Abstract of Logic, Book 1 · Chapter 31
CHAP. XXXI. Of Enunciation True and Falſe, Neceſſary and Contingent, and their Degrees.
Ax. 1. A True Enunciation is that which conjoyns thoſe things which are of their own Nature conjoyn'd, or divides thoſe things which are of their own Nature divided.
Ax. 2. A Falſe, that conjoyns thoſe things which are divided as before, or divides thoſe things which are conjoyn'd.
COMMENTARY.
1. §. But in this Place is to be underſtood not Ethical, but Logical Falſhood and Truth, which we have ſaid to be the Convenience and Diſcrepance of the Speech, with thoſe things that are ſignified in Affirming or Denying. A true Enunciation conjoyns thoſe things which are conjoyned; that is, declares thoſe things to be which are; as, that Man is an Animal, or the like; or divides thoſe things which are divided; that is, declares thoſe things to be which are not; as, Man is not a Beaſt, &c. A Falſe joyns thoſe that are to be divided; that is, Enounces thoſe things to be which are not; as. Man is a Stone; or divides thoſe things which are to be conjoyned, that is, Enounces thoſe things not to be which are; as that a Plant does not live, &c.
Ax. 3. An Enunciation true, is either Neceſſary or Contingent.
Ax. 4. A Neceſſary is that which cannot,
Ax. 5. Contingent, which may be falſe.
1. §. That is ſaid to be Neceſſary in the General, which cannot but be, or be otherwiſe than it is: Contingent, which may. To be Neceſſary may be ſaid of a Thing two Ways, viz. either Abſolutely, or Secundum quid, or in ſome Reſpect. Abſolutely, that which without a Centradiction, cannot be ſaid not to be, or to be otherwiſe than it is; according to ſomething; which ſome Condition ſuppoſed, indeed, or reſpect, is Neceſſary; but that Condition or Reſpect being taken away, or altered, without ſuch Contradiction, may be ſaid not to be, or to be otherwiſe than it is. Both theſe, together with Contingency, are conſidered either in Exiſtence, Cauſes, or Enunciation. And that alone is of this Place: Which is no other than an Indiſſoluble Connection of Parts; whilſt Contingency is a Diſſoluble and Mutable. For Example: This Enunciation, Man is an Animal, is a Neceſſary; becauſe it cannot be otherwiſe, but that a Man muſt be an Animal. And this Neceſſity is abſolute. This Enunciation alſo; A Crow is black is neceſſary, but not abſolutely, but according to ſome Reſpect; becauſe altho' Naturally a Crow cannot be otherwiſe than black, yet by the Supernatural Power of God it may. But this Enunciation, Craſſus is rich, is Contingent; becauſe it may ſo be, that Craſſus may not be rich.
Ax. 6. Neceſſity of Enunciation is diſtinguiſhed by three Degrees. The firſt of theſe is of every one: the Second by it ſelf: The Third univerſally firſt.
Ax. 7. That of every one, is that in which the Predicate agrees with every Subject and always.
1. §. Theſe two Conditions are always neceſſary: For Example: This Enunciation, Man is juſt, is not of every one; becauſe to be juſt does not agree with every Man: Neither this; A living Creature grows; becauſe it does not always grow: But this, A Crow is black, is of every one; becauſe every Crow is black, and that always.
Ax. 8. An Enunciation by it ſelf is only that whoſe Subject and Predicate are cohering together by an Eſſential Tye.
Ax. 9. And is either of the Firſt or Second Mood.
Ax. 10. And the Firſt is when the Predicate is contained in the Definition of the Subject.
Ax 11. The other, when the Subject in the Definition of the Predicate.
Ax. 12. To which is oppoſed Enunciation by Accident.
Ax. 13. That is, that in which neither the Predicate is contained in the Definition of the Subject, nor the Subject in the Definition of the Predicate.
1. §. To the Firſt Mood, viz. that by it ſelf, belong Five Genus's of Enunciations; Firſt, when the next Genus is predicated of the Species; as, Man is an Animal. Secondly, the Remote; as, Man is a Subſtance: Thirdly, the next Difference; as, Man is Rational: Fourthly, the Remote; as, Man has the Faculty of Feeling: Fifthly, and Laſtly, the Definition of the Defined; as, Man is a Rational Animal. To the Second belong thoſe Enunciations in which the Proprieties are Predicated of their Subject, and that either ſingly and ſeparately, as, Man is Riſible; or Two Disjunctively, as, Number is either even or odd. But this Enunciation a Crow is black; altho' nec ſſary, yet is it by Accident; becauſe neither the Crow in the Mention of Blackneſs, nor Blackneſs in the Mention of the Crow, is defined.
Ax. 14. The Enunciation Univerſally firſt, is only that in which the Predicate agrees or convenes with the Subject, as it is its ſelf that which it is.
Ax. 15. And, therefore, conſiſts of Reciprocal Terms.
1. §. For Example: This Enunciation, Man is Riſible, is from hence known to be Univerſally firſt; becauſe it may be ſaid that Man as Man is Riſible; and alſo that all Men and only Men are Riſible, &c.
Ax. 16. Of theſe Degrees, the Second includes the Firſt, and the Third the Second, viz. of thoſe having an Univerſal Subject, but not on the contrary.
Ax. 17. Of Enunciations Contingent, ſome are for the moſt Part true, ſome ſeldom, ſome of a doubtful Nature; that is, now true, now falſe.
1. §. As for Example: For the moſt Part, it is true, that Parents love their Children; ſeldom, that a Man is born with two Heads: Of a Doubtful Nature, viz. now true, now falſe; that a Player at Dice wins, &c. Now
Ax. 18. A falſe Enunciation is, either Poſſible or Impoſſible.
Ax. 19. Poſſible, that when falſe, may be true
Ax. 20. Impoſſible, which, when falſe, cannot be true.
1. §. A thing is ſaid to be impoſſible alſo two Ways; to wit, either Abſolutely or according to ſomething. An Abſolute is that which implies a Contradiction; as, that a Man ſhould be a Stone. According to ſomething, which when not, may be done indeed by God, but not natural Cauſes; as, for the Sun to ſtand ſtill; the Fire not to burn; a Virgin to bring forth: So likewiſe a thing may be ſaid poſſible two Ways. For one thing it is to be poſſible to God; another, to Natural Cauſes: And this in Reality differs not from that which is Contingent, but only in Reaſon: For that is ſaid to be poſſible, which is not, but can be. Contingent, which is and yet may not be: And this of Abſolute Affections.
Notes and Obſervations Extracted from the Learned Heereboord, and apply'd as proper to the End of this Chapter.
1. A Predicate is ſaid to agree with the Subject, as, the Subject is that which it is, when there is nothing elſe in the Subject to which it can firſt be attributed; as of theſe two Enunciations; Man is Senſible, Man is Riſible. The former is not Univerſally firſt; becauſe to be Senſible, does not convene to Man as he is Man, but as he is an Animal, to which in the firſt Place it is to be attributed; but to be Riſible, convenes to him as Man; becauſe to none it is to be Attributed before Man.
2. Terms are ſaid to be Reciprocal, when there may be a Converſion of the Predicate into the Place of the Subject, and ſo on the contrary, that is, when one may be put into the Place of the other. As for Inſtance, as one may ſay, every Man is Riſible, ſo one may ſay that every Riſible is Man. But altho' one may ſay every Man is Senſible, yet cannot one ſay that every Senſible is Man, and ſo in other Inſtances: And that we may fully know, when an Enunciation is Univerſally firſt, it is to be obſerved that when the Predicate may be ſaid of the Subject with theſe Particles, viz. quà, quatenus, quia, that is as, ſo as, becauſe, &c. that is, when with the Predicate, either any Cauſal or Reduplicative Particle may be uſed, the Enunciation is always Univerſally firſt; as Man as, and becauſe he is Man, is Riſible, &c. When otherwiſe the Enunciation muſt be of ſome other Degree.
3. Of the Degrees of Neceſſity the ſecond includes the Firſt, and the Third the Second, not Reciprocally. For Inſtance: Every Man is Riſible, is an Enunciation Univerſally firſt; becauſe conſiſting of Reciprocal Terms: Of it ſelf, and of the ſecond Mood, becauſe the Subject and the Predicate cohere together in a Reciprocal Tye, and the Subject is contain'd in the Definition of the Predicate: Alſo of every one, becauſe every Man is Riſible and always. But when I ſay a Man is Two-footed, it is alſo of every one, but not of it ſelf; becauſe neither Man is contain'd in the Definition of the Two-footed, nor Two-footed in the Definition of Man; much leſs to it Univerſally firſt, becauſe it conſiſteth not of Reciprocal Terms: And ſo we come to the 32d Chapter. viz. That