Abstract of Logic, Book 1 · Chapter 17
CHAP. XVII. Of Efficient Cauſe.
Ax. 1. CAuſes External are thoſe which enter not the Eſſence of the thing, as Efficient and End.
Ax. 2. An Efficient is an External Cauſe, from which a thing proceeds by a true Cauſality.
1. §. For a thing may be ſaid to proceed alſo from the End, but by a Metaphorical, not a true Cauſality.
Ax. 3. An Efficient is of a very large Extent.
Ax. 4. And is firſt divided into Active, which, by the Mediation of Action, cauſes the Effect; and into that from which a thing immediately flows and proceeds without any Action.
1. §. It ſometimes happens that a Cauſe cauſes the Effect by the Mediation of ſome Action which is ſaid to be its Cauſality in cauſing. Such a Cauſe we call Active; ſometimes by its own Exiſtence without any Cauſality diſtinct from its Exiſtence; and this by ſome is call'd Emanative: Which Word tho' feign'd with Repugnance to the Analogy of the Latin Tongue, yet is it to be uſed upon this Occaſion till a more Convenient can be found out. For Example: The Fire is the Emanative Cauſe of its own Heat; but the Active of anothers.
Ax. 5. Secondly, Cauſe Efficient is divided into Immanent and Tranſient.
Ax. 6. Immanent is that which produces the Effect in its ſelf.
Ax. 7. Tranſient, out of it ſelf.
1. §. For Example: When a Workman builds a Houſe, or any one throws a Stone, both theſe are ſaid to be Tranſient; but when our Mind underſtands or deſires any thing, it is ſaid to be the Immanent Cauſe of thoſe Conceptions or Affections, which in underſtanding or deſiring, it forms.
Ax. 8. The Conditions of the Tranſient Cauſe are Two: 1ſt that it be conjoin'd with the Patient; and 2dly unlike unto it.
1. §. The firſt of theſe is precepted, Book 7. Phyſicks, Cap. 3. and the other Book 1. of Gener. and Corrup. Cap. 7. An Efficient is ſaid to be two ways joined to the Patient, to wit, either by Exiſtence vulgarly call'd Suppoſitum, or Virtue. For Example: When Fire burns Wood, it is conjoyn'd to the Wood by its Exiſtence; when heats the Sitters by, it is not joyn'd to them by its Exiſtence, but Power, or Virtue.
2. §. An Agent likewiſe is ſaid to be Two Ways unlike the Patient, either as to Species or Degree. In the firſt manner Hot to Cold; in the laſt, that which is more hot to that which is leſs hot; or that which is more cold to that which is leſs cold. Thoſe which neither the one cannot act upon the other, or ſuffer from it any manner of ways.
Ax. 9. Thirdly, the Efficient is divided into free and neceſſary.
Ax. 10. A Free is that which Cauſes Conſultedly, or with Deſign.
Ax. 11. A Neceſſary, not, but by Neceſſity of Nature.
1. §. Liberty, in general is a Faculty of doing what one pleaſes, and therefore he who is abſolutely free, is free from all Servitude, Law impoſed upon him by others, Coaction and Neceſſity of Nature. But when the Will is ſaid to be free, and a free Cauſe oppoſed to a Neceſſary, nothing farther is underſtood by the Name of Liberty, but an Immunity from Coaction, Neceſſity, and natural Determination. For he who is a Servant or Subject to another's Law, enjoys the Liberty of his own Will, when he judges that he is to live according to the Law or Beck of him with whom he lives. But Natural Neceſſity and Coaction evert Liberty. Why therefore is not coacted Cauſe contained in this Diviſion? Becauſe he who is compell'd, is ſo compell'd by another, as that he conduces nothing to the Effect himſelf, and therefore cannot be numbered amongſt the Efficients.
2. §. By Natural Neceſſity we underſtand not only that by which Inanimate things act, as Plants, but that alſo by which Brutes and Infants before the Uſe of Reaſon. For the Actions of Brutes and Infants proceed almoſt, in the ſame manner from Natural Inſtinct, and Senſe; as do the Actions of Plants from Nature it ſelf. In this Senſe are the Parts of the Diviſion immediately oppoſed; and in this are contained all the Species's of Cauſes which follow.
Ax. 12. A free Cauſe can act, and not act, what, how, and when it pleaſes.
Ax. 13. A Neceſſary is determin'd to one certain thing, and acts both when, and as much as it can.
1. §. For Example: For this Cauſe is one ſaid freely to diſpute or write; becauſe Voluntarily and of ones own Accord one diſputes or writes; and alſo becauſe one can diſpute or not diſpute; and the Diſputation begun, can at Will interrupt; or do any of thoſe things, which are ſaid to be in our own Power. For to theſe only does the Liberty of the Will extend. Cauſes neceſſary are determin'd to one thing; that is, they can, but cannot but act; and that only which they do, and nothing elſe; and as much as they can: So Fire cannot but heat fit Matter, and heats every thing ſo much, as that it cannot heat it any more.
Ax. 14. Fourthly, Cauſe Efficient is divided into Cauſe by it ſelf, and Cauſe by Accident.
Ax. 15. Cauſe by it ſelf is that which as it is ſuch, produces an Effect of its own Council, and agreeable to its Natural Diſpoſition.
Ax. 16. By Accident, which not as ſuch, or elſe beſides its own Council or Natural Propenſion.
1. §. That a Cauſe Efficient be a Cauſe of it ſelf two Conditions, thus, are required. Firſt, that the Effect anſwer to its Council or Natural Propenſion; to its Council if a Free, Propenſion if a Neceſſary. The other, that it produce it as ſuch. If either of theſe are wanting, the Cauſe is ſaid to be by Accident: If the firſt, becauſe ſome Event, or Effect by Accident, coheres with the Effect which is produc'd by the Cauſe Efficient, by it ſelf. As when one digging up the Earth, finds a Treaſure: For to dig the Earth, is the Effect of the Digger by it ſelf, with which Effect, the finding of the Treaſure by Accident; that is, beſides the Council of the Digger and Nature of the Digging is joyn'd. So when an Animal begets a Monſter, it is the Cauſe of the Monſter by Accident. Becauſe the Generation of the Monſter is joyned with that of Nature by Accident, and beſides its Scope and Intention; If the latter, that is, if the latter Qualification be wanting, the Cauſe is ſaid by Accident; becauſe the Effect is not aſcrib'd to the Cauſe, but that which happens to it. As when Polyclete, or a Muſician is ſaid to be the Cauſe of a Statue: For neither does Polyclete make the Statue as he is Polyclete, or Muſician as he is Muſician, but a Statuary: For it is Accidental to the Statuary; that he is either Polyclete or a Muſician. See Book 2. of the Phyſicks, Cap. 2.
Ax. 17. To cauſe by Accident are reduc'd Fortune and Chance.
1. §. Videlicet, To the firſt Species of it which is ſaid to be by reaſon of its Effect. Fortune in Greek foreign, is defin'd by Ariſtotle, Book 2. of the Phyſicks, Cap. 5. thus; It is therefore manifeſt, that Fortune is a Cauſe by Accident in thoſe things which are done for the ſake of ſomething, and conſultedly undertaken. By Themiſtius in his Periphraſe upon this Place, more fully, to be a Cauſe by Accident of thoſe things which neither neceſſarily, nor often, but rarely happen; and in thoſe alone which for the ſake of ſomething are conſultedly undertaken.
2. §. Now Chance in Creek foreign, is a Cauſe by Accident of thoſe things which rarely happen, and that in all thoſe things which are undertaken for the ſake of another, and not only conſultedly: For Chance extends farther than Fortune. For whereas both are Cauſes by Accident, which act for the ſake of ſome End, and are converſant in things rarely happening, Fortune only is placed in thoſe things which act conſultedly: Chance alſo in thoſe which act by Neceſſity of Nature; as in Infants, Brutes, Plants, and alſo inanimate things, in which there is no Place for Fortune. As for Inſtance, when any one digging, finds a Treaſure, we may ſay, that 'twas by Chance or Fortune done: But when a Tile falling from a Houſe ſhall wound a Paſſer by, that is, we ſay, by Chance, not Fortune done. All Fortune therefore is Chance, but not on the contrary; as is ſaid Book the ſame, Cap. 6. Altho' theſe Words are often confounded.
Ax. 18. Fifthly, Cauſe Efficient is divided into Principal and leſs Principal.
Ax. 19. A Principal is that which produces the Effect by its own Virtue.
Ax. 20. A Leſs, which inſerves the Principal towards its producing the Effect.
Ax. 21. The Principal Cauſe, is either equal to, or nobler, never worſe than the Effect; the leſs Principal as far as it cauſes, is always worſe than or inferiour to the Effect.
1. §. When we compare the Effect with the Cauſe we are to conſider the Cauſe as it is ſuch; that is, according to that Virtue by which it cauſes, when the Virtue of the Cauſe is ſuch as that it contains in it, whatever is in the Effect, it is ſaid to be a principal Cauſe. The Effect is ſaid to be contained in the Cauſe, either formally or eminently. When formally, or the Effect is of the ſame Nature with the Cauſe, the Cauſe is ſaid to be univocal, and is equal to its Effect; as when Heat begets Heat, or a Mouſe a Mouſe: When Eminently, or the Cauſe by a Nobler Sort of Virtue produces the Effect, it is ſaid to be Aequivocal, and is better than its Effect; as, when Light produces Heat, or the Architect an Houſe; when neither formally nor eminently, it is ſaid to be leſs Principal, and that not ſo much effects as ſubſerves the Principal in producing the Effect.
Ax. 22. The leſs Principal is ſubdivided into procatarctical, Proëgumenal, and Inſtrumental.
Ax. 23. Procatarctical, is that which Extrinſically excites the principal Cauſe to Action.
Ax. 24. The Proëgumenal, which inwardly diſpoſes, or alſo excites the principal Cauſe to Action.
1. The Cauſe in Greek foreign or Procatarctical, in Latin may be called Incipiens or Inchoans, that is, beginning or inchoating: And is either Object, Occaſion, Author, or Merit. So far it may be ſaid to be the Object, as it moves or excites the principal Cauſe to Action. Occaſion is the Conveniency of Time and Place to act in, which it ſelf alſo has ſome Force of moving to Action, in as much as it removes Impediments to Action. Author, here is ſaid to be him who propoſing Reaſons, perſuades the principal Cauſe either to, or from Action: He is alſo call'd the Moral Cauſe. Merit or Meritorious Cauſe is that which moves the Agent to a Requital, and that either in good or evil things. And even all theſe are without the principal Cauſe: In which they are diſtinguiſhed from the Proegumenal, which conſiſts in the principal Cauſe it ſelf. For Example: If any one walking about in the Night ſhould ſee many precious things in the open Houſe of his Enemy, from whom juſt before he had receiv'd an Injury, to be negligently kept, and at the Inſtigation of another ſhould take them away. The objective Cauſe of of this would be the Precious Things themſelves, exciting the Covetouſneſs of the Thief; the Occaſion, the Darkneſs of the Night and open Houſe, which in no little Meaſure further him in his Purpoſe; the Author or Moral Cauſe, he who inſtigated him; the Meritorious, the Injury received, for which the Thief comes to be more prone to ſteal: The Proëgumenal Cauſe is the proper Avarice of the Thief. Farthermore, Author or Cauſe Moral, has Place only in voluntary Cauſes. Object, Occaſion, Meritorious and Proëgumental, alſo in others. Occaſion is ſometimes taken for Cauſe Meritorious. As when an Injury committed or done is ſaid to be the Occaſion of a Fight, or War, or Slaughter; and in this Senſe if feigned, is call'd by the Greeks foreign and foreign, and the Latins Pretext. The Proëgumenal either diſpoſes only the principal Cauſe; as when the Temperament of the Body is ſaid to be the Cauſe of Manners; or, alſo, moves it and ſpurs it on: As when Anger is ſaid to be the Cauſe of Revenge, or Avarice of Theft.
2. §. The Procatarctical and Proëgumenal Cauſes are of great Uſe in Phyſick: For Phyſicians reduce almoſt all Diſeaſes to three Cauſes Procatarctical, Proegumenal and Synectical or Containing. The Procatarctical with them is the External and Evident Cauſe. The other Two the Internal and hidden Cauſes. The Proëgumenal the Antecedent. The Containing the foreign, or that which is connate with and alſo exiſts together with the Diſeaſe, and coheres immediately with it; and this, with us, is the next Cauſe. For Example: The Procatarctical Cauſe of the Fever is either Cold, or the Aſtringent Bathes; the Proëgumenal, the Skin bound up and Evaporation hindred; the Containing, the Humour Putreſcent and accended.
Ax. 25. The Inſtrumental Cauſe is that which ſubſerves the principal Cauſe in its Effecting.
1. §. All Inſtruments ſubſerve not the Principal in the like Manner: For there are ſome Inſtruments joyn'd to the principal Cauſe in acting; and there are ſome in acting ſeparate from them. Thoſe are Inſtruments conjoyn'd, of which the principal Cauſe makes uſe in the Effection of the thing. And theſe are either Active as the Heat in the Fire, or Paſſive, as a Knife, a Sword, &c. Separate Inſtruments are thoſe which act in the place and ſtead of the principal Cauſe. So the Ambaſſadour is the Inſtrument of the Prince; and the Seed ſeems, to many, the Inſtrument of Generation, but miſtakenly: For ſeparate Inſtruments have no Place in Naturals, but Morals. And this brings us to the next Maxim, viz.
Ax. 26. The Eſſence of Inſtruments conſiſts in their Fitneſs for Uſe.
1. §. Inſtruments, ſays Ariſtotle Book 2. of An. Cap. 4. in Offices and Uſes, are diſtinguiſh'd or convene amongſt themſelves: For every Inſtrument is that which it is, becauſe, and ſo far as it is fit for ſome certain Uſe. So an Ax is ſo far an Ax, as that in the Quality of its Matter and Form, it is fit to cut: And the Eye ſo far an Eye as it is fit to ſee with. For the Eye, the Hand, and other Organical Parts of Man or Beaſt, when dead, are not Eye or Hand, unleſs Homonymouſly or ambiguouſly, that is, doubtfully, as Ariſtotle ſays, Book 4. of the Meteors, Cap. 17.
Ax. 27. Sixthly, Cauſe Efficient is divided into Firſt and Second.
Ax. 28. The Firſt is that which depends upon none.
Ax. 29. The Second, which depends upon the Firſt.
1. §. A Cauſe is Two Ways ſaid to be Firſt; to wit, abſolutely, or in its own Genus. That is ſaid to be abſolutely, on which all things depend; both when they are Made, Exiſt, and Operate; or as they ſay in Fieri, Eſſe, and Operation. The Cauſe abſolutely Firſt, is only One, to wit, God. For all things depend on God, both as to their Making, Being and Operating; according to that of the Apoſtle St. Paul, Acts 17. In him we live, and move, and have our Being. Furthermore, all things are ſaid to depend upon God as they are made, or in Fieri, as they ſay, by reaſon of Creation; and that either proximately or remotely; as they are; or in being, by reaſon of Conſervation, as they operate of his Providence, either ordinarily or extraordinarily, &c.
2. §. That Cauſe is ſaid to be Firſt in its own Genus, on which the reſt of the Cauſes of the ſame Genus depend. Such a Firſt Cauſe is, not only given, in every Genus of Cauſes, but alſo in every Subordination. So Adam is the firſt Cauſe of Men in his Species; becauſe begotten of no other Man as the reſt were, but immediately created of God: So alſo the Heaven is the firſt Cauſe of Motion, not abſolutely, but in the Genus of Natural Cauſes; as is collected from the 1ſt. Book of the Meteors, Cap. 1. In the ſame manner may the Soul be ſaid to be the firſt Cauſe of vital Operations; and likewiſe every principal Cauſe in regard of its Inſtruments, &c.
Ax. 30. Seventhly, Cauſe Efficient is divided into Univerſal and Particular.
Ax. 31. Univerſal is that which concurrs with other Cauſes, with the ſame Efficiency, to the producing of many Effects.
Ax. 32. A Particular only which by its Efficiency produces but one Effect.
1. §. Univerſal Cauſes are God and the Heavens. God concurrs with particular Cauſes to all Effects. The Heavens only to them which are Natural and Material. In this Senſe Book 2. of the Phyſicks, Cap. 2. The Sun, and Man, I add God, are ſaid to beget Man: The Sun as an univerſal: For with the ſame Efficiency it concurrs to the producing of all things; Man as a Particular: So, alſo may a Driver be ſaid to be a Univerſal, when driving a Team of Horſes; becauſe in the ſame manner, and with the ſame Virtue, he drives all his Horſes, as well the Sound as the Lame.
Ax. 33. Laſtly and Eighthly. Cauſe Efficient is divided into next and remote.
Ax. 34. The Next, is that which produces the Effect immediately.
Ax. 35. The Remote, which produces the Effect by means of ſome more neighbouring Cauſe.
1. §. A Cauſe Efficient is ſaid to be two ways Next; to wit, either generally or ſpecially. In general, that Cauſe is ſaid to be Next, which either by its Exiſtence they commonly ſay, Suppoſitum, or Virtue is joyned to the Effect: For ſuch Virtue being an Inſtrument of the principal Cauſe, it is deem'd with the Principal to be one only. And therefore when the principal Cauſe by its Virtue is joyned to the Effect, it is its ſelf eſteemed to be joyned to the Effect. Neither is it any matter, whether that Virtue be an Inſtrument conjoyned or ſeparate. For Example: The Fire is ſaid to be the next Cauſe of Uſtion; Parents of their Children; notwithſtanding the Fire acts by Mediation of Heat, and the Parents of Seed: For altho' Heat and Seed are Inſtruments, yet do they not effect by their Intervening; but that the principal Cauſe may be ſaid to be next to the Effect, A Cauſe therefore is ſaid to be remote in this Senſe, viz. which neither by its Exiſtence nor Virtue is joyned to the Effect: As when the Grandfather is ſaid to be the Cauſe of his Son's Son, or Grandſon, &c.
2. A Cauſe Efficient is ſaid to be next in Species which is ſo joyned by its Exiſtence to its Effect; as that it is joyned to it without any mediating Virtue. And a next Cauſe has no Place in Subſtances, but only Accidents eſpecially proper: For a Subſtance does not effect a Subſtance without ſome mediate or inſtrumental Virtue. And this is the Cauſe which is ſaid to be abſolutely next; and that is either Internal or External. Internal is that which is in the Subject of the Accident, of which it is the Cauſe. So the Soul and every Subſtantial Form, is ſaid to be the next Cauſe of its own Proprieties. Hitherto appertaineth the Emanative Cauſe: Likewiſe the Continent, or Synectical of the Phyſicians. External is that which is not in the Subject of that Accident whoſe Cauſe it is. And ſo the Interpoſition of the Earth, is ſaid to be the next Cauſe of an Eclipſe. But the Uſe of this Cauſe in the Definition, and Demonſtration of proper Accidents is much the more great.