Abstract of Logic, Book 2 · Chapter 27
CHAP. XXVII. Of Sophiſms, or Fallacies in Things.
Ax. 1. OF the Sophiſms in Things, there are ſeven Places, viz. Accident, a Word ſimply ſpoken and according to ſomething, Ignorance of the Elench, Conſequent, Begging of the Queſtion, Not Cauſe for the Cauſe, and manifold Interrogation.
Ax. 2. Accident, is then, when we collect that to agree to the Subject which was ſaid of the Predicate.
Ax. 3. And this is ſolv'd, by ſhewing that that which is gathered of the Subject, is only ſaid of the Predicate by Accident; or that the Predicate it ſelf, is Accidentally ſaid of the Subject.
1. §. And thus a Catch of the Accident is laid for us two manner of Ways; And firſt when any thing's ſaid of the Attribute by Accident, as this; Man is a Species; Socrates is a Man: And therefore he's a Species. This Fallacy conſiſts in this, viz. in that to be a Species is ſaid of Man by Accident; But To be a Man, of Socrates by himſelf. The other is, when the Attribute it ſelf, is ſaid of the Subject by Accident; As here; The Mouſe gnaws Cheeſe; Mouſe is a Syllable: And therefore a Syllable gnaws Cheeſe. This Fallacy is, becauſe to gnaw Cheeſe, is ſaid of the Mouſe by it ſelf; to be a Syllable, by Accident, and Cauſe of its Name. Both Ways the Fallacy ariſes, out of the Acceptation of the Word chang'd, or Genus of Suppoſition, as the Schoolmen call it. For Man in the Major is taken in a Simple; Minor, a Concrete Acceptation; and Mouſe in the Major, is taken Formally, or for the thing ſignify'd; and in the Minor, Materially, or for the Word only.
Ax. 4. That from the Thing ſimply ſaid, is then, when from ſomething that is ſimply true, we collect another that is true only in ſome reſpect, or according to ſomething. On the Contrary, That, in ſome Reſpect, is, then, when from that which is partially true, or, according to ſome reſpect, we collect that any thing is ſimply ſo.
Ax. 5. This is ſolv'd by ſhewing the Difference between that which is ſpoken ſimply, and that in ſome Reſpect.
1. §. A ſimply ſaid is that, whoſe Predicate agrees with the Subject in every Reſpect, Part, Time and Place without any Limitation. That according to ſomething, in ſome Reſpect, Part, Time, Place only, &c. Examples of the firſt kind are theſe, viz. The Right-Hand is not to be cut off: And therefore not then, when it is invaded by a Gangrene. The Man is Mortal; And therefore ſo as to his Soul. The Pledge ought to be reſtored to its Owner when he requires it; And therefore a Sword, altho' he be Mad when he requires it, &c. From that according to ſome Relation theſe, viz. Man's Soul is Immortal: And therefore the Man. Wine hurts a Man in a Fever: And therefore in general. Mycillus is a good Shoemaker; And therefore he is good, &c.
Ax. 6. Sophiſm from the Ignorance of the Elench, is that, when the Concluſion ſeems to contratradict the Proof of the Reſpondent, and yet does not contradict it, by reaſon of ſome Condition's being Wanting.
Ax. 7. And this is ſolved by ſhewing what Condition is omitted.
1. §. We have Cap. 25. affirmed an Elench to be a Syllogiſm with a Contradiction, and Cap. 22. of the Firſt Book we entreated of the Conditions of Contradiction. But altho' every Sophiſm offends by Ignorance of the Elench (for every Sophiſm ſeems to be an Elench, and yet is not ſo) yet here that eſpecially is ſo called in which the Concluſion is oppoſed to another's Aſſertion, and yet ſome Condition or other is wanting that belongs to a legitimate Contradiction. For Example; If one going about to prove, that Chriſt was not David's Lord, ſhould conclude that he was his Son, he miſtakes by an Ignorance of the Elench; that is, an Ignorance of the Caſe and the true Senſe wherein the Reſpondent were to be taken, and Laws of Oppoſition: For Lord and Son are Oppoſites, if they are attribted to any One in the ſame Reſpect. But theſe are not attributed to Chriſt in the ſame Reſpect, but in a Diverſe. For he was David's Lord as to his Divine, and Son, as to his Humane Nature, &c.
Ax. 8. Sophiſm of Conſequent is then, when One Enunciation is inferr'd from another, from the which it does not follow.
Ax. 9. And this is ſolv'd by citing of the Rule againſt which ſuch Inference does offend.
1. §. There are Four Rules which are to be obſerved in the Inferring of a Conſequent from an Antecedent, of which if we break but One, the Conſequent will be Null; and if ſuch an Inference be admitted, there will be then a Caption or Fallacy of the Conſequent. And the firſt of theſe is, The Univerſal Affirming muſt never be ſimply converted: And therefore if any Man ſhould conclude thus, viz. Becauſe every Flatterer is Complaiſant; Therefore every Complaiſant is a Flatterer; he would be deceiv'd by a Fallacy of the Conſequent. And the ſecond Rule is, that from a Univerſal Affirming a Univerſal Denying, can't be concluded otherwiſe than by Contrapoſition. And therefore if any one ſhould conclude thus, viz. Whatſoever is begotten, has a Beginning: And therefore whatſoever is not, has not; as the Humane Soul, the World, &c. One ſhould commit a Fallacy of the Conſequent: For thus one ſhould have inferr'd, viz. That that which has not a Beginning is not begotten; and ſo it is a Converſion by Contrapoſition. The Third is, The Minor muſt not be denyed in the firſt Figure; Or, which returns to the ſame Account, viz. From the Remotion of the Antecedent can't be inferr'd that of the Conſequent, as we obſerv'd Chapter the 12th in that Part relating to Hypothetical Syllogiſm. The Fourth is, That One of the Premiſſes muſt be denyed in the Second Figure; Or, which is the ſame thing, the Poſition of the Antecedent ought not to be concluded from that of the Conſequent, as we have obſerv'd again in the ſame Chapter; And therefore theſe ſorts of Syllogiſms will be Paralogiſms, viz. Every Man is an Animal; A Horſe is not a Man: And therefore not an Animal. Or thus, If a Horſe be a Man, he is an Animal: But a Horſe is not a Man; And therefore not an Animal, &c. Likewiſe Every Flatterer is Complaiſant; Such an One is Complaiſant: And therefore ſuch an One is a Flatterer. Or thus, If Criſpus be a Flatterer, he is Complaiſant; But he is Complaiſant; And therefore a Flatterer, &c. If any one be deceiv'd by theſe ſorts of Argumentations, either from himſelf or others; as it often happens; he is then deceiv'd by a Fallacy of the Conſequent.
2. But becauſe the Fault of a falſe Conſequence is eaſily diſcernible, in theſe ſorts of Syllogiſms, Sophiſters uſually conceal it, either by ſuppreſſing one of the Premiſſes; As, Criſpus is Complaiſant; And therefore a Flatterer: Walks by Night; And therefore a Thief. Or elſe by Circumlocution; As, he that ſays you are an Animal, ſays true: He that ſays you are an Aſs, ſays you are an Animal: And therefore he that ſays you are an Aſs, ſays true. For this Argumentation is juſt as if one ſhould lay down this Poſition, viz. You are an Animal: An Aſs is an Animal: And therefore you are an Aſs. Which is an Argumentation contrary to Rule, Of two Affirmatives in the ſecond Figure.
Ax. 11. Which is ſolv'd by ſhewing that the Medium is not diverſe from the Queſtion, or at leaſt more known than it.
Ax. 10. The Sophiſm of Begging the Queſtion, is then, when any thing is proved, either by it ſelf or ſomething that is equally unknown with it ſelf.
1. §. This is call'd a Begging of the Principle becauſe it is, a Begging of that which in the Beginning was ſought for. Theſe Sort of Catches may be two ways laid: And Firſt, when the ſame thing is prov'd by it ſelf. Secondly, when one unknown thing is proved by another that is equally unknown with it ſelf. The ſame thing is ſaid to be prov'd by it ſelf; when the Subject or Predicate of the Queſtion, the Name being chang'd, is brought in for a Medium, to prove the Queſtion; As, if any one ſhould prove the Soul of Man to be ex Traduce, Engliſh, of the Seed of the Parent, becauſe begotten by the Seed of the Parent. I ſay, the Subject or Predicate, changing the Name: For, if the Name were not changed, the Argumentation would be mere Child's Play. And yet for all this, every Argumentation in which the Medium is the ſame with the Subject or Predicate of the Queſtion is not to be rejected as a Sophiſm, but only that whoſe Medium is not only in it ſelf and of its own Nature the ſame with the Queſtion; but alſo as to us; as, in that which we propoſed above. But if the Medium be of its own Nature, the ſame as the Queſtion, but not alſo as to us; or our Manner of Concetpion, the Argumentation is not to be rejected: Unleſs you can ſuppoſe all the Arguments which are fetch'd from Eſſential Places; As, Genus, Species, Definition, Whole and Part, to make Captious Argumentations, &c.
2. Secondly, The ſecond Way is when the Medium's as much unknown as the Queſtion it ſelf; As, if one ſhould prove Viſion to be made by Emiſſion, becauſe not by Reception. Now this Sophiſm tends to this; Partly, that the Sophiſter may ſeem to abound with Arguments; partly, that changing the Forms of the Words, he may conciliate a Shew of Probability to his Declarations.
Ax. 11. Sophiſm of not Cauſe for the Cauſe is then, when that which is not the Cauſe, or by Accident is obtruded for the true Cauſe, and that by it ſelf.
Ax. 12. And this Sophiſm is ſolv'd by the Deſignation of the true Cauſe upon which the Effect by it ſelf depends.
1. §. The Caption of not Cauſe for the Cauſe either lies in a Syllogiſm that leads to Inconvenience or direct. In a Syllogiſm that leads to Inconvenience; when the Falſity of the Concluſion brought, is imputed to one of the Premiſſes, which is not the Cauſe of it; As, if one deſigning to prove the Humane Soul Mortal, ſhould thus argue: Every Immortal is Eternal; The Soul of Man is Immortal: And therefore the Soul of Man is Eternal. But this Concluſion is falſe, and the Occaſion of it was in the Minor, which was that the Soul of Man was Immortal; And therefore Mortal. For this Argumentation is a Sophiſm of the not Cauſe for the Cauſe. For he ſays, that this Propoſition, The Soul is Immortal, is the Cauſe of a falſe Concluſion; when it was that, viz. That every Immortal is Eternal. In a Syllogiſm direct, when that which is attributed to the Cauſe by Accident, happens not, but to the Cauſes by themſelves; As, Religion excites Civil Wars. From the Reading of the Sacred Scriptures ſpring Hreſies. Wine is heady and intoxicates, &c. And therefore Religion, Reading of the Sacred Scriptures, and Wine are not to be tolerated in any Common-Wealth, &c.
Ax. 13. The Sophiſm of many Interrogations, is then, when two or more Queſtions are ſo propoſed, as that they ſhew only but as One.
Ax. 14. And theſe ſorts of Sophiſms are brought about two manner of Ways: And firſt, when two Subjects or two Predicates, or perhaps more, are propounded under ſo many diſtinct ſort of Names; as, is the World, Eternal and Perfect, &c. This is a Captious Interrogation: For if you anſwer Affirmatively, the Sophiſter will ſet upon you as if you had grantted that the World was Eternal; and if otherwiſe, he excepts againſt you; as if you deny'd that the World was perfect. And, ſecondly, you may make a Fallacy of many Interrogations in one Word; As, Deſiſtine, &c. Have you left off to commit Adultery? Have you loſt your Horns, &c. But enough of this is ſaid in the Place of Homonymy.
And thus much may ſuffice for Syllogiſm. The Laſt of the Four Inſtruments is that which now demands our Attendance; And that is Method. Of which we ſhall entreat in the following Chapter.