Abstract of Logic, Book 1 · Chapter 13
CHAP. XIII. Of Property, and Accident.
Ax. 1. PRoper is that which declares not what a thing is, and yet is only in it, and reciprocated with it.
COMMENTARY.
1. §. A Thing is ſaid by Porphyrie to be proper four Ways: Firſt, that which agrees and convenes to one only Species, and not to all its Individuals: So it agrees to Man to be muſical. Secondly, that which convenes to all the Individuals of any one Species, but not to it only; and ſo it agrees to Man to be Two-footed. Thirdly, that which agrees to one only Species and all its Individuals, but not always: So it agrees to Man to laugh Fourthly, that which belongs only to one Species and all its Individuals, and always; and ſo it agrees to Man to be riſible, or a laughing Creature.
2. §. The Fourth of theſe Properties Porphyrie calls properly proper: For the reſt, ſays he, are only proper in ſome Reſpect, and for ſome time.
3. §. This Definition of Property is extant in the firſt Book of the Topicks, Cap. 5. Properties, ſays he, do not declare, What a thing is; that is, they are not contained in the Eſſence of the Subject, but follow it, reciprocated with that in which alone they are; that is, with the firſt and proximate Subject; not thoſe contained under that proximate Subject: For of Properties ſome are of Genus's, others Species's: The Properties of Genus's with Genus's, not Species's; and thoſe of Species's with Species's, not Individuals, are to be conferred and reciprocated. So to be of Quantity is reciprocated with Natural Body and not the Heaven, or Element, or Stone. And Riſibility is to be reciprocated with Man, not Socrates or Plato. When the Property then of the Genus is predicated of the Species; as, when the Heaven is ſaid to be of Quantity; or the Property of the Species with the Individual; as when Plato is ſaid to be riſible. The Predication is not of the Accident of the Subject, nor yet the Property: For the Number of Predicable ariſes from a Compariſon of the Predicate with the Proximate Subject. For thoſe compared with the remote are not of this Place; as have been beforeſaid.
Ax. 2. Properties either flow from the Eſſence of the Subject, or from External Cauſe.
1. §. Propers either flow immediately from the Eſſence of the Subject; as Riſibility from the rational Soul, Quantity from the Eſſence of Natural Bodies: Or, by the Mediation of ſome other Property. So to be in a Place, flows from the Eſſence of a Body, by reaſon of its Quantity: But now an Eclipſe, which is the Property of the Moon, flows not from the Eſſence of the Moon, but from an External Cauſe, to wit, the Interpoſition of the Earth between the Sun and the Moon. Theſe are not abſolutely proper, but only from Suppoſition of ſome External Cauſe; which Cauſe yet being in being, they are no leſs neceſſarily in their Subject, than the others.
Ax. 3. Properties which flow from the Eſſence of the Subject are ſo neceſſarily in it that they cannot be ſeparate from it, ſo much as in Thought.
1. §. So that he would be guilty of a Contradiction that ſhould ſay or think that the Property was abſent from it: For whoſoever ſays or thinks a Body is not Quantity, or that the Fire is not hot, ſays or thinks as much as if he ſhould ſay or think, a Body is not a Body, or a Fire a Fire.
Ax. 4. Properties cannot be communicated to Subjects of different Species's.
1. §. Let no body call that a Property, ſays Ariſtotle, Book 4. of the Topicks Cap. 5. which may be in another: For ſince Properties flow from the Eſſence of the Subject; if Properties ſhould be communicated, of neceſſity alſo the Eſſence would be communicated: For if Riſibility or Rationability could be communicated to an Horſe, a Horſe would be a Man; if Quantity to a Spirit, a Spirit would be a Body; and if to be every where to a Creature, a Creature would be God, &c.
Ax. 5. As Properties which flow from the Eſſence of the Subject are to their abſolute Subjects, ſo are Properties alſo which flow from an External Cauſe, to theirs, the Cauſe being put.
1. §. So altho' the Moon does not always ſuffer an Eclipſe, yet when the Earth is interpoſed between the Sun and the Moon, it is as neceſſary it ſhould ſuffer an Eclipſe, as that a Body ſhould be a Quantity, or that the Fire ſhould be hot, &c.
Ax. 6. An Accident is that which in any One and the ſame thing may be, and not be.
Ax. 7. Or thus: An Accident is that which is either preſent or abſent, without the Ruine of the Subject.
1. §. That which is preſent or abſent, that is, may be preſent or abſent at divers times without a Contradiction: for one Part of a Contradiction we know deſtroys another. The Senſe therefore of that Axiom is no more than this. An Accident is that which without a Contradiction may be affirmed or denied of its Subject.
Ax. 8. Of Acidents ſome are ſeparable, ſome inſeparable.
Ax. 9. A Separable is that which may be in Reality ſeparated from its Subject; as, to ſtand, to ſit.
Ax. 10. An Inſeparable that which cannot; as Blackneſs from the Crow.
1. §. All Accidents may be ſeparated from their Subject in Thought, without a Contradiction. And herein they differ from Properties which cannot. For he who thinks a Crow not to be black, altho' he thinks falſe, yet he does not think a Crow not to be a Crow, or any thing from which it may follow a Crow is not a Crow. But he who conceives that the Fire is not hot, conceives that, from whence it muſt follow, that the Fire is not a Fire, &c.
2 §. That Accident therefore is ſaid to be ſeparable, which in Reality may be ſeparated, and not only thought; or without which the Subject may naturally exiſt; Inſeparable not: For God alſo may ſeparate inſeparable Accidents from their Subjects; becauſe he can do all things, which evert not one another, and imply not a Contradiction.