A Treatise of Original Sin, Part 3 · Chapter 4 · Section 2
SECT. II.
Propoſitions concerning the Nature of the Will.
BEfore we come to lanch into this ocean of wormwood and gall (for the polluted will, polluteth all other things) Let us ſay ſomething to the nature of the will, not enlarging our ſelves, either as Philoſophers or Divines do in this point, but ſelect only what is fit for our purpoſe.
Firſt, Therefore conſider, That God hath appointed and ordered in nature, that every apprehenſive power ſhould have an appetitive power proportionable thereunto. The apprehenſive being like the eye to diſcern and diſcover the object; The appetitive like the hand to imbrace it: Thus the Angels, as they have an underſtanding to know things, ſo they have a will to deſire them; In beaſts there is a ſenſitive apprehenſion by imagination, and a ſenſitive appetite accordingly. Now becauſe man in his ſoul is like an Angel, and in his body communicateth with beaſts, therefore he hath both a two-fold apprehenſion, intellectual and ſenſitive, underſtanding and imagination; and alſo a two-fold appetite, a rational one, which is the will, and a ſenſitive one, which is the ſenſitive appetite in a man, wherein the paſſions and affections are ſeated; The will then is in a man his rational appetite, following the propoſition and manifeſtation of the underſtanding: For if a man did know what was good, or what is evil, and no appetite to imbrace the one, or avoid the other, he would be no better than a ſtone or a ſtatue for all his reaſon. We ſee then why God hath placed ſuch a power in the ſoul, as the will is; It is that the good which the underſtanding manifeſteth may be imbraced and entertained, and the evil it doth diſcover may be ſhunned, Whether this will be diſtinct really from the ſoul it ſelf, and from the underſtanding is a Philoſophical Diſpute, and will not tend to your edification.
Secondly, Though it be the appetite in a man, yet it is a rational appetite, it is ſubjected in the rational ſoul. There is a three-fold appetite,
1. Natural, which is in the motion of inanimate things, as in the ſtone to deſcend downwards, this is called an appetite, though properly it is not ſo, becauſe it doth not follow knowledge, but is conſequent upon the forme immediately.
2. There is the ſenſitive appetite, which moveth upon the knowledge of ſenſe, and this is both in beaſts, and alſo in men, yea naturally we live and deſire, even all the motions of the ſoul are according to ſenſe, and ſo in this reſpect man is become like the bruit beaſt: But of this afterwards.
3. There is the rational appetite, and that is called the will, and this is in man onelyonly; a beaſt hath not properly any will, no more then he hath underſtanding, ſo that the will of a man is a noble and high faculty in him, appointed to follow reaſon, and to be regulated by it in all things; and therefore Auſtin ſaith, Voluntas tantum eſt in bonis; The will is only in good things; If a man love evil or deſire evil, this is not voluntas (ſaith he) but cupiditas; It doth not deſerve the name of the will, but of luſt, but common ſpeech is otherwiſe, there is a bad will, a corrupted will as well as a good will, only when we ſay, the will is a rational appetite, that muſt not be underſtood formaliter, but participativè, as they ſay, that is, the will doth not know, doth not reaſon, but is directed thereby, therefore it is called coeca potentia, a blind power, and if you ſay, it is blind, How then can it ſee the good propoſed? I anſwer, it followeth the good propoſed, not becauſe it knoweth it, but becauſe of its eſſential ſubordination to the underſtanding; Hence it is that to have a good will, it is ſo requiſite to have a ſound mind. Ignorant and blind minds are alwayes accompanied with corrupt and polluted wils; There cannot be a ſanctified will, where there is not an enlightened mind; This ſhould make the ignorant and ſtupid to tremble in their eſtate they live in: This ſhould make you prize knowledge above gold and pearls, as alſo to wait upon the Miniſtery with diligence, ſeeing that by knowledge the will cometh to be made holy.
Fourthly, we are the more to inform our ſelves about its depravation, by how much the more noble and excellent it is. It is hotly diſputed between the two factions of Thomiſts and Scotiſts, which is the more excellent faculty, the underſtanding or the will; The Thomiſts are for the underſtanding; the Scotiſts for the will, but theſe two cannot abſolutely and in every reſpect be commended before each other, only in reſpect of power and efficacy, the will is more eminent, for the underſtanding it ſelf in reſpect of its exerciſe is ſubject to the dominion of the will, and the will alſo is properly the original and fountain of all good or evil in a man; for though the underſtanding hath actual ſinfulneſſe, and the affections, yet this is becauſe of the will either directly or indirectly; ſo that to an actual deliberate ſinne there is required ſome kind of voluntarineſſe, either expreſly or interpretatively, either in ſe, or in causâ; Original ſinne (you heard) was voluntary in ſome ſenſe, although we need not judge of that by Ariſtotle's rules, who was ignorant of any ſuch thing. Therefore Julian the Pelagian triumphed in his Ariſtotelical Philoſophy againſt original ſinne, deſpiſing his Eccleſiaſtical Judges, as not knowing Ariſtotle's Categories; as if (ſaith Auſtin) he deſired a Synod of Peripateticks rather than Judges in the Church; but though original ſinne, with the indeliberate motions thereof, have not the actual perſonal will of a man, yet all other ſinnes have, ſo that the pollution of the will, is in effect the pollution of the whole man. Hence
In the fifth place, There is this difference between the underſtanding and the wil in relation to its objects, The underſtanding doth receive the ſpecies of the object, to it ſelf, not the objects themſelves; and therefore when we know or underſtand evil as an object, this doth not defile the underſtanding, but is a perfection of it. Thus Godknoweth all the evil committed in the world, yet his knowledge is not polluted thereby, Scire malum, non eſt malum, but the will that goeth out to the objects as they are in themſelves, and thereby loving of them, is what the object is. Thus if we will ſinne it is ſinne, and not if we know ſin, becauſe the will goeth out to a ſinfull object as it is in it ſelf, ſo that above all keepings we are to keep the will, for what that is placed upon, it preſently becomes like it; If thou loveſt the world, or earth, thou art earth, thou art of the world: Hence all the while ſinne is kept out from the will, though it be in thy mind, though it be by ſuggeſtion to thee, yet becauſe there is no conſent, it is not thy ſinne but thy miſery. I ſpeak not of the motus principatus, which are antecedent to our will, but of ſuggeſtions only offered from without, but when the will yeeldeth, when that conſencs, it becometh thy evil immediately, as poiſon while it is in the remote parts of the body may not kill, but when it ſtriketh to the heart, then it is mortall. Thus ſinne in temptation, ſinne in ſuggeſtion doth not deſtroy till the will receive it, ſo great a matter is it to look to this power of the ſoul. For
In the ſixth place, Becauſe of this rule and dominion the will hath therefore it is called the univerſall appetite of the whole man. We ſee all the other powers of the ſoul have their peculiar and proper inclination, The eye to ſee, the ear to hear, the underſtand to know, but the will is to will the good for the whole perſon, therefore it is not limited to one good object, more then another, but bonum in communi, the good in general is the object of it, ſo that the will is the univerſall appetite and inclination of the whole man; now if this great wheel that moveth all, be irregular and out of order, what good can be expected in the leſs wheeles, if the foundation be deſtroyed, how can the building be eſtabliſhed: Let then your attention, your thoughts and affections be greatly quickned, while we anatomize all the evil of the will. This is the moſt grievous and moſt dreadfull inſtance of all the pollution original ſinne infecteth us with.
In the 7th place, When we ſpeak of the pollution of the will, The wera [will] may be take ambigouſly; for ſometimes therby is denoted, the power to will, ſomeomes again the very act of willing, and ſomtimes the object that we do will, is often called our will: Thus when the Scripture ſpeaketh of Gods will, it doth ſometimes mean the object willed, and this is often called Gods will, ſometimes the act of willing, thus (if God will) and ſometimes that power whereby he doth will, not that there is, Potenis volendi properly in God, for all power is, Perfectibilis per actum, whereas every thing in God, is actum purus, only we ſpeak ſo of God, according to our capacity. Some indeed have queſtioned, Whether we may porperly attribute the word [will] to God; or metaphorically only? but ſeeing that ſimply to will, is, Perfectio ſimpliciter ſimplex, and abſolute and moſt ſimple perfection, therefore it is not to be denied to God; for as the Pſalmiſt ſaith He that maketh man know, ſhall not be know? Thus he that maketh man will, ſhall not he will? only will is not in God, as it is in man, for mans will is carried out to a good deſired, or not enjoyed. In our will there is, convenientia and indigentia; Firſt, A convenience, or ſutebleneſs between the faculty and the object, and therefore we will it: And then there is an indigency or want of it; Now Gods will being the ſame with his Eſſence, is abſolutely perfect and ſufficient, but the created will in man is otherwiſe, and this will ſince mans fall, whether taken for the power to will, or the act of willing, or the object will…d, is altogether a corrupt and a diſeaſed will, there is nothing found or good in it; Although our purpoſe is to ſpeak of the will as a power in the ſoul, yet prone to put it ſelf immediately into actings.
In the eighth place, The will having this great dominion over the whole ſoul, and being the univerſal appetite of a man, therefore it is that in it is ſeated obedience or diſobedience to God. Obedience or diſobedience to God is not properly, at leaſt not primarily, or radically, in any part but in the will. It is true, all the other parts of the ſoul in regeneration are made holy and ſanctified, and thereby in their way conformable to the will of God, yet obedience and diſobedience are primarily acts of the will; ſo that as the will is qualified, ſo is a man ſaid to be obedient to God: A good will is the good tree, that maketh the fruit good, and a bad will is the bad tree that maketh the fruit bad. As then all the evil or good of a tree cometh from the root, ſo doth all the evil or good of a man come from his will; For till this be ſanctified, till this be renewed, nothing can be good in a man; Therefore if you examine, what is the cauſe of all the impiety, and all the wickedneſs that moſt commit, it is becauſe their wills are corrupt, their wils are rebellious; Their minds, their conſciences many times, tell them they ought to do otherwiſe, only their wils are ſlubborn and contumacious, Joh. 5. 40. Ye will not come unto me that ye may have life: So in the Parable, Mat. 21. 29. when the ſonne was commanded to go, and work in the vineyard, he ſaith, I will not, It is then the will of man, that is the deſperate and implacable enemy to all the things of God, men may delude themſelves with reaſons and fair gloſſes, but it is their will, and only their unſanctified will, that maketh them continue in ſuch oppoſition to God; now the will is therefore the root of all obedience, of diſobedience in a man, becauſe that is like the Centurion in a mans ſoul, whatſoever it biddeth this, or that power of the ſoul do, it doth; what it bids the mind think, it thinketh; what it bids love to love, it loveth; what it bids the hand move to, it moveth to; for there are two acts of the will wherein it demonſtrateth its dominion, The Elicite acts, and the Imperate; Elicite are thoſe which the will doth immediately produce, as election, intention, conſent, &c. and herein it hath full power, yet ſo, as that it's in ſubordination to God; The Imperate acts, are thoſe which are produced by other parts of a man, yet from the command of the will, ſo when we move our hands or our feet, theſe are imperate acts of the will; Thus when we turn our mind from one object, and place it upon another, this is an imperate act of the will: The affections alſo they are in ſome meaſure under the command of the will, but not ſo abſolutely as the body and the motions thereof are. By which you ſee that all things in a man are reduced to his will, and therefore the more active and univerſal this is, the greater is the defilement thereof.
In the ninth place, The will in regard of its conſtitution at firſt, hath for its object that which is good; And in the ſtate of integrity it was alwaies a true real good, but in this ſtate of revolt from God, the will cannot indeed be carried out to any thing but what is good, only it's but an apparent good, a diſguiſed good, it is a true and real evil. As the object of the underſtanding is truth, and it cannot give its aſſent to that which doth appear to be falſe, ſo the object of the will is good; neither can the will have any motion or tendency to any object, which hath not the colour (at leaſt) of ſome good. As the Devil appeared in Samuel's cloaths, and ſo was believed to be Samuel; Thus doth all the evil in the world, which doth at any time ſeduce and draw the will aſide, it hath the mantle and covering of good; It being impoſſible that the will ſhould deſire evil▪ as it is evil. It is true, ſome deny, that bonnus is the object, adiquate, and general of the will; but they ſay, good is the object of the will, as it is proſequntiva, proſecuting and deſiring; but malu… is the object of the will, as it is perſequntiva and averſiva, as it doth repel and diſlike, ſo evil is the object of the will; For diſplicency and hatred are acts of the will, and the objects of theſe is evil. But we ſpeak of the will now, as it is a rational deſiring appetite, ſatisfying it ſelf with love of ſome object, and if this be not good, either real or apparent, the will can no more tend to it, then the eye to muſick, or the car to colours; onelyonly by original ſinne, herein ariſeth our unſpeakable miſerey, that the good which the will doth now imbrace, is onelyonly a counterfeit ſpecious guilded good, no true real good; They are but ſeeming goods, and real evils; Like the Glow-worm that ſhineth in the night, and is nothing but an earthly worm; Like a rotten Poſt or Tree, that in the night ſeemeth to be glorious, but in the day we know what it is: Thus if we could take off the viſor, the painting from thoſe objects, we place our wils upon, we ſhall ſee nothing but damnable guilt, and real abominable evils, which will at laſt damne our ſouls, Per falſa mala itur ad vera bona, per falſa bona itur ad vera mala; by that which is ſpeciouſly good, we come indeed to that which is truely evil; and by that which is apparently evil, we come to what is ſubſtantially good.
Laſtly, In the will (according to thoſe that are exerciſed in School-Divinity) We are to conceive in it ſutable and proportionable affections, to thoſe we call paſſions in the ſenſitive part. Thus in the will (as it is a rational appetite) there are love, joy, deſire, fear and hatred. This is plain, becauſe in Angels there are ſuch affections; ſo alſo in the ſoul ſeparated, there is love and joy, earneſt deſire for the coming of Chriſt, and its reunion to the body; by which it appeareth evidently, that beſides thoſe paſſions in a man, which work by a corporal tranſmutation, there are theſe ſpiritual and immaterial affections, or rather actions, and operations of the will; So that the will loveth, the will rejoyceth, the will deſireth, &c. This is the more to be attended unto, becauſe hereby this pollution of original ſinne, will appear the more extenſive and diffuſive; The love of the will, the deſire of the will, the joy of the will are become abominable.