, 7. Thus Exod. 24. God is deſcribed by this property, Not acquitting the guilty. Now when we ſay, God cannot but puniſh ſin with death ſince the promulgation of the threatning, that is not ſo to be underſtood, as if then only the tie and obligation of Iuſtice came upon God, but it was from eternity: for as God did in time reveal this threatning; ſo he did from all eternity will this threatning; and ſo therefore from all eternity it was just with God to puniſh a ſinner, neither could he forgive him without a ſatisfaction. This is diligently to be obſerved, becauſe men ſpeak ſometimes, as if vindicative Iuſtice were then only due when the actual threatning was; whereas the executions of God in time, are, as his decrees were from eternity; and truly we ſhould not give way to ſuch Diſputes, Whether God could have pardoned abſolutely, or provided any other way and remedy, when we ſee God pitching upon this, and the Scripture only revealing this. Hence the Scripture commandeth us to eſchew ſins, not meerly becauſe of his will onelyonly, but becauſe he is holy in his nature, Lev. 11.44. Joſh. 24.19. It is true Gods hatred and diſplicency of ſin cannot but be, yet the deſtination of it actually to puniſhment comes in ſome ſenſe under his liberty.
6. It is in Gods freedom to puniſh ſin in the party offending, or in a ſa…ety.Prop. 6. Though God cannot but take notice of ſin, ſo as to puniſh it, yet it is under his freedom, whether he will puniſh it in their own perſons or in a ſurety; and by this means the wiſdom of God found out an excellent temperament of Iuſtice and Mercy, ſo that the one doth not oppoſe the other; notwithſtanding Gods juſtice, yet his love and wiſdom put him upon that remedy, which neither men or Angels could have excogitated; ſo that God doth not let ſin go unpuniſhed, only he provideth a Ram to be ſacrificed for Iſaac, a Mediator to come between his wrath and us. It is true, reaſon (as we ſee) doth much gainſay this myſtery; but we may ſay, mulier iſta taceat, let this woman hold her peace in the Church of God: Though therefore God cannot but execute juſtice upon ſinners, yet his juſtice did admit of a temperament, whereby God doth proceed to ſee the ſins of his people, to hate them, but yet to puniſh them upon Chriſt.
7. Great differe…ce between Gods juſtice eſſentially a… intra, and the effec…s of it ad extra▪7. Prop. There is a great deal of difference between Iustice, as it is an eſſential property in God, ad intra, and between the effects of it, ad extra. Theſe latter come much under the liberty and freedom of God; which appeareth in the variety of his judgements upon wicked men, ſome being conſumed one way, and ſome another, ſo that it is meerly at his pleaſure, whether he will ſtir up more or leſſe wrath, Pſ. 2. there is a little anger of his ſpoken of: but you may read a remarkable expreſſion, Pſ. 78.38. He turned away his wrath from th…m and ſtirred not up all his wrath. Here you ſee the anger of God ſubject to his free-will. If the effects of Gods juſtice ſhould flow from him as burning from fire, or drowning from water, the whole world were not able to endure before him who is a conſuming fire. How could it come about, that the wicked do ſo overflow with proſperity in this world, if ſo be that God did neceſſarily puniſh and deſtroy, which are effects of his Iuſtice? So that there is a great difference between Iuſtice taken for an attribute, and Iuſtice for the effects; God cannot but be alwayes juſt the former, whereas there is a liberty in the latter. As in man, the power of laughing is an eſſential property in him, yet the act of laughter ariſeth in ſome meaſure by the freenes of his will. Hence it is that Gods eſſential Iuſtice doth not receive more or leſſe, but the effects of his Iuſtice may be more or leſſe: If many men be in the ſame ſin, and God doth puniſh ſome of them with a remarkable temporal judgement, we may not ſay, God dealeth more juſtly with theſe then the other; yet we may ſay, the effects of his Iuſtice are greater upon ſome then others.
8. Propoſ. Chriſt ſatisfied God as a juſt Iudge, not as a Father provoked, and by this means, though puniſhments are taken away,8. Chriſt ſatisfied God as a juſt Judge, not as a Father. yet afflictions for ſin are not; and this doth directly anſwer the whole Queſtion, whereas it is demanded, ſeeing Chriſt fully reconciled God to us, and thereby all puniſhments are taken away, why not as well all afflictions? If he hath removed greater, will he think much at the leſſe? The anſwer lieth fully in this, Chriſt by his bloud and ſatisfaction undertook that the juſtice of God ſhould never fall upon us to puniſh us, not that he ſhould never be angry with us a Father, to chaſtiſe us. By this redemption, its Chriſts will that God ſhould not as a juſt Iudge, require compenſation of us; not, that as a provoked Father, he ſhould not ſcourge us for our ſins when committed. The reaſon is clear, becauſe fatherly anger is an …ffect of love; but puniſhment the fruit of hatred. And thus now you ſee, why God will not ſee ſin to condemnation, becauſe Chriſt hath made up that; yet he will ſee it in believers to angry caſtigation, becauſe Chriſt did not interpoſe there: it is therefore no derogation to Chriſts death, no injury to his ſufferings, if notwithſtanding them, God doth afflict for ſin, even his own children.
9. Propoſ. By reaſon of this anger of God againſt ſin, 9. Affl…ctions on believers agreeable to Gods Juſtice.even ſtill abiding, thoſe afflictions which come upon believers, are from a conveniency with the justice of God. Although we cannot ſay rigidly, That if God did not chaſtiſe believers for their ſins, he were unjuſt; yet we may ſay, his afflicting of them, is beſeeming his Iuſtice, partly, becauſe he hath preſcribed this law to himſelf, 1 Sam. 7.14. Even as to wicked men upon their obſtinate ſinning, to puniſh them, ſo upon his own, if they offend, to chaſten them; and partly by afflicting of his people for their ſin, he demonſtrates the hatred of it unto the world. Although therefore God do not alwayes chaſtiſe every godly man, but ſometimes by their repentance theſe very chaſtiſ…ments are either prevented or removed, yet when God doth thus break out in his anger againſt them, this is becoming his juſt nature, and the world thereby ſeeth how he is diſpleaſed with it. One of the Articles which Arminius relateth, as laid againſt him, was, that he ſhould hold, The temporal afflictions of believers, were not chaſtiſements but puniſhments, properly ſo called. To this he anſwereth, pa. 103. Reſp. ad Artic. 31. That the calamities inflicted upon David for his ſin, in the matter of Ʋriah, may be called puniſhments properly; and that the Text ſeemeth to be better explained ſo, and yet withall, that there will be no favour to the Popiſh opinion: for he grants, That Chriſt ſatisfied both for eternal and temporal puniſhments, but yet God when he takes off the ſpiritual puniſhment, may for a while reſerve the temporal, as though Chriſt hath taken away the jus, the power and right death hath over us, yet he hath not quite deſtroyed actual death: but all this is a meer itching, to innovate needleſly in Religion; for if Chriſt have ſatisfied for temporal death, then though it be not removed preſently, yet it cannot abide as a puniſhment ſtrictly.