The Book of Ecclesiastes and Song of Solomon Paraphrased, Text and paraphrase 1 · Annotations 1
ANNOTATIONS.
[a] V. 1. The Wiſdom, Vertue and Dignity of an Author making his Work more valuable and regarded, Solomon (or he who compoſed this Book from what he had heard him deliver, or found in his Writings) begins with his Quality; not merely as a King, and as the Son of a Great King, and of a great people, in a famous City: but, which was moſt of all conſiderable, as a publick Inſtructor, having ability and authority to inform all men where they ſhould find that happineſs, which they ignorantly ſought, but could not meet withal. This he proclaims with a loud voice; deſiring ſerious attention to ſuch a weighty Diſcourſe, and that they would often recollect, as he had done (all which may be the import of the word Koheleth *See Preface, num. IV.) how frivolous and trivial, all thoſe things are, which moſt men purſue with the greateſt earneſtneſs.
[b] V. 2. This is the Subject of this Book; to ſhow how ſenſleſs it is to place our happineſs in theſe frail and inconſtant things, that we enjoy upon this Earth: which he not only pronounces, but proves to be mere emptineſs. So Vanity ſignifies; and what is conſequent upon that, diſſatisfaction, trouble and affliction. See Pſal. LXXVIII. 33. And this, beyond what can be expreſſed: for our Tranſlators take it to be a word of the ſame import with Tohu; which is uſed in the Hebrew language, when they would ſignifie that of which they ſpeak, to be ſo trivial, that it is below leſs than nothing, XL. Iſai. 17. And yet Solomon is not content with this ſingle word, but doubles it; to denote the extreme diſſatisfaction he found in all things, which made a ſhow of affording him contentment; but performed nothing of that which they ſeemed to promiſe. So the Word Vanity is alſo uſed for that which is falſe, lying and deceitful, LXII. Pſal. 9. and other places, where Idols are called Vanities.
[c] V. 3. Here begins the Proof of his Aſſertion; by conſidering firſt the mind of man: which runs from one thing to another without any end: but finds no ſatisfaction remaining after all its reſtleſs thoughts. And then the body of man (V. 4.) which, as proud and lofty as it now looks, muſt moulder into Duſt; and the pooreſt perſon perhaps ſhall tread upon its Grave. For it cannot laſt like the Earth, from whence it comes; which ſtands for ever, as a publick Theatre, whereon men enter and act their Part, and then go off and never appear again: and when they go (as ſome prettily rather than ſolidly gloſs upon thoſe Words, The Earth abideth for ever) they can carry none of it along with them, but leave it all behind them, unto thoſe that come after; who paſs away alſo, leaving the Earth where they found it.
[d] V. 5. The Sun alſo in a ſettled courſe, obſerves its times of riſing and ſetting: whereas man, when he goes down to the Earth, cannot like the Sun come up again. So the fifth Verſe ſeems to be moſt naturally connected with the foregoing; and in like manner the ſixth and ſeventh Verſes are to be expounded. There are many Interpreters indeed, who look upon the things mentioned in theſe three Verſes, only as Emblems of the inſtability of all humane Affairs, and of the conſtant revolutions of the ſame miſeries: which cannot be hindred by any humane counſels, but will return after all the changes, whereby we think to mend our ſelves. Upon which ſenſe I have juſt touched in my Paraphraſe, but not followed it; becauſe it doth not ſeem to me to be the ſcope of theſe Verſes. In which man is repreſented, by four compariſons, with the Earth, the Sun, the Wind, and the Sea, to be more ſubject to Vanity than other things.
[e] V. 8. Which having thus illuſtrated, he proceeds here more particularly to conſider, what he had ſaid in general words (V. 3.) of mans vain endeavour to ſatisfie himſelf in worldly deſigns and contrivances: in which he is tired, but comes to no end of his deſires. How ſhould he? when his whole buſineſs here is only to do and to enjoy the very ſame things over and over again: as all men have done before us, and ſhall do after us, v. 9, 10, 11.
[f] V. 9. We may fanſie indeed, that we have found ſome new thing: but this conceit proceeds merely from our ignorance; as the Lord Bacon excellently diſcourſes in his firſt Book of the Advancement of Learning, Chap. 8.
Learning and Knowledge, ſaith he, takes away vain and exceſſive admiration; which is the very root of all weak counſels. For we admire things, either becauſe they are new, or becauſe they are great. As for Novelty, there is no man that conſiders things thoroughly, but hath this printed in his heart, There is nothing new under the Sun: nor can any man much admire a Puppet-Play, who doth but thruſt his head behind the Curtain, and ſeeth the Inſtruments and Wires whereby they are moved. As for Greatneſs, we may ſay as Alexander, who, after his great Conqueſts in Aſia, receiving Letters of ſome ſmall Fights or Skirmiſhes in Greece, at the taking of ſome Bridge, or Fort, was wont to tell his Friends, that it ſeemed to him, that they had ſent him News of the Battles of Homer's Frogs and Mice: ſo, certainly, if a man conſider the Univerſe, and the Fabrick of it, to him this Globe of Earth with the men upon it, and their buſie motions (excepting always the Divineneſs of Souls) will not ſeem much more conſiderable than an Hillock of Ants, whereon ſome creep up and down with their Corn, others with their Eggs, others empty: all about a very little heap of Duſt. And as Melancthon well obſerves, the ſame deſires, the ſame counſels, the ſame ends, the ſame cauſes of War, and calamitous events, return again: according to that of Thucydides, While humane nature continues what it is, the like miſchiefs will happen; ſometimes leſs, ſometimes more direfully.
[g] V. 12. Thus having confirmed his main Propoſitions, by ſuch general Arguments as reach to all things in this World; he proceeds here to a more particular proof of it, from his own proper experience. And deſigning (before he declared his own Opinion of the Chief Good, and by what means it may be attained) to confute the vain fancies of men about it; he reduces them, as I have ſhown in the Preface, to four Heads. And obſerving that ſome place it in knowledge, and curious inquiries into all manner of things, others in pleaſure, or in both theſe together; others in honour and power; others in riches and heaps of wealth; he begins with that which is the moſt plauſible. And demonſtrates, from the 13th Verſe to the end of this Chapter, how little ſatisfaction is to be found in the mere ſpeculation of things; though a man arrive at the higheſt degree of humane knowledge.
[h] V. 13, 14. Melancthon reſtrains theſe two Verſes, to political Wiſdom, in the Government of Kingdoms. Which gives men a double affliction: firſt, in that the Wiſeſt men often err in their counſels; and ſecondly, that events ſometimes do not anſwer to the beſt counſels that men can follow. Examples of the firſt are innumerable: Sometime they err through ambition, as Perdiccas, after Alexander; ſometime through a falſe opinion of Right, as Brutus; ſometime, through over-doing, buſie headedneſs and inquietude of mind, as Pericles; ſometime through anger, as Marius. And how many ways good counſels have miſcarried, it is too long here to remember: becauſe, it is here further obſervable, that ſometime more doubtfulneſs and uncertainty of mind what courſe to take, is as great a torment to the mind as any other. Thus Pompey was firſt perplexed in his Counſels, before he ſaw the diſaſtrous event of his Error. To conclude this; All Government is ſo full of cares, perplexities, and impediments, that it made Demoſthenes ſay, If he were to begin the World again, he would rather die than be promoted to it. And Aeſchines, that he was as glad when he was rid of his Office, as he would have been to be delivered from a mad Dog.
But this I take to be too ſtraight a ſenſe; though it be agreeable enough to what he ſaith v. 12. of his Kingly Office: and therefore I have inlarged it further in my Paraphraſe; though Greg. Nazianzen alſo ſeem to have a reſpect to it, when he thus interprets this place Orat. LIII. p. 750. That all things here below are poſſeſſed with an uncouth and execrable ſpirit (foreign) ſo that a man cannot comprehend how abſurdly all humane affairs are managed.
[i] V. 14. The word we tranſlate vexation is found only in this Book, and is capable of many ſenſes, all pertinent to the ſcope of this place. For according to the ſeveral Fountains from whence it may be derived; this Phraſe may be interpreted, either anguiſh of Spirit, or breaking of Spirit, or preying upon the Spirits; or (in another ſenſe of the word Spirit) feeding on the Wind or Air: none of which I have neglected in the Parapraſe.
[k] V. 15. The ſhortneſs of humane Wit, though never ſo much improved, is here repreſented by two things: firſt, that it cannot remove what is inconvenient; ſecondly, that it cannot ſupply what is deficient, in any condition of life. Or, as others will have it, the firſt part of the Verſe refers to the inability of man to rectifie that perverſeneſs (as the Hebrew word we tranſlate crooked ſignifies) which he finds in himſelf or others; and the latter part, to the ſmall reach oſ humane underſtanding, which can attain but a very imperfect knowledge, either of words, things, times, perſons or actions; as ſome branch out the innumerable Particulars of which we muſt be content to be ignorant.
[l] V. 16. I have not curiouſly diſtinguiſhed between Wiſdom and Knowledge, either in this Verſe, or in the 18th. But there may be this difference pertinently made, That Wiſdom directs a man, in the practical affairs of life, unto that which is moſt fit for his purpoſe, according to the various circumſtances wherein he may be. It conſiſts chiefly in a clear judgment, to diſcern our true intereſt, and the proper means to compaſs it: together with a preſentneſs of mind, to obviate ſudden accidents. And then Knowledge relates to the ſpeculation of natural things; in their cauſes and effects, their properties and differences, and ſuch like things.
[m] V. 17. Madneſs and Folly, may refer alſo to all the idle Speculations, wherein men of Parts and Wit, ſometimes not only imploy, but applaud themſelves, as the firſt of thoſe words ſeems to import in the Hebrew. This trifling ſort of Knowledge is notably deſcribed by Eraſmus, in his Praiſe of Folly.
[n] V. 18. If there be any difference to be made between Wiſdom and Knowledge, I have noted it above upon v. 16. As for grief and ſorrow, they may be thus diſtinguiſhed, That the former, in the Original word, includes in it indignation which is a ſharp anger mingled with ſcorn; to find either our Perſons and Counſels contemned, or our Projects and well laid Deſigns defeated. Such as was in Achitophel; whoſe penetrating Wit made his rage the greater, to ſee his judicious advice rejected, and the whole Conſpiracy utterly diſappointed. The other word (ſorrow) properly denotes an extreme great trouble and ſickneſs of mind; and is ſometimes applied to pains in the Body: which is the effect too frequently of overhard ſtudy Melancthon underſtands the whole Verſe (as he did v. 13, 14.) of the trouble that wiſe men have, when they are intruſted with Government, to ſee the confuſions, errors, vices and calamities of Mankind. And their afflictions are the greater, becauſe they are not only more ſenſible than other men of preſent evils, but foreſee by the preſent thoſe that are future: and therefore are tormented with a ſore pain and grief, both for what they feel and for what they fear. For they know, that from the firſt diſorders, there commonly follow greater confuſions: as when Pericles had once ſtirred up a War, there followed the deſtruction of almoſt all the great Cities of Greece. And it is too truly ſaid by Pindar, that it is eaſie for any body to diſturb a City; but God alone can reſtore peace unto it.
This I take to be too limited a ſenſe; but it is no ſmall trouble to a wiſe and prudent perſon, as Corranus excellently expreſſes it, to behold the miſerable diſorders and confuſions of humane affairs. For how is it poſſible to avoid it, nay how can a man chuſe but be filled with indignation, to ſee Juſtice, Equity, Probity, Fidelity, Integrity and Conſtancy, and all other ſuch like Vertues ſlighted and diſregarded by mankind; and on the contrary, Injuſtice, Baſeneſs, Perfidiouſneſs, Flattery, and ſuch like Vices, poſſeſs the World, and carry all before them? Or what man can, without vexation, obſerve the prepoſterous judgment of mankind, which magnifies thoſe things, that are not only vain but hurtful and pernicious; and not only contemn but hate thoſe things, which are truly good for them; nay, alone deſirable: No man can either be wiſe alone to himſelf, in ſuch a multitude of Fools and mad men, without the greateſt grief and indignation: nor can be accommodate himſelf, with an equal mind, to the dotages of the common people; when he ſees that which is better.
I ſhall conclude this Chapter with the Lord Bacon's Obſervation, concerning this anxiety of ſpirit which ariſeth out of Knowledge; in the beginning of his Book of the Advancement of Learning.
Solomon, ſaith he, doth not paſs this cenſure abſolutely upon Wiſdom and Knowledge, but only ſets forth the true Bounds, wherein humane knowledge is to be circumſcribed: which if we do not obſerve, it will prove very troubleſome to us and others. And thoſe limitations are three. Firſt, That we do not ſo place our felicity in Knowledge, as to forget our mortality. Secondly, That we uſe not our Knowledge to beget anxiety, but repoſe and contentment of mind: and Thirdly, That we do not preſume by the contemplation of Nature, to think our ſelves able to comprehend the Myſteries of God. The firſt and the laſt of theſe are plain enough; and therefore I ſhall only note what he ſaith of the ſecond: that it is certain, no anxiety or perturbation of mind ariſeth from Knowledge, but by mere accident. For all Knowledge, and Admiration (which is the Seed of Knowledge) is pleaſant in it ſelf: but when we fall to frame Concluſions from thence, which, obliquely applied to our own affairs, beget either weak fears, or immoderate deſires, then ariſeth that torment and trouble of mind, whereof Solomon here ſpeaketh. For then Knowledge is no longer dry light, (which Heraclitus was wont to ſay was the beſt) but moiſt light, ſteeped and infuſed in the humours of the affections.
As for that Expoſition which ſome have given of theſe words, that he increaſeth the number of his ſtripes (or wounds) who increaſeth knowledge; but makes no uſe of it, nor takes care that his obedience riſe in ſome good proportion with it; it is not the proper ſenſe of the place, but rather an accommodation of the words to another profitable purpoſe.