Abstract of Logic, Book 1 · Chapter 2 – Chapter 4
CHAP. II. Of Themes Simple and Compoſed, Ʋniverſal and Singular.
Ax. 1. A Theme is whatſoever may be propos'd to the Underſtanding to be known.
Ax. 2. Themes are either Simple or Compoſed.
Ax. 3. Themes Simple are thoſe which are underſtood without a Compoſition or Complexion of Notions, as Man, runs, &c.
Ax. 4. Compos'd, ſuch as are underſtood by two or more Notions, by an Affirmation or Negation join'd together, as Man runs.
A Complexion of Notions is nothing elſe but an Affirmation or Negation in the Underſtanding or Speech. And by this means are Themes Simple to be diſcern'd from Complex, and not by the Multitude or Compoſition of Words: For a Simple Theme is often expreſs'd by a Compound Word, as Common-Wealth, Goat-Hart, &c. Frequently alſo by many Words, as, Love of Parents to'ards their Children. Sometimes in one, and that a Simple Word, you have a Theme Complex; as when I ſay in Latin, pluit, ningit, itur, ſtatur; that is, it Rains, it Snows, we go, we ſtand, &c.
Ax. 5. A Theme Simple is either Univerſal or Singular.
Ax. 6. A Univerſal is that which is apt of its own Nature to be predicated of many things, as Man, Horſe, Plant, &c.
A Univerſal is ſaid to be predicated of many things either actually Exiſting, or at leaſt ſuch as may Exiſt. So Man was a Univerſal when Adam only was in being; becauſe Man was not only apt of its own Nature to be ſaid of Adam, but of all Men that were to be born. So altho' the Sun be really but One, it may yet, that is, the Term Sun, be call'd a Univerſal, becauſe many Suns may be made of the ſame Nature with this of ours.
A Univerſal is ſaid to be of its own Nature apt to be predicated; leſt any one ſhou'd think Homonymous Words, or Words given to many Singulars of the ſame Species; as, When many Men are call'd Peter, to be Univerſals: For Homonymous, as Homonymous, are predicated of many as to their Names only, not Definitions, or, as to their own Natures.
Ax. 7. The Singular is that which of its own Nature, is apt to be predicated only of One.
Ax. 8. Singulars are alſo call'd Individuals becauſe not diviſible into more of the ſame Name and Nature: So Plato, altho' he may, be divided into Body and Soul, Head, Belly, Breaſt, Feet, and his other Members; yet cannot he be divided into more Plato's.
Ax. 9. Individuals are either Determin'd or Vague; that is, Uncertain.
Ax. 10. Individuals are determin'd four ways: firſt, by their Proper Names, as Alexander, Bucephalus, &c. And ſecondly, by a Common Name taken by way of Excellency, for their Proper; as Philoſopher for Ariſtotle. Thirdly, by a demonſtrative Pronoun, as this Man. Fourthly Periphraſis, as The Apoſtle of the Gentiles, for St. Paul.
Ax. 11. An Uncertain Undividual is that which is pronounc'd with a particular Pronoun; as Some Man, a certain Man, &c. by the Greeks foreign.
CHAP. III. Of the Categories in general.
Ax. 1. A Category is a Series of Things gradually diſpos'd under the ſame chief Genus.
A Category is ſo call'd from the Greek Word foreign, that is, to Accuſe; for it was a Word us'd in the Forum, and from thence brought into the Schools, and ſignifies to ſay or affirm a Thing of any Body. But the School-men ſay Praedicate. Farther, a Category either is taken for the Affirmation it ſelf, or for the Series and Diſpoſition of thoſe things which may be affirmed of others under the ſame Genus. Such a Series Boethius calls a Predicament. We have choſen rather the Greek Word.
Ax. 2. The Categories are Ten, Subſtance, Quantity, Quality, Relation, Action, Paſſion, When, Where, Seite, and Habit.
Ax. 3. Of which the one is of Subſtances, the reſt of Accidents. This Number is taken from the diverſity of Queſtions which may be made concerning the firſt and individual Subſtances, as appears from the very Appellations of the Categories.
Ax. 4. In theſe Ten are contain'd all things which can be praedicated of any Subject; others directly, others indirectly.
Ax. 5. That which directly, requires theſe Five Conditions.
I. It muſt be a Finite Being.
By this Condition God is excluded out of the Categories: For altho' God be a Subſtance, yet is he not put in the Category of Subſtance; for thoſe things which are directly plac'd in this Category, not only ſubſiſt of themſelves, but are ſubject alſo to Accidents, as we ſhall hereafter make appear, which to think of God were impious. Beſides, the Genus, properly ſo call'd, of thoſe things which are directly plac'd in the ſame Category, muſt be the ſame: But neither Subſtance, nor any thing elſe, can be the Genus properly ſo call'd of things Finite and Infinite: God therefore being Infinite cannot be directly contain'd under the Genus of Finite Subſtances. Yet is he aequivocally revok'd to this Category. For Subſtance is the Genus aequivocal both of God and Finite Subſtances.
II. True and Poſitive. To a true Being firſt are oppos'd Beings of Reaſon, as Genus, Species, &c. which are by no means in Categories. 2dly. The fictitious or feign'd, as Chimaera, Centaure, &c. which are referr'd to Categories Hypothetically, or by way of Suppoſition: For if a Centaure were that which it is feign'd to be, it wou'd really be put in the Category of Subſtances. 3dly. Appearances, or, as they commonly ſay, Intentionals, as the Rain-bow, Colours appearing, Species's and Spectres of the Senſes and Underſtanding, and other things whoſe Eſſence only conſiſts in their Apparition. Theſe things belong to Categories, becauſe of their Similitude; for they are the Reſemblances of true things. Hither alſo referr painted Images of true things as they are Images. To Poſitive Beings are oppos'd Privations; as Blindneſs, Darkneſs, &c. which are reduc'd to Categories by their oppoſite Habits.
III. Compleat and Perfect. By this Condition are excluded, 1ſt. The Principles or Beginnings of things, as Unity, Moment, &c. 2dly. All Parts whatſoever. 3dly. Imperfect Beings, and, as they commonly ſay, in fieri or Action, as an Embrio, Motion, &c. 4thly. Modes and Compliments of other Beings. Theſe are all reduc'd to the Categories by Concomitancy, except Differences, which altho' Parts of Species are ſaid to belong collaterally, becauſe they adhere collaterally or ſideways to their Species's.
IV. One by it ſelf. By this Condition are remov'd, 1ſt. Complex Beings, as A Man Runs. 2dly. Concrete, as White, Juſt. 3dly. Aggregate, as an Heap, an Army. Theſe are all reduc'd by Accident to the Categories of thoſe things of which they are compos'd.
V. Univerſal. By this means are rejected, 1ſt. Tranſcendents, as, Being, Thing, One, True, Good, which by their Community exceed all the degrees of Categories, and then Singulars, which becauſe naturally they are not praedicated, but ſubjected only, are not in Categories, but underneath them, as it were a Baſis.
Ax. 6. The firſt and principal Uſe of Categories is, that things which are of their own Nature, infinite, being reduc'd to certain Forms or Claſſes, our Mind may ſurvey them at one View or Glimpſe, and obſerve how this or that may be compared with any other thing.
This Uſe confers much not only to the knowledge of Logick, but of all Philoſophy, and other Diſciplines.
Ax. 7. Out of this firſt Uſe three more do ariſe. For, Firſt, the Diſpoſitions of things in Categories conferr much to the delivering of the Affections of Simple Themes, and ſecond Notions, which are to be form'd out of the firſt.
2dly. From the ſame Diſpoſition it appears, what of its own Nature is fit to be ſubjected, what praedicated.
3dly. There is no greater Aſſiſtance towards defining, dividing, diſpoſing, I may add alſo Argumentation, than an Order of Categories well diſpos'd.
From whence it appears how much they are miſtaken who would cut off from Logick this ſo uſeful and neceſſary part; which Ariſtotle ſo much eſteem'd, that he wrote a particular Book of it, if yet that Book be Ariſtotle's; and has again inculcated it in his Metaphyſicks; and moreover in his Logical Precepts, made mention of it very frequently in the firſt Book of his Topicks, alſo Cap. 9. commending it not obſcurely for its Utility: The like to which Porphiry has done in his Introduction.
CHAP. IV. Of Subſtance.
Ax. 1. A Subſtance is a Being ſubſiſting of it ſelf, and ſubject to Accidents.
That which in Latin is call'd Subſtantia, or Subſtance, is in Greek foreign, from the Word ſignifying To be.
To ſubſiſt by it ſelf is nothing elſe but not to be in any thing as a Subject; and agrees to all Subſtances, even to God, but to be ſubject to Accidents only to Finite; For God is not ſubject to Accidents, as I ſaid before.
Ax. 2. Subſtance is either Firſt or Second.
Ax. 3. The Firſt is a Singular Subſtance, or that which is not ſaid of a Subject; as Alexander, Bucephalus.
Ax. 4. The Second a Univerſal, or that which is ſaid of a Subject; as, Man, Horſe. For Man is ſaid of Alexander and Philip; and Horſe of Bucephalus and Cyllarus.
Ax. 5. The Notes of Subſtances are ſix; Firſt, A Subſtance is not in a Subject.
Ax. 6. Secondly, Subſtances are ſaid of others Synonimouſly.
The firſt Note agrees to all and only Subſtances. Enough of which is ſaid in the Definition of Subſtance. The Second only to the Second Subſtances. For the Firſt are not ſaid of a Subject; the Second are ſaid of the Firſt Synonimouſly, that is, as to Name and Definition.
Ax. 7. Thirdly, A Subſtance ſignifies foreign, or, this ſomething.
To ſignifie this Something, is nothing elſe but to be Something Singular, which may be demonſtrated with the Finger. This Note agrees only with the Firſt Subſtances. For although Second Subſtances in the Scheme of Category, that is, Figure of Predication, may ſeem to ſignifie this Something, yet in truth they ſignifie foreign, that is, What Something; not indeed of themſelves primarily, but upon the account of the Differences of which they are conſtituted: For Second Subſtances ſignifie a Nature affected with a Difference, which is nothing elſe but ſome Eſſential Quality.
Ax. 8. Fourthly, A Subſtance hath no Contrary.
That is, not by reaſon of their Subſtance but Qualities; as Heat and Cold, Drineſs and Moiſture, Weight and Lightneſs, &c.
Ax. 9. Fifthly, A Subſtance receives not more or leſs.
That is, is not intended or remitted. This is underſtood of one and the ſame Subſtance, which in ſucceſſion of Time, cannot be made more a Subſtance in Genus or Species than it was before. So Man and Stone cannot be made more a Subſtance, or more a Man and Stone than they were before.
Ax. 10. Sixthly, One and the ſame Numerical Subſtance receives Contraries.
That is, A Subſtance, altho' it has receiv'd Contraries, remains ſtill the ſame Subſtance as it was before. So cold Water, altho' by a Mutation it becomes hot, yet it is not another Subſtance, but remains ſtill of the ſame Nature as it was before.